 Good morning, and welcome to the 29th meeting in 2018 of the Finance and Constitution Committee. Can I remind members to put their mobile phones at least into a mode that interferes with proceedings? I'd be most grateful. The first item on our agenda this morning is to take evidence from the Cabinet Secretary for Government Business and Constitution Relations on the withdrawal agreement that was published last week. Mr Russell was joined by two Scottish Government officials, Ian Mitchell, who is the Deputy Director of EU Strategy and Migration Division, and Alan Johnson, who is the Deputy Director of EU Exit Readiness. I'll warmly welcome our witnesses to the meeting, and I'll just wonder if the Cabinet Secretary would like to make an opening statement. No, I think that given the detail that we're going to have to go into today, I'm very happy just to respond to questions. Clearly, I'll be addressing the issues that arise from the attempt to secure a deal by the Prime Minister and what follows from that. I think that we'll probably open up with a general discussion about the deal at a higher level, then we'll get into specifics and bits of it, but we also need to cover areas about legislative consent, etc. If any future EU withdrawal agreement bill contains such issues. Cabinet Secretary, yesterday, even in my constituency, I was talking about individuals and businesses, and I was up in the northern part of my constituency, around the calendar, the culinary area yesterday. There's no question why my people are anxious, they're concerned about the situation that we're currently in, what the deal means for them, their families, their security and their jobs. Businesses certainly are telling me that they are concerned about their planning for the future, and it's beginning to hamper investment decisions because of the level of uncertainty. I'm no doubt that stalling of investment plans is probably having a drag in the economy. The clear message that I'm getting from people is that they just want all this uncertainty to end, but they're not sure at this stage if the deal that the Prime Minister is prosecuting cuts it in terms of removing that uncertainty, and therefore that concern remains. Just as a very general opening in the circumstances, Cabinet Secretary, what's the Scottish Government's view? I share the view of those who want this to come to an end. This has been an appalling period, it remains full of uncertainty and difficulty. I noticed today that there's a published study, I just say it in passing, out today from a group of doctors in England that show that prescribing of antidepressants rose immediately after a referendum. People feel terribly insecure and it's getting worse, but I have to say that this would be if you thought this was the moment at which you would feel better. This is a false dawn. This deal is not a deal that will do what those people and ourselves want, which is to provide certainty. Indeed, I will argue, I'm sure, during the course of this morning that this deal actually prolongs uncertainty, and I would find it highly surprising if, for example, a transition period arising out of this deal was concluded within the timescale being talked about by the Prime Minister. I think that even the timescale now being talked about by Mr Barney at the end of 2022 is ambitious in terms of the reality of the EU and how things will move. I think that we have to understand what this deal is. This deal arises because of the red lines that the Prime Minister set and has set over a two-and-a-bit-year period. There is a chart that illustrates this that was originally a slide from task force 50. It's reproduced all over the place. We reproduced it ourselves in one of the Scotland's places in Europe papers. That indicates that if you set red lines, then certain things will happen. A red line that is set, for example, on no jurisdictions of the ECJ will have certain consequences. A red line that is set on leaving the single market and walking away from the four freedoms will have certain consequences. The trouble with that is that those consequences arising from those red lines will be very damaging indeed, in particular to Scotland. Particularly on the issue of freedom of movement, the issue of freedom of goods, capital and services, which are the four freedoms, on the ECJ issues and on other issues, there is a profound difficulty that will not be lessened by this. The outcomes will be bad for Scotland in the short, medium and long term and it will not be certainty. My own view and the view of the Scottish Government is that this is the moment in which we should work as hard as we can across party to ensure that this deal does not go through, to ensure that there is no deal because that can be done, and then get ourselves to the stage where we will have a better set of outcomes. That's what we are trying to do. I was in London on Monday at a AMC, a deeply unsatisfactory AMC, and then talking to others and the First Minister was doing the same yesterday. We will continue to do so. Indeed, in this Parliament, I am very keen to have those discussions and I will be having some of those between parties later this week. Forgive me for saying so, but how realistic is it at this stage that a new deal can emerge? It is very realistic indeed. There is an established procedure that we can follow. First of all, unfortunately the opposition parties at Westminster working together last week managed to secure a set of arrangements, which means that the meaningful vote can be amended. It is, in my view, first of all essential to vote this deal down, but also for the House of Commons to indicate that there cannot be no deal. There is a procedure that would then allow 21 days for other proposals to be brought. The opposition parties are working with a sensible Government, and it would be good to see that. The opposition parties working hopefully with Government can devise other scenarios, and there is a range of scenarios. You can start with the sensible move of staying in the single market and customs union as an EA option, and that is really a sensible thing to do. However, there are other options, and we are neither ruling them in or out. You could have an election, you could have a people's vote, and of course there will be discussions about other possibilities. What nobody should do is simply say that it is this deal or nothing, because it is not. Even the Prime Minister herself admitted that outside Downing Street last week, because she talked about no Brexit in those consequences, and that is also a possibility. If we were to find ourselves in a position of accepting this deal because we wanted this ordeal to be over, we would be making a profound mistake with really damaging consequences, not just for ourselves but for those who come after us. James Kelly I want to be clear and to develop a bit on what you have been discussing in relation to the implications of the vote that will take place at the House of Commons. It is quite clear at this point that that vote will not be successful when the deal in its current form will not get through the House of Commons. Your view is that post that, there is a 21-day period, and you would seek to explore options for changing the deal but you would also look at the options of a general election and a people's vote? Yes, I think that you might be able to come to an agreement before the meaningful vote as to what the next step would be, but the priority—and I have said this on Monday and I said again now—the priority is to vote down this deal, not to allow the damage to take place. However, the range of options are, as you indicate, and those would include a general election, a people's vote, a single-market customs union membership and a range of other things. What we shouldn't be dragooned into thinking is that either we accept the deal or chaos in the shoes. That is not the case. We shouldn't allow that to be the case and it doesn't have to be the case, but working across-party is now absolutely essential in this regard, and I'm glad that work is under way. The First Minister met Jeremy Corbyn and some of his colleagues yesterday, Vince Cable, the leader of Plyde and the Greens yesterday, and those meetings will continue. Do you think that article 50 would need to be extended, or do you think that post a deal has been voted down but the House of Commons is still a possibility for a way forward to be worked out? I think that we should recognise that it's not about renegotiating this deal. In that regard, you are firm and they are quite right to be firm. It's taken a long time to get to this, but this deal, as