 Good afternoon, everyone. My name's Chris Johnson. I'm the Freeman Chair in China Studies here. It's great to see so many friends to join us for what I think is going to be an absolutely fantastic panel. I couldn't be more proud of the panel we managed to pull together. Obviously, issue of tremendous concern, lots of thinking about what's going on in the Sino-Russian relationship and how it matters for Sino-Russian U.S. triangular relations. And you all have the bios, so I'm just going to go ahead and dispense with that. This is another installment in our China Reality Check series where we try to look at issues that are either controversial by their nature, are poorly understood here in Washington, or we just feel deserve more attention across the board. And this topic certainly struck me as I was in Shanghai, watching the summit between President Putin and Xi as something I needed to do as soon as I got back. So I'm very pleased that all these great gentlemen were coordinating their schedules. It was not easy, but we managed to get them all in one room, so that's great. We're going to have Dr. Brzezinski start off and then Ambassador Roy will follow and Prime Minister Red will follow up from that, just giving some framing remarks. We'll have a few questions and answers amongst ourselves here and then we'll turn it over to the audience for broader discussion. Dr. Brzezinski, please. Well, thanks very much. I take it we're supposed to talk about the agreement between Russia and China and its implications. So let me make just sort of three basic points about it because in my judgment, at least, it is still in the realm of speculation. Perhaps my two colleagues know much more about it because they know more about China than I do. But on the whole, so far, most of the issues that arise out of that agreement are subject to some degree of uncertainty. My sense of that agreement, however, on the whole is that it does not really create a situation in which the Russians are gaining a great deal. They're gaining something that's essential to them and it's important for them and it can contribute to some degree of influence and success. But they don't retain, in my view, at least, as much freedom of action in subsequent times as the Chinese. After all, it's a long-term agreement. It's a long-term agreement which involves commitments by both sides of substantial character but of much larger character on the Russian part than on the Chinese. Moreover, the Russians are making commitment to China of a sort that they will have a long-term interest in maintaining its maximum or perhaps even enlarging. Their relationship on that same issue with the European Union is already stalemated and will probably decline. So they have a vast interest in this being successful and sustained. The Chinese, of course, do also. It's good to have this Russian support. It does provide them with a degree of guarantee for the future. That's very important. But consider this. In some years to come and there could be issues pertaining to, for example, new opportunities from Iran. There could be new opportunities to purchase a great deal of energy from Saudi Arabia, especially as a structure of world distribution comes out from Saudi Arabia will be altered. The Chinese already have a far-ranging long-term agreement with Turkmenistan which can grow in size and they certainly want to preserve it. So in a sense, my feeling is that while this is a mutually beneficial agreement, the strategic consequences of it are more promising for China than for Russia. It doesn't imply in any sense some cleavage between them. It's a normal outcome of a prolonged negotiating relationship. But the Chinese retain options subsequent in time regarding that agreement that are not open in the same degree that the Russians. On the minor second aspect, I don't know what the price structure for the agreement was. But talking recently to some Central Asians who obviously have a keen interest of their own in this agreement, I got the impression that their view was that the Russians were compelled to make some serious concessions in the price. So that even from the price structure point of view, this probably was more to the benefit of the Chinese than to the Russians. But it does emphasize an enforcement of an enduring relationship, the one that can be altered asymmetrically. My second point pertains to the geostrategic realities of that relationship more generally. Clearly, Russia, China, and the United States are the world's most preeminent powers, although President Obama on the whole correctly demoted Russia publicly in recent times to the status of a very major regional power, not global power. I don't want to take issue with my president, especially since I'm sympathetic to that point of view, but I do have to acknowledge that when it comes to atomic weapons, Russia is a global power. It is a global power that's close to being a peer of ours, whereas China is not. And that, of course, introduces a significant asymmetry in the Russian-Chinese relationship. Although I rather doubt that either the Russians or the Chinese are contemplating the nuclear engagement against each other. Nonetheless, the fact is Russia is a global atomic power. China is not. China lags behind the United States and lags behind Russia. And in terms of reciprocal targeting, it is very asymmetrical. The Chinese, in effect, believe in minimal nuclear deterrence, inflicting a minimal amount of damage sufficient to enforce political consequences that they view desirable, but not wreak total damage either on us or on the Russians in their targeting. That makes some significant difference. Secondly here, however, on the other hand, both China and the United States are global economic powers. Russia is not. Worse than that, China is a growing global economic power. Russia is not. Russia is a receding regional at best economic power. And that problem is getting more serious for the Russians. So here it is also a matter of some asymmetry in the relationship. And one could even argue that one of the highly possible consequences of the Ukrainian adventure is going to be a result which might well be one of the most damaging territorial geopolitical outcomes for Russia in its entire imperial history. If you think of Russia's imperial history, it has been one of steady growth with some setbacks here or there. But the setbacks were never really decisive. The war in Crimea in the 1850s was a setback. The war with the Japanese was a setback of some far Eastern significance, but not fundamental. The defeat in 1940s would have been that, but Russia prevailed. But the possibility of losing Ukraine is going to be the most serious territorial defeat for Russia. It will mean the loss of more than 14 million people in a large piece of territory. And Putin has already accomplished something that hasn't been achieved by anyone so far in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship. Unlike, for example, the Poles who for a variety of my judgment on the whole legitimate reasons strongly suspect and distract the Russians, distrust the Russians. The Ukrainians have not harbored animus towards Russians by and large. The results of Crimea, plus of what's going on, is creating a nation of intense hostility towards Russia. And if it prevails and if the outcome is one that sustains a West-oriented Ukraine, Russia will have suffered. And I think the probabilities are, will suffer the greatest setback insofar as its territorial history is concerned. The Chinese are not threatened with that. The Chinese have, from their point of view, unfortunately, rather bad relationships with the majority of the countries on which they border. Their claims and counterclaims, and the Russians and others are worried about that. The largest piece of territory lost by China historically is to Russia. So far the Chinese have not raised it openly. Although in private conversations, with some people myself included, they have mentioned it rather explicitly. That is a problem for the future which the Russians cannot entirely ignore. And the Chinese, while having regional conflicts, local conflicts with some of the neighbors, with some exceptions on the whole, have acted with restraint on the whole. There have been some problems lately with maritime limits and so forth, but they have not resulted in drastic outcomes. And then my last and third point is what about the Jewish strategic trajectories of these three countries? Here again, on Russia, it can be very straightforward and simple. It is a downward trend. The by and large general trends are negative. Take it in terms of population. Russian population is declining. Take it in terms of Russian social talent. Large parts of it, not overwhelming, but significant, are emigrating. Take it in terms of durability of human life. Russia is still relatively on a low level compared to advanced societies. Take it in terms of private capital. Every successful member of the new middle class is trying to