 I think that both sides in the relationship are too focused on trying to persuade the other side of the correctness of their point of view, to persuade the other side to think about the problems and challenges in the way that they do. So from the U.S. side, for instance, the U.S. very focused on trying to persuade with argumentation, not only with pressure, but with argumentation, persuade the Pakistanis to see the risks and the opportunities in Afghanistan the way that the United States does. I liken this to the problem of road rage. I think you're never going to persuade another driver that you were right and they were wrong. In fact, the only people who hear loud and clearly what your arguments are and have some understanding of them are the people in your own car, typically your wife sitting next to you. And you don't resolve the problems by exhibiting that rage and trying to, as I said, persuade the other driver that they're the ones who aired. My recommendation is to focus more on practical action than on trying to, from the Pakistani perspective, persuade the United States of the correctness of their historical argument and the necessity of looking at the problems of the region through a historical lens and through an India-centric lens and from the U.S. perspective of overly focusing on trying to persuade the Pakistanis that the problems that we see in the here and now moment in Afghanistan are the dominant ones and that our way of resolving them is the correct way. Now, the Pakistanis often have complained to U.S. officials that they think the U.S. is overly transactional in its approach to the relationship. My recommendation is not to be less transactional in the relationship, but to the contrary to be much, much more transactional about the relationship, to see it as a relationship of two parties with two sides in which there is a need for exchange of benefit. And through that perspective, I think what the United States needs to see is not only what are the ways to pressure Pakistan to take seriously U.S. concerns, but to make a clearer case as to what is on offer for Pakistan. And I don't mean carrots in the sense of financial assistance. I mean, what is it that the United States is prepared to do in terms of its strategy in the region and its vision of the relationship to attract the Pakistanis to something that can be of mutual benefit? And from the Pakistani perspective, I think there's much more that can be done to articulate how they see an exchange of being something that could be a basis for the relationship. What is it that they are prepared to do and not do? And what is it that is on offer from their perspective that could appeal to American interests? So a transaction and exchange based on a recognition of each side's interests, of the other side's interests, rather than being overly focused on how to, again, persuade the other side that each's own interests are the ones that need to dominate the conversation.