 Gwdeithg welcome to the 20th meeting in 2018 of the Finance and Constitution Committee. I hope that everyone has a good summer recess. To begin with, can I just inform members of that that the St rewnmeth mill on MSP is joining us today as an observer? The first item on our agenda is to take evidence on the UK trade bill. From the right honourable, George Hollingbridge MP, the Minister of State for Trade Policy, Susanne Greaves, OBE Trade Bill Manager, Eleanor Weavis, who is the Head of Domestic portfolio a Rebecca Hackett, the deputy director policy at the Scottish office. I welcome our witnesses to the meeting this morning. I understand that the minister is first to visit to the Scottish parliament and he's at least seen the committee rooms on the lift on the way up, so he'll at least get the chance to see a wider perspective of the building later. It's a fantastic place. Can I ask the minister to make any brief opening remarks that he may have? By May. Is it chairman or convener? Well, convener. Thank you very much indeed, sir. Well, I'm pleased to be here. It's fantastic to see the building. I've driven past it a number of times. My son is at Edinburgh University, so a pollock calls was just round the corner and saw it from a distance on many occasions. I'm looking forward to supporting the committee's scrutiny of the trade bill. The bill continues to be a key element of our package of legislation to establish a fully functioning, to be a fully functioning for our international trade partners and individuals and businesses across the UK. The UK government wants all parts of the UK to support this bill. We've been very clear from the bill's introduction that elements of this legislation, namely in relation to clauses one and two, do engage the legislative consent process. I note the Scottish Government's memorandum on the LCM from December 2017, and since then, the UK government has taken significant strides through its amendments to the trade bill that came forward at report stage, making improvements to the bill and answering many of the concerns that were raised in that memorandum. Despite those amendments, I do acknowledge that the current position of the Scottish Government is not to provide an LCM. I'd like to reiterate the Government's commitment to engage with the Scottish Government and I remain confident that we will reach a position which this Parliament can support. I also welcome the Scottish Government's recent paper making its case for Scotland's role in future trade agreements. My officials will be discussing this with Scottish counterparts later today. Importantly, the trade bill of course focuses on transitioning EU deals, not making future arrangements. However, I'd very much like to learn what the committee thinks are the most important parts of that paper for them. I look forward to hearing the committee's views on the trade bill and answering your questions over the course of today's session. I just add finally, sir, that I am relatively new into post. I will attempt, in all cases, to give the political steer that a minister should give. However, on some of the technical detail of the bill, you will, I hope, agree that referring some of the questions to my colleagues might give you better information. I really appreciate that minister and thank you very much for your opening remarks. I need to get some of the things on the record, obviously, just for the purpose of making sure that we cover all the detail. I recognise that some amendments have already been made, but given that the majority of members on this committee and the Scottish Parliament have already recommended that consents are not given to section 12 powers in the EU withdrawal bill and given some of the things that you said about being confident to the reaching agreement, why does the UK Government continue to propose that the same restrictions apply effectively in the powers and clauses 1 and 2 of the trade bill? It is worth saying that we think that it is quite unlikely that any of these powers will actually be necessary. I was discussing with officials a little earlier the sorts of circumstances in which we may find ourselves having to use the concurrent power in these areas to put something on to the statute book. It is relatively difficult to see it. That does not obviate the principle, and I completely understand that. Nevertheless, it seems to us quite unlikely that it will be used. As to the principle itself, as far as we are concerned, there are certain areas where the consistency of approach across the UK as a whole is the driving force that we must work with to make sure that, when we transition any of these existing EU trade agreements, that approach is maintained. It seems to me that there is room for negotiation, and we are absolutely committed to carrying on talking, cooperating and working with colleagues in the Scottish Parliament and officials to try to find our way through this. When I say that I am confident, I believe that there is plenty to talk about still and that we will achieve success, despite the principle of objection. Obviously, there might not be many changes, but the bill makes no provision at all for circumstances in which the terms of existing trade agreements do change as a result of negotiations, particularly if they might be initiated from third countries. Under current proposals, the devolved Administrations will not be involved in these negotiations, which would be conducted by the UK alone. Or continuity. Grandfather writes rollover, because that is the description that you provided in the beginning of what the trade bill is about. If that was to happen, the potential could be prolonged and involved trade-offs. In those circumstances, you might imagine that people in Scotland would have concerns or any impacts on the fishing industry, the seafood industry, etc. The House of Commons International Trade Committee takes a slightly different view from the UK government, where they say that our evidence strongly suggests that substantive changes will be necessary when EU trade arrangements are rolled over. The Government should set out provisions for both extensive parliamentary scrutiny and enhanced involvement of the devolved Administrations in situations in which such situations and changes occur. The Government must show what it is doing to foster a cross-par-departmental approach to the issue of rolling over trade and other trade related agreements and fully involve the devolved Administrations. Can you give us an update about what that involvement will look like, what progress is being made and what discussions have already taken place and what might happen in the future? If we just address those comments at a fairly high top level, first of all, clearly we made a large number of amendments to the trade bill. For example, when the new version of the arrangement, whatever that is, is transitioned, Nuclear 6, as proposed by Jonathan Genogli, came forward and he said that we need to have a great deal more scrutiny upon this. I looked at it carefully and the answer was, I think, yes, we did. What was agreed was that a report would be placed before Parliament, that would describe the changes that were occurring between the original EU agreement and that that was going to be ratified by the UK. It would also describe, in each of those cases, it would be very clear as to what those changes were at where they happened in the agreement and what their effect was. Any delegated legislation that was to be passed to enact those changes would, in its explanatory memorandum, point to exactly which bit of the report on the transitioned arrangement it would affect. That gives the Parliament very clear routes of scrutiny over any changes and, indeed, the ability to object and to deal with them in the subsequent debates that will happen upon them. Furthermore, each of those will be subject to ratification and, of course, the Parliament is capable of delaying that as well through the Crag process. We made some very real concessions, which I think have improved the bill, made it better. The sponsor of that particular clause, Jonathan Genogli, agreed that we would come to a better conclusion about how we would scrutinise those changes. I think that I would add on top of that that, of course, it is our intention to alter those as little as possible. The whole point of the trade agreement continuity process is to ensure that we have those agreements in place for exit day. I would agree with your analysis if we try and change too much. It will delay matters. There is absolutely no question about that. Therefore, colleagues should take some comfort from the fact that it is absolutely in the Government's interest to ensure that there is as little changes as possible because speed is of the essence. I just wonder if colleagues wanted to add anything to that. It may be that change does not happen very often, but if we take the evidence from the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons, there is a prospect that that might happen on some occasions. You have described well, Minister, what the process is for the UK Government and the UK Parliament, but what I am not hearing is how the devolved institutions would be involved in that process, how they would be involved in any consultation, any discussions about those potential changes. I might ask colleagues in a moment to describe the access to those papers, but I think that I would be right in saying that they are available as all parliamentary papers are to anybody who wishes to access them. As this is a reserved competence, I am not entirely sure that there is a formal role, at least, for Scottish colleagues, perhaps Eleanor just wants to fill in a little. At an official level, we engage with the devolved administrations on a regular basis. We have a number of forests for this through which we update them on the trade agreement continuity work. That will be the main for it at an official level in which we would discuss any changes that might need to be made to ensure continuity. In addition to that, as the Minister referenced, the papers that we are going to lay before Parliament in advance of any SIs being laid would be freely available, and the Scottish Parliament would be free to review those as they wished. So, there will be no formal process of consultation between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, or indeed the Scottish Parliament, if there are changes to the trade arrangements that already exist. Is that what you are saying? There will be no formal process. The process will be at an official level, as we have described. In addition, as the Minister referenced, this is a technical process. We are making technical changes to those trade agreements to ensure that they make sense in a bilateral context. Can I also say, convener, that all of these arrangements have been in place, by definition, because we cannot transition anything that is not already on the books, have been in place for some time. They have been tried and tested. They have been ratified by Parliament. Their texts have been available for a long time. I just re-emphasise one more time that it is absolutely not in our interests to vary those arrangements greatly. There may be opportunities in the future to renegotiate with partners as and when time allows and things have settled down. But continuity is all about giving certainty to our businesses, to consumers, to politicians and anybody who needs to understand the process that what we will have in place is pretty much exactly what we have in place now. This process has already been gone through once in detail. Therefore, it seems to us that a light touch approach, modifying as little as possible and putting that through Parliament, making sure that everybody understands what has changed, which will be evidence to anybody who wants to read the documents, is the right way forward. If we were looking to change huge issues of ground principle in each of those on any of those agreements, then a question might arise, but we absolutely do not intend to do that. I am pressing you on that matter, because the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons has a different perspective to you. Others on the table have a different perspective. Changes may be required that are substantial. If we are talking about systems that already exist, the Concordat between the UK Government and the Scottish Government states that the UK Government recognises that devolved administrations will have an interest in international policymaking in relation to devolved matters and obligations touching on devolved matters that the UK may agree as a result of concluding international agreement. The thrust of involving the devolved administrations is already part of the architecture. It may not be specifically part of the architecture of existing trade deals, but it is part of the architecture of agreement between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. I