 I love risks, part of my professional life, but of course, I love even more to offer solution and for that I would like to have your help ask for your help. Let me start with a provocative statement. We often design and operate socio-technical systems. Our societies depend on, without fully understanding their behavior even, or in particular under adverse conditions. This capability gap is widening, sorry to say. Breakdowns of so-called critical infrastructures such as the electric power system often reveal surprises, disclose interdependencies of different order and unforeseen cascades. In short, we experience complex behaviors including dynamics, feedback loops, even regime shifts coming along with consequences often attaining global dimensions, all hard to imagine and to analyze. Moreover large-scale systems are witnessing tighter integration by pervasive use of information and communication technology, creating a system of systems and besides enormous benefits adding cyber attacks, some call it even war, to the set of hazards. Looking at risks in general, so we see that they have become interconnected, they are systemic by nature, they have hubs and linkages between different sectors and domains. A little bit more technical, so experience blackouts have shown the dominance of soft factors, lack of communication among operators. Overestimation of one's own capabilities and economic pressure turned out to be more important than purely technical failures we have learned to deal with. These soft factors are not adequately taken into account in present pre-analysis. The most sophisticated approach with agents to model elements of the power systems, for instance, the operator response and an intact physical layer may be taken for proof. Looking at nuclear power plants, they are among the most complicated but also the best analyzed single hazardous systems. However, the frequency of severe core meltdown accidents based on probabilistic risk analysis differ from statistics. We learned from recent Fukushima disaster about the importance of institutional deficits, lack of independent safety authority and cultural misperceptions, no failure culture, characterizing the nuclear accident as Japan made. It has been said by Japanese, not by me. So we also experienced a strong impact of a hostile environment, high radiation level, destroyed infrastructure on emergency measures which turned out to be insufficiently planned. We have also to recognize that a nuclear power plant becomes an open system under beyond extreme conditions, closely interacting with its environment while current analyses based on a closed system approach and linear causal chains taking dynamic, for instance, dynamics out of consideration. So we have to expand our analytical skills to come up with real risk numbers. And this calls for advanced methods which cope with all these factors and create scenarios by simulation, a huge challenge, hard to meet if at all. So we think it's time for a paradigm shift from pure prevention and mitigation to enhanced aftershock capability of complex systems. And past events have shown that resilience makes a difference. This is the only curve I would like to show. So in our views, resilience means that we have to stress the adaptive behavior and recover capabilities in the design and management of systems at different levels. We can do that at the technical, social technical and even at the societal level. We have to provide some tools also for this approach. This all implies new challenges, a lot of work of course, that require a new mindset and novel approaches including super tools helping us to expand our predictive capabilities and to rethink frameworks for future expanding systems. So do we have a chance to meet the challenges which I've tried to outline or do we have to live with black swans? And what do you think about the concept of resilience and how to make it operable, how to do it in the area of social technical systems? Thank you very much.