I said at the outcome, is driven by the red lines, and we have to stop at that being driven by the red lines. I think that the indications are also that if there is a material change—in other words, the House of Commons votes this down—then the UK Government should request an extension of article 50, which is, of course, in the text of article 50 itself, that that is a possibility. I think that if there was a material change, my view is that the EU would look at that sympathetically, because it wouldn't want that to descend into a complete, further chaos. I'm going to ask about the consequences of a no-deal Brexit, but before I do that, I just want to clarify something. You've been very negative about the draft withdrawal agreement. I assume that that means that you've read it. Well, I have it here. I have, you could say, skimmed it. I did note David Allen Green's tweet yesterday, which I thought was very accurate. It is probably only possible for anybody who is engaged in any other work to skim a document of this complexity, particularly if you're not a lawyer. If you are a lawyer, he said that it would take you three days of solid study to understand it fully. I am not a lawyer, and I haven't spent three days on it, but I am familiar with its contents. I am also familiar with the contents of the draft political declaration as published, but I have not seen any of the developments of that, which have clearly been taking place in the last 20 to 24 to 48 hours. However, it is here—if you want to ask specific questions about it, we would have to go through it and find those things. It's not electronically indexed, but it is here, and it is clearly of importance. I appreciate that you're not a lawyer, Mr Russell, but you will have in the employment of the Scottish Government many well-qualified and eminent lawyers who can assist you on that. When did you read the agreement? I read the agreement when it started to read it when it first came out and continued to read it over the weekend, and it is here. However, I am not a lawyer, and I am not going to debate or discuss the fine print of this. We have lawyers in this room who are more than capable of doing so, and I am sure that I want to do so. You indeed are a lawyer. What I am familiar with is what is in here in the draft political declaration, and I am also familiar with the recommendations and information that has come to me, as you say, from distinguished lawyers. You skin the document and you formed a view on it when it was published. I am just wondering how you were able to do that, because the document went in the public domain at 11.46 a.m. last Wednesday, and at 12.09 p.m., 23 minutes later, you tweeted the following, that this is a very poor and disastrous deal. How much of the document had you read? What you are endeavouring to do is to say that I came to this document unwilling to accept it. I came to this document on the basis, as I have said, Mr Fraser, and I think that it is very clear, if you have an agreement based upon a set of red lines that will be very damaging to Scotland, which this document is, then you cannot have an agreement that is going to be good for Scotland. Now, I have to say, had I proved to be wrong in that, you know, I would have admitted to be wrong. I am not wrong, and neither is the opinion of all of those who have looked at it and said to themselves, this will be a disastrous deal for Scotland. As a representative of a Scottish constituency and a member of the Scottish Parliament and a minister, my view is that this is very bad for Scotland. I would hope that all those who are responsible to their constituents in Scotland would come to the same factual conclusion. We have established that you made up your mind before you even saw the text of the document, that it was a bad deal and that you were not going to like it. We have established that, thank you. We hear a lot of concern about the prospect of a no deal Brexit. We have heard that from a whole range of industry sectors and a whole range of those across the public sector and the public about a no deal. Is this better than a no deal or worse? It is. A no deal would be worse than this. It comes to a choice between this and a no deal. This is better. When it comes to a choice between this or alien invasion, this is better, but the reality of the situation is that both are very bad. We could go into semantics and discuss what that means in terms of comparison. With respect to alien invasion, this is somewhat worse likely than a no deal. Oh, I don't know. Have you seen Jacob Rees-Mogg? Really? Let me make one more question. Let's try and elevate this discussion that we can, cabinet secretary, and not get personal about it. We've heard in the last few days calls from the Confederation of British Industry from the National Farmers Union across the United Kingdom, including in Scotland, urging support for the Prime Minister's deal. Shouldn't you be listening to them? I am not only listening to them, Mr Fraser. I am engaging with them on the basis that I have indicated to you that I fully understand the position that they are taking. They have been treated abominably by the current Conservative Government for the last two and a half years. They quite clearly want the agony to end, and I fully understand that. However, I also think that a measured approach to this would say two things. One is that this is very bad and will continue to create uncertainty and damage in the long term, and therefore it's important that that is recognised. Secondly, I want to counter the false propaganda that it is only this deal or no deal that is not true, and therefore it is an obligation upon me to say that it isn't true, and therefore to talk about what can be done. That's precisely what I'm doing, and I'm going to go on doing it. Good morning. I wonder whether, Mr Fraser, like myself, you took the liberty of reading the draft withdrawal agreement that was published on 19 March, therefore initiating the need to go and read through the entire withdrawal agreement that was published last week, allowing to focus on the key matters that were not published in March. That's a very good point. That doesn't come as an enormous surprise. I would have hoped that the Prime Minister could have done better, but I'll just go back to this really important point. What is in this arises out of the red lines, and the Barnier slide is of great importance in this. We saw that slide 18 months ago, certainly a year ago, and what the slide tells you is that if you set these red lines, this is what's going to happen. These are the outcomes. The Prime Minister set these red lines in an attempt to balance the forces in her warring party. Those red lines have resulted in this bad situation. It's not a surprise. Nobody came to this tabula rasa. They came to knowing what had taken place. Patrick, you had a good—I know that you've got other questions about the GM, the committee process, but do you want to talk about the general light at this stage? I think that the questions that I wanted to ask about the joint committee are relevant to the discussions about initial reactions that just came up. You're right, Cabinet Secretary, there's no electronic index. It's not a very well presented document in terms of making it easy to understand, but it did take me about five minutes with the control left function on my computer just to find that there is no mechanism included for the clear input of either the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament or other devolved administrations. The joint committee that's set up under article 164 between the UK and the EU, which will be really pretty crucial in trying to smooth out any conflicts that arise if this agreement is actually put in place, so all on the assumption that's been passed by Westminster and put into law. That joint committee has there been any discussion between the Scottish Government and the UK Government about how that's supposed to operate and the means by which there'd be input, because in the absence of Scottish MEPs, it seems to me that this is the only route in to the discussions about how to implement and how to continue to negotiate either the transition period or the longer term future. There has been no such discussion, but the precedent on this is worrying. There was a discussion at GMC last week led by Suella Braverman, yet another one who isn't there now, and led well, I have to say. I thought she was an effective minister in terms of taking her brief forward about the independent monitoring authority on the withdrawal agreement bill, and both Mark Drakeford and Wales and