 Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to 31 Bly Street for this event. I'm Michael Fully Love, the Executive Director of the Institute. Before I go any further, let me acknowledge the traditional custodians of the land on which the Institute stands, the Gadigal of the Eora Nation, and I pay my respects to their elders past and present. Ladies and gentlemen, today you're in for a treat. We have two international superstars, Corey Sharkey and Samir Saran. Both Corey and Samir came out as guests of the Institute this week to speak in Canberra at a conference on grey-zone challenges to the rules-based order. But I always try to nab these superstars and make sure that they come to Sydney so that you guys also get some exposure to them. And I thought today we would have a broader conversation, not just about the rules-based order, although I'm sure we'll touch on that, but also to ask them about the politics of their own country and the international moment in which we find ourselves. Corey Sharkey's career has alternated between government service think tanks and universities, including IWS, which hosted the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last year. She is an internationalist Republican at a time when the GOP is the party of strong military, strong alliances, is increasingly Trump-ified. We might get onto that later. Corey now leads the Defence and Foreign Policy Program at the American Enterprise Institute where she leads a small band of rebels in defence of traditional Republican values. Samir Saran is another energiser bunny. I don't know if that metaphor works in America and India, but both Corey and Samir are intimidatingly energetic and entrepreneurial. It's not enough that Samir is president of the Observer Research Foundation, the leading think tank in India and an old partner of the Lowy Institute. He originated and continues to run the Ryzena Dialogue in Delhi, which many of you have heard of. He used to run a company in Silicon Valley and he's the founder of sci-fi, India's annual conference on cybersecurity and internet governance. So in sum, we have two brilliant observers of the world, one from the world's largest democracy and one from the world's oldest democracy. So please join me in welcoming Corey Sharkey and Samir Saran. Let me also say it's a big day for me. It's a red-letter day for me because today I was blacklisted by the Putin regime. So thank you very much. Thank you. I take that as a high compliment and I just want to say hello to our friends in the Kremlin and various troll factories at the moment who may be listening in on this conversation and thank you very much for that. All right, let's start off, but this is about you guys, it's not about me. So let me start off with you guys. I want to ask about your own countries, but first I want to ask about Australia. You've both dropped in to Australia, parachuted in about a month after an election that produced a change in government. The new Australian government is off to a very quick start, straight to the Quad meeting in Tokyo. The new foreign minister has been around the region a lot. It was just announced today that the Prime Minister would be going to the NATO summit, I think, in a week's time. So lots of international activity. What have been your observations? Corey, I'll start with you. I think you were last in Australia about three years ago during the fires. So I'm glad we've produced nicer weather for you today. Yeah, that's a beautiful blue sky for me. Thank you. But welcome to Sydney, and tell me what are your observations over the last couple of days? Let's see, a couple. The defence minister of the new government made a very strong early showing in Singapore and other places and holding his own in a meeting with his Chinese counterpart. It looks to me like Australia is increasingly a front-line state in thinking about and managing malign behaviour by China. And it's incredibly impressive how stalwart Australians are about the challenge they are facing and what they are asking of themselves in order to manage it. That's my strongest impression. It helps when resources, prices are so high, it helps to be stalwart in those circumstances, but thank you for what you said. Sameer, what about you? I think this is your second visit to Australia with you last eight or nine years ago. Have you seen any changes? What have you observed? So the last time I was here, the relationship between India and Australia was very different. I think we were just coming out of the episode around some students being beaten up in Australia. There was a big hula-baloo in India. We were fighting fires on both sides in terms of keeping a communication line open. I think that's where we were a decade ago. And today here we are, and I can safely say that if you were to ask an Indian thinker, an Indian strategic planner, who are your top five or six partners in the world today, Australia would figure in that. So here we are, you know, in less than a decade, we have moved from being countries who could not stand each other, even on the cricket field, to countries who are now looking at working shoulder to shoulder, facing the challenges in Asia and putting together new frameworks and partnerships for the future. But I think there is also a few questions that this moment poses when you come to Australia. What is this new government going to do on a few big questions? The China policy, right? And of course it helps that the first meeting you had was with the new Prime Minister had, was with this Quad counterparts. In some sense, the Quad meeting sets an early tone to the agenda of the government, hopefully. But the second question, of course, how much are you going to be able to hold your own Monroe Doctrine, you know, the Pacific Islands? How are you going to manage them? Now, you've tried to tell the world that we'll be managing this neighborhood by ourselves. And now you have trouble in paradise. You have the Chinese there. And how will you leverage your other partnerships to manage this region? And the second question, how do you manage your own particular neighborhood with others? And the third and the most obvious question is that what does this do to some of the big political decisions that the previous administration had taken, the partnership with India? Do we follow the same trajectory? Or are we going to have a progressive element in the labor government that is going to focus more on poking each other in the eyes rather than working together? And I think that's the big question. But also on the trade deal, also on your relationship with some other countries in the neighborhood, including the ASEAN countries, which I think are going to be crucial for the Australian future. ASEAN is not such a sweet spot anymore. It's again facing turbulence in terms of different actors playing there. And I think Australia has interesting days ahead. And we hope India and Australia walk together in those days. All