 Question 106 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triities on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triities on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 106 of thankfulness or gratitude in six articles. We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness, there are six points of inquiry. First, whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues. Second, who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent? Third, whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors. Fourth, whether thanksgiving should be deferred. Fifth, whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver. Six, whether one ought to pay back more than one has received. First article, whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues. Objection one, it seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues, for we have received the greatest benefits from God and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore, thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues. Objection two, further. Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice according to the philosopher in Ethics 5.4. Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment. Therefore, thanksgiving which belongs to gratitude is an act of justice. Therefore, gratitude is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. Objection three, further. Acknowledgement of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship according to the philosopher in Ethics 8.13 and in 9.1. Now friendship is associated with all the virtues since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore, thankfulness or gratitude to which it belongs to repay favors received is not a special virtue. On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice in his rhetoric, too. I answer that as stated above in the Parse Prima Secundae, Question 60, Article 3. The nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that he is the first principle of all our goods. Secondarily, it is found in our Father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing. Thirdly, it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed. Fourthly, it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him. Accordingly, since what we owe God or our Father or a person excelling in dignity is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion whereby we pay God do worship, and piety whereby we worship our parents, and observance whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity. There is thankfulness or gratitude whereby we give thanks to our benefactors, and it is distinct from the foregoing virtues just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes as falling short thereof. Reply to Objection 1 Just as religion is super-excelling piety, so it is excelling thankfulness or gratitude, wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above in Question 83 Article 17, among things pertaining to religion. Reply to Objection 2 Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice when it answers to the legal due, for instance, when it is contracted so that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt and is paid spontaneously. Hence Thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes in On Benefits 3. Reply to Objection 3 Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs especially to the virtue of gratitude. Second Article Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent Objection 1 It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound to give him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. Objection 2 Further A man owes love to his benefactor, just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says in his confessions, too, What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength, that so he should love thee the less as if he had less needed thy mercy, whereby thou remittest sins to those that turn to thee. And further on he says, And for this let him love thee as much, yea and more, since by whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved. Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent. Objection 3 Further The more a gratuitous favour is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving do for it. Now the favour of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says in his confessions, To thy grace I ascribe it, and to thy mercy, that thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil, for what might I have not done. Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own willfulness, and what by thy guidance committed not. Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent. On the contrary, it is written in Luke 7 verse 43, To whom more is forgiven he loveth more, And at verse 47, To whom less is forgiven he loveth less. Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving. I answer that, thanksgiving, graziarum axio, in the recipient corresponds to the favour, grazia, of the giver. So that when there is greater favour on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favour is something bestowed gratis, wherefore on the part of the giver, the favour may be greater on two accounts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given, and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favour may be said to be greater because it is given more gratuitously, and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given, since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him, even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singular in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the philosopher observes in Ethics 3 in treating of the voluntary and involuntary. This suffices for the replies to the objections. Third article. Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor? Objection one. It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor, for a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself according to Ecclesiasticus 1415. He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good? But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another, therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. Objection two further. Gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace, but some favours are granted without grace and are rudely, slowly, and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor. Objection three further. No thanks are due to one who works for his own profit, but sometimes people bestow favours for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them. Objection four further. No thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor. Objection five further. No one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favour he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem to be equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favour may be a poor man and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to a payment for favours received. Objection six further. No one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favour would be hurtful would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favours are not always to be repaid by gratitude. On the contrary it is written in 1 Thessalonians 5 18. In all things give thanks. I answer that every effect turns naturally to its cause. Wherefore Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 1 that God turns all things to himself because he is the cause of all. For the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor as such is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favour should, by