export money somewhere else. Now some of that up to a point is happening in China too. There's no doubt that the new class of multi-billionaires is trying to export a great deal of its capital. But by and large, there is still nothing comparable in any way to what is transpiring in Russia. There is not a mass immigration movement. There is a sense of vitality. And there is a sense of prospective success. China rising peacefully is still the predominant slogan in the country, at least on the official level. And in that sense, the dual strategic trajectory of China is rather positive. And again, in sharp contrast to Russia. Now that, of course, from the Chinese point of view and from the global perspective is complicated by the fact that the Chinese-Russian relationship is not the preeminent global relationship. It is the Chinese-American relationship that is the globally preeminent relationship. But the decline of Russia in that triangular relationship obviously boosts the influence of China, gives China the option of utilizing Russia whenever convenient, but presumably out of caution and strategic intelligence, not associating themselves with Russia too much. Look at the UN votes, for example, in Ukraine. China explicitly abstained. Abstained from a resolution which was explicitly condemning Russia. They didn't back Russia. They didn't try to veto the resolution. They simply abstained, which shows that the Russians do not enjoy the preeminent place in Chinese strategic calculations. It is still the United States. And hence, a great deal of what transpires in the triangular relationship also depends on us. Can we maintain a posture that enhances the significance mutually of the American-Chinese relationship? Because that impacts on the Chinese-Russian relationship. And here I do have some reservations regarding both sides. And I'm not trying to be solomonic or evade a judgment. I think both sides lately have not acted as skillfully and as intelligently as one might wish. I had from the very beginning some reservations about the wording of the pivot speech. The moment I read it, I said to myself, I really wonder how the Chinese would interpret it. Why put such heavy emphasis on the significance of a military shift to the Far East with the Afghan war coming to an end? Why put so much stress on it? Why talk implicitly about some form of containment in that context by hints about maritime or territorial problems? Why not simply say, which would have been truthful, and accurate, and serve the same purpose by saying the United States has been part of the Far East since 1905, the Roosevelt negotiating treaties between Japan and Russia. And it remains one and will remain one. And you don't have to say that involves aircraft carriers or military personnel or new deployments or Mr. Rudd in your country, actually, where it wasn't specified very clearly whether American Marines to be stationed there are to defend Australia from China or from Guinea New what is the country called? Papa New Guinea. Papa New Guinea. But the fact that it's going to be American troops there, I thought, was a somewhat wrong message, not necessary. Lately, even in some speeches, in particularly the West Point speech, there were some references to China in relationship to other issues, which implied a somewhat ambivalent assessment of the Chinese role in the world. I think we have to be more careful in that respect. And of course, our newspapers can be naturally an instinctively critical of the Chinese political system being free. The Chinese, however, have been responding to this, or maybe even contributing to it through an increasingly negative press about the United States. The fact of the matter is much of the Chinese official, the controlled press, is very hostile towards the United States, and very explicitly so. Some of the articles, which I read every week, are emphasizing American aggressiveness, American insensitivity, American domineering aspirations, and so forth. And that, I think, feeds a sense of mutually increasing antagonism potentially, mutual suspicions and uncertainties. Just coming here, I was reading an article entitled, American Hegemonist's Biggest Threat to China is the Americanization of China from a major Chinese publication. It is, of course, connected with systemic challenges within China itself. The Chinese don't like the comparison between themselves and ourselves in terms of who has the largest number of corrupt public officials. I think it's a close call as to which one does. Except the problem is that our corrupt officials act in keeping with our financial culture. That is to say, enrich yourself as much as you can and rip anybody off as much as you can. The Chinese officials happen to be members of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China. I thought the Communist Party had rather different principles regarding the distribution of wealth. So it's even more of a challenge to their internal logic and stability than ours. But the interaction of the two, perhaps, has a somewhat cross-feeding effect. So these are the kinds of problems that I think can surface and link to specific problems on the ground could become quite serious. One of the things to watch, and I will end on this insofar as strategic prospects is concerned, is the potential evolution of a very specific Japanese-Indian relationship. The Indian press is full of articles about the new connection between Modi and Abe and how logical it is for a potentially strong maritime power, technologically highly advanced, such as China, to a close relationship with India, which is threatened territorially by a nearby strong neighbor. So the Chinese, too, I think, have to be very careful in how they handle their external affairs. And for us, the challenge is to prove to everyone that America's energy for continued growth and vitality and social success has not been dissipated, and especially by social trends, which warn of certain potential social risks and tensions. And I'll end by simply mentioning it, the growing disparity between the very rich and few of them, and the very many increasing the poor, and they're the vast majority. Thanks. Thank you. Ambassador Roy. Dr. Brzezinski has made my task very easy because I basically agree with the various points that he has made. But when we're talking about Russian relations with China, it can't be all summarized in just a few minutes. So there are some additional points that I would like to make. First, it's vitally important not to oversimplify the relationship. It's an extremely complex relationship, and it's an asymmetrical relationship. What do I mean by asymmetrical? In 1993, Russia's economy and China's were about the same size. China's economy is now four times larger than that of Russia, and the disparity is growing. As a result, until recently, Russia, including Putin, was very reluctant to commit Russian resources over a long-term period to the growth of China. Now some other factors have come into play now, but that underlying suspicion on the part of Russia about the potential threat to Russian interests of an increasingly strong and prosperous China is always an underpinning in Russian views of their relationship with China. Having said that, though, it's very important to understand how strong the impulse is between the two countries to improve their relationship. Neither of them like a world dominated by a sole superpower. So that strategic factor, despite the fact that until recently both of them had more important relationships with the United States than with each other. And I think you could still say that in the case of China. But recent developments in U.S.