myself made the point that we expected to see and thought we had to see a representative of Scotland on that. What we were getting back was what often you get back in these discussions. This isn't going to be representational. This is going to be based on merit. I did make the point that I thought there would be at least one person who was meritorious enough in Scotland and one person meritorious enough in Wales to serve upon it. Exactly the same, of course, with the Trade Remedy Authority. No membership, despite the fact that this was pursued in the House of Commons. In my view, the joint committee will not, presumably, contain the balance that it should contain. If that were to come to pass, I would want to make sure that Scotland was in there, but the precedent isn't good. There is a provision that says that the joint committee will make its decisions by mutual agreement. It seems to me that there is an opportunity to ensure that the UK on this joint committee is represented by all ministers who are interested in matters under discussion. If there is a devolved matter, the devolved administrations would be physically present on that committee. Or that the positions of the UK on that committee are those that are reached by mutual agreement in the UK's internal JMC mechanism. Do you have a view about what would be the best way of doing this? I would personally be happy to see this deal struck down, but it is theoretically possible that it will be implemented, and we will be living with those provisions. How should it work? What efforts are you making to change the thinking of the UK about how it is going to work? Can I roll that question back just a step? Whatever arrangements are come to, we will need to recognise both the existence of devolution and the fact that devolution is badly broken as a result of Brexit. That is tied up with the issue of what happens next in terms of the devolved administrations. It seems to me that the poor understanding of devolution exists in the UK Government at the present moment fails to understand that there is no hierarchy of Governments. There is a hierarchy of parliaments and no hierarchy of Governments. There are responsibilities for each Government. That is not to say that the UK Government cannot overrule the Scottish Government, but by using the parliamentary route is that hierarchy of parliaments. It would seem to me that the important thing is to recognise the need to ensure that, where there is a devolved responsibility, the minister with that responsibility is the one involved in this process. That leads you to the assumption that some sort of mechanism, such as what Carter and Jones talked about frequently, of having some sort of council of ministers of those islands that sit as equals, dealing with issues that, for example, the UK Government will deal with for England, Welsh ministers will deal with, Scottish ministers will deal with, and when they exist, Northern Ireland ministers will deal with, they would be the right way forward. That would mean that, in what you are postulating, the involvement of those ministers as equals within that process would be the right thing to do. That deciding upon that should be part of the process of looking at the failures of devolution to cope with the present situation and changing it accordingly. You yourself just raised, Cabinet Secretary, the issues of involvement and devolved institutions, and I think we should go there now on the issues of consent. Thank you, convener. Before I ask you questions of consent, Cabinet Secretary, I am not sure I have your attention yet. Sorry, yes. Are you ready? I am, of course, really. Before I go into questions of consent, Cabinet Secretary, the Presiding Officer of this Parliament has many times reminded us all that, in these debates, we should treat other parliamentarians in parliaments across this country with dignity and respect. I have my quarrels with Jacob Rees-Mogg, too, but describing him in the context of an alien invasion is a remark which I know was a rush of blood to the head, Cabinet Secretary, but, frankly, was beneath you. Would you like to withdraw it? No, my blood didn't rush to my head, but if the joke misfired in any sense, then, of course, I'm sorry about that. Thank you for that, and I'm sure that Mr Rees-Mogg will appreciate the apology. Certainly I do. A legislative consent, Cabinet Secretary, is it still the Scottish Government's position that the Scottish Government will not participate in any legislative consent process with regard to any Brexit legislation? Yes. So this presumably includes any future legislation with regard to the withdrawal agreement? It does. Thank you. Does it also extend to the legislative consent process, which is under way with regard to the healthcare international arrangements bill? It may not extend to that. That is a matter that we have to fully discuss with the relevant ministers. Who is the relevant minister? It would be Jeane Freeman, I would think. But the healthcare international arrangements bill is Brexit legislation, is it not? It is, and I don't want to give a hard and fast answer on the healthcare arrangements bill, because it does cover a significant number of individuals who will require services, and in those circumstances I don't want to give that at this present moment, because I want to discuss it with the relevant minister. As I understand it, Cabinet Secretary, please correct me if I'm wrong, but as I understand it, the healthcare international arrangements bill gives the Secretary of State powers to fund and arrange healthcare for British citizens living in the EU 27 after we leave the European Union. Among other matters, it will help nearly 200,000 British pensioners, including Scottish pensions, of course, living in EU countries to continue to access the healthcare that they need, and it will mean that hundreds of thousands of British citizens, including people who live and work in Scotland, who require medical treatment each year during holidays in Europe can still be covered for medical assistance when they need it. As we have agreed, Brexit-related legislation is, therefore, legislation that you have said and you just reconfirmed that you wish to have no part of the legislative consent process with regard to any Brexit-related legislation. As I understand it, Cabinet Secretary, Scottish pensioners living abroad would continue to have their healthcare paid because the UK Government would legislate for that anyway, even if your consent or, indeed, Holyrood's consent is not forthcoming, but there are categories of people that the bill cannot cover in Scotland unless there is a legislative consent memorandum and, indeed, a legislative consent motion passed. For example, present arrangements that enable patients in the United Kingdom to be treated by the NHS—sorry, being treated by the NHS—to travel to an EU country for treatment if required would no longer be possible for NHS patients in Scotland. Is it really the Scottish Government's view that the devolution process is so broken because of Brexit that these patients should be harmed in this way? Well, let me repeat the answer that I gave to you before you ask that question. I will have discussions with the relevant minister because I recognise the sensitivity of this and that is our position. If you are arguing that I am taking a hard and fast view on that bill, I am not. So it is no longer the case that the Scottish Government will not participate in the legislative consent process for all Brexit-related legislation. Perhaps I could just say, would you rather I had a hard and fast view that did what you wanted me to do clearly, which is to deprive people of the services, or would you rather that I took a pragmatic, sensitive and sensible view, which is what I am taking? I would rather that you were accurate in your answers to questions that are asked in good faith by this committee. The question is, is at the Scottish Government's position that the Scottish Government will have nothing to do with the legislative consent process with regard to any Brexit-related legislation? It is the Scottish Government's position that I will consider on their merits, as the Cabinet will, issues that arise, including issues that are of great sensitivity. That is what you would expect a Government to do. So having thrown all your toys out of the pram, you are now having to get them back in the pram, aren't you? Convener, I think that there was a question about respect at the start of this that seems to have disappeared. I understand that this is an emotional matter and I just ask everyone involved in these discussions