 Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming out this morning to to the second day of this conference Now today we are very privileged to have speaking to us first up. I'm a stranger small More on him a little bit later, but for those of you who don't know me hi there My name is Matt Sussex, and I'm the academic director here at the National Security College Was going to be Rory Medcalf this morning, but he's been otherwise Detained so I am swinging in his present in his stead And doubtless going to do not nearly as Swarva job But the rules of engagement were pretty much as yesterday that will ask Andrew to speak for about 30 35 minutes or so And then David Brewster will offer his his thoughts on Andrew's paper And on the theme more generally for about 10 minutes leaving plenty of time for question answer and discussion So without any further ado, let me introduce Andrew small to you I should be familiar to most people who have any desire to learn about China and counterterrorism issues Not only did he set up the German martial funds Asia program, but he is a senior transatlantic fellow With them and of course his research focuses on China Sino-American relations Europe China China in South Asia And broader things about China's foreign security policy and economic policy as well Previously he's worked as the director of the foreign policy centers Beijing office He's been a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences He has worked in the office of senator Ted Kennedy And his many many publications have appeared in a number of highly reputable sources Including the New York Times foreign affairs foreign policy and the Washington Quarterly And you'll probably know him best for his book the China-Pakistan axis Asia's new geopolitics So I think he's eminently qualified to talk to us on the topic of terrorism and counterterrorism in China And I'll ask him to offer his thoughts for for about half an hour or so. Thank you. Thanks very much Matt and Thanks to Thanks to Michael to for putting this entire Conference together. I think people often say it's a very timely event for whatever it is But I really do think this is a very timely event on this topic. I think there's a lot of important Questions across all of the regions that we'll be talking about today and in the context that I'm going to be talking and although I will put the paper itself is focused on South and Southwest Asia and much of what I will cover Involves some of the specifics of developments there. I've also tried to look at a broader question, which is How far was Chinese counterterrorism policy in general shaped by its particular regional conditions? In South Asia and therefore how far did the shifts that are taking place and in that region and the enlargement of the threat Beyond that region affect some of the basic principles that have guided Chinese Forum some of the basic principles that have underpinned an important element of Chinese foreign policy It's kind of terrorism policy and for the last 20 years or so and the basic argument. I'll be running is as follows for better part of two decades and Pakistan and Afghanistan have provided the main focal points for the The best of the better part of two decades Pakistan Afghanistan have provided the main focal points for The overseas terrorist threat facing China and ETIM did have a network of camps in Taliban run Afghanistan and after the US invasion Pakistan's Fata the federal even is tribal areas and provided the base for ETIM's Remnants which subsequently emerged as the Dakhstan Islamic Party their operating environment ETIM and TIP's Operating environment was very heavily conditioned by the central role that Pakistan played in the region's terror map It's sponsorship of the Taliban and other militants gave it a unique capacity to influence how these groups behave towards China And whether through dissuading them from supporting ETIM TIP Detering them from targeting China themselves and all through direct operations on Pakistani soil against ETIM Then TIP and its partners Despite some tensions over China and Pakistan in recent years and in practice this resulted in a highly constrained environment for TIP While they were able to generate propaganda materials their capacity to launch attacks In China or on Chinese targets was extremely limited Pretty small in number and dependent on larger more capable groups such as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan And they had very little autonomous space in which to act These conditions have now shifted in a few important respects Pakistani army Zabay-Azab operation in north of Zerestan appears to have displaced the TIP from Fata Meaning that after 15 years in Pakistan the group's leadership is now centered in Afghanistan again The IMU which previously acted as the TIP's host Has been decimated by the Taliban following its declaration of loyalty to ISIS to such a degree that some analysts Now question whether the group meaningfully exists at all. There may be some kind of small Faction of the group that's still there And the principal theater for the TIP has also shifted and while the group's Amir Abdul Haq Who was previously believed to have been killed in a US train strike in 2010 appears to be in Afghanistan And the largest number of TIP fighters are now located in Syria operating with Jabhat al-Nusra The broader strategic context in which China's counterterrorism policy is operating has seen important changes too The rise of ISIS introduced a major new actor to the network of global militancy one that has had fewer qualms than Al Qaeda historically exhibited about making China an explicit target Although more Uighurs are fighting with Jabhat al-Nusra and then with ISIS The groups reach poses a different set of problems for Chinese security exemplified by the fact that it has attracted as we Discussed briefly yesterday a small number of non-Uighur Chinese recruits at the Syria conflict has also reconditioned the pathway to Uighur militant recruitment and with improvements in security and on China's borders with South and Central Asia The main transit routes to Syria for Uighurs have generally been through Southeast Asia and Turkey with Turkish government acquiescence Taken together I think these changes amount to perhaps the most significant set of shifts and in China's external terrorist threat and since 9 11 The net effect of them is that after many years in which China was able to mediate major elements of its counterterrorism policy through its closest security partner and Pakistan Beijing is finally being required to take on a more direct role and in addressing the threat across virtually all dimensions of policy and politically economically and potentially even militarily and I'm going to look at this across three phases and which partly correspond to The phases and periods that that's shorn outlined yesterday the first phase is one that runs through the late 90s and into the early 2000s and I'll kind of begin with a few of the principles that I I think Underpin Chinese policy across