would be personally disappointed if there was no formal mechanism recognising that there is a role for the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament if and when any changes to trade arrangements were to be brought forward. I think that that would be a weakness, not just for Scotland but for the UK. I am very happy to confirm to the committee that it is noted clearly. I am absolutely clear also as far as future trade arrangements are concerned. You may well want to move on to this in a separate section, so I am not trying to anticipate too much. I am absolutely clear that the devolved parliaments and assemblies should be very clearly involved. I am absolutely clear what you say as a matter of principle. I think that our difference here is that you take the word of the international trade committee about the fact that there will be substantial changes. I believe that there will not be substantial changes. I do not believe that it is in our interests and I believe that time mitigates against it. Therefore, there will be little to discuss other than the fact that what we largely have before is going to be had again, but with the UK, substituted for the EU. Thank you very much. Good morning, minister. On the same point, if you do not mind, we already have an agreed concordat relating to the coordination of EU policies. It is set out in the memorandum of understanding. It says this quite clearly that the UK Government wishes to involve Scottish ministers as directly and fully as possible in decision making on EU matters that touch on devolved areas, including policy formulation, negotiation and implementation. I say to you again that it is what you have just said a moment ago, not backtracking on that already. I would just like to elucidate a little on how we are fulfilling what is promised in that concordat and memorandum. A large number of meetings have occurred on trade policy on how we will work together on that, but I would like Eleanor to give the committee some view of how many meetings there have been and what we intend to do in the future. We have a number of mechanisms through which we are engaging the devolved administrations on our future trade policy following a deep dive that we had with them before the summer. We have a series that occur roughly monthly of technical policy roundtables to discuss UK trade policy in detail and to enable the devolved administrations to feed in their views and expertise upstream in the policy development process. In addition to that, we have a six-weekly senior officials meeting that reviews the devolved administrations role in trade in addition to cross-cutting issues such as discussions on the bill. In addition to that, we and teams across trade policy group engage with their counterparts in the Scottish Government on a regular basis. Indeed, after the meeting, we will have a series of meetings with the Scottish Government both on their future role in trade agreements but also on the outcome and consultations and on how they can best feed into those. Can you give any examples of how the devolved administrations have shaped the policy formulation that perhaps she did not propose initially? Can you give us any examples of that? I am sure that we can find some examples. Those would be at a technical policy level for the policy leads that work on the trade agreements themselves, so I would need to return to the committee. However, I know that colleagues have had a number of very interesting discussions with our colleagues in the Scottish Government about the detailed policy that goes into forming a UK position for trade agreements. Just to give a practical example and to explore what you are saying here in terms of the locus of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish ministers, in Scotland there are 467,000 people who earn below the living wage. That is far too high. We will not use any levers at our disposal to bring that figure down. If new trade agreements were set up in the future and part of that trade agreement involved Scottish public bodies in purchasing goods or services, would there be a facility under the new trade agreement for the devolved administrations to mandate their own public bodies to pay the living wage? The provisions in the trade bill about the GPA sign us back up to the obligations that we already have as members of the EU. I am very happy for officials to intervene if I mis-speak, but in essence that means that we have access—British companies, Scottish companies, Welsh companies, Northern Irish companies have access to £1.3 trillion of international procurement opportunities. On the other hand, it also means that we are relatively limited in the way we can shape the procurement policy that we use at home. It has to be open, it has to be transparent, it has to be understandable and it has to be accessible to all who come to use it. I do not think that I am going to particularly comment on the individual example that you give, but if a particular policy was to be applied, it would have to be compliant with the rules around the GPA. Are you then saying that in terms of devolved administrations we are not able to exempt and apply a specific policy where Scottish public bodies are involved in procurement activities under a new trade agreement? With slightly talking across purposes, I am concentrating on the provisions in the trade bill and I am absolutely clear that the procurement agreement will be the same as we have had. In essence, we will simply be individual single members ourselves. I believe that Scottish institutions already have legislated for and made policy decisions about how they do that sort of procurement. However, if colleagues have any further notes on that. It is obviously worth noting that we are, as a member of the EU, part of the Government Procurement Agreement now, which we have signed up to and set the rules around procurement policies. Under the trade bill, we are going to continue our membership of that as an independent trading partner, so nothing is changing. Perhaps that is your question, which is in future trade arrangements. Would Scottish authorities be able to take on a different role or different set of policies in how they procure and what it was and so on and so forth? Those agreements will be mandated, whether they will be agreed at a UK level. Therefore, I would have thought that the policy in the free trade agreement as agreed at a UK level will apply to all public authorities across the UK. So, if the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish public bodies took a different view, the UK view would overwrite that? I think that it will entirely dependant—I do stand in the view, you do—but, for example, in the EU-Japan free trade agreement that was recently signed, there was a whole chapter on the procurement from local authorities. Now, this may not be directly relevant, but, just to give you a flavour, some local authorities had decided that they did not want to be included in this, and were not included in the free trade agreement, and some concluded that they did. That is an example of where there are variations across the piece. It is a different country with different relationships, and it gives no great indication as to how we treat things here. However, I think that what I am saying to you is that it will depend on the free trade agreement and how it is struck. The GPA is wholly separate from that, and we are just replicating. If we are talking about procurement in general, we are replicating the arrangement that we already have with the EU, other than changing technical details and using the delegated powers where necessary to do accessions and people coming in and out of the arrangement. I think that it will be pretty much as experienced previously. Minister, some members inevitably will ask wider questions than just to trade, but I think that we all understand that this bill is about rover issues and grant for the rights, et cetera, and existing arrangements. It is probably the right time to raise scrutiny issues at this stage. Yes, absolutely. Good morning. Following on from some of that and picking up on the comments that you made about changes in relation to parliamentary scrutiny, it is right that this covers the issues immediately in the trade bill but also the longer-term approach to trade policy and the UK Government's commitment to work with the devolved administrations on both of those fronts. In particular, in your preparing for future trade policy document, it says that you remain committed to working with the devolved administrations not only on your approach to the implementation of new trade agreements but also as well as the role they will play in helping to shape the UK's future trade policy. There are two levels to that. One is about the extent to which the UK Government will work with the devolved administrations and the other is the extent to which parliamentary scrutiny is brought to bear on both levels of government. Would you agree that, in general, what you are talking about, if we are going to be consistent with those commitments, is the idea that trade policy and some of the immediate decisions in relation to continuity and rollover and so on are shared responsibilities and therefore that both Governments have to have a mechanism by which they can decide and express clearly whether an agreement has been reached, whether an approach is agreed and both parliaments have the ability to say no. The Scotland Act 1998 makes it pretty plain that conducts of international issues particularly on trade—specifically identified on trade—are reserved matters. Whilst there is absolutely no doubt that Scotland has an interest in trade and in promoting it and influencing UK Government policy upon it, which is quite right and proper, I do not think that it has, according to the Scotland Act 1998 and perhaps I should call Rebecca Grant in here at some stage, a formal role where it can set trade policy for the UK. The UK is the body that does that. That is my understanding and I am happy to be contradicting. No, indeed. I am not saying that the devolved Administrations set trade policy, but your possession—the UK Government's possession—is that the devolved Administrations will play a role in helping to shape the UK's future trade policy. Could you tell us what role that will be and how it will operate in practice? As we have already heard, there is extensive discussion at official level about the UK's trade policy as it emerges and evolves. With the devolved authorities, we absolutely take those discussions very seriously and points that are made will be incorporated as appropriate into the policies that we bring forward. It is also a course entirely proper for the Scottish Parliament to have debates on any issue that it wishes to be doing, including trade policy. I have no doubt that those would be noted in the UK Parliament as well, so there are many mechanisms there. I absolutely confirm to you that it is the department's clear intent and desire to take the concerns of the Scottish Government and the other devolved authorities extremely seriously on trade policy because, plainly, there are very important industries in Scotland, very important issues that are clearly right that the UK Government takes into account. We will continue the official level contacts as to be as deep and as long as they can, such that we shape our overall trade policy such that it reflects the interests of the devolved authorities. I will reflect on some of the evidence that we have heard so far. Professor Rawlings told us that the UK Government's new board of trade treats the devolved administrations just like any other stakeholder. This is very much a top-down approach that sends a negative set of messages. The Scottish Government has said that the UK Government's approach to trade policy appears to place the interests and involvement of the devolved nations on a par with sectoral interests, and that approach must change. If that is the perception of the level of involvement and seriousness that is being taken to this, then we have a problem and something has to change, right? I am afraid that an impression it may be does not reflect the reality. We have just reiterated the reply that I gave earlier. There has been a huge amount of engagement with the Scottish Government and officials on trade policy. There will be a great deal more. We continue to evolve and think through our approach to trade policy and its relevance to devolved authorities and how we engage on that. We are thinking very clearly about the devolved authorities' roles and how we bring the expertise that no doubt exists here and working closely with the Parliament to ensure that we exploit that expertise, get those views and make sure that they are incorporated into UK-wide policy. The impression may be from one or two commentators that this is not happening. My impression from what I hear about the engagement is that it very definitely