right. So let's move on to your countries. Let's start with the United States, Corey. The world is always interested in your politics. I often think to myself that most countries in the world, the citizens of those countries have two sets of national politics. They have their own politics and they have American politics. And they have a side in American politics. And that's usually, I think, a great source of strength for the United States, that the world is so interested in you and so focused on you. But of course, when the activities in the United States have been, you know, when what we're focusing on, I guess, is things like the hearings into the January 6th committee, it can be a source of weakness and vulnerability as well. So there are no things like the January 6th committee because there is no precedent to a sitting American president organizing violence to prevent the peaceful transition of power in my country. And so to the extent you are interested in American politics, I encourage you to watch the January 6th hearings. They're making a very strong, very careful, very strong case against the president and those who assisted him to try and overthrow democracy in America. Where will that end up? Well, as Thomas Jefferson said, the only safe repository for power is the people themselves. And so it's too soon to tell how my mom and my fellow Americans are reacting to this. But we will probably have a pretty good approximation in the midterm elections in the fall. And also in whether President Trump continues to have strong purchase on Republican candidates. Well, on that subject, I said at the beginning that the GOP had become increasingly Trump-ified. Is that fair, do you think? Can you give us a view from within as a strong Republican in Washington, D.C.? Yeah, I do think it's fair. It's genuinely shocking the number of my fellow Republicans who are excusing a coup attempt in my country. But I also see signs that the fever is breaking. The election of Governor Junkin in Virginia, who had nothing to do with President Trump and focused on education and local issues. And that was a winning strategy in a democratic state. And you see lots of Republicans beginning to experiment with trying to put Trumpism behind us. On the other hand, you also see President Trump endorsing candidates, some of whom are winning races, and the president strongly and vituperatively trying to keep the 2020 election in everybody's focus while Republican candidates are trying to put it out of the picture. Let me ask you about the Democratic Party. I think you endorsed Joe Biden for president in 2020. I did. And I think you endorsed Hillary Clinton for president in 2016 as well. Why are the polls so savage for President Biden? Because as an outsider, I would say he's doing a pretty good job. They're fighting a pretty good war in Ukraine. We'll come to Ukraine later. They've restored some stability and decency to the Oval Office. They're getting on with things. Sure, inflation is high, but inflation is high in Australia and Britain and around the world. Why does he seem to be getting so little purchase with the American people, do you think? So I think there are a couple of reasons. The first is we're in a surly mood. We've been in captivity for two years. And the baseline of anxiety during a pandemic has been incredibly high. A million Americans are dead from COVID. And so I think that's one thing. We're just in a surly mood because the world feels uncertain and anxious. The second thing is the abandonment of Afghanistan and the way it was carried out by the Biden administration did an enormous amount of damage to the public perception of the president and his team as being calm, competent. One of the reasons President Biden was elected was because we were weary of the melodrama and incapacity of the Trump administration. And you saw President Biden's support in polls drop precipitously after the Afghanistan debacle and they haven't recovered. Even with, I grant you, the better performance of the president's team on Ukraine. And I think the third reason is that the president doesn't actually understand much about economics. If you look at why people are voting Republican, in particular Hispanics and black Americans are voting Republican. It's because they care about the small business environment. They're worried about taxes. They care about kids' education. And those are not, those are issues that at this political moment are playing advantageously for Republicans. All right. Last question for you, and then I'm going to come to Serea, to Sameer, I should say. It's too soon to tell as Jefferson cautioned us, but still, if you were to plug all these factors into the Kori Sharki computer, what's the most likely outcome in 2024? Does Biden run for president? Does Trump run? If Trump runs, does he win? If it's Biden v. Trump, who wins that contest? What's the most likely outcome do you think? So I very much hope that President Biden won't run because he's 1,000 years old. And there are questions about his declining competence that are also affecting his popularity ratings. And he'll be 1,004 in 2022, so that's a wasting asset. And I think if he does attempt to run, he will be primaried by Democrats because they do not want to lose the 2024 presidential election, and they especially don't want to lose it if our disgraced former president is once again on the ballot. I doubtful myself that our disgraced former president will be on the ballot in 2024 for two reasons. First, I think in the current circumstances, he can wander around Mar-a-Lago, grifting donors for the rest of his life and pretend the election was stolen from him in 2020. But if he runs again, I believe he will lose, and I think he believes he will lose. And so he's going to want to keep it in play until the absolute last minute where you have to file in New Hampshire. And then he will sulk away because I think Trump is not a political phenomenon. He's a psychological phenomenon. And I think he will not want to be a two-time loser. And also, if President Trump attempted to run, the Republican field is already crowded, right? You're probably going to have Ron DeSantis, the governor of Florida. You're probably going to have Nikki Haley, the former UN ambassador and governor of South Carolina. You're probably going to have Asa Hutchinson, the governor of Tennessee, Alabama. And so the great thing about, so the danger of American politics is any idiot can get elected president and very often does. The upside of that is there's incredible dynamism because it's so entrepreneurial. The parties have very little control over who becomes their standard bearer. And so that makes for wild swings, pendular swings in American politics. But it also means quick corrections. All right. So if I want to nail you down then, you're saying it's most likely it'll be a contest between a Democrat other than Joe Biden and a Republican other than Donald Trump, which means you