 Hello, and welcome to the United States Institute of Peace. We're delighted to have you with us today for the launch of USIP's Senior Study Group Report on China's Influence and the Freely Associated States of the Northern Pacific. As many of you know, USIP was founded by the US Congress in 1984 as a national, nonpartisan, independent institute focused on preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflict around the world. As part of that work, over the last few years, USIP has led a series of senior study groups looking at China's influence on conflict dynamics in specific countries and regions around the globe, including Myanmar, North Korea, the Red Sea Arena, and South Asia. The report that we are launching today is the fifth in that series. This report examines China's increased engagement in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia, collectively known as the Freely Associated States. And this report comes at a particularly important time. First, because China's engagement across the Pacific Islands region is increasing in ways that have important implications for US national security interests. And also because the compacts of free negotiation, those agreements that form the foundation of the US relationship with each of the Freely Associated States are currently being negotiated for the future. The project that we are here to discuss today was led by three exceptional co-chairs. First, Admiral Phil Davidson, former commander of US Indo-Pacific Command. General David Stillwell, the former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. And Dr. Robert Underwood, former delegate to the US House of Representatives from Guam and former president of the University of Guam. Under their leadership, USIP convened an expert group of 16 experts who met five times by video conference and once in person. And the group also consulted widely with officials and experts from the freely associated states themselves as well as from other countries around the region. I want to take just a moment before we dive in to thank the members of the senior study group for the time and energy that they generously gave to this project over the last nine months. This would not have been possible without them. So if you'll bear with me, I want to read their names just to make sure that they are recognized for their contributions to this project. David Cohen, Jerry Finnan, Laurie Foreman, Carla Freeman, Mary Hattori, Elizabeth Havis, Frances Hazel, Ken Cooper, Satu Lemay, Bonnie Lin, Jim Loy, Jonathan Odom, Andrew Scobell, Vikram Singh, Alan Stamen, and Alan Tidwell. We are grateful for their efforts and the expertise that they have shared with us throughout this project. Now on to the main event. It is my honor to moderate today's discussion within our exceptional panel of experts. First, we are honored to have two of our co-chairs with us, Admiral Phil Davidson and Dr. Robert Underwood. Unfortunately, generals, David's still well. Our third co-chair was hoping to join us but had a scheduling conflict pop-up, so he will not be able to make it. But rounding out today's panel is Ambassador Joe Yoon. Many of you know that Ambassador Yoon is currently serving as the presidential special envoy for compact negotiations. And he is also a senior advisor here at USIP. So he is particularly well-suited to join the discussion today. So with that, I think we'll open up the conversation about the report, your impressions of it and main takeaways, and we can start from there. So I guess I'll start with our two co-chairs and ask both of you, why did you decide to get involved in this report? We're very glad that you did, but be curious to hear from both of you, why you think this question of China's influence in the freely associated states and US relationships with these countries is so important. Perhaps Admiral Davidson, I'll start with you. Oh, thank you. Well, first and foremost, I think the enduring prosperity and security of the United States is deeply rooted in the Indo-Pacific region. And next to that, we have this extraordinary relationship with the freely associated states. First, in my mind always becomes our continental and Hawaii and Alaska presence in the United States on the Indo-Pacific rim. Of course, our territories, American Samoa, Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas and others. And then this very unique relationship that we have with the freely associated states, which occupies such large air and sea space, but with such small populations and much small land mass. But the compact and the structure of the freely associated states is probably not well known to most Americans. And I would submit here in Washington as well. And I thought it was important to shine a light on the strategic importance of the freely associated states, Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia to make sure that the compacts, the very unique interdependence of our nation with those three nations and our obligations and the benefits we accrue from the security and defense aspects have a light shown on it and be discussed across the expert community. So I thought it would be a benefit to Washington. All right, thank you, Dr. Underwood. Well, first of all, I live in the area and basically I'm from Guam and this is my home and I spent much of my professional life not just working in Guam but also working in the surrounding area going back to the days of the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. And as the Admiral has stated, very few people kind of understand the complexity of these relationships and they don't understand them here. And I worked here for 10 years. I kept trying to explain it and it's