repaying the favour, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And as stated above with regard to a father in question 31 article 3 as well as in question 101 article 2, a man owes his benefactor as such honour and reverence since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle, but accidentally he owes him assistance or support if he need it. Reply to Objection 1. In the words of Seneca in On Benefits 5. Just as a man is liberal, who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious, who forgives not himself but others, and merciful, who is moved not by his own misfortunes but by others, so too no man confers a favour on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature which moves him to resist what hurts him and to seek what is profitable. Wherefore, in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless, things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the philosopher states regarding justice in Ethics 5.11. Insofar to it, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons. Reply to Objection 2. It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore, if someone has conferred a favour, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks than if the favour had been conferred duly, since in fact the favour is less for as Seneca remarks in On Benefits 2. Promptness enhances, delay discounts a favour. Reply to Objection 3. As Seneca observes in On Benefits 6. It matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake or for ours or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle. And further on, if he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness unless the giver has been the loser thereby. Reply to Objection 4. As Seneca observes in On Benefits 3. When a slave does what is want to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service. When he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favour. For as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service. Wherefore, gratitude is due even to a slave when he does more than his duty. Reply to Objection 5. A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can, for since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so to gratitude depends chiefly the heart. And Seneca says in On Benefits 2. Who receives a favour gratefully has already begun to pay it back, and that we are grateful for favours received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere. From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honour. Wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 8.14, He that abounds should be repaid with honour. He that is in want should be repaid with money. And Seneca writes in His On Benefits 6. There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them, such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery. Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because as Seneca says again in On Benefits 6. It were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favour. How much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor? If however the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness as here to fore. And yet as far as it is possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the philosopher says in Ethics 9.3. Reply to Objection 6. As stated in the preceding reply, Repayment of a favour depends chiefly on the affection of the heart, wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If however through the benefactor's carelessness it proved detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes in On Benefits 7. It is my duty to repay and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment. Fourth Article Whether a man is bound to repay a favour at once Objection 1 It seems that a man is bound to repay a favour at once, for we are bound to restore at once what we owe unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favours, and yet this repayment is a duty as stated above in Article 3. Therefore a man is bound to repay a favour at once. Objection 2 Further A good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favour at once. Objection 3 Further Seneca says in On Benefits 2 that it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly. Now repayment ought to equal the favour received, therefore it should be done at once. On the contrary Seneca says in On Benefits 4, he that hastens to repay is animated with a sense not of gratitude but of indebtedness. I answer that just as in conferring a favour two things are to be considered, namely the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favour. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says in On Benefits 2, Do you wish to repay a favour? Receive it graciously. As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favour for favour. It would not seem to be a virtuous but a constrained repayment. For as Seneca observes, again in On Benefits 4, he that wishes to repay too soon is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful. Reply to Objection 1 A legal debt must be paid at once. Else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor, and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands. Reply to Objection 2 earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason. Wherefore it is not praiseworthy to first stall the proper time through earnestness. Reply to Objection 3 Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time, and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes, and the same is to be observed in repaying favours. Fifth article Whether in giving thanks, we should look at the benefactor's disposition or at the deed. Objection 1 It seems that in repaying favours, we should not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore, in repaying favours, we should look at the deed. Objection 2 Thanksgiving whereby we repay favours is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore, also in repaying favours, we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor. Objection 3 No one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favour according to the benefactor's disposition. On the contrary, Seneca says in On Benefits 1, we are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who is given little with a large heart and has bestowed a small favour yet willingly. I answer that the repayment of a favour may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude, and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt. As in alone and the like. And in such cases, repayment must be made according to the quantity received. On the other hand, repayment of a favour belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship, we have to consider the cause of friendship so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favour conferred. And in the friendship based on virtue, repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue as stated in Ethics 813. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favour in as much as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favour depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect. Reply to Objection 1. Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, insofar as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says in On Benefits 1. A kindly action consists not indeed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer. Reply to Objection 2. Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above in Question 80. Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues. Reply to Objection 3. God alone sees man's disposition in itself, but insofar as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance, through his doing it joyfully and readily. 6. Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favour received. Objection 1. It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favour received, for it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the philosopher states in Ethics 8.14. Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favour does not tend to something yet greater. Objection 2. If one person repays another more than he has received by his favour, by that very fact he gives him something his turn as it were, but the latter owes him repayment for the favour which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favour will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite since the indefinite removes the nature of good, according to Metaphysics 2.8. Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favour received. Objection 3 further. Justice consists in equality, but more is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favour received is sinful and opposed to justice. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 5.5. We should repay those who are gracious to us by being gracious to them in return, and this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater. I answer that as stated above in Article 5. Gratitude regards the favour received according to the intention of the benefactor, who seems to be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favour gratis without being bound to do so. Therefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis unless he exceeds the quantity of the favour received, because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines as far as possible to pay back something more. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above in Article 3.5.5.5. In repaying favours, we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents, namely to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the philosopher states in Ethics 814. But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repair, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father as Seneca declares in On Benefits 3. If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude. Reply to Objection 2. The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid, the more it is due, according to Romans 13.8. O, no man anything but to love one another. Wherefore, it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit. Reply to Objection 3. As injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. For while, on the one hand, the benefactor of his own free will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand, the beneficiary repay something over and above what he has received. End of Question 106. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 107 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox Recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 107 of Ingratitude in Four Articles. We must now consider Ingratitude, under which head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether in gratitude is always a sin. Second, whether in gratitude is a special sin. Third, whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin. Fourth, whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful. First article, whether in gratitude is always a sin. Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. Forsenica says in On Benefits 3 that he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful. But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance, if one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. Objection 2 further. Every sin is in the power of the person who commits it, because, according to Augustine in On the Free Will 2, no man sins in what he cannot avoid. Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance, when he has not the means of repaying. Again, forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca says again in On Benefits 3 that to forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude. Therefore, ingratitude is not always a sin. Objection 3 further. There would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to the apostle in Romans 13.8. O no man anything! Yet an unwilling debtor is ungrateful, as Seneca declares in On Benefits 4, therefore ingratitude is not always a sin. On the contrary, ingratitude is reckoned among other sins in 2 Timothy 3.2 where it is written, disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked, etc. I answer that as stated above in Question 106 Article 4, first reply, as well as in Article 6. A debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin. Reply to Objection 1. Gratitude regards a favour received. And he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favour but an injury. And so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will supposing him to have been deceived and to have thought to help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil. And this is contrary to gratitude. Reply to Objection 2. No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to repay for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above in Question 106 Article 6, first reply. Forgetfulness of a favour received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For as Seneca observes in On Benefits 3, when forgetfulness of favours lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment. Reply to Objection 3. The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence, that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor. Second article. Whether ingratitude is a special sin? Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin, for whoever sins acts against God, his sovereign benefactor, but this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore, ingratitude is not a special sin. Objection 2 further. No special sin is contained under different kinds of sin, but one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for instance by kalamni, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore, ingratitude is not a special sin. Objection 3 further. Objection 3 further. Seneca writes in On Benefits 3. It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness. It is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it. Now, these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore, ingratitude is not a special sin. On the contrary, ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore, it is a special sin. I answer that every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue. Thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now, a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance, if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above in Question 106, Article 4. But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above in Question 106, Article 6, inclines to return something more. Therefore, ingratitude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now, every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit, for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore, just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin. It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find faults with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness. Reply to Objection 1 In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, in as much as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contaminant and this is a special sin. Reply to Objection 2 Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin. Reply to Objection 3 These three are not different species but different degrees of one special sin. Third Article Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin Objection 1 It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin, for one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin, else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin. Objection 2 A sin is mortal through being contrary to charity, as stated above in Question 24, Article 12. But ingratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue as stated above, in Question 106, Article 13 Reply, and in Article 6, Second Reply. Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin. Objection 3 Seneca says in On Benefits 2, Between the giver and the receiver of a favor, there is this law, that the former should forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget having received. Now seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove ungrateful, and there would be no necessity for that if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin. On the contrary, no one should be put in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet according to Seneca, in On Benefits 2, Sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives assistance in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he has received. But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin. I answer that as appears from what we have said above in Article 2. A man may be ungrateful in two ways. First by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin because as stated above in Question 106 Article 6, the debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which however he is not bound to do, wherefore if he fail to do so he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin because it arises either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin by reason either of inward contempt or of the kind of thing withheld this being needful to the benefactor, either simply or in some case of necessity. Secondly, a man may be ungrateful because he not only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done. It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character. Reply to Objection 1. By committing a venial sin, one is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude, but there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin insofar as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God. Reply to Objection 2. When ingratitude is a venial sin, it is not contrary to but beside charity, since it does not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof. Reply to Objection 3. Seneca also says in On Benefits 7, When we say that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say he must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it. Reply to Objection 4. He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not ungrateful if he fails to obey it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vain glory, as when blessed Nicholas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity. And because the kindness is all the greater, through the benefactor, wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the favor. Fourth Article Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful Objection 1. It seems that favors should be withheld from the ungrateful, for it is written in Wisdom 1629, The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice. But this hope would not melt away, unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful. Objection 2 further No one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful and receiving a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful. Objection 3 further By what things a man sineth, by the same also he is tormented, according to Wisdom 1117. Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor. On the contrary it is written in Luke 6 verse 35 that The highest is kind to the unthankful and to the evil. Now we should prove ourselves his children by imitating him, according to Luke 6 verse 36. Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful. I answer that there are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is what ought his benefactor to do. For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful since as Seneca remarks in On Benefits 3. A man is often grateful although he repays not because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once he may by being so a second time. If however the more he repeats his favors the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him. Replied to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer. Replied to Objection 2. He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes there from an occasion of ingratitude this is not to be imputed to the bestower. Replied to Objection 3. He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude but rather that of a kindly physician by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors. End of question 107. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 108 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 108 of Vengeance in Four Articles. We must now consider Vengeance under which head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether Vengeance is lawful. Second, whether it is a special virtue. Third, of the manner of taking Vengeance. Fourth, on whom should Vengeance be taken? First article, whether Vengeance is lawful. Objection 1. It seems that Vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is God's sins. But Vengeance belongs to God, for it is written in Deuteronomy 3235, as well as in Romans 1219. Revenge to me, and I will repay. Therefore, all Vengeance is lawful. Objection 2 further. He that takes Vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Canticles 22, as the lily among the thorns says, He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one. Therefore, we should not take Vengeance on the wicked. Objection 3 further. Vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the new law is not a law of fear but of love, as Augustine states in Against Adamantus 17. Therefore, at least in the New Testament, all Vengeance is unlawful. Objection 4 further. A man is said to avenge himself, when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him. For Chrysostom says in a homily on the Gospel of Matthew, Let us learn after Christ's example, to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by listening to them. Therefore, Vengeance seems to be unlawful. Objection 5 further. The sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of only one, for it is written in Ecclesiasticus 26 verses 5 through 7, Of three things my heart hath been afraid, the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and of false calamity. But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a multitude. For a gloss on Matthew 13 verses 29 and 30, lest perhaps you root up the wheat, suffer both to grow, says that a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign. Neither, therefore, is any other vengeance lawful. On the contrary, we should look to God for nothing, save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on his enemies, for it is written in Luke 18 verse 7. Will not God revenge his elect who cry to him day and night? As if to say, he will indeed. Therefore, vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful. I answer that vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who is sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful, because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him. For a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the apostle who says in Romans 1221, Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good. If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned, for instance, that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honoured. Then vengeance may be lawful, provided other do circumstances be observed. Reply to Objection 1. He who takes vengeance on the wicked and keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God, but makes use of the power granted him by God. For it is written in Romans 13.4 of the earthly prince that he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and therefore sins. Reply to Objection 2. The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them. But they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbour. For Chrysostom says, It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God's wrongs is most wicked. Reply to Objection 3. The law of the gospel is the law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love and who alone properly belong to the gospel ought not to be terrorised by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit. Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the church. And then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him in 4th Kings 1, and likewise Elysius cursed the boys that mocked him in 4 Kings 2, and Pope Silverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile. But insofar as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind as Augustine states in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount 1. Reply to Objection 5. When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude. Thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel in Exodus 14, and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed in Genesis 19. Or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshiped the calf. Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the principles, whose punishment fills the rest with fear. Thus the Lord, in Numbers 25, commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude. On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the multitude that is sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them, provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to others. Else the multitude should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the Sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude. Unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than with the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment. Second article. Whether vengeance is a special virtue. Objection one. It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the reward of the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. Therefore, in the same way, vengeance should not be accounted a special virtue. Objection two further. There is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore, vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue. Objection three. Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special virtue, but seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. Therefore, it is not a special virtue. On the contrary, Tully, in his rhetoric, too, reckons it a part of justice. I answer that, as the philosopher states in Ethics 2.1, aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us, so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations which belong to the natural right. Therefore, to every definite natural inclination, there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupcible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him with the intention not of harming, but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says in his rhetoric, too, that by vengeance we resist force or wrong and in general whatever is obscure, that is derogatory, either by self-defense or by avenging it. Therefore, vengeance is a special virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt arising from the bestowal of a particular favor belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so to the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of commutative justice, while so far as it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge. Reply to Objection 2. Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle there too, namely fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance insofar as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since according to Gregory, in a homily on the Gospel, there are no green leaves on the bow of good works unless charity be the root. Reply to Objection 3. Two vices are opposed to vengeance, one by way of excess, namely the sin of cruelty or brutality which exceeds the measure in punishing, while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefor it is written in Proverbs 13-24, he that spareth the rod, hatheth his son. But the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances. Third article. Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among men. Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of punishments customary among men, for to put a man to death is to uproot him. But our Lord forbade in Matthew 13-29 the uprooting of the cockle whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners should not be put to death. Objection 2 further. All who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death, and this is evidently false. Objection 3 further. To punish a man publicly for his sin seems to publish his sin, and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be afflicted for a sin. On the contrary, these punishments are fixed by the divine law as appears from what we have said above in the Parsprima Secundae, question 105, article 2. I answer that vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from committing sin through fear of losing those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning. Else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently, vengeance for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the things which a man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods such as riches, his country, and his good name. Wherefore, according to Augustine's Reckoning in On the City of God 21, Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment, namely death, whereby man is deprived of life, stripes, retaliation, or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety, slavery, and imprisonment, whereby he is deprived of freedom, exile, whereby he is banished from his country, fines, whereby he is mulked in his riches, ignonomy, whereby he loses his good name. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger but even with great profit to the good. Wherefore, in such a case, the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners. Reply to Objection 2. All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character. Wherefore, the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone, which conduce to the grave undoing of others. Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time as the sin, makes man's will averse to sin, because the fear of punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin. 4. Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily. Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another according to Exodus 20, verse 5. I am God, jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. Thus for the sin of Cam, his son Canaan was cursed in Genesis 9.25, and for the sin of Jezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy in Fourth Kings 5. Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said in Matthew 27.25, his blood be upon us and upon our children. Moreover, we read in Joshua 7 that the people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons of Heli in First Kings 4. Therefore a person is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily. Objection 2 further. Nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power. Thus a man is removed from the administration of the church on account of being infected with leprosy, and a church ceases to be an episcopal sea on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins. Objection 3 further. Ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their parents in Genesis 19. Again for the sin of Dathan and Aburon, their children were swallowed up together with them in number 16. Moreover dumb animals which are devoid of reason were commanded to be slain on account of the sin of the Immacolites in First Kings 15. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily. Objection 4 further. Compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily. Objection 5 further. Ambrose says on Luke 5 that the ship in which Judas was was in distress. Therefore Peter who was calm in the security of his own merits was in distress about those of others. But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished without having voluntarily deserved it. On the contrary punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary according to Augustine and on the free will too, as well as in retractions one. Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily. I answer that punishment may be considered in two ways. First under the aspect of punishment and in this way punishment is not due save for sin. Because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored insofar as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Therefore since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin as stated above in the parts prima secunde question 81 article 1. It follows that no one is punished in this way except for something done voluntarily. Secondly punishment may be considered as a medicine not only healing the past sin but also preserving from future sin or conducing to some good and in this way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own yet not without cause. It must however be observed that a medicine never removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser thus the medicine of the body never blinds the eye in order to repair the heal yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater consequence and since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence while temporal goods are least important sometimes a person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our humiliation or probation but no one is punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part neither in this nor in the future life because in the latter punishment is not medicinal but as a result of spiritual condemnation. Reply to Objection 1. A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for another man's sin because spiritual punishment affects the soul in respect of which each man is master of himself but sometimes a man is condemned to punishment and temporal matters for the sin of another and this for three reasons first because one man may be the temporal goods of another and so he may be punished in punishment of the latter thus children as to the body are a belonging of their father and slaves are a possession of their master secondly when one person's sin is transmitted to another either by imitation as children copy the sins of their parents and slaves the sins of their masters so as to sin with greater daring or by way of merit as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior according to Job 34 30 who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people hence the people of Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people in 2 Kings 24 this may also happen through some kind of consent or connivance thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked for not having condemned to their sins as Augustine says and on the city of God 1 9 thirdly in order to mark the unity of human fellowship whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another lest he sin and in order to inculcate horror of sin seeing that the punishment of one affects all as though all were one body as Augustine says and speaking of the sins of 8 can in his questions on Joshua 8 the saying of the Lord visiting the inequity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity since he does not take vengeance forthwith but waits for some future time in order that the descendants at least may mend their ways yet should the wickedness of the descendants increase it becomes almost necessary to take vengeance on them reply to objection to as Augustine states in his questions on Joshua 8 human judgment should conform to the divine judgment when this is manifest and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins but human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments whereby he punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient for each individual where for according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment such as death mutilation or flogging but a man may be condemned even according to human judgment to a punishment of forfeiture even without any fault of his part but not without cause and this in three ways first through being a person becoming without any fault of his disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good thus for being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the church and for bigamy or through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from receiving sacred orders secondly because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own but common property thus that an episcopal see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good of the whole city and not only to the good of the clerics thirdly because the good of one person may depend on the good of another thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent reply to objection three by the judgment of god children are punished in temporal matters together with their parents both because they are a possession of their parents so that their parents are punished also in their person and because this is for their good less should they be spared they might imitate the sins of their parents and thus deserve to be punished still more severely vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other irrational creatures because in this way their owners are punished and also in horror of sin reply to objection four an act done through compulsion of fear is not involuntary simply but has an admixture of voluntariness as stated above in the paris primis akundi question six articles five and six reply to objection five the other apostles were distressed about the sin of judas in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of one in commendation of unity as stated above in the reply to objections one and two end of question 108 read by michael shane craig lambert lc question 109 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a lever vox recording all lever vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lever vox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 109 of truth in four articles we must now consider truth and the vices opposed there to concerning truth there are four points of inquiry first whether truth is a virtue second whether it is a special virtue third whether it is a part of justice fourth whether it inclines to that