 So good evening everyone, warm welcome from the ANU Center for Arab and Islamic Studies and from our partner, the Near East Policy Forum with whom we are organizing this panel. I'm Karima Jir and I'm the director of the center and I have my co-host tonight, Samia Akin, who is the co-founder of the Near East Policy Forum. The Australian National University acknowledges, celebrates and pays our respect to the non-violent number of people of the Cambrian region and to all First Nations, Australians, on whose traditional land we meet and work and whose culture are among all this continuing culture in human history. Now the researchers of Taliban after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan has plunged the country into another deep crisis. Afghans are facing the confluence of multiple crises, including dismal economic conditions, the Vietnam COVID-19 pandemic and the prospect of another or of civil war. Our panelists tonight who are leading practitioners and scholars from Afghanistan and Afghanistan will discuss these issues in more in depth. I will introduce them very, very briefly in the order in which they will be speaking. I will then ask them few questions each and I will open the ground for discussion. You can send your questions via the chat box or raise your hand during the Q&A time and ask them directly. Please mute your microphones and switch off your videos to maintain the quality of this panel. I'll start first but introducing our first panelist, Dr. Nea Matoba Ibrahimi, a lecturer in international relations at Latrobe University in Melbourne. He was published extensively on Afghanistan politics and history. He is the author of the Hazaras and the Afghan State Rebellion Exclusion and Struggle for Recognition published in 2017 and co-author of Afghanistan politics and economics in a globalist state. Our second speaker, Ms. Najiba Wazifadost, is one of the founding members for Global Refugee Network, Global Independent Refugee Women Leaders and Asia Pacific Network of Refugees. Najiba has been actively involved in the development of refugee networks at both regional and global level, focusing on bringing together a refugee-led organization to propose effective and sustainable refugee policy. She has received many medals for her activism and work in this area. Our third panelist is Professor Roger Kangas, who is the academic dean of the Middle East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the US Department of Defense located in Washington DC. His areas of research, teaching, and publication include the security, geopolitics, and politics of New Asia, specifically Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. Professor Kangas has been an advisor to the combatant command, NATO, ISAF, and various US government agencies on issues relating to Central and South Asia, Russia, and South Caucasus. Our next panelist is Ms. Diana Sayed, who is the chief executive officer of the Australian Muslim Women's Center for Human Rights. She joined the organization in 2019 as an international human rights lawyer with experience working in both Australia and the United States. She is the former campaign manager at Airfare Agenda and Senior Crisis Response Companion at Amnesty International Australia. She has worked as a lawyer, advocate, and campaigner for over a decade, and has believed the experience of being a visible Muslim woman of color in Australia as a former refugee from Afghanistan. And our last but not least panelist is our own Dr. Kenneth Roshanoff, who is a city lecturer in political science at the ANU Center for Arab and Islamic Studies. His main research and publications are on Central Asia and Eurasian politics and international relations, political history of the region and Islamic radicalism. Dr. Roshanoff has worked as an academic consultant on the World Bank-funded project in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. His most recent monograph published this year is timely and actually it anticipated the current crisis in Afghanistan. It's titled the Afghanistan Security Threat, Security Dilemmas for Central Asia and beyond. So thank you so much for all our panelists and we look forward to the discussion. I'll start with some questions to Nehmet who will kind of introduce or contextualize the debate for us. So Nehmet, what would a Taliban government look like and what policies will it pursue? Would it include coalition partners and minority groups with their vision of the so-called Sharia-based state besieged to their brutal rule of the 1990s or there are signs that they have evolved in their approach? And do you think resistant movement to Taliban led by Ahmad Masrood will lead to another civil war in the country? Thank you Nehmet. Thank you Karima and thank you colleagues at the Center for Arab Islamic Studies in the Center, the nearest policy forum for organizing this event. Well, I think to answer those questions I think I would like to begin by saying that there are a lot that we don't know about Afghanistan and what will be likely happening in the future. But there are quite a few things that we already know that may likely point to the future of that country over the coming months and years. Looking with I think it's important to keep in mind that the Taliban has won the fight in Afghanistan. They have won it militarily. They have seized control of Afghanistan. And that military onslaught that they led over recent weeks to take control of Afghanistan came after several attempts to negotiate a peace settlement with the Taliban in Doha and also other negotiation attempts around Afghanistan in recent months and years. And we also know more generally that the Taliban is subscribing to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. That is in my view, a totalitarian form of ideology, which is used by the group to impose its will on all aspects of the Afghan life, you know politics, the economy and society and it is in the international relations. You know, as to whether the Taliban will be forming an inclusive government as to whether they are ready to embrace some of the changes that have taken place in Afghanistan over the past 20 years. I think there are serious questions. You're serious suspicions to be maintained. I think at this stage. The reason is because over the past few months and years we have seen there have been active public relations campaign that for large by the Taliban, they have used various platforms to tell a story to the world that the world would like to hear at this stage. That there is a new Taliban that has learned its lesson from the past, and it is ready to embrace an inclusive government in Afghanistan. However, I think, you know, some of those statements and rhetoric by the Taliban must also be evaluated and judged on the base of its behavior in the ground in Afghanistan. And what we are seeing is that there's a huge mismatch between what the Taliban say publicly and what it is members of groups and militias behave in Afghanistan locally. Right now, I think, you know, to describe the mood in Afghanistan, you know, for it is 35 million population. And I think it is one of fear, terror and hunger. We have seen that the Palestinians in the middle of a really acute humanitarian crisis. You know, we have known from the UN and other humanitarian agencies that they are up to 18 million population who need some form of humanitarian support now. And 14 million are at the moment requiring some food assistance. You know, they are a danger of hunger. And on the ground that the Taliban have also been going after people that have a report of somebody exclusions, extra judicial killings, knocks on doors of people who work with the government, journalists and some society groups. So I think there is a lot of mismatch between what we are hearing from the Taliban's leadership, the political Taliban and the behavior of it is more militant military groups on the ground. And these are, you know, important considerations to keep in mind, especially in the context of the question you asked about Panjshir and the resistance led by Ahmad Massoud. I think having seen the group showing, not showing any meaningful willingness to negotiate a peace process in Doha for so many years. They have been very skeptical of the negotiation that was recently conducted between members of the Taliban and the resistance that was launched in Panjshir. In fact, from what we are hearing is that currently Panjshir and the areas under the control are currently cut off from the rest of the world. There's very little information coming out because the Taliban cut the telephone lines and the internet for the people who are living in that region. But we are seeing that there have been some attempts by the Taliban to infiltrate into the valley forcefully and they haven't pushed back in recent days. So I think, you know, some of those resistance are also indicative of the fact that there are a lot of people who are really concerned and they are suspicion of the attention and the capability of the Taliban to engage in any meaningful dialogue. I know that there have been some negotiations between the Taliban in the city of Kandahar in recent days. For the past three days there was some negotiation. And some of the members of the group have announced that they will be forming a new government announcing a new government. Given the political and military situation in Afghanistan at the moment, I think the Taliban do not really have a strong incentive to make any meaningful concessions to other groups. We know former President Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah and other individuals like them, they have been engaging in some negotiation with the Taliban in recent months. But what I'm gathering from the ground is that a lot of those negotiations do not involve any substantive issues other than some of those reconciliation moods that have been met by the Taliban more publicly as well. So I think, you know, just to sum it up, I think there are a lot of questions and challenges that remain. And I think in my view, the peace in Afghanistan will involve multiple layers. One is important questions to be asked with the peace within the jihadist movement in that country in that region. There are tensions and conflict between the Taliban, the local affiliate of the Islamic State, Islamic-led Khorasan. And there are also a lot of factions within the Taliban, whether they will agree on a common inclusive government. I think there are a lot of questions to be asked there. And there's also a lot of questions to be asked whether the Taliban have a willingness and capacity. Another thing that is quite important as well here, to embrace Afghanistan's diverse political groups as well as ethylengivistic groups. Here I think I would like to briefly highlight is there are some groups who really stand to lose from the institution of the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban of the 1990s. On the top of the list, I think the Taliban as a year interpretive ideology is really amounting to what I believe is a general apartheid. And we have seen some evidence of that already from some of the ceremonies and public meetings of the Taliban are held in places like Kabul. Second, I think the Hazaras and the Shias, they have seen the wars of the Taliban in the 1990s and I think there's a lot of fear that some of those atrocities and persecutions will be reinstituted by the Taliban towards the Hazaras as well. And Afghans, more generally the liberal Afghans, who were by the way quite significant