still not very clear but there are relationships with territories like Guam and then there are relationships with these independent nations called compacts of free association, freely associated states and kind of run on both territories and the freely associated states kind of run back and forth between being domestic entities, kind of international entities, foreign entities, not quite sure how they fit into making both domestic policy and foreign policy. And now we have a series of changed circumstances in the broader Pacific which of course are impacting the lives of the Islanders and are drawing attention to that part of the world. And so trying to look at it as an entire region especially from the perspective of someone who lives in the region and who feels that this is my home, my homeland and I wanna make sure that everything that happens especially in relationship to the United States advances the interests of the islands themselves as well as the United States. It has to be made clear these are not protectorates, these are not territories that are owned by the United States and that this is not a patron-client relationship. This is a relationship that supposedly is founded on some enduring values and those enduring values are important to restate in the process of negotiation, commitment to democracy, commitment to openness and the advancement of peoples in those areas and then to establish the defense and diplomatic conditions that enhance those things as well as deal with the concerns that people have. So people in the territories and of course people in the freely associated states are really affected by all the conversations that are going on about Chinese influence and so it's really vitally important to have a kind of an island perspective on many of these issues. Wonderful, thanks. Oh, I've heard both of you lament that there is perhaps not enough understanding of the US relationship with these three countries in Washington. However, there is one person who understands these relationships very well here with us today and so Ambassador Yun I would turn to you and ask if you could tell us a little bit more about why the US relationship with the freely associated states is so important and perhaps a little bit about your role now as you're negotiating the compacts. Thank you, Dr. Stats. It's a pleasure to be here with Dr. Underwood and Admiral Davidson, two persons who know so much about this area. You know, you mentioned a lot of senior study groups and I was of course took part in the first one, one on North Korea. So doing the compact, these are two really polar extremes of what US interest is in. So, I mean, like what Admiral said, even though I done a lot of work for State Department on Indo-Pacific area, I really did not know that much about freely associated states. When I started my current job in late March this year, and so it's been learning by doing, you know. And so I've made some observations and I wanted to also test them on the Admiral and Dr. Underwood. One is that, and I think this goes well with your first recommendation, that we need to engage deeper and more, the United States. And what, when I talk to FAS partners, what they want is respect. I think respect is very important concept. These are very proud Pacific Island countries with tremendous history and culture behind them. They're small. They had been largely colonized over the last century or more and they have just found their own self-determination sovereignty. And so I think for them, sovereignty is important and self-determination is important. So while they still rely on compacts for economic assistance, they know that they are strategically important. And so the first question I have is, compacts are not what I would call straightforward economic assistance. It is much more, we give them what we can in terms of economic assistance, immigration rights and federal services. And in return, they provide what is very important, especially for Indo-Pacific command that the Admiral used to command, which is that we have strategic rights, strategic denial rights over the vast area, which essentially covers most of the Pacific, northern Pacific, between Hawaii and the Philippines. So that's the first point I want to make. It's not straightforward economic assistance. The second point I wanted to make was that, let me say I did have a second point, which is that compacts have defined the relationship but it's gone through changes over the past 40 years. I would say there was significant change in compacts of 1980s as opposed to the last compact that was done in 2003. So still in the 1980s, Soviet Union was important. And in 20 years later, it's no longer there. China had yet to be a major threat. And now it is, of course, we're involved in this competition with China. And so, but my point in this is we should not look at compacts purely vis-a-vis our strategic competition, whether it's over at Union or China. It is in our own security interests, you know? And so I think we should be a lot more constant, a lot more long-term in our goals to the FAS countries. And I guess the last point I want to make in that, so it should not be about China, rather it's about our own United States security self. Just to give you a little bit of update to close it up, I wanted to say that the compact negotiations have progressed quite well. We've met three times with Micronesians, FSM, and we'll meet with them again next week in Hawaii. We've met twice with Marshall Islands and we'll meet with them also next week. And then I expect to have a second meeting with Palau soon. So our goal is to get all three done by the end of this year. But obviously, you