 Manuel Mirt, welcome to WPC TV. You're the director of an important program on transatlantic relations at Harvard. Yes. Thank you for having me. So the obvious question is, how are transatlantic relations going to be affected by the election of Donald J. Trump? Right. Well, it's very hard to tell. But we know from the campaign speech that he's much more skeptical about the European project. And I think he gives it less strategic importance than previous presidents. Some of the things that he said on the campaign trail have actually been said by prior presidents, but not in such a radical way. So sort of the free-riding issue of European security and NATO, European security and defense, the fact that Europeans need to contribute more to NATO and to global security more broadly, that has been said in the past. And it's been said by secretaries of defense, by presidents. What he has said, though, is slightly different in the sense that he's not just saying you should take more of the burden. He's saying we're going to stop abiding by Article 5 or we're actually going to leave the space until you take responsibility for this. And I think that is very different. And if you connect that to what he's been saying to other allies, he's sort of revising and reviewing the alliance system that the United States has had in place since the end of the Second World War. This is true about Korea. It's true about Japan. It's true about other countries. So he seems to be very much about retreating. I mean, in terms of NATO, that's quite a big threat because if you take the Baltic States, who obviously have a certain fear of Russia, only Estonia meets the 2 percent of GDP benchmark for defense spending. Yes, but you know, I mean, this is, you know, it's a curious way of measuring defense contributions because Europeans take on different burdens, different to the Americans. So if you look at cold defense spending, yes, it's true. I think the Americans are contributing about 80 percent of the NATO defense budget or something like that, you know. So they're contributing more in the hard, hard spending side of things. But on the Russian sanctions, for example, if you look at who suffered the highest cost for the sanctions, it was clearly the Europeans, right? So there are different tools that we use together for similar objectives. And the cost of using those tools is distributed very differently across the Atlantic as well. So it all depends on how you define security. We define it in very simple terms, and clearly there's a huge free-riding issue. If you define it in more complex terms, then it's a little bit more balanced. Although I have to tell you that almost everybody agrees now that Europeans need to do a little bit more and coordinate the way they work around security issues because I think, you know, Europe spends around 200, a little bit over 200 billion security and defense every year combined. But we have an issue with inefficiency, we're not coordinating our procurement or defense spending or planning or et cetera, et cetera. Final question, then. It's pretty clear that most Europeans, A, didn't expect a Trump victory, and B, didn't really want one. Do you think that nonetheless the transatlantic alliance, which has been there since World War II, actually will survive? Yes. I mean, I think it'll survive because the underlying drivers are still there, which are shared values, pretty significant shared interests. Those interests range from economic, to diplomatic, to, you know, the whole architecture that we build together around issues that have to do with rule of law, human rights, free trade, things like that, I think are still going to be there. So it's a nice, optimistic note I wish to end. Yeah, thank you. Have a new ominous. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you, John.