 My name is John Andrews and it's my pleasure to welcome you to this session, and it's quite a long way I suppose from the current obsessions of the news headlines because this is the Indo-Pacific region. We are going to pivot to the Indo-Pacific region, not quite in the way that Barack Obama may have imagined, but anyway I think clearly whatever the current crises are, the medium and long term questions, geopolitically and economically, will be in the Indo-Pacific region. Now I have a wonderful panel here which I'll introduce in just a second, but let me just say a couple of words about this Indo-Pacific region and about the title of this session. This session is about security concerns and economic opportunities, and there's a lot to be said about both. I mean if you take the region it has I could argue far too many nuclear powers. You've got the US, you've got Russia, you've got China, you've got North Korea, you have some real flash points, you've got Taiwan obviously, India-China, they may be members of the BRICS, but actually they're often not quite at daggers drawn, but pretty hostile relationship. You've got plenty of maritime and territorial disputes which I think include almost everybody actually, every country in the Indo-Pacific region. Let's just take security first of all. There are so many acronyms and initials that we can festoon over this subject. You've got AUKUS, Australia, UK, US, Cypher France there, France wanted to sell its submarines to Australia, and Australia said no, and it came to the BRICS and the Americans, so there we are, but we'll put that behind this, so there's AUKUS. You have US security treaties actually with Australia, with New Zealand, with Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, and you've got non-treaty partnerships with the US, with India, with Indonesia, with Vietnam. So what, if you think of that as one particular block, what is the, let's say anti-Western, I was exactly like the sort of anti-Western idea, but you've got China and North Korea, I suppose that's the only neutral aid and cooperation friendship treaty that China has, apart now from its no limits, strategic partnership, I'm putting no limits in inverted commas, with Russia, with Putin of Russia. A lot of acronyms and initials for the economy. We've got the Shanghai Corporation Organization, which I think actually became really from Central Asia, rather than the Indo-Pacific region itself, but does now include lots of players from Indo-Pacific, including India. You've got ASEAN, and ASEAN expands, you've got ASEAN plus three. You've got ASAP, regional comprehensive economic partnership, which is ASEAN plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand. They can all see the economic potential of this region, and therefore they see the virtue in collaborating and cooperating. And of course you have the CPTPP, the comprehensive and progressive agreement for a trans-Pacific partnership. 11 members so far, not yet China, and rather unfortunately in my opinion, America decided not to go for the TPP way back in the days when Harry Clinton was running against Donald Trump. And finally you've got IPEF, the India Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. I know nothing about this, but perhaps someone else here does, and that I think was launched by Joe Biden in Tokyo last year. Will it amount to anything? I don't know, but clearly we have lots of security concerns, and we have lots of economic opportunities. So really I'm going to ask the panel to talk about in that almost binary fashion. Now let me introduce the speakers to my left, Jean-Pierre Cabestin, who speaks much better English than most English people, despite being a proud Frenchman. And as he revealed yesterday in a question to the former Chief Executive of Hong Kong, is now a permanent resident in Hong Kong. I hope that this panel will not get you chucked out, but you never know. Jean-Pierre Cabestin is a professor emeritus at the Hong Kong Baptist University and was a senior researcher with CNRS in France. Yuichi Hossoya is a professor of international politics at Keio University in Tokyo. Kim Jong-un from Korea, South Korea, as I realize he's on North Korea as well, has a very distinguished career as a diplomat, not just ambassador to Indonesia, but also to the European Union, and now representing the Korean Federation of Businesses. I got the right title, I hope. Hervé Mariton, very distinguished career in French politics, and he's also a very important man, chairman of the Franco- British Council. And really my plea to you, Hervé, is to try to get back my rights as a European citizen. Why are you allowed Brexit to happen? I do not know, but anyway, that's my problem. And then MK Narayana, the former senior advisor to Mam Han Singh, who was a very, very successful and influential prime minister of India, long and distinguished career in Israeli intelligence. Sorry, that's a slip of the tongue. Forgive me, forgive me, Indian intelligence. Although I think perhaps they needed you in Israel. Yeah, exactly. You took the words. I think I did a better job than what they did when Hamas attacks. And also former governor of West Bengal. And then last but definitely not least on this panel, Doug Powell, who has been very influential diplomat, he's been a very influential academic and a quite a successful businessman, so large in the life almost. But I think from this particular panel, one should actually underline that he was once the American head of the American Institute in Taiwan. That means that in the real world, you were the American ambassador to Taiwan. So I'll introduce you to that. Anyway, that's your platform or your panel. I think they're all tremendous. Jean-Pierre, the floor is yours. Seven minutes. All right, as you look at the time. Well, thanks a lot for this very kind introduction. Thank you to Thierry de Montbriere and Ifri for inviting me again to this August conference in which I've learned a lot on other topics like AI and semiconductors, which are very, very much related to the topic we're going to talk about. We are located actually at the western end of the Indo-Pacific region, a region which is very vast, which includes maybe two-thirds of the world population and maybe more than half of the world GDP. So it's a very, very important region of the world. Even in Europe sometimes, of course, we tend to, I wouldn't say neglect in the Pacific, but we are so focused on Europe and Ukraine for good reason and also on the Middle East for obvious reasons as well, that the Indo-Pacific maybe is not at the top of the agenda of most European leaders and governments. However, I think there are a number of things that we'd like to tell you about very briefly to start with. Since I'm based in Hong Kong, which is part of China, as you may have realized, I would like to say a few things about, first of all, the new environment in the Indo-Pacific and in particular the economic environment in which the region is developing today. It's a much slower economic environment than before. The economic growth of China has slowed down to 3%. The Chinese economy is facing a number of issues in the housing sector. Local governments are in the red and the post-COVID recovery has been quite disappointing. It worked well in the first term of this year, but then it has slowed down and there are some concerns. There are also some concerns about employment in China. The unemployment rate officially is around 21%. Maybe it's much higher among young people, maybe 40%. And there's a sense of malaise. If you haven't read an article by Evan Osnos in the New Yorker, which is a very interesting magazine, and the article tells you quite a bit about the mood of quite a number of Chinese today. And I can see that among my many Chinese students in Hong Kong itself. So that's the first thing I would like to say. The second thing is, of course, geopolitics is having an impact on the economy of those in the region, big on the Chinese economy. And it's not disrupting everything. I don't think we're witnessing a full decoupling of Chinese and the economy from the U.S. economy or Western economies. But it's disrupting. It complicates the trade flows in a number of sectors. Semiconductors