might be able to actually endorse the Republican candidate in 24. It would be a great pleasure to be able to endorse a candidate of my own party again. All right. Samir, we don't know as much about Indian politics as we do about US politics. So maybe just begin by giving us a snapshot of India at the moment. The last time we spoke was for my podcast, the director's chair. When India was in the grip, I think of that deadly second wave of COVID and things were really difficult. We could hear ambulance sirens in the background as we had our conversation. India has emerged from that. Tell us a bit about the state of affairs in India and Indian politics at the moment. So Michael, since we last spoke, which was pretty much a year ago, I think maybe 14 months ago or 13 months ago, we have recovered strongly. We have recovered strongly in terms of our very ambitious and rapidly delivered vaccination program. We were able to pull our weight behind that particular ambition. We have also been able to recover in terms of our economic growth. We have seen good numbers in the last financial year. In the fastest growing, large economy in the world. We have also been able to, in many ways, put together systems in place which are going to allow us to continue to grow our economy in the days ahead. Some major reforms, some investments in infrastructure, focus on the right sectors. Many states now beginning to take the mantle and do it themselves. So we are in many ways unleashing the federal depth of India in the story. But at the same time, it would be fair to say that everything you say about India, the opposite is also equally true. We continue to remain a development deficit country. And providing what you take for granted to our people continues to remain the enduring challenge for us in this decade that has taken a severe beating curtsy the pandemic, the slowdown, the lockdowns, the disintegration of global trade as it were in the last two years. Now the Ukraine crisis and its implications, second order implications on energy and food and commodity pricing continues to challenge the Indian state and the Indian government in terms of providing what the people need most, which is jobs, which is food, which is medicines and health systems, etc. So we are going to remain a two-paced country for a while where you will continue to read headlines of the unicorns that are appearing every week. But you will also hear stories of challenges and resource scarcity and competition for resources and therefore, loud debates, argumentative Indians are going to continue to dominate that space. That's one part of the Indian story. The second part is like in most parts of the world, like other parts of the world. We are also beginning to see a new Indian direction in terms of its dealing with the big powers, right? So we have clearly a neighbor who doesn't like us to our north. And we are having to dig deep to find ways to deal with the ever-expansive and relentless China. China on the borders, China probing the borders, China wanting to in a way redraw the map of Asia to its advantage is an Indian reality as well. And even as we grapple with our development challenges, service our economy, create global linkages for our future growth, we have a live border where we have 50,000 plus troops facing off against similar numbers. And of course, two years ago, we've also had a bloody clash. And I would caution everyone that we are in that period when we could see a careless action in the coming months. So we have to continue to remain vigilant, muscular, on our toes as we face off with China. We have to navigate the Biden presidency because US does become an important partner for us in many of our global endeavors. And for all the reasons that Corey mentioned, perhaps we are also having to navigate a rough foreign landscape where you have the US, which is uncertain in terms of its ability to command global attention. You have Europe occupied with Ukraine. You have Russia embroiled in its own problems of its own making. And you have China on our heels. Our neighborhood is, of course, looking quite uncertain. Sri Lanka is in trouble. Pakistan always likes to be in trouble. And a few other neighbors of ours having their own challenges. So we are in a tough neighborhood. We are in an interesting economic spot. And we are having to face our own development demons in some sense. I think that's the India story. It's good. It's bad. Sometimes it's also ugly. But it's going to be so for the next decade. And tell us a little bit more about the relationship with China. And in particular, during and after the bloody clash that you mentioned, how did the line of communications remain? Were there still communications between ministers? Has the relationship softened at all in those two years? Is there any positivity or optimism in the relationship? Or is it more alert and stalwart? So we have never stopped talking to China. I don't think big powers should behave like that. I don't agree with the current discourse coming out of the Western countries vis-a-vis Russia. I think canceling each other is not an option in geopolitics. Communications need to remain open. But the communications are clearly quite stern. They are quite, in many ways, reflecting the ground situation. So in some sense, I think there is absolutely no trust. We don't trust the Chinese. I think the public perception of China is at its lowest. China has lost the whole generation of Indians. All India is basically a young country. And we have over what, 500 to 600 million under 30. For them, China has lost them forever. In that sense, two years ago, China has signed its own future with the young Indian demography. So I don't think you're ever going to see the relationship reach any degree of coziness. That, I think, lies out of the question. What we have to basically plan for is that how do we maintain stability in the relationship and predictability in the relationship? And for that, communication is important. But the communication we are having with China right now is to prevent conflict. It is not to do more. It is not to build the romantic idea of an Asian Union or an Asian energy grid or an Asian market. We have realized that China wants a unipolar Asia with China at the center. We are clear that for them, the propagation of the interests of the Communist Party of China is the sole motivation. Be it its economic footprint, be it its political footprint, be it its cultural footprint, the sole purpose of everything Chinese is the propagation of the Communist Party of China. And I think that is the assessment of China from India, that we can't negotiate with the Chinese. They don't believe in negotiations. So you have to continue to exert muscular pushback both through the mic and at the border. And I think our relationship will be defined by that. Now, of course, along the way we have collected a few packages. One of them is clearly the membership of the BRICS, which means