in number, you know, there are some people who might see Afghanistan as a very traditional conservative society, but I, you know, I see there's a very large section of Afghans society who embrace global values, connection with the rest of the world, and who are impacted by the force of globalization. And I think these are the people who stand to lose the most across Afghanistan in the cities as well as the countryside. So I would like to just sum it up here. I think there's some we don't know about the intentions and willingness. I think it will be a lot clearer what was a declarative government, but it's a lot that we don't know about the intention and capability to government policy. Thank you. Thank you so much, Nehmet. That was great. Fantastic introduction to the discussion. We'll come back to you. Najiba, can I ask you what's the role of Asia Pacific network of refugees, which you are leading and their involvement on the ground with Afghan women and girls. And what is the situation of refugees crossing the borders to Pakistan and Iran. I mean, we heard a lot about the shortages of humanitarian assistance and Nehmet was just speaking about that earlier. Can you tell us about the role of the UN refugee agency and other international actors in the Afghan crisis, like for example Australia. Thank you very much, Karima. I would love to start by acknowledging the tradition of the land on which spiritual meeting taking place and pay my respect to the elders both past and present. And also thank you, Karima and Anna University for actually having me as one of the speakers for tonight. So just quickly to give you a bit of background on APNO, the Asia Pacific network of refugees. It is the only refugee network across the Asia region, which established in the year of 2018. Our objective is really to build a sustainable and inclusive network for refugee organizations in the Asia Pacific regions. And it's really about setting the regional agenda for refugee policy that draws on the collective voices of lived experience to influence stakeholders and decision making priorities, as well as supporting the development of stronger national refugee-led structures that can influence national policy reform. So this is just to give you a brief overview of who we are and what we are right now. But if we are to go back again to the context of Afghanistan, I think we all know Afghanistan right now is sitting at a very dangerous point. Ahead lies a tragically intertwined set of crisis, you know, an increasingly brutal conflict combined with an acute humanitarian situation and multiplying human right abuses. And the rapid retreat of U.S. soldiers from Afghanistan and the recent fall of Taliban to the Taliban has left the country torn apart. And we just heard from Dr. Neymet along that, you know, and it's people in danger. Over the past few days, again, I'm sure most of the participants in this call knows that we have been hearing the cries of Afghans, millions of Afghans, their screams for support and help echoes from all corners of the country. These sounds are quite actually familiar to me because my country has been in a state of war for so long for many decades, to be honest. And this same pain was what forced me and my family to live on a boat many years ago and to seek refuge in Australia. At the refugee again, due to the actions of the Taliban, I know with devastating certainty that my country now faces continued sufferings that will leave thousands of refugees in its wake. So as the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates, many Afghan and again I have to say, especially women and girls and human right defenders face the worst security situation ever of their lifetime. On the ground, especially away from Kabul and its provinces across Afghanistan, women and girls are really being denied access to a lot of things and that includes education, employment, with its freedom of movement. Many human right defenders are being shot in the streets. What we're hearing again that Afghans are really facing this coming darkness with a sense of being abandoned by a regional and international community. They've been expecting far greater engagement and visible support from the international community. I strongly think and believe that the root causes of instability that has gripped Afghanistan for decades really goes back to lack of accountability, you know, of credible governance and health and education needs, which still exists today. And as I just mentioned, you know, for us in Africa, one of the major concern has been the safety of women and girls and other human right defenders. You know, if we are to explain, you know, the situation for everyone in the country, I would say, you know, and one of the foremost target when it comes to the Taliban, it is women and girls. It is not Taliban practice to talk to women about peace. It is not, you know, Taliban's practice to allow women to go and have access to their job. A lot of women that we speak to in AAPNOR have already described to us that they have lost hope, you know, for peace and stability. And many of these women have told us that they're finding themselves again as prisoners of their own gender. We've been speaking to outspoken women rights activists, women politicians and the countless women leaders who are all basically equating for support and telling us how they've been facing the fight of their lives. Women are being told to stay in their homes unless they're accompanied by male relatives. Women are forcibly being asked to marry the Taliban fighters and many, many other things, you know. And in AAPNOR, in the past two weeks, we've been able to actually launch an Afghan crisis hotline where we are receiving calls directly from Afghanistan and also from those Afghans that have crossed the border to Iran. And in all of this vast amount of calls, and we are talking about 50 to 100 calls a day that's coming to us here in Australia. And all of these calls are reporting to us about executions, about beatings, about clam towns, you know, on media and on everything basically. They've been reporting to us about the Taliban's door-to-door searches, you know. They've been telling us about targeted killings which involves women, the looting in the capital. We've also been hearing so much, you know, through these phone calls around how hospitals and schools and thousands of homes being attacked. And again, all roads leading to and going out of the cities are closed by the Taliban. Hospitals have nearly reached their full capacity and can no longer accept patients. The available food supply in the city is vastly diminishing, you know. And we've been hearing so much of people actually calling AAPNOR's door and asking for emergency relief. And some women, in fact, you know, have been subscribing to us in this crisis helpline and sending us email and saying, you know, in fact, before we actually dial in the hands of the Taliban, we can also dial off starvation, you know. So we've seen that, you know, all the international forces, whether it's humanitarian or development actors, they have left people on their own, you know. It is not only the situation of Kabul Airport that's devastating. We are talking about millions of other people who still haven't been able to manage any kind of evacuation, which is important to focus on. So for us, I mean, as an immediate support, as an immediate response to all of these that we are hearing, we want to do our part. Obviously, we want to make sure that, you know, to avoid any rates that can, you know, happen by the Taliban's. We want to make sure that girls are still able to go to schools. We want to make sure that, you know, those that are trying to flee violence and persecution and going to the borders doesn't necessarily face the coast borders, you know. And again, we've been hearing of families and children that have tried to cross the border to Iran, but they've been turned back. We've been hearing about families and children that have tried to go to the Pakistan and have gone through almost 19 to 20 of Taliban checkpoints and basically facing, you know, death again and again and again. You know, so it is really about how do we get international community to show much more solidarity and ensuring that those borders remain open. So it allows people to flee persecution. It allows people to flee violence, you know. And when we talk about, you know, situations such as these, there are only a few things that we've been able to do in relation to all of these. So as a refugee organization in the region, as I mentioned, what we've been trying to do is first to advocate our international community, whether it's Canada that's, you know, talking about 20,000 intake, whether it's Australia talking about 3000, whether it's Germany about 10,000 and so on. Our role, you know, has been to ensure that in all of those, you know, commitments, we ensure that, you know, women and girls are prioritized. Because again, when we look at the situation in Kabul, when we look at the numbers of people that have been able to evacuate through those planes, you know, we will see that there is a very small number of women and girls that have been able to make it through. Just today we received, sorry, yesterday we received another five calls through our crisis helpline and women are actually asking us to trace where their children are because they've been forced to pass on their children to the guards over the fence. They've been pushing their children to get into the gate to the airport, and they have no idea about their whereabouts of their children. So this is quite devastating situation that we're talking about. So it has been very difficult for us in APNOL, and we've been trying to respond to this in several ways. One is that we've been writing to our minister of foreign affairs here and ensuring that our minister is very well aware of the situation of women and girls in particular. At the same time, we've been looking at ways of, you know, supporting the Afghanistan crisis helpline, which is basically providing people over the line mental health support as well as providing legal support. What we've done actually called upon 230 law firms across the globe and asking these law firms to support, you know, those that are coming to our door, you know, in supporting their application to find some protection pathways. Even though it is very limited, we still ask, you know, those law firms to do what they can. And lastly, we've realized that, you know, there's so much of something that we all know, the humanitarian resources on the ground is shrinking. You know, the country basically is left shut down. There's no jobs, there's no food, there's nothing that people can actually survive on. So what we've been doing in the past two weeks, you know, luckily, we've been able to use our intraditional local partners on the ground and deliver almost 200 food packages so far to 200 displaced families in Kabul. And from the kind of information that we've received from the ground is that, you know, while delivering these food packages to those families, it's not only about delivering emergency relief, but it's also about, you know, ensuring that our stuff on the ground has had, you know, that mental health skills to also support those women and girls who have been releasing, you know, a lot of tears and wounds around, you know, the death of family members, death of spouse or missing of children and so on. So we've been trying not to only provide the emergency relief at the same time, trying