 Right. I appreciate y'all coming in. My name is Van Lieberg. I'm going to be talking probably pretty quickly because I've got a lot of things to cover. This is justifying an Ospo and dollars and cents. I wanted to start by just making, by briefly touching on a number of the things that have been said earlier in the presentations today. Nithira Ruff talked about, hey, if you've been out there, you see, you know the value that is being provided by the Ospo. The last session that was here was fantastic. They were talking about here are all these tools that you can find out in order, that you can use in order to find out what's happening in a project, in a community, and so you can make more data-driven decisions. But the thing that I want to focus on is that so often, I've been around this community for a couple of decades now, and one of the things that I see over and over again is that when you have a set of bad quarterly numbers or you've got some sort of competitive pressure, Ospo's are almost always on the list of things that get cut. And the reason why is because people start to think about Ospo's as a cost center. And I think that this is mostly a failure of marketing, but it's also about chasing that, as the gentleman just said, that elusive ROI. How do you connect what the Ospo does to your larger business? So I want to note that Ospo's are amazing for driving business value. In fact, as we've talked about, open source software is driving the world. Everyone is using open source. 99% of all code bases have it in it. It is essential and key to everything that just about every company is doing in software. And so if it is such a key part of what software development is, then you would think that being able to manage this and understand it is really about driving business value. And the fact is that it is, but we don't necessarily communicate it or track the metrics necessary in order to see it. So I'm going to be talking about a couple of things. I want to make a couple of caveats. The first is I'm going to be talking about some specific situations. In many cases, names have been changed to protect the guilty or innocent or not. But I want to understand that one size does not fit all. This is very much about the need to focus on what is happening in your organization and what is driving the success of your organization. And so not all of these may be perfectly applicable, but there should be something in here that you're able to take back and think about. Yes, this makes sense in the context of my organization. The other thing that I want to note is that this is illustrative. There are lots of different ways, and we'll touch on this at the end, that your OSPO interacts with different parts of your organization. Any one of those interactions can truly be one of the places in which you drive value. So let's start by talking about why in the world do people get involved in open source. Now there are thousands of reasons, as many reasons as there are companies, but I tend to generally lump them into these three big buckets. You want to reduce costs, you want to develop new business, or you want to reduce business risk. And you see that I've got sort of subheads under each of those. I want to note that the reason why most companies start getting into open source is that number one, that idea of we're going to reduce costs. This stuff is free. We're going to have free licensing, and hey, people are going to write it for us. This is, well, no one who thinks that people are going to write it for them, they still are not out of the glory days of the late 90s. It just doesn't really happen. And the free licensing, yes, it's a thing, but that isn't really what's driving value. So often we talk about compliance, and so much of this is around compliance tools. Real value drivers end up being in business development, mind share, market share, recruiting, retaining and developing your employees, as well as reducing the business risk. And so these are the things that I am going to focus on. So here's a question you're going to say, then how in the world do you know that Ospo's actually create value, and how can you prove it? Because in some ways this is just talking. No, we actually know this because we have been able to observe situations in which people have destroyed business value and done so in a way that allowed us to measure it. I would like to put special thanks to those providing the content for this section of the program. One of those logos actually got cut off, I believe Elastic also shows up here. So let's talk for a moment about OpenOffice. How many people remember OpenOffice? That's right, it's still honestly a better name than LibreOffice, just personally thinking. If you cast your mind back to 2010, OpenOffice was actually in an extraordinary place. You look at it and you think, hey, it's kind of an also rant, but if you think back to then, people actually generally had OpenOffice. It had between nine and 14% business share, depending on who you believed, in the United States and the UK, and it had up to 20 or 30% market share in various other countries. This is an astounding number of installs. And even the people where they had it on, they primarily used Microsoft, they usually had it for compatibility or you had a lot of people coming up because it was cheap, it was available. They also had at that time an online office product, where the only competitor was Google Docs, which was not nearly as full-featured as it is today. Think about that circumstance and would you like to have something like that with nine to 14% business market share? Absolutely you would. There was a study that said OpenOffice is now so entrenched in the space that its growth has become irreversible. Oracle said, hold my beer. This, what you're seeing right here is the migration of users from OpenOffice to LibreOffice over eight weeks in late 2010. And those different colors are different organizations starting to contribute code to LibreOffice. The second thing that you'll see is authors and submitters for OpenOffice is the green and LibreOffice is the blue over the past decade. You'll see that there was actually a lot of, there was millions of lines of code, there was a lot of value created. In some ways it was a huge value destruction that I'm not sure they ever got past because there was a lot of rebranding, a lot of different things, but absolutely they actually took a write-down associated with OpenOffice. And years later they paid on the order of several hundred thousands of dollars to get rid of it and donate it to the Apache Foundation. In 2019 it was declared dead, if I remember correctly. No, that was Hudson, that was Jenkins. They paid to the ASF, the Apache Software Foundation. Oracle also, 2010 was really a banner year for them. If you're familiar with Hudson, Hudson