that whether we want to be in that room or not, since we run a bank together, the new development banks, since we manage an organization together, we will have to have that conversation with the Chinese. We are part of their CO as well. And we are part of a few other organizations where we happen to meet each other. So in that sense, it is both a boon and, of course, a bane for us. It's a boon because at least we get to talk to each other. There is a dialogue that continues even through the worst moments. So you continue to have a line to each other. But it's also disturbing because you have to smile at each other when you don't want to. For the family photos after each of these meetings that follow. So I think we are in for a tough decade. We are at our most vulnerable, at this particular point of time, the asymmetry between their capabilities and ours is perhaps at its sharpest right now. It will begin to diminish in the next five to seven years. As India moves to $5 trillion and then $7 to $8 trillion GDP size, we will have enough defense budget and other economic weight to be able to push back significantly against Chinese encroachments, both political and economic. But till then, I think we will continue to have to build smart partnerships. And guess what? We are not alone. The Australians are in a similar situation. The Americans are hard pressed to do it alone. So I think there are four or five or six countries who are facing the heat of the dragon, who will need to work together smartly and not rely just on Uncle Sam or one actor to deliver. We will have to build our own capabilities to push back. I think in some sense, we will have to hold the line with the Chinese, each of us in our own areas, own geographies, and hopefully make them into more responsible actors. I don't think we can ever expect them to behave like us because they're not like us, but we can expect them to behave within a certain framework of acceptable behavior. All right, well, speaking of one of those smart partnerships, the bilateral relationship, I interviewed your external affairs minister, Dr. Jay Shankar, about perhaps 18 months ago. He said to me then that the bilateral relationship between Canberra and New Delhi was the one that he took the greatest satisfaction in the sense that the progress there had been greater than in other bilateral relationships. What more could we do? I mean, if we want to be ambitious and positive about it, I'm certainly confident that the new government wants to invest in the relationship. What else would you like to see in the relationship? I think a few areas pick themselves. One is political, which is that you are concerned about your neighbors, the island countries around the Pacific Islands. We are concerned about the Indian Ocean island countries. Both of them are facing great inducements by the Communist Party to select the Chinese way of life. I think it's important that we realize that it's not enough to just go and talk to these governments and tell them, no, Chinese are bad, don't do this. No, I think we have to put something on the table. Can Australia and India create an island's initiative, where we actually put together our resources, build an initiative where we invest in the technology futures, we invest in the climate resilience, we invest in the adaptation challenges, and then we actually put money on the table. Rather than saying, don't take Chinese money, we also put our money alongside and say, here, this is safer money, better money, and money that works for you. So I think one is, can we create an island's initiative? I think we are thinking about that. India has teamed up with Australia. Australia was helping the Pacific Islands. We need to do more of that. Can the court, can India and Australia, can like-minded countries put together a development fund that helps these small countries not be gobbled up by Chinese money? And I think talk is not enough. We need the green bucks on the table alongside the talk. That's the first thing. The second, of course, is, finally, hopefully, Australia is back on the climate table. And as India is going to be the world's cleanest $3 trillion, $5 trillion, and then $10 trillion economy, no one would have emitted less carbon than us to get to these numbers. As India makes this green transition, Australia can finally partner in that. You have sophisticated financial institutions. You can create, help us build green instruments, climate finance, exotic funding for special projects. You have great depth in that. Similarly, innovation in R&D and technologies, right? Batteries, solar, hydro, wind. Australia was out of the game. Australia was focused only on the fossil fuel. I don't think that's going to go away. And we shouldn't go away. We shouldn't be the crazies. Fossil fuel will have to play a part as we build up the green capabilities to transit. And I think, finally, we can have a wholesome energy partnership with Australia that covers the entire spectrum of energy. And the third and final, of course, is technology. And I think the previous government had announced some initiatives of creating a Australia-India Technology Center in Bangalore. And I think that could be another area where, rather than becoming the B teams of Silicon Valley, if the Australia-India Technology Partnership could create technology for development for this region, which helps ASEAN, which helps the island countries, which helps the emerging world, we could actually be the A team of the tech for development paradigm. So in that sense, an Australia-India tech partnership for our neighborhood, for the neighborhood that we reside in, could be something that we really, really would both benefit from as well as give others the benefit of. And I think the final point would be the diaspora. Again, I think it has two edges to it. One, of course, it builds closer links between the two countries. We are part of the same continuum. We have the human bridge connecting us. But we will also transmit each other's politics to each other's countries. So enjoy the Indian politics as you embrace more Indian than your country. But on that point, can we think of scaling up Australia's educational and knowledge partnership with India? So can we, rather than receiving X number of students every year in Australia, can we take Australian institutions to India and offshore your education industry, where you're able to scale up your presence and really build a whole economic future for yourselves in the Indian market that seeks scaling and various kinds of knowledge inputs over the decade? Smart and creative. I told you these guys were energiser bunnies. We've just got a full agenda for the Australia-India relationship, which I think we should turn into an interpreter article and put it out this afternoon under Simea's name. I'm going to come to you guys very soon, but a couple final questions on the international front. First of all, let me ask you, Cori, about Ukraine. What