this period some of them are stated But a number of them are really unstated principles But that obtain across this entire stretch of time First that China should make sure that it doesn't become a top tier target for any of the principle Groups operating in the region and whether outright terrorist organizations militant groups and all their sympathizers and supporters Taliban al-Qaeda Kashmiri groups and so on The China Canon should reach deals with some of these groups over Xinjiang and over there backing to any of the groups that do target China ETIM TIP That China well ETIM in that period and China should not take direct action itself Against any of these broader groups and should be careful about its positioning and cooperation with anyone that does counterterrorism policy Should and and was almost entirely about the Uighurs specifically the message to most of the other groups was Again in some cases directly in some cases implicitly We don't have to be enemies as long as you leave us alone Yourselves and that you don't back our enemies for the most part this Set of principles worked a deals reached with the Taliban over the status of ETIM and attacks from Afghan territory Some bin Laden made very conciliatory sounding statements about China in this period of time and ETIM operates under extremely restricted conditions and throughout this throughout this stretch There are various reasons for this Local and global priorities for a number of these groups do not include China any way The Uighur cause is relatively peripheral for them and so on and but the other element in all of this I think that is important is Pakistan Across this whole period of time the state that is at the center of the web of so many of the region's militant networks Consistently sought to ensure that it's all-weather friend and didn't become a priority target for them And it used its influence to broker relationships to dissuade these groups from concerning cells with China and to take direct action Where necessary including killing the leader of ETIM Hassan Masoum in South Waziristan in 2003? I won't go into the historical dimensions of the China-Pakistan relationship and the close military and intelligence try ties and why Pakistan is doing this but Suffice to say that This Pakistan functions essentially as China's closest security and intelligence partner and not just in in the region But but more broadly and and and this is a form of cooperation that been there for a very long time And so weakened is ETIM during the latter half of this period That are precisely the moment that China is winning its designations at the UN and from the US And you get very serious questions about whether the group really exists any more at all And the corollary of all this is very limited cooperation on counter-terrorism Issues with with other powers and China's willing particularly in the 9-11 aftermath to work on issues ranging from Sanctions terrorist financing monitoring of shipping containers a few important and concrete areas But it's unwilling to assume visible involvement and in any broader counter-terrorism Coalitions it's reluctant to take on a very direct counter-terrorism role Itself and it's a verse to being tainted by association with the US and other Western powers And you see this most obviously playing out through much of this period in Afghanistan The second phase runs from the mid-2000s to a couple of years ago Essentially a period in which this previous framework comes under pressure particularly following the establishment of the Pakistani Taliban in 2007 And the general tensions around the Pakistani government's cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan And and the resulting diminution of of Pakistan's capacity to deliver some of these outcomes for China And this translates in a few very concrete ways Pakistani Taliban target China specifically partly as a means of putting pressure on the Pakistani government And partly because of their specific hostility to China and after its involvement in the assault on the Red Mosque in 2007 in which China seemed to have had a heavy hand Al-Qaeda do make their first explicitly hostile references to China and notably after the July the 5th events in Arumchi in 2009 TIP emerges in this stretch I agree very much with the analysis that says that it largely performed a propaganda function through this period of time And even the Chinese government Dismisses some of the instance for which it claims responsibility The numbers in the group seem to be very small. It's in a very restricted location in North Waziristan But none of these factors stopped China, of course from from plaking and the potential threat very seriously Yet the Pakistani army doesn't do and won't do very much about it directly They won't take military action in North Waziristan themselves out of fear of blowback and even their friends such as the Hakkani network whose territory The group is in for at least a stretch Won't help and so they resort at points Pakistani government resorts at some points to providing targeting windows for US drone strikes that they'd previously Toggling windows that they'd previously been unwilling to make available to the US government in an effort to wipe out the TIP leadership that way This does result in in some tensions between China and Pakistan over the continued presence of TIP on its soil And the appearance of a kind of a question mark about the degree of reliance that China has had And on Pakistan for its intelligence and for cooperation on counterterrorism issues in the region Which which it goes into both questions of Pakistani government's intentions and its its capabilities And the most recent phase then runs from early 2014 and first of all Pakistani Army's campaign in North Waziristan at Sarwey Azub about which people were initially Relatively dismissive and has been quite consequential in a few respects at least for China As it became clear that the operation was going to be launched and a number of TIP members were among the group that was sent over to Syria and the leadership itself appeared to relocate to Afghanistan and including Abdul hack who then reemerges after After being presumed dead and the campaign effectively particularly after the face of the Operation that goes into the Shawar Valley and effectively eliminates what had previously been the TIP's base in Pakistan Second the shift in focus to Syria sees the TIP Emerging as a larger and more capable entity than it ever was in Afghanistan or Pakistan and whether that's in terms of combat experience Facility with sophisticated weapons its networks and so on Propaganda material from Syria is far more serious than the sort of stuff that was coming out from North Waziristan Third the establishment rise of ISIS and introduces a new kind of problem for China to deal with More explicit about Xinjiang where groups in South Asia had often been very mealy-mouthed Recruitment efforts taking place in Uighur and in Mandarin and some success in actually attracting recruits Even if it falls far below