which is less first article whether truth is a virtue objection one it seems that truth is not a virtue for the first of virtues is faith whose object is truth since then the object precedes the habit and the act it seems the truth is not a virtue but something prior to virtue objection two further according to the philosopher in ethics four seven it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to be neither more nor less than they are but this is not always praiseworthy neither in good things since according to proverbs 27 verse 2 let another praise thee and not thy own mouth nor even in evil things because it is written in condemnation of certain people in isaia 39 they have proclaimed abroad their sin as sodom and they have not hit it therefore truth is not a virtue objection three further every virtue is either theological or intellectual or moral now truth is not a theological virtue because its object is not God but temporal things for telly says in his rhetoric too that by truth we faithfully represent things as they are were or will be likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues but their end nor again is it a moral virtue since it is not a mean between excess and deficiency for the more one tells the truth the better it is therefore truth is not a virtue on the contrary the philosopher both in the second and in the fourth book of ethics places truth among the other virtues I answer that truth can be taken in two ways first for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true and thus truth is not a virtue but the object or end of a virtue because taken in this way truth is not a habit which is the genus containing virtue but a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified or again between a thing and its rule as stated in the first part question 16 article 1 and in question 21 article 2 secondly truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true in which sense one is said to be truthful this truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue because to say what is true is a good act and virtue is that which makes its possessor good and renders his action good reply to objection one this argument takes truth in the first sense reply to objection two to state that which concerns oneself in so far as it is a statement of what is true is good generically yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue since it is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due circumstances and if these be not observed the act will be sinful accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for that which is true and it is also sinful to publish one sin by praising oneself on that account or in any way proclaiming it uselessly reply to objection three a person who says what is true utters certain signs which are in conformity with things and such signs are either words or external actions or any external thing now such kinds of things are the subject matter of the moral virtues alone for the latter are concerned with the use of the external members in so far as this use is put into effect at the commandment of the will where for truth is neither a theological nor an intellectual but a moral virtue and it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways first on the part of the object secondly on the part of the act on the part of the object because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality and equal is a mean between more and less hence for the very reason that a man says what is true about himself he observes the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself and one that says less than the truth on the part of the act to observe the mean is to tell the truth when one ought and as one ought excess consists in making known one's affairs out of season and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known second article whether truth is a special virtue objection one it seems that truth is not a special virtue for the true and the good are convertible now goodness is not a special virtue in fact every virtue is goodness because it makes its possessor good therefore truth is not a special virtue objection to further to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here but this belongs to every virtue since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act therefore truth is not a special virtue objection three further the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives a right and of which it is written in isaia 38 verse 3 I beseech thee remember how I have walked before the in truth and with a perfect heart now one lives a right by any virtue as follows from the definition of virtue given above in the parse prema secunde question 55 article 4 therefore truth is not a special virtue objection for further truth seems to be the same as simplicity since hypocrisy is opposed to both but simplicity is not a special virtue since it rectifies the intention and that is required in every virtue therefore neither is truth a special virtue on the contrary it is numbered together with the other virtues in ethics to seven I answer that the nature of human virtue consists in making a man's deed good consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness in human acts it is necessary that man be disposed there to buy a special virtue and since according to Augustine good consists in order as is stated in on the nature of good 3 it follows that a special aspect of good will be found where there is a special order now there is a special order whereby our externals whether words or deeds are duly ordered in relation to something as sign to things signified and there to man is perfected by the virtue of truth therefore it is evident that truth is a special virtue reply to objection one the true and the good are convertible as to subject since every true thing is good and every good thing is true but considered logically they exceed one another even as the intellect and will exceed one another for the intellect understands the will and many things besides and the will desires things pertaining to the intellect and many others where for the true considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good since it is something appetable and unlike manner the good considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something true since it is something intelligible therefore since virtue includes the aspect of goodness it is possible for truth to be a special virtue just as the true is a special good yet it is not possible for goodness to be a special virtue since rather considered logically it is the genus of virtue reply to objection two the habits of virtue and vice take their species from what is directly intended and not from that which is accidental and beside the intention now that a man states that which concerns himself belongs to the virtue of truth as something directly intended although it may belong to other virtues consequently and beside his principal intention for the brave man intends to act bravely and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a consequence besides his principal intention reply to objection three the truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true not whereby a person says what is true life like anything else is said to be true from the fact that it attains its rule and measure namely the divine law since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law this truth or rectitude is common to every virtue reply to objection four simplicity is so called from its opposition to duplicity whereby to wit a man shows