know, each negotiations involve not only economic assistance, but federal programs and services. And so it gets complicated, each negotiation or each country, we have to complete about seven or eight different set of agreements. So it's a lot of work, but you know, at this time we're getting good help from Congress, good help from interagency. Thank you. Wonderful, thanks. Well, I think you make the very important point that I think is important to stress at the outset, which is the U.S. relationship with the freely associated states goes back a long time and is much broader than China. It's based in cultural ties, values, political ties, economic relationships, all of these things that existed long before we started talking about China and its engagement in the region. That said, this report is part of our China series. So we are going to talk about China. And for that, I guess I would turn to Admiral Davidson. So take us into the mind of the Indo-Pakum commander. You know, why are these islands strategically important for the United States? How are we seeing China becoming more engaged in this part of the world and what are the implications of that? Well, thank you. Well, Ambassador Yoon highlighted it geographically, which is, you know, the most important aspect of it to a military man or woman. And it's the fact that they are the North Pacific. People don't always, you know, people think of the North Pacific as above Hawaii and to Alaska. But in the discussion of the Indo-Pacific, it's the compact states that are actually the North Pacific. They occupy much of the air and sea space between Hawaii, American Samoa, and the Philippines, and the rest of the first island chain, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines. Why is that important? Well, our logistics and sustainment, not just for military people, but for the United States, our markets in the Indo-Pacific, these areas are either astride them or just below them, depending on how you're moving back and forth from the Indo-Pacific. And they also are in an area between Guam, our most important Western domestic US military facility, and again, the first island chain of Taiwan, excuse me, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South. And as you talk about the second island chain and third island chain issues in the Indo-Pacific, they become very important aspects for defense and offensive capability in the second island chain. The ties with the US go back more than a century, but certainly deeply since the end of World War II when Americans fought and died in and around and on, many of these lands. The relationships, people to people ties in the military are extraordinary. The three fast states per capita provide more US servicemen and women than any of the 50 states in the United States and any of the territories. It's really an extraordinary heritage and link for the US military to have that as well. And then as we think about the future, what capabilities are coming from the bottom of the sea all the way up into space, the area of the three freely associated states and our territories becomes more and more important, not only for our own interests, but certainly for China's as well, as they're seeking accesses throughout the Pacific, certainly in the very beginning of the Belt and Road Initiative, they talked about it in terms of commercial accesses, but they've revealed in the last three or four years that these are dual use accesses as well. Everybody's read about the secret pact with the Solomon Islands, which is in the South Pacific, but we've seen a number of activities by the Chinese, commercial, economic, diplomatic, and frankly, underhanded in terms of corruption across the Pacific region, South Pacific and North Pacific. Those corrupt activities are meant to co-opt elites, both in the business world and sometimes in the government world, and with the intent of establishing their own relationships and really supplanting ours. It's not that the US, I think, resents competition, the US welcomes the development in the region of any interested party, but it's been pretty plain to me that the Chinese objectives are to supplant US interests where they can, and it has to be part of the discussion. Wonderful, thanks. I just want to follow up on some of the points that you made there. Much of China's investment in the region is economic and brings much needed investment and economic assistance and support to these islands. Of course, there are also some links to organized crime and corruption and other problems that can be certainly something that these countries need to deal with and hopefully we can help them address. Dr. Underwood, I want to go to you. As you said, you live in the region, this is your home. What do these dynamics look like from the North Pacific? What does China's engagement and both the pros and cons that come with it, what does that look like? You engage regularly with these, the leaders of the Philly Associated States, how are they seeing some of these developments? Well, some of the things are quite dispiriting because the nature of some of the economic activities have created the opportunities for corruption or seeming corruption and kind of interfering with local politics and I happen to know a number of locally elected officials. I've talked at length about this. But at the same time, Chinese are welcome as long as the businesses are above board and they provide the opportunities for investment, to provide the opportunities for tourism as had happened in Palau but now the relationship has been strained. But the main point here is that there should be some sense of regard and respect as the ambassadors outline for the