have been mentioned, but also China has retaliated against sanctions imposed by the U.S. and started to use also some economic tools in order to put pressure on the other side, including restricting the export of gallium, germanium and graphite to the U.S. and to other countries as well. Now, what is interesting in this new context is you see both trends taking shape. One is some kind of reduction of some countries dependent upon China. And one of these examples is South Korea. We may come back to that. And on the other side, we see countries like India, despite the tensions you've alluded to on the border, they still do a lot of trade with China. And actually the trade deficit between India and China is huge and keeps growing to the point that now India trades more with China than with the U.S. So we're not really witnessing any decoupling. If you look at the trade figures between China and the U.S. or the U.S., it's still very, very strong. And then the slowdown has had also in China has had other consequences. The fact that the BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative now has less steam, less, I mean, in its engine, less money has been involved in, invested in the BRI today. I think it gives opportunity to other players to play a bigger role in the, in the Pacific region and the global south as a whole. I'm alluding here to a number of initiatives taken by the U.S., like the, the, the, the B3W, Bilba Becker World, or the Global Gateway of the European Union, or the G7 Infrastructure Project. So, so there are a number of opportunities here, which is also shouldn't be neglected. But I think there are security challenges. And here I will be brief because we can come back to those five challenges. It doesn't mean that every country is aligned to, and to this new bipolarity with, with new bipolarity with, which is emerging in the region between the U.S. and China. I think they still love Liyue for a number of countries. And the best example maybe is India, which is the same time a very active member of the BRICS, why, why, why being much closer to other partners in Asia through the Quad, if you never heard of the Quad, the Quadrilateral Security Forum between India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. So we see India playing a, you know, very diverse role in, in the region. But what dominates in the, in the Pacific region now it's, it's really a growing bipolarity and growing tension between the U.S. and China. The question, of course, is for other players, including the European Union, whether they can, you know, how, how can they play a role in that new context? Now the good news in the sense that they, is that there, there are tensions, but for the time being, China is playing what, in what we call the gray zone within the gray, the limits of the gray zone strategy, which is to put pressure on the other side and other players, including the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait on the, even in the East China Sea with Japan around the Senkaku Islands, but doesn't go beyond the threshold of war. So the gray zone strategy is not without risks. I think there are growing risks of incidents of military crisis. And the mini crisis, a military crisis needs to be managed. But I think we have precedence, one of the best known precedent, the EP3 incident in 2001 between the U.S. and China, which was, you know, negotiated and managed and negotiated by both sides of the foreign ministry. So, so even if today, one of the issues and the dog will come back to that, I'm sure, is the lack of military to military relations and contacts between the U.S. and China. I think those meal-meal relations will be sooner or later resumed. And if they need to communicate, because of a crisis, I think they will find a way to communicate. So that's the, that's the background now. The, of course, quite a number of people have alarmed about the growing tension in Taiwan Strait and for good reasons. And now I don't think that the TSMC and the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is an efficient shield against any attack from China. The so-called Silicon Shield is not something which I would really invest in or believe in. But what I think is that a number of factors have also led China to think twice about starting a military venture against Taiwan. The war in Ukraine is playing a role, clearly. But I think at the end of the day, what is very important to bear in mind is the fact that both China and the U.S. are nuclear powers. And it's very likely that in the case of a Taiwan contingency or crisis in Taiwan Strait, the U.S. will intervene. So it raises the stakes, clearly. But the fact that we have two nuclear powers and nuclear weapons, in a sense, are factors of peace, rather than factors of war, because it will compare both sides to think twice before starting a war in the Taiwan Strait. So that's what I would insist upon here at this stage, and maybe we can come back to those issues. Thank you very much, Jean-Pierre. Yewichi, the floor is yours. And I should, of course, in the acronym, have mentioned the Quad. But fortunately, Jean-Pierre mentioned the Quad. And the Quad was a Japanese initiative. So the floor now is yours. Well, thank you very much, indeed, for having me in this session. And also, thank you very much for maintaining attention to the Indo-Pacific region, the most dynamic region, as well as the largest region in the world. So that's why we have the largest numbers of speakers in this session. Of course, thank you very much for mentioning about Quad. It's a Japanese invention, as well as a concept in the Pacific, which is generally regarded as the invention of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. For some reasons, many things have happened in the last one year in the Indo-Pacific region, while we are seeing two wars, one in Ukraine, of course, and the other one in the Middle East. So we are now asking further another war would happen soon in Asia Pacific or in the Pacific region, of course, around Taiwan. So I'd like to focus on four points in my talk, initial talk. First, the possibility of contingency around Taiwan has been repeatedly discussed in the last one year. Last month, the Chinese government sent the fighter jets to monitor and warn a US Navy aircraft that flew through the Taiwan Strait. Many observers naturally sensed the possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict between the two parts. In Japan, we have been generally saying that the possibility of war is quite small, because China is not Russia. China would be more rational and more restrained. That's why the possibility is limited. But still, we can see some elements of the outbreak of war. So we have to be careful about how we should stop the happening of the war in the region. This is one thing. The other thing is that secondly, on the other hand, both China and the United States have been searching opportunities to talk at the highest level. It is now reported that the president Xi Jinping would soon visit San Francisco to attend this year's epic meeting. This would be undoubtedly variable opportunity to ease the tension between the two greatest parts. So this is good news. Thirdly, Japan, the number three largest economy in the world, Japan decided to double its defense budget to enhance Japanese deterrence in the region. This is largely because of the fact that the US government has been repeatedly asked Japan to do so. There are so many uncertainties, and the regional powers must take more responsibility than before. Of course, the United States is becoming much more inward-looking, and next year, we do not know who will be chosen as an expression. That's why Japan must play a larger role in stabilizing the region. Fourthly, another good important thing is that Japan and South Korea have been improving their relationship. This is good news during the time of great concern and woes. I think that this is essentially important trend for some reason. One of them is that the United States government has been trying to persuade the two governments to improve their relations because US forces in Japan and US forces in Korea cannot work effectively without the cooperation between the two