to bring some hope and confidence. I think that's so important when we talk about emergency situation. We are trying to build again, you know, in people's lives, some sort of hope and confidence where they can survive, you know, where they can actually get to a next point of establishing safety, because many are still waiting, you know, they're still waiting what the international community is going to do. The US has lived after 20 years, you know, and that itself has been quite frightening for our community back in home, as well as the diaspora here in Australia. So this is what we've been doing as a community, but I think, you know, there's much more commitment that's needed from, you know, important international actors such as UN agencies, such as UNHCR. We all know in December 2018, the international community came together to adopt the global compacts on refugees, which was really about, you know, committing to forge a stronger, fairer response to large refugee movements. This tragedy that is unfolding in Afghanistan is an existential test of the global compacts on refugees, and so far I have to say the global compacts on refugees is failing, you know. This failure is notably evident across the international response to Afghanistan. Words of condemnation or concerns will not stop Afghans being killed, tortured or repressed. But now when Afghans need protection more than ever, you know, neighboring countries should and must respond to this crisis, you know, by having their borders open, by ensuring that Afghans that need protection are able to cross. Even the countries that have been more vocally receptive to fleeing Afghans have said no caps, again, on the numbers of refugees allowed into the country, as I just mentioned earlier, like Canada, 20,000, Australia, 3,000, I'm sure there's so much more Australia can do. So this distressing context is something of which we are all aware, but despite the challenges, I think the credible policy options available to the international community to help protect Afghans and secure safe passages for those that seek refuge and hold again the new power in Kabul to account. It is such leaderships that change the national act is be it at the UN Security Council or the G7 have so far failed to uphold. You know, I fear that the consequences of inaction will be felt far beyond Afghanistan's borders as underlying norms and democratic values we collectively believe in are at stake, you know, we need action. And I'm talking about action that is now. It is again this. So it is really against this whole background that we in AFNOR have been urging not only to governments but also to UNHCR to take concrete steps to lead the global response to support for civil displaced Afghans and really ensure that the principles of responsibility sharing and again international unity enshrined in the GCR and the global complex on refugees are upheld. We've, we've been really pushing not only governments to expand the resettlement in ensuring that more, you know, Afghans are actually evacuated or more Afghans are now resettled into countries. We've also asked UNHCR to play their role and and and first and mostly you know to coordinate a multi-stakeholder response to the Afghan conflict. This will really help ease pressure on the host countries as well as calling upon them on the UN Security Council to pass a resolution calling for multilateral coordinated support for Afghan refugees. And lastly, you know, something that we've been working on and asking UNHCR to do the same is to meaningfully engage refugees, especially Afghan refugees in designing the UNHCR response to the Afghan crisis. And similarly, I think in Australia with my last comment that I would like to conclude is that, you know, if there is little that we can do, you know, in the country itself, but there's so much more that we can do here in the country. We have, you know, hundreds of Afghans that are now seeking asylum in the country, hundreds of Afghans that have lived in limbo and uncertainty for years and haven't had the chance to reunite with their families. The diaspora has been crying and losing hope that they are probably no longer able to see their families ever again. Some already lost families, you know, so how can Australia ensure that they do their moral obligation in this? You know, how are they going to ensure these families that have spent years of uncertainty and limbo is actually being given some sort of hope. And I think with that, it's not too difficult to give them indefinite protection. You know, so again, it's a resettlement providing, you know, offshore resettlement is one option, but then the second option is even more easier. You know, we have people in our land right now that are coming from the same country that we already have labelled as a country of, you know, one of the most dangerous country on earth. So I think that this is the least that the Australian government could do right now as well. And I'll leave it there. Thank you, Karen. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Najiba. These are extremely important points. And we'll go back to that in the discussion. And now, Roger, we've heard a lot of theorising about the repercussions of the US with the drone from Afghanistan. Please, can you talk to us a bit about that and tell us whether you think the US with the drone is final, complete, or will Washington continue to be present on the scene in an offshore manner. And do you think the Taliban want or have the capacity to forestall the resurgence of international terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and what will happen to the regional balance of power, how true, and the forecast of China moving into Afghanistan. Okay. First of all, I want to thank the organizers today. It's an absolute pleasure to join this panel and, you know, hearing the comments of the first two speakers. You know, I'm glad we're emphasizing the seriousness of this topic and the seriousness of the situation in Afghanistan and of the people of Afghanistan. Okay. It's in this light that, you know, I'll make my comments. You know, these are my own views and kind of observations as I've looked at this country, you know, off and on for almost 30 years. And seeing the rise of the Taliban the first time, their departure in 2001, and of course their return now. And so, you know, when asked, you know, is the US withdrawal final and complete, which is an excellent question. You know, we just have to go to what President Biden said a couple days ago, and it sums it up well. In his opinion, and this would, this reflects the US administration as it is. You know, we're done with forever wars, as you know, as has been noted a number of times with spending, you know, lives and money on operations that are doomed to fail. Now, the post-mortem of the US, and I would also say NATO mission in Afghanistan, has yet to be written. You know, there are a lot of commentaries. You know, we're all seeing this in fact, you know, discussions like this are important. And we're working our way through, you know, okay, what happened? Why did this fail? Why did this work or not work, etc. But like any inflection point in histories, and I do say we need to see August 2021 as an inflection point in US sort of history in the region, you know, it's going to take some time to figure this out. So my response is simple. Yeah, at present it is final and complete. You know, the US is rethinking its presence in surrounding states as well, not just Afghanistan, but in the Middle East and other parts of the world. And it may be hard to hear, but when we look at US security priorities, Afghanistan is going to quickly fall out of this top list. And you see relations with Europe, with East Asia, with allies and partners, you know, Australia remaining high on the list. And could Afghanistan fall in that category of countries that were at one point important for the US, but then disappear or become less important, you know, absolutely this can pass. Think of Vietnam, think of Nicaragua, think of Lebanon, think of Somalia. And yes, we're going to see this with Iraq and Syria, as well as Afghanistan. Americans today are seized with other priorities and save a specific cadre of experts and interested parties. You know, those of us who do have an interest in this part of the world, we may find it less important. However, it's not to say it will disappear and before the news gets so bad. Because I do think personally that Afghanistan is going to be important for the US and how it relates with Pakistan, with India, with Iran, Russia, the Central Asian states, China, this gets to your point. Is this an offshore capacity? Perhaps. We're going to, we have to work our way through that. And my hunch is when we do, it will be through multilateral structures, whether through NATO, the so-called Quad or other organizations that will be important. Because, again, when we look at the country, governance and security now rests on the shoulders of the Taliban. And, you know, do they have the capacity to actually manage the state? And I think the previous speakers highlighted very well some of the initial concerns we have. I would add on to that, you know, they fought to run the country. Now they have it for a second time. But, you know, they could be ineffective in providing services to the population. And there could be ineffective in providing security for the country as a whole. You know, do they have the manpower, the infrastructure, the resources, the administrative skills? And do they have the popular support to run the country? I fear that these are all going to be challenges for the country. And could we see the Taliban as they were in 1990 with better technology today? You know, absolutely. This talk of a new and improved or reformed Taliban. I guess I'm a bit of a skeptic. I need to wait and see how this goes. And what this does is it offers opportunities for others. Al Qaeda is still linked with the Taliban. And other terrorist groups still work with them. Islamic State Khorasan province, an adversary, is going to find ways to challenge the Taliban. We saw this with the tragic bombing at the airport the other day. And expect to see this continue in the region. You know, and I think this will be a struggle for that administration and how they work with the international community is, I think, still an unanswered question. I think they will find it difficult to reach out, particularly because they have such clear views of how they see their rule. And I should say how they see the rest of us as less important. And then just so lastly, a few comments about the regional balance of power. You know, I guess it's inevitable question is what next, right? I mean, we're seeing celebratory moments in Afghanistan itself in terms of parades of American weaponry or flags. At least I should say Taliban sponsored parades. I agree with our previous speakers. There's also a lot of fear, concern and trepidation in the country. And I hear this as well from friends within Afghanistan. But to the point of the international actors, the Ghani government is out. The Western supported administration is out. Does this mean the West is out? Are we looking at a new normal here where the regional dynamics are going to change? I'd have to ask what is Iran going to do as an immediate neighbor when they see the challenges in the Hazara region or in Heran? Will they become more engaged? Will Turkey want to continue to play a role in the country? You know, providing airport security and economic engagement