 Okay, so welcome again to this last also Belgian meeting. And our first speaker today is Kevin Chavar, who is currently a PhD student as a services funded by FNRS, the Belgian Research Agency, and as you know, he did physics before coming to philosophy. So his topic is there is no problem of time or change in general relativity. And Kevin, we are happy to have you here and please start your talk. Okay, hello everyone. Thanks for being here. So as I said, my first talk in this kind of research meeting so if I'm a bit nervous and I'm eating my words don't hesitate to stop me so that I can speak a bit more slowly and more articulated. So, yes, I'm a new PhD student from Alexander, and I'm working on the role and presentation of time and change in contemporary physics, more specifically in the transition from general relativity to LQG so quantum gravity and quantum gravity in general. So for his talk, I propose to defend the change in general relativity against mostly against the airman's article from 2002, which is called fully modern back to guards. So, so that will be the outline of my book. First, I will just generally present some ideas about physics of time and why one would defend change in physics of physics for people who are maybe not aware of this kind of stuff. I will be presenting the formalism that is the main argument from your man's article against change. And I will open up a new last session to work toward the more conceptual tools, but it allows one that could want to have real genius, genuine change in general relativity. To start with, my main commitment is that I'm following Einstein saying that time is something of change. So the fundamental concept is that time is changed for me, and time is built up from change. The main vocabulary that is used in physics of time, physics, at least, is Mac-Taggart's vocabulary. So there is two ways to define properties of change as property in the physics of time, either in a dense way. So saying that there exist properties of vastness, fluidity, fluidity, and vastness, and that one goes from one to the other in a traditional change way. But the change that is mostly different in physics is mostly the B-Series, so a dense-less account of time, which says that change in time is only the relationship between two events of being later than or being earlier than. So that's the dense-less way to see change, and that's the one that here, man, a lot of physics thinks is the only one that you can find in physics, actually. But I want to just briefly say and point out that for both of these accounts of time change, the main concept is events and not things, and that will be relevant for the last part of my talk. So why would one define the change in physics in a more personal way? I may be wrong, maybe I don't know physics that well, but I guess that the different change is we're covering the idea, common idea that physics is a sense of how things change with dynamics and mechanics. Another idea, a more philosophical one, is that from a perpetual realistic point of view, we want to have an account of change in physics that is more or less tied to the one that you could have in phenomenology and the way you would experience change in time. Because for me, my commitment is that we all experience change and there is some relative change, man. We all go up, we all die, so that must be changed somewhere. And if there is no change in physics, maybe we should ask ourselves why and if it's necessary or if it can be recovered. And the more epistemological sense, epistemological motivation to different change in time in physics is that you may have issue with empirical incoherences in physics if you don't have change in time in your ontology. And it was, it's a concept that was defined by Jeff Barrett in quantum mechanics of mind and world in 1999. And you have a station of definition, the theory is empirical equivalent in case the truth of theory undermines our empirical situation for believing it to be true. So basically has experiences and of our way to test theories. So to have reasons to believe our theories are true are taken place in space and time. Most of the time, it will be an issue if the theory tells us that we have no change in time because then if the ontology is, so it's changeless and timeless. So it will be an issue with how to fit experiments and measure inside the theory to test it which we are not, which may be an issue for further content gravity stuff. And if we, if we believe that theories are changeless and timeless. We are holding some explanation on why, because as I said, that's a common experience to experience change in time. So, at least if you want to defend, but there is no time in the change, maybe tell us how we have the illusion of this being true of existing. And now I will turn toward the article from airman and the main argument that will be given me against. So as a general direction to formalism that is the main point of argument from your minds which is called constraint on formalism. So formalism it was developed by Dirac in the middle of 19th century, as a way to have a quantization quantization process use that would allow to have concentration for more complex dynamics than just the usual quantum mechanics. So, so, so why would one want to use this formalism for general activity so the main use of this formalism in contemporary physics is for the research to control gravity, when you start with general activity. Because if you use the usual amytonian quantization, you would find actually that your internet is new and so you have no dynamics. And if you want to go a bit further than that and see a code dynamics in