does... We're four months into this brutal, unprovoked, unjustified invasion of Ukraine. What effect is this having, first of all, on the international order? And secondly, how do you think the actual... The battle for Ukraine will end. Russia is having some gains now in the East. Where do you think that will come out? So I think it... To answer your first question, it has an enormous potential effect on the international order. If we resign ourselves to aggression-changing borders and not preventing it, you will see the collapse of the European security order. And as it's the most stable in the international order, it will do grave damage to the possibility of a rules-based international order. I am, however, optimistic that will not come to be. The Russian campaign has been a disaster and a real surprise for me, and I think many other military experts, at how bad the Russians are at this, their tolerance for committing atrocities is a shock, but not unexpected. The terrible performance of their military on basic professionalism is a genuine surprise. They have had to concede the battle in the North, both for Kiev, the capital, and Kherson in the Northeast. They have narrowed their objectives and are trying to hold the Donbas, Luhansk, and to hold the coastline. And I just don't see how the arithmetic works that they succeeded it. 80% of the Russian army is already in Ukraine. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense of my sweet provincial country announced yesterday that our estimate is Russia has already lost 20% to 30% of its military in Ukraine. They don't have much else to draw on, and what they do have to draw on isn't professional and isn't trained and can't be equipped. So Russia is a wasting power in Ukraine. And if you look at the progression of assistance to Ukraine, right, in November, the Biden administration in my country didn't want to send weapons to Ukraine because we thought they would lose very fast and the weapons would end up in Russian hands. In January, we weren't going to send offensive weapons and only defensive ones. And now we're sending weapons that can range Russian territory, but the Ukrainians are promised, right? That toboggan is picking up speed because I think the United States and other Western countries, including quite admirably Australia, have understood that this is a proxy war about the sustainment of the rules-based international order, and we want the Russians to lose, and we want the Ukrainians to regain the sovereignty of the entirety of their territory. All right, Samir, India's position on Ukraine has caused a lot of disappointment in Europe and the United States and Asia. India did abstain from the UN vote on condemning Russia's aggression. Obviously, you have a deep historical relationship with Russia, but is your attitude to Russia changing as this war progresses? As you see the atrocities, for example, that Corey mentioned, and also as you see the weakness of the Russian effort, is that changing the calculation in New Delhi about the value of the relationship with Russia? So, Michael, that's a question with many parts and many subtexts, but let me try and piece it into three parts. The first is our relationship with Russia changing. Our relationship with Russia was changing before the Ukraine conflict. In fact, it would be fair to say that over the last 10 years, both of us have been working very hard to find something that would fire up the partnership again. So in many ways, besides the military partnership and especially the partnership that dealt with some of the crown jewels that Russia gave to us, the nuclear submarines, the S-400s, the hypersonic missile systems, which no one else was willing to put on the table. Besides those elements of the partnership, we were struggling to find any other avenue for significant engagement. Energy was marginal because of the distance and geography and some legacy businesses and legacy linkages continue to keep us closer. Russia was by its inability to grow as an economy, by its inability to become an international actor, was limiting its nature of relationship with India through its own decisions. It wasn't that India was deciding that I'm changing, I've decided against Russia. Russia was just absent from our future and it will continue to remain less significant as in the days ahead. So our relationship was changing even prior to Ukraine. But this does not mean that we don't have significant historical IOUs and obligations to each other. And Russia has been USSR and thereafter, Russia, has been a big support to India in the international system when everyone else wanted to sanction us or wanted to do things to us that we did not like. And for that purpose, there is that old historic partnership that continues to remain in the minds of many. And I always tell folks that the best way to assess this is by looking at that one development in 2004 when India abstained from voting on the US invasion of Iraq. There was a furor in the Indian parliament and the Indian prime minister and the foreign minister were castigated and eventually they had to come out with a strong statement condemning American invasion and they had to change their mind. This time around when India abstained, there was no debate in the parliament. And this is an Indian parliament that can't agree on drinking water. We don't agree on anything, but we agreed on abstaining. And that tells you that there is a historical sense of who, that there is a friendship that needs to be respected. Now, I think that is a bit romanticized. And maybe this particular moment could be the time when we have cleared our obligations and maybe it's a reset for the future. That's one part of the relationship. The second part is that, listen, we have, if you look at our statement alongside our vote, there are, we have shown you the duality of India. Again, that statement is a condemnation of Russia, but the vote is an obsession. And each time that has happened, if you read the text alongside the vote, you see the mood versus you see the act. The act is of history and the mood is of your current assessment of Russian action. And I think that must be understood. You are not going to vote against America irrespective of the rationality of America. You will either decide not to attend the UN that day or abstain from voting. The same reason, you have to understand the same pressures work on us. When we are asked to speak about it, we are quite harsh with our assessment of what Russia is doing. In fact, even at the BRICS meeting, our foreign minister has recently said that two countries out of the BRICS have violated the foundational principles of BRICS which is respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. So even in an internal BRICS meeting, this was mentioned. But it's not just the statements, is it? I mean, you're still importing Russian oil as far as I know, your central banks are working on a payment system to assist the