 Well, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It's a great pleasure. Tony and myself have been running a marathon for the last two and a half years. We had a first author meeting about this project in April 2016 and we seem to have been on the go working with our respective authors and with the editorial process pretty much ever since. So we're delighted to see this final product of our labors and we hope that it will make some contribution. We were greatly helped this morning by Joe Stiglitz because he said something which is not often said in development debates. He briefly said that extractive industries, natural resources that he called them including mining, should be part of this sort of structural transformation agenda of lower income countries. He talked about various aspects of that in one slide. So essentially what you're getting this afternoon is Joe Stiglitz's one slide is now transformed into 750 pages of our thoughts over the marathon of the last two and a half years. There's one quote from Joe. I didn't mean to talk about this in the introduction but I think summarises some of the aspects that we're trying to get out. I mean he says in his paper that the development countries resources should to the extent possible be part of development strategy beyond just the provision of foreign exchange and I mind that government revenues. Moreover they can be a variety of linkages to other sectors that can be enhanced. The fact that in the past such linkages appear to be weak may only reflect the lack of effort in developing them. I think that summarises pretty much some of the intuition that Tony and myself had when we started this project. What we're going to do this afternoon, I'm going to briefly cover the objectives and content of the book, its main messages and a couple of minutes then on the way we see the scope of policy interventions both by donor agencies but of course most importantly by national governments. There's been a lot of discussion in past years about the importance of governance in institutions but in 750 pages you can drill down to quite a lot of detail as to what exactly that means and we have very much tried to do that. We have 36 authors and 33 chapters so in the quick overview I'm going to give in topics 1, 2 and 3 you will understand that we're not going to be able to drill down too much but we have the benefit of four of our authors on my left and that they will selectively drill down into some of the subtopics contained within the book. Please understand it's very much four out of 36. There's a lot more in the book and although Tony is advertising the discount I would also pay tribute to why I don't know you pay for the fact that this is going to be an open access book. So if you don't have the money to pay 100% minus 30% you can see many of the chapters free of access on the internet sites. First the objectives of the book. I think the first thing we were trying to do and this is based on factual information is to recognise the increased importance of extractives in the economies of low and low middle income countries. It's amazing to go to meetings like this where one is talking about various aspects of history and recent history and not see extractives mentioned hardly at all in countries like Ghana and Tanzania where they are actually the most important single private sector industry. They are the most important source of export earnings. They are the most important source of foreign direct investment and they are commonly the single largest taxpayer. This is a fact that is easily documented but not very widely recognised. Secondly we wanted to recognise more explicitly than has been done in mainstream development debate the potential extractives to boost sustainable development to do what Joe Stickert's basic was beginning to talk about this morning. To of course assess and doing that the impact that climate change is going to have on the demand for various minerals and of course oil and gas and how that will affect some of the host countries in the low and middle income classes that currently mine or produce those items. Then fourthly another important element again I think is understated. There has been an absolutely enormous explosion in the last 20 years of international initiatives designed to make extractives more development friendly and more sustainable. I don't think that is why they recognise the development community. We are not where we were in 1995. We are where we are in 2018 with a number of very important and some very effective international initiatives. We wanted fifthly to try to provide a comprehensive coverage of the multiple domestic policy and institutional areas that need attention if we are indeed going to turn the potential of extractive industries into genuine long term sustainable development. There is a lot of talk about institutions matter, governance matters. There is some econometrics where people put governance as the last right hand variable in the equation. But this really does not do the job. If you want to talk about institutions and governance you have to drill down to exactly what that means in a specific context. We tried to do that in the book in a lot of detail and Evelyn will talk about some aspects of that after me. We also wanted pragmatically to try to say a little bit about the difference between countries that are extractives dependent in terms of their potential. It seems to us very unproductive to say that all extractive dependent countries face the same problem. That is clearly not the case. A country like the DRC is fundamentally different from Brazil. They both have a lot of extractives that can play a role. It is important to somehow develop some taxonomies which enable us to frame policies and tailor policies to specific circumstances rather than simply talk