-Russian relations have altered that particular balance. But the underlying fact is they don't like a superpower-dominated world. And it was reflected in the fact that 10 years ago, they finally settled their remaining border dispute through a border agreement that involved the transfer of some islands in the Amur River from Russia to China and the division of an island. So here were two big strong countries resolving a territorial dispute through the transfer of territory. That's something that both governments ought to bear in mind and particularly China in terms of looking at how territorial disputes are affecting their bilateral relations. So the trend in Russian-Chinese relations has been toward improving them. And I think it's fair to say that they are the best they have been in post-World War II history, including the period of communist cooperation because it's a different type of relationship now. Now having said that, I've mentioned that Russia was reluctant to commit its resources to the development of China. That has changed. It was changing over time. And I think the Ukrainian developments have greatly strengthened that desire on the part of Russia. In the case of China and looking at the energy picture, which is what we were supposed to be talking about today, until the mid-90s, China's energy strategy was based on self-sufficiency. But beginning around 1993, China had to move to a different energy strategy because it was becoming increasingly reliant on imported energy. And so now the fundamental driver of China's energy policy is diversity of supply. And in large measure because of the Ukrainian crisis, the importance to Russia of the diversity of demand has become much more important. A large portion of their gas exports has been to Europe. And now there's a question in Russian minds as to how reliable that demand is going to be. And the second factor is the Chinese demand is growing rapidly. And European demand is growing very slowly and may decrease because Europe is now looking at diversifying their sources of energy because they don't like the implications of being too dependent on Russia as the source for their natural gas supply. So these are the considerations that came together in this meeting that produce this agreement. Now the agreement on its surface looks like a very important one. The supply of 38 million cubic meters of gas annually by Russia to China beginning in 2018. That's a big deal by any measure. But we have to be careful. Dr. Brzezinski correctly pointed out, we don't know the details. Key factor is price. What we do know is that China compromised a long standing position by agreeing to a base formula for price that is related to oil prices. This is the way that Russian supply of gas to Europe is priced. So high oil prices mean you pay higher price for the natural gas. But China has always resisted that type of a formula and it's one of the reasons why for 10 years the two countries were not able to reach agreement on this particular deal. Now they've reached agreement and it seems that they have agreed to a oil price related formula but we don't know the details. And it's very likely that Russia was in a weaker position than China was in working out the final details of the agreement. But we'll have to wait until we learn more about the actual price in arrangements. Now the second thing to remember is let's not blow this deal out of proportion. The deal provides for 38 million cubic meters of gas per year. Doesn't begin until 2018 and it will take a while to ramp up to that level of supply. China's current consumption of natural gas is running at somewhere between 70 billion cubic meters a year and 100 billion cubic meters of gas a year. So this deal represents maybe 25% or less of China's current consumption. But by the time the gas comes on stream it'll be a much smaller percentage. Why? Because China has set the goal by 2020 of having an annual consumption of natural gas that is in the 200 billion cubic meters of gas per year or 220. So 38 billion viewed in that context is a much smaller percentage of China's overall natural gas consumption. Now there's a reason why China is trying to increase its consumption of natural gas so rapidly and anyone who has traveled to Chinese cities knows why. Cold-fired pollution is decimating the air quality in China and therefore they have a major urgent need to diversify away from coal burning and to utilize more clean air which is underway and Russia is part of that picture. But Dr. Przensky referred to the Turkmenistan deal. The Turkmenistan deal is for a shorter period of time provides for $40 billion, 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year at its maximum level and there's a possibility that will rise to 70 billion cubic meters per year. So once again, and Australia is becoming an important potential supplier of LNG to China and somewhere around 2020 it's possible that US fracked gas will become available for export to Asia and that will also affect the considerations. So if you look at this particular deal in the context of this broader picture you realize that it's an important arrangement but it's by no means one that ties the two countries together in a highly dependent relationship over a long period of time. In the sense that one country could exert influence over the other by diddling with the supply of gas as Russia has done with the Ukraine. China is not prepared to put itself subject to that type of leveraging and I don't think that Russia has gained that potential in this particular agreement. So within that context I think we should not assume that the rivalry factors in the Sino-Russian relationship have been eliminated. They're very important in Central Asia for example where the Chinese supply of consumer goods has essentially driven Russian goods out of the market but the Russia still has those historic relationships with the Central Asians. Now here's an interesting point and I'll close on this point. We've just had this conference that Putin attended called the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia or SICA if you will. At that conference, President Xi Jinping gave a very important speech in which he essentially addressed a major security proposal. He's talking about a collective security arrangement for Asia and there was some language in that speech that seems to be targeted against the United States. But if you look at other language you realize this particular organization has 26 members plus some observers. And of those 26 members 19 are not in East Asia they're basically relevant to Central Asia not to East Asia. And President Xi emphasized that no country should dominate the security of a region and all countries have a right to their security independence from other countries. Was that really targeted at the United States or was that targeted at Russian security ambitions in Asia? I lean toward the latter interpretation because of the locus of where he made the speech. That doesn't mean that there were not elements that were aimed at the United States but it suggests the complexity of the Sino-Russian relationship we should be very careful to do our homework before we jump to premature conclusions. Great, thank you, State. Prime Minister Redd, you certainly traveled to Beijing a lot and have embarked upon this very ambitious project up at Harvard to help think about these issues. So I wonder if maybe you would frame a little bit about how this is all seen through Beijing's eyes and how you think that sets the strategic framework going forward. Good, thanks very much. It's, I take very much State Brewer's comments just now about complexity. And there is too ready a tendency to translate complex developments into a snappy phrase which then causes us to reach false strategic conclusions. That's the first caveat which we should all apply to a serious study of international relations and strategic affairs. Second point therefore which arises in my mind is when we look at both the content and the symbolism of the recent summits between Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping and Shanghai, what does it actually mean as opposed to what everyone theorizes it as meaning? And in the grand sweep of China, Russia or Sino-Soviet relations as it used to be, does it mean a lot? And within that frame, are we looking at a dramatic event which fundamentally turns the dial in the arrangements which Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon and Mao and Joe Enlai reached effectively in the early 1970s which was a strategic accommodation between Washington and Beijing based on a common strategic neuralgia towards the then Soviet Union. That was of genuine global strategic significance and the subsequent unfolding of what then became modernizing China as well. Have we reached a new point at which that fundamental axis has now changed? I think personally that the Shanghai meeting represents the culmination of forces which have been in work for quite some time in the China-Russia relationship and the China-US relationship which begin fundamentally to alter the premises of the 1972 strategic concord. The second point I would seek to go to is how then our analysis to one side is this reality viewed from Beijing and then finally, although I am no Russophile and no Russia expert and no Sovietologist by training, based on recent travels to Moscow, I'll hazard my arm on how some of these realities are viewed from Moscow as well. On the China view of reality, I think it's always important to go back to the fundamental principles of what are China's abiding national interests and how it currently perceives those through the Standing Committee of the Politburo under Xi Jinping's leadership and where does the Russia dimension fit into that equation? The first point, if you are sitting around the table of the Standing Committee of the Politburo at present, whether it's articulated or not, it's certainly assumed that the number one interest of the Standing Committee of the Politburo is to preserve the Communist Party and power. It is not something that we should simply smile about and pass on from because when you look at the current dynamics of Russian politics and the Russian leadership, there is no critique coming from Moscow nor has there been for a long, long time in terms of the viability, the