another way you have to use the constraint on formalism which encode the dynamics, not in the amytonian but constraints of the face space of your fear. And so for quantum gravity it's the necessary step to go all the way with that. But for a man in his article from 2002, there is another point of this formalism which is not directly linked to quantum gravity stuff. It's more to have no way to erase some indeterminism that would arise from the general activity theory. And mostly with the concept of general covariance, which is, which means, I think, so maybe not, but general covariance basically the idea that you can take any equation equation of Einstein's equation. And if you transform them through different morphisms based on morphism, you would have inviolence based on the space time deformer morphisms, gauge group for the models of relativistic theory, general genetic theory. And that's the way Hermann's talk about it is basically another way to you to describe the whole arguments, which was an argument that was used by Einstein in the 1913, and was then redesigned by Hermann and John Norton and John Stasham in a way to fight against this substance activism. So basically the argument goes that if you take a space time with coordinates and you define a region of space time where you use a different morphism to transform the region of space times the whole. You would have an issue with predicting how the field will evolve in this whole, because everything else will be exactly the same as before. And you would have a smooth transition to the whole, so that there is actually an issue with determinism of the field evolution inside this whole. And that's another way to see covariance, general covariance in a more active way. And this in determinism are gauge freedom things and Hermann is especially against that in his article is saying, so you have a quote, in a theory of gauge freedom, what is real or objective is what remains out of the gauge freedom. So, so for him it's necessary to re-erase visitorism so that your theory is more clear. And the way to do so is through this constraint and in the formalism that was designed for quantum gravity to stop. More quantum stuff. So how does it work in Hermann's article at least. So, the start of the thing is to transform your usual formalism of GR, which is a Lagrangian one into an Hamiltonian one. And when you do so, you see that because of the general covariance of the theory, you have dependency in the phase space coordinates, but just naturally come from a transformation. Then you define this dependency as the primary constraints. So the constraints that will be coding the dynamics. And from this primary constraint to single out one of them, which is called first class constraints, and are defined by their commutation with all the other constraints can find. So, following the issue if you flow the usual format from Iraq. Then you propose that the observable and the body of a gauge transformation that the gauge transformation are the ones that are given by the first class constraints transformation. Basically, when you have two point of phase space that are connected by good gauge transformation actually the same physical space. So the transformation doesn't go to anything physical. It's mainly mathematical surface of structure. So the way in this constraint for my son that you define the observable is by defining them against among the great new found quantities. So that you have been a domestic evolution because when you want to, you have taken out all the mathematical surplus. And you all that remain is domestic stuff with only one orbit in phase space. So when you do that, actually, since the middle and constraint, which code of the dynamics are among the first class constraints. So you're observable but you just define maybe the termistic, but actually the constant of motion. So, you wanted to go further and frozen dynamics with the usual amytonian but you get again some kind of frozen dynamics. So you want to conserve determinism in this way. So, no, we have seen so there is a man's proposition is actually more trade off between determinism change and you have to choose which one you prefer best. And it's not really like a rejection per se of becoming like a. It's really a trade off. First, both. Obviously, so he's changing. So, I want to claim that from following others, but I've said so bowling dicks and. Hey, maybe, but actually you're not forced to take this. You're not forced to trap as I said, but you're not forced to there are different strategies to do so. Herman's strategy is to recognize the term is as physical stuff and will mathematical stuff that you can that you need to get rid of so that you get physical stuff. And so you go from theory towards the ontology. And that's herman's strategy but has more than said in response to herman's, which is called for a model. But I didn't put the year but it's the same year. So there are actually actually three different strategy that you can adopt in front of his in terms of determinism. And then you go the herman's way and you can question the face space. Question thing is how you define the observable as constant motion. I should have maybe put it before. So you get at the end only one gauge of it and you have to determine them but no change. So you can't accept that there is an internalism as a real property of your theory. It's possible if you're an instrumentalist, for example. Or you can do another thing and you can say that there is a gauge that you can choose to avoid having to do the question to question thing of face space and so to avoid having to take changes for determinism. So the first