was one best of show in 2008, it was up and coming. It was largely, it had surpassed cruise control. It was the largest continuous integration project ever and definitely across the entire ecosystem. There were some issues with the Java.NET servers and they just said, we would like to move to GitHub, that's where more of our community is. Oracle said, no you may not. And if you try to do that we will assert our trademarks against you. Well, 2013 they all, everyone moved over to Jenkins. They actually paid Eclipse to move Hudson over to Jenkins. In 2019 that's the one that was declared dead. This is the market share for Jenkins still as of today. How many people would have liked to have had that? Do you think that Oracle, if they would have been thinking correctly, would have liked to have had 51% share in CICD tools? Except they didn't. They didn't deal with their community effectively and so they lost the opportunity. Again, they took a write down and paid to get rid of it. One last one, this one is happening. I've got a question to mark here because it's not 100% sure that this is happening. Over in January of this year, Elastic said we're going to re-license from Apache to various proprietary licenses, the Elastic Search product. Amazon announced that they were going to fork. And in August, August 6th or 8th, if I remember correctly, open search became generally available. This is wild. I've got an orange line on the next slide that shows the date when the open search product became generally available. What you're seeing is the rate of retention of people who create issues. Maybe this won't happen or maybe this won't continue. Maybe this is a blip. But that strikes me as one of those eight weeks types of situations that someone is going to be referring to years and years later down the road. So we have been able to see if you don't treat your community well, they can go away and they can take all the value with them because the value is not in the code. The value is in the community. This is actually something that is well known. There are lots of things that Ospo's do that address this value. Most often times we think of and we justify our Ospo's in terms of compliance, legal, non-legal pressure, issue reporting, bug fixes, et cetera. But I'm going to be talking about those last three items and giving you some real live situations that happened that I helped some companies with. So I'll note that the typical argument is about Ospo's is, hey, we can be compliant. Now, I am a lawyer, compliance is really important. Please be compliant. It is far easier to stay compliant than it is to go through and not be compliant and have all those things fall over. The problem is that this is important but not urgent, as sometimes people say. And so it's easy to push off until later and to under-invest. The second thing I mentioned, people will help us develop it. Yes, it's true in certain circumstances but this is really not going to be an effective driver for your code because you're going to be wanting to drive it anyway. This is not actually the thing that is going to be a successful driver of value. Yes. Driver number one, which I think is you can tie is employee retention. This is a true story and this is one that came about when I was at Rackspace. We had a long history of working with open source. We had a large number of open source developers. This was during the 2015-14-15-ish time frame. Some of our policies had not caught up and so it was actually kind of difficult for people to contribute back to various communities with which they interacted. We went through and pushed through and it was much harder than it should have been. We pushed through a new employee contribution agreement, a policy really, that basically said people are free to contribute under their own names and it had a very generous way of figuring out what things are business-related, which were going to be relatively few and what things were not. Anything that was defined as not business-related, they got permission to actually go through and contribute to. I don't know how many of you are familiar with the idea of NPS scores. It's a net promoter score. It is a measure of how many people are really excited about you versus neutral versus sort of a detractor. It's a widely used tool. Rackspace use it a lot. They had both an external one and they had an internal one, the employee NPS. A good score is officially anything above zero but a really good score ends up being somewhere between 20 and 30 and anywhere in the negatives you've got more detractors than promoters. You've got real serious issues. It leads to high loss of people. When we implemented this new policy, we had an NPS in the range of negative 20 in our San Francisco office. We were losing people. We were in danger of losing people. The new open-source policy was credited with driving, at least temporarily, a 40-point increase in our NPS from negative 20 to positive 20. We estimated later that this caused maybe six to eight people to stay and at least an additional year because they felt like they could develop their careers better at Rackspace. Let's look at that analysis. Six to eight developers, if you think about and you look at studies as to the cost of losing somebody, finding someone new, retraining them, it ends up for technical workers being on the order of 100 to 150% of their salary. If you looked at this estimate, the aggregate salary was 1.6 million, we avoided an estimated cost of retraining and retraining about $2 million over that year due to that one change. This is also, by the way, related to your employee acquisition and your cost of training. Those are also major drivers that your HR people are 100% following and that you can have a major effect on as an OSPO. They're already one of your partners in putting out and managing the open-source policies as they reflect the employees and contractors in your business. You can get with them and partner with them to make it easier for them to attract, recruit, and retain in such a way that you can make a measurable millions of dollars difference in their bottom line. Story number two. OSS is part of your funnel. Now I want to be very careful here. Going out and saying, we are marketing to developers and you sometimes people say, I hate it when people market to me. That's so terrible and it drives a lot of negative results. For all intents and purposes, for many companies out there, open-source engagement is marketing. It's just you can do it right or you can do it wrong. And if you do it right, it vastly increases people's awareness of health and positive feelings for your company. And in fact, it can be if you have a situation where your products are primarily centered around one or more open-source projects, it can be a major driver of sales without you being, hey, do