credibility of a one-party state. And so in terms of regime fundamentals, to state the obvious, but we should restate it, you do not have a rolling critique of the fundamental nature of Chinese political power under the Communist system coming from Moscow. And that is of some genuine comfort to China, given the volume of critique it obtains from the rest of the world in the sustaining its current political and political economic model. Number two, from the Chinese national interest point of view is this, the maintenance of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Well, there's nothing remarkable about that. That's the same discussions we have around any cabinet table and any capital in the world. But applying specifically to the Russian question, this is, I believe, profound significance. Number one, the fact that in that period, post-89, starting with that epoch-making meeting between Gorbachev and Dung in the middle of 1989, which began the settlement process of the Soviet Chinese then Russian Chinese border, that has provided the fundamental long-term security from a Chinese perspective, about the vast expanse of 4,300 kilometers of the land border across the North. Any student of Chinese history will tell you that the highest levels of Chinese strategic concern have always existed in terms of what comes rolling across your frontiers from the North. From the former and later Han dynasties right through until the Manchu invasions of the 17th century. And if you include Japan within the wider North, or frankly into the 20th century as well. The strategic significance of effectively settling the Russian Chinese border, which occurred in a process beginning in that meeting in 89 and concluding with the Amal River negotiations and agreements most recently, is of profound strategic significance. Because the core point is this, China no longer regards Russia as a threat. And this is a deep, deep question, which has been resolved from a long period in history. Therefore, when we look at China's territorial integrity and territorial claims, the focus now is no longer on this vast terrestrial border, but on India in one direction and on its maritime disputes and borders on the other with Japan and Southeast Asia. The third national interest of China and where Russia again fits into this is, of course, the paramount importance attached to the transformation of the Chinese economic growth model. The number one, number two, number three priorities, national security to one side of this leadership is how do you transform the model which has served China's economic modernization from 1978 to 2012, 13 into a new model, which is essentially based on domestic private consumption replacing public investment as the primary drivers of economic growth. Secondly, priority also attached to the growth in the services industries as opposed to traditional labor intensive and energy intensive manufacturing. And number three, with a greater role for private firms in relation to state and enterprises into the future. This is where the bulk of this governments, this leadership in China's energies are currently focused. And therefore, where does Russia fit into that? The underpinnings of the old growth model and the new growth model, and this is where state's contribution has been so particularly important, lies in long-term energy security and food security. And across the energy security, security of raw material supply and food security questions, China sees in Russia a potential long-term, huge strategic partner, yet to be fully articulated, yet to be fully expressed, but of direct and fundamental significance to the continuation of this transforming process of China's path to economic modernity. Number four is this, that within the framework of these other three sets of interests, China, however, in the period since, I think we could probably point it to October, November, last year, or maybe September, October last year, in a major national conference on diplomatic work, articulated a new approach to its diplomacy, at least in East Asia, and certainly with its neighboring states. And this is of relevance to Russia as well. The Russia problem having been resolved, China's new, and the best word to describe it is, proactive foreign policy. Some would describe it as assertive foreign policy. The Chinese word is funfair your way, and open to multiple definitions, and there is no official one, but basically I hang a lot more active than it used to be. I think that's what we could safely define it in the modern Oxford or Webster dictionary of international relations, whichever side of the pond you happen to be on. But you don't have to simply be an international relations theorist and observer of statements to conclude that Chinese diplomacy has become infinitely more active across the East Asian hemisphere, in the last six months plus, and we can point to the manifestation that in various domains of security policy as well. And more broadly, multilaterally as well, as individual multilateral agreements come up for renegotiation or reconsideration, China is now actively asserting its views about how the redraft of any existing international government should unfold. Why this is relevant to the Russia relationship is China finds a large scale strategic partner, providing it with diplomatic leverage in various of these negotiations, but not all of them, and correct emphasis was placed before on direct conflicts of diplomatic interest over the question of the Ukraine. But on balance, the Chinese find that this is a very useful strategic addition to their repertoire. To conclude, a few thoughts on how this is viewed from a Russian perspective. I spent a week in Moscow recently in the last two, three months with one single question for all my Russian interlocutors. What is Russia's long term view of China? And I spoke with a whole range of people across government and semi-government circles. And there's a high degree of coalescence between Russian interests and those which I've just described as being Chinese, but there are a significant degree of non-coalescences as well. And it's important to be clear about them. When you roll in the door and ask a senior Russian diplomat these days, so how's it going with China, Chris? The response is along the lines of, best it's been in 450 years. So to which I would then say it's been a bit rough of late, has it? But there's something in it, because if you look at this grand narrative between Russia and China, going back to the enormous territorial acquisitions for one of a better term of Peter the Great, through to the present, this is by and large a very sharp and contankerous relationship throughout history, including in the Sino-Soviet period, for most of it, not all of it. And therefore when you ask, well, why is that the case? And then the answers flow recently, quickly and freely. Number one, China does not challenge the legitimacy of our own political arrangements. Number two, the economic potential of this relationship provides us with a huge ability to sustain ourself from any sort of economic pressures coming from elsewhere and frankly become a much bigger driver of growth in the future than we've ever seen in the past. Remember, by natural economic trade between the two at the present, it's only about 70 or 80 billion U.S. with Australia I think it's about 150 billion or more. But that 70 billion has grown from nowhere in the space of about five to seven years. So the trajectory that they see is huge and of course the juxtaposition against Western sanctions over the Ukraine on the energy question is clear and transparent to us all. So our Russian friends have imbibed that very deeply. And finally, of more interest to them, perhaps than to China until recently, has been the fact that they could work together in pursuit of what's been described already as multipolarity in the global world's based order, which basically means anything which lessens U.S. influence in the global world's based order, as acting as a sole power, a unilateral power or one driving consensus against its own interest. And then to conclude on, but what are the anxieties in Moscow? And this I think is equally relevant to our deliberations. The anxieties have already been pointed to in part, but when you scratch the surface in Moscow, the deep anxiety is over the great strategic competition in Central Asia. And this is profound in its deep. The five stands are very much seen as part of a Russian sphere of influence given where they have existed most recently historically in terms of the composition of the Soviet Union. Within that frame, Kazakhstan is a particular significance, simply given its geographical size but the abundance of its resources. And the Russian concern is that over time, just given the sheer weight of economic power that China has within its possession, it will overwhelm Central Asia simply by the volume of its economic presence, leading this tenuous thread of an ongoing security