governments. Finally, the missing puzzle can be found. The United States can effectively increase deterrence in the region with much more enhanced ROK Japan relations, so this is good news. The US government has been trying to create a cooperation among the like-minded partners, and the Quad is one of them. At the time when the multilateral cooperation is really difficult, we need to rely more upon the cooperation among like-minded partners as well as Minidatella cooperation, Minidatellaism, which means, of course, AUKUS and the Quad as well as the G7. These are the cooperation among the like-minded partners. By enlarging the cooperation, I think that we can remedy the so many problems that we are now facing. So in the sense, Japan can provide many things to bring stability in the region by enhancing deterrence on one hand. But on the other hand, Japan is providing inclusive regional concepts such as in the Pacific. This is a huge inclusive regional concept based upon the free and open in the Pacific strategy, which has been driven by Japanese government. Also, CPTPP as well, the largest free-trade area in the region. So with these inclusive regions, I think that Japan can do something to bring stability in the region. Thank you very much. Interesting that in a sense, America's policy in the region overhangs everything. And one does wonder if Donald Trump were to be the next president. How policy might or might not change? I mean, in a sense, Biden has continued much of Trump's policy towards China. But, you know, it's interesting you brought up the question of the need for more, for Asian powers to take more responsibility for input. Kim, Mr. Jungman. All right. Thank you, John. And thank you. President Thierry Montvial and his team and all the organizers for the World Paris Conference, especially including Sangim. I think it's an excellent occasion to be joining this wonderful team of panelists. It's my first time to attend this World Paris Conference, but it's really enlightening and informative. I think there's something that I just want to make highly of what I've been seeing. And I'm representing the Federation of the Korean Industry, so I would like to share with you all some of the business perspectives, especially in relation to the increasing geopolitical risks and uncertainties across the Indo-Pacific. And increasing geopolitical uncertainties precipitated the return of so-called economic statecraft. Every government is putting economic policy priorities linked to long-term national security interests. Intestification of US China's strategic competition is leading us to be put under increasing pressure to choose between the two sides, particularly in relation to high-tech industry investment. And secondly, the shift has been necessitated by various forms of economic coercion from China and other countries, as well as examples of unilateralism that has been exhibited by the United States. And there are two very fundamental questions that CEOs in the boardroom ask themselves at a deep psychological level. One is what kind of geopolitical risks is most relevant to business decision-making? The first one. And the second one is does economic security, which is kind of the buzzword in these days, make the business environment become even safer or more stable one? That's two questions. Let me first touch upon the first question. I think this first and foremost, the most fundamental threat or risk that they are feeling at the business dimension is the US-China rivalry. It's no doubt. As US China rivalry intensifies, economic security, whether it's as a policy or initiative or the defensive reaction to what is being charted out within the context of the hegemonic competition, the governments of big powers and even middle powers are trying to adopt more kind of protective and sometimes kind of fortification of his own economic structure. And economic security is bringing not only just limited to controls on sensitive technology such as high-end semiconductor production equipment, but also it is also extend into value networks, especially critical minerals and rare earth minerals securement. It could also expand into building a broad industrial base, including products with relatively few national security implications such as electric vehicles. Let me just cite one example. That is Samsung electronics. Samsung has been enjoying quite a significant share of the market in smartphones up until 2016. It has been on the top of the market share. Now it has been gone down to almost 1% of the market share in China. And Samsung has shut down, we've thrown its production plans in two important cities in China. And they have shut down the TB manufacturing plants in China as well. So most of these plants have been relocated to either to Vietnam or to India. So India is now having largest manufacturing plant of smartphones to be run by Samsung electronics. So it's kind of the general relocation and the alignment of the whole manufacturing facilities within the in the Pacific era area, especially when it comes to a certain specific company. And the second question is related with is economic security really makes making this business environment a safer and stable one. My answer is not really. Actually economic security is causing a lot of increase in input prices. And also instability sources, uh, stirring up social and regulatory pressures on business, widening geopolitical schemes, leading parts makers and regulators to structure and administered, administered their respective economies and business environments differently. Businesses are increasingly navigating administrative, logistical and brand reputation risks. So rapidly inflating input prices are creating cost issues for business and reduce labor flows are also forcing business to spend more on these workforces. Lastly, I just want to touch upon what Professor Yuichi Osoya has mentioned, especially on the improvement of bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan. I do echo what Professor Yuichi Osoya has mentioned. It's a bit of game changing effect upon the regional structure, not only in the security and political realm, but also in economic and trade realm as well. So one kind of landmark example is the Camp David leaders meeting among South Korea, Japan and the United States that was hosted by President Biden in August this year. So that is the first time ever stand along trilateral leaders meeting among three countries that has been enabled by the warming up of bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan. That's a very encouraging point to end on actually. Yes, indeed. I think, you know, when you talked about how, you know, the spread of manufacturing from China has gone into Vietnam, etc. I mean, do you think that decoupling or re-risking actually is just words which actually don't really have much practical effect except to make things perhaps more difficult at the political level? Is it an empty phrase that industry and your real businesses can simply ignore? I will get back to you later when the first round is complete. Fair enough. Hervé, the floor is yours. Thank you. Thank you, Thierry, for having the Indo-Pacific as an issue again this year. And I'm just proposing to share a French point of view on the Indo-Pacific. France has its tense on the Indo-Pacific and actually has its stakes. French overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, Pacific and Indian Ocean. That's more than, well, if you get it roughly, it's about one and a half million inhabitants, a little more than that actually. And we boast of the second largest maritime domain in the world, the first one being the US. The French one is 10 million square kilometres. The US is 12. Actually, the Australian one is 9 and New Zealand is 7. So I wouldn't say New Zealand boasts as a major strategic power, although it has 7 million, but the French, we do actually boast of our 10 million square kilometres in the Indo-Pacific mostly, at least. That's 10 million in the world, but most of it is in the Indo-Pacific. The first thing I would stress is that we did not necessarily define the concept of Indo-Pacific exactly the same way others do. I remember last year having some discussions about this and as