 Thanks a lot, thanks a lot for inviting me to be part of this project to present here today. My talk is going to be about labor market turnover and inequality in Latin America. So it's almost consensus that labor turnover is high in Latin America despite the strict labor market regulations. So 24% to 44% of the workforce separates from their jobs every year. And this is, of course, largely linked to the high informality as we all know it exists in Latin America. So in fact, informal sector jobs last around three times less than formal sector jobs. So there are unclear correlations between turnover and inequality. Why is that? Because on the one hand, turnover lowers on the job capital accumulation, leading to lower wage growth over the life cycle, and in fact, it can be even worse if you return to firm or sector or occupation-specific capital or high. On the other hand, there are gains from allocating workers from low to high productive jobs. And as mobility is a source of wage growth, as evidence shows, and it's also theoretically very, theoretically very explored, especially early in the career, as there is learning problems and learning issues. And as workers, they stay on the firm and of course get older, the match gets improved and they get promoted and they get to stay in the firm over the time. So this presentation will go through this main point, so I'll be very quick here. So I'm going to show some main facts of patterns on labor market mobility in Latin America and compared to developed countries. So two simple questions that we all want to know is labor turnover truly high in Latin America compared to rich countries. And how is turnover related to the degree of stringency of labor market regulations? It might be that turnover is not as high when you look just at the number, but then when you compare across countries in terms of labor market regulations, it doesn't make sense. So I'm going to provide some detailed measures of job-to-job transitions by real-rate wage variation, including switching of occupation, industry, firm size, and formality status. And for these, I'm going to use the micro data, the LFS data from four countries. Then I'm going to discuss some main implications for inequality. And if time allows, I'm going to show some further evidence on the role of no wage benefits on job turnover. So yearly total separation rates that can be exit from the labor force or exit unemployment or job-to-job transitions, they range for OECD countries between 11% and 41%. So there is an overlap range. The range actually overlaps for Latin American countries. So you cannot really say that total job separation rates are higher for our countries, maybe a bit higher on the lower end. But then indeed here, we don't see much of a difference and there is significant overlap. So in terms of job exit to non-employment, we have for OECD countries between 4% and 23% and for lack countries between 11% and 16%. Again, a significant overlap of these measures across, let's say, lack developing countries and OECD countries. Job-to-job transitions are, let's say, there is a significant overlap. But there are significantly higher. So if you consider all job-to-job transitions out of total job separation rates, total job separation rates, we're going to see Latin America having this always above 50, which seems quite high. We just need to understand whether this is going to, you know, more productivity jobs or less productivity jobs. They're having wage gains or not. So when you compare across countries, I'll go very quickly here, total job separation rates are closer, are comparable between Latin America and Germany, US, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal. Job-to-job rates are very similar to the US. So never do lack countries have job-to-job transition rates closer to the US. However, the US has one of the least strict labor-active regulations, at least when we look at the EPL index from the OECD. So US has this index, the index is between 1 and 6. So US has 0.5 and Brazil 1.84, closer to the average of OECD countries, closer to Europe, actually. So let's say our turnover rates, they are high comparatively, not comparatively to the US, but actually when you consider the amount, the strictness of labor market regulations. So implications for inequality. Turnover may increase in equality because some workers benefit from it while others do not. So there is evidence and plenty of evidence that transitions into informal employment are more frequent for young women and low-skilled workers. And there is also recent evidence from across many OECD countries, at least within the OECD or across OECD countries, we see that the positive correlation between turnover and wage growth is not driven by low-skilled, low-wage workers in such countries. So there is also evidence that turnover is not driven by this. So it might be that heterogeneity is a great part of this, why turnover is related to increasing inequality. Also, turnover may increase inequality because of unproductive transitions. So people are moving more often, more often between towards the informal sector, either self-employment or informal employment. And this is the reason why we have an increase in inequality. We may be part of it. Right? So this is also evidence from more than 100 countries showing that these