about a blanket group of countries and so on. And stress finally, and this is what Catherine is going to talk about, the imperative in policy terms of having an all-of-government approach. Many of the countries like Mozambique and Tanzania where I've done work or Kenya, there's a tendency when you talk about extractives to say, well that's the job of the Ministry of Mines or Minerals. Maybe the Ministry of Finance comes in because of the fiscal management issues, maybe the central bank comes in for the same reason. But it's really a lot broader than that and Catherine will say a great deal about that in a few moments. I'm going just to flick ahead one slide to pick up the first point just to try to find the data. If you're trying to sort of make a statement about the significance of extractives in development, you are able to do it easily for one variable and that's exports and that's what we've done. You can do it to a limited extent for things like government revenues. It's much more difficult to do it for production. You can do it for foreign direct investment. So this slide is just one slide from one of the chapters of the book that looks at exports. But just take a quick look at some of the numbers comparing 1996 with 2014. This is the share of exports of extractive products in total exports. You'll see the figure from Chad goes from 0 to 94%. You'll see the figure for Mozambique goes from 8% to 62% and so on. Now in a paper, one of the chapters of the book, Samantha Dodd and myself looked at identified 72 low and low middle income countries that had more than 25% of their export earnings accounted for by extractives. And in the vast majority of those over that 20 or so year period, there had been an increase in dependence. Now a great deal of that is explained by the so-called commodity super cycle, the fact that prices are rising. What we tried to do some we took the analysis from 1996 to 2012, which is about the point where the super cycle was coming to an end and we moved along to 2014. It doesn't make much difference. That dependence level has remained high. And it seems likely to remain high. The contents of the book. I'm not going to talk about this in too much detail. I said we have 33 chapters. We start in part after the overview from Tony here and myself. We start in part two with a perspective on the way extractives fit into the global context. We have some very data rich materials, particularly from Magnus Erickson from what used to be called the raw materials group in Sweden that looks at this from minerals. We have an in-depth paper by Paul Stephens and Chatham House that does the same for oil and gas. Then in part three we move on to the academic literature. We haven't gone into this in huge detail, but there are three sub themes. One is the resource curse and what has happened to it. The second is the way in which institutional economics fits in with the extractives discussion. And the third is the way in which extractive industries fit in with the discussions about the new industrial and new structural policies that again Joe Stiglitz was talking about this morning. And on the last two of those topics Evelyn will elaborate further later on. Part four is on macroeconomic topics. We have a fairly high powered theoretical paper by Tony Venebus and Rick van der Plerg from Oxford University looking at the inter-temple problems that countries face in handling those macroeconomic problems. And then we have two contrasting case studies. One written by Namadu Bawwmiar who kindly wrote this chapter even though towards the end of the process he had become vice president of Ghana. He managed nonetheless to contribute the chapter. So he's written a sort of salary tale about the management of extractive revenues in the case of Ghana. And then we have the contrasting case written by my colleague Andres Salomano at the end here looking at a somewhat more successful example of macro and fiscal management of extractives in the case of Chile. And then we go on to the institutions of national institutions of extractive management. And we've got a number of contributors here, a number of topic areas. Tony Orbin as a practitioner in Ghana talks about it from the point of view of the practitioner. We have an in-depth chapter on the questions of environmental management of extractives written by Ruth Greenspan Bell. We have a detailed chapter on the role of national oil companies which play a very important part both in the sort of structural decisions about the investments that follow on. One from oil and gas extraction, but also play an important role in my view in the macroeconomic management dilemma because they often control a very significant part of the total revenue streams that flow from, especially from oil and gas. We also have a chapter in that section, part five on the gender issues in sector. And we have an important chapter written by Tony about the international initiatives on climate change and how these will prospectively interact with the extractive dependence of so many low and building countries. And then we talk about in part six about international initiatives of which there are many. We have, I think, a very important chapter written by Tony Hodge, who, when he started to write this, was just retired as the president of the National Council on Mining and Metals, which is the organisation for which Catherine Fairle also worked for many years. Tony has done an inventory of the international initiatives that have been promulgated mostly in the last 20 years since the turn of the millennium. But he also then asked the question, what have they all done? What have they all achieved collectively? And his answer is quite important because he says basically we don't know because we don't really have a systematic way of monitoring it. We have impact