relationship with Moscow, which will ultimately then be overwhelmed. And the final point of which the Chinese abstention on the question of the Crimean annexation resolution before the UN Security Council is also, I think, relevant. Russia is an enormously proud country, enormously proud of its history and still believing deeply that it has a long national future ahead of it. There is, I think, a deep concern in Russia about if and when China starts indicating to Russia what it should do in terms of global diplomacy through the United Nations system. And this, I believe, is a very deeply entrenched concern in terms of how the ultimate power realities have played out between the two of them on the global stage, most particularly through the mechanisms of the UN. To conclude on this one sentence, when you ask our Chinese friends, how do you now characterize the Russian relationship? Their form of language is not, it's the best it's been in 450 years. Their phrase and Chinese leaders, in my experience, choose these phrases carefully is one which describes the China-Russia relationship as one of a collaborative strategic partnership. And so what does that mean? And this is where I think we should conclude that within the framework of that collaborative political, diplomatic and strategic behavior, what we are likely to see, quite apart from a BRICS framework but exclusively on a bilateral framework, more and more intense political, diplomatic and strategic policy coordination between the two of them. And if the Shanghai meeting represented anything, for me it was that, but within the framework of events unfolding over a long period of time, which have set the redial on the 1972 deep changes to the strategic architecture engineered by American political leadership at the time. Great, thank you, Kevin. Dr. Brzezinski, I know you have to leave in a few minutes, so I'd like to give you the opportunity to maybe respond to our other two panelists' comments. And also I wanted to pick up in particular on a thread you raised, which I think is so very important in your remarks, which is this issue of the trajectory of Russian imperial sort of dominance of the region where we think that's going. And then in particular, how you see that playing in the Central Asian context, especially with the Eurasian Union effort with very few members in the room. Well, it was announced. First of all, I think we're basically in agreement. There may be some differences of emphasis, but I think we're in agreement that this is an extremely complex relationship, but also in terms of the Russian-Chinese aspect of it, there is a significant asymmetry between what China can do and what Russia can do under the current circumstances. The one point with which perhaps I would emphasize different aspects or define it so much differently is this issue of the territorial relationship between China and Russia. It's absolutely correct that the Chinese take the position that legally everything's solved and they still buy it. But I have also been struck by the fact that in private conversations, some Chinese are beginning to bring it up, are beginning to bring it up. Now, where that will take them, we don't know. But in one respect, we already do know. Namely, the competition for influence in Central Asia, to which Mr. Roth just referred to, is in part competition in regards to territories that in a broad sense, the Chinese in the past view has somehow subordinate to their sphere of influence. And for the Russians, it's a central issue as to whether they can be incorporated into this elusive and relatively vague concept of the Eurasian Union. I spoke to one top level Chinese official who in kind of friendly conversation and which we sort of talked about the last several decades and in which he talked about the future. And I realized that no conversation of that type is ever truly friendly, but at least the tone was that. He did say to me suddenly, and I want you to know that we are really moving westward. And when I heard that, I was kind of baffled for a few seconds and the thoughts flashed through my mind. Is he talking about some special relationship between China and Germany maybe, or the Western Europe or the Union? And then of course it quickly dawned on me. No, he was talking about Central Asia. And he started to amplify, amplifying all the different undertakings that the Chinese are pursuing. The effect of which is of course, a more cooperative relationship with Central Asia, but also a relationship in which their influence rises and someone else's inevitably declines. And then of course there is the attitude of the Central Asians themselves. Part of their game right now, and that's been done diplomatically by Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, far less diplomatically by Karimov of Uzbekistan is to limit the significance of the Eurasian Union, in part not only by open opposition or reluctance, but in part also simply by enhancing the relationship with the Chinese. Nazarbayev now always emphasizes that this is the Eurasian Economic Union, very important qualification. And Karimov more or less bluntly told the Russians where to go and has invited a NATO office to be opened up in Tashkent, which has a kind of echo to the previous comment. So I think this is where the contest to some extent is beginning perhaps to be nurtured. I don't think it's going to expand dramatically or rashly, but I think in the Chinese redefinition of their position in the world, they are no longer so inclined to ignore the fact that at one point in a significant fashion, Russia benefited by expanding territorially at China's expense, and that this had Jewish strategic consequences for China that were negative, and that perhaps we're entering a period which in a subtle fashion, but a determined fashion, some of these asymmetries can now be reduced or reversed. And what happens in Russia will then affect that. If Russia at some point becomes a committed long-term enemy of the United States, it has to be associated with China and de facto as a subordinate. If Russia however chooses to democratize after Putin is gone, it might be able to enhance its capacity to retain its position in the Far East if it really becomes part of the West and of Europe, especially. I once wrote something to the effect that in those circumstances, Vladivostok will surely and safely be Russian, but especially so if a lot of the people living in it are Germans and French and Poles and Portuguese in a more united Europe. And that I think is the big sort of geopolitical uncertainty that confronts this relationship and a lot of it will depend on how the American-Chinese relationship unfolds. If we can keep it stable and cooperative, that is to the good. I refer to the Chinese really, I think in some cases very unnecessarily hostile or ironic articles about us. One recent example, the Chinese military organ reported on the visit by our defense secretary, Chuck Hagel, to their aircraft carrier. And they have long asked us to invite them to ours. So we invited them to ours, the Reagan one called Reagan. The Chinese are now making a great deal in that particular statement of the fact that our aircraft carrier is so much more modern, so much more effective, so much capable of being threatening than theirs, that this is an invitation that they're deliberately designed to humiliate. That shows some of the potential tensions here. But I think we have to strive more seriously to averted, they have to strive seriously to averted. And Sinhua had just had a long editorial for the first one that I've seen in the last two years, emphasizing precisely at that point that America and China have to resume striving for genuine partnership, that things they're hinting have somewhat slipped, and that it isn't so easy just to point fingers one side and say they're all at fault. And I happen to agree with that. I think we have helped to make it more difficult and tense. They have done it too. And I think we'd better take a second look. Staple, I wanted to follow up on a comment of yours. Oh, I got that. Yeah, thanks. Excuse me, thank you very much. You know, you mentioned this issue of the Chinese clearly making a compromise with regard to the gas deal in terms of how it's structured and so on. One issue that hasn't come up, and it didn't seem to come up much, at least publicly in the Putin-Xi summit, is the whole issue of defense cooperation. My sense is that that has started to shift as well in terms of the dynamic. I think the Russians had been long resistant to sell the Chinese Finnish systems. There was a long dormant period there where they were not engaging in any kind of major cooperation in that area. Interestingly, when President Xi first took office and went to Moscow, CCTV seemed to think there was a deal for both fighter craft and naval vessels. The Russians were quick to say, I don't think so. So do you have any sense, I think it's too early to tell as to whether there was a defense cooperative