in Kabul and making comments about international assistance. Could Turkey be a lead state? What about the Gulf country, Saudi Arabia in particular, who have the resources to put into Afghanistan? I kind of look at these as countries to watch. As well as Russia and China who will engage with Afghanistan. But is it more as a holding or hedging pattern to not have any threats or challenges from that country go into theirs or adversely affect them? People in the room here can correct me if I'm wrong. But I right now have nine embassies that are open for business in Kabul and are working to an extent with the Taliban. Russia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and China. Saudi Arabia among these has signed on to the international agreement, I should say international petition to encourage the Taliban to allow people to leave the country. Let's see if others sign on to that and make this happen again to what the previous speaker said. So just in a few seconds to finalize, you know, the question does come up, particularly in the US is China now going to step in. China's had 20 years to play a bigger role and they've played a limited role. And I'm going to argue that they'll probably continue to do the same because the security concerns emanating from Afghanistan, particularly with an administration they're not too keen on, is going to perhaps preclude them from wanting to engage in a stronger economic basis. A lot more to be said, but I'll turn it back over to you and to the next speakers as well and I look forward to the questions and discussion. Thank you. Thank you, Roger. This is really, really interesting and I think there will be a lot of space for discussion in the Q&A. If I may ask you please about the question of minorities and refugees again. I mean, we've heard a lot of, I mean the views of the three previous panelist is that the Taliban basically have not changed much. But going back to the refugees, who is actually trying to flee? In the images we see in the media is usually the Orbanite Afghan via Kabul airport, but we don't get to hear about the mass oxydest from rural areas that Najiba mentioned earlier. And what about the situation of minorities targeted before the Taliban? And also what do women activists inside say on the situation as strategies of survival for women? And again, what is the Taliban stance on foreign NGOs and advocacy groups operating in Afghanistan? Thank you, Karima. And thank you to everyone, my fellow Afghans on the panel. Salams. Thank you, Dr. Niamah Tula. That was really informative. I feel like I'm learning so much from you all. I haven't been in an academic space for a while. I work sort of outside that in terms of campaigning, community organizing, direct service work. And as you mentioned, like my former life as a lawyer, so I haven't really been as much involved in the sort of academia as on Afghanistan, particularly, I've actually, and Sammy can testify, I've sort of steered clear of working directly in Afghanistan or on it because it just is too close and I find it quite triggering of the trauma that continues to live on in people who are refugees in the diaspora community and those who have been directly affected. Before I start, I'd also like to acknowledge I'm calling in from Nam here on the lands of the Rurundri people of the Kulin nations to and to acknowledge elders past and present and that the lands that went or virtually meeting on the unceded stolen lands of the First Nations communities. And that actually informs a lot of my advocacy and campaigning, sort of locating myself, my family, my community, my ancestry here in so called Australia, understanding that my citizenship here is not conditional on my silence and that the fact that I've also been forcibly displaced from my ancestral homes in Afghanistan, my family are all from Herat. We came out through different migration journeys as diaspora and we happened to end up in Australia. And yeah, that's a huge question to unpack Karima about what's going on back in Afghanistan. I felt like when Najiba and Dr Neyama Talawa talking, I was like, they've got it covered. Like why am I even on this panel? You guys are experts, real leaders in the space don't need anyone here to add anything else. But I will talk a bit about what we're doing here in Australia in terms of local organizing. I think Najiba covered sort of what's going on with women in Afghanistan really well. And, you know, not there's not one single narrative about the Afghan experience and Dr Amin, Professor Amin Saikal really talks about the Afghan experience being a bit of a mosaic. Like we're all from different backgrounds, different ethnic groups, a minority from different areas around Afghanistan. But as your first question about the focus on Kabul airport, you know, I've been getting calls and people from all over Afghanistan, it's been from it hasn't just been people trying to flee Kabul and people are willing to travel to get what were during the evacuations were willing to actually travel to Kabul if that meant some sort of chance at safety. So there was a lot of focus on Kabul airport, given the sort of ways that the Taliban were sort of gathering force and taking over all of those cities. And for us, when we saw a head up full and a smile on sort of get captured and taken. I think that for us was a real big indicator that it was a matter of time that the whole country fell but we've kind of already gotten that analysis, the political analysis on that. And what we can do here in Australia, I think that there is a lot of sort of hand wringing and feelings of overwhelm around, you know, with communities that are at threat absolutely women and children 100% other minorities. And I can often talk about the LGBTQI community in Afghanistan and I'm really happy to see that kind of getting a bit of cut through in petitions and go fund me campaigns. The humanitarian aid situation is so dire, and it has compounding factors in terms of the Western Union's closing the banks closing, but a lot of foreign aid money is not actually being able to be distributed and dispersed so when we've been run fundraising and millions has been raised, we're actually at a bit of a standstill as to how to get that money distributed through aid networks and it's going through sort of peer to peer channels at the moment, but it's just not enough. And I think that's, that's a point that was also mentioned by the previous speaker in terms of what next, how will that be distributed and what you said about, you know, people aren't going to die at the hands of the Taliban they'll die from salvation and the countries, you know, we can't forget that they're also battling global pandemic No one's talking about COVID-19 and talking, you know, looking at all those images of people sort of crammed into some of those airplanes the whole time I was watching that I was just like horrified because I haven't seen I'm in lockdown calling in from lockdown Melbourne and I was just like, wow, I'm so worried about people, you know, going to safety what does that mean for them coming and arriving in third countries and settlement and in going into hotel quarantine, particularly if they're coming to Australia, the trauma that they're experiencing and that sort of, you know, having to battle multiple fronts is just really overwhelming. But from an Australian perspective, the diaspora has been incredible. And of course, like, we can't get the same experiences of those who have been trying to flee the country and I would never sort of minimize or try and do a comparison. But we've mobilized really quickly and it's been amazing to see how organized how much how many community leaders have come together on this, how well connected and entrepreneurial and just incredible people have been and calling their MPs signing on to open letters and petition utilizing the same social media channels that we saw last year with Black Lives Matter, the Palestine sort of unrest we saw earlier this year, you know, even just around Aboriginal depths and custody like we actually understand now that organizing and building collective movements does not eventuate in a collective movement for change at a governmental level. They're watching, they're listening, their policymakers are on social media. They're watching all of our media appearances, they're hearing the MPs that are calling your local MPs. They are scrambling right now to sort of appease their electorates. You know, we can't forget that the first waves of Afghan refugees that came to this country in the 80s, you know, their children of those are first refugees are here now who are educated who have access to have, you know, financial contributions to make and voices to be heard that can't be ignored anymore. And so that's also something that I feel has really shifted, you know, we're coming up to an election year as well so there's a lot riding on this for the government to act. We've got precedents in this country even, you know, it's actually a bit insulting the 3000 number within the humanitarian it's already their obligation under the humanitarian intake of 13,750 which was reduced already from 18750. And in 2020 of the 13750 8000 spots weren't actually taken up because of the travel restrictions to Australia. So we're actually falling behind on our existing commitments to bring people to Australia. And under this quarantine, the guys of quarantine and having, you know, the pandemic is sort of like, it's not an excuse anymore and we actually can't accept that at face value given the dire nature of what's going on. Australia was the first country to join up to the US led coalition has been shoulder to shoulder with the US led coalition forces in Afghanistan. And what has been lost in this debate. And I was very sensitive. I'm very mindful that you know the Afghan experience and our traumas, you know, in a war that we didn't choose sometimes gets drowned out and sidelined. And I know that a lot of sensitivities with the veteran community here in Australia, but we can't overlook the fact that there was an extensive Brereton inquiry done in November 2020. Detailing and outlining damning allegations of war crimes that the Australian Defense Force committed in Afghanistan during the period 2016 to 2000. And must have been when we last year I can't recall the exact date but it was outlining those very specifically around the culture and impunity and not and to date not one person has been held to account for these allegations of war crimes. Now we actually have to be debating all of these and the role that Australia play the role of the ADF how we were there shoulder to shoulder with the US. And we can blame Trump for the negotiating the so-called peace deals in Doha with the Taliban. We can blame Biden for the shambolic extra strategy that frankly I don't think anyone could have predicted the last few weeks. And some of the highest political pundits in the State Department have spoken to me as I worked in Washington DC for a number of years that even they were taken by surprise taken by surprise. So all of these things sort of marrying up. We can't forget that in Australia, even as a middle power, we need to be putting pressure on our government. The diaspora communities have mobilized. We have a role. We have a responsibility. We have to maintain pressure 3000 within an existing amount is not enough. We should be going hard 20,000. You know, also we can't forget that there is a large community here who are on TPV temporary protection visas and chefs who