 Thank you very much, Marcella, and my other panel members for very interesting presentations. Now it comes to me to offer some thoughts, and as Marcella mentioned, I'm from the World Food Program, so we're one of the larger humanitarian organizations, both looking at emergency response, but also the transition towards development and recovery. So I'll try to give some reflections on that. I think John actually did a great job of sort of making the case for me, the association between conflict and hunger. I've never seen it put so clearly before. It's always sort of an assumption or something that we infer from context that we're familiar with, but it's very, I don't know if it's actually heartening to see that in numbers or not. At least we can be clear that that is there. But what I wanted to start, before I actually touch on the presentations themselves, is to put this in the context of the theme of this session, which is economic recovery and development. And what we heard today were sort of research and introspection on very specific elements of the impact of conflict on societies and how societies themselves may change or adapt to conflict. But what I'd like to look at is what does that tell us about how we actually contribute to peace as an international community that is delivering services in both emergency and development contexts? What lessons can we start to draw from this? I'll start from a WFP perspective. And I think it's instructive because what we're seeing right now is, as John actually sort of put forward, is we're seeing an explosion in humanitarian requirements. And it's driven by, we often talk about sort of the three C's. So it's conflict, it's climate change, and it's cost. So we see that the cost of food and other inputs increasing dramatically in the last period. The most recent, there's a report that was just issued last week, actually, the Global Report on Food Crises. It's been a report that's been released by WFP, FAO, and many other partners, including the EU, for the past six or seven years. And we've seen a tremendous increase in the number of people who are critically food insecure across the world over that period. So as of the end of last year, we had 193 million people across the world that were in acute food insecurity. Of those, 40 million were facing emergency food insecurity. So that means that without humanitarian assistance, they would die. That's an 80% increase since the first report in 2016. And it's linked with the increase that we've seen in conflict around the world. And in fact, we estimate that approximately 60% of these people who are critically food insecure are partially food insecure as a result of conflict, at least partially, if not, if not more. So as much as we want to talk about recovery and how we contribute to creating more socially just and sustainable societies, we also have to look at what we do in the here and now in terms of our response. Because it's not just the forward planning, but it's how we start to put the building blocks of peace contribution and recovery into the humanitarian phase that really, this is, I suppose, where we have the opportunity right now to forestall some of the needs that we see coming up in the future. And so as WFP, we've been looking at this quite critically internally. What is, you know, as we're reaching 130 million people with food assistance, whether that's cash or food every year, what can we do differently to try to generate positive peace outcomes, to try to stabilize situations. And so we've been working with the Stockholm Institute for SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, to look at what the impacts of our own programs are. And we're just one of many humanitarian actors. And we see that there are positive sort of avenues that we can contribute to peace. But they really require us to understand the context and to design and deliver our programs in a way that reflects the lived realities of the people that are in those and the different tensions that exist between communities and also in terms of government power structures, etc. So, I mean, what we've looked at have been what types of programs we deliver as a just a directly emergency assistance. Is it a conditional form of assistance that involves communities brings them together to build communal assets, to work across resource divides? Who are we actually reaching with that assistance? Are we truly targeting the most vulnerable? And we know that great, you know, the power inequality is both a root of food insecurity and of conflict. So it's very important that you actually target your assistance to those that'll benefit most. We've looked at the modalities that we use. This doesn't matter if we give people food or if we give people cash and we've seen if we give people cash and we link it to financial inclusion. That's another positive contribution to peace. And then we look at the whole idea of how do we measure this? How do we actually ensure that what we're doing is the right thing? And all three of these things together help us to work more in a nexus approach. And so this is what I wanted to talk about now as we reflect on the panel presentations, what they are sort of giving us in terms of inspiration and ideas on the way forward. So Irma talked about the prevalence of minority religious politicians in an Indian context. And her research showed that where there are higher numbers of, in this case, Muslim state legislators in government, that we saw a reduction in international violence between various religious groups, in this case Hindus and Muslims. But what she hadn't yet taken us through is what are the real mechanisms that are driving this? And so we see that in our interventions, should we be looking at how we include, how we increase political participation? Is there a positive impact in the fact that if you have representation of minority groups in politics that that creates a greater awareness and greater trust amongst populations? Or is there what I would call more of a negative sort of mechanism or pathway where in fact having those people in power means that they can use the mechanisms of