is. You do not see any need to change the approach that is being taken? The approach should always evolve and improve. We should always look to do things differently if we can create better results. Just finally, and this one looks further ahead to the longer-term approach to the development of potential future trade agreements, one of the serious themes of evidence that we have heard is about democratic scrutiny of that process. If we look at the level of democratic scrutiny that has existed in the European Parliament, which will no longer apply if Brexit goes ahead, there is a huge amount of public campaigning around concerns about the transatlantic trade and investment partnership. That was effective campaigning and the European Parliament was able to reflect that and prevent the things that people were concerned about from happening. What level of democratic scrutiny, of parliamentary scrutiny—and I would talk about multiple parliaments—is necessary to ensure that people power can have the same role in future. Does it involve parliaments signing off negotiating mandates, having scrutiny of draft texts and ultimately approving trade agreements rather than ministers doing that and reporting their decisions? Just to re-emphasise that the UK competence remains part of the role that is used to sign off those treaties, and there is no intention to change that position. As for democratic accountability, the ability of people to shape what free trade deals look like, the Secretary of State is extremely clear that one of the problems with TTIP was that it was not widely explained. There was not a huge amount of ability to address key issues and the problems that people had with it. If we were going to have a system in this country, it was going to be much more widely accessible that the public would be generally consulted—we are in the middle and we are just starting that off the day here in Scotland—that we are going to run a 14-week consultation period when people from any walk of life, any background, any age, any part of the country can put in their views as to what we should be doing with the four potential free trade agreements that we are proposing to move forward with. We are also holding, as you know, lots of actual direct roundtables and consultation groups with people and regions across the country. The whole reason I come to this is because people will be able to shape what they think they will have much better knowledge of and shape the agreement before it becomes set down into a framework. Forgive me, that is all nice to have, but will they be able to call on their MP to vote no if they fail that the outcome is not in their interests? I think that the honest answer to that is that the ratification process does provide for this change in 2010, for the crack process to be delayed, in fact indefinitely, so if there are very serious concerns about the shape of the free trade agreement and sufficient numbers of MPs agree, then yes, that can be achieved. But what we are looking for here is to produce an agreement that everybody can agree upon. We are putting in place a mechanism by which we feel we can make sure that all the benefits of a free trade agreement are made plain, that people can feed in where they have concerns, that those can shape the actual framework around which we negotiate. We will report to the UK Parliament on a regular basis. We will be reporting directly into the international trade committee as well. There will be regular parliamentary opportunities upon the free trade proposals, so we believe that there is a level of democratic accountability here where people can see what is going on whilst, at the same time, retaining the UK Government's ability to sign free trade agreements. Just to pick up directly on that last point, Minister, if I may, when you say the crag arrangements, what you mean is the constitutional reform and governance act, which placed what I think used to be called the Ponson Bureau on a statutory footing, which significantly enhances the role of the United Kingdom Parliament effectively to hold the United Kingdom Government to account for what it agrees in any international agreement or treaty, not uniquely in trade agreements. That is the ability that the UK Parliament has, as I think you just said, indefinitely to delay the ratification by the crown of international instruments that the United Kingdom Parliament has problems with. Indeed, it also clearly counterpoints with where the EU is moving on this, where we now have competence at the EU. These are EU-only agreements from now on in pretty much ex-investor protection arrangements. Therefore, what we are proposing here is certainly superior to that. If you compare it with the previous arrangements, ratification was an issue there as well, and it could be delayed, but now the EU is quite clearly moving towards something completely different. The UK arrangements provide opportunity for the input that we need to shape. They provide opportunity to scrutinise on a regular basis and see where we are in terms of the negotiations on how those are being changed. At ratification, when we have a final agreement, we still have an opportunity to act while parliamentarians still have an opportunity to infinitely delay the ratification of a treaty if they object sufficiently. In that process, the very important process of parliamentary accountability of the United Kingdom Government Scotland, as such, is represented by the 59 MPs that Scotland delacts to the House of Commons. We are talking, as you said, a number of times, I think completely correctly. We are talking here about competences that are reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament. Quite so. It is key to remember that Scotland has its fair representation in there, and there have been any number of debates on all of these topics on which Scottish MPs have made their opinions very well known. They looked after their sectoral interests, their consumer interests and their political interests and told the UK Parliament precisely what they think. Indeed, many amendments were put forward and put down regularly by Scottish members of the UK Parliament. I am sure that you would expect that there is an effective group of people and highly successful campaigners. I would trust them to be able to shape rules, regulations and shape FTAs in ways that suits Scotland. Absolutely. It has been the very strongly expressed view of this committee minister and it is certainly the view of my party that Brexit can and must be delivered compatibly with the United Kingdom's devolution settlements. That means, I think, that not only that devolved competence must be respected, but that reserved competence must be respected. That is also the view that I take of the United Kingdom Government. That certainly is. There is no sense in which Brexit can somehow return the United Kingdom to a constitution that we had before we joined the European Union in 1972 and there was no legislative devolution in Scotland or Wales. Quite so. It is just right to reflect at this particular stage that the Scottish Government will become responsible for a great deal more than it has been responsible before upon the moment of Brexit. Indeed. Whilst we can discuss section 12 and the issues around that, large amounts of competence are going to be given to the Scottish Parliament that did not previously exist. That is the constitutional starting point. We are talking here about reserved competence and we are talking here about competences in which Scotland's interests are represented principally by the 59 MPs that it elects to the House of Commons, but the United Kingdom Government has consistently said ever since the EU referendum that, in the management of this process, both the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament will have roles to play in helping to shape policy and in helping to hold that policy making process to account, notwithstanding the fact that we are talking about something that is essentially reserved to Westminster rather than devolved to this Parliament. That is correct, is not it? Absolutely. There is an absolute appetite at all stages in all of this to make sure that the settlement that was reached when the Scottish devolved powers were brought in in 1998 are respected and that, as far as possible, the devolved authorities must be brought with us as we reach this process reaches its conclusion. To do so, we would undoubtedly create problems, we would create difficulties, we would create objections and it must be dealt with. You said in your opening remarks that you have only been in post for a matter of weeks, but in that timeframe, how is that process going? What is your immediate reflection on how the process of engagement with the Scottish Government is going? We have heard from your officials that there is very meaningful and very frequent engagement at official level. What about at ministerial level? In fact, the first visit that I did in my role was in one day to be in Leeds, but later in that day to be up here in Glasgow meeting with Mr McKay. Derek McKay. Derek McKay. No, it's Ivan McKay. I do apologise, just a slight brain fade there. I have been up here. I'm here again today. There's been any amount of engagement, as we've already discussed, at some length between officials. I actually believe that we can up the level of that and there's more to do. We continue to think very carefully about how we deal with, how we negotiate with, how we work with and co-operate with colleagues in the Scottish Parliament and I think we can make improvements to it. As I've already alluded to, there's more that can be done. We continue to think about how we can improve this process and how we can make it better and how we can reach agreement with colleagues as best we can. Perhaps Rebecca, anybody else want to add anything more to that? Well, just to refer to the fact that there, I suppose, in addition to the 59 MPs that Scotland has in Westminster in terms of the process of the UK Government, you have the territorial secretaries of state who are representing the interests of the devolved nations as policy is made. The Scotland office is actively involved in the process of developing the policy. Institutions have been re-established like the Board of Trade. You have the territorial secretaries of state participating in those meetings and devolved businesses from devolved nations involved in those. In addition to that, there is a review of inter-governmental relations under way. The UK Government is working with the devolved administrations to look at how the structures that we have can be reformed to respond to the new challenges post EU exit. When might that review complete? It's going on over the course of the year, so it's progressing with a view to further discussions later in the year and then perhaps new arrangements being ready for EU exit. Thank you very much. That's been quite a useful look around the architecture of how the UK works on these issues. On our internal report on the EU withdrawal bill, we noted the Concord Act on International Relations. I just want to see where this fits into this discussion that we're having, because that says quite clearly that it promises co-operation on exchange and information, formulating UK foreign policy, negotiating treaties and implementing treaty obligations. It also provides for ministers and officials of the devolved Governments to form part of UK treaty negotiating teams and for apportioning any qualitative treaty obligations. Do you see a role in that way in the future for devolved administrations, as is already laid out in the Concord Act that already exists? I think that the answer to that is absolutely nothing out. It's clearly there in the document already. As part of the process that Rebecca was just outlining, all of those issues are being considered and I don't think that I can go any further than that at the moment. Murdo, do you want to still cover GPA issues when you can? Minister, my colleague James Kelly touched on some of those procurement issues earlier, but I just wanted to follow up on a couple of points. Clause 1 of the bill deals with the power to implement the agreement on public procurement, which is a voluntary agreement between 19 WTO members, including the EU. The bill doesn't appear to address the process through which the UK will become a signatory to the GPA or the role, if there is a role, of the devolved administrations in such a process. Are you able to tell us a bit more about how that process will work in practice? The actual application at WTO-TO level, that one I'm definitely going to refer to officials if you don't mind, as long as we've got someone here who can respond. In that case, if you may, that will require a very precise answer. If I may, we will write to you with a reply. Can I just ask one follow-up, just to put this in a little bit of context? This is more about future trade policy than it is about