entities as they deal with these situations that they're not simply vassals of the United States and they're not kind of runting interference for the United States but instead are actually cooperating partners in this. There's a lot of issues that sometimes we don't go into great depth but they certainly affect the compact negotiations, include the nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, the nature of the relationship in the past and all the activities which were carried out when the trust territory was unlike all the other trust territories, a strategic trust which the US directly managed and supervised, all of those issues are part and parcel of that history so they kind of affect the thinking. But I have to say that the other part here is to think of the region as an integrated whole even though Guam and the Northern Marianas are quote, our territories, they still have issues of their own with the federal government and there's still the issue of self-determination for Guam but in the region as a whole is integrated in many ways because Guam kind of functions as a metropole for the area so there's all these things that are going on that need to be considered as part of the relationship and how you deal with migration, out-migration now we have climate change, the potential for climate refugees, out-migration and which many of the freely associated states the likely destination is either Hawaii or Guam and actually proportionately Guam is bearing that burden the most and but they go into other places as well so it provides a kind of a rich set of circumstances where domestic policy, assistance and how you deal with the migrants and how do you deal with the entities that have to deal with the migrants and then how you deal with China in that I have to say that many leaders in the Micronesian region are grateful for the attention that the Chinese influence has brought upon them because I think now I think they feel that people are recognizing their true value and should be pointed out that in a place like the freely associated, not the other places but in the FSM, Federated States of Micronesia annually they send lots of young people to China to study and they get free tuition, they learn Mandarin these young people are not gonna stay in China they're gonna come back to the FSM and in another five, 10, 15 years they'll be all over the bureaucracy they'll be into economic activities it could lead to a change series of circumstances so thinking about the military security arrangements which are immediate and which need attention but also kind of thinking long term what does this relationship need to be like in order to basically secure a peaceful environment for everyone? Wonderful, thanks. One more note on the strategic aspect one of the dynamics that we have not talked about yet is that of Taiwan and of course Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands both have formal diplomatic relationships with Taiwan just curious if you could say a few words about how solid those relationships are and what the implications of those relationships might be or if you wanna say something about it. Sure, that's a constant conversation and I'm very familiar with both the leadership and the RMI and Palau and of course they want to maintain those because those are of great benefit to them and I think it's sort of a little bit awkward for the US to passively encourage that but I think the US is passively encouraging that because it helps create a kind of a hedge and it keeps the PRC busy. Their comments on that? Okay. Oh, nothing to add, I mean it's well said by Dr. Underwood, I think it's accurate. Okay. Great, just to follow up on some of the points that you made I think a lot of what we try to do in this report and in these discussions here at USIP is to share some of the perspectives of the region, right? The policy is made here in DC but it shouldn't be made in a vacuum and trying to understand how people living in the region understand these issues is really important. So I guess Ambassador Deune to you as we're thinking about these relationships what are the priorities that the leaders of the freely associated states highlight and what are they bringing to the table? What's important to them beyond just the grant funding and the compacts? You've talked about this some but what are their interests in the relationship? What are their concerns about China and thinking about how the US can strengthen our relationship with these countries both in the process that you're leading but also just in the years to come? I think they would really like the United States to pay more attention to them and I mean this is obviously a constant request of many places have been to including Southeast Asia and so on but again don't just pay attention every 20 years when we are renewing compact, you know pay attention throughout and this again gets to the idea of respect. I think that's very key. I think the second item is in terms of substantive issues climate change is number one, you know climate change is really an existential question especially for RMI Marshall Islands. The highest point on Marshall Island is six feet and so you're going to see really increasingly serious erosion of farmlands, the need to build seawalls and so on. So climate change is very serious and then the second big challenge is of course level of economic development. These are very small countries. Palau is the third smallest in population in the world. After Vatican, we can have a long debate whether you know, well I won't go into that debate on Vatican, you know, very, very un-USIP, you know. And I think Nauru is the second smallest and then a third one is