the state to reduce the amount of violence? Both are good in terms of violence reduction, but which one is going to be, is there a way that we can promote the first so that there's a greater understanding between communities? Leandro spoke about the impact of peace building, peacekeeping operations on women's fertility, particularly in Liberia context, but I think we can generalize or I hope we can generalize to say that this type of stabilization has shown positive impacts. What's not clear, I think, yet from your research is, you know, is it constrained to women's fertility? Or could there be other ancillary benefits? And what is the driver? Is it the sort of security that's created by the presence of peacekeepers? Or is it the fact that, you know, at the country level, many different organizations come together and try to package a delivery of services around peacekeeping missions as well? Of course that's supported by the security that's provided, but there's also a greater inflow of investment into various services. And so that's an interesting question that we could look at. Guillermo spoke about state investment, post-conflict, and how that, you know, how it works at the geographic level between areas that were controlled by the state, areas that were controlled by those in opposition to the state and contested areas in between. And very interesting to see that post-conflict during the reconciliation phase, at least in this case in Peru, state investment in both control and legitimacy, was highest in the areas that were previously held by rebel groups, and then somewhat lower in the contested areas and eventually lowest in those areas that the state already controlled. I'm wondering what that tells us in terms of what we can do, of course, post-conflict, very, very important, but are there things that we can do even pre-conflict or where there's a risk of conflict to help encourage states to align their investments and establish legitimacy, establish relationships with their own citizens in cases where there is the risk of tensions turning into open conflict through social safety nets and other mechanisms that the state may have at its disposal. And then finally, John spoke about the relationship between hunger and conflict as measured by battlefield deaths over the last 50 years or so. And I don't really think I need to go into too much detail on that one, because it was mathematically extremely complex, and I'll be honest, I lost it about halfway through. But the conclusion was quite clear that, yes, there is an association. But perhaps the question is, what is it? Is it hunger driving conflict? Is it conflict that's driving hunger? And my guess is that they're interrelated, and there's a sort of an interesting flow between the two. But can we describe that in more detail? And therefore, maybe we can design and drive our interventions in a more effective way. So I think I will wrap up there. But just to say that, and this is coming from a practitioner's view, that research like this is so instrumental in helping us better understand the environments in which we work. It helps us debunk many myths, and it also helps us reinforce where we do see trends that we can actually use that as justification and we can help drive our programs around it. So I want to thank the panel again and hand it back over to our chair, Mochella. Thank you. Thank you, Jesse, and everyone. We are now going to open the floor to the public. So there's someone who's going to be helping us with the microphone over here in the center. I'm going to take three or four, and then we'll go back to the panel and do rounds. So let's start over here, please. Thanks for the panel. Two quick questions. So one for the panel. Since this panel was on economic development and recovery, what kind of interventions would you recommend for reducing conflict and economic development? Is there a trade-off between measures needed for reducing conflict and promoting economic development? And where should policy makers prioritize? Second, a very quick question for Irma. Great intriguing results, but again, like at least with the question of the mechanism and the why is it selection? If yes, how is it like a competition in the broader marketplace? Like areas like West Bengal and Kerala that had secular and left parties didn't suffer as much minority violence? Or is it something else, marginalization on other counts that is interacting or that itself is maybe caused by a third factor? For instance, this week's economy covers, economists covers exactly the same story and it reports slightly different number from yours, like representation, 5%, in your case it was 9%, but these maybe are different in years. But also representation and bureaucracy of 5%, police, Supreme Court and business of around 3%, in prisons 20%. So is it like, are these factors interacting or caused by something else? Thank you. Over here and then in the next, in the same table. Okay, Jean-Pierre Samestat from UCLouvain. Two quick questions to Leandro. What's the added value of using peacekeeping rather than conflict from a theoretical point of view? Because it seems a bit the same from your theory. And then I was thinking what could be, whether early marriage may be a mechanism because we know that conflict is sometimes associated with early marriage, so you would expect then increase in fertility and the opposite in peace time. And just the last question to John. So I really understand why you introduced fixed effect, right? Don't worry about this, but to some extent I'm wondering, are you actually capturing those countries who are going into phases of peace and war? And therefore, to some extent, you may underestimate the effect on anger. To some extent, to be provocative, are your results more representative for Ethiopia and Sri Lanka than let's say Yemen and Somalia were really protracted conflict situation? One third question over here. I have two quick questions. First to Irma regarding the plausible mechanism. So I don't know if you know this work by Samit Rajah on trade and inter-ethnic violence where he basically looks at occupational complementarities