what we're discussing today. If you listen to some of the commentary around these issues, you often see it claim that, for example, future trade policy will lead to the national health service in Scotland being sold off to American multinational companies or will all be force-fed chlorinated chicken, which will then become part of the food chain. Can you give us some assurance as to whether those claims have any basis in fact? It simply comes from the fact that the American market is different from the UK market. I suspect that a great many people around this table have actually been to the United States and therefore have probably consumed products that have some of those items in them. The UK is absolutely clear that we will not be dropping our phyto-santria standards. We will not be dropping our food standards. Those are things that we will not be negotiating with in any free trade deal. As to how it could be dealt with within a free trade deal itself, that will all be a matter for negotiation. There are offensive interests, there are defensive interests. If there are some things that you refuse to accept, there are other things that you may have to give, and all that in the end will come out in the wash. I think that it is right that people express their concerns about free trade deals. I think that it is right that, if they have particular issues that they want included, they make those plans to us and people should write to us during the consultation and go online and do that. At the same time, I think that it is also right that we should seek to deal with any misinformation that is out there. It is not true to say that any free trade deal will end up creating issues for the national health service. In all the trade deals that we strike, the right to shape public policy is absolutely clearly protected and will be so in the future, and we will not be signing any free trade deals that do not have that protection in it. It is right for the Government to be able to control how it provides healthcare for the nation and to invest in state dispute settlements and so on and so forth. Push to one side, the UK will not be signing agreements that allow the national health service to be challenged by foreign investors. Likewise, any of the sort of food issues, any of these, can be dealt with in these agreements, and we made very clear commitments about how we will deal with those issues. Okay, that is very clear. Thank you. I can perhaps answer the question about the UK joining the GPA in its own right now. So, as the minister explained, this allows us to have access to a huge market for public procurement. It is both in the UK's interest and, indeed, on the other members of the Government Procurement Agreement for us to join. We very much want to join on the same terms as we are at the moment. If the other members agree to that, and, as I say, it is in their interests as well, then the agreement would be ratified and Parliament would have an opportunity, if it wishes to do so, to consider that under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, which we referred to earlier. Thank you. But just for the volumes of doubt, this is simply the UK replacing its membership via the EU with direct membership, so that we know substantial change in their regions. That is absolutely correct. Yes, that is absolutely correct. Okay, thank you. Can I just ask whether that answers the question sufficiently, that we do not need to write? I do not want to waste any official's time doing something that is not necessary. So, if you are content with that answer. That will ask for you for me, convener. If you are content, I am content, but as usual. James, do you still get any other issues on GPA? In which case, we will go to Emma and PGI issues. Yes. Okay, thank you, convener. Good morning, everybody, and thank you for coming today. I am interested in geographical indications of protected foods, and under the protected food scheme, a named food or drink will be given legal protection from bogus imitations. In the UK, there are about 86 PGI's, and there are actually 18 for cheese, one for Orkney and one for Ayrshire Dunlop cheese, so we have got two in Scotland. The EU wants to continue with the PGI status, and my understanding is that that is great, they want to continue, but the UK Government does not, so why not? Okay, so I think I'm going to need that question fleshing out a little. So, plainly not trade bill issue, which I'm absolutely content with, convener, I'm not saying it's not. GGI's are a complex area, they present quite serious difficulties in free trade negotiations because some nations out there just regard them as unfair protection of non-tariff barriers to trade. Could you just explain for me a little what this is the EU has said about Ayrshire cheese and in what circumstance? As far as I'm aware that the EU is quite happy to continue to assign protected status for certain products, for instance our Scotch beef, Scotch lamb, the welfare of our animals is different than maybe American beef. I used to live in America and I stopped eating beef when I started looking after patients who presented with Crushfield's Jacob's disease. So, I think when we're looking at the difference in the welfare of the products, we have great products, our beef, our lamb and our Scotch salmon and of course our whisky. So, the issue is why can't we just make that a done deal and accept and protect the geographical indication status of our good provenance? Okay, and again please official, this is this. Well, this is not about this moment when I realise it might have to come back to us. We might do it, but just my general impression is that A, as I said, some countries regard these as non-tariff barriers to trade. B, do we think they're important? Yes, we do. There is absolutely no question that the likes of Scotch whisky have to carry some sort of GI with them because they're easily counterfeited, they need to be protected, it's a very, very, very important export for the United Kingdom, let alone Scotland. And we believe that there are very clear areas of other interests, sectoral interests, where that also applies. Now, we also have to count, I just have to set that around a little bit and say that in most free trade deals, certainly ones I've looked at recently anyway, you have to demonstrate a certain level of penetration into market and or desire amongst consumers for that GI to gain protection. So on the whole, quite a few UK GI's which we promote fail that test when going to the Japanese market or say the South Korean market, whisky, no problem at all. Amazingly, blue and white stillton actually quite often get through, but there are several others which we would like to protect. It's just don't have sufficient market penetration to warrant GI status in that market and we come across that. So the GI issue is not a particularly straightforward one. I think if I can, I'd like someone just to have a quick word with you afterwards, if I may, just to get a slightly better feel for exactly what the question is, so we can answer it properly by replying later if that would suit you. Alex, you've got issues on common frameworks. I just wonder if after the summer recess, maybe you could give us an update on how the common frameworks have been developing and how you feel they'll interact with trade negotiations and if there's any timetable you're able to share with us either now or by correspondence. This is definitely one for Rebecca. I think also I'm right in saying and I'm pleased to tell me if I'm wrong. I think the Secretary of State for Scotland is appearing in front of you tomorrow. It may be a question that is better directed there for a fuller answer, but I'm sure Rebecca can help a little. Yes, I mean, I think essentially the frameworks negotiations are ongoing and the deep dives that Eleanor referred to earlier in the discussions with the devolved administrations are forming part of that process. So I think there is a lot of intensive work underway and the Secretary of State will be very happy to talk about the detail of that tomorrow. I look forward to tomorrow. Thank you. Okay. Do you have a supplementary there, Patrick? No, I want to ask one last question at the end, if that's possible. No problem. I've got another couple of folk I need to get in anyway. Willie, I think that you had the areas of the trade remedies authority, which I think is part of the bill. Absolutely. Yeah, thanks very much again, convener. As you know, this body of individuals will be set up to look at issues involving trade and so on and so forth. But inevitably, minister, they're bound to intersect in issues of devolved competence, so they're bound to happen. How can you therefore ensure that the interests of all devolved administrations, not just Scotland, will be properly represented on that body? Okay. This is nowhere where I have very firm views. It is absolutely essential that the trade remedies authority is seen to be independent, to have no sectoral interest, to have no specific interest of any kind represented on its board. Why? Because those outside the system, those who are making representations to it, those who are demanding restitution from it, those who are trying to resist that restitution have to have absolute confidence that it is independent and does not reflect interest of any one sort at all, whether it's sectoral, whether it is country-based, whatever it is. Now, that does not mean to say that somebody from Scotland cannot be on the board, of course they can. But what they have to be is somebody who takes an impartial view based upon the evidence from across the UK, because those are cross-UK measures. I'm absolutely clear that we should be choosing people by merit on their interest in doing the job, because it will be hard and technical, in their ability and background that allows them to take the sorts of view and conduct the sort of analysis and understand the sort of evidence that they will be presented with in a reasonable and rational fashion, preferably with a background in the area, but it is by no means required. But there are people who can take an absolutely clear view. If they cannot, we will not have trust in the authority. We will have dispute, we will have people petitioning saying that the board that made the decision had narrower views in mind rather than the straightforward policy that the Government had set for the TRI to follow. I'm absolutely clear that no narrow group or narrower group, whether it's a devolved authority and or a sectoral interest, should be directly represented of and chosen by a body to be on that board. Will we at least ensure though that whoever is successful in being on the board does have knowledge skills about the devolved administrations and the shared competencies that we have? I think I'm reluctant to even go that far. I am not reluctant to say that the devolved authorities absolutely will be taken into views, sectoral interests, all the technical data that is needed to make any of these judgments in a reasonable, rational, sensible and timely fashion will be taken in by the authority itself, not the board, but the chief executive and his or her staff. That is the place for those interests to make their representations. The job of the board is to decide whether the decision that is being made is the correct one based on the evidence. The evidence itself, all the evidence that all those interests that devolved authorities and sectoral interests can provide, should be provided as information to the authority upon which to base their judgment. On top of all that, there sits the economic interest test so that if, for whatever reason, a decision comes out that fits the various metrics and rubrics that are provided to the authority to calculate damages, to calculate the lesser duty rule and so on and so forth, but it looks like the decision produced by that metric is somewhat perverse. The economic interest test can look more closely at geographical weightings, about effects on particular communities and it can modify, and indeed a null, or the recommendation that goes up to the board. Geographic interests or devolved authority interests can play a part in the economic interest too, which should provide a second level of satisfaction of comfort that narrower geographical consequences of potential trade remedies that might be applied or indeed damage that is being caused will be properly represented. So you could have people serving on that board who have an influence on about devolved issues and trade disputes, who themselves know nothing about the devolved competencies that they are dealing with and perhaps arejudicating on? I suppose theoretically that that is possible. I would suggest to you that the sorts of people who are sitting on this board and I suspect the position in which they find themselves and the knowledge that they will require suggests that they will be only too well aware of devolved competencies and those