 OK, I have some basic ideas I have for a little time, so just scratch the surface of the ideas I have. But let me first start by saying that we live interesting times because the international community set itself to an unprecedented global agenda of ending hunger, poverty, and deal with climate change within the next 15 years, as far as the first two objects are concerned, and laid the foundations for dealing with climate change throughout the century. Building on that, we have the Paris Agreement and Climate Change. We have various other major international police frameworks for agreement. So we want to make true on these commitments, do we have the mechanisms to actually steer in that direction to avoid these are nice, lofty objectives and will not be followed through. Now having worked for a bit over 10 years in the UN system and depending to a large extent on mechanisms for global governance to do our work, we have plenty of mechanisms. But the main characteristics of what we have is multi-layered governance platforms, which to some extent work together, to some extent sit on each other's backs and in each other's ways. But one could say is that if we put a negative word on it, there's a lack of coherence, transparency, and in many ways legitimacy. There's legitimacy in the UN system at large. But in terms of dealing with the true implementation of governance, that's not necessarily there. In terms of coherence, the Food and Agriculture Organization, our major counterparts are the Ministers of Agriculture. But the work we do goes well beyond the scope of work of Ministers of Agriculture. It has to do, think of under nutrition with access to food. It has to do with poverty reduction, social protection. We have to deal with confronting crisis with sustainable agriculture. So if nothing happens on the environmental front within agriculture and in other sectors, then we cannot properly do our jobs. And in working together with the other parts of the system and with other platforms, sometimes that's where things bite, but also within our own constituency. And that matters throughout the system. So I just want to talk about what are ways to get to more policy coherence and coordination as part of the governance framework. How can we finance the provisioning of global public goods, which if we take the SDG agenda, it's, I wouldn't say, all about global public goods, but it's very enshrined in there. But we don't have commensurate financing mechanism. And last thing is what I would call should we move to international multi-stakeholder-alism instead of just multilateralism. OK, let's quickly run through these points, flagging a few books which are collaborated on that deal with these things much more at large. So I suggest you consult those. But the key thing is that we don't have true mechanisms for agenda-wide coherence. So we have basically in the realm of development, it should be the economic and social accounts of the United Nations, that has to start and that originally was invented to coordinate the works across the areas of economic and social development. That's why FVO is a specialized agency under ACOSOC, but a lot of people don't know that, but also the IMF and the World Bank are specialized agencies that fall under ACOSOC, although each of us have our own constituencies and ways how we work. But this coordination was meant to be at the inception of ACOSOC talks where it should be called an Economic and Social Security Council, that it was revived later on. But the powers would be at the start of the year and didn't want it to give it that much powers. And of course, if we think now, it's a momentum to think more of this coordination because the SOG agenda commands to do so. Maybe a couple of years ago, with the outbreak of the global financial crisis, that momentum was much bigger. We had a crisis, not just the financial crisis, there was a food crisis. We talked about an energy crisis, this big momentum to make these reforms. There were lots of proposals. We talked at the UN, when I was at the UN Secretary at the time, about a new Bretton Woods moment, right? So to rethink the international system. And lots of discussion. There's a Sticklets Commission was set up by the President of the General Assembly that produced a very interesting report about reforms, mainly focused on the international financial system, but also called for a proposal to strengthen economic and social council, precisely to provide this coordination role to bring more coherence in the system and provide this guidance that was there to all the agencies and the platforms that fall under ACRSOC to coordinate better and to avoid inconsistencies that, I think, move in different directions and stay in coherent. With the SDG agenda, there was a new thing at the event called a high level, it's an HLPF political forum. Sorry about that mistake, but to monitor it, but not to coordinate. So it's to give accountability, but how are we going to coordinate? So I think, and to strongly believe in the proposals proposed forward by the Sticklets Commission and previously to do so, but then I'll come back to the end. It's very difficult to achieve that if not all parties, if we don't have the same consensus about the overall goals as the consensus about how should we coordinate the implementation and guide things moving forward. Now one example I give, which is also why some of these proposals did not work so well is what we proposed before the global financial crisis is to have much stronger mechanisms for macroeconomic policy coordination. The World Economic Situations Prospects, which one of the reports I coordinated at the end, had a long analysis of that of what would be the rationale and the reasons for historic coordination, but also flagged the reasons why that might be difficult and why we don't get there. And at that time also the IMF flagged this, but people have short memories. But the IMF, before the crisis around 2007, was more or less in shambles and could not make this role. And actually, thanks to the G20, it was put back on its feet. Not all the details, but we got a new allocation of special drawing rights, which sort of replenished the fund and also helped to put the IMF back at the forefront of managing the part of the crisis with the guidance of various platforms. The IMF's own constituency, the G20, the G7 finance ministers, and a lot of other platforms, they're confusing a little bit how this should work and how we should move forward. Now, positive things have come out of that. The G20 have also been an observer to many of those meetings, which were very useful. A lot of discussions on reforms and also the G20 is not just about micro-recognized policy coronations, it's broader discussions. But things fell flat as a