probably most of you know, the Americans mostly have defined the Indo-Pacific in a more northern and eastern way than we've had. The French wouldn't insist actually that the Indo-Pacific is the Pacific but also the Indian Ocean. Actually, if I get it right, American organisation, particularly American military organisation, takes the word of Indo-Pacific but actually concentrates mostly on the Pacific and tends not to look very much on the Indian part of it, although it has basis in cooperation with the UK in the Indian Ocean. The second point is that the US, look at it, is mostly northern, although Ocus and all this and since our territories are mostly in the southern hemisphere, the French look on the Indo-Pacific is mostly southern. So there is a difference in concept not only between France and the US, but between the US and some other countries. France defines itself as a balancing power in the region. We had a short discussion with Jean-Pierre this morning. The French term is puissance d'équilibre. We're not quite sure that balancing power is a very good translation and we're not quite sure the concept is exactly the same in French as it would be in English, but the French insist on puissance d'équilibre. We're not actually the only ones in the region, but the translation I propose to share with you is a balancing power. So, well, I think Thierry would agree with you. This is a very nice phrase to have. So, I propose we discuss on these two aspects, actually, balancing and power. France would boast of being an Indo-Pacific country through its doctrine and its influence. First, the doctrine in itself poses a status saying we're in Indo-Pacific power, however balancing power does put us in a position of being amongst the major powers. Not quite the size of the US and China may be, but a major power. This is important for us and obviously geography and history helps us defining us as that sort of power. We do understand we're not quite in the same position as the major powers in the region, neither as the small Pacific Islands, for example, thus the very convenient definition of a balancing power. The status is underlined as being a side beyond the antagonism between the US and China. This is French tradition of defining itself as a sort of third term power in many circumstances. But actually here stands a first difficulty in the fact that there are many balancing powers, small powers or medium-sized powers in the region. The Pacific Islands would not acknowledge any sort of alignment with China or the US alternatively, neither would Asian countries. Indonesia itself defines itself as a balancing power. What about India? Its size is considerable in the region, its economy not quite yet, but it does not acknowledge, as far as I understand, an alignment with neither with the US nor with China. So when we define our position as being particular as a balancing power, it's not that specific as it supposes it is. Actually the US themselves, being part of many forums and cooperation and dialogue schemes in the region, also play on that. I mean in some circumstances they're looking for some sort of alignment between powers, but in other circumstances understanding the subtlety of the positions of different countries, they play their role in different forums that do not necessarily require any form of alignment. Okay, you do have the quad, you have AUKUS, but the US also, for example, has organized what is called Partners in the Blue Pacific. And this is a cooperation with the very many island countries you get in the midst of the Pacific that does not require any necessary alignment. Neither does actually the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the IPEF, which in a lower level counts to succeed the TPP retreat in 2017. So, France in this frame, particularly with the US, is an ally with many reserves. And in a way we pay the price to it. Obviously we're not in the quad, which is US, Japan, Australia and India. We're not in AUKUS, and as you underlined in your introduction, I mean AUKUS has to do with the way we lost a contract with Australia on nuclear submarines. And so the problem is that being a balancing power is a positive definition in itself, but it's also a negative definition in the way that it defines itself as participating in many forums that others share, but having decided not to participate in some of the important forums that are aligned to the US. Assertion. France actually has enhanced the assertion of Indo-Pacific as such. For example, we have been very much the driving force with the definition of a trade policy for European Union in the Indo-Pacific, and for example we've simulated Europe's engagement in 2022 with a ministerial forum between Indo-Pacific countries and members of government from the European Union. Our assertion is not only about overall discussions and forums. It is an actual military presence. Although we tend very often to present as military presence and military cooperation, what is very often humanitarian presence and humanitarian cooperation, military means being used for humanitarian missions, which is fair and useful, but you should not confuse both terms. We purport to have reality on the ground and at sea, France as an Indo-Pacific country through its presence and connections. The presence, as I was saying, several territories in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific and more than one and a half million inhabitants, but one must remember that most of the connection from these territories, be it French Polynesia or Mayotte between Madagascar and Africa, most of the connections are with mainland France and obviously there is a deficit so far on regional connections. We may have no choice in the future actually. We remember the slides that were shown yesterday by the chairperson from the BCG presenting what everybody knows as the regionalization of globalization and this, for example, weakens the maritime routes on which we are very dependent. All the trade that's organized between Europe and the French territories in the Pacific depends on maritime routes that are extremely fragile today because they are reorganized, understanding the evolution of globalization. So we have a concern, a direct strategic concern shared with our allies on the security of these routes as everybody understands in the Pacific, but we have a more direct interest in the fact that they obviously are changing today and this should stimulate us in turning to new opportunities in the region. There's a gap to bridge on our regard and connections on shared interest. There are political connections with all the forums we're a member of and some, I mean the many I could say are the South Pacific community, the Pacific Commission, the Pacific Island Forum, the Indian Ocean Commission, but there are some difficulties, for example, in articulating roles and position the fact that our local governments in all these regions and territories are frequently members of these different groupings and sometimes they yield real power influence and for example trade responsibility concerning the Pacific French territories is not the responsibility for national government but responsibility for local government and so these local governments actually have economic responsibility although today they mostly understand their Pacific role or Indo-Pacific role as a political one obviously underplaying their role in the economy. We need to build up more economic connections. Economies as I was saying are very much linked to Madeleine today but there are some realities. For example, I will be concluding let me cut you short. Yeah, sure. Some realities for example in oil supply to these territories coming from Singapore for example concerning the Réunion Tourism as well which is very strong from Australia or Japan in New Caledonia or from the West Coast in the US to French Polynesia. We didn't play or do not succeed in a role to be regional hubs which usually other territories have better succeeded than we did. This is history but France is taking a very prominent role in renewable energies for example. Many companies in renewable energies in Australia or French companies nowhere and occur for example but they develop in the region