sorts of issues, because they are the sorts of people who will be recruiting to do that job. Will they formally be required to know those things? Possibly not. Are they extremely likely to have real appreciations of them and understanding of them? The very job that they are doing will expose them to that day in, day out. I was helpful. In terms of the establishment of the TRA, the Secretary of State, I think, said he is looking forward to working with the devolved administrations on the establishment and operation of the TRA to ensure that their views and interests are taken into account. How are you going about that? Again, there has been huge amounts of discussion with officials, I believe. Since Alan is having the discussions largely, I am going to defer to her to discuss that a bit more detail. It is my trade remedies colleagues who are having those discussions with the Scottish Wash and Northern Irish Governments and those are on-going about how the devolved administrations will be engaged throughout the trade remedies process itself. I will get a chance to ask Mike Russell just very shortly just what that really means. Obviously, the trade bill sets up the trade remedies authority and provides the governance structure. Of course, that is about the efficient operation of that body. There is also a separate piece of legislation, the taxation cross border trade bill, which sets out the framework under which the authority will operate. That is legislating for the economic interest test. Obviously, when the trade remedies authority is looking at an investigation into any particular issue, it will want to consider what the impact of that is across the whole of the UK. It will want to investigate if there are any particular impacts in particular areas, including if that is in any of the devolved nations. If there is, it will be looking to get evidence to that so that, when it comes to making the recommendation, it will take into account all of the factors that might influence wherever that might be in the UK. Thank you. There is a huge amount of concern among businesses and trade unions about the possible impact of a no-deal Brexit, particularly the impact of a shortage of goods on manufacturers, suppliers and consumers. In that event, what are the types of goods that the UK Government believes are likely to be a shortage of in the event of a no-deal Brexit, and are any of those likely to affect the Scottish economy disproportionately compared to the rest of the UK? I think that the honest, straightforward answer to that is that there are questions that should be directed at Deksu, who are much more likely to be better positioned than I am to talk about that. We are talking about future trade policy. Now, my general comment that I can make is that the Government continues to negotiate to try and strike the future economic partnership to create the withdrawal agreement. The checkers deal, I believe, crucially solves the northern Irish issue, which is by far and away the most difficult part of this entire arrangement to get right, and it solves it in the way that the Prime Minister always suggested, which is that it solves it through the future economic partnership and how that will work. That, of course, seeks to create frictionless borders and zero tariffs, which will answer the questions that you are raising. The deal that we seek is to mitigate the issues that you identify. I believe that we will strike that deal. I believe that it is in the interests of all the parties to do so. Yes, there remains a realistic possibility of an ideal Brexit, but I continue to believe that much more likely is that both sides will come to this issue with pragmatic issues in mind about the potential consequences. We will see that the future lies in a close partnership between the two countries, and we will see success. I know what you are saying about directing questions to DECs, but we are here representing the UK government, so I am slightly disappointed with your answer. Mike Russell, the Cabinet Secretary for Government Business and Constitutional Relations, who will be giving evidence shortly, wrote to David Livington earlier this week, saying that we have serious concerns that a no deal outcome will magnify massively the uncertainties over Brexit. The Scottish Government believes that there are major questions over a range of vital matters, including customer arrangements, burdens on business imports and exports of plasma products, medicines and medical devices, the involvement of UK universities and programmes such as a RASMIS scheme and the future funding for UK aid organisations. He is asking me to be grateful to know what arrangements the UK government will be making to ensure that it evolves in ministers since it was assaulted and their views made known in advance of the special cabinet meeting. Do you appreciate that letter that was published earlier this week and is not directed to you, but do you have any response to the concerns and issues that have happened in Scotland? I can only mirror what I said before. Clearly, there will be consequences of a no deal Brexit. That is what we absolutely do not want to happen. I could reiterate what I said about my analysis of the chance of success, but I am sorry that you were disappointed with my response to the previous question. However, the consequences of the effects of a particular sectoral interest over a no deal Brexit are exactly what DECSI will set up to deal with, and it is absolutely their line of responsibility. It is not proper for me to comment on those particular details, because those are very much their province, and I would be stepping over ministerial boundaries if I did so. It is perfectly reasonable for me to say that I do not think that we will hit that position. I very much hope that we will not, and I very much hope that we will have a very close relationship. However, I am not about to enter into setting policy or making comments upon a portfolio held by a different department. Okay. Thank you, minister, for coming along with your officials to date. Sorry. Apologies, Patrick. I forgot that there is one other supplementary. I do apologise. One brief final question. You are presumably hoping that there are any outstanding differences in relation to the trade bill that you have with the Scottish Government that will be resolved, that it will recommend consent to the bill, to this Parliament, and that the Parliament will vote for consent. If that does not happen and Parliament does not consent to this bill, does the UK Government intend to respect that decision and not impose legislation in devolved areas without the consent of the Parliament? The best I can say, convener, is that we will work very, very hard to make sure that we get that legislative consent motion. And will you respect the decision on consent made by this Parliament? I'll just repeat my previous answer. That's a no, then. Okay. Well, thank you very much again for coming along this morning, minister, with your officials. I hope that you've enjoyed your first sojourn into the Scottish Parliament. I now suspend this meeting for five minutes to allow a change-over of witnesses. Well, colleagues, we'll now hear from our second panel of witnesses. Firstly, Michael Russell, the Cabinet Secretary for Government Business and Contitutional Relations, Francesca Morton, who's a solicitor, and Stephen Sable, who's ahead of the trade policy team. Welcome our witnesses to our session this morning. I will invite the minister to make any opening remarks that he wishes to do. Thank you very much, convener, and thank you for the invitation to start off the new session, the way we finished the last session. I'm very pleased to be back at the committee. Let me reflect very briefly on the background of this and on the trade bill. The events on legislative consent for the withdrawal act have effectively overturned 19 years of constitutional convention and practice. The UK Government sought this Parliament's consent and it was refused. The UK Government proceeded with its legislation ignoring that view. If the UK Government believes it can proceed whatever the decision of this Parliament on consent, the convention is of very little value in protecting this Parliament and the interests of this country. We're therefore seeking urgent discussions with the UK Government on how to strengthen and protect the Sewell convention and, of course, we will discuss that next week. We'll also be looking for discussions with the other parties on how to respond to these developments. In the meantime, we've made it clear that we will not be bringing forward further legislative consent motions on Brexit bills. We will work with the UK Government to develop this trade bill to ensure that Scottish interests are protected as far as we can, but we cannot in all conscience invite the Parliament to consider the issue of consent legislation if the UK Government reserves the right to set aside that view for all bills. The trade bill is designed to operate alongside other legislation to help to ensure continuity in the UK's existing trade and investments arrangements with third countries by allowing steps to be taken to carry over or grandfather existing arrangements between the EU and third countries when the UK leaves the EU. The UK Government has said in most cases the implementation of any obligations within existing international trade agreements will be dealt with through the EU withdrawal bill. The trade bill deals with those circumstances where that will not be possible and confers powers on the Scottish ministers and Parliament to do so in devolved areas in those cases. Our concerns about the bill as introduced were set out in a legislative consent memorandum last December. I'm pleased to say there have been some changes made. The bill will be considered in the House of Lords next week and it is a better one than the one that was introduced, but we still have significant concerns in two areas set out in Derek Clyde's letter of 28 June to Liam Fox, which I believe members of the committee have seen. The first was a direct read across to section 12 and schedules 2 and 3 of the EU withdrawal act, which gives Scottish ministers powers to make fixes to retained EU law. As things currently stand in the trade bill, as with the EU withdrawal act, Scottish ministers will have the power to amend direct retained EU legislation in areas that are otherwise devolved, but not where section 12 UK framework regulations have been made by the UK Government. Our other concern, and I know that you've been discussing this already this morning, is in relation to the trade remedies authority. The TRA will have an important role in the development of UK trade policy. It will undertake trade remedies investigations across the UK, which will inevitably touch on devolved areas or areas of significance to Scotland. Its decisions could have a substantial impact on businesses and consumers in Scotland, yet despite repeated representations from us and the Welsh Government, neither the trade bill nor taxation cross-border trade bill provides a role for the devolved administrations, for example, in relation to the appointment of board members. We will continue to press for the bill to be amended to address those. The trade bill focuses on ensuring continuity through the rollover existing arrangements. It does not deal, however, with the development of future trade arrangements, so let me conclude on that. Last week, Derek Mackay and I published a discussion paper on Scotland's role in the development of future UK trade arrangements. Focusing on the decision-making processes under Piningham, the paper makes an evidence-based case for an overhaul of existing arrangements for developing, scrutinising and agreeing trade deals. The arrangements for agreeing trade deals are already inadequate, out of date and in need of a radical overhaul, even if the UK continues as a EU member state and member of the customs union. That inadequacy can be seen in both the currently limited role of the UK Parliament and of the devolved institutions, a point made often to this committee and at Westminster during the course of the trade bill. The need for change becomes even more urgent if the UK leaves the customs union in the single market. Leaving the EU will fundamentally change the nature of the UK as a state and impact on the UK's current constitutional arrangements. Much has changed in the last 40 years, both within the UK and internationally. The scope and nature of trade deals themselves has changed considerably from an initial focus on a limited range of issues, such as tariffs, quotas and co-operation, to encompass a far broader range of issues affecting a wide range of devolved interests directly impacting on Scotland businesses and citizens. The development, conduct and content of future trade deals will therefore have very important implications for Scotland. The UK Government has topped of trade deals at