the TIP numbers fighting with the al-Nusra front in Latakia and the killing of Fanzing Hui In the Chinese government had been negotiating to Release obviously had had an impact on Chinese public opinion at least And fourth as I kind of mentioned in the introduction the group that had in many respects functioned as the TIP's host and since The turn of the millennium the IMU and is destroyed by the Taliban after it declass affiliation to ISIS Which the TIP leadership tried to persuade them not to do and unsuccessfully This means that in a certain sense and this is still all very provisional and the TIP Could be seen to have acquired the status as the main central Asian Aq affiliate role in a kind of subsidiary What does this add up to for for China? It's a terrorist threat that I think is now much wider in geographical scope and with more diffuse locations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East in Play as well as South Asia and much more difficult partners to deal with in the process notably Turkey Fewer of these groups are amenable to the sort of general deal making that was possible with the the Taliban at the turn of the millennium, whether that's ISIS Aq in its current phase the TTP some other groups And China although it's still not a top tier target for for any of these groups is not a bottom tier target Either there's more of a normalization of hitting Chinese targets than they used to be including economic targets And there's far greater normalization of China as a focus for for recruitment efforts Than there was in the previous phases and then this doesn't completely unravel the principles that Underpinned China's counter-terrorism policy in the past, but it does make some of them harder to sustain And it has necessitated a few behavioral shifts in South Asia itself and it has Meant being a bit less Pakistan centric While Pakistan still occupies a critical role for Chinese policy in the region TIP's location in Afghanistan And some other developments in Afghanistan and have pushed Beijing towards close of direct military and intelligence cooperation with the With the Afghan government This has been in motion for a number of years particularly following Joi Yong Kong's Landmark visit to Kabul in 2012 Followed by state councillor Gorsheng Kun and Xi Jian Guo the PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff in 2014 The efforts by the Afghan government to establish their standing as an alternative security partner for China in the region Go back even further, but I think you've really seen that intensify in the last year with the visit from the PLA Chief of General Staff and CMC member Feng Feng Wei in March 2016 followed by the first Kind of proper scale package of Chinese military. I've had been some smaller things They've given before But the biggest shift is not just the question of the new partners in the region that China is working with I think there is also the the broader issue of China taking on a more direct role Itself and taking on a role not just in addressing some of the narrow concerns about weaker militancy In the way that it had in the past and but some of the broader conditions in which these groups operate Again Afghanistan I think probably provides the best illustration of that Where China has been focused on ensuring that the country doesn't become a safe Haven for weaker militants after the US drawdown Following about a decade of avoiding virtually any political involvement at all In Afghanistan Beijing's willingness to take a leading role in the negotiations Over Afghanistan's future and had seen it in recently as pushing forward reconciliation process with the Taliban convening an array of bilateral Trilateral multilateral groupings and exerting influence over Pakistan to try to deliver Taliban representatives for the talks while these have evidently not come to fruition and the process has been notable for China's unusual willingness to take responsibility for facilitating the process and for its close and open coordination with the United States and After years of refusing to collaborate bilaterally on any Afghan initiatives The deployment of Chinese economic instruments in the region has also been portrayed more explicitly than it was in the past as a long-term means of addressing the terrorist threat And the Belt and Road Initiative itself has partly been framed as a way to provide stability through Development across an arc of instability from from Xinjiang to the Middle East And at least in private Chinese leaders have been quite explicit in describing some of the specific plans in these terms my favorite still Leaker Chiang in his meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and characterizing the China-Pakistan economic corridor as a means of weaning the populace from fundamentalism It's also intended to function as a large-scale incentive for various actors in the region to prioritize economic and financial rewards over security competition And some of the economic rewards that accrue from war and you can ask questions about the efficacy of this How many of the resources will come through for CPEC and some of these other plans and so on and but I think the deployment of Chinese economic Commitments for strategic ends and is really one of the biggest change factors and in in the region including even starting including even on some of the security questions and in a more tentative fashion We've also been debates in China about whether to take on a more direct military role in counterterrorism efforts and with the anti-terrorism law that Discussed yesterday including provision for the deployment of Chinese security forces Overseas and and I have been struck by the degree to which some of the internal debates in China about intervention of this sort of focused on Syria and the conclusion of these debates have has obviously been against intervention And the terms of the debate as far as I could glean appear to have been as much concerned with the broader value of these missions for PLA rather than their specific utility vis-a-vis counterterrorism goals notably they were focused on ISIS rather than on those referent were actually the largest number and of We go militants fighting and nonetheless, I think that even the possibility of serious military missions of this nature Was was not even being seriously entertained a couple of years ago That's it to sort of wrap up I don't want to do the Delusional thing of getting to the end of this and then saying that this opens up new opportunities for cooperation When actually a lot of the obstacles to that cooperation have not gone away and for various countries strategic tensions with China are rising but I Think cooperation with China on counterterrorism in a foreign policy context Was not just difficult because of the terrorism definition problem that we talked about And all the double standards debates and things and it was difficult because China did have a framework in place That was delivering relatively successfully and that I think was perceived to be potentially undermined