component in this whole gas piece and so on or just where you think the trajectory in that part of the relationship is going? Because I think it is really the other key piece to the energy relationship, at least, to store. I think there's a growing defense cooperative piece between Russia and China, but I think it's shifting from a military supply relationship in which Russia has provided more advanced military equipment, particularly in terms of fighter aircraft and submarines than the Chinese were producing, but not providing their best technology. And now it's shifting toward more military cooperation and a sense of combined operations. There was a joint naval exercise. There's a technical term in a room during the meeting in Shanghai. And their naval units have been doing some joint exercises together involving other components of the military. I suspect we may see that type of cooperation expanding. But the other side of it is Chinese military technology has been catching up very rapidly. And now China is beginning to be able to produce cutting edge military technology in certain areas. I think as a strategic goal, China does not want to be dependent on Russia for its most advanced weapon systems. To the extent that Russia is prepared to sell them, China may still be interested in buying, but my impression is that the military sales from Russia to China have decreased quite sharply as China has caught up in its own capabilities. Great. Kevin, you talked a little bit in your remarks about the domestic politics in Moscow, kind of how they see things, and also a little bit on the Chinese. But I wonder if you might expand a little bit on how you think the domestic politics in China factor into this relationship. Well, every diplomatic observer has to conclude that any country's international policy posture at a given time in history is always shaped by domestic political realities. And the only question is by how much? And whether that's positive or negative. I think what we have with Xi Jinping, and I've spent some time with him as Prime Minister and some time in conversations with him, is a unique, post-Dung product. And that is very self-assured, very self-confident. I think a leader who self-describes himself as a strategist and a grand strategist in terms of where China goes for the future. Very comfortable with the exercise of power. As I've said before, perhaps here or elsewhere, not so much primus into pares, but primus. And as a consequence, wields an extraordinary political influence within the system. Of a type we have not seen, I believe, since Dung, which has appeared effectively since Dung's Southern Expedition 1992. We may agree or disagree on the detail of that, but I haven't seen anything like this in the last 20 years or so. So that's point number one. Point number two is the domestic preoccupations are huge. We've spoken already about the challenges on the question of China's economic transformation process, which are formidable and complex in their own right if no other challenge existed of any other character. But number two is this. Because Xi Jinping, based on what I described earlier, is national priority number one, which is to keep the Chinese Communist Party in power, has launched an anti-corruption campaign of the type I have not seen in my years of analyzing modern Chinese politics, and certainly unprecedented at least since the late 1970s. And so this is taking an enormous amount of domestic political energy at the moment. And you've seen it applied both to the military, which is significant in itself, the recent public humiliation of the former Chief of General Staff, Xu Tai-Hou, as well as what's happening within the utmost high levels of the Chinese Communist Party leadership proper. This is massive. Now, one of the open speculations at present is the extent to which this is creating domestic forces for reaction within China itself. But on the trying to therefore take those two sets of realities out to the broader equation is how is that those dynamics affecting China's international relations posture and how is it driving the question of the Russian relationship in particular? I think because of Xi Jinping's authority within the system, what I observe, and I stand to be corrected by others who follow this more closely, is a high degree of chemistry between he and Vladimir Putin. If you follow Chinese domestic media sites and Twitter sites or Web or sites, Putin is very popular domestically within China as a strong leader who is seen to be able to take it up to the United States and take it up to the West. And as a consequence because Xi Jinping sees himself as his nation's strategic architect for the period ahead. I believe that these large moves in terms of a closening in the relationship with Russia, a firmer posture in foreign policy terms towards the rest of East Asia and the neighboring states in particular and those with whom there are border disputes in particular are all part of a strategic evaluation, a reevaluation of where China sees its interest long term. The third leg of that, of course, is what he announced last year in terms of a new type of strategic relationship with the United States. As Dr. Brzezinski said before he left, that's the one which has kind of been swinging in the breeze a bit for the last 12 months. And if there's some suturing which needs to occur, it is taking that headline, which both President Obama and Xi Jinping have broadly agreed with and giving it content. But that's now quite a rocky road. So there's that, the movement towards Russia, no progress on a new type of great power relationship with America and a new proactive diplomacy to use the Chinese definition of Fen'faiyue Wei with the neighboring states. I think as a projection in some respects of the Xi Jinping dominant personality and his analysis about where he wants to take China for the future. Great. State that you want to add to that at all? No, that's fine. Okay, well, we'll turn it over to the audience now and we welcome your questions. As a standard practice here at CSIS, if you would identify yourself and let us know which organization you're with and do please try to confine yourself to a fairly brief question. The gentleman in the back there, please wait for the microphone. Barry Wood, RTHK at Hong Kong. Mr. Rudd, could you say something about the BRICS and how both China and Russia relate to it and specifically the plan to set up a development bank? I wonder if this is a means of cooperating in Central Asia? Well, the BRICS has been around as a strategic concept. I think we can thank Foreign Affairs magazine for giving the BRICS its first definition and whoever wrote the article, I think it was from Goldman's at the time which wedded together the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and who else have I left out? South Africa. Thank you. And whether it becomes BRICSY, by the way, if you include Indonesia as there is some diplomacy underway and has been underway for some time about the possibility of doing that. Two, it has been a strategic concept which has, in many respects, formed a ballast around China in its internal negotiations with other states who are members of the G20 on the economic front. The BRICS meets it not just at head of government level, head of state level, it meets at foreign ministers level, it meets at finance ministers level. And often when you go to major summits around the world there is essentially an agreed BRICS position. Certainly I had experience of that in 2009 at the climate change conference in Copenhagen where there was a BRICS position going into that conference. On the specific proposal for an infrastructure bank then there is, which has now been agreed, at least at principle, this will be largely driven by Chinese financial capital, I think that's accepted. There's an active debate about where it's located, therefore whether it becomes in China or some recent debates about whether it's actually lodged in Jakarta as a potential, shall I say, bridge to our friends in Indonesia, but recognizing the Republic of Indonesia is gonna become one of the 10 largest economies in the world before too much longer. A quarter of a billion people live there, growth in recent decade of about six to seven percent, and massive infrastructure needs. So in terms of the political symbolism attached to such an infrastructure bank and its place within the Asian hemisphere, I think it aids China's strategic and foreign policy interests, but I'd say this is one caveat. The amount of capital which this thing is going to have at its disposal is relatively limited against regional and global needs. Private financial markets will be the principle source of capital into regional infrastructure needs, and on top of the existing multilateral development banks. So I think in terms of adding capital, financial capital to the region to meet its infrastructure needs, the region's infrastructure needs, it's all fine and dandy, but you should see it in the