actually can't bring their family out. They don't have a pathway to permanent protection to live your life in limbo like that is just so unconscionable to me. So there are lots of things that Australia could do to remove the bureaucratic red tape if there is enough political will and momentum behind them. And I'm just so worried as a campaigner working in this space. It's either Yemen, Palestine, Syria, Iraq. It's got some cache this week, but it won't next week. So Afghanistan is something that has had a long protracted era, decades and decades of conflict. And it gets very quickly forgotten about and the war and the withdrawal might be over for the US and Australia and other allies, but it's not over for us and not for our families. And I just want to bring that message home again and again as people who are living in the diaspora as Afghan Australians as Australians. We need your ally ship. We need your support. Please be amplifying the voices of Afghans and centering our experiences and the veteran community actually sided with us. They're behind us. I've had so many people from the veteran community coming out and supporting Afghans and saying, we feel you, we see you, we understand, and we are so sorry, how can we help? So it isn't an either or situation. It's not Afghans versus veterans. It's not Afghans versus this or that. Actually, all of us and our collective humanity and history would judge and we're at a really important impasse right now and we can't let this opportunity slide irrespective of what else happens in Afghanistan. I really want Australia to actually play a really important role right now. Thank you. Thank you, Diana. I'm sure we'll go back to the question of solidarity, particularly what we've seen on transnational solidarity with Afghanistan. We'll go back to that in the Q&A, but now, Kirill, can we please go back to the regional player and focus on Central Asia and Russia. When do you think the Central Asian republics become involved in internal affairs in Afghanistan, for example, by supporting the revival of Northern Alliance and Tajik, Osbek militias fighting for the Taliban? And do you think, or what may happen to the U.S.-sponsored project of regional activity in Afghanistan to Central Asia? And what would Russia do? Do you think it will recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban? And also, I know Roger and Nehama touched on the issue of other regional players. But can you please talk us through the role of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey? Thank you. Thanks, Karima. I think I have to take a rain check on Turkey and Iran. It's not my catalogue fish. We can discuss it in a general round of questions and answers. And also, I'm afraid after such passionate and erudite talking points by my colleagues, I'm going to be a decidedly wet blanket when I talk about Central Asia and its response to Afghanistan and what it means for Afghanistan's future. Because it's pretty obvious to me that in Central Asia, as Roger put it, just moving from one kind of abnormal to another kind of abnormal in Afghanistan, they didn't really pay much attention to internal politics in Afghanistan under Afghani. Central Asians are not going to be involved line who can sink in Afghan internal politics now. There's absolutely no way of this happening. Also, of course, the Central Asians would much rather prefer Afghanistan existed 7000 kilometers away, but their neighbors, they have to articulate some kind of policy and response to what is going on in Afghanistan. And so far, I'd say the response has been a mix of very cynical pragmatism as in we don't really care who's in charge in Afghanistan. So long as our selfish national interests are preserved and met, we shall not feel any kind of empathy or, as Diana said, we're not going to wring hands about the colossal human tragedy that is unfolding in Afghanistan. And the second prong of Central Asians approach is simply building a fortified perimeter with Afghanistan. And this is not something that is happening right now. This has been in the making for at least 10 years after the United States announced the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan. So thus, the Central Asians today are feeling pretty much assured that they can carry any military threat and the incursion from Afghanistan. Suffice it to mention that this was a big fear really apocalyptic fear back in 1996 when the original Taliban burst onto the scene and the Central Asians were absolutely horrified. These days, while we have a reformed army, we have allies, we are not that frightened anymore. That is the message from Afghanistan, from Central Asia on Afghanistan. And I noticed that when the news of the fall of Kabul arrived and was included in the daily briefing by the Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense. It was only item two on the agenda because item one was how to choose competitive dogs to participate in the army games that are currently happening between the China, Russia, Central Asia, and Algiers, I think. So it's, it's unpleasant. Things are not moving in the right direction in Afghanistan. Is it the end of the world for Central Asia? I don't think so and they don't think so. And I think that is quite important to keep in mind when we talk about the northern flank of Afghanistan. Is that despite some kind of common history and shared language and culture to some extent. As far as the Central Asians are concerned, Afghanistan is in a different universe. They never regarded it as part of greater Central Asia. And again, this is demonstrated by the response in the streets of Central Asian capitals to what is going on in Afghanistan. There are no demonstrations, no spontaneous picket lines demanding an end to the depredations by the Taliban against women and other vulnerable communities, not a dog barked in Central Asia so far. And just yesterday I saw a publication by Uzbekistan think tank and there are no independent think tanks in Uzbekistan so this must reflect the official position of the government of Uzbekistan typical for Central Asia, I think. And the headline was we are nothing to Afghanistan. This is quite important and this will tell us a lot about the future stance of Central Asia and its activism or other lack of it in Afghanistan in the coming years. So what does it mean for Afghanistan's future and Central Asia is an important player, perhaps not in the same category of process Pakistan and Iran but it's a neighbor shares a colossal border and has ties that bind perhaps not emotional but certainly business ties. So the most important beat I think it's a hunch but it's an enlightened hunch is that Central Asia will not support any militant groups in Afghanistan at least in the foreseeable future. I don't talk about budding ties between Ahmad Massoud and the government of Tajikistan but all of this pretty much comes from Afghan sources in exile, plus some sensationalist journalists. So Uzbekistan is that silent on the possibility of supporting do storm and Uzbek militia man in the north of Afghanistan it's not going to happen. At least I'll be very much surprised if this is going to happen. But then it's, it is a reality already that all Central Asian republics bar to Tajikistan already indicating their reasonable acceptance of the Taliban. None of them has removed the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations but within a dispute period of time with the Taliban plays the game to the satisfaction of the Central Asians. And most certainly this is the kind of people the Central Asians can do business with. Of course, the latest test and the only concern really that will determine the acceptance or non acceptance of the Taliban and Central Asia is how effectively the Taliban will continue to fight. The Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and other home grown but expatriated Central Asian radicals if the Taliban continue to be more or less efficient on that front. Central Asians will not ask for the questions of them. So that's the what blanket and the bad news now how about I put a bit of a positive spin on the situation. Central Asia actually by virtue of its. Well, I wouldn't call it neutrality but being removed from the early early of Afghan domestic politics and not having any proxies on the ground. It's actually a boom it's an advantage for the well wishers who want to engage Afghanistan want to continue. An example to send humanitarian aid to Afghanistan or seek some kind of intra-Afghan dialogue, because Central Asia is an ideal staging post both for delivering aid and hosting negotiations Central Asians especially Uzbekistan have a proven track record as an honest broker. Central Asia is essential for Afghanistan in one critical aspect of human security. And let's will forget and as Nehemat mentioned, of course, lots of people in Afghanistan are suffering the prospect of starvation is very real and that's why Central Asia comes in handy. For years now wheat from Kazakhstan or flower from Uzbekistan had been staples staples in Afghanistan. Of course it's the US taxpayer who picked up the bill in many regards, but both as a commercial transaction and as aid in kind such shipments from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan if they continue to the northern areas of Afghanistan can alleviate the suffering of quiet. If you have this. So I'm being cautious and wary of the time so if you just brief remarks about Russia because I think you raised a very important point here in the question, and I simply would like to repeat what Roger said in his presentation. And use the questions holding hedging position. And that's exactly what the Russians are going to do in the foreseeable future pretty much like the Central Asians. There is no bloating about the US withdrawal from Moscow in Moscow said haha you bought your Vietnam just like we were badly leaked in 1989. There is nothing of that kind, at least from the officials in Russia, and most certainly there is no talk in Russia that we're going to move in like a ton of bricks and feel the geopolitical vacuum whatever it is. Putin is on record he said that several times in the past week alone that under no circumstances will Russia sending troops again into Afghanistan or in other in any other way be involved and entangled in that country. So this is presumably good news that the new great game is not going to flare up anytime soon at least not featuring Russia. So, and I think that's, that's all I have to say I'll just wait for the questions. Thank you very much. Thank you Carol and thank you to all our panelists for such extraordinary responses very success and thank you for giving to the time I'm going to hand over to Sammy, who's got questions via the chat box from the audience and we also have questions that came through email. There's quite a long list will try our best to get through them, please our panelists be brief in your answers so that we can cover as many as we can. Sammy over to you. Thank you. My audio still working well. Thank you very much for all the panelists and all the attendees has been a great seminar so far. And it's nice to see a lot of familiar faces. So, just in regards to the questions if you everyone kind of within 90 seconds it would be very much appreciated to take 30 seconds if you really have to but 90 seconds would be good so we can go through all the questions as much as possible. The first question is voluntarily if anyone wants to take it. It's regarding the Afghan economy. And whether I know or