to recognise that we are trying to do a job as best as we can, in a civil way as we can, regardless of who we are on this table. I think that that would be helpful. Let me ask a question first of all about legislative consent issues. If the withdrawal agreement is voted on by the UK Parliament, that will require domestic legislation in the UK. Has there been any discussions with the United Kingdom Government about the areas of the bill that may require legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament? Yes, there have been in terms of the withdrawal implementation bill. I said earlier—I want to say it again—Suella Braverman, who was handling this for UK Government through GMC, was doing extremely well and was doing it in a very positive and instructive way. Both Mark Drakeford and I indicated at the meeting on Tuesday that we will miss her, because she was consulting and bringing material to us. That does not alter the fact that we do not believe that we should give legislative consent given that the legislative consent process is broken and was clearly broken in the way that the UK Government behaved earlier this year. However, there are areas in the bill that will require legislative consent. We have negotiated and discussed details of the bill and will continue to do so. We could resolve the issue of legislative consent very quickly. I have put proposals to David Lidington, which would resolve this instantly. I had another conversation with him about them last week. Regrettably, the UK Government has not brought those forward and has not agreed them. If they agree them, we can move into a situation that will allow us to operate in as constructive a way as possible by having profound disagreements about what the issues are. I have to say profound disagreements that are undertaken in a civilised and sometimes jocular way, as they should be. We are moving into some of the specifics now, Emma. Thank you, convener. Good morning. We'll have the secretary. Good morning, everybody. I'm interested in issues around fishing and the common fisheries policy as we move forward. There's been some interesting info in our briefing that the draft withdrawal agreement contains provisions related to fisheries with transition, future relationship and the potential use of the backstop. I'm aware that concerns have been raised about the issue of backstop and access to waters and access to markets. I don't know if I fully understand it. I wonder if you could tell me how we plan to have access to our waters with the Scottish fishermen as we move forward. I think that this agreement indicates that that's not likely to happen in the way that the Scottish fishermen have been promised, repeatedly promised, by the Conservative Party at every level that it would happen. This won't be a surprise to observers of this over the last 40 to 45 years, because the story of the last 40 to 45 years is a constant disappointment from the UK Government to Scottish fishermen in terms of what they've been promised and what it's actually delivered. This deal indicates that there could be at some stage the status of a coastal state. What it also indicates is that there are already discussions under way about trading off access for other issues. It also does so with one new element, which is very concerning. Suddenly, out of nowhere, aquaculture appears in this matter. Aquaculture is actually worth more to the Scottish economy than the other parts of the fishing industry. It appears to have been thrown in here as something to be traded off. I heard at the weekend from somebody I know who is a senior journalist in Norway who says that the Norwegian aquaculture industry is thrilled by this, because they think that it will diminish the competitiveness of the Scottish aquaculture industry. I think that we're seeing something very cynical in this, cynical in terms of promises to the Scottish fishermen, and cynical in damaging in terms of the aquaculture industry. The final point that I would give to you on this is that if transition is longer than presently stated, and it will be, there is a European election in June next year, it will be October at least and possibly the end of the year before a new commission is in place. That will leave a single year for the complex negotiations, which are far more complex than what has happened up until now. Let us assume that transition will take considerably longer. That means that we could be at 2022, 2023, before there's any resolution of this, again contrary to the promises that have been made. I think that we should be very straight about this. The Prime Minister's so-called deal in here doesn't even honour the commitments to the one sector that she talks about in the Scottish economy. She never talks about any other sector in the Scottish economy, but she talks about fishing because she thinks that she's got support there. That support might be eruding faster than she expects, given the nature of this deal. The Secretary of State, David Mundell, said that he was content with the fishing deal, and he used that one word, content, but I would be more inclined to use the word continued uncertainty or potential sell-out again. Is that something that we should be alerting the fishermen about? Well, if fishing was a red line for the Secretary of State for Scotland and the status of Northern Ireland, then I don't really quite understand why he hasn't recognised that, but that's a matter for him. Alex, you've got questions on agriculture. Thank you, convener. I can't make my register of interests around agriculture. Cabinet Secretary, you say that everyone shared your immediate rejection of withdrawal agreement, but NFU Scotland, in a joint statement, said that it was for draft Brexit withdrawal agreement whilst not perfect, was an opportunity that needs to be taken. Were they wrong? I didn't say that everyone immediately rejected the draft withdrawal agreement. What I said was that I believe that I have the greatest understanding and sympathy for those who want to get this agony over, an agony imposed by the Conservatives, but I do think that it will turn out to be a disappointment to them. A point that I have already made to the NFU and will continue to make to them on the basis of the analysis that I have given you and further information, and we will publish more information over the next few days that will indicate what the real problems are within this. Before I ask some questions around EU citizens and migration, the cabinet secretary knows me well and he knows that I just like to cut to the chase. I am sure that he will correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me that England and Wales get what they have voted for. Remain vote in Northern Ireland is getting a special arrangement to stay close to the EU, and rightly so, and for good reasons. Yet Scotland, with the highest vote to remain in the UK, has, in my view, been ignored. That leads me to ask the question in less than the 23 minutes referred to by Mr Fraser. How come everybody else gets what they voted for? Given that they say that past behaviour is the best predictor of future behaviour and we know that the LCM process has been trashed, we have heard countless accounts of how the joint ministerial committees have been frustrating. There is no membership for Scotland on the joint committees. How confident are you that the UK Government is going to start treating this Parliament and the people of Scotland with the dignity, fairness and respect that they demand and deserve? I am very familiar with your direct approach. I will give you a direct answer. I have no such confidence at all, as you say. You are well qualified as a former professional and social worker to say that past behaviour is often an indicator. I see no change coming at all. I would only add one thing. It is not just all those areas that have got what they asked for. Gibraltar, of course, has what they expected, and I am very glad about that. I rejoice that Gibraltar and Northern Ireland have got arrangements which suit them. I understand that, in Wales, for example, the votes were very likely now against leaving, but they did originally vote by a small majority to leave. Scotland has been uniquely disadvantaged and remains uniquely disadvantaged. Given that the governing party Westminster has 13 Scottish MPs, they would be leaping up and down and demanding a better treatment for Scotland. The opposite is the case. They are actually demanding that Scotland is treated as badly as everybody else. I do think that that is a bit weird. I am sure that the cabinet secretary has seen the BBC reports of