 The current war in Ukraine has brought up many questions about the invading power Russia. In a world where countries are expected to be diplomatic in disputes, Russia has taken out its internal frustrations of population decline, low cultural morale, and weak geography on another country through brute force. This isn't even the first time they have subverted the US-led global order in this way, invading Georgia in 2008 and seizing Crimea in 2014. The US-led global order, as a rule with many exceptions, seems to function as a collection of many countries subject to American soft power. Russia truly fails to achieve this global level of soft power, always resulting to coercion to achieve its goals. But why does Russia fail in soft power, especially in comparison to the US and other nations? Welcome to today's episode of Max World Politics Report. Before we can answer this video's main question, the definition of soft power must be understood. Soft power refers to actions countries will take to influence others through diplomatic means, usually by appealing and attracting. Many countries in Eastern Europe became influenced by American soft power after the Cold War. Due to their desire for free market economies and democratic government, something the US could help them achieve. By joining NATO, the quintessential organization of American soft power, these countries also received military aid from the US. Soft power can also be achieved by appealing to cultural ties, such as the relationship between Turkey and its partners Azerbaijan and Albania. Though not the best example today, Turkey has put tons of investment into spreading its soft power across its neighborhood, so we may start to see the fruits of these efforts bloom in the next few decades. Russia, on the other hand, does not put this effort into soft power exports. While the US and Turkey are examples of countries that prefer soft power but often use brute force to achieve their goals, Russia is the reverse, prioritizing hard power over its partners rather than negotiating with them. In other words, Russia does a good job of telling its partners who is boss as it tries to hold the pieces of the former Soviet Union together. In this light, let's see a few of their organizations that attempt to do this. The Alma Ata Accords, signed on December 8th, 1991, signified the end of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The organization's members aimed to continue working together in areas of trade, security and military coordination, though this last one is not as pronounced. 12 of the 15 former Soviet republics initially decided to participate, though the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declined membership due to their view of Russia as an occupying force. Russia's military actions in Georgia and Ukraine have caused both countries to leave in 2008 and 2014 respectively. The CIS lays the framework for a few different alliance structures in the post-Soviet space, such as the CIS Free Trade Area and others which will be explained soon. Russia is very involved in the affairs of nations in the CIS, often intervening in local conflicts to keep its regional order intact. To this end, Russia has been involved in the Tajikistani Civil War, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and most recently, the 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan, never being afraid to use its military and allies' militaries to restore stability. However, Russia cannot seem to keep the CIS member states united under a single front. From its own invasions of former members Ukraine and Georgia, to constant fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to recent border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and numerous diplomatic rows with even its closest allies, Russia struggles greatly to hold on to the pieces that once made up its empire. But can Russia at least keep a smaller group of allies in line with its aspirations, without constant military intervention? Russia's main military alliance, and the true successor to the Warsaw Pact, is the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The alliance initially consisted of Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, coming into effect in 1994, initially as the Tashkent Treaty. Yet, an alliance of these diverse members could not really survive, due to the infighting between many of them. Georgia and Azerbaijan left in 1999 due to disputes with Russia and Armenia respectively, and Uzbekistan left in the same year, while joining and leaving again in 2006 and 2012. Thus the alliance is today left with six members, who for the most part have a much easier time conforming to Russian dominance. The CSTO, in a way, functions very similarly to NATO in the West, serving as a collective defense treaty for the six nations involved. Unlike NATO, where the dominant force of the United States shares at least some balance of power with significant regional powers like Turkey and France, the CSTO is a completely Russian-dominated alliance. Russia is geographically central to the alliance, its technology and military prowess far exceed those of its allies, and the relatively weak and landlocked nature of the lesser allies keeps them tied to Russia for economic and military support. The CSTO, in Russian-led coalitions, has been the driving force behind keeping the status quo in the post-Soviet space. Most recently, quelling rebellions against the governments in Kazakhstan in January. Russia is able to keep most of the countries in its line in other ways, too. The Eurasian Economic Union, the Russian equivalent of the EU, was founded in 2015, and today includes all CSTO members except Tajikistan. It serves as an integrated single market for the five nations, and attempts to work towards Eurasian