by cooperating too closely with other Western powers That framework isn't working successfully anymore China is having to operate in more regions where its partners are Inadequate or actively problematic and where its own intelligence capabilities aren't always as well developed The very narrow purely weak or centric approach and I think has also been recognized as Inadequate and there's more of a move and to think about broad-based conditions in which some of these groups can operate And China is now bringing more tools and resources to deploy to address some of these problems Afghanistan again, which is partly the focus of this but I think partly exemplifies and all of these trends is already a context in which some of this broader-based cooperation is already under way and Despite the tensions that exist elsewhere in the relationship with China and this is an area Cooperation Afghanistan and certain strands of counterterrorism has been pretty well firewalled And and protected against some of those developments Strategic competition in the South China Sea and all of these things and which suggests that it may be possible and elsewhere too I think the next session talking about the Middle East and we'll touch on the area where I think some of that more expanded form of Cooperation is most likely and so on South Asia. I will wrap it up there Thanks very much Andrew and now I will invite David Brewster to offer his thoughts on Andrew's paper Okay. Well, thanks very much Andrew As always you've given a great comprehensive and insightful Presentation on developments in this field particularly on the evolution of Uyghur Militancy outside of China and My list of some of Andrew's key points Is is that essentially terrorist or separatist groups are Threatening China from outside of Chinese territories have shifted their base of operations from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Syria And this has several consequences one of which is a reduced ability of Beijing to control these groups or respond to these groups via allies such as Pakistan the impact of Uyghur militants now joining ISIS which has less qualms Than the previous arrangements in terms of directly targeting China and also the consequences in in various directions of the transfer of the physical location of Uyghur militancy from being centered on Pakistan Afghanistan to Syria Andrew also commented on Chinese perspectives on the China Pakistan economic corridor and in particular as the the impact of that initiative as an anti extremist strategy and and essentially that the economic development of Pakistan facilitated by Chinese infrastructure developments will wean the populace from fundamentalism. I love that quote so rather than focusing on the impact of the movement of existing fundamentalist groups from Pakistan Afghanistan to Syria, I would like to focus on this last aspect of Andrew's analysis and perhaps press him for his views on the consequences of the CPEC project in Pakistan for the possible rise of a whole new type of fundamentalist reaction against China and indeed on the whole nature of the Pakistan-China relationship are we potentially are we going to see a whole new front of terrorism against China arising from this initiative. Now in looking and at and researching the One Belt One Road initiative I've talked to many Chinese interlocutors about their views of why they believe that China will be successful in building infrastructure such as roads and railways pipelines, etc across thousands of kilometers of some of the most dangerous territories in the world through Pakistan occupied Kashmir tribal territories, Baluchistan, etc Now even if we put aside the 46 billion dollar pipe price tag as rather aspirational as I think Andrew's book demonstrated quite well. If past Chinese projects in the region are any indication these new projects will likely involve many thousands of Chinese engineers and workers being based in the Pakistan countryside and in addition obviously to the establishment of many billions of dollars worth of Chinese owned assets in these parts. It seems to me that the level of involvement of China in Pakistan that this initiative implies creates a whole new recipe for China in the region. But Chinese perspectives about this is quite revealing. There seems to be a strong belief that in general that Chinese promoted economic development will be an antidote to fundamentalism and in particular that these developments will make Chinese people popular among local populations and thereby shield them from fundamentalist reactions. I'm not sure whether these views reflect somehow reflect a economic materialist ideology that could be traced to be somehow linked to communist ideology or whether it in fact reflects elements of hubris arising from China's recent economic successes. Whether and in particular a view that the Chinese economic development model can be easily translated to other countries in the region. However, I think that these sorts of views are quite analogous to the optimistic views of the world that would be displayed say by an American engineer in 1955 as they embarked on various projects in Southeast Asia that they were building new things for people who wanted it and they would receive the local people's gratitude for this. I wonder whether China has an exceptionalist view of itself that might in some way be analogous to that. As you know, the Pakistan Army is mobilizing a significant force. I think the numbers are 12,000 personnel or so that will be devoted to protecting Chinese workers and assets in Pakistan. But I do wonder how effective they will be in being able to protect many thousands of Chinese nationals in the countryside and infrastructure spread over many thousands of kilometers. One would have thought that the presence of so many Chinese nationals in Pakistan will naturally breed resentments and one would have thought that the temptation, there would be strong temptations among fundamentalist groups to attack Chinese nationals and assets if nothing else says a way of gaining Islamabad's attention. I also wonder how much patience Beijing would be willing to to show in allowing Pakistan to have full responsibility for the protection of CPEC and Chinese nationals if terrorist incidents do start to occur. As Andrew documented in his book about the Red Mosque incident in 2007, the Chinese authorities take these incidents very seriously and in fact have very little patience in terms of Pakistan reactions. So if Pakistan authorities aren't able to provide adequate protection what is the possibility or likelihood that Chinese authorities may want to provide direct security for their people and assets. And we've already seen reports that Chinese security forces were at some stage deployed into Pakistan occupied Kashmir to protect Chinese workers building roads and other infrastructure there. So while not trying to be too pessimistic about this, certainly in my view the elements are all there for the development of a whole new front in terms of anti-Chinese extremism or at least