Russians. Yeah, yeah, so my question, though, is the conduct of the war. Do you think both the atrocities but also the ineffectiveness of the Russian military, do you think that will change the relationship in the future? So I think all military planners around the world who have relied on certain kind of weaponry post the Azerbaijan conflict and now Ukraine would have to go back to the drawing books and see what works and what doesn't work in modern conflict. And it would be fair to say that many folks would be assessing the usefulness of some of the investments they've made in equipment coming from Russia. It does not necessarily mean that all of them have not done well or whether the problem was with the equipment or with the planning because you also see the other side use similar equipment and do a better job. So it's not as if the problem is in the trucks and the tanks and in the artillery. It's more about the thought process that went behind it. So I'm not sure you can discard the industry for poor implementation, but having said that, like I mentioned, our economic size is taking us to a place where when we are five or six billion dollars and we have to buy 12 to 15 billion dollars of international defense equipment every year, Russia is not even, is not going to be able to contribute even a fraction of it. It has counted itself out of our future. We have already seen our Air Force and Navy diversify away and move into European and American platforms. You are going, the army has been slower because our army is a live army, active army. We fight, right? We have a border with the Chinese. We have a border with Pakistan. It's impossible for India to do a major re-jig vis-a-vis the land army is concerned because we are in an active situation. So you are going to see increasingly a diversification away and into different geographies for our defense needs. But I must respond to the rather false canard that is being spread on India, Russia, trade and India, Russia, energy purchases. Look here, our energy purchases are marginal. Marginal into four is still marginal. We are not going to see Russia becoming a major supplier of Indian energy needs at the end of this year. So let's be very clear. It is going to remain insignificant compared to the 53 billion euros that the European Union has already paid to Russia by way of its fossil fuel transactions. We are a very small negligible actor. So please focus on what Europe buys from Russia, not what India buys from Russia. We are not in the same frame. The second point. We can focus on what everybody buys. The second part, we will buy from Russia. The same reason Europe is buying from Russia. We all have to look after our own needs. Our own immediate needs have to be catered to. Governments are meant to do that. We were primarily procuring our energy from the Middle East. Now, most of you guys have suddenly decided Middle East is your source. You've come into my reservoir of energy. You have started to pick out from that reservoir. You have crowded out India from the options of Iran and Venezuela. And now you want to continue to have a favorable energy partnership with Russia while denying anyone else the same privilege and dipping into my reservoir. That it doesn't work like that. I need energy. And I'm going to get it. And I'm going to get energy at the right prices. So we are going to see the same transactionalism happen in India that Europe is engaged with or America is engaged with. We are going to look after the interests of our people without having to compromise on what we believe in our principles. Those two are not related. And the India, Russia, ruble rupee trade is not. It predates Ukraine by many decades. So it's not a new system. It has been activated because you have prevented us from using this system. It doesn't mean that it did not exist before that. All right, good. I've had my crack at Corey and Samir. I've still got some other questions I'd like to ask. And I haven't mentioned the quad yet, which was the pretext for getting everybody here today. So I'll have to come back on the quad. But I want to give the audience an opportunity to ask some questions. Yes. All right, I'll take two questions at a time. And I'm going to ask people to keep their questions very brief, if you don't mind, this gentleman and then that gentleman. We'll take two questions at a time. My name is Krishna, a professor from University of New South Wales. Samir, you are not from government. So I thought I would ask this question. You raised the whole issue between China and India, the border issues. Historically speaking, China has been raising Arunachal Pradesh, and it has been raising various other issues. Why is that India very quiet on the Tibet issue? We have, I think, about half a million Tibetans who are in refugees in India. Is Tibet a very sacrosanct or one China policy, a very sacrosanct kind of a thing? Or is it going to remain like that? Not only for India, but for other countries as well. Understood, thank you, Professor. And we'll take a question from this gentleman with the face mask. Well done for preserving COVID safety there, sir. My name is Tang, I'm an analyst at Macquarie. They're unrelated to geopolitics. My question here is, being in the Quad comes with certain commitments. What are the commitments that the rest of the three members that most expect out of India? And what is the commitment that India is most reluctant to commit to? They're good questions. Sumi, why don't you kick off? So on the one China policy and the importance of Tibet, look here. My view is that India is hosting the Tibetan government in exile and lots of Tibetans in India. And that itself is a clear public demonstration of our recognition of Tibetan rights, Tibetan people, and the Tibetan cause. So every day, every moment that that continues is an Indian support for that particular issue. So I don't think India is shying away or is even coy. We are in the open hosting them. And the Dalai Lama enjoys all freedoms in India. Plans is international travel, meets international dignitaries and visitors. The question is, are others doing enough for the Dalai Lama in India? I think are other countries inviting him? Are other countries engaging with him? Are other countries engaging with the Tibetans? The opportunity that is being offered by the very fact that India allows them to be here and allows them to meet everyone that they want to meet. So I think the question is, do others want to invest in the Tibetan issue? The opportunity which is offered by India hosting them in Himachal, in Dharamsala. So that's one part of it. But I think you would have seen a change already in India being kind of coy and not necessarily towing that one China policy nomenclature anymore. I think Sushma Sarawak changed that. And we have not said that anymore. We have refrained from announcing that or even acknowledging it till such time that China does not acknowledge one India policy. If China