not from our territories but they develop from Australian basis and so obviously we have to reconcile tomorrow what is the political assertion we're on today and the economic developments we may succeed in the future. I've given you far more than seven minutes but thank you much. You've flown the flag for France extremely well. Thank you and now MK I should by the way I'm congratulating you on the performance of the Indian cricket team because I know you're a keen fan of cricket and we have devastated Australia and England. Well I'm afraid England have played terribly in the World Cup. We were the champions but no longer India you know you I think you will be the next champion so congratulations. The floor now is yours seven minutes maybe a couple of minutes more if you don't mind. Okay thank you. I think he's left for this opportunity to present an Indian perspective on Indo-Pacific security concerns. I apologize at the beginning for being a mere practitioner of security rather than being an expert like the other members of this panel but I do hope you will still give me a worthwhile listening. I begin by making a controversial statement that not understanding the conflict in Ukraine and the war in Gaza the Indo-Pacific I believe is the pivotal theater of interstate contestation and it is important that we realize and recognize the site. Listening to the debate the previous debate one got the impression that the war in between Ukraine and Russia is a centerpiece of world history. I dare say that it's important it's critical all nations are important but I think it's important for us to recognize that the Indo-Pacific has to be maintained in a manner that this area does not become a part of China's back borders because China is the emerging power in the region and is able to do a great deal not understanding some temporary hiccups that they are facing today. I would begin by saying that there's another controversial statement I mean with apologies to the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a statement regarding the quadrilateral the Indian parliament in November 2007 and I think it caught on it was going on I feel proud that I was present on that occasion so with your permission may I set the record straight about that but more to the point I think there's a great deal of controversy that surrounds what is India's role in what is India's degree of support to the Indo-Pacific when you see India's partnership in the quadrilateral security dialogue which goes by the acronym quad as indicative of India's willingness to be part of a military pact to contain and checkmate China definitely as far as the Pacific is concerned I do think that this would be reading too much into India's intentions he has joined the quad but I think its intention is not that it would be a dedicated partner in a military confrontation with China dedicated partner along with the US the United Kingdom Australia France and Japan in a military confrontation with China I think it's important to stress this point at the very outset that there is any misreading of where India stands I know that many nation many non-nation countries find it difficult to comprehend India's stance or its unwillingness to be part of any anti-China military and defence pact I do say this because as I was explaining a little while ago to John I've been around for a very long time in the history of Sino-Indian tensions and conflicts has a long one but never the way while we have occasionally shooting wars I would regard them as skirmishes both countries believe that their war or conflict is civilizational rather than territorial we have an undiligrated border and therefore there are skirmishes but I think that we don't have any major conflict et cetera there's this struggle for influence rather than a struggle for territory I think that's important and people don't understand why why are we not part of court or why if AUKUS is willing to include us why are you not part of AUKUS because there is this basic issue I know this is changing to some extent because China had confined itself basically to the Pacific and India basically to the Indian Ocean India's interests were always in the Indian Ocean area and the Indian Ocean little while as China was in the Pacific lately China started intruding into the Indo-Pacific but it is sorry into the Indian Ocean but it is not yet altered India's perspective whether India would change that perspective in the days to come I cannot say but at the moment I think it's important to set the record straight that India does not believe in a military confrontation with China on the seas as of now yet I agree that there are many many what should I say and differing interpretations on how we should achieve the objective of containing China to some extent and not allow it to run riot if I might say so in the in the Indo-Pacific but I temper all that by my one particular reason saying that there is a tendency of you know when you talk of China to talk of extreme competition with China and it's this or not it's not not this or nothing sort of thing I think that is something for which I think India certainly but I'm aware that many Asian nations do not quite believe that this is the answer also how we should go about dealing with China as I said India needs a strategy to contain China along with other Asian nations but we do not see that the only way to achieve this is through an anti military or anti-China military military pact there's a lot of debate but there's a great deal of sober realization as well that a war could have disastrous consequences both for China and India China will not provoke a war with India because its target of 2049 becoming the world's number one power will go up in smoke India cannot also afford a war with China because we've just heard how the rest of the world I mean if Samsung is coming to India we have the world's granary today et cetera all that will also go up in smoke if you have a conflict with China so both China and India have reserves of strength and also reserves of beliefs as to what you need to do so we are now strength India is now strengthening its relationship with many of the Asian countries particularly those who are part of the Indian Ocean little but more so with Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan for instance Japan and India have now types of friendship which are almost like a military relationship but short of being called a military military pact so I think that we will collaborate with the United States we will avoid a military sort of a pact with the United States or with other countries on that or with the other country the West but we will be in that sense anti-China but if you are expecting that India will will join forces to wage a war against China I think we should be careful give me a few more minutes I want to spend the order in this context I would say and given the state of disorder that exists in the world or India I mean in the discussions that are taking place in India I'm not part of the mainstream today but I still have reasons I mean ways and means of knowing what's going on that many Asian countries are not very comfortable with the idea concept of if I might say with the quotes righteousness I mean which is becoming part of I would say the foreign policy particularly of the United States which involves a mixture of strong moral feelings coupled with great power we are doing the right thing we need to go to the kind of stuff I don't think that has been the history of international relations the world over we believe therefore that it would be a mistake not only for us but also for the viewers in the West to think that they can extract concessions from China by using military pressure tactics we live in close proximity to China and we are well aware of China's perfidious designs China wants to be first the number one power in Asia and the only country that can withstand or with a standing between that is India so they will try to belittle or sort of reduce India's layer of influence but we see in China not as a dangerous adversary as an imminent threat to which we have to face the presumption of permanent hostility or adherence to a belief that China must be confronted forcefully