two possibilities are the two sides of the trade off herman's but the one that we are following is mostly along the side of the third possibility. So I want to show you so quickly because I know it's a lot of time but I want to show that if you define change as a local stuff, and you start from the idea that change is you can actually have no issue prediction and determinism in what you do with your theory. So there I just put like a good before again for some who are maybe not as inclined in physics and time, but there is a way to fix this goal gauge globally, which when you go to cosmology and you say that in cosmology your universe is basically homogenous and illiterate. So, you can define an average which we call co more logical time. So it's a time that is defined in average for the other global time function for the whole in years. But I have to point out that I don't really like this kind of solutions because they are highly idealized model in real life, your universe is never homogenous or illiterate. Maybe, okay, sure. Specifically, if you go to infinite maybe for the average. But so I propose to the reverse network for global time function that look at the local time function that is actually a byproduct of change. And I think that by looking at change as a primary stuff and that time. Actually, it's more easy to see how it will be local because change is something that is a property of objects, but change in space time and enjoy. And this idea of having a local change is also something that is quite common for people who do relativistic stuff because you have, which is called the twin paradox, which is basically the famous experiment where you send two twins in two different spaceship at different speeds. And you can see that when we age faster than the other so change is something that you experience locally and there is no real reason why change needs to be something global. If it's just relativity of senior studies or everything is experienced locally, and it's actually more preferable to define change in local way. And anyway, when you do any test of theories or word of possibility of empirical inculence that would come out from the German solution because German is committed to change less. Well, at least. Not in the show that in your presentation. And so. Sorry. So, yeah, any test that you will do a theory will be a local measure because you're doing stuff locally. Or you're defining a local gauge that is the fallacious space and that is based on your point of view. And it's great is coinciding with our expense of time because of expense of time is local. So why should we have global change is actually the reason and if we take the local change everything goes well so I don't see any point in trying to have global change. My strategy is actually a one that is quite close to both Hilly and Dix, which is to look at local properties by local change and I think a good choice to define a gauge locally when you do a measure of experiments. And you'll try to use your theory basically. So there is no real issue with with local idea with a local change of any epistemic issue. So I put two quotes for me and Dix that are quite close to what I claim what I want to defend. So, in the article of 2004, which is called change without change. In fact, it is saying that these restrictions so the restitution of what's an observable is in terms of activity seems justified only as long as one ignores the fact that genuine change in the relativistic world is frame dependence. So it depends on the local frame that you define. This is an insignificant and observable feature of the general of the general relativistic world, only because our situation in such a world naturally picks out with a new class of frames. And Dix from 2005, which is becoming relatively in a locality, the name of the article. Our experience does not support the existence of global simultaneity and arguments from modern physics further support the conclusion that time should not be seen as a succession of cosmic now. And finally, I propose that if you want to make sense of becoming, we should attempt to interpret it as something purely local. I don't know how many times I have left. Maybe, maybe 10 15 minutes. Okay. Okay. So now we have seen that. And in front of Fairman's article, if you want to design change, we have to design a clock on so that we have no issue with. So, so, I want to explore what I'm doing right now in my physical my physics, actually, which is looking at more conceptual analysis of change to secure genuine change, you know, like just near change or difference or the other kind of change that we may be seeing. So, the main issue that I take with the way change in time are discussed in the radius ticker frameworks is actually pharmacy of events. We look at change in time through events. And it's something that airman explicitly says in the article. So he says, as quoted space some points and regions are the only obvious candidates for a subject role in GTR is ready to change to change. But it's not an issue because in things in the relativistic physics events are defined as space as space time points and points cannot have any extension and so it is if it has no extension. I don't see why you can. How you can find change is that is not extended because change requires a lapse of time to as by so if you have none extended, none extended points or as your subject of change, obviously you will never find change real change or genuine change as you prefer. And I propose that actually the issue in relativistic one of the issue in relativistic field of relativistic theory is that we tend to to conflate both Mac Taggart