terrorism or militants that target Chinese nationals and assets outside of China. And these include to my mind the presence of large numbers of Chinese nationals in Pakistan if to the extent the CPEC project goes ahead. The likelihood that many of these projects will be undertaken without significant regard to local sensitivities. A high degree of vulnerability of these assets and people to attack and the limited ability of Pakistan authorities to provide protection and the potential if it all goes sour for Chinese security forces to become directly involved in the situation. And last but not least is the willingness of Beijing to become more involved in Pakistan domestic politics to support the CPEC project and whether this is from a desire to make the project or the decision making around the project more efficient or just a perceived need to involve China more directly in politics whether it be politics at a national level or at a local level. This involves a significant or would involve a significant sea change in China's relationships with many of these countries. We've already seen these or the beginnings of this from recent reports that Beijing was pressing Pakistan to have the Pakistan army take control of the CPEC and for whatever reasons you can attribute to that involves a significant change in the relationship and that would in my view result in a significant change in the views of Pakistani militants towards the CPEC project and towards China. We've already and this isn't just only relating to Pakistan. We've also seen signs of this movement in Myanmar where in connection with the trans-Myanmar project an economic corridor ending at Calcview China has become more involved in domestic politics in Myanmar including in domestic politics in Rakhine state where there's the Rohingya population resides and there is a significant potential for violence. Now as I said to my mind this potentially reflects a sea change in China's involvement in local politics in neighboring states and I wonder whether this could be a new dimension of terrorism against China. Well thanks very much David one of the signs of a good discussant is their ability to to raise lots of topics for everybody else to pick on and sitting there I came up with a number hubris exceptionalism the willingness of China to get involved in in local politics and and also I suppose questions over whether we see China as a mid-range or a top tier target for future terrorist attacks. Another thing I think that struck me was was about the economic dimension of some of the confidence building measures that China sees itself putting in place through One Belt One Road. It's interesting I think that the view is that you provide development opportunities initially through the construction of an economic trade corridor and that might well bring decent benefits in terms of soft power effects for the People's Republic of China however I suppose the question is once it is completed if it is completed how does one ensure that those benefits are sustained and ongoing so that local residents for instance don't just see the caravan passing on through the region without without any sort of sustained benefits for themselves but that's just something I was thinking about so with that I'm sure people have lots of questions can we just ask you to state your name and affiliation if you have one and keep your questions relatively brief if possible so that we have plenty of time for everyone to take part who's going to kick us off yes sir thank you for your presentation my name is Adam from University of Adelaide how do you understand China's new passport policy towards Uyghurs it was extremely difficult years ago like it took me 10 10 years to get my passport now it's available to general public even to farmers and generally Uyghurs travel to Turkey with the passport these days if there are any links between the new passport policy with losing the child a thousand China border control and that some Uyghurs cross the border in both ways whether legally or illegally Uyghurs end up being in Turkey some of them of course will continue to continue their journey into Syria whether they join islamic state or elsewhere front my question is do you believe or think that there was a Chinese involvement or a political agenda to label Uyghurs as terrorists or Uyghurs being Uyghurs are just super intelligent and found way out to leave China thank you I'll try and answer a slice of that maybe not all of it particularly on the specifics of the passport policy I mean evidently there is a combination of the political agenda in the labeling but also something that is that is a genuine threat I mean I obviously focused on the latter dimension in the presentation the I mean one of the questions that I think is a new one that I'm still trying to figure out answers to is how this recruitment process is working through these in the context of these new transit routes and where previously there was obviously people trying to leave China and go to Turkey for other purposes and the degree to which the Turkish government is actively funneling people into the conflict how far this is taking place at the behest whether this how how how much intentionality there is in this how recruits are being identified and how some of the how the distribution is moving between people that are basically being sent into these former Alawite villages in northern Syria through that phase the much more limited numbers of people who are being targeted by ISIS I think what has been I think we talked about it yesterday an exodus that is evidently taking place as a result of particularly the post 2009 crackdown and then the much more efficacious border controls in central Asia and south Asia than existed in the past I think is just posing a very different set of questions about the transitions from people who in a number of cases and this was the same evidently in Afghanistan and Pakistan had no real intention of leaving China to go and join militant groups but were simply being funneled into them by the networks that were enabling their their exit from China or for financial reasons when they found themselves in in in the new destination countries very much for a very interesting presentation I have a cluster of questions which I will keep brief and I apologize in advance the first is the sort of a question about Pakistan I mean Pakistan has you know been a problem for terrorism for a long time for a lot of different countries and I think a lot of other countries have found so very frustrated by the degree to which Pakistan is manipulating the problem to have some sort of bigger relationship with whichever country it is be it the United States be it European countries and so a lot of countries tend to look back as a fairly unreliable actor within this regard have you seen any evidence of China having that particular concern when we're looking at CT questions or is it very much a sort of reliable partner that they feel that they're dealing with and the sort of ancillary to that you know how much do you