context of, frankly, the sheer volume of need and the volume of private capital which is interested in these areas of investment as well. Yeah, in the middle here. Thank you, Chen Weihua, China Daily. I would ask some China foreign policy experts say that despite China being ruled by the Communist Party in Russia no longer, but US-China relations seems to be better than US-Russia relations. How, why is that, can you explain? And secondly, do you think the triangle relationship is going to involve, I mean, much further? I don't think as a problem as the Cold War days, but do you think it's going to involve much further? Thank you. I'll begin with an answer, but I think Prime Minister Rudd can weigh in on this very effectively also. I think that recent developments in East Asia and in Europe have tended to push China and Russia closer together. And I think that's one of the factors that produce the gas deal that we have been discussing here. They've been negotiating for 10 years over price and all of a sudden the pieces fall together. I think it's not accidental that the United States relationship with China has developed much more positively than Russian-Chinese relations. If you look at our bilateral trade, it now runs over $500 billion a year. Russian trade with China is still under $100 billion a year. Russia is now interested in diversifying away from Europe on the gas level, but if you look at the trade statistics, Russia's number one trading partner, both for exports and for imports is Europe, the EU. China is second in terms of both exports and imports now, but the differential between the EU trade and the China trade is very sharp. I'm talking about four or five times larger in the case of the EU. So that China has been able to develop certain areas of cooperation with Russia that have been beneficial to China. And I've earlier referred to military technology, for example, as one of those. But in terms of modernizing its economy, in terms of the expertise needed, namely what you are taught in universities about development and about business management, China has largely turned to the Western countries and particularly the United States, not to Russia, as it did in the past. And as I mentioned, until recently, Russia has been resistant to overcommitting itself to the development of China. I think it's too early to tell whether or not the recent cooperative trends will be extended into the future for a long period of time. For example, Japan also shares a strong interest in getting expanded access to the natural resources in Siberia and the eastern territories of Russia. And I wouldn't be surprised if you were to see a Russian-Japanese deal involving oil gas, timber, other types of minerals that they are interested in developing. So I think this is something we have to watch. There's no question that the Sino-Russian relationship at the moment is at a high point. But I don't think that China has lost sight of the fact that the United States still, in very important respects, is much more important to its ability to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, which as Xi Jinping puts it, is the China dream. I think just to add to that briefly, on the triangular aspect which you made as part of the second part of your question, from China's perspective, my judgment is that China sees strategic leverage to be obtained by an improved relationship with Moscow. And I think that informs part of recent decisions. It doesn't explain all of them. But I think that is reality. Secondly, however, China in doing so has been simultaneously active in reaffirming the principles which govern its relationship with Russia. And these are not new, but continuing since the days of Yeltsin, really. And that is principles of, first of all, there will be no alliance, may or may not. The second one is that there will be no conflict. Now, the third is not directed to the third party, and so the Chinese I've noticed in recent commentary have actually continued to emphasize that in order to discourage the view that this is actually heading in the direction of some form of informal or even formal military alliance with Russia. I think that's important to bear that in mind. There is strategic leverage is one thing. Strategic alliance is another. And we need to be clear in our thinking of that as well. But here's the third point about the strategic triangle, which I do think is important for the medium to long term. And that is China has internally concluded that it is being contained by the United States. That's its internal conclusion. Whether we support that conclusion, agree with it analytically or not, is to some extent beside the point. That is very much their internal conclusion. And in part explains China's behavior in relation to the triangular relationship. And therefore, what I described earlier as being mindful of not oversimplifying the complex, a shift in the dynamics of the triangle, which have been unfolding for quite some time. And I think the extent of that shift has been in many respects symbolized by the recent Shanghai meeting. It doesn't go from strategic neutrality to strategic leverage onto strategic alliance. But I think the nature of the triangle is now significantly changed from that which Dr. Kissinger and others engineered with the Chinese leadership in the first half of the 1970s. I always try to resist the desire to play player coach. But to throw in a brief comment on that, I think especially on the triangular relationship, I mean, I think it's important to look at two things in the way that Chinese are describing the relationship that are quite important. The first is this fact that there is, they're calling for a new style of great power relations, but only with the United States. The Russians aren't included. And I think that says something about how they see that triangle developing these days. But I think the second very important point to take into consideration here with regard to the Russia relationship is how does China intend to use the relationship with the Russians to balance the relationship with the United States? And in particular, to the degree that they see having an active Russia card or option, I think actually under the umbrella of managing Sino-US relations is really a critical factor. And I think some Chinese would argue that if we, the United States, I think in their terms they would say are foolish enough to allow them to maintain that active card, then that's our fault in the strategic triangular relationship. Next question, right up front here. Thank you. My name is Jeanine Wetwood, Voice of Vietnamese Americans. I thank Prime Minister Roe and Ambassador Roy and Chris. You mentioned Prime Minister Roe, the Shanghai communique in the 70s, and the recent Shanghai, and then Dr. Johnson now also mentioned the trilateral and the balance. I remember you have talked about equilibrium of powers in Asia, and I'm most concerned about Southeast Asia and the current situation in the South China Sea. So I'm going to ask you, as the leader of Australia, where do you see the role of Australia and all the allies, US allies, Pacific allies in that region, especially with the current situation in the Southeast China Sea or the South China Sea, with China actively, assertively, aggressively invaded, it did invaded Vietnam and all the countries, especially the Philippines, the Scarabosho, the EEC of Vietnam, partly Paracels by force, and there had been people killed recently, ship sank, two ship sank, and right now we have about more than 100 vessels, Chinese vessels in that area, including air forces and all the military efforts. Okay, thank you. I've got the thrust there. Firstly, I'm not the Prime Minister, but... Yeah. But you play on my TV. That's a different bloke, Tony Abbott, so... You all look the same. Ouch. Americans, I can never tell them apart myself. Talk the same, you and the guys from Mississippi, it's all the same actually. So we continue this. Anyway, let's go to the core elements of your question, which is one of what is unfolding in the maritime space and secondly, what policy should be considered in response to it. I think it is fair to say that I have not seen such activity in these maritime zones, both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. I think at least since the mid-70s, and you could have an argument about that in terms of what happened in the South China Sea before then. And it is at a more fractious state than I have seen certainly in my diplomatic career, which began in the early 80s. And so that causes me concern. It causes me concern for one particular reason. And we have never taken a position on who's right and wrong on territorial dispute for the simple reason is the complexity is just mind-boggling. And that's why you have other dispute resolution mechanisms available. However, what worries me is what I've said repeatedly about the danger of conflict through miscalculation. And poor incident management. There is a piece of mathematics