events and the way we define different events in the physics. So Mac Taggart events of event is not necessarily a point event. And so, if you allow events to have some kind of extension, you can find change which is not the case with points events. So despite the fact that both vocabulary looks quite similar. Actually, I think there is an issue. So that's what I just said. So change is commonly taken as a property of objects. So I've seen as things that endure and have some temporal extension and not the point stuff event. So there is a really issue there and that's why I think the hot hat or similar to graphical field of change is actually so popular in physical physics. So this theory of change is the one that was developed mainly by Russell the start of the 20th century. And it is, it is a theory that is designed with the idea that change is just the property of object. It's just the same type of object and different properties that are incompatible at different time, instant of time. So you see the main issue because it's in the name of cinematographical theory of change. So it's a sphere of change that takes us change different, a lot of different instance, but are just just opposed. So in succession, one to one another, and that in the clear, clear on the article from 1990, which is called different in return and they come with change. It is basically just kind of a change is the genuine change, because then you treat it as if it were made up of temporary order sequence of interesting static states. There are different points that are just in succession to one mother, and there is no real relations and no real incentive to go from one point to the other. So there is no real change, you just have different static stuff that are not really changed. And it's quite close actually to Berkson's insight that there is a real issue in physics with the specialization of space, of time, sorry, there is an issue, there is a mistake here. It will be specialization of time. There is a question, do I take question or do I wait? Okay, it's just, so if you want to defend. Yeah, but do you want to add something now or you just wanted to give us references. If this was just references to what you're saying, so let's continue then. I'm sorry I haven't used your article, Mr. Pete. I know that you wrote something on that for purpose of time I didn't include it. If you want to defend the cinematographical amount of time, you could always say that actually you have some incentive in physics to go from one point to the other which is the instantaneous velocity, which you could define as a propensity to go from one state to the other. And mathematics is well defined, but there is an issue that is related to my last point. But actually, the way to define it is by taking the limits from smaller and smaller intervals that are being centered around the instance at which you want to define your instance with velocity. So it's actually not really a property of the instance. It's just a limit of different extended interval. So now the issue I think I claim is that actually you, the mathematical formalism that physics has used over the last century, actually is cannot take it to a genuine change because the same way cannot take it to a genuine continuum. So what you get, what you define mathematically, since dedicating the contour and the others, is you define the sequence of infinite sequence or infinite series of points, inextended points, but make up a continuous line but that is actually not a real metaphysical continuum. It's something that is broken and you got to make something truly continuous outside, out of an inextended stuff. And to my, to what I'm doing right now is just looking at how much, how necessary it is to define a continuum that way in contemporary physics. There is a different way to do that, to do, to look at a change in a continuous way. You could say also that you have an extent present in shifting those or moving spotlight scheme that are already quite well reflected upon, but this kind of scheme had metaphysical entities on top of the scheme of mathematical structure and it's not necessary, I think. So now what I want to show actually in my project, my physics project for the last month, next month, next year maybe, is to show that actually maybe we can have another mathematical formalism that would be more true to our intuition about the true continuous and that could reason more or truthfully change, which we buy from the infinitesimal. So you have a lot of mathematical development that have been done in the hand of the 20th century on this kind of stuff and one of this mathematical development is using category theory to implement infinitesimal to kind of cut a real line to instance, you are forced to have some extension and you got defined truly extension with well defined limits so that you don't have instant as limits of intervals either. So the one I think has the most chance to actually work out if you if you want to replace mathematics that are used today with more continuous mathematics is the smooth infinitesimal analysis which is also called synthetic different charge geometry. So why is it the one that I'm looking at most right now is because actually, not so long ago there were a lot. There was a quite good book that was developed on how to take different charge geometry and manifolds with synthetic different charge geometries. So how did the tool manifolds is the tool for relativistic physics, most of them, I think there's the most chance to actually bring out something and maybe show that we are not necessarily forced to take instance into our mathematical And also, so I get to