think because I think there's an interesting dynamic that's evolving around Turkey's relationship with the conflict in Syria and I think you could draw some parallels with what we're seeing have what we saw historically with Pakistan and the conflict in Afghanistan are there any lessons you think specifically for China about how they have managed that relationship with Pakistan that you think they could use in a Turkish context whichever you're curious about and then the final question is looking at the Pakistan-Middle East relationship which is very interesting because Pakistan of course a country that has relationships with Iran and with Gulf countries quite strong ones do you think that's a possible way for China to leverage this relationship with Pakistan to try to achieve ends or worry about CT concerns in Middle Eastern countries thank you sure so on the first one yes I have other points at which there have been questions about Pakistan's reliability on these issues and yes I think there were there were particularly serious questions when these lists were being released and Pakistan was not taking effective action against any of members of the the group for a period of time and so there was a question that was there about whether this was as was being said by Kayani and others because they didn't want the of the risks of taking action in north Waziristan or was this was this because there were some people in the Pakistani army who were sympathetic to these groups and the word you would get these complaints from people about intelligence being provided warnings being then given to groups before operations were conducted and a lot of the stuff that would have sounded quite familiar to to others too but with a very different backdrop of the level of trust that I think is is is there historically in that relationship and between the Pakistani army and and the PLA and then existed with with others so I think there's more of a predisposition of more of an assumption of trust than that than there has been but there were I think some some some questions that were being raised and and they were raised partly as a result of broader developments that people saw within the Pakistani army and religious sympathies within the Pakistani Pakistani army and this sort of thing. I think Zarbayas was in that sense also quite effective in allaying some of those concerns because it's taken out a piece in the China-Pakistan relationship that was was a source of tension that I mean didn't really spill out very much in public but you would talk to former army chiefs and things from the Pakistani side I mean you had very reliable accounts of some of the exchanges on on these issues that were for a stretch particularly from 2007-2008 through to more recently some some real tensions like I think have it no longer having TIP on Pakistani soil is a consequential shift and the action taken in North Uzairistong is consequential in in at least taking some of those tensions out. Lessons to learn for Turkey I mean I think the difficulty is that the Pakistan relationship has so many distinct and unique features to it and such a long sort of prehistory that it's quite difficult to replicate too many elements of that. I've been struck by some of the writing in the last year saying though that Pakistan is a relationship that is a model to follow for others for China and in that sense I think a model to follow in being a kind of deep security relationship that still falls short of being a military alliance and still I don't think the expectation is that that would that would change but whether there's a level of trust that's been built over time in military to military cooperation that can mean that the country functions as sort of quasi-ally that can be counted on for a whole series of of different things and so whether that I think the Turkish case is so far away from being something where that's realizable in a time frame of years even a longer time frame that I think it's difficult to take direct lessons from the the the Pakistan relationship for that but I think you would see it in in other in other cases in terms of a deepened and heightened level of military cooperation that can then translate into various other benefits including on counterterrorism but not necessarily centrally on counterterrorism. I don't think I think Pakistan historically played a role in breakering China's relations in the Middle East I think that's dropped off in important ways in in in the last stretch just as a result of the fact that China has its own direct relationships there. I think there are moments when China draws on Pakistan for these purposes notably after the Arumqi riots in 2009 where Pakistan was having to do a lot of the running in make a lot of the running in the OIC and places like that but I think the bulk of the cooperation that on intelligence and a number of these kind of new areas that China is having to navigate in the region I think are less mediated through the Pakistanis and more as far as I can tell directly with the states in question and there's a fair prehistory of ties with a number of states in the region that that don't necessarily require very much Pakistani involvement. I'll just say some quick words about the idea of China leveraging Pakistan's relationships in the region I mean it's obviously it's a strategy that the US followed for for many decades with with some successes but overall I suppose failure but the more fundamental question is is to the extent that it turned Pakistan into a rent seeking state and the application of that rent seeking behavior to its relationship with China so I would I think agree that it wouldn't be a good policy or even a or a necessary policy for China to be following. I wanted to follow up on some of the things brought up by the discussant regarding the Belt and Road Initiative. Andrew you you wrote a piece recently in the foreign policy about kind of how the changing leadership in the Taliban could create problems for China. I mean one of the things that strikes me about what was said about the Belt and Road Initiative is there certainly could be motivations out of that to create local discontent but of course that doesn't immediately translate into militancy or terrorism but if Al Qaeda was involved it could. So I'm wondering what your analysis since you wrote that piece in terms of the potential for Al Qaeda kind of the deals at one time made between China and Al Qaeda those breaking down and perhaps leading to a tension that could be translating the violence. Now China's kind of gone and had to go through two rounds of new leadership on the Taliban. I think the last one was just the post-Mula Omar development. I mean I think the Afghan Taliban is probably the case where at the leadership level they've been able to maintain relatively effective contacts and relationships and hold certain elements of the deals that they've made previously together with them and I think there has been a real continuity of those ties at the leadership level. I think the difficulty has been