Mrs May's remarks yesterday to the CBI where she has vowed to put a stop to EU nationals jumping the queue. She did not, of course, set out any details on how she proposes to do that. It would again seem to me that the Tories are once again appealing to the lowest common denominator, a theme through this whole Brexit debate that has its roots back to the referendum. What is your reaction, given that there is a positive case, an economic case, for migration and the importance of freedom of movement and the facts that we know that EU nationals are also net contributors? It was a substantive item of discussion at the GMC. In fact, it has been several times migration, but on Monday there was a very, very strong view put both by myself and Mark Drakeford, that we found this totally unacceptable. Indeed, I went so far in the television afterwards to say that I specifically disassociated the Scottish Government from those remarks. They are disgraceful. They are, in my view, dog whistle politics. They are designed to play to the lowest common denominator. They are also wrong. They are both morally wrong, but they are wrong in the practicalities of the situation. Migration is a benefit to Scotland. As you say, it is a net benefit in terms of the earning potential and contribution of migrants. However, they are essential in terms of Scotland and Scotland's economic health. I say again and again that, in the highlands and islands of Scotland, 20 per cent of the working-age population will retire within the next five to 10 years. People are not reproducing themselves. There is no growth in the highland population unless it comes from migration. If you do what is proposed—actually, this Prime Minister's deal proposes—then you will condemn the highlands and islands of Scotland to perpetual long-term labour shortages in key sectors. I met with a lead tourism provider in my constituency some weeks ago who told me that, on the sites that they manage, they have been between 10 and 15 per cent down in workforce for the last year, that they are now paying cleaning staff up to £12 an hour because they have to compete because there is a real shortage of staff. That is kicking in progressively every year. It is not just in tourism. It is every part of the labour workforce. This is self-defeating, but the language of it is wrong, too. The language is driving people away, and it is utterly the wrong thing to do. We will have nothing to do with it. Nobody in this country should have anything to do with it, because it is against our interests to argue in this way. I am sure that Mr Russell is also aware that the committee has acknowledged and indeed appined on the financial risks associated to our budget with the demographic challenge facing Scotland. We know that, over the next 25 years, the pensioner age population will increase by 25 per cent, and yet there is a predicted contraction in the working age population. We know that Scotland, in comparison to the rest of the UK, has the impact of migration on our GDP, which is potentially greater. What certainty does the proposed withdrawal agreement give to Scotland that our particular needs are going to be met? We gave very comprehensive evidence to the MAC study. We were immensely disappointed with it. So were Wales, so were Northern Ireland. There was a complete inability to understand the economies of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It was incredibly Anglo-centric. That has continued, because the UK Government is leaning on this false analysis in order to drive forward a policy that will do huge damage. I have to say that I really laboured the point on Monday in London. It has to recognise. This is not as one of the previous immigration ministers said, but the same sort of difficulties we have in the shortage of construction workers. This is existential for Scotland. If the population declines in the way that it looks at it may decline in the scenario of zero EU migration, the population would decline by 3 per cent by 2041. In those circumstances, that will be particularly concentrated in rural areas and particularly in the west of Scotland. I speak with some passion about this because of my constituency. That type of depopulation that drives down the availability of services is circular. It feeds upon itself and leads to whole communities essentially declining dying and being emptied. That is the reality. That is what Scotland is being condemned to by a Government in London that is not listening. That is why I feel particularly strongly about it. I really want to take those people. I want to take Caroline Lucas, the immigration minister, to the islands of Argyll and point out to her the consequences of the actions that she appears to wish to take will lead to the decline and emptying of those communities. That is the reality. That is what they need to know. Surely in those circumstances, if they saw it with their own eyes, they would desist from their destructive actions. I want to ask you about the effect that withdrawal agreement will have on going to discussions about common UK frameworks. Do you accept that there is now a greater urgency in agreeing those frameworks in the possible event of a hard exit? What impact will the Northern Ireland protocol within the withdrawal agreement have on the negotiation of common UK frameworks and the operation of the UK internal market? Two related questions. On frameworks, we have tried very hard over the past two years of the GMC, and, astonishingly, the 15th meeting was held this week. We have tried very hard to see if we could get a modus operandi through the frameworks that at least allowed some activity and work together to take place. We have been quite successful, I have to say, because of a determination by those of us to do so and because of superb work by officials. I am not intending to threaten the work of the frameworks in any way. We are continuing to make progress. There is a lot of stuff in there and operating. I said at a previous meeting in this committee that the real problem of frameworks—I think that I said that at the event that the committee held in the RSE—is the more you have to write them down, the less easy it is to get agreement. If they operate on the basis of mutual cooperation, if they operate on the basis of established relationships, they contend to work quite well. When you get to something like the agriculture business bill, when you are trying to make it very specific, you do have a problem because there will clearly be issues of difficulty and agreement. Even in that instance, discussion is continuing. I hope that we can continue to work on frameworks. The relationship is poor, and I have to say that there is a complete lack of trust, I think, on both sides. We are also in a situation where we profoundly disagree with what is now taking place. In terms of the Northern Irish situation, the conundrum of that that presents an additional issue to frameworks. The conundrum is that if you are trying to engage the four countries of these islands to work together in the framework, but one of those is a natural fact in regulatory alignment with the EU country, which will be the case in terms of the Northern Ireland situation, then there are difficulties in managing that. We pointed that out at the very beginning. It has not been addressed by the UK. I think we will begin to see it. Now, of course, if there was another one, if we were also in that situation, then the benefits might accrue to the other members who weren't. But the present moment is not clear how that will happen with simply one of us and operating in a different way and perhaps in a different market. Finally, there is nothing that prevents—as far as we understand it—within the agreement that would prevent Northern Ireland fully accessing the UK market, contrary to what I noticed Sammy Wilson was saying the other day. There isn't anything that would prevent that. In those circumstances, the operation of the so-called UK internal market would presumably continue. The UK internal market must be predicated upon the understanding of devolution and the legal reality of devolution that exists, and some of the way in which the UK internal market is being talked about seems to ignore the reality of devolution and the subsidiarity, and we will resist any changes that push us in that direction. Will he have any questions in this area? Thanks very much, Bruce. The Secretary of State last month said that he couldn't support a differentiated deal for Northern Ireland now. I've got one now. He appears to support it. Can you give us your view about what the difficulties that Scottish