work for the whole of the UK, but Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland could have very different interests to the rest of the UK in some negotiations or differences best addressed before reaching the negotiating table. The UK Government's approach so far appears to place the interest and involvement of the devolved nations on a power with sectoral interests. That must change. We must have decision-making processes that recognise, respect and protect the economic and social interests of all four nations of the UK. Scotland wants to be a constructive partner to the other nations of the UK and a fair trading partner to countries around the world. To protect and promote Scotland's interests, the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament must have a guaranteed role in all stages of the formulation, negotiation, agreement and implementation of future trade deals. The paper is, however, a discussion paper. Whether the paper describes what future involvement trade deals might look like, we recognise that others, including members of this committee, will have a role in shaping proposals. I look forward to that process. Thank you, minister, for these opening remarks. Before I ask my first Caesar question, I just want to clarify, did you see any of the evidence previously? I saw some of it. You may have seen the beginning of the evidence-taking session in regard to how the current trade bill, it's clauses 1 and 2, replicates what was in section 12 of the EU withdrawal. I would like your reaction to what the minister said in that regard, but also in regard to the factor. As far as existing trade arrangements are concerned, and any potential change in these trade arrangements initiated by third-party countries, no specific role is being seen for either the Scottish Government or the Scottish Parliament in overseeing, providing scrutiny, consultation, etc. What is your reaction to that position? My reaction is one of surprise, given the commitment that already exists within the JMC process—indeed, accepted by the Prime Minister—that there should be a review of the devolution arrangements, particularly the arrangements for consultation. I think that everybody would accept that the weight of Brexit is too great for the current devolved settlement to bear. That's obvious. That's what's happened in the last two years, and no matter what position you took on it, the system has not worked. Therefore, there needs to be changes to the system. If you take a rational, evidence-based approach to this, some of those changes would come in areas that have also changed substantially since devolution first took place. Those include trading arrangements. Trading arrangements that I've indicated in my opening remark were at one stage very much and solely about issues of tariffs and borders. Trading arrangements now respect the domestic requirements of nations. If you look at Scotland, we regard ourselves as a moderate, progressive nation, with a particular interest, for example, in environmental issues. We would bring those to the table in any of the considerations that we have. We think that there is a case to be made for substantial change, and I would make that case, and I would encourage people to discuss that case. This is very much in parallel with what the Welsh Government put forward last year in terms of how they saw devolution requiring to change. I make no secret that I don't think that it's a surprise to anybody that I believe in independence. However, if devolution remains the system under which we live, it is not adequate for the times, and it needs to change. What we're doing is arguing a positive constructive case for that change. We've published a paper for discussion. I think that that should be seen as a positive issue. I'm not sure that the ministers had time to read that paper. I'm happy to debate the paper with him and to debate it with others. My final question at this stage is, as part of the initial evidence session, the UK minister for trade policy also emphasised what he saw as the meaningful engagement between officials and Scottish government officials, for example, in relation to the tiari. He saw those as meaningful. What's your view of what those discussions have felt like? How often have they been? I understand that the officials may meet each other today four times, but I don't think that they've met each other for weeks, and there will be no future plans to meet. I'm pretty critical presently of the nature of that engagement. I think that some of that engagement across Governments is meaningful and has worked well. The deep dive, for example, has been driven forward. Where I see a tick box exercise going on, I have an obligation to say that there is a tick box exercise going on. In any case, the quality of that engagement is a key issue, not the regularity. Is there a willingness to listen to and discuss changes that are required and to fully express in the work that we do what was meant to be and promised to be a partnership of equals? I don't see that. The white paper is an indication of that. We went through a process in which we saw drafts of five chapters of the white paper—in fact, I only saw four. Those drafts didn't bear a great relation to what eventually was in the white paper, but I did sit at a ministerial meeting in which two UK ministers read out the precy of a couple of those drafts because we, as ministers and people on the table, were not allowed to see them. I don't call the quality of that to be high. I felt that I was sitting in a monastery being read out while things went around me. That's not a quality of representation. To be fair, I doubt whether those two ministers had themselves seen the white paper. Part of that is a culture of extreme centralisation in the current UK Government and a culture of extreme chaos. However, I don't believe that the quality of engagement is presently meaningful. Minister, it won't surprise you to know that I want to get into the issues in a bit more detail today that were raised by me yesterday in the chamber, which you chose not to respond to on that occasion. This time last year, you and I were agreed that Brexit can and must be delivered compatibly with the United Kingdom's devolution settlements. Why do you no longer hold to that view? Why is it now your view that the United Kingdom's devolution settlements need to be changed, which is what you've just told us, in order to bear the weight of Brexit? Well, they're not mutually incompatible positions. I believe that the current devolution settlement needs to be observed. However, I do believe that it is possible to say that there are parts of that that need to be improved because they don't work. An example is a civil convention. The civil convention is shown not to work. We've seen that in recent months. Consent means consent, even if we say that it isn't consent. In those circumstances, there needs to be a change. However, of course, what is happening at the present moment has to be delivered according to the current settlement, but we can envision a better settlement. If I may finish, it is a dynamic work in progress. Under the current settlement, international relations, international treaties and international trade are reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament, aren't they? They are reserved, but of course there is an operation, a way in which they have operated, has tended to be much more relaxed than the definition that you're giving. Of course, the definition that was given by the advocate general in the Supreme Court case was quite a considerable narrowing of that definition. I think that it's right for us to point out that that is a worrying development. It's been pointed out by the other devolved administrations as well. You accept that international trade is a reserved competence, in which Scotland's interests are represented by 59 MPs that Scotland elects to the West. I accept that the devolution process is one that is dynamic and has continued to change. I do not accept that there is a hierarchy of Governments as we exist within the devolution settlement. I think that because there are responsibilities that the devolved administrations have, they should be represented in trade talks. That's a position that I'm taking. Richard Keane's position on the international obligations will be tested in the Supreme Court. I don't think that it's wise for us to speculate on the record about what the Supreme Court might say in a case that is live before it. I'm not going to accept the invitation to reflect on arguments that were put before an independent judicial body minister, if that's all right with you. The point, though, is this, that in your paper published last week or the week before, jointly with Mr Mackay, you have proposed that Scottish ministers should have an effective veto in every stage of the preparation, negotiation, mandating, ratification and signing of future trade agreements for all future trade agreements, notwithstanding the fact that these are reserved competences. How is that standing up for the devolution settlement, which you and I agreed 12 months ago needed to be done throughout the Brexit process? The reason I didn't respond to this yesterday is because I wanted to have the opportunity to do so properly in this debate, so thank you for raising it, because it's the point you raised yesterday. The only veto that exists in the devolution settlement is that from the UK government. There is no other veto because in the devolution settlement the actions of any devolved administration can be vetoed by the UK government. There is no means by which, either in this paper or in anything that exists or anticipated under devolution, we could veto the decisions of the UK government. That is regrettably a mistaken impression that you have, and I'm glad to be able to correct it. The reality of the situation is that in this paper we do suggest that there are areas in which it would be important to have the agreement of the Scottish Government. Just as to take a… I'm sorry, but you don't say important. You say agreement required. You have listed in Annex B on page 62 of your paper five instances where the agreement of not only the Scottish Government but also the Scottish Parliament will be required in your view, required in your view for a future trade agreement to be even prepared, never mind negotiated, never mind ratified or signed. Now, agreement required is the definition of a veto, because if the agreement is then not given there is an effective veto. No, that would only be the case. Or required doesn't mean required. That would only be the case if that agreement was withheld, if it was withheld for good reasons, and that withholding agreement was final. It would not be final in these circumstances, but you treat agreement as something that's confrontational. I would treat agreement as being something that we would seek to find because we have and continue to seek to find agreement. And it's not unreasonable to say that, for example, on matters of agriculture, where that is within a trade deal, that the devolved administrations, which have responsibility for agriculture, should be involved in that process and should agree to that process. The issue, I think it was Emma Harper who raised it earlier, but it's taken 20 minutes or so to bring it in here. The issue of chlorinated chicken refers. The issue of hormone-fed beef refers. There are circumstances in which we would not agree to those. Now, in the end, the UK could Scotland is independent, the UK could impose that, but seeking agreement would be the thing that you would do to sit down and negotiate. I know that the current UK Government is incapable of negotiating agreement, but we're not incapable of negotiating agreement, and I'm quite sure that that could be found. I don't think it's at all unreasonable, but in addition, this is a discussion paper. You may say that you would want to change the word required, say that agreement would be sought. That would be good, because then the UK Government would be able to seek agreement for matters that were our responsibility. Perhaps that's the change that you would like to see in the paper. I welcome those remarks, Minister, because those remarks are much more conciliatory than the very angry tone that you've taken in the paper that you published a week ago. You don't talk in that paper about the United Kingdom Government seeking your agreement. You talk about the United Kingdom being required not to proceed with reserved competence unless and until it first has your agreement, and that is a very different set of issues. However, the point remains this. A year ago, you were all for defending the devolution settlement, and we supported you in that. Now you've changed your tune, and you want to attack the devolution settlement because you don't believe that international trade should remain a reserved competence. Isn't that the long and the short of it? It's