look very further into that, but I found some article as well, who claimed to have found some way to read the redo generativity or content theories in this framework of mathematics so in a way to add a really continuous line. So, as a send off for the next speaker, he asked me to do so, so I'm sorry I haven't done a lot of it, because it's supposed to be the end of my thesis but just quickly. The transition from generativity to quantum gravity is actually quite interesting as a case study for emergence, because as I've defended the change for classical level for generativity, I believe that for quantum gravity it's not as easy. And actually, there is a good chance that actually there is no space time in the sense that we think of in the quantum level at the quantum level so it was a question of emergence of space time actually. And we usually talk about emergence and we categorize emergence as either synchronical or the acronym so we categorize emergence with respect to time, and here we are talking about the emergence of time itself. So we cannot really do so, and we have to think about how what kind of emergence what type of emergence would be fit for this kind of two level structure. So, that's the end of my talk. Okay, thank you very much. Okay. Yeah, you want to, to turn to some slide or stop sharing your screen as you prefer. No, it's alright, I just, as in, okay. Okay. So, yeah, some persons are happy. So now, please say anyone if you have questions. Otherwise, while persons are reflecting, let's, well, yeah, let's have some discussion. So, yeah, as I said in the chat or as you can. Okay, so Kevin, I had the presentation was interesting. But as a my nonchalizer, I should also look for the things. So, in this position, I should say that your slides are not informative enough because too much text and it will help to have shorter phases and they shouldn't be a phases from a text but they should be like statements or maybe parts of statements or maybe even some schemes that will help to understand, especially as you're saying yourself, you're speaking quickly. Since we are limited in time, is it appropriate to critique the presentation? Alexander, if you have questions about them. I have a question for Kevin. Yes, please. This is on that slide, so it's fine. First of all, many things, Kevin, for the topic was very, very interesting, very, very stimulating, many staff to discuss. Now, I was just wondering, in the first point, you said that to add some, I mean, in this discussion about the relationship between change and time and when it comes to generative activity and gravity, it seems that we need some metaphysical stuff or metaphysical structure to try to figure out how this notion can be, can fit together in this very weird and strange framework. But in this first point, you said that adding some metaphysical structure, it seems to need to add a non-necessary metaphysical entities. And I was wondering, what do you mean by that? Why they are not necessary? Because it seems that at some point, we need it. We need to say something. It seems to be a particular case, we need to add something to try to link this thing together. But probably I am wrong, so I would like to hear why do you think that it's not necessary to add some metaphysical structure to try to combine time and change in this particular framework. Thank you for your question. So, yeah, I guess it was just about you. But no, what I want to say is that if you have a symmetrical, cinematographic lack of change that works well for the energy of physics and for mathematics you are doing, because the shifting now is adding metaphysical issues that are not necessary. Because if you are shifting now stuff, you have to ask the rate of echoing that is your shifting now. And it's not necessary to add this shifting now on top of mathematical structure if you can actually reform mathematical structure so that you can represent change in a more natural way. Okay, okay, got it. I think that Alexander raised his hand, but I have another question but I can't wait. Okay, let's continue with Alexander. Thank you, Kevin. Kevin, you plan to explore new mathematics, new kind of mathematics to have a better tool to think about change, and especially about continuous, which is very Aristotelian by the way. But formalism at best will help you to think but formalism cannot solve a metaphysical question so so at the end this formulation. How do you plan to interpret it will you will you put some modality like some some philosopher try to say you know a position. I understand but you can think about the position and it's time to position as where you would have been if you had stopped or something like that. And, and the metaphysical interpretation is in the model claim about the line, the point on the line. Or, or do you think this, this kind of mathematics will really get you to something else to something new. In this alternative to have representation of changing physics. What I want to show is that the points that you use the authority of points in relativistic physics is not necessary. So you can do mathematics without the idea of. Extensiveness points. Okay, so, so you want to go against some kind of indispensability argument that we have in the back of our mind. Yeah, basically, I want to know what I don't like in the discussion right now is that we are talking about events and at best working with object as a series of events. And then what you have mathematically is what the person was against basically and I would like to see if you can have other presentation of physics or manifolds, but don't have the specialization of time and as necessary condition