producers will face if the deal goes ahead in this manner? Well, they are legion. If you have a very close neighbour here who can access the single market in a way that we can't, you will, on the very crudest level, be competing with one hand tied behind your back. If you are an incoming investor and you want to access the single market, you'll base yourself in Northern Ireland, not in Scotland. You will be able to have preferential treatment in terms of your goods and how they move, including services, which will not be available to Scotland, so it will be an additional element of competition that will be difficult to deal with. It will also mean that those who manufacture in Northern Ireland, whether it be food or drink, agri food is very important in the Northern Ireland range of other things, will be operating with full European standards in perpetuity, because that's what the backstop is about. Whereas we will be at the mercy of a UK Government that may be increasingly driven towards coming to trade deals with people whose standards are not the same standards as a European standards, and in those circumstances that will also lead to deterioration of our ability to compete effectively in the markets that we should be competing in. It's simply a wrong thing to happen. This is driven by a UK Government that doesn't want to give anything to Scotland. That's the centre of their thinking. We saw the reports that, in their discussions with the Northern Ireland backstop in Brussels, they were desperate to ensure that any drafting excluded any possibility of Scotland being involved. There is a dog-in-the-manger attitude towards Scotland, which simply cannot be overcome as far as I can see it. In those circumstances, the exclusion will be damaging, and they know that it will be damaging. Why does the Secretary of State for Scotland not see it be damaging? I have no idea. Maybe it's reading a different document. As we move forward from this NFS deal, as is rejected by the House of Commons, how do we move forward from that to try to get at least the same kind of arrangement for Northern Ireland for Scotland to, in some future discussion, be on this deal being trashed? We very much recognise what Northern Ireland needs. We have no difficulty with that at all. We support it very strongly. We're not resisting it in any way. Indeed, where Scotland is offered, what Northern Ireland is offered, I wouldn't be sitting here criticising the withdrawal agreement. I would say that I still want to stay in the EU because I do want to stay in the EU, but that deal would be a deal that we could certainly negotiate seriously upon. At far back Scotland's place in Europe, which we published in December 2016, we indicated why a single market membership was of vital importance to Scotland. We indicated that we would prefer the whole of the UK to stay in a single market, but if that didn't happen, then we would want to see a Scotland staying in a single market, a differentiated deal. David Davis told me to my face in his office in the House of Commons in January 2017 that was, in his words, impossible. It could not be done. Now we see it not only could be done, but it's going to be done. That is particularly galling. Scotland's place in Europe also indicated that, to make it really effective, it would move on and strengthen the evolution package. It gives, for example, legal personality to Scotland and allowed Scotland to take part, as the subsidiary parliaments do in Belgium, in trade discussions and negotiations. So you get a strong package out of it. Scotland's had nothing. Is there any support for Scotland's position, do you think, in the House of Commons opposition parties on this issue? I think you'd have to ask the House of Commons opposition parties. I noticed that Jeremy Corbyn referred on, I think, last week in response to the Prime Minister in her statement, talked about the issue of migration and devolution. I think that that was an important contribution that he made, so clearly there's an understanding. It may not be and probably isn't exactly the same as I'm expressing it, but I think there is an understanding that these are live issues. Basic Democrats would look at this and say, hey, a minute, on the point that Angela Constance made, if Scotland voted 62 per cent to remain, surely, in a mature political system, there would have been a sensible negotiation that would have recognised that and allowed for that within the overall polity that the UK Government was pursuing. There has been no recognition of it at all. I do want to ask about digital, perhaps. We'll come back to that, because I've still got other supplementaries in this area. Thanks very much. I just wanted to come back on the issues relating to the arrangements in the withdrawal agreement for Northern Ireland or to prevent a hard border. The relationship to the later discussion on frameworks, because we talk about frameworks almost in a technocratic sense that it's a merely operational or administrative arrangement to allow separate policy to exist and some shared decisions to bind them together. If frameworks are this technocratic arrangement, they should be ideologically neutral. It seems to me that the level playing field commitments in the Northern Ireland backstop place a great deal of emphasis on things that restrict the ability of Governments to make decisions like state aid and very little emphasis on things that restrict the operation of the private sector, like environmental regulations or workplace protections. It seems to me that this is an ideologically loaded framework, if you like. Is there a danger not only that that has an impact on Northern Ireland, but that that is the tone of the discussion on common frameworks in future, that we don't see something that merely facilitates good Government, but something that is ideologically loaded in favour of the kind of politics that some on the hard right of the Conservative Party, whatever their planetary origin, would like to see imposed on us? I'm a bit surprised by that one particularly, but I have to say that the hard right, of course, is driving this debate, and Brexit is a hard right policy. The rest of the Conservative Party, even in Scotland, have simply gone along with it, presumably for fear of the Conservatives not being in office. I think that the point that you raised is an important one. My position has been, I think that it's been the position of others, who have been negotiating this to see frameworks as a scaffolding around the building and to make sure that the scaffolding is there and can be used. The actual agreements lie within the building itself, within each of the subjects that we're dealing with. Of course, on those, the policy differences become important. If there is freedom to operate in those key policy areas, that's fine, but in some reserved areas there will be no such freedom to operate, and in those areas the type of push that you're talking about is taking place. That is why it is very important that this Parliament is the master of all the issues, rather than merely some of them, so that we don't find ourselves in that position. I wanted to ask a supplementary to Willie Coffey's question, but I now have a supplementary to Patrick Coffey's supplementary to Willie Coffey's question, which we've convened around. We were just talking about, as you were answering it, cabinet secretary. It is the case, isn't it? That there are included within Annex 5, which is the very long list of single market provisions that will continue to apply in Northern Ireland, but not in the rest of the Irish Kingdom, in the event that the protocol comes into force. Included within that list are quite a number of environmental regulations and directives. It's not the case that, as Mr Harvey might have implied, all of the single market rules and regulations that will apply in Northern Ireland are restrictions on government. Quite a lot of them are about product standardisation, product safety, environmental standards and so on and so forth. The argument that Mr Harvey put to you was about whether the construction of the single market protections that we have in the Northern Ireland protocol in Backstop is ideologically driven in favour of a particular pro-business direction. I don't think that that would be an accurate reflection of the complexity of what's in Annex 5. Let's not follow about this because this is an interpretation of a question, but it seems to me that the ideological drive in surprise at Fett Scotland will be and could be profound. I wanted to ask you a slightly different question, but we're very closely related