not a great surprise to anybody here that I would prefer independence to devolution, but I think that putting forward constructive proposals to develop the devolution settlement in the light of the chaos that we have seen and the difficulties that Brexit has created for devolution should be seen as a constructive act, because what we're trying to do is to say that devolution does not work. My goodness me, I think that the evidence of that is all around. What we're trying to do today is that there are different ways to do this. I have read this paper, re-read this paper and even edited this paper. I don't think that it's angry in any place. What it is is trying to put forward a constructive set of proposals to improve devolution. There are those who would attack me for doing so because I would be expected only to talk about independence, so I seem to be caught between a rock and a hard place here, but I do think that this debate is a useful one to have, the Welsh are having it, we're having it. I don't think that it's inconsistent to defend what exists now, but to say that it could be improved, that would seem to be rational. Patrick Harvie. Good morning. What the Scottish Government has said is that the devolved institutions must play an enhanced role in the development of future trade policy. That's very similar to what the UK Government has said in its paper on future trade policy, that there must be a role for the devolved institutions. Is there a way of framing that in a clear, comprehensible manner that allows decision making that recognises that this is an area of shared responsibility where co-operation and compromise will be needed on both sides and where each institution has the ability to determine whether sufficient compromise has been reached without getting into the kind of dynamic that we've just seen where people are angrily counting the number of vetoes? Yes, and there's an example that you could use. You could use the example of the Canadian trade treaty, and you could use the example of the provinces in Canada being involved in that negotiation and having to be at the table because the negotiation is about responsibilities that they have. There seem to be two examples that are taken from the Canadian experience. That's the positive example where you can, in actual fact, have the range of provinces with the federal government sitting there discussing this with the EU and coming to a conclusion. The negative take has been the UK Government's take, which is terrified of what happened at the ratification stage with the Malonia Parliament saying that they had reservations, which was perfectly natural and which was overcome. So I think there's an example before us that you can move in that direction and have that work. Now, you would need a willingness to do so. We've put on the table some ideas to do so. If there are other ideas about how that can be refined, we're very open to those ideas. You've also given a fairly clear indication that you favour more parliamentary scrutiny in general, not just in relation to the devolved institutions, for example in maintaining, to some extent, perhaps even building on the level of parliamentary scrutiny that's operated in the European Parliament, which won't operate under the UK Government's plans in the UK Parliament. Is it reasonable then for us to assume that in whatever level of engagement there exists between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, the Scottish Government will persistently seek the agreement of the Scottish Parliament for the decisions that it takes in relation to those discussions? What's the mechanism for us to ensure that that happens? Within the paper, there's some discussion of what that mechanism should be, but I would have thought that there would be stages in the process in which we would seek parliamentary agreement or authority. There would also be committee scrutiny, which actually would be a pretty powerful part of it. Trade deals, by definition, are complex. Therefore, we would want to make sure that the decision-making process was on the principles that were applied, not necessarily on every sub-paragraph, but committee scrutiny would be important, parliamentary scrutiny would be important, and parliamentary decision-making would be important. If, for example, a UK Government doesn't agree that the Scottish Government should be able to have to agree or disagree to a negotiating mandate for a future trade agreement, but is willing to discuss that mandate with the Scottish Government, the Scottish Government will also be able to discuss it with the Scottish Parliament, will not be inhibited from discussing that with the Scottish Parliament and seeking parliamentary approval for its approach? No, I agree, I think that that would be the right way to do it, and of course we've shown that example and what we did on the continuity bill, which was very much a product of discussion and debate, and indeed that bill was developed as it went through Parliament because there was a willingness to do so. That's exactly where I'd find myself. Just finally, in relation to the shorter term issues within the trade bill in terms of Brexit is done and the desire to have continuity of existing arrangements, a great emphasis from the previous session, from the UK Minister, was that there will be no substantial or very few substantial changes. Is there any discussion that's taken place between the two Governments about the scenario in which the UK Government thinks that a change is not substantial but the Scottish Government thinks that it is substantial and how that difference would be resolved? No, there hasn't been that discussion and I think it's a topic that needs to be addressed but, as usual, the present structures would seem to me to find it very difficult to resolve those, because at the end of the day the UK Government makes those decisions and the UK Government definitions. It's like the definition of the word consent that is defined by the UK Government. So we have no confidence then that the UK Government's commitment that there will be no substantial or significant changes, you don't believe that? No, I have very little confidence in that. I'm afraid to say that, I mean I'm being straight about that. Alexander Cormann frameworks? I just wonder if the cabinet secretary would like to give us an update maybe after a summer of any progress that's been made in his contribution to common frameworks. I know that the officials answered this with the trade minister and he referred to the discussion of the Secretary of State. From our side the deep dives have continued, there have been no section 12 orders yet, which I regard as a positive step, and we continue to discuss the areas where we think that we can work together. I do not believe that section 12 orders are the right things to do, and therefore if we can find ways to establish those frameworks without section 12 orders, we've made it absolutely clear that we will do so, and that work is continuing, and we have not reached an impasse yet on any of those. In addition to common frameworks, we have unique differences in our fishing and our agriculture in Scotland, so Scotland needs to have the ability to contribute quite effectively into trade negotiations when we're talking about common frameworks and further agricultural aspects. How can we be assured that we have the ability to communicate effectively what the unique issues are with the requirements for common frameworks? The outcome of a common framework in the areas where we think that we're required may or may not be legislative. That's clearly been the debate up until now. If you look at agriculture, there is progress being made on an agriculture bill, the Brexit agricultural bill, and therefore the issue that you're addressing is germane to that. Is that discussion on the UK agriculture bill making progress and understanding that? Now, so far, so good. That discussion continues. When it is at its conclusion and a bill is published, we will see whether that discussion has produced the correct fruit or not. I'm not sure it's a complete agricultural term, but that's what we're looking for to find out. So far, that discussion continues. That's a product of the deep dives. It is also the product of ensuring that there's continuing dialogue on those matters. If we got to the stage where there is a section 12 order, or a bill that essentially took powers that it should not take, that would be the hard moment. We're not at that moment as yet, but it takes a lot of work from a lot of people to make that happen. We need to make sure that the frameworks are agreed and not imposed on Scotland. Isn't that one of the key aspects? That's exactly the thing. It's the outcomes of that. They're important. For example, an agriculture bill that can be agreed and recognises the roles of the devolved Administrations and does not impinge on those. That's vital. What are you areas to do with the PGA? Yes, thank you. I don't know if you saw the previous exchange I had with the UK Trade Minister around the GPA. I don't know if you have any specific concerns around the GPA. I understand what Mr Hollingbury said to us. All that's happening here is that the UK, which is currently part of the GPA through the EU, is replacing that with direct involvement. Is that something that the Scottish Government is content with as an approach? We are already in the GPA because we're a member through the EU. I've met officials involved with the GPA last year and they were starting that process of making the transfer. I was slightly concerned with one of the answers that you got from an official, which seemed to imply that the trade opportunities, the opportunities to bid for public procurement contracts would be something new. They're not new. They already exist under the EU and indeed the official admitted to you that they are seeking to replicate the UK terms. The EU terms, there would be no difference in that regard. It does seem a lot of work, however, to be required on both sides to get to where they already are. The opportunities that the GPA presents to businesses within this country will not change, providing they are able to secure the same terms, if that's not guaranteed. One doesn't wonder why that is going on. Just about the same question that I put to Mr Hollingbury around procurement issues, we've heard various claims being made that future trade deals will open up the NHS in Scotland to bids from American companies. We're all going to be force-fed chlorinated chicken and that'll be part of the food chain. We heard very clearly from the UK Trade Minister that this is nonsense and that's not going to happen. Do you accept that? No, I don't accept it. So he's not telling the truth? No, I'm not saying he's not telling the truth. I mean he may as an individual be telling you exactly what he believes to be true. I believe the system that will come into place will make it considerably easier in terms of trading for those things to happen because the people who are influencing this and they will be politicians such as ourselves, there are many of those whose interests lie in ensuring those things do happen. It is also in the interests of the countries that are seeking the trade deals to push what they want to happen and I fear that the expertise in the UK in trade deals will be considerably lessened by not being in the EU and the weight available in those trade deals will be considerably lessened and that's a big issue. Trade is not solely about the biggest stick, but sometimes it is about the biggest stick. Having that debate doesn't mean that we will not have chlorinated chicken. The weight against that from the United States, which has not been behaving exactly charmingly in these matters in recent times, will be great. I do not accept the assertions not because I doubt his word but because I think the whole system and the weight of the system will be against where we are now and we have weight on our side now. It is a European issue not to have chlorinated chicken. It is a European issue, which we saw with the T-Tep treaty. It is a European issue. The people of Europe were very substantially against the weakening of the system that would have destroyed certain public services. I think that there is a danger in that. With respect, Mr Russell, the UK trade minister could not have been clear in his answer to me. He said that there will be no diminution of food standards and there is no question of our public services being opened up to international competition. I don't understand why you can't accept him as his word. I am being absolutely clear with you and not accusing him of lying. I just think that the changes to the system will immensely weaken our ability to stop those things happening. You have two divergent points of view. People will have to choose between them. In terms of future trade deals, what do you wish to view in terms of the devolved administrations being able to opt out in relation to where contracts are involved in Scottish public bodies? Say, for example, on something that will live in wage? It would be important. That relates to the issue that I raised earlier about the wider context of trade deals. A 19th century trade deal is about tariffs. Even when a 20th century trade deal is about tariffs, it is about borders. 