on every issue is something that we find it difficult to adjust to I would like to end by yesterday I was struck by the forcefulness which went the Eti Leong spoke about Taiwan I know that Taiwan is like Bangkok's ghost all the time we keep talking about Taiwan Taiwan is a problem there is no mistaking the fact that it is a problem but there is no immediate solution to Taiwan I think we need to recognize and I think this problem we can discuss it I believe and I think when I say I am not in mind but amongst the discussions we have in the security community in India time is perhaps the best option to arrive at a formula which means maintaining the status quo for some more years any attempt to change the status quo through force would not only upset the global equity and could have it would have disastrous consequences of the world our understanding is that China can live with the present position with equanimity for quite some more time and I would like to say please listen we can debate later on in this finally this might be a very personal again one more I am used to controversy I have lived by my wits most of the time I'd say that Asia especially East Asia needs to avoid the kind of situation in Europe today where Russia has a paranoid feeling of danger and of a threat from Europe and the US while the west sees Russia as a threat that needs to be eliminated two sets of people in major conflict dealing with China is going to be very complicated but I think patience is important we need to avoid the threat of a war on Taiwan and we should be careful as to how go about it finding desirable means to achieve a modest way of ending on Taiwan is perhaps the best way to foster stability in the region sorry if I sound too controversial thank you very much you mentioned Taiwan and that's perfect segue into let's call you his excellency the ambassador to Taiwan Doug the floor is yours well thank you very much and thank you to WPC and the organizers for this opportunity to share the stage learning opportunities as a member of the audience I'd like to start by framing my perspective on where we are with China in the Indo-Pacific today in terms of the revolutionary challenge that China presents China has is now I think the fourth in a series of revolutionary challenges to the international system that we've seen since the Napoleonic wars which in that case ended in the defeat of France and the rebuilding of Asia by patient and complicated diplomatic work at that time the next great revolutionary challenge was the fascist challenge which was defeated and worn again the victors made the determination of how it would be managed in the aftermath and then the Cold War came along and the Soviet Union represented a revolutionary challenge to the world but it had an inward focus it didn't really carry itself out to the same extent and today we find China under guise of revising the international system but increasingly talking about revolutionizing that system and China unlike the previous defeated Napoleonic or defeated fascist forces or the collapsed Soviet Cold War era, the China today still has a foot in the world as we know it the rules based order it's been profiting from that but it also wants to change it so I think we need to look in the long term at how we're going to find a new equilibrium, a new way to manage this Chinese ambition China as a result of being a product of four decades of involvement in the international system of investment in China and China's becoming major trading and manufacturing partner for most of the world China has also made itself vulnerable it has to protect those interests as it goes forward with its own ambitions and the my administration came to office having inherited a chaotic approach to China in the Indo-Pacific under Donald Trump if you recall I think some mention was made earlier today of the finger pointing that went on in Anchorage, Alaska between the American diplomatic representatives and the Chinese and the Chinese complained the US said it wanted to deal with China from a position of strength and derided that American position well we had a couple of years passed by and the US and the Biden administration has worked hard to reconstitute the quality of our relations to that which prevailed before the Trump administration came to office and we saw the US in Japanese and Korean alliances strengthened the alphabet soup has been mentioned of August and strengthening the Pacific Islands we've been ignoring the Pacific Islands for 20 years but China woke us up to our interests and concerns there we have the AUKUS arrangement which I'm hoping will be something material but it's still a promise not really a reality and the quad today as Biden prepares to host Xi Jinping at the APEC meeting in San Francisco I think he can take satisfaction that compared to two years ago in the Anchorage meetings the United States now is in much greater position of strength to deal with China as they go forward now the APEC meeting will mark only one moment in the continuing competition between the US China despite a slowing economy it continues to develop unprecedented military capabilities the US is challenged to upgrade its own military capabilities while being compelled to provide assistance to Ukraine and now to the Israelis in Gaza the US is also challenged by having old habits that have not been revised to meet modern requirements our military industry is fallen behind are the ways of dealing with the military industry through congress and through the defense department need to be upgraded our processes are slow there are multiple demands on resources domestic demands are up because the American people are tired of paying for maintenance of the peace around the world they want a peace dividend all of these are putting pressure on the US and ways that make it not easy for the US to simply enter into a confrontation or make series of demands we have to find ways to chisel away at our problems in the Asia Pacific region, the Indo-Pacific region and China will work all the while to make these harder I understand China has announced that it's willing to be hosting a Hamas delegation shortly China has interests in the Middle East more than the United States does but we both have an interest in keeping the energy supplies from the Middle East going forward and there's a basis for a kind of standoffish cooperation between the US and China on restoring peace in the Middle East but that has to be explored it has to be found and it's not present at the moment China seems to be rather eager to take advantage of the distress the Middle East is causing and hope that the US will be further distracted from the Taiwan and Asia Pacific sets of challenges that China is posing the main area where the United States is falling behind hasn't done enough to re strengthen its position is economic we should never have walked away from TPP in 2016 and the end of the Clinton campaign we should be talking about CPP TPP IPEC is a worthy effort but it's not a substantial an attractive offer for the parties in the region who have become increasingly dependent on trade and investment with China itself and I'm not optimistic that either the Democrats or the Republicans should they take power in the next administration would be willing to start the bullet dealing with the economic challenges that we face in the Indo-Pacific now a word about Taiwan where I served as an unofficial ambassador this is now remains the most dangerous flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific region over the past year the Biden administration has in my view retreated from its more substantial approach to our past agreements with China on how to manage Taiwan affairs we had an era where starting with the end of the Trump administration and through the beginning of the Biden administration the US was sort of pushing the envelope on official dealings with the people of Taiwan since May of this year when Jake Sullivan the national security advisor in China's counterpart Wang Yi met in Vienna talking the line more carefully it's what I call a restoration of diplomatic discipline this is not something you do alone you don't just retreat and yield to Chinese demands but you also