true coordination platform, once the first actions were taken to circumvent the global economy falling into a real global recession because of different interests. That was also the reasons why we thought that it was so difficult to get to micro-coronation even before that, because you need to do that, that everybody believes that by doing things together you have gains and that by doing so, you can also overcome political strains within your own constituency that this is to your own interest and to a longer term interest. And that's what has been holding back. And as long as we don't change that, then it would be difficult to make this into a proper platform. OK, let me just dwell too much on it, but so I'm skeptical about the G20. It's good that at that level it's much better than the G7, but it's probably not as good as the G193, which are all the red member states. OK, well, I'll just leave this for the discussion. Let me quickly move to proposal 2. We need new mechanisms to finance global public goods. A lot of proposals are out there, but I think the bottom line for the rationale is that the existing development finance mechanism we have for well-short of what's needed, particularly finance, the global sustainable development agenda at the bank and the fund. They talk, well, development finance has to move from the billions to the trillions. So how do we get there? There's a lot of proposals out there. Now, one proposal which is also the previous studies, also the Sticklage Report, was mentioned and a lot of other attempts. We did also report on in search for new development finance in 2012. And one of the proposals which I think is worth thinking more about, and there's other options, but is to use precisely the needs to reform the international monetary system to a more stable system. And one of the things is to make it less reliant on one single national currency and move to an international currency, and that could be special drawing rights. Now, that already exists out of the issues of regular SDRs that could serve as stabilizing factors to immediately address short-term balance payments crisis, but also can be served to leverage long-term development finance. In this study, we say with modest assumptions, that could lead to leverage up to a trillion US dollars per year for development finance. If you do that, you also have a mechanism to at least how you would generate the funds. What we'll be lacking is a mechanism how you would allocate the funds. No, maybe that's where we could give some power to a stronger economic and social council if that ever comes about. Lastly, the world has become more global, more complex. So we need this further coordination because of the interdependencies, but also we need to take better account of all the players that are out there. And I think also in the opening plenary sessions I mentioned made of what role to give to the private sector in all these discussions, civil society organizations. So if in the multilateral system they don't have a role, then it all depends on the capacity of national governments to mediate the international agreements with their constituency. But since many of the private sector and CSO organizations have also become very strong and influential international players, that may not be good enough. So one of the things to think about is shouldn't we reform our key platforms that can absorb these interests in the deliberations and in the decision making? Now close at hand, FVO is also guided by the conclusions by the Committee on World Food Security, which is an intergovernmental body but which includes the private sector as in large food industries and agribusinesses, as in the farmers through farmers organization, as in consumers through consumer organizations and produce organizations, as well as other agencies that are concerned with food security, nutrition in the broadest sense. And I would say that the Committee has a lot of powers, but it makes a difference if you can make decisions inclusive of those agents. And for instance, to give an example, CFS recently developed a set of principles and subsequent guidelines for responsible agriculture investment. Now I can say, well, they're voluntary guidelines, and so what difference does that make? But the fact that you have already brought in the industry, the agents, and agreed on that, there's also since the responsibility to make true in it. So governments are adopting it. We get a lot of calls from the private sector actually trying to change behavior responsibility. These stats try to see what can they do to actually re-channel their investments towards more sustainable and more inclusive ways of doing business. So this hasn't changed the world, but it's, I think, are meaningful steps in the right direction. So question is, can this be applied more widely? It's not easy to do. I'm not saying that now everything goes smoothly. You get easy to consensus, not at all, but it's different ways to do things forward. To end, there's a report of, I think, two years ago of the Committee for Development Policy that discusses these challenges for global governance. And there's five principles they lay out which I agree with and which are not new, but I think are essential for good global governance. And I have to do it recognizing that they're common, but also differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities. We need to follow through subsidiarity principles and trying to take the decision making where possible, we're necessarily to the lowest level decision making, but making sure it's guided by the overall and common principles. Should be inclusive, and that's where the multi-stakeholder approach could come in as one example. We need coherence to make this work because of the interdependency and the challenges we have, and we need what's called responsible sovereignty. So there should be the sovereignty of taking decisions, but also that we see national interest as best served by doing it through policy cooperation. Here are good principles. They may also be the obstacles to actually get this done because, as you can see, it's extremely difficult to get all the parties to agree on these principles or the interpretation of these principles, maybe not on the principles in an abstract sense, but yes. So they're just taken common, but differentiated responsibilities, think of the climate change discussions, okay, what does it mean in practice? So who should contribute what? So there's enormous distributive, current distributive, well, it's historic distributive, as well as future distributive complications to do so. I could run through the others. So I think the key thing is to try and flesh this out in the future proposals for a new global governance. Thank you very much. Thank you.