wants India in parts, then God bless them with a similar outcome. So I think we should not be shy from, and as a think tanker, I can say this. I think we need to be perhaps even more pronounced in acknowledging that there is no one China. And there are significant parts of China that don't believe they are parts of China. And I think we should continue to have that option with us in our communication with China till such time that they make peace with their neighbors and with us. And I think that's an important tool to have on what are the demands from the Quad from India. I don't think there are too many demands. I think Quad is a limited purpose partnership, which is to continue to work together and be ready for such time when it's principal mission, which is right now to have great food in four different capitals to become more active and respond to the Chinese threat. I think for me, Quad is the preparatory group meeting for an eventuality where they may all be faced with unrelenting and expansive dragon. And then they will have to discover specific instruments as well as policy options to respond to it. So Quad at this stage is getting to know each other and sharing your own perspectives about the challenges you face, sharing information and assessments, and working together and investing in a region that doesn't necessarily have to lean too much on the dragon. So I think this is the early stage of something more significant that is likely to happen a bit later. This is Quad 1.0, which is quite easy-paced. I don't think there are any demands of each other. All right, Corey, jump in. Limited purpose partnership, the main purpose of which the moment is to have great food in four different capitals and prepare for something in the future. Is that your view of the Quad at the moment or are you a bit more ambitious for it? I think it's sly and funny and not quite true that they just eat good food in four capitals. The food's not that good. What I think I see from America's relations in other parts of the world is that routine consultation at high levels of government and military, over time conditions you to much more deeply understand each other's concerns and creates a dovetailing of perspectives. And so I think we already begin to see some of that. It's facilitating cooperation and won't just come in handy on limited partnerships. But I think it's important that the first Biden administration initiative for the Quad was on vaccines, not on military cooperation. So these four countries have a lot of things in common and a lot of work that needs doing for themselves and for others. And so creating an institutional way to facilitate cooperation and deeper understanding actually I think is incredibly valuable. All right, I wanna do at least one more round of questions, so I'm gonna hold it there. I'll take a question from this gentleman and that lady. Why don't we go with that lady first as the microphone's near you, madam. Thank you. Thank you, Yovana Rarten. I was hoping to get your views as to what do you think is gonna be the impact of the changing economic outlook, the capture of the US citizens by Russia and the sentence pass on UK citizens on the overall short, medium term development of the war in Ukraine. Thanks. Thank you. Sir. Thank you very much. I'm retired naval officers from Bangladesh Navy. Can I ask two questions? If they're brief and punchy, yes. Yes, brief to Cody, you just started the first speech that the China had intention, malign intention. So I put myself into China's shoes. So if the British West and everybody could have their own island or some understanding agreement in Pacific, if China comes to make agreement in Pacific islands, it's a sovereign islands. So why do we consider China had a malign intention if where there is a pen and paper is everything to improve the development, economy, trade, everything? Okay, got it. Yeah. So, Mr. Samid, before I ask you, you said Ukraine crisis. So a few times. Sorry? You said Ukraine crisis. But the whole Western media, they say it's an invasion by US. Russia. Russia. So do you agree? And they're right. Ukraine, that doesn't mean it's not a crisis. It is an invasion by Russia, but it's still a crisis because now it is beyond just the invasion. Now it has implications beyond just the war that is being fought. And I was talking about the larger. It has implication. Just wrap up your question. Okay. I'll answer your question. It is an invasion and it is a crisis book. So can I ask you the climate? No, I'm going to stop you there because I want to give some other people some opportunity. So you've answered the question on the invasion. Corey? Yes. So if I recall the question, it was, how is the darkening economic outlook in the US and other countries likely to affect support for Ukraine? I very much hope the answer to that is not at all because Ukrainians did not cause these problems of food scarcity because Russia has barricaded their ports and refusing to allow grain to be shipped and is lubbing artillery pieces into Ukrainian farm fields. So it will be a challenge as energy prices go up for us all, as food prices go up for us all. I was very pleased to see that Secretary Blinken, the American Secretary of State, when the US took over its turn in the chair of the UN Security Council said that America's priority for our security council term would be food insecurity and what the United States and other nations can do to attenuate the consequences for countries that bear no responsibility for what Russia has done, including Ukraine, but not only Ukraine, and make sure food remains available. So I hope it doesn't affect it. It doesn't appear in my own sweet provincial country. My mom isn't mad at the Ukrainians for gas prices. She's mad at the president and not because of his Ukraine policy. And I... Another question was on why should we say that Chinese probing in the Pacific is a lie? Yeah, because they refuse to acknowledge the sovereignty of their neighbors. As the UN court in the Hague voted against China for its intimidation and attempts to seize Philippine territory, for the way Vietnam and other countries are very nervous about China's claims on their territory, for the reckless military behavior experienced only last week by Australia but by so many of our countries, and the fact that last week China's defense secretary stood up at the Shangri-La Dialogue and said there's no such thing as sovereignty of weak countries. That's why I think they're a malign actor. So just two quick points. One on your question on why is China malign. China is malign because China is opaque, unreachable and unquestionable. That's why it's malign. When I disagree with the U.S., I can take a placard and stand outside the White House if I can buy a ticket. And I can protest against American action. I can also petition the Congress. I can also talk to the media. And I can also question their actions. I can abuse them online. I can criticize them