pair that with an effort to strengthen Taiwan's ability to deter aggression China's growing military capabilities can't be dismissed but they can't be confronted directly either except at great cost the question is how to find the balance between deterrence and diplomatic discipline that keeps the peace in the Asia Pacific region what's the outlook for the 21st century in the Indo-Pacific in my view Xi Jinping and his revolutionary ambitions look to dominate the next decade or more with Xi himself in charge and a mixture of discipline and deterrence will be required if the US despite competitions for national priorities at home and leadership in other parts of the world will have to have a sustained steady measure by measure approach to the Indo-Pacific my belief however is that the people of China and the China we know today of Xi Jinping is not forever and as we move forward in our efforts to incentivize peaceful resolution of disputes in the Indo-Pacific and make the alternative of using force unattractive we also should keep the door open to the Chinese people at all times so that they understand that our competition is not with the people of China but with the behavior of a certain government in China and that if China is willing to change its behavior the US will be willing to cooperate to help make a 21st century that achieves what the Congress of Vienna did in the 18th century and with the the bright men and women of the end of the World War II period did to establish a way of maintaining a balance in global affairs to stem this revolutionary disruption and to allow us to build a peaceful future so thank you for that thank you very much D-Duck I note that you are not allowing Xi Jinping to be immortal you have a time limit for him do you have a guess when China will change you know I have been lucky enough to know a lot of Chinese for quite a few years and when we can get together I think they're pretty frank about the shortcomings of their current leadership but they're also frank about the risks of taking on the current leadership as waiting out the current leadership and not closing doors to a more cooperative and productive future between China and the various countries of the region and the world for the matter I'm tempted to have a second round but I don't think I will because you want to have questions from the audience but what I note in all your presentations I don't think North Korea was mentioned once and yet it dominated in a sense the Trump the first I hope personally the last Trump presidency who should Mr. Kim what is happening with your neighbor to the north well that's quite interestingly an economist intelligence unit has recently published Risk Outlook 2024 they have listed our top 10 risk elements but North Korea whether it's nuclear or missile proliferation or the nuclear issue was not listed was not singled out as one of the top 10 risk so I think there's quite a back in Korea I think there's of course the South Korean people are more or less getting used to kind of the perennial threat coming from the north but I think there's this North Korean threat or risk is a kind of the given factor for the Korean business and also some of the western and other foreign partner business are taking into account that is the kind of the constant factor that would be fitted into their occasion for the business I think that's one part of the answer for why this North Korean factor was not listed out and I think that the level of threat or level of threat perception has remained more or less the same they have included the first use of the nuclear weapons even to be included in that their constitution so that is quite alarming and also this series of intercontinental missile tests that is also alarming but still I think there's people in the boardroom I mean CEOs more concerned about intensification of the US-China hegemonic rivalry it was Doug who brought us back to the CPP and sensibly in my opinion the CPP but Kosovsky of course is not in the CPP we are not in yet and perhaps I think there's a next year the Korean government is trying to make a push for their participation into CPP and of course Britain which is a long way away from the Indo-Pacific region but I wonder originally when the TPP was envisaged it was a way of keeping China out now China wants to join the CPP from a Japanese point of view would China be welcome yes quite interesting question of course I think that within the Japanese government many officials examining the possibility as well as the result of Chinese participant first of all the hurdle is extremely high so it is quite unlikely that China can pass the hurdle this is one thing the other thing is that you mean this will be a way of keeping China out well in addition to the original members now UK is going to be a member of the CPP so that hurdle will be higher for China to enter into it so if China all the barrier to enter into the TPP it means that the China should promote political and economic reforms these would be welcome to welcome to Japan or other members of the CPP so in both cases number one the hurdle is still very high so it is quite unlikely that China can join in it number two if China can reform politically and economically it's own system it's also very welcoming but at the same time we need to stick the original point we shouldn't be affected by Chinese pressure to lower the handle so as far as this continues I think it's okay let me we only have 15 minutes left 14 actually gentlemen there and the microphone is coming yes maybe a question for Jean-Pierre Cabestan understood from the panel the Indo-Pacific is a rather floating concept but as far as I know Jean-Pierre it is not used as such by Chinese diplomat it is even refused so what is the Chinese wording for the same region maybe it's not exactly the same limits and which are the arguments to refuse the Japanese born Indo-Pacific concept thank you thank you thank you for the question yes I didn't mention that at the beginning but China doesn't as you said doesn't like the concept of Indo-Pacific because it sees in it an intention to contain China and the alternative concept proposed by China and China's structure it is the Asia-Pacific region where China is in a much stronger position the irony is that China is more and more active in the Indian ocean actually now it has a base in Djibouti every day seven or eight of its naval ships sail in the Indian ocean so India is important for China also because most of its oil comes from the Middle East or Africa so even if it has tried to diversify its energy sources in importantly more it has access to the Indian ocean through Gwalior from from Burma from Burma through Burma and it has also diversified its sources of energy in importantly more from the central area and more recently from Russia as you know as double its trade with Russia and mainly in importantly much more oil than before so that's where we are and of course the fact that the US has been renamed Indo-Pakom in Honolulu has also contributed to China's suspicion about the Indo-Pacific concept and the fact that it was Abishinzo who coined the expression in 207 and then it was picked up by the Trump administration in 2017 when the Trump administration decided to launch a new free and open Indo-Pacific strategy of course targeting China more or anything else so clearly there is no reason for China to promote that concept but just the opposite to question there the microphone two questions you can fight for the microphone I'll take two questions from you first of all and then from the gentleman there Cristiano de Chifere from the Boston Consulting Group in a previous life I was one of Chile's lead negotiators for the TPP so I felt compelled given that you spoke a lot about the agreement so the Trans-Pacific Partnership well and the CPTPP as the trans-Atlantic treaty between Europe and the US as the China-US bilateral investment treaty which was negotiated for 10 years and others are agreements that are rules such as the World Trade Organization is everything we're seeing today are deals understanding alliances and the question for anyone of the panelists do you see space in the short term I'm sure no but even in the medium term for