such unproductive transitions are the drives of an increase in inequality. So for Latin America, evidence is very scarce and that's why I wanted to contribute for this part. So there is a rare contribution by Julianne and Joana Silva, where they show that relatively high-wage workers in the informal sector transition to low-paying jobs in the formal sector. And okay, so there is another reason why turnover may be related to inequality, which is not related to exempt heterogeneity. So it could be that individuals, they become heterogeneous exposed just because they move a lot across occupations and then they move, they have differential tenure since they move a lot across occupation. And occupation tenure is, if there are substantially returns to occupation tenure by moving across occupation, of course they are losing something. And that's why when they lose human capital that's one of the reasons why you could have an increase in inequality. So and to the extent that there are more higher returns to tenure in the formal sector in developing countries than in the U.S., you might have mobility across occupations playing some role in explaining high-wage inequality. So I'm going to provide some additional evidence, additional evidence on four countries. We used microdata from this country tried to harmonize them as much as we could. Sorry, 10 minutes. 11, thank you, as much as we could. So why is that? Because we don't, in the harmonized data that is available, we don't have all such transitions, all detailed transitions that we need. We need to address some quality of transitions in this work. So, and then that's why we, so to start, when you look at this data, the microdata, we see that any job to job transition rates are not very dissimilar across between Mexico and Brazil and even compared to the U.S. again, this is just for comparison. This is the job-to-job transition rate for the U.S., this is Brazil and Mexico, and here we have, sorry, we have Argentina and Brazil and Ecuador closer to Spain and Portugal. Without any intervening period of unemployment, so these are direct transitions, yeah. Okay, so we see among the movers, the annual movers, right? So we see large wage gains, I mean, at least we see higher, for most countries, we see above 50% have higher, have an increase in wage, a real increase in wage, right? It's all, when you compare with the stayers, we have more gains, at least in terms of the proportion. We have a proportion of gainers, which is higher among the movers than among the stayers, right? But there is a lot, and also there is a lot of job changes associated with the real wage increase in these four countries compared to OECD countries. However, our stayers in Latin America, they lose more, too. So they gain more when they move and they lose more when they stay. So on average, when you calculate the average gain, right, with those proportions in the wage increase, we see in the wage losses, we are going to see like larger wage gains for movers than for stayers. Heterogeneity, so when you look by gender, we see that women move less, they move relatively less, not so much for most countries. And the gains for women are actually higher if they moved, right? So when they move, the gains are relatively higher, so it's not really clear why. Anyway, let's move to the average growth. So basically, when you calculate the average wage growth, we see that the gains for women are higher, so remember that they move less. So that's the reason why we might have some heterogeneity coming from the fact that they move, they take less opportunity by moving. So regarding education, when you do this by education, we see the diffraction of job-to-job changes decreased by education in most countries among college-educated individuals. So why is this so? Basically because the blue is more like prominent here, so you see like, you know, which is consistent with the lower, you know, benefits from job search among the more educated individuals, although they would have larger gains, relatively larger gains, 56% against 53 and so on. So on average, let's say that for most countries except Ecuador, the gains from moving are higher for college-educated and the gains from staying as well. So the gains from staying suggests positive returns to education or to training or to job-specific capital and the returns from the mover suggests that there are still returns from moving in Latin America for college-educated individuals despite the fact that they should have at least theoretically lower gains from search and from moving across jobs. So by age, this is the most impressive, I mean, unexpected, so young people, they move much more. Okay, so they learn, they move, they move until they find a good match. And then they also have larger gains from moving, then from staying. So if you look at Ecuador, Mexico, they actually, they might lose by staying comparatively. So if you look at this green with this green. Okay, so on average, they have much larger gains from moving than from staying for most countries except I think Argentina has also relatively. But still, when you compare this side with this, we have larger gains. So I have some detailed results as well. I don't think I have time and no one to go through five. Quickly, I looked at occupation switching one digit. I looked at the