21st century trade deals are about a wider range of things. They should be about public protection, social standards and environmental standards. Those are things that we should put into them. That is a type of trade discussions that we would want to have, but we would want to influence the EU to have. Increasingly, that is the case. They are also about things such as data. I noticed yesterday a piece of news that said that the last stages of the new EU arrangement of Japan were being put into place. Those stages were the Japanese assuring the EU about the data standards that they had so that Japanese companies and others could be involved in data processes and data handling. That is about a trade deal. That is very high standards of regulation that, in actual fact, protects citizens. That is extremely important, too. We need to make sure that we are in control of that. Particularly the areas for which we, as a Parliament and a Government, are responsible. Whether those things are our responsibility, we should be the people who are making those decisions. I mean, I would have thought that that is axiomatic. Will he want to cover TRA still? Yes, please. Thank you very much. I do not know if you heard the discussion that we had on the TRA with the minister, and I asked him about representation on that board for any of the devolved administrations. He ruled that out, but I then went on to ask, well, in whoever you appoint to that body, will you assure us that at least of some experience or knowledge of the devolution settlement and powers and so on? He appeared to rule that out, as well. Which of you in that indeed, does it look that we could have a board of adjudicators that do not know anything about what they are adjudicating on? Yes, it is. I was disappointed in his response. This remains an issue in which we are seeking amendment to the bill, along with the Welsh Government, because it is necessary. There is a very easy answer to this, of course. There is an amendment in place that would solve it, but there is actually practice within public appointments that makes it easy to deal with, which is to ensure that there is within the person specification on that board at least two individuals, one of whom has a substantial knowledge of the Scottish economy and the Scottish trading and Scottish market. Another one has the same knowledge of Wales. You might want one with Northern Ireland as well, depending on what happens in that settlement. That is normal in personal specifications. If you see advertisements for public bodies, there are key specifications for members of public bodies and that should be applied. I just cannot see the difficulty here. The argument that this should be solely on merit seems to apply to the knowledge of Scottish trade in some way would not be as meritorious as having some other qualification. At the very least, the person specification for those appointments should include individuals who are nominated on the grounds that they have this knowledge, as well as a wider knowledge. This is also common practice for generations. I am sure that the convener will remember that they used to have in the DEAR commission particular categories of membership. One member had to have a knowledge of DEAR issues in the south of Scotland, and I seem to remember that it was always difficult to appoint to that one. That is not new. What I read from the minister was simply a refusal to accept that they should be thinking about the issues of the Scottish economy, the Welsh economy and the Northern Irish economy. Is that another example of what you said at the beginning, cabinet secretary, about a sole process that is effectively overturning 19 years of the devotion south? Yes. I think that what it is about is a lack of recognition of reality. That is not the country that it was 20, 30 or 40 years ago. It has changed. Devolution changed things and recognised that change. You would expect me to say it, but you perhaps would not expect the PAC Act committee to say it in its report. I know that you have met with Bernard Jenkins and that report makes it clear that that lack of knowledge of devolution is an issue and a problem. Neil Hamilton, you have written to David Lindenton to outline some of your very reasonable concerns about the impact of a no-deal Brexit. There is obviously a great deal of concern about a shortage of goods that could happen as a result of a no-deal Brexit that could hit the UK economy, but I am interested to know what the specific impact could be on the Scottish economy. Mr Hollongbury said that he was not in a position to respond to that point, but I know in your letter that you have outlined the number of areas in which you have concerns over. What are the specific areas that will have a disproportional effect on Scotland? There is a number. There is a legislative burden that this Parliament is going to have to meet, so we are already locked into that. We are going to have to do a considerable amount of additional work between now and next March, and that is simply a reality. I think that perhaps of greater importance is the dawning realisation in some sectors that they are also going to have to make exceptional preparations. If you look at the medical side, it has been well publicised that there will have to be a stockpining of drugs. It is extraordinary that we are at this stage, but that will have to happen. There are discussions taking place between Jean Freeman's department and the Department of Health about how that will be handled and exactly what our role will be in that, and that is on-going. There are issues in food supply, both food supply coming in—nobody suggests that there will be an end to food—but there is a pinch point at Dover. A great deal of the food supplies that we have come here, if there were to be disruption to trade at Dover, then there would be a knock-on effect. Of course, the further you are from Dover, the greater that knock-on effect. There is an issue for businesses, and particularly businesses that are involved in perishable foodstuffs going the other way. An example that I often use in my constituency is shellfish. If shellfish is going to France, leaving it on the hard shoulder of the M20 for three or four days is not conducive to making it better, I put it that way. There are issues in there. One of the big issues is that we do not know. I think that reasonable people would say that every effort will be made to avoid the no deal, but it is being talked up by the UK Government again and again. Some people believe—I was talking to a very senior MEP some time ago—that there is a dynamic within the system. Once people like the financial sector and others prepare for a no deal, it becomes more likely, because people are hedging against their being a no deal and making their preparations. We are locked into an extraordinary set of circumstances. There are things that we just do not know, such as ports and arrangements at ports. You can make lots of arrangements, but what happens if you suddenly have to put into place a customs inspection? You do not have enough people and enough facilities to put in place a customs inspection. We will do, as a Government, everything that we can to do two things. One is to avoid a no deal, because we keep saying that this should not happen. The other one is to make sure that what preparation and protection we can put in place, we will put in place. That is a job for the whole Parliament. Quite clearly, we will work with everybody to try and do so. It is fair to say that I do not think that any Government will be able to put in place everything that is required, partly because we will not know what everything is required. I have a process question at this stage, cabinet secretary. The Government has already put forward a legislative consent memorandum in regard to the trade bill. We heard what you said at the beginning of the process in regard to LCMs. Does that mean that, in those circumstances, given that there have been some changes to the bill, there will be no supplementary legislative consent memorandum from the Scottish Government? In which case are we expected to rely on the letter that Derek Mackay sent to Liam Fox on 28 June as being the position of the Scottish Government? Let us not say never. I have proposals that the Scottish Government will want to make to the UK Government about soul. I would have hoped—and I have had conversations with the UK Government about soul—that there might be some thinking there that things could change. If that was to change, then the issue of legislative consent would change, too. I think that the timing of that would be quite crucial. The legislative consent process for this bill has to take its course, but presently the position that Derek Mackay has outlined and the position that I have outlined in terms of why we will take those actions is quite clear. I should point out that we recognise, for example, that on secondary legislation for the no-deal option we require to do certain things and we will do them, but the Brexit bills themselves are an issue and will remain an issue until we have a soul process that we can rely on. I understand why the Government has taken the position that it has taken. I do not want to interrogate that, although we can get into it if you want. I am just trying to understand the process. I did not really understand your answer to the convener's question. Will there be a supplementary legislative consent memorandum for this bill or not? At the present moment, not, but I am open at the present moment. I think that that is something that we would want to discuss and also discuss with you. It is not a situation that any of us like. I am happy to discuss it both with this committee and cross-party, because we have done that before. If the current position is that there probably won't be a supplementary legislative consent memorandum for this bill, will I take it that there won't be a Government-sponsored legislative consent motion for this bill? Does that mean that Parliament will not have the opportunity to express whether or not it consents to this bill? Whether or not it consents is, in the UK terms, irrelevant, because it will be taken as consent anyway. I suppose that that would be the case, but I am open to discussion as to whether the Parliament would wish an opportunity to say that it refuses legislative consent. We did that with the withdrawal bill. We did not have to do that with the withdrawal bill, but we did it with the withdrawal bill. It may well be that the view of many is that we should debate it, in which case I suppose we would then bring a supplementary legislative consent memorandum. However, it is fluid at the moment because there are still the changes to the bill that we have suggested. I would want to see what happened with those. I am disappointed by what we have heard from the Trade Minister this morning, but there is still the opportunity for a change of heart, and there is an opportunity for a change of heart and a soul. Both of those would be helpful. Going forward, thinking about future likely Brexit-related bills on, for example, agriculture, is it the Government's current position that there will not be a legislative consent memorandum in respect of future Brexit-related legislation? I do not think that it is a hard and fast position. The hard and fast position is that we will not recommend a legislative consent motion on those, but I think that we are under an obligation to bring forward our reasoning on that, so I think that we will bring forward our reasoning on it. That would be the normal process. I cannot see why we would refuse to do so. So you would anticipate that there would likely be future legislative consent memorandums on the basis of which committees such as this could take evidence and report? Yes. If the issue is the committee involvement, yes. Okay, so it is not a complete withdrawal from the Scottish Government in the entire LCM process? No, it is a good point and I think it is useful that we clarify it. We are not resiling from the process within this Parliament and the involvement of this Parliament. We are seeking to ensure that this Parliament understands the position that the Government has taken and we seek the support of the Parliament and the position that the Government has undertaken, but we are not intending to recommend a legislative consent motion on any of the Brexit bills. Is that clear? Thank you. That is very helpful and very clear. Thank you minister. We now are moving into private, so I thank our witnesses for their contribution this morning. We are very grateful.