between Hindus and Muslims and how in areas where there were these complementarities, violence was less prevalent. So could that be a potential mechanism? You basically elect a higher fraction of minorities. They then contribute towards generating complementarities in occupation between the majority and minority group and hence you get lower prevalence of violence. The other question is for John. So John, I'd like to know if possible, I don't know if the data allows that, whether as a potential mechanism of your result, the undernourishment primarily comes from those battles that disrupt trade routes or that cut off hubs from peripheral rural areas. So because it's about undernourishment access to food markets. So that could be a very precise and neat mechanism if you could argue that it's really driven by conflicts that disrupt either trade routes between countries or internal trade between different hubs, food hubs and so on so forth. Thank you. We're going to go back to the panel and I'm going to ask the panelists to first address the general question. How does your research inform policy or can we say anything about what to do in order to make economic recovery possible and sustainable over time? And then we will take turns to address the specific questions. Shall we start with Irma? Well, can you hear me well? Okay. I guess in, thanks for the question. And I guess in my case it's a bit difficult because in our paper we'll look at the effect of minority political representation on violence and we find that there is a decrease in violence. Now how should you increase or how could you increase minority political representation? One way to do that and that has been advocated in other countries, you know, the settings or even in India itself is to use quotas. However, quotas can change completely the political equilibrium, change the type of candidates that parties present, change how voters perceive elections. So it's not easy to say we should impose quotas and then in this way we would improve minority political representation and that would decrease violence and that would be associated with very good outcomes, as well because quotas have been associated with backlash in other studies and in the past. So that's something that we should keep in mind. So I think in my case it's not easy to say which could be the policy. Now maybe quotas for a while would be good, especially if we actually once we get all the data on whether the representation of Muslims in the police, in the bureaucracy and so on, if we find that politicians improve that and that actually reduces conflict, maybe quotas for a while would be a good solution. But as I say, it's something that's very, very difficult to say that should be tested in any case. We don't have the test in our paper. Thank you, Irma. Who wants to go next? Can I listen to you? So I think your question is directly related to the comment that just you made to my paper. And I think the core contribution that I intend to make in here is to drive us a little bit away from the starry connection that we usually do between conflict and violence. There are a lot of different war dynamics that take place during war that are completely understudied. And in here I intend to focus on the role of territorial control. And one of the things that we know from the last years is that actually in these areas that are controlled by the rebel groups, we see lower levels of violence than in areas, for example, that remain contested. So if we want to understand how to achieve effective peace, we need to understand and to put ourselves back on what happened during the conflict. As I said in my presentation, the type of social order that emerges in the aftermath of war is completely different from the one that was existing there. So from a policy perspective, I would encourage policy makers to go to the ground, talk to people, try to understand a little bit which have been the direct effects of conflict into their communities. And from that point of view, you will be capable of start developing policies that definitely cannot be applied in a general context to all the conflicts. We need to understand which are the concrete characteristics and the concrete dynamics of each conflict to develop particular policies that are applicable to each of these processes. Of course, civil wars have commonalities. There are, of course, common dynamics. But we still need to understand the complexities and the particularities that are happening in each of these places. So that's why that's the co-point that I wanted to make. Leandro. I mean, I think that I must probably, I'm going to say something very obvious, but I think that the best way to reduce conflict would be economic development. I mean, this is said and done. And especially when economic development is well distributed across the population. But we can use evidence, already evidence from the literature, how to trying to boost and spur economic activities and economic development. And basically, we know already from the literature that UN intervention, in terms of peacekeeping, already produced tangible results in reducing the conflict recurrence. So this is one first point. And the second point is also, is that once the peacekeepers are deployed, they provide securities, which is essential. So it's key for economic recovery, because then this allows to revitalize the economic activity, also to increase confidence, individual confidence where people trust and labor market participation. So this is, and there is also in this, some evidence showing that it seems that deployment of peacekeepers together with of course the help of international organization and providing development projects, I mean, they are somehow successful in this. Thank you, John. You want to comment and also address the direct question that you received? Sure. So I'm going to give two answers to, okay, please go ahead. No, no, sorry. I forgot to answer the direct question, actually. I will give you a chance. I just thought we should start going a little bit faster so we don't run out of time. Okay, okay, sorry. So I'm going to give two answers to the