Russia would be stepping into understand not through a military thing but more through an economical or economic setting that be something viable and if no if so how and to what extent perhaps Carol or Roger would you perhaps be interested in taking this. Well, I can start yes and Roger can correct me because I believe that we can have a diversity of opinion. First, the economic situation in Afghanistan it's bleak and it's not going to improve anytime soon. Neither Russia nor Central Asia will play any role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mega projects that the United States and Western donors and Asian Development Bank pushed for so long and so hard so TAPI or Casa 1000 power grids are not going to materialize. So, thus, my opinion is entirely pessimistic do not expect any help for Afghanistan coming from up north. Okay, and I'll continue the pessimism to say that you know with the international community and I'm looking specifically at the US and the European Union and other major partners in you know IMF World Bank and other aid programs. As I look ahead, I suspect they're going to put a number of conditions on being able to distribute the aid. This is going to depend on how the Taliban is treating the population in the country and how much access they're going to get in the country to distribute the aid. I can't see this as a case of giving a blank check to the administration in Kabul now to run their aid programs it's going to be internationally run. How much the Taliban will let that happen is a good question. I think there may be some resistance in these conditions and so back to Carol's point, it, you may not see a lot of water coming out of this bigot. There's going to be some trepidation and bringing money in. Thank you. Thank you very much. We're in Carol. Another question for you would be a bit more in something you can assist us with. A question here, and I quote, what do you know and think about the new governor of the Afghan Central Bajim Hamad-e-Driess? Well, honestly, I don't know. I've heard his name. I don't know much about his background and his history. But for generally speaking, in my own impressionism, I'm happy that pointing a lot of people from within their own ranks who all have clerical positions in different positions of authority, including some that requires really typical experiments. In this case, I think he is not anyone with any reputation of having previous background in running a competent institution like the Central Bank. Great. Thank you very much. The next question is more NGO focused. So perhaps Diana or Najiba could process this with this question. As the challenges in the LGBTQ plus community was being raised in the seminar today, would any of you perhaps be able to elaborate on how the community has fared so far in a stand since the Taliban took over and what the international community and NGOs do to protect that community? I'm happy to take that one. I think there's a bit in there to unpack. And as a human rights lawyer, I think a question like that makes a lot of assumptions about the fact that LGBTQI Afghans would be visible in the country, which we know that they just aren't. Because of the not just cultural sort of understanding and lens, because I don't like to make that analogous with culture. It's just actually where the country's at in terms of its acceptance of the visibility of it, even though we know it predates colonization. So I've got very close sort of contacts with some LGBTQI Afghans and, you know, it's not something that's disclosed. It's not something that's visible and even pre Taliban now with the Taliban, you know, it's not something that we would identify. They would identify themselves. The risk is too high. They don't want to be targeted. It's something that has always been an ongoing concern, I think, across the world really, not just the Muslim world. But the organizing has also been quite phenomenal in terms of their fundraising and trying to get people to safety outside the country. We've been trying to raise money through go fund me campaign specifically for the LGBTQ community to get them to safety through evacuation and safe passage to third country processing visas. And there's been a lot of issues with go fund me. I know people have seen the way that West Union has shut down the way go fund me accounts for those in the diaspora who are desperately trying to channel some of that fear and that energy and concern for people back home, you know, has been channeled into those sorts of fundraising initiatives only to have them retain the money, not give it to the people who are doing the fundraising because we need we needed that money on the ground and to be immediately distributed. So that was actually at a structural level for go fund me in Western Union. It's actually created more of a risk now because the window was so small for us to get those people to safety. Whereas now it's actually to help them with processing if they're living in third countries, their basic living expenses, while they wait for what alternative options exist for them to get humanitarian or other visas in safe countries. So that's just that's just what I know and can can disclose obviously about the LGBTQ community. Thank you, Diana. Yeah, I just wanted to say quickly, I mean what the international community can do. I think in the context of Australia, I need to refer back again to community sponsorship, something that we can replicate from Canada. I haven't been successful so far in getting a government to be convinced in relation to the community sponsorship but I think if we are to replicate from what Canadians has done, especially in relation to providing much more protection to the LGBTQ community, it really goes to the private sponsorship. So what we've been doing in Apnoor in the past two weeks in particular, we've been actually identifying women and girls that are at higher risk. And in that lease, it actually includes the LGBTQI community. And we've been speaking to the Canadians private sponsors, you know, ensuring that those that identified to become a priority when it comes to their sponsorship. And I think this goes to the same thing to our government. I mean, right now when you look at the way advocacy has taken place across Australia, we haven't seen, you know, a petition that really just goes to women and girls. We are calling our government to do what they can when it comes to the, you know, to those that have worked either for NGOs or government or have been human right defenders, but we are leaving, you know, other millions, including the LGBTQI, including other, you know, wonderful girls that women and girls out of this quarter of protection. So I think Diana probably mentioned in her talk as well, it's really about writing to R&Ps. It's really about ensuring that, you know, we have other complementary pathways to be looked at. You know, humanitarian procurement is not the only option. Family reunification, ensuring that community sponsorship is also open or can be expanded to those in much more higher needs and risks, including LGBTQI. Perfect. Very much. Just to note, if anyone would like to ask the questions directly, speakers, please raise your hand and you may direct them early. It makes my life a lot easier because some of those questions are really compact and lengthy, so you would definitely be helping me out. So I'll try to nonetheless try to go through as quickly and as effectively as possible. I think the next question would be perhaps directed to Roger. It is said that Biden's rate of withdrawal, which is obviously very quick, was not recommended by administration. Do you think that was because he not want to have a forever exit, which would perhaps prolong and exacerbate the situation in Afghanistan? Okay. No, excellent question. And, you know, the phrase forever exit is one that has popped up, so it's good you bring it. You note it. And I do think it's a case of, you know, this is an issue that he campaigned on. This was a situation that even his predecessor noted would be done. Now, had Trump won re-election, would we have seen a May departure? Probably. Would the departure have been as chaotic and problematic? And I have to agree with my fellow panelists here who kind of note that this was not the best executed departure. Absolutely. Now, behind that, and this is what we don't know, there were debates about the timing of it, how many more months, how many more weeks, how many more days. Could this go on in what capacity? Should it have been out of Bagram? Should it instead of Karzai International Airport? You know, all sorts of questions will be brought up. And I hate to say it, we don't know what the limitations were of what they could and could not do, because much of this was managed by really in cooperation with the government on the ground as long as Ghani was in charge when he departed, of course, the leadership vacuum required that it simply became an airport focused effort. And so the goal was to get it done quickly. Understanding there's going to be blowback both internationally and I'll be honest, more importantly domestically. But time has a funny way of sort of pushing this in the background. We'll have to see what the broader impact is. And by the way, there are still discussions of people needing to depart and leave and what the US can do. And so on that regard, I do hope that there'll be a greater or continued US presence. Thank you. That's great. Thank you very much. And I'll just have a personal follow up question in regards to that. I think that the Biden administration will definitely need a foreign policy victory within the next three years. CC, OPCM, and Libya or Syria, will that be something that they'll be focusing on to kind of this foreign policy legacy? Yeah, and it's that but also how this is going to be cast. You know, when we look at upcoming elections, I've already seen commentary saying that, you know, the departure from Vietnam was, you know, the fault of Jimmy Carter and the Democrats. But take a pause for a moment and realize that the departure from Vietnam was actually under the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford Republicans. It has become a politicized issue in our country. So we're going to be a little insane on this one and everything about Afghanistan somehow is going to relate to US domestic politics and vice versa. But we're also going to throw in other issues, hurricanes that we've had and fires and floods and COVID-19 management and mismanagement. And so this is going to be part of the bigger chatter. Yeah. Many thanks, Roger. We do have a question from a speaker to speak. Mr. Mohamed. Yes. Hello, everyone. Good. Thank you guys for organizing this seminar. I really appreciate it. Sorry, I can't stop being emotional. I was just a very, very upset about what happened just couple of last days, just last weeks. Mohamed, we can't hear you very well, unfortunately. It's very, or I can't hear you personally. Would you mind going, trying to speak louder and being quick, please? Thank you, Mohamed. Yes, sure, sure. I just, maybe I stop my video, maybe that helps. Is that all right now? Yeah, if you can just be quick so that we can go for the next question. Thank you. Yes, just like a, yeah, very, just really two questions, very quick questions, as you said, just like it. I had from Dr. Nemet since last couple of days, I, that was the biggest question in my mind. I couldn't solve it and I was just like, what happened? Like 20 years, building modernization, monies, billion