studies, I've done many myself together with Evelyn and Catherine, and we have environmental impact assessments. Fine, but we don't have what Tony Hodge is arguing for, which is a systematic assessment of the contribution of an extractive sector. And he refers mainly to mining, to the broad economy in terms of the ecosystem and the economic system, taking the whole product cycle, the life cycle of a project, right through to the most difficult part of a project in mining and oil and gas closure. When you've put a big, big investment in possibly a remote community in a poor country, and it's generated incomes and done some things good and bad for maybe 50 years, and then you have to close it down. So he puts this question, it's an unanswered question, but it's very important in my view, a chapter. And then in part seven we talk about how we leverage what you could call the direct effects of mining and oil and gas in a country, the spending of the corporates in the country, how we can leverage those into bigger transformation effects into other sectors. There's a framework paper written there, but then we have a drilling down into topics like local content and upstream effects written in both cases by Olli Ostinson, who used to be the head of commodities in England. And then finally we come down, we drill right down to the community level. We've got a number of chapters talking about how you manage extractives at the community level. So in a way the most important, Dutch disease and macro gets all the attention, but if you think about it when you put a mining gano, you put an oil and gas project into Mozambique, you're often putting things in remote areas and you are affecting communities which are actually a small microcosm of the total economy. They get all the negatives, the noise, the disruption, the environmental damage, they tend not to get directly too many of the big number of benefits that tends to go to the national level. So how you manage this and how you help communities and you get corporations to work sympathetically with communities is a very big topic and we've dealt that in the party. Sorry, that's a bit long wind. Main messages very quickly. Statistically there are 10 in the book but we're concentrated here on eight because time is running short. Statistically there's little doubt there's been a large increase in dependence. Second message is that there doesn't seem to be much controversy that in the future, talking about the next 20, 25 years, there is a tremendous potential for that level of dependence to increase should the host countries want it to happen. Some host countries may well say we've read all the stuff about the resource curse, we really don't want any of that. It's hard to find such cases in low income countries. Most such countries say my God, we've discovered oil or we've discovered some other valuable mineral, we will develop it, we're going to be rich. But the potential is there's some significant documentation of this, not least in the very interesting McKinsey study of 2013 which is called reverse the curse, where they have estimates of the investment that will be needed in the next 15, 20 years and argue that even if you allow for a climate change adjustment, that level of investment will be significantly higher than it was even in the period 1995 to 2012 which was itself historically very high. So there's tremendous potential to see this statistical dependence on extractives increase in low middle income countries. If that happens, what's the response? The first response has to be we need to use this to diversify and achieve structural transformation. Joe Stiglitz is absolutely right that if you're going to do something with natural resources, you cannot do it in a short time frame. You've got to sort of commit it into a long term development strategy as part of what the economy is doing also in other sectors. You've got to work out the synergies between extractives and agriculture and manufacturing and services. And there are many synergies, many of which we demonstrate in various chapters of the book. But the diversification agenda has to be absolutely central to the any strategy in these countries, we would argue. Fourth message, improved institutions and governance are important, I mentioned that already, but let's actually say what that means in the context of extractives. Let's wave our arms and say institutions are important. Fifth message, what would we ideally like to see if we're going to turn the potential into effective development and sustainable development? We would like to see the combination of effective and inclusive governments, whether democratic or less democratic, but effective and inclusive, combined with corporates who are mining the minerals or extracting the oil and gas, who are enlightened in some sense. We'd like to see that. The trouble is in many countries it's not such a question that we have governments with perhaps limited capacity or with no interest in inclusivity, favouring particular elites or particular ethnic groups, but we also see that sometimes combined with companies that really do not pay attention to any sort of social obligation to help with a development strategy. But then the sixth message is looking at all the evidence and we have plenty of evidence for this. Corporate practices have improved out of sight in the last 15 or 20 years. Many more companies have been in light and there's abundance of very good case examples to demonstrate this. They've been helped by things like the IFC principles and also the ICCM sustainability principles, which are now, dear to I think Katherine, correct me if I'm wrong, by about 33 companies which together in mining represent about 60% of world production. So there is a real sense in which the corporate sector is now an enlightened participant in the