question about the indirect interventions, a very short one and a slightly less short one. The very short answer is, I actually don't know. The slightly longer one to relate it back to the associational findings I was presenting here, is this, is that one of the things which is suggestive in these data is that countries where conflicts are more protracted or more frequent, that the association between battle deaths and hunger is higher than it is in countries where they're less frequent or less protracted. Holding everything else constant, that would suggest that given that particular welfare indicator that prioritizing interventions in those types of countries would have considerable value. But of course, not everything else is equal. And in some sense, by definition, the fact that those conflicts are protracted and frequent might mean that actually trying to end or reduce the intensity of those contracts is a specific conflict. Given that's especially difficult in those types of environments, it's not clear how successful those are going to be. And that's why, in some sense, what I say I really don't know the answer is because I think you've got those two things playing off against each other. In terms of the questions you all raised, which I all thought were very good ones, I'm just going to kind of work through a couple of thoughts. One of which is the bidirectionality point, which is, I think, a very important one to note. As we know, for very obvious and good reasons, we obviously can't randomize conflict if we want to look at these types of analyses. An approach some people have tried to take is to use some sort of instrumental variables approach. But it's not obvious to me that that actually would be any more successful than just being honest about the associational representations. And the reason for that, as you all know, is the IV approach requires that we identify instruments which have to actually, in this case, meet three characteristics and have to be time varying because we're controlling for the country fixed effects. They have to be correlated with conflict and they have to be not correlated nor not directly correlated with their outcome of interest, which is hunger. And I find it very difficult to actually think of any variable that could actually satisfy that criteria. So, for example, as I think some people in this room have used, for example, measures of ethno fragmentation as an instrument for something that might affect conflict. But of course, I can already see Anka shaking her head, but amongst the things that change is very slowly over time. So that's clearly not going to be a good instrument. Other people in this literature have used things like GDP growth, but it's as an instrument for conflict. But of course, that's going to be directly related to the prevalence of undernourishment. So my sense here is that in terms of coming up with estimates that we at least somewhat believe, I think we're better off with the limitations of the association lessons than trying to address that bidirectionality. Jean Francois, of course, has suggested another approach as to why don't we ditch the country fixed effects. I'm not sure I would go that far, but another way of actually phrasing your question is to say possibly there's some actually very interesting heterogeneity within this set of countries that may be being masked by these aggregate results. And in particular countries which have frequent conflicts or actually very intense ones. And that's where this comment in the specification checks of looking at countries where, in fact, the conflicts have been most frequent, I think is really useful because it suggests that when that frequency of conflict takes place, the association with hunger is much higher. And in some sense, that leads to the comment we started off with, which is the issue of what might that imply for intervention and where we place them. And finally, to your question about the mechanisms, it's a great question. I think it would require a different data set. I think you'd want to work with subnational rather than national or global data sets to get at it. Thinking it through very quickly, it might be much harder to actually come up with results which you would really want to ascribe to the disruption of trade routes. And that's partly because the direct effects conflict might have in other ways, for example, on production or movements of population. Also, too, to what extent it might be very difficult to distinguish between the effects of the actual conflict and also the perceived threat of a conflict taking place. So even though you might not have actually observed the conflict happening, it may still be the case that that threat of that conflict could be disruptive in its own right. Thank you. Thank you, John. I know Leandro needs a chance to answer his direct question. Yeah, sorry, I don't know why, but I was thinking just to answer the general question. Sorry about that. Okay, there was a question about the theoretical contribution. So what's the main difference between considering conflict or peacekeeping? I mean, basically, I think that the main difference is that on timing, basically, right? So we look at a period where conflict is already settled, and then, you know, actually, our main idea in the beginning was to look at and to see if we can find similar dynamics in fertility rate as dynamics or occurring in developed countries, in which we all observe decreasing fertility rate. And then the idea was because the Liberia or any country in conflict are in the process of recovering, so they are sharing similar characteristics if you want the developed country. So basically, you know, so the interest would be to just look at these dynamics on a different time period, so when there is already recovery. And on the early marriage, yeah, I didn't think about it, so I think that it's a nice, very nice suggestion, so perhaps we need to check it out. Yeah, thank you very much. We're going to take three more questions, and we'll go back to that. But directly to me too, I will have time later. We'll have, you'll have time later. So just we, it's a lot of