 good afternoon chair. It's certainly nice taking Nigeria at last, giving the complexities of the country. We've made the two variations because we didn't have enough information on prices, so FSS is on non-income poverty. We are also interested in in that country variation of what is happening at the sub-national level, which is the main work we've done here. By and large, a lot has been said about what is happening at the macro level in Africa, given the fact that poverty, the rate of poverty decrease has not been commensurate to economic growth, and has preoccupied very many analysts, including very many of the regional institutions. There's a lot of interest now, not just in that, but in the wide disparities in poverty between African countries, which I think is part of what the GAP has taught us all about. Like we've seen, some of the case studies that we've taken, countries like Morocco, Gambia, Senegal, Cameroon, and Ethiopia, Ghana. I don't like measuring Ghana because Ghana is our neighbor, and we did that here, everybody. They seem to be making significant progress was a poverty eradication. Whereas the so-called elephant, that's the like we heard at the last presentation, and Nigeria, are moving in the opposite direction. They've not made much progress. In fact, that of Nigeria is possibly where you died out of what has happened to oil, the oil boom. Moreover, the country has had some of the highest GDP growth rates in the world. You don't want to know what is happening, what is happening to poverty, but there has been a major discourse in the country ahead of the 2015 political elections. So the trust of this country is to empirically analyze multidimensional poverty in Nigeria. Like I said, if you look at the growth rate, the GDP growth rate and poverty incidence, they are moving in opposite directions. So we want to sort of confirm all the future of what is happening to poverty in Nigeria. I was hoping Professor Eric Tope could not be here, so I will ask you which of the inequality I'm presenting here. We'll start with the national poverty figures. This is from the Central Historical Office. What you find is that national poverty has sort of increased for 27.2% in 1980, to about 69% in 2010, which is a very alarming. And there is marked disparities between urban and rural. For administrative convenience, Nigeria is also divided into geopolitical zones. I mean, I'm sure very many of you have been hearing of the Boko Haram crisis, which is made in the north. If you be following these poverty figures, you're not going to be surprised. It's only magnitude, because like an inkling of what is going to happen in that part. Probably I'll go to demonstrate as intensified in those figures and go to see this particular paper. Like I said, Nigeria is a federation. It's good that you move from the national figures to what is happening at this national level, especially considering the fact that we have 36 states and some of these states are big or not bigger than some children countries. Take Lagos, for example. Lagos alone has a population of about 20 million. And if you use the GDP to compute, you'll find that if Lagos were to be a country, it would be the 11th biggest country in Africa. The river stage would be number 15. Why Petta Stage would be number 21? I mean, using GDP to rank. So, first, they didn't know what is happening at that subnational level, which is why what we've done all over the paper, you're going to see that we measure, like those are the state-level poverty estimates provided by the national level. We sort of prepare a sort of standpoint for us to compare what we've done. Without wasting time, poverty too. I mean, there is a marked inequality in Nigeria by any standard. We look at it, looking at the unique coefficient in national levels, it has increased from 0.43 to 0.45. But what is the most puzzling? I mean, the World Bank has been able to document some findings that shows that the top 20 percent of a Nigeria population owns almost 45 percent of the wealth. I mean, it's puzzling that it's reflected what you see on grant. So, in terms of what we did, because we didn't have data of prices or something, so FAS is on measuring non-competent poverty. The approach which we adopted is the first order of dominance, which was recently applied by Anne Tower. But before that, to put everything into perspective, they just general agreement that poverty is a multinational phenomenon. But they're actually measuring it. There are a lot of methodological difficulties. I mean, several approaches have been used, as you can see, in this room. And there is no agreement on what you think is the best methodology. In fact, currently, as we are talking now, a controversy is raging on whether you should have a scalar indicator. I mean, judging from the recent human development report that I tried to present on the form of multinational poverty, whether you should have a scalar. Why are people like Ravanian that have opted for the Dutch border approach? Well, people are trying to resolve that controversy now. But by and large, what we can state is that the methodology which we adopted is particular art. Because what we have is all the information at the micro level. I mean, that methodology can capture that. Not only that, like I mentioned, we are so interested in what is happening at the subnational level, which is why we're very happy with this methodology. One good thing about this FOD methodology is that it does not depend on the weighting scheme which it will do some element of being financed. Moreover, it will move all these ad hoc simplification assumptions about the sociography and function. But rather, what you get is just a form of binary indicators. It will tell you whether you are either deprived or not going to bore you about the methodological perspective because of time constraints. But basically, what we did was to use two main data sets. The harmonized Nigerian standard surveys of 2010. We were able to use up to 1,000 households and the comparable national level standard survey of 2003 to 2004, which had about 19,000, 154 households directly usable. You can look at the paper where we documented many of the transformations which we did. In terms of some of the results, I'm not going to bore you. Let me just present some of the main results. By and large, you find that our results are sort of, we don't have enough evidence to justify that poverty has intensified. If you look at the accurate deprivation from the tables, you find that why it was 5.7% in 2003 from O4 national level, it marginally reduced to only 2.6% in 2010. But for those who are not deprived at all, that was just a marginal improvement by 2%. If you look at this, as it is very well done. In terms of some of the other results, we will use two out of the five indicators registered in the Geolomite Magnetic Improvement, nationally, in the evolution of the two time periods. Whereas sanitation, electricity and education declined, if you look at what between 2003 and 2004 and 2009, 10. Like we said in the last one, the actual deprivation, not that I mentioned, why it was 5.7% in decline marginally. If you look at the dominance of the results from the methodology, you find that as of 2010, 12 states had 0% of dominating compared to 7 states which had the 2004 results, which implied that five more states lost their social economic strength. And if you look at the states, Zafara, Bauchi, Benway, Bono and Gompin, they are all in the not a part of the country. So also, using our bootstrap results, the results may not be very clear, but that is according to you to read the paper. But the summary is by and large, it confirms to what you expect after all, Lagos had a 79 chance of probability of dominating, followed by reverse and a number of states. I mean, these are all, if you look at GDP, the wealthy states and something. So also, we look at the issue of net dominance to look at what has happened. I mean, you're going to see that Lagos, for example, also dominates here. But you find that very many of the states, there was a decline in performance where you compare what is happening in 2004 relative to 2010. I mean, they lost their performance, their dominance. I mean, all those things are presented in the main results. Lagos, for example, again, maintain its high dominance, I think we improved over time. Wise states like River Abia and Nambra had a significant webbing. Others like Kanditanga Kano, Niger lost their strength by 2010. I'm particularly happy with some of these results because my major job is to monitor the performance of these governors so I can show them that this is a reflection of part of what is happening. So quickly to round up, what we can state is that the results indicate that Nigeria has registered all the fewer gains in non-compoverty which although conform with what is happening. And also, the issue drill into those results, we find that right areas are characterized by a higher proportion of acute depravation in both time periods. The analysis, the state analysis also indicates that about a third of the Nigerian assistates had a never teaching in zero deprivation when Mrs. Wostnain over time. The FOD analysis to provide over resolved Nigeria was stagnant in the two time periods where you cannot actually see whether there was a migrant movement. So from the point of policy, we are suggesting that it is necessary for the authorities to realize why they are looking for inclusive growth. They should be cognizant of the fact that poverty rates are yet to be both geographically concentrated in some states as well as in the northern rural parts of the country. Thank you for your attention.