rules to come back for trade agreements for actual treaties that have provisions that become international rules which need to be abided by all countries and the bilateral or pro-lateral level I'm not dreaming about multilateral agreements anytime. Okay, question there and then gentleman there. Well I think we had very important discussions about the new trend in the Indo-Pacific well I think panels really reflected very important stakeholders in the region well but I would like to bring your attention to the role Canada can play in the Pacific well as late commerce Korea and Canada released its important foreign policy and security guidelines in the Indo-Pacific strategy last December so we will act I mean according to the strategy I mean released between Canada and Korea last week there was a forum between Korea and Canada and Canada emphasized they will increase and enhance the role play in the Indo-Pacific region by bringing in more resources than before so they will help some underdeveloped members of the Indo-Pacific for better welfare and development of their economies well I think we heard a very important point about the Quad from Indian participant my friend Narayan well he emphasized the way we look at Chinese military advancement or potential threats quite different from other members of the Indo-Pacific so there is Quad a very important component of the security policy of all Indo-Pacific nations so Korea thought about joining the Quad as Quad Plus but in the forum last week well some member I mean the point Narayan just indicated so there was some proposal that because North Pacific threats security threats from countries in the North Pacific North Korea, China and Russia so what about we form the new Quad US, Japan Korea and Canada so what do you think good question there was a trade question as well so I can remind me of that question again let me take on the question I think as the TPP negotiator you recall that in the early days the question was why do a TPP and the answer from the negotiators at the time was if we create a high quality trade agreement it will not be universal at the outset trying to get the WTO to do the Doha round was a great failure because consensus was the enemy of practical progress but to do a TPP among the world's largest trading partners at a high level of equality would be an attraction for others to join the idea is you start as big as you can with a coalition of willing partners and then you build on that by creating something whose gravitational pull will be very strong I think as we go into a new period of reconstructing the world in this post Cold War era we're going to have to take things a bit by bit, step by step practical measure sort of the way Jean Monnet and George Marshall and others made small steps in the aftermath of World War II to rebuild Europe trade world we should view as something we can't do overnight but we create a momentum toward an outcome that will in the long run be one that leads to a global consensus that is the right way to go Thank you very much Canada of course is always everybody's favorite North Americans we only have 5 minutes and 43 seconds left I know that both MK and they wanted to say something MK there's no magic wand to deal with with China I think the answer how to deal with China is not to have more and more facts I think there are enough facts available I think the United States has taken on more than what should be its role in these matters I think we need a concerted strategy as to how to reduce Chinese influence across the region I think one measure already started by economically if you can bring down China in many ways you can do that the other is for the other nations to understand the making of the Chinese mind I think it's really a conflict and I think I would think that countries like Japan India and others who dealt with China over the years can play a very major role it's not merely a question of guns and butthole sort of stuff I think it's dealing with an ancient civilization it's now divided and split in many ways can we do something to reduce that if there is a confrontation China will get the Chinese population will get together we need to sort of how do you separate Xi Xi Ming from the rest of the Chinese kind of thing a lot of people in China who want a different kind of a system I think we should emphasize that and I think that's where some of the think-thanks and others can play a very major role I do think it is counterproductive to add more and more facts I'd stop with that I would be more pessimistic than Douglas since indeed the concept is really a floating concept and with the very difficult questions I believe that the multiplicity of organizations and schemes today is convenient for many partners the major ones and the medium and minor ones and I do not see why this should evolve in the short and medium term final question yes gentlemen over there on the right good evening my question is we can't hear you yeah my question is why South Korea was excluded from the quadra alliance between UK, US Australia and Japan so why South Korea was excluded from AUKUS no from the Quad from the Quad from AUKUS was that a job? well Japanese invented the Quad you may start with Yuichi I couldn't catch the question I think if I heard it correctly was why was South Korea excluded from the Quad well no no no from the beginning South Korea didn't really like to join in a group which can be regarded as a confrontational to China because China was an extremely important trading partner to South Korea so in the beginning well I think South Korea thought that it was not quite wise to join in but wisely the four countries particularly India partly Japan have seen transforming the nature of Quad from the at the beginning Quad was much more security corporation organization to that focusing on much more technology under COVID-19 vaccination and so on these kind of technical issues that's why the Quad now is much less confrontational to China so I think Quad can be accepted to much broader numbers of countries in the region I suppose we have just looking 30 seconds I think just to add to what Professor Yuichiro Sayah has mentioned is that to answer your question I think there's quite a myriad of issues or the regions behind the decision when Korea was not at the very beginning not to initiate and also take part in the whole discussion to join Quad I think the main primary factor is how to deal with China and the second is kind of the bilateral relations between Korea and Japan at that time not that comfortable and a bit souring relations between South Korea and Japan and also kind of we do have South Korea has quite rock solid alliance partnership with the United States and the World Security Alliance has been backbone of the whole the foreign policy foundation on the part of the South Korea those are the reasons why South Korea at the beginning has not joined the discussion we are almost out of time there's a few seconds left I mentioned at the very beginning that the Indo-Pacific region has plenty of flash points so flash points are by definition risk exploding so on a scale of 10 they will explode somewhere Taiwan or Korea or whatever or 0 no they will not explode if you take the next 5 years where do you put your mark 10 there will be an explosion flash point within the next 5 years 0 there will not be Doug it's a one number answer when it comes to the Taiwan question it's about 2 2 so it's a little over MK I think the world has enough wisdom to avoid a flash point or Taiwan 1 or 2 excellent very good LV2 it's about Taiwan no any flash point as long as the Indo-Pacific Taiwan could be for me South China Sea the answer would be on your scale of 0 5 5 I'm optimistic that's why Taiwan 7 so big explosion ok 2 marks 1 for the South China Sea Taiwan 4 well it's a kind of sobering outlook perhaps with a 5 year time horizon and there will be an important election in the United States next year and the term will be a 4 year presidency so I suppose adds another perspective to the number I'd like to thank the audience very much for getting this excellent panel together and I think the panel have been very good and deserve very good round of applause thank you very much