to the issue that you were exploring with Mr Coffey. One of the things that is remarkable about the Backstop, as it's informally called—I prefer it to call it the protocol because I have the misfortune of being a lawyer and I've got this document—is that the European Union has accepted something that, at the beginning of this process, it said it wouldn't accept, which is the disaggregation of the four fundamental freedoms of the single market. What article 6.2 of the protocol would maintain for Northern Ireland in the event that the protocol comes into force are a series of single market provisions, a long series of single market provisions, with regard to goods, not with regard to free movement of workers or people, not with regard to free movement of services, not with regard to free movement of capital, but with regard to free movement of goods. The European Union has accepted this because, as I hope we all agree, it is imperative that Brexit does not jeopardise north-south co-operation on the island of Ireland, that Brexit does not trigger a hard border on the island of Ireland and that Brexit does not undermine in any way any aspect of the Belfast agreement of 1998. On all of that, I think that there is agreement between all of us, certainly Mr Russell, there's agreement between you and me. The Scottish Government wants those provisions that apply with regard to Northern Ireland also to apply to Scotland so that, in the words of the First Minister last week, there is no competitive disadvantage to businesses in Scotland. My question is this. What evidence do you have that the European Union would be prepared to accept that the extraordinary provisions that apply in these extraordinary circumstances, because of the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland, could be extended also to other parts of the United Kingdom, whether Scotland or whether the whole of the United Kingdom, given that they do fly in the face of what was one of the European Union's red lines at the beginning of the process, namely that the four fundamental freedoms of the single market could not be disaggregated. In other words, would the European Union accept that the extraordinary provisions of article 6.2 of the Northern Ireland protocol could be extended to other parts of the United Kingdom? It's a good question. I think that it should be in two parts, if you don't mind. The first part is to consider the whole of the UK and the second part is to consider Scotland. In terms of the whole of the UK, I concur with your view that that particular disaggregation would be unlikely, to say the least, because it does impinge upon the integrity of the single market. If the UK had suggested, as we don't know whether it did or not, that this was the solution applied to the whole of the UK, that would not have been acceptable, because, as I said, the integrity of the single market would be affected. What we don't know—and I wish that I did know—was at what stage, if any, in the negotiations, the UK said—I don't think that it ever did, but if it did say, look, there are separate issues here in Scotland to which we require a particular approach. What read-across could we have, given the democratic imperative to have a compromise? We don't know whether they ever said that, but we do know that all the discussions that have taken place and been reported publicly in terms of attitude towards Scotland, particularly at the start of this process, and commented upon by UK Government ministers, were that if the UK were to come to the table seeking special dispensations for Scotland or particular deals for Scotland, that would have become part of the negotiation, because it would have been brought to the table by the UK. I can't say whether or not that particular formulation that came out at the end would have been the same formulation that was exactly applied to Northern Ireland. What I can say is that no attempt appears to have been made to do the read-across by the UK Government and to recognise that the case—which is a different case, of course—it's a different case, but the case for ensuring that Scotland had a better treatment because A of how it voted, and secondly because of the implications of competition from Northern Ireland, that that was the case. Now, if the UK Government were to have said—because it's late in the day for this deal—that's what should have happened, certainly my view from what I have heard in the EU is that discussion would have taken place, could it have been part of the negotiations? If it had been pursued with vigor by the UK Government in the same way as they were absolutely insistent that there had to be a deal for Northern Ireland, then I'm sure there would have been some different treatment. The reality was that nothing was done. That's where we are. Just to be clear about this, and I'm not trying to put words in your mouth, but I do think that it's very important that we clarify this for the record. My question was what evidence do you have that the solution proposed by the First Minister, for completely understandable reasons, given everything that you've written in your various Scotland's place in your documents, what evidence do you have that the solution proposed by the First Minister would be acceptable to the European Union, and your answer is that you don't have any evidence that it would be acceptable to the European Union? I know you're not trying to put it where it's my matter, so I want to be absolutely clear what I say. We have—there is no evidence that at any stage the UK endeavoured to get a differentiated deal for Scotland. Therefore, where we find ourselves, there's a differentiated deal for Northern Ireland, but an expression that such a deal was impossible for Scotland. That is not the case. A differentiated deal would have been possible for Scotland. What we are now left with, whether there is one differentiated deal, is to say, if there is only one differentiated deal on the table, we should have had it too. But do you not accept that the European Union has accepted that there needs to be a differentiated deal for Northern Ireland, to the extent that it compromises the integrity of the four fundamental freedoms, only because of what the protocol describes as the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, which are not shared by any part of Great Britain? But we could have, and the UK Government could have, and I'm not trying to be difficult about this. The UK Government could have said at any stage, here are the unique circumstances in Northern Ireland and the unique circumstances in Scotland, which are not the same, absolutely not the same, but they both require for us, speaking as a UK Government, to have an understanding of that in the negotiations and to produce an outcome that is acceptable. That did not happen. So, when you are at the end of that process and you have on the table one unique deal, it is entirely legitimate to say that we should have that deal too. Cabinet Secretary, you described perhaps some of the reaction to the withdrawal agreement as a false dawn. I think that it would also be fair to say that this is not the end, the beginning of the end, and giving the arithmetic of the House of Commons is probably not even the end of the beginning. However, if you will indulge me for a moment in the hypothetical that the withdrawal agreement does find a majority in the House of Commons and we move into the post-29th of March world, the negotiations that the United Kingdom will have to undertake with the European Union will be the most difficult negotiations the UK has had to conduct in the post-war era. The UK, a state which has not had an independent trade policy in almost half a century, will be going up against a trading superpower. There is clearly a great asymmetry of power in this scenario. However, it is further compounded by the arrangements that provisions are made for within the withdrawal agreement. With reference to the withdrawal agreement and the lack of any unilateral options for the UK, can you perhaps characterise the context that the UK will have to conduct these negotiations in and what you think some of the implications would be with regards to the concessions about the European Union will be able to extract on numerous areas, for example fishing? I had a fascinating conversation with a Swiss negotiator some time ago who said to me, the UK should remember that if they are going to negotiate, they are negotiating with the best in the world. What we have actually seen is some fairness and generosity from the EU, but a recognition that if the UK sets its red lines, that is in