Palau, you know with 17,000 people and it's decreasing. Micronesia is about 100,000, RMI is about 40,000. So it's a tremendous challenge being isolated, being small and so for them, as it is for the rest of the Pacific and which is why you're seeing places like Kiribati, Solomon, Tuvalu, Samoa all being challenged and I mean I'm not smart enough to say what they need to do but they need economic assistance. They need adaptation techniques for climate change. They need investment and which is why China offers, even though there are dark sides to China, you've seen them deliver quickly, infrastructure assistance and so on. So I think there is some of that we have to adjust in order to be more competitive. Great. Sorry I was going to back up. I guess thinking about, as you said, countries are glad that the United States is paying attention. They want the US to listen to and focus on and address these issues that are critically important to them. Climate change of course being at the top of the list and economic development after that. You know there has been a flurry of activity and a renewed focus on the Pacific Island regions in Washington over the past year. Of course next week President Biden will host the Pacific Islands leaders for the first ever White House summit. The leaders of the freely associated states will be a part of that conversation. The new White House Indo-Pacific strategy talks a lot about the importance of the Pacific Islands. There is a new Pacific Islands national strategy in the works and again the freely associated states will play a big piece of that. Yes Ambassador you just to go back to you. As you're looking ahead and thinking about how the United States engages with the Pacific Islands region going forward. You've mentioned a lot of the key areas that we need to address. Once your mission is complete and the compacts are renewed, how should the United States continue to build ties with the freely associated states to make sure that these relationships remain strong? Are the compacts enough or is there more that we need to do? I think freely associated states have a special status. Quite different from the rest of the Pacific. So we have the U.S. as our own island chain. Territories, Hawaii being the first, I would say freely associated states or perhaps second island chain for us. So given the deep rooted connections between FAS countries and us, I think we have a huge advantage. For example, we talked about Micronesians going and studying in Beijing. The President of Micronesia and Vice President of Micronesia all graduated from Eastern Oregon University. Oregon is where I happen to come from. So I know that place pretty well. And so you're right, those ties have to be maintained and they kind of regard Oregon as their second home. And now we have huge population because of immigration rights that FAS countries have. They're not going to live in Xinjiang or even Shanghai. They will live in Guam, Hawaii, Arkansas, Oregon, California. And so we have a huge advantage that the United States is home to probably now almost a third, if not half of the overall population of FAS countries. So we have that advantage and we are giving them quite a big economic assistance every year. So I'm not so concerned about the long-term relationship. It's the short-term, how do we agree on these agreements and how do we build what we have. And I think that that building block has to start in Washington. I'm glad to say in Congress, there actually is a good strong building block there with a lot of Congress folks quite aware. And in fact this issue gets tremendous amount of bipartisan support. What I'm more concerned is within the bureaucracy, within Washington, whether it's Department of State, Department of Defense, whether they get enough traction. We in a State Department, we used to have an office that dealt just with FAS countries. But that's gone, you know? And so it's just now one office doing Pacific Australian New Zealand affairs. That's not enough, you know? And so you have to start with bureaucracy, build it out from there for them to take care and manage better and at a higher level day-to-day relationship. Thank you for raising this question about bureaucratic dynamics because I know this is one that has come up many times in our deliberations over the last few months. And Dr. Underwood, I'll turn to you, obviously. In these conversations, you've made the point many times. There is a trend in Congress to treat the freely associated states as insular territories. The way that the U.S. government is organized to address issues related to the freely associated states is very complicated. It's not just the State Department, but it's bureaus and agencies across the U.S. government who are engaged in different parts of this relationship for good reason, but can also make things more complicated. I wonder if you could just say a little bit more about those bureaucratic dynamics and their implications. Well, the bureaucratic dynamics are exactly that, is that they become entrenched and people, you know, the funding that Ambassador Yoon is negotiating on behalf of the State Department is going to be managed by the Department of Interior. And then, of course, you have the citizens of the compact states now moving to the U.S. states and territories like Guam in large numbers, and then they're going to get a series of benefits as individuals who are not green card holders. They have non-immigrant status, but sort of permanent non-immigrant status, and then each jurisdiction is having a difficult time trying to understand whether they're eligible for all of the federal programs that are eligible for. There's legislation