dollars, just like, what happened? It was a pre-planned. It was just like a, guys, it looks like a pre-planned, like since the office opened in Doha for Taliban office. Like guys, we're going to leave Afghanistan, you guys are going to come take over power. It was like, it looks like that, but was it? Is that true? But like, what happened? Why not exactly? Everyone just shocked, like what happened? And just my second question goes to Mr. Roger. Is that the end of the neo-conservatism? After the deterioration of the neo-conservatism, like post-democratization? Have you ever heard of John Bolton or what they were reactions like? Is that true? It's the end of the neo-conservatism? Thank you so much, guys. Thank you, Mohamed. Appreciate it. Mr. Nematullah, I don't know if you wanted to grab the first section and then what if you had anything to add? Well, thank you, Mohamed. That's a very complex question, probably I can't deal with it at the moment. I think my quick response would be, no, it was not anything pre-planned. I don't believe that the handle of a plan of the Taliban was in any way planned either by actors in Afghanistan or by international powers like the U.S. who were involved here. However, I think, you know, what happened in that country was that I would come up with a series of tactical and strategic mistakes that were made by both international actors and also the Afans, I think. There is a lot of debate to be had on this who were responsible and who had more responsibility. But I think in my view, the failure of Afghanistan is really a political failure because the United States got too distracted by other priorities. In Afghanistan, even though the money was really huge in terms of number, but Afghanistan's problem was also quite original in nature. It is very easy, I think, to blame Afans and Afan conservatives or religious fanaticism for the rise of the Taliban. And this is such even corruption. I think you can see a lot of corrupt governments around the world who are not falling apart. But I think there is an element coming from outside and I think Afans are very easy to be sidelined now in the Pakistanis. But I think at the heart of this is Afghanistan's problem is a product of international relations. The way the states use actors like the Taliban. I mean, it was not only the Pakistanis but also the Iranians and other actors. They technically supported the Taliban to gain an age in competition with the United States elsewhere, not in Afghanistan. So I think it's a very complex question. I think that was hopefully an answer to some of those questions. Thank you. Yeah, I quickly added a few seconds. First of all, excellent questions and comments. And on the notion of it planned, I think that the rapid pace was what surprised people. And let's not forget 20 years ago, the rapid collapse of the Taliban in the fall of 2001 was likewise a surprise. The U.S. and other partners actually anticipated this would take through 2002. And by November and into December of 2001, the Taliban had largely left the country. And so speed and how local dynamics affect broader strategic campaigns are things that, especially we outsiders, don't always get right. And I think don't always figure out. And I'm just saying this as an American. Secondly, to the question on the neoconservatives and I'll be honest, deafening silence, at least in the international space. Maybe they are writing. I would be very curious what is being said because you're absolutely right. These experiments and bringing democracy through military transition, if you will, are coming to an end, right? And the postmortem is going to be it probably wasn't a good idea. Well, it shouldn't be that cynical or that crass because these are lives and countries we're dealing with. But I do think that that era is over. In fact, the notion in the U.S. of wanting to democratize and conduct transformation policies like this, there's no appetite. Thank you very much, Roger. The next question is COVID related. It's open to everyone if whoever has a bit of experience or knowledge about what's happening now in regards to the situation on the ground. Perhaps Diana would like to give us some of your insight on what is happening with COVID in Afghanistan and how do you expect to tele-manage the COVID situation? Should they receive any significant amount of international support in terms of testing kits and vaccines? I'm happy to respond, but there might be someone else who knows more specifically about it. It's definitely been something that here in Australia, the media has not been showing us enough about the COVID response in Afghanistan. I think it's because the people here have just been so consumed with our own pandemics and lockdowns and vaccine rollouts and the rest of it. And so I suspect that what we saw in Iran, what we saw in India with the situation being uncontrolled, ventilators, hospitals, vaccinations even coming in from India. I'm sure it was an absolute debacle, just like the exit strategy. So I don't have any real insights. I'm not sure if anyone else knows more about the COVID situation. I was saying more in terms of that was another thing that they were dealing with and an ongoing drought in the country in terms of climate change. And now this crisis evolving and the whole collapse of the economy potentially teetering on being a failed state. So I don't really have that sort of insight. Thank you very much, Diana. Did anyone else from you speak about anything else? Maybe if I could quickly add something to that. I think when we talk about COVID situation, let's look at back again the time that we had a government in place. Even when we had Ashraf Ghani's government in the country, we still had very poor response when it came to COVID situation, let alone that the Taliban is now in the country. I think that's the least that the Taliban is not thinking in relation to the COVID. We are healing around all the attacks that are happening in the province, the killings that are happening every day on children and women. I think if we had such mindset in the Taliban that they would worry about the pandemic, I think we wouldn't be in the water we are facing right now. I mean, that's, I wouldn't say that's even a little worry in the least right now. We're talking about people that, you know, their only agenda is to kill and persecute to basically get to their agenda and COVID is really the last thing for them to think about. I would agree 100% with Najiba. I think that's the reason why we haven't been hearing about it is because it's just not even something that they care about in terms of the humanity of their own people. Thank you very much Najiba. Next question is only a couple of minutes left, so I'll try to ask them as quickly as possible and whoever wants to pick a question and go for it. We very much appreciate it. Although this one is to Dr. Carol. So, what do you think of the current refugee intake of Central Asian States and will this change in the future. So as I already foreshadowed, everyone in Central Asia in the government is opposed to the refugee intake, but they use different excuses to avoid showing any hospitality or sharing spirit. So in Turkmenistan, the excuses too much COVID happening around and Turkmenistan is officially COVID free, of course, which is rubbish. In Tajikistan just yesterday, the Minister of the Interior said, we did what we could, which is providing 70 hectares of land where tents can be built for Afghan refugees, but someone has to pay for the infrastructure. And we don't have the money. So clearly Tajikistan beats for a portion of 600 million euro kitty the EU is bending around Uzbekistan said that basically anybody who tries to cross the border for Uzbekistan illegally will be dealt with harshly. We are not accepting refugees full stop Kazakhstan is pretty much in the same position, although being a rich country they are doing some contingency. They are planning and activating some shelters just in case, but otherwise it's a very inhospitable and really dreadful environment. Thank you very much, Carol. The next question is open to everyone. To what extent has our community influence Iran's relationship with the new Talib government. Any takers. I might try to do it but we don't have a lot of time. I think this is a very complex question. We know Shia majority around is often perceived as promoting the interests of shares in other parts of the world including Afghanistan. But from what we know, over the past two weeks, two decades in Afghanistan the problem has, the Iranians have also established really strong links with the Taliban in Afghanistan. There are a lot of reasons first to help the Americans, especially after 2003, they wanted to show the capacity that you have the willingness and capacity to help the Americans. And the second is especially after the eyes of ISIS, the Islamic State, they saw the Taliban as a lesser, even of the two jihadist movements in their next door neighbor. So I think the Taliban and the Iranians have had really close relationship and because of that the Iranians haven't really done anything to support any anti-Taliban movement in Afghanistan recently. To what extent have we survived? I really don't know. I think, you know, this is probably like other states and Iranians are also trying to hedge their backs on what the new Taliban government will look like and what the implications will be for this region. Thank you very much. Did anyone else want to add anything on this question or should we move to the final question? Okay, so if the Taliban can't form, actually end up forming an inclusive government, will it affect militant movements not only in the Middle East and Central Asia, but in Southeast Asia as well? The question is how the international community to press and help the Taliban to form an inclusive government and while at the same time perhaps to counterbalance the rise of other Islamist currents. I've seen groups, different groups such as Haida Hirsham in Syria and congratulations to the Taliban government, same as the some branches of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Brotherhood in general, as well as Al-Qaeda. What pact will this have to militant the Islamist currents all over the world? Any takers? Carol? Thanks, Sami, I'll just pick the low hanging fruit about the so-called inclusive government in Kabul and at the peak of rather cynical exercise, the Russian ambassador on Afghanistan issues, special representative of Putin went on record saying and his breath taking that for Russia it's enough for the Taliban to imitate an inclusive government. A talking Uzbek and a talking Tajik woman perhaps in response with responsibility for some minor aspect of women's issues in Afghanistan would satisfy Russia's very low criteria. And I suspect that the bar is set reasonably low in quite a few countries beyond the West. Just a couple of quick additions agree with what Carol said. And also, at least in some initial interviews, Taliban spokespersons have said that, you know, if there are women in the government which they say will be they will only be in subordinate positions. There's not much reference to religious minorities because presumably they will not be allowed in. And of course, ethnic minorities are going to be a challenge, although this current Taliban iteration does have stronger ties with some non pushed in communities. But to the other question on terrorist groups globally. This, this is perceived as a victory. This is going to be perceived as as as