development debate and not the pariah set of organisations that perhaps it was once presented as being. Seventh, there are now a lot more ways in which governments of host countries can get help from international initiatives like the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, like the National Resource Charter, like the African Mining Vision, and like the other 42 similar examples that Tony Hodge identifies in his chapter. Governments should take advantage of those. The final message is climate change will change the story, will change the perspective, the outcome and the outlook for some countries. There will be winners and losers as we move away towards a less carbon dependent future. We know that coal will go, but how fast will it go in those low income countries that currently have a significant coal resource? Probably not that fast as perhaps some people would like it to happen. But we know setting against that will be the minerals which will be absolutely critical to the new environmentally friendly, climate friendly technologies of the future. We know for sure that if you were an investor in 2007, you would have done no better than put your money into cobalt and lithium. Because notwithstanding the end of the super cycle of commodity prices, cobalt and lithium rose faster than almost any other asset you could have invested in at that time. We have the rare earths which are critical ingredients in wind turbines. Until quite recently they were concentrated in China. There was some anxiety about that fact, but we know for sure that they are now being opened up in the country. So climate change will affect this agenda quite significantly. But we think positively, we do not think it will run over the basic proposition I put in message 2 that there will be huge potential for an increase in the dependence of low and middle income countries on extractive resources. Should they wish to accept that dependence? And this of course is a choice for national governments. It's not a prediction. And I'm going to finish then with this slide which Tony myself agonised over when we were drinking beer one day in London. But we think it might be quite helpful. I mean in dichotomising governments and the quality of governments, we are used to sort of talking about time horizons. Ernest Arotev yesterday used to talk about the difficulties in his country, Ghana, of governments that work with a four year time horizon. It's a particularly serious problem in extractive industries because the life time horizon of a mining company is typically 20 or 30 years. I've done work in Brazil on iron ore in the Amazon region where the life expectancy of the mines, the time horizon for planning is 100 years. So we're used to that dichotomy time horizon. We're used to the dichotomy democratic versus non democratic. We had some discussion of that in some of the sessions yesterday. But what we thought would be useful would be to look at this in terms of governments, are they technically effective? Do they have the technical capacities and are they inclusive? There are two dimensions of this. And at the top of this we've got the ones that the governments that are complying with that ideal state. At the bottom we have the opposite sort of governments. They couldn't care a damn for their citizens. They're not inclusive. They're favouring certain elites or certain narrow groups. And then in the other dimensions diagram we've got companies. Here we have enlightened companies. Those that would perhaps have subscribed completely fully to the IFC principles of sustainability or to the ICCM principles which are quite similar. Or indeed to the communist China principles in mining which are now adopted and adopted and are very similar in some respects to what the ICCM came up with 15 years ago. At the other end we have what you might call road companies who go in to dig out the gold mine or the copper and do this abusing labour rights, human rights and every other right you can think of. And we have this spectrum therefore and these four zones. And what we are basically saying is quite useful to think about zone B because if you have a prior that a country is somewhere in zone B, the government is broadly effective and fairly inclusive. Countries like Ghana and Tanzania come immediately to mind and they find they've got companies turning up in their country that are pretty enlightened. They understand their international and domestic obligation. There's a very good chance of getting progress if the domestic policies are put together in such a way as to take that long term view and to think about the linkages that Joe Stiglitz talks about and develop those policies specifically to develop them. If we're down here, it's the opposite story. How are we going to get the EITI working with the warlord governments and with road companies? They'll try to make some impression but it won't be necessarily all that effective. So I'm going to stop at this point by just mentioning one more chapter in the book which is down here we could be perhaps a bit depressed. We've got relatively poor quality governments. We may have some pretty lousy companies. But we would expect, I think, that the cumulative effect of these international issues I mentioned earlier would have some, even there, would have some marginal effect. We have one very interesting chapter in the book about what you do in a country like Nigeria. I'm not necessarily putting Nigeria in any of those boxes. Recognising that the inherent difficulty is the inherent corruption that some people identify there. It represents what I think is one of the more important donor projects in Syria. It's funded by DFID, it's the FOSTA project. It has been perceived as an extremely successful example of where donor intervention can make a difference. Thank you very much.