here, which people who fly aircraft and drive ships usually tell you about, which is the more metal you've got in a given space, at any given time, the more likely they're likely to hit each other. And therefore, if that is the case, we now have literally hundreds of assets rolling around the place. In particular zones at particular times, with varying degrees of skill on the part of those who are driving these assets, then incident management becomes very, incident probability is high. Incident management, therefore, enters into the equation. And so when I read reports of aircraft in the East China Sea, originally passing within 35 meters of each other at considerable speed, I become deeply anxious about, A, the probability of incidents, but B, most particularly, about the absence of protocols for the handling of incidents once they occur. And so for me, what I become quite electric about in this current environment and worries me deeply is notwithstanding all the preexisting strategic tensions which exist, the historical animosities which exist, the political disagreements which currently pertain. It is simply the rising mathematical probability of an incident, the absence of protocols to management, manage such an incident, and therefore the risk of escalation of the incident into a high level of conflict. And you don't have to be a Rhodes scholar in international relations to work out, there's a few historical precedents for this. So that's what really worries me. You asked about my country. I'm a guy who has advocated for the last five or six years that in order to construct effective confidence and security building measures in Asia, we need to over time begin the construction of what I have called in a speech in 2008 as Prime Minister, an Asia Pacific community. People might see that as lofty and idealistic, I do not. I see it as something beginning with the most basic forms of political security and economic cooperation and building step by step to paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, Mordechit Ogoha, step by step across the river as one level of trust builds into another. We don't have any institution like that at the moment. And while these institutions do not solve necessarily fundamental preexisting conflicts, they can take the edge off them. And that's the experience of the European Union. And so it's my proposal. 2010, through some Australian diplomacy with others, we managed to get America and Russia into the East Asian Summit. They're all around the one table now. It has an open agenda to discuss political, economic, strategic, whatever questions you want. My strong argument is we should now begin using it. And item number one should be a region wide protocol for managing incidents in the air and incidents at sea across all the armed forces and the naval forces because those who are prospective, shall I say, participants in an incident, participants in an incident, you're now talking about seven or eight sets of armed forces across air force, civilian aircraft, I'm not civilian, customs aircraft, customs and patrol boats, naval aircraft, fishing vessels, state-owned, non-state-owned. I mean, this Rubik's Cube of complexity is such that you need some governing protocols. So that's where I believe we should go. Right here. Steve Wendrits, researcher, I just sort of follow up on that comment that you just made. Isn't the structure of alliances that's developing or does exist now in East Asia actually complicate the situation which would arise if there were a very serious incident of the type that you were just imagining? And I was struck by the comment of a Chinese analyst who said, well, one thing we don't, Chinese don't really understand is how to deal with these alliances. I mean, we have Japan, America Alliance, we have Philippines, America Alliance, I mean, we can deal with a country, okay, one at a time, but we're not so familiar here. And isn't the sort of worry about the way the alliances play into the possibility of a serious incident and sort of pulling everybody in what's led to the recent books, for example, by Hugh White and Malcolm Frazier, really questioning what might happen here? Yeah, I fundamentally disagree with the work by Hugh White and for a whole range of reasons, which I won't go into, but let me just go to the question of alliances. What do all these alliances such as the United States have in East Asia have in common? Most of them by and large predate the emergence of the People's Republic of China or certainly any strategic capacity of the People's Republic of China to constitute a perceived threat to anybody. Let's take the Australian alliance called ANZUS, which has formed in 1952. If you look at the diplomatic history there, why did we end up with an ANZUS alliance in 1951, 1952? Even though we'd been allies during the war and allies during the First World War. We end up with that, but that was the price to pay for the US-Japan peace treaty and the US-Japan security treaty because politicians in Australia at the time, having just been through the Second World War, were not about to be passive on the question of any future emergence of a militaristic Japan. And so the entire strategic frame within which that was put together, nothing to do with China, let me tell you, was also to do with a threat as it was perceived from China where we'd just lost a whole bunch of people in the Second World War and Japan and the Second World War and where we're going to go into the future. And so it is if you look at the alliance structures across most of East Asia, the Japanese one, the Korean one is obviously different because of the Korean War, that with Thailand and the Philippines, frankly they come out of different historical circumstances. So the idea that these things have their origin in or their current manifestation in an anti-Chinese form of strategic behavior, I think begs a whole lot of further analysis. There's a further question too. If you're a bunch of Australians occupying a continent as large as the United States and there are 23 million of you, then which is half the population of California, with an economy the size of the Netherlands, well no, something about the size of the Republic of Korea, it kind of makes sense to be our ally with someone who you've had a few things to do with over the last 100 years. And so against whatever future contingencies might unfold, if you're responsible for 32,000 kilometers of coastline, just more than you guys are going to look after on the basis of that as an independent nation. So when you say, yeah, yeah, alliance, not a bad idea. Steve, do you want to toss in the words? Do you want to? I'll just very briefly comment on the fact. Perhaps our alliance structures confuse the Chinese who would prefer to sort of deal bilaterally with these issues. I think it's very important, however, that they read and understand the nature of our alliances. They're fundamentally defensive, but in the case of both the Japan alliance and the Philippine alliance. In the case of Philippine alliance, an attack on a Philippine ship or aircraft anywhere in the Pacific is covered by the alliance. In the case of the Japan one, it applies to areas administered by Japan, not simply to Japanese territory as recognized by the United States. The Chinese don't like us to point this out, but the reason we pointed out is to avoid inadvertence, misunderstanding of the nature of alliances. Now the other side of the coin is equally strong. The United States does not want to get into conflict with China or any other country over essentially minor territorial issues involving uninhabited rocks in the South China or East China Sea. We haven't lost our good sense in wanting to be a good ally of these countries. The purpose of the allies was to protect them against aggression, not against provocative behavior over disputed territories of the sort that's occurring. Basically the American approach, I would add a third element. We did not sign the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea that was signed by China and the 10 Southeast Asian countries in 2002. But if you look at the statement of then Secretary of Defense Panetta two years ago, you will find the American position is based exactly on the principles that were set out in the Declaration of Parties. Peaceful resolution of disputes, no threat or use of force, no provocative actions, efforts to constructively approach differences. If the principles of that declaration had been carried out by all of the signatories, we wouldn't have the current levels of tension in the South China Sea. And we believe in those principles and we deal with our allies in terms of upholding those principles, but we also will be allies if they are subjected to unprovoked aggression. Great, well I think we've just about reached time so I want to thank you both for your very insightful comments and Dr. Przensky and Emsensya and really appreciate the audience's participation as usual. Please thank me.