online. Now, try and do that to Xi Jinping on Baibo and Baidu, and you will get to know why they are malign. So do this experiment today. Tell me if you had a different experience than I did. So China is an unaccountable actor, and an unaccountable actor should not have the kind of power that China wants to wield. Countries that are accountable, countries that are transparent, countries who can be impeached should be the countries who should actually contribute to global affairs and should provide the undergirding of our global public goods. It doesn't mean that America was not a hegemon, and America did not do terrible things. I just mentioned the invasion of Iraq. And we have a list for every year where America, it doesn't mean that anyone else is non-malign, but at least they are accountable. And that's the point that we are trying to make here. Now, on your question on, look, I think in some sense, if you were to have that UN General Assembly vote again, you will not get 141 votes against Russia anymore. I think the wins that you had in the early days may have already, in some sense, been moderated. And in the battle of perceptions, the food crisis and energy crisis is not blamed on Russia, in the emerging world and in the developing countries. Many of them blame it on Western action, Western sanctions, Western responses. And this is a fact. I'm not saying whether it's true. I'm just saying that the perception is a fact. That largest number of people believe that it is the hardship that they're enduring today is curtsy American and European action. Now, the challenge here is, when will the Europeans and American perceptions also start believing this? Till such time that it is the distant countries who think this way, it doesn't change the dynamics of the war. But when American public opinion or European public opinion starts believing that its own interests are being hurt and it is a possibility that it could happen in certain parts, in certain countries in Europe, you will begin to see rethinking. In fact, if you were sitting in Kremlin today, you would be actually betting on that. You would be hoping for that. You would actually also be instigating that. In some sense, if you were to have one response to the current alliance that is being mobilized against them, it would be to use economic hardship as a means of sowing the seeds of division between the partners. And I truly believe that Europe has itself to blame for this. In the last six months or four months since the war, but at least the last many, many years since we've been talking about it, Europe has done precious little to build infrastructure to receive energy from other sources. And come the winters of 2022, it will still be dependent on Russian energy, which means this winter is going to be an interesting period, both politically and in terms of our economic hardship issues. So I think this is an interesting winter of Europe. Winter is coming. I'm going to take the final question. I'm going to ask you each for a very brief response. I'm going to give you, Corey, the last word too, because just in case you want to respond to anything that Samir said recently. How optimistic are you? Based on the international order that we find ourselves, we're in the middle of this shocking invasion and crisis that might go either way. We have stock market crashes, interest rates increasing, inflation increasing, a real risk of stagflation, recession, financial crisis. On the other hand, we have a decent person in the White House for the first time. I would say certainly that there is some hope in the heroics of President Zelensky, the resistance of the Ukrainian people, and the support that many parts of the world have provided. Not all parts of the world, you're right, it's not uniform. Does that leave you optimistic or pessimistic about the world, Samir? About the world. About the world. Look, there are large parts of the world where this decade and this period is the period of great hope and change. So don't let the European pessimism make you believe that this is the world view. This is a commonly held world view. Many parts of the world are using this time to meet their aspirations, raise people out of poverty. This is that period when many people are going to be focused on changing their destinies. So many parts of the world see the next five, seven years as important for their national journeys, societal journeys. Are they hopeful of having global support as they were a few years ago? No. Clearly, many of them have to rethink their assumptions in terms of support from the European Union or from the international institutions or from America if they continue to remain preoccupied with this political conflict. So people are finding other plans. People are finding other routes. But people are going to get by. There are young people on the rise, and they are going to do this. So I'm not hopeful about the sanctity of the international order. But I hope on the ingenuity of people who are determined to meet their aspirations and ambitions. Corey. So I too am hopeful about people reaching their aspirations. As dark a picture as we are looking at internationally in a lot of ways, my grandfather would have thought this was a pretty good world compared to the one he more economically prosperous, more reliable, safer. And I think importantly, for all of the challenges you rightly identified, Michael, we also have the tools to address them. And that was not the case previously. You do have a robust set of cooperative allies with a common purpose of maintaining prosperity and security in the international order. You do have a great recognition that we not only that we have responsibilities to developing societies, but that they have enormous ability to shape their futures with education, with technology, with opportunity, with immigration, with changing their own governments. So yeah, I am actually hopeful that, despite all of those challenges, that we have the ability to navigate them in ways that will make the world even safer and even more prosperous for our children. If you want to finish on an optimistic note, always go to a Californian. I've really enjoyed this conversation. You mentioned, Samir, that accountability and transparency is the key to whether an actor is benign or maligned. We've demonstrated some accountability and transparency today. I know in the bustling, robust democracies of India and the United States and Australia, there's always that accountability, that ability to ask tough questions, to disagree, to agree, but to do it with good humor. We've touched on the quads, so I'm glad we ticked that box, but we've gone much broader on Ukraine, on Indian politics, on US politics, on development, on technology, on the rules-based order. And many topics. It's been a great discussion. I hope that my friends in Moscow, as well as everybody here on Bly Street, has enjoyed it. So please join me in thanking Corey and Samir. Thank you.