industry switching by occupation. There are gains from switching occupations. Of course, this graph here doesn't show where they're going. When we look at the occupations, a larger matrix, when you see exactly if they move to higher occupation positions or to lower, we see that these gains are driven by any move that involves a skill upgrade. And there's selection, a lot of selection of younger individuals moving upwards. When you look at the industry switching, there's also considerable switching across industry, one digit industry, less than occupation, which is consistent with the literature. So people move more across occupations than across industries. And when they move, they have a gain. But however, they might lose by moving. So in this wage gains from moving, they happen when individuals move from manufacturing to all other sectors, which is interesting because there is a literature which shows that there is some, let's say, a reasonable degree of transferability of skills across, when you leave manufacturing to other industries. Okay, so firm size, there are some gains, but the gains of moving firm sizes when we move from small firms, zero to five workers, to higher-sized firms. You will always or almost always lose when you move downwards from larger firms to larger, I mean, six to 40 or 41 upwards. So basically, moving to very small firms, you might have a loss. So I looked at transitions across sectors and I do find that the gains are driven when there are gains from moving across sectors, employment sectors, employment categories, gains are driven by informal workers and the self-employed who are able to move who are able to move to the formal sector or by the self-employed who become an employee in the informal sector. So always suggesting that, I mean, if on average informal sectors are less productive, it's less productive transitions or transitions towards less productive jobs is what drives the wage losses. So here is just, this is very fresh. I just, people ask, like, what if you control the statistics for, you look at the relationship between inequality and turnover, which is the objective here. And then one way we could do is, and I did here, is to look at within group wage inequality. So I focused on gene inequality, gene index and I looked at the contribution of job-to-job rate and job-to-job rate with the wage increase or staying rate or job separation for the gene inequality index. So basically we find that when you look at the column two and three, we see that the job-to-job rate contributes less than the staying rate for the reduction in the gene inequality. And except when the job-to-job transition involves a wage increase, okay? Whereas staying rate, there are relatively, there are gains that might involve not immediate gains like annual gains, you might have yearly gains. And in that case, this further contributes to decreasing in gene inequality. But there's something about staying the same positions which might be the returns to occupation-specific or industry-specific or firm-specific human capital that contributes to the decline in inequality. So when I look at the cells, because this is controlled, this is a pseudo panel by a country, year, age, education groups, three groups of age, three groups of education and gender. So basically when I control for this, this is, I separate the cells with the low informality and the cells with the high informality. And then when you look at the low informality, let's say cells, we're gonna see a relatively higher contribution of job-to-job turnover for reductions in inequality. And why is that so? These guys actually move within the, let's say cells or within places where you have less informality, so you have higher chance of having more productivity wage gains. More productivity turnover which leads to wage gains. Okay, so just to finalize, I won't be able to go through the whole thing, but I used data, detailed micro data from four lakh countries. There are larger fractions of movers with a pay cut in Latin America than in UECD countries. Exanti heterogeneity suggests that there is some role there is some role for the types of moves among low educated, less educated, older workers or basically driving the inequality because average gains are also lower for them. Okay, so there is some regarding exposed heterogeneity. The face value, when you look at the statistics of occupation changes, we are actually much, we have much lower occupation change compared to the US. Sometimes half of the mobility of the US. And still why should we worry about it? So one reason is that we have very steep wage tenure profiles, so I think we should combine these two evidence because just by looking at the occupation transitions, this is not enough to conclude that this is not an issue, a type of transition which is not gonna be an issue in our case. And finally, we have some indication that some less productive transitions are happening towards small firms and then towards informal sector of course and all these labor market segregation will, and the transitions across all these dimensions will contribute for, likely contribute for the, well actually work is not, don't seem to reallocate to more productive jobs is what contributes to inequality. So I stop here, I won't have time to go through further evidence. Thank you.