questions over here, so we're going to start with you. Thank you. Grazie baccino, CGR. I have a question for John. I think it is clear also from what Jesse has said that there is a correlation. There is an association between hunger, food insecurity, malnutrition, and conflict. But I wanted to understand, is there a gap, an ideal gap that we should consider when we go and study these relations? Because I suppose we cannot really assume that if there is a conflict in day one, there will be hunger, malnutrition, and in day one itself. So what is the gap that we have to consider in between these two phenomena? Thank you. Hello, my name is Aina. We have one question from the online platform, which is directed to Irma. And the question is, why the time span of the study is only until 2010? Over here in the middle. Thank you. Thank you all the panelists. I learned a lot from you. It all was really great. But my question is for Landro. I was just wondering if you know that your findings for the peace period, is it similar to before conflict period? So I just wonder really there's a convergence back to the pre-conflict situation or it is something else. It's another path. Thank you. Do we have another very short question over there? Thank you for the great presentations. This is a question for Guillermo. I was wondering, so most of your main hypotheses are all about investments. And I was wondering, so there seems to be a trade-off between some kinds of investments and punishing the former insurgents or cracking down the opposition and so on. So I was wondering how this could play a role in your main hypothesis and whether you could collect data on that. Okay, so we'll start with Irma this time. Okay, thank you. Sorry I didn't answer the questions directed to me before. I received a question related to whether our results were due to selection or different parties being elected. That would be accounted for by the close elections, by the regression discontinuity design. So the assumption is that in a close election, the identity of the winner would not be, in the limit, would not be correlated with other observables, such as political party or characteristics of the area where they are elected. We test for that and we find that this is actually the case. The only difference that we find is that Muslim politicians tend to be from different parties. So the BJP does not have Muslim politicians. So then what we do is we control for the political party of politicians in the specification and we find that our results don't change. So then that's reassuring. Then in terms of the literature that looks that there have been occupational complementarities historically between Hindus and Muslims in India and whether that could be a potential mechanism. Well, first of all, we control, in all the specifications, we control for district fixed effects. So that would, in a way, account for these differences. But I agree that this would be interesting to see whether there are heterogeneous defects depending on these possible historical complementarities and this is something that we may want to look at. And it would also be interesting to see whether politicians actually improve or tend to improve these economic activities. I think it was textiles or textiles trade, for example. So I think that that would be a possible avenue for research. And in terms of mechanisms, we are collecting data on Muslim representation in the police, business, bureaucracy. Ideally, we would like to have it at the constituency level. We'll probably only be able to get it at the district level. And something that you commented that it's very interesting as well is whether this Muslim political representation has created greater awareness within the population or trust in institutions and then that has affected conflict as well. So this is something for future research as well, but something that we've had in mind and we would like to take a look. Thank you very much. And in terms of the years, just one second that we used, it's true we could update the data until later dates. Actually, what we had in mind is to use all the data because we have politician data since the 1960s and we haven't exploited that part. So that's probably what we will do soon. Thank you so much. Okay, so we're probably going to go five minutes into the coffee break. I'm going to give Leandro Guillermo and John the opportunity to quickly answer and then we'll go back to Jesse if you want to give us a final insight to close the panel. Okay, to be honest, I don't remember exactly about the aggregate trend in fertility during conflict, but what I remember is that given that our identification strategy is based on contrasting fertility rate between cluster where peacekeeping is deployed and with cluster where peacekeepers are not deployed, I remember that. I mean, actually, I have a graph here. It was on the backup slide where we didn't find any significant difference in fertility rate between these two groups of cluster. Okay, so this is sort of supporting the basically the identification strategy, I mean the empirical strategy in which we can be sure that the effect we found is not driven by pre-trends. But if I remember correctly, but I'm not 100% sure, but at the beginning when we were working with the data, I remember that there was a decreasing trend, a timid decrease in trend before the UN arrival. So that's something that was produced during the conflict periods. But then what is interesting is that when the UN deployed, when there is the UN deployment, then you have this very important decrease and this important effect in fertility rates. I don't know if I answered your question, but yeah, I'll try to be fast. Thank you for that fantastic question. It's absolutely something that that was difficult to deal with in the paper. But one of the core assumptions of the theoretical framework is that there are budget constraints. Therefore the state will need to be strategic on where it's going to produce its investment at the local level. These are definitely multi-gaussial processes. I'm not trying to claim that wartime territorial control was the fundamental