that the Taliban have as a whole become perhaps less amenable to central leadership control and less amenable to Pakistani control than they were even with leaders being put in place that are exceptionally close to the ISI and as was the case of the Mula Omar's death and I think that's part of the concern that feeds in more broadly in Afghanistan that how far do these kinds of agreements hold in light of how the movement has evolved and in light of the behavior of various facets of the movement that won't necessarily on questions of do you provide some support to TIP, do you fight for TIP, do you, these sorts of things are not necessarily the authority that was once exercised by Mula Omar on those questions is not going to be exercised quite as forcibly on a question like that and therefore you don't necessarily want to see an overly successful Taliban in Afghanistan, you do want to make sure that there's some kind of deal in place that mitigates at least their role in the country, role in trusting that these these kinds of deals will stick and I think you also see the concern playing in with respect to the peace talks for instance if if the Pakistani army had decided that in light of the Afghan Taliban's unwillingness to take part in peace talks they should crack down on the movement for instance let's say hypothetically they had been had been willing to do that I think that could have led to I can see why China would be sympathetic to a Pakistani view that says that this would have more problematic consequences for them than it was really worth it if you did and the Pakistani Taliban of course provide the sort of problem model for how that could evolve much more explicit targeting of the Chinese much more explicit targeting of the Pakistani state and possibly the Chinese to get at the Pakistani state and if and the concern that you would have a kind of more not necessarily completely unified movement but something that looks more like those groups operating in in closer cooperation with with each other which I think informs some of the the caution still about China's approach to the Taliban you know how heavy-handed they are with the Pakistanis on some of these issues I don't think any of these I mean the Afghan Taliban certainly haven't been talking there's been no sense of targeting Chinese economic assets I think there's the the the the questions there are as much the Baluchi groups and to a certain extent Pakistani Taliban and certainly CPAC is a is an appealing looking target I think as David was discussing little in his presentation I think the difficulties are as much with also with the broader politics in in Pakistan and ensuring that you at least have a consensus between the main parties and some of the other forces some of the other provinces and things and and again there's a high residue of goodwill in in in Pakistan that means that at the popular level at least China's still in in pretty good standing so it does still come down more to some of the specific for now and that could change but for now it does come down to more of the kind of specific militant groups that see themselves as being problematically affected yeah thanks Andrew and also David for your role as discussant I'm raising lots of interesting questions I've just got a sort of wider question which I think sort of links a number of different concerns that people have raised in their questions and that is really the role are there debates in China about how growing involvement a number of these key regions so for example Pakistan we've talked touched on CPAC also debates about intervention in Syria and also the growing relation direct relationship with the Afghan government is there sort of any high-level debate oh that you've seen within China about sort of this argument that you know China is in some senses in danger of replacing the United States as kind of the bet noir for various regional and global jihadist organizations I mean I think there's still a degree I mean if you're looking at the particular each of the cases in question it's quite a delicate dance at the moment I think in Afghanistan there's been a real caution I think about extending military aid in the vast to the Afghan government that was quite a statement even if it's not hugely consequential in a practical way I think the symbolism of being willing to do that was quite important both in terms of the what it amounts to in the direct cooperation with the Afghan government but it was it was the Fengfeng waystrip was a very delicate juncture in the piece whether the Taliban would participate in peace talks and so there's been some I think some of the the signaling that there's been around that has had to be quite carefully calibrated to both signal the Taliban that they have to take part in the peace process there's no route to victory purely on the battlefield etc etc the Kabul isn't going to be abandoned in the context of a broader Western withdrawal that China is going to be one of the continued partners there but that the Taliban also a political force that China is willing to deal with in a certain framework as well in certain forms of support that have historically been provided there too but it's it's a more it's a trickier balance to play I mean you had in the first phase of the peace negotiation stuff there were a lot of statements coming from a lot of parties saying you know China's the only one your statements from the Taliban China is the only country that we really trust the terms of their intentions and things like that the at a certain point in any of these processes that unravels and and and the suspicions about the motivations and things grow and I think you've seen that in Afghanistan in the period in which China has been more actively involved I think you will see it in Pakistan as I think David suggested somewhat in the talks again very high very high base of public support still the country in which public opinion around China you know plus 80 popularity and plus 90 percent in certain polls but I would imagine that will come down as China's the depth of China's involvement the extent of the interactions and becomes more broad based and I think the intentions behind a lot of what is being done with CPAC are are pretty benign but the ramifications of that immersion for Pakistani companies aren't happy about Chinese companies getting preferential terms particular regions feeling that they're missing out China reinforcing Punjabi dominance all of these kinds of things just whether China likes it or not they get sucked into and I think the degree of infighting that you've seen over CPAC is is quite illustrative of that and you do I mean that there is a difficult question at the moment when it comes to for instance a heightened role for the military in the implementation of projects I think trying to be very careful after the red mosque incident not to repeat that degree of what looked like heavy handedness if on CPAC you were to have a situation in which you had you had optics that were that China had been part of a process of pushing