that says, let's make all of these migrants eligible in the same way that green card holders are eligible. So they're eligible for all of the benefits which sets up an anomaly because the U.S. citizens living in the territories aren't eligible for all of these things, but now they're going to make the migrants eligible for them. And so there's a lot of lack of cohesion in that thinking. And I'm hopeful that the Congress will take a look at this and kind of revamp how these things are dealt with. Not to just say State Department is the winner over Interior, but to say have a new structure, have some kind of inner agency, a real inner agency arrangement that really addresses these issues because HHS is going to be looking at certain kind of benefits that they're going to hand out to people and they're going to have constituencies and the benefit packages. The COVID, the pandemic COVID experience is that a lot of things went right to the compact states as if in fact they were territories or domestic areas of the United States, which was an emergency measure, but then that sets up a whole series of expectations for the future as well. So those things have to be kind of carefully thought through and so that the kind of bubbles of responsibility and burden is more or less equally shared or understood by the federal government as a consequence, as a federal responsibility that is a consequence of these compact negotiations and compact relationships. So that's the complexity of it. On the other hand, there's a lot, there even some people are arguing now, let's all try to become a freely associated state. What's wrong with that? They get sovereignty and they're going to get the same level of domestic benefits. What's the difference between a freely associated state and a non-freely associated state? I think there is a move in Puerto Rico where they want to be freely associated states and U.S. citizens. That's right. There's some people who argue that that's alright so that's what they call it in Spanish, estado libre asociado, and in reality it isn't. But there's all of these kind of dimensions to that which have implications. And for someone who lives in the area, I'm just grateful that the attention to China has allowed all of us to have this very robust conversation because the implications are not just what are you going to do with territories, but also how is the federal government going to manage what is going to be a long-term relationship. This relationship is not going anywhere. Maybe people don't know, but people who are running for office in the freely associated states campaign as much out of the freely associated states as they do inside, because all their people are living somewhere else. They're living in Hawaii or they're living in Guam. And in some instances, the presidents of these countries were determined by votes that came outside of the country. And so these things have an amazing consequence, but I think as long as people understand the responsibility for it, we'll do well. I have to say that in the past few years I've been kind of talking about that the Micronesian region is no longer an American lake because everyone was comfortable with that and strategic denial. But the only ones who seem to be aware of that was the Department of Defense. They were really keen on understanding that this was a serious... And I think that you have to also distinguish somewhat Indo-Paycom from who are completely aware of the importance and Pentagon. I don't want to get too deeply involved in this one. That's part of the bureaucratic. I think that's a part of the bureaucratic thing where Indo-Paycom is completely aware and less so as you get further and far away in Washington. I'll ask you a question on this point specifically. I think both the depth and the breadth of the relationships which are established in the compacts is really astounding. And we've talked about it a little bit today. I hope people will read the report where you can read more about exactly all that that includes. One of the provisions, though, does give the United States the right to establish defense facilities in the freely-associated states. But that's not a provision that we have really taken much advantage of aside from quadriline. And I wondered if you could say, should the U.S. take greater advantage of this opportunity going forward? How should we think about the potential for defense facilities or military presence? Certainly as we think about the security of the United States and the threats that emanate from the Indo-Pacific region and kind of the new dimensions of long-range rocketry and our ability to defend against that, both the continental United States but our allies and territories as well. In addition, new capabilities in space and things like that, we need to be thinking about the freely-associated states. During my time as the Indo-Pacific Command Commander, there was intense interest from the Congress resulting in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. We talked at depth strategically across the department and with the Congress about what our posture needs are. That's code for where are there places where we could go? Airfields, logistics support, ports, things like that. Within the first, second, third island chains that perhaps need some attention and some opportunity. There are some initiatives underway, budgeted already in the freely-associated states and I think there's opportunity for more. We've heard from the Republic of Palau and the President there who's asking for U.S. defense facilities and bases in his country and it's something that we need to be doing more of and certainly be aware of as we think about