the end what is going to dictate what comes out. If the UK had gone in in a better frame of mind and gone in better prepared and better briefed and with a better set of red lines, for example looking at single market and customs union membership, we could have come out with those things. What will be necessary in these negotiations is absolute clarity of what the UK wants and how it can get it. One of the remarkable things of the last two and a bit years is that what the UK wanted was only written down eventually in the checkers agreement. We had had actually two years from the referendum to the checkers agreement without anything written down. Now, why was that? Because we now know, having seen what happened after the checkers agreement, when it was written down, people fell out over it and couldn't agree and resigned because of what's in it. That's happened again with a written agreement now, last week, more people resigned. The more specific the UK has become, the less able it has been able to keep its own people on board and the more it has actually been the victim of others. I think we'll see that doing these very complicated negotiations regrettably. I mean, I have little confidence that they will produce the results that are much wanted. Remember, this takes a long time and people's memories are often short. We see what we're seeing at the present moment, that people say, a plague on all your houses. We've had enough of all this, we just wanted to stop. Our obligation, I would suggest, is to persist, to tell people the truth of it as we see it, and to try and ameliorate the difficulties and disasters if we can, and that's what we're going on trying to do. Also, things keep changing minute by minute. I mean, I've just been told that this morning on radio, Amber Rudd says, it is my view Parliament will stop no deal. Now she said that on radio 4 this morning. She has, in a sense, torpedoed the Prime Minister's argument that it's either her deal or no deal. That gives an opportunity to say, let's get this as right as we can, given the chaos, and that would allow us to reject that deal and to do something better. If we were to choose a single market and customs union option, of course, then the type of negotiations you're talking about wouldn't be necessary. You spoke about the generosity and charity of the European Union in these negotiations. However, when it comes to deciding upon a free trade arrangement with the United Kingdom, ultimately will be a transactional consideration. Now, as provisions within the withdrawal agreement effectively state that the UK is locked in a customs union or a shared customs area with the European Union until such times as Bristol was determined otherwise, does this not make it impossible, therefore, without an agreement with Europe for the UK to cut any independent trade deals with third countries? Well, I mean, they may cut them, but there'll be the greatest advantage in so doing, and we know that. I mean, there's no pot of gold. I've said this, I think, every time I've been in this committee. There is no pot of gold in these new trade negotiations. It simply does not exist, and it's a cruel deception to people to say it does exist. Any deals that will be struck will be disadvantageous and minor. I noticed last weekend while all the fuss was going on in London that David Davis and the former agricultural secretary's name escapes me to Owen Patterson, indeed, were in Oklahoma, or discussing trade matters with the trade commission from Oklahoma, and apparently there are huge trading opportunities in Oklahoma. Well, they failed to notice. Then actual fact that there are two European countries higher up in the amount of trade they do with Oklahoma than ourselves, but both Germany and the Netherlands. So there's no barriers if you wish to trade to Oklahoma to do so now. The fact that it's not being done is probably a reflection of how poor the UK has been in setting up these agreements. But Oklahoma is 0.3% of the trade potential of the United States. So this is all nonsensical. Can I make a point about, I think, the three big issues in here. One is the integrity of the single market will be very important to the EU, and that will dominate the next process. It will be absolutely determined not to weaken that. Secondly, the UK will be as a third country. It will be treated like a third country. So it won't have any heft or weight in negotiations which it has as a member of the EU. And thirdly, we are not the centre of the universe. British exceptionalism has been a real problem within these negotiations. The reality of the situation is that there are bigger fish to fry in the EU at the present moment, and therefore this will fall rapidly down the agenda of an EU that has major issues of its own to address. If I could, very finely, cabinet secretary, to ask about the timescales. Do you think that the timescales set out within the withdrawal agreement are realistic, given that an average EU trade deal takes about four years plus a limitation period? They are not really impossible. The European elections take place in June, so you can't expect anything much to happen between March and June, nothing at all. Then a new commission comes in. I think the expectation says it will be hard to form that commission, given the likely outcome of the elections, which will not be clear cut, so October is normally about the earliest to expect a commission to be in place. It could be the end of the year. What does that leave, 12 months? You just can't do this in 12 months. When Barney says, we will give you until the end of 2022, and Tory Brexit has stood her hands up in horror and shouted about vassal states, they will be lucky that 2022 is the conclusion given the complexity of it. You stated October, but that would give nine months before the decision has to be made. It would give nine months before having to make a decision on extending a transition period, so do you think that it is inevitable that the transition period would have to be extended? It is impossible to do it in the time required. There was, apparently, the end of the transition period. The date was to be written to the withdrawal implementation bill. I would be highly surprised if that happens now. Willie, have any of you still wanted to ask that question? If I could, Ruthless, if there is time, thanks very much. Cabinet Secretary, I just wanted to ask a wee question about the digital single market. The Prime Minister has some records saying that we are coming out of that as well. As you probably know, the digital single market is worth about 400 billion euros per year and supports hundreds of thousands of jobs right across the European Union, and, in the half an hour or so, we have been here to document. You do not have to read it cover to cover, but there are only four mentions of the word digital in it, and they are about digitally signing application forms for residency. There is not a word in the entire document about this massive digital economy in Europe. What is the Scottish Government's view about this, and how can we possibly take this forward to ensure that Scotland's interests are maintained in this economy? We have addressed this in previous publications. It is not just a question when you leave this whole process of leaving the EU. It is not just walking away from things that are valuable. It is also for going opportunities that would continue to be valuable, and the digital single market is a classic example of for going opportunities. Edinburgh is a very good example. I declare an interest. My son is involved in the tech centre sector in Edinburgh. Edinburgh has got a flourishing tech sector. The opportunities for Edinburgh and Scotland in the digital single market are enormous, but they are immensely diminished because we will not begin it as a member. We will begin it as a third country, and third country by definition do not get the privileges of membership. This is really a crying shame for the opportunity that exists. In Edinburgh and throughout the UK, those are opportunities that will not be taken. Those are the opportunities of the next decade of the 21st century. Those are the things that we would need to do. We will no doubt be able to do some of them, but one hand will be tied behind our back. Why should we do that? Why should we? We would not vote to do that. We do not want to do that. That is a wrong thing for us, but it is being imposed on us. That is utterly wrong. I thank the cabinet secretary for his evidence this morning. The committee previously did to take the next item in private. I will close this public part of the meeting.