integration in other manners, such as a single currency and freedom of movements for goods and services. Belarus's relation to Russia goes a step further and includes the freedom of movement for people, and with other common integration policies, the two nations form the Union State. In all of these unions, Russia is undoubtedly the central force behind them, and member states must either fall in line or face consequences as Ukraine and Georgia certainly have or Moldova has to a degree. This brings up a major issue with Russian foreign policy, the line between their use of soft power or brute force is very vague, and their alliance structures serve as a veil of mutual cooperation over the truth of great coercion. Russia has strings attached to nearly all of its allies. If Armenia should not fall in line with Russian aspirations, they could easily allow Azerbaijan and Turkey to have their way with the country. If Belarus seeks a more independent foreign policy against Russian interests, they can simply annex the country into Russia proper. If Central Asia wishes to break free from Russian dominance, Russia can cut off supplies to these nations and let them fall into instability. It sounds shocking to hear, but it has happened to three countries already since the fall of the Soviet Union, not to mention all of the times the Soviet Union invaded an ally to keep its status quo. In Soviet times, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were invaded to quell anti-Soviet rebellions, and the USSR planned an invasion of former ally Yugoslavia due to sharp tensions between leaders Stalin and Tito. This historical precedent lives on today. Russia's so-called allies cannot create a truly independent foreign policy without fear of backlash from Russia. The three nations that did so, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, now have their foreign policy mangled by disputed territories and unresolved conflicts, hindering their western aspirations. My tone so far may sound as if Russia has an option to be diplomatic, and just chooses to be aggressive out of spite for its neighbors. However, Russia's geography and history have shaped it into a generally aggressive country with little practical use for diplomacy. And no, this is not condoning Russia's actions in Ukraine or in other countries, this is just explaining how Russia's history has made it into the country it is today. Russia's independent history began under the wrath of the Mongol invaders, who stayed in Russian lands a century longer than in other regions in Europe, forever changing their trajectory. This period of occupation and the realization that they need strong frontiers to protect themselves from future invasions played a role in making Russia the aggressive nation it is today. Their expansion into Siberia in the 16th and 17th century, crushing the nomadic peoples who once occupied them, gave the Russian heartland a huge advantage, which would no longer see invasions from the east. Russia's expansion westward into Eastern Europe in the 18th century further protected the heartland, making swift invasions from the European plain from countries like Poland much more difficult. Their most recent acquisitions in the 19th century were in the Caucasus and Central Asia, giving them a mountainous border on both frontiers. Russia's geography at this time was optimal for the most part, as with stable borders on all sides, they could become a stable and prosperous land power. None of this could be done with diplomacy, and Russia knew this. Yet, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia open on many sides, with long and flat borders in the areas closest to the heartland. Russia was at its most vulnerable, and the only way they could continue their global position is by holding on, in one way or another, to those lands that kept them powerful. Today, Russia finds it very difficult to use diplomacy for getting its neighbors to cooperate, and besides stability, Russia has very little to offer its former subjects. Most of the former republics in Eastern Europe have aspired, and in some cases succeeded to join the West as protection from Russia. Their time under Russian rule was not seen positively, and the somewhat more diplomatic nature of the West was much preferred. Yet, the big reason I would say why very few nations would want to become part of the Russian sphere today has to do mostly with demographics, and Russia's declining potential. The nation has been struggling with population decline and low birth rates for a few decades now, and the share of young people in the country to keep it running is at a record low. Russia needs to integrate the younger populations of Central Asia and its sphere to keep its machine running, as well as to protect its heartland. Without such force from Russia, the Central Asian nations would be better served compelling the growing Muslim populations of the Volga and Caucasus to break free from Russian rule. If Russia has any chance of surviving as a great power into the end of the 21st century, a proposition I see is very unlikely. It needs to integrate its neighbors into its sphere and create unity amongst its diverse people. As we have learned, countries with great insecurities in demography, geography, and economy like Russia will often have to establish themselves in the battlefield rather than the courtroom, as nations never easily give up sovereignty through diplomacy. Russia needs some of these countries to give up their sovereignty for its own survival, something it has learned throughout its history. Thank you for watching today's episode. If you like my work, please consider supporting me on Patreon to obtain access to exclusive maps and future updates. Tell me in the comments what you want to see next, and I will see you then.