strategy for the United States and our long-term security interests and what these three freely-associated states deliver to the United States in terms of benefits, not just obligations. Yes, absolutely, thanks. Well, we are running low on time but I would like to give each of you a chance to make some final concluding remarks or observations if you would like. You can take that in any direction you like but I guess specifically if there are any findings or observations from this report but also the conversations that have informed it over the last several months that you've found to be particularly important or noteworthy that you would like to stress or share here today before we end this event. I will let our co-chairs contemplate on that just a minute, Ambassador. I'll go to you first because you're scrambling notes but if you have any thoughts you might just leave us with. I've worked with a lot of the so-called allies, not so-called DRA allies and partners in a way we have mutual defense treaty like South Korea, NATO and so on. I think what people don't realize is the compacts are even beyond that, way beyond that in terms of the alliance commitments, defense commitments, strategic commitments and so they are really, I would say, continuation of a lot of things we did while they were UN trust territories at the time. So that relationship has continued but evolved and I think Dr. Anduwood's point is a good one. There's no doubt we have a long-term relationship with them but that relationship has to be day-to-day managed well and that I think is the challenge for defense department, for interior department and as well as for state department and I do think Dr. Anduwood's recommendation that there be an inter-agency process on top looking at these things. I think that will go a long ways towards making sure that we actually fulfill the long-term promise that is the free association. Great, thanks. Go down the line. I think the most important thing for me as a result of the study is one, is the uniqueness of these relationships and I don't think that's necessarily well appreciated and despite their small size, the interdependence, the benefits and obligations that our collective nations enjoy here need to be approached with that uniqueness in mind and that's why it drives to more attention. It may drive to a wider inter-agency process so that you can assess the collision of international and national obligations and benefits that we derive from the two nations. FEMA is involved, the National Weather Service is involved in the freely associated states. The Postal Service, they all have a voice but they all need to understand from an inter-agency level what that benefit and dependence is and why it's important to our collective security and prosperity. And by collective, I mean the United States and these freely associated states. It's really, really important and of course when I say the United States that includes our territories as well. Okay, well it's really important I think Admiral Davidson has highlighted that this is a relationship that is interdependent and that's really important to understand that this is not dependent, independence but it's interdependent. It's an ongoing relationship and it's a very complicated one and the U.S. side of it the benefits that accrue from this relationship are of course enormous and no one is trying to put a dollar amount on it but there are trying to put a relationship amount on it if you will. And it's important to understand that as well that this is a region on its own. It includes the territories. It's a regional and then there's a relationship with the other Pacific Islands so as recommended in this report don't stand in the way of the Pacific Island Forum encourage that, encourage healthy relationships encourage the regional cooperation that exists between the freely associated states and Guam and the CNMI encourage that because that really accrues to the benefit of all concern and as always the United States is a Pacific power with a Pacific interest it's also to some extent has been responsible for a Pacific Empire so trying to balance all of that is a complicated issue in the 21st century but Ambassador Yoon is up to it. Tell my boss that. On that note I think we will close today's event but before we do I just want to say a quick word of thanks again to our co-chairs Admiral Davidson, Dr. Underwood and General Stilwell for the time that they have dedicated to this project we're grateful for your leadership we're so glad that you could be a part of it thank you for joining us today Ambassador Yoon thank you for joining us for your wise counsel throughout and for your service right now in this very important project of compact negotiation we're really glad to have you with us I want to also thank the members of the Senior Study Group themselves who also really dedicated a tremendous amount of time but also just decades and decades of expertise on these issues that was incredibly valuable as we pulled this report together and last but not least I'd like to thank the USIP team that was really instrumental in making this happen and anyone who's done a project like this knows it's not possible without a lot of people doing a lot of hard work behind the scenes I want to first thank Brian Harding who was the project director for this effort and we also had terrific research and writing support from Camilla Pola Anderson Nicole Cochran and Trevor Sutton so we really appreciate all of their contributions and finally thanks to all of you for joining us the report is live on the USIP website now we hope you will download it and we hope you enjoy it thanks so much for joining us thank you