one thing outwardly while having another in his heart so that simplicity pertains to this virtue and it rectifies the intention not indeed directly since this belongs to every virtue but by excluding duplicity whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another third article weather truth is a part of justice objection one it seems that truth is not a part of justice for it seems proper to justice to give another man his due but by telling the truth one does not seem to give another man his due as is in the case in all the foregoering parts of justice therefore truth is not a part of justice objection to further truth pertains to the intellect whereas justice is in the will as stated above in question and 58 article four therefore truth is not a part of justice objection three further according to Jerome truth is threefold namely truth of life truth of justice and truth of doctrine but none of these is a part of justice for truth of life comprises all virtues as stated above in article two third reply truth of justice is the same as justice so that it is not one of its parts and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues therefore truth is no wise a part of justice on the contrary Tully in his rhetoric to reckons truth among the parts of justice I answer that as stated above in question 80 a virtue is annexed to justice as secondary to a principle virtue through having something in common with justice while falling short from the perfect virtue thereof now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice in the first place it is directed to another since the manifestation which we have stated to be an act of truth is directed to another in as much as one person manifests to another the things that concern himself in the second place justice sets up a certain equality between things and this the virtue of truth does also for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice as to the notion of debt for this virtue does not regard legal debt which justice concerns but rather the moral debt in so far as out of equity one man owes to another a manifestation of the truth therefore truth is a part of justice being annexed there too as a secondary virtue to its principle reply to objection one since man is a social animal one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society now it would be impossible for men to live together unless they believed one another as declaring the truth to one another hence the virtue of truth does in a manner regard something as being due reply to objection two truth as known belongs to the intellect but man by his own will whereby he uses both habits and members others external signs in order to manifest the truth and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of the will reply to objection three the truth of which we are speaking now differs from the truth of life as stated in the preceding article article two third reply we speak of the truth of justice in two ways in one way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according to the rule of the divine law and in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life because by the truth of life a man lives a right in himself whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth of which we are now speaking as neither has the truth of life in another way the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that out of justice a man manifests the truth as for instance when a man confesses the truth or gives true evidence in a court of justice this truth is a particular act of justice and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking because to it in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another man his due hence the philosopher in ethics 4.7 says in describing this virtue we are not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements nor does this apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned the truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths relating to science wherefore another does this truth directly pertain to this virtue but only that truth whereby a man both in life and in speech shows himself to be such as he is and the things that concern him not other and neither greater nor less than they are nevertheless since truths of science as known by us are something concerning us and pertain to this virtue in this sense the truth of doctrine may pertain to this virtue as well as any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests by word or deed what he knows 4. article whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less objection one it seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less for as one incurs falsehood by saying more so does one by saying less thus it is no more false than 4 or 5 than that 4 or 3 but every falsehood is in itself evil and to be avoided as the philosopher declares in ethics 4 7 therefore the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to that which is greater objection to further that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather than to the other is owing to the fact that the virtues mean as nearer to the one extreme than to the other thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity but the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the other because truth since it is a kind of equality holds to the exact mean therefore truth does not more incline to that which is less objection 3 further to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth since this is to subtract there from and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition there too now to deny the truth is more repugnant to the truth than to add something to it because truth is incompatible with the denial of truth whereas it is compatible with addition therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than to that which is less on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 4 7 that by this virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is less i answer that there are two ways of declining from the truth to that which is less first by affirming as when a man does not show the whole good that is in him for instance science holiness and so forth this is done without prejudice to truth since the lesser is contained in the greater and in this way virtue inclines to what is less for as the philosopher says in ethics 4 7 this seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance for those who represent themselves as being greater than they are are a source of annoyance to others since they seem to wish to surpass others whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure since they seem to defer to others by their moderation hence the apostle says in second Corinthians 12 6 though i should have a mind to glory i shall not be foolish for i will say the truth but i forbear lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me secondly one may incline to what is less by denying so as to say what is in us is not in this way it does not belong to the virtue to incline to what is less because this would imply falsehood and yet this would be less repugnant to the truth not indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth but as regards the aspect of prudence which should be safeguarded in all the virtues for since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to others it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not than to think or say that one has not what one has this suffices for the replies to the objections end of question 109 read by michael shane craig lambert lc