and the only element that is driving the decisions over where to invest from a spatial perspective. I'm just trying to point out that this is one of the different factors that could have played a fundamental role. And in order to try to deal with all these potential alternative explanations that might be driving the relation of interest, I control for economic growth. I also include district fixed effects and some of the time-varying control variables try to deal with one of the core confounders which is the role of political competition. One of the co-finders that we have from the distributed politics literature is that targeting is not random at all. Targeting in the different levels of investment at the local level is not random. There are always political factors behind this. So what I'm trying to claim in here is that this is just one of the factors that we need to consider when we are trying to understand investments in the post-war period and that there is a fundamental link towards end dynamics. Thank you, Tom. Yeah, so I think your question is actually both well placed and maybe a very nice one to actually end at least my part of the session on. And if I was to reframe your question slightly, I would say, well, we can all agree that reducing conflict in all its forms is of intrinsic value, that that's something which is just a good thing to do in its own right. So why should in some sense we care about it any more than that? And implicit, I think, in my presentation is the notion that it is also of instrumental value, that in fact it may be a mechanism or means by which we can attain other welfare outcomes that we care about. In my particular case, outcomes relating to undernourishment and hunger. The reason that matters is that as one of our colleagues said earlier is in terms of how we prioritize investments. In fact, it's something where in fact we should be increasingly concerned about if we're worried about this particular outcome or not. And that's getting at kind of this notion of the magnitudes is that if the magnitude of the association was very small, that wouldn't attract any from any way from the importance of reducing conflict, but it would suggest it's not going to assist us with this other instrumental objective. But magnitudes are reasonably large. And more importantly is that they're growing. And the reason that part is important is that the world is committed itself to a whole series of goals, including those around hunger and undernourishment. It's clearly becoming harder and harder to attain those goals. And if we look at a lot of dialogue, particularly around the hunger indicators, they are all very sort of kind of technocratic in terms of their approach, focusing very much on things like investments in agriculture, social services and so on and so forth. And yet if we believe these associations, what they suggest is that approach is at best partial. And more likely may be one which ultimately will be insufficient to actually attain goals around the limiting hunger and undernourishment. Jesse, you want to take two minutes for final reaction? Yeah, thank you so much. And just again, thanks to everybody up here for sharing very, very interesting presentations and depth of research on what I think is a critical subject. So on this panel, Economic Development and Recovery, my takeaways. Essentially, it's very difficult to be prescriptive on what we should do as policy makers and on as service delivery organizations if we truly want to reduce the incidence of conflict or address complex, complex situations and contribute to peace building for the longer term. But what's become clear to me, and I think it's being reinforced, but what we heard today is that the greatest investment is in prevention. Once conflicts become embedded and complex, as Guillermo said, there's a 50% chance that a civil war will reoccur within a few years. And as conflicts become longer and more complex, you see the impact on food insecurity, hunger and nutrition also increase disproportionately. And so I think as a community, we need to look before the conflicts occur. We need to look at the period where we're making development investments, where we're trying to drive economic growth, provide jobs, and look at what sort of interventions we can make at that point in time to help forestall or, in fact, address the underlying drivers of conflict. So that's one piece. And then the second piece is, regardless of where we're at in the spectrum of humanitarian development and peace building, and those are not a linear arc, those sort of recurrent circles in its reiterative, we need to look at, I think the most powerful thing we can do is look at engagement and participation. So how can we bring forward the voices of the most marginalized, whether that's politically, such as the example that Irma raised, or whether that's in control over their own circumstances, their bodies and their reproductive rights, like Leonardo raised, or if it's in just simply determining the types of interventions that they believe will make the biggest difference to their lives and seeing the governments and other partners invest in a way that increases or drives social cohesion and also reinforces the citizen-state relationship. So that would be my sort of appeal to all of us who have the opportunity to work in this field is to make those investments before conflicts become violent and material and to place our emphasis on really engaging affected populations and bringing forward the voices of the most marginalized. Thank you. Thank you, Jesse. Just in closing, let me do a little propaganda. Our regional human development report from last year has a chapter that addresses issues directly in connection to this session, looking at violence as a factor of both high inequality and low economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. And it has a background paper behind it by Ana Maria, by Ana Arjona that specifically examines the channels by which violence affects inequality and other development outcomes. So I invite you to look for it. It's online. Thank you to all of our panelists. It was a great session.