the Pakistani army to take on an enlarged role at the expense of civilian government that would that would start to look like another actor and would you know what I think hit parts of public opinion that have not been that have been very positively disposed to China for some time at the same time I mean on some of these areas China kind of has to take on this role and there's been a I don't think it's always been done with much enthusiasm I think it was just been the sense that there's a real necessity to take on an additional level of involvement on on these issues to be able to look out for Chinese interests that are on a very very large scale in some of these cases I mean that the economic level of involvement the salience of the issues for China's domestic security all of these things are such that it's pretty unavoidable and there's how to do that most effectively but I think the fact of their having to take on this additional role and in what some quite straight domestic political questions just naturally naturally presents nature brahman you spoke quite a lot about China's increasing willingness to deploy their economic interests for the economic development in Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight fundamentalism if China sees this as a policy that is effective in fighting fundamentalism has there been any consideration of applying that policy domestically so say within Xinjiang apologies for the pronunciation within domestic regions where they do see there's a potential threat as a way to fight fundamentalism so I think the kind of unpack that into into two elements and one is I don't think that I don't think that China's been particularly naive about believing that putting economic resources into Pakistan is going to magically resolve the problems there I think it is seen as a pretty long-term process that is as much about how do you create the conditions for the Pakistani economy to function basically normally I'm sort of I tend to be more skeptical about the degree to which the kind of transit corridor stuff is a central part of it versus the degree to which you know energy projects and industrial parks and some of the kind of how do you how do you really how do you get the Pakistani economy growing at 7% a year rather than 4% a year and what does that do over the long term I think some of those questions are probably more important ones even if in the interim period you may well have more unrest there was a result more reaction of certain sorts to an enlarged Chinese role in doing some of these things I think the the argument would be that over a very long time frame ultimately an economically growing Pakistan will be will be a Pakistan that moves further away from the risks of instability and extremism but that I don't think there's a there's a blink of view that this is going to translate in any way quickly or that as you suggest I mean China's internal experiences in Xinjiang don't necessarily it doesn't necessarily follow that say heightened economic equality that sees more winners from economic growth more losers from economic growth more perception of inequality doesn't necessarily translate into less problematic responses from some of the affected groups through that through that economic transition I mean one thing I've also just finally kind of differentiate between it in Afghanistan and there is the willingness to put the money into to or a belief that it is possible to put the money into to fix the problems I think their stability is seen as a precondition for investment whereas in Pakistan I think the sense is that there's a willingness to make investments despite knowing that instability that there is a degree of instability there there are some of these risks I think there's a somewhat greater appetite for a greater threshold for for tolerating some of the likely ramifications in in in Pakistan which may well involve heightened attacks and and and things in Afghanistan that's that's that's not that but just because of the situation in in the two countries and because of the considerably greatest strategic importance that that Pakistan plays as well I'm not necessarily sure I mean sorry this is partly also responding back to a couple of David's initial points I'm still not necessarily sure that that translates into I mean I think you could see kind of as you've already seen a little bit in Pakistan and Afghanistan a bit of you know kind of private security XPL serving PLA rotated out working on particular projects and things I still think that's on quite a modest scale and I don't think it would be seen as efficacious to put real you know actual numbers of people in and I still think most of the presence in Kashmir or Gilgit Baltistan things like that are still you know Omicore of engineer type stuff rather than kind of real PLA presence or something like that and I would imagine that's still true and Pakistanis have done a decent job since 2008-09 in actually protecting Chinese workers that have been there was the near miss in Karachi if anyone else has been attacked in China in the last period of time has not been working on a project you had an academic you had the mountaineers but since the phase in which there were a number of successful attacks the protections that have been extended by the Pakistanis have been what have worked relatively effectively and although I think there's still very high levels of concern there and that does actually go back to one of the reasons why that there is some interest in seeing the army more hardwired in some of these projects Pakistani Pakistani army has done a better job than it was doing in 2007-2008 the even into the earlier phase of attacks in in Balochistan and in at least ensuring that Chinese workers themselves have not been hit whether that continues with the larger numbers who knows but at least there's a few years of precedent for suggesting that they that you barring a broader deterioration in the security situation in in Pakistan you're not as likely I think in the next phase to see a direct repeat of the sort of stuff that you saw in say 2007 I thought that was a very very stimulating presentation by Andrew and also some quite interesting remarks by by our own David Brewster particularly struck by you know the willingness of the participants to move beyond the weaker dimension and particularly Andrew's observation that China now really does face an urgent need to broaden beyond that initial narrow scope now of course Beijing is going to resist doing so because once you change strategy once you broaden your ambit scoping who you deal with the types of policy responses you use when you use military force raises the question of well when does that become a self-fulfilling prophecy and how do you prevent that from happening one of the consequences of course of China's upwards upward trajectory dragging it into new security dilemmas which previously it hasn't needed to engage with so I think plenty of food for thought from this session and I'd ask you to join with me in thanking Andrew and David