an event to embolden them we saw, you know, and this has happened before globally. I would expect to see greater activity in the Sahel, you know, in the, you know, parts of Syria and elsewhere, where we might see such groups feel, you know, kind of charged to get involved. And interesting, this notion of connections with international terrorism was part of the agreement the Taliban signed in February of 2020. I hope they're held accountable to that. They need to be. So we'll see what happens. Thank you. So there is a member of the audience who is very, very keen to ask this question. And it's particularly to Roger, he says, what do you think that how do you think the withdrawal will impact domestically on the building administration, especially with the commemoration of September the 11. We will the competence of the administration handling of the withdrawal impact on the governor votes in California on September the 14. Okay. Yeah, very quickly, because I know we're at time. But on the domestic issue, you know, the California race is about handling of COVID it's about handling of environmental disasters in the country and the economic result of severe restrictions in that state. And, you know, a number of personality issues I think the Afghan crisis is too early for that and I would say for domestic matters. As noted earlier, as noted earlier, when we get to national elections in 2022, this will probably play a role, a limited role, largely in casting the Biden team as in it, you know, unable to work security issues unable to work if you want to say A couple of extreme conservatives are looking at the impeachment of Biden and the resignation of Secretary Austin, for example, for their handling or mishandling with they see as the departure from Kabul. So we're going to have these what I would call theatrical moments, but the impact is going to be limited. The issue raised earlier about refugees and a point raised by a number of colleagues. I do think this could play a greater role because you are seeing calls to bring people in, increase the numbers to the US, much as has happened in other conflicts. I personally remember in the, you know, the end of the Vietnam War, the desire to bring in refugees from that country and the sense of moral obligation, particularly to those who worked with us. And you are starting to see voices raise this in a political context. Some want to prohibit refugees coming in, you know, America is not for them. But quite frankly, you're seeing some pretty active people wanting to bring in individuals, especially those who worked with the US, but quite frankly, others as well. That could be a politically charging issue in upcoming elections. But yeah, wonderful questions. Thank you very much Roger. With that, I'll pass it back to Karima. Yes, thank you our fantastic panelists for such a wonderful discussion. I have a final question as a way of conclusion. I would like to ask you each to make few concluding remarks like really brief ones about whether there is hope for Afghanistan. We live somehow in optimism and hope. Can you please say what about that? Do you see a way out? Thank you very much. I'll start with you, Najiba. Please. Sorry, I was just trying to unmute myself. I mean, there is definitely hope if we can bring, you know, stronger commitments and moral obligations by the states, you know, that have basically announced their, and unable to do their parts when it comes to that responsibility sharing. I think when we talk about, you know, the context of Afghanistan, obviously, you know, talking about resettlement, increasing, you know, refugee intake and opening borders and so on. I think these are all going to go back to being, you know, still temporary measures to support and protect the country. It really goes back to how are we going to support inside and within the country. How do we make sure that, you know, again, the country is able to stand on its own feet? And with that, I think it's quite important for us not to talk about the Taliban as a legitimate government. You know, as much as the conversations right now is about, you know, how this government is getting shape in the next two days. But I would say, you know, even when we talk about inclusion, I think there's no inclusivity when it comes to the Taliban. So hope only comes if we are actually able to bring our forces together and ensure that each state and each community and each site and each individual is going to do their parts. Whether it is about, you know, providing emergency support like Diana was speaking to, whether it's about ensuring that our diplomats are very well aware of our interest when it comes to the region. Whether it's about, you know, the catastrophic situation in Afghanistan and the belief that, you know, what happens in Afghanistan can also, you know, go far beyond the borders of Afghanistan and the September 11 is a clear testimony to that. So I will leave it there. Thank you. Thank you, Najiba. I'm just in awe of Najiba. I just can say I just defer all my questions to her to answer them so well nails it. And I just feel like, as you can see from the Afghan panelists here today, we have agency to self determine the future of our country. And I know that there's a lot of political pundits who have made their careers out of speaking on behalf of instead of and down to Afghans, rather than allowing us the space. And I think that is inherently part of the problem in terms of our history of imperialism intervention colonization, all of the foreign intervening interveners and our neighbors. I understand, you know, Moscow, Beijing and Tehran are very happy to see the backs of the Americans. You know, we've got Pakistan and India playing their own sort of hegemonic two games over here over cashmere and nuclear state trying to contain them over there. Ultimately, it comes back to Afghanistan wanting to self determine its future. And we always have maintained hope in that. I don't think that us as a diaspora and all the times that we've invested and gone back and traveled and you know visited our what time and how much we've enjoyed over the decades. We wouldn't still be here convening this forum for a new if we didn't have hope. And so I want to come back to that and come back to the voices of the Afghan people and if people. And the dehumanizing narratives about us that in so harmful to the future. And I just really caution people to not buy into these narratives, particularly in Australia particularly leading up to an election year don't buy into the security lens. We have a moral obligation as Najiba said to bring in refugees, but yes it is a temporary solution. Ideally, we none of us would be here we would be in our homes safely living amongst our own communities. So, of course, I have hope I wouldn't be here saying all of this if I didn't. Thank you. Thank you. They are great and now please. Thank you for this final opportunity. I would like to echo everything that was said by Diana and Najiba I think I will repeat. I agree with everything they have say. I would like to be helpful. But at the moment my hope that the rest of the time. I think I would like to be proven wrong and really have said this many times, I would like the Taliban to prove prove me wrong times and again. If they have the capacity and willingness to be moderate force and change for peace in that country, I would really appreciate and help them. But at the same time, I'm also really worried that the news cycle might change its attention on Afghanistan, something else happening. And I think that is also coming at the same time as many Afghans from within Afghanistan are also going silent. And this is what I'm witnessing at the moment. People are taking down the social media accounts. They are not posting anymore. And they are trying to readjust to the situation with security reasons. And because of what I think over the coming days and months, we will not be able to get a lot of report coming from that within that country. But if you are someone concerned about human rights in Afghanistan, I think if you have done anything, you're an academic journalist, you have a responsibility to make sure that you are holding the Taliban accountable. And you have a sort of broader lens on that one as a society. And I'd like to make a final point. It is sort of, you know, it's kind of journalism that has really emerged around talking to the Taliban, reporting at the Taliban. And they are trying to generalize from that to describe the whole of country, portray Afghanistan. And I think that it's really misleading. I'm really fearful that that sort of journalism will take hold because that justifies and legitimizes all internationally disengaged from Afghanistan. So I think I would like to express and hope it is clear at the same time. Thank you. Thank you, Dammit. Great. Roger, please. Okay. Wow. Three, three excellent summations with not much more to add. I will say a point I missed earlier. Your comment on 9 11 are the question regarding 9 11. It will definitely be muted in the US. And the interesting thing is, if we're trying to be optimistic. I hope we can return our thoughts, at least in the US to that day 20 years ago, as really the notion of al-Qaeda terrorist attack on the US, et cetera, and not say it's about Afghanistan. Afghanistan was not the source of 9 11. It was a separate country. And today, 2021, it is a country we're still going to have to work with. And I agree wholeheartedly with the comment that at least this notion of agency in the region, Afghanistan itself, the Afghan people in the different communities in Afghanistan. I'm hoping to see and waiting to see what voices are going to be heard in the area and what can regional actors do. I do think we're moving past the era, or at least we're taking a pause in the era of larger outside powers wanting to come in and dictate or perhaps shape what's going on. We need to let people run their countries. But please, let's have the Taliban become a moderating influence. And I'm looking forward to an inclusive government. I'm skeptical, but I want to remain optimistic. Thank you. Thank you, Roger. Right. Well, it's even more difficult for me to sum up my impressions, but I take heart from what my colleagues who actually are from Afghanistan had to say if they hope Afghanistan obviously has hope. And I also take on board Roger's prognostication that while the great powers are not entirely out of the picture in an ideal world and it would be good news for Afghanistan. They should stay away from any kind of ideological paradigms or the great game mentality. This would be excellent for Afghanistan. And the final comment, perhaps a historical occurrence that gives me personally some heart about the future of Afghanistan. Remember what happened to Dr. Najibullah, who started as a pucker communist, but after 1986 he changed his colors, became a national pucker and almost succeeded. If only if only he received the modicum of help, a pat on the shoulder in 1992, the history of Afghanistan might have turned out quite differently. And hopefully the history of Afghanistan will change to the better. Thank you very much to all our panelists. I'm really grateful for this fantastic discussion. Thank you to my co-host Sami Aqil. Thank you also to our center manager Yannia Perit who's been behind the scenes dealing with all the logistics of this event and thank you for all of you, the audience. And we ended up in solidarity with the Afghan people. Thank you everyone. Thanks very much. Thank you. Thank you everyone.