you want to buy? Do you want to buy? You're always trying to get in people's minds in a positive way and OSS, both in terms of distribution and community engagement, can be a part of that. That's what your OSPO does. So for this particular client, we identified that this was one of those service and support slash SaaS type products. It was one of those ones that had relatively high lifetime value because when people came into it, they had the order of several thousand dollars a month and average life was between three and five years. So you had a lifetime value in the hundreds of thousands. This was a good product, but it tended to have long times through traditional marketing it had a slower sales cycle except when you went through the developers. Through reaching out to them and talking to them, we identified that more than 90 percent of the paid commercial contracts started with open source evaluation. And what's more, I want to jump to that last point. People sometimes say, oh, if you've got the commercial version and the open source version, you better make the open source version crappy because no one will want to pay. No, it actually turned out that the positive developer experience was the thing that drove them to engage. And the better they liked the product, the more they were evangelists for it inside their own company and that more that drove sales. And so what happened was that the implied value of a download from GitHub was somewhere in the $50 range. That doesn't mean that every download was $50, but because you had a smaller number of downloads that were very lucrative, it averaged down to about that. What I think is what's most interesting there is that when you... there was a selection effect that was highly advantageous to the company, that people who were going to be well served by the vanilla offering and they didn't have highly complex needs tended to mostly stay with the open source offering. The people who were the most likely to graduate to a paid commercial offering were the ones who were also the most profitable to support. This means that it was not only a great sales funnel, it positively selected for the client who were going to be the most profitable and best to serve. That is an astounding thing that your Osmo can be the middle of. And then like I said, the better developer experience led to higher conversions. We tracked downloads. Other things like Forks, GitHub Stars, et cetera were also positively correlated with essentially end revenue in the door. I'd like to... Story number three is about an acquisition of a very small company. This was not pre-product, but it was nearly... It was not pre-revenue, but it was nearly pre-revenue. They had very low revenue, but they had a really interesting product that they put out and they started... They started to get a community around. I wanted to touch for a moment the things that I'm saying are not unique to my thinking. I did not necessarily think this up. Goodwill, you see the definition up here, it is the total value of stuff associated with your company that is not like your concrete accounts receivable, et cetera. It's all the things that you can't measure. So many times people think about Goodwill as mostly being around the IP, especially the trademark of the brand, things like that. Your community relationships, if you're one of these companies that deals with the open source community, your community relationships are a huge source of your Goodwill. In fact, it is, in some cases, the largest source of your Goodwill. So this was an early stage startup. If you think about it, the fact... If you think about it in terms of... Put your mind back in the... In the early 2000s, late 1990s, it was astounding that they would get purchased at all because they had an Apache license code base. They had one trademark that was not interesting, but they had community interest. So they had seven, eight employees. It was... There was just not a lot that was being purchased except for the community interest. For these people, it ended up being an $8.2 million exit, which is pretty good when the primary thing that was being bought was community Goodwill, that community relationship and the chance that they had to build that into a later product. We evaluated the metrics. We needed to justify this up to the board. This included downloads, stars, forks, blog posts. This was all about the Goodwill. So, as I've said, you can become aligned with either your revenue generating capability or some of your cost centers, and you can be a major part of that. In fact, if you look at what is in an open source program, you touch almost every part of the company. I've highlighted these different functional areas in the company that really go into a full-fledged Ospo, the leadership and the legal, engineering, marketing, cross-team, and human resources. Each one of these has a P&L, or at least they have costs and drivers that are associated with what they do. If you can talk to them in their language and figure out the things that you're doing that affect their bottom lines, you can show the real value of your Ospo in dollars and cents. So, I want to essentially identify these things are compliance. Absolutely, it is a huge value. If you've ever had the opportunity, but the misfortune of being in a lawsuit associated with some of these things, you'll notice that compliance suddenly becomes a very large driver. Again, it is a huge deal, but don't just stop there. Don't stop at community development. Think about all the different ways in which you interact, and that is how you can and make sure you're talking the same language. So, your final takeaways, cost and profit drivers, look for how your Ospo interacts with them. Use the same categories that the rest of your business is using. You want to be able to say that GitHub star ties to this incremental ability to retain or this reduced training cost. That's another thing that I didn't mention, is that if people are already coming in knowing your tools, you have much reduced training costs. That's a huge thing for large organizations. Share wins with other parts of your organization. That's part of using the same language. And if you are in the case of, if you're doing any sort of mergers and acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions are the only time when goodwill is measured, except for usually like a year later. And if they've been able to say, yeah, we've kind of kept this, they get to keep it. If they've had a measurable decrease, they need to write down the goodwill. They don't like doing that. So, watch for those sorts of things any time you have an acquisition and you can avoid a write down that can affect share price about a year later. That's it. I'm happy to answer any questions or comments or even just like have a discussion about this.