to have metaphysical physical mathematical presentation. Okay. Christian, do you have a question on no longer. Christian. If not, sorry, it's fine because there are other other people that raised their hands on I can wait I think that Brian pieces. I want to make a question so. Yeah, let's continue is fine because here we'll get back to us so Brian please ask your question. Sorry to disappear at a computer problem. Thank you very much for your talk. It's, it's an important topic and I think you're quite ambitious if I may suggest that to look for change at particular points. If you're content with having different properties at different times as a definition for change as is probably as many people settle for, then I think a local definition is already available in terms of the absence of time like killing vector field. I think I put that in the chat somewhere. So I think if you really want to respond to urban I think that there are lots of ways that you know there are many things that one should not say that he says, although of course he didn't invent any of them they're quite widely received. So, I think you could find change without having to do to do any new differential geometry. I mean, which doesn't mean you shouldn't do any differential geometry that is, is, I think the classical stuff will do for at least some of the things that you're interested in. Okay, thank you for comments. Yeah, maybe you're right. The thing is, I would, I would have liked to keep Berkson definition of change for the mathematical representation of change that is as close to what you can find Berkson or more continuous of our tutorial way of change to define change. So that's why I'm looking in this direction. But yeah, it's very ambitious because then to use this kind of mathematical you have to to abandon the law of physical middle and to abundance of part of mathematics so I don't know exactly how we will end up. But yeah, it could be less ambitious. I don't know if I have to respond to your points. Thank you. Okay. So Christian, now finally, if this is your question. If there is not any more. I have a question of those. Okay. Okay, okay. I want you to hear. What do you think about about the following because at some point, one of the, one of your more general argument is that I think that it was more, more in the beginning of your talk. Physics is about change or physics about matter changing or battering space time over at this. This, I mean, this is really very interesting and because it sounds like a normal to play in the sense that whatever we call physics should be about change. You propose a theory that is not about change where you have to someone to some way to change it because physically by definition about change and sounds like a normal to play. And sounds pretty much like, for example, people working on quantum mechanics and proposed this primitive ontology or local vehicles. They also, in some way or another thing that, okay, physics about three dimensional stuff. So if you come up with wave function or stuff in high dimensional space. Well, okay, you have to get rid of the stuff because physics is about three dimensional stuff. So in this way you are raising a similar argument. I mean, probably it's in the background but the idea is that it's a normal to play in saying physics is about change. So if you have a theory that do it without change. That probably is not a very good physics and just I would like to hear if you really think if you really think something like like this and or why do why did you say that physics is about change or physics is about. Yeah. Thank you for the question. It's true that Alexander wanted me to read that. So, yeah. Yeah, you have no motif chain. Maybe it's more like the idea that I had physics actually that the sense of how things change because that's how it's presented. You can work with dynamics, but it's true that you can you can also define your utility as something that is the geological theory and dynamical room. But yeah, I think it's, I think physics is always about how things evolve and change things being non-living things or things that evolve naturally. I guess. Maybe too much. Okay, thanks. That's very interesting. Okay. So we still have some time for questions. So if one wants to raise your hand in the meantime. So, you know, as far as we'll start out 16. Normally, I don't have a bag but we can make one minute needed. Okay, so. Yes, I will ask my question. I think it was, it was not for nothing that I said I didn't understand the size were not convenient for me to grasp the contents I would still do be a pizza to like finish your presentation without understanding what you were actually claiming. Did I understand well or not that your, your proposals are basically to fix the case locally and to, to abandon this idea of something temporarily extended as a sequence of states as something. So this, like, is your proposal, the combination of these two ideas or have I missed also, and second question is more interesting. So, my understanding of the problem of time, which is not, I know about this problem I haven't broken on it. And so, but I have an understanding which is that persons perhaps conflate different time transformations. So there is a kind of statements that you cannot. And then, that the way you indexed time should not influence on your dynamics. So if I say that now it's like almost 16 hours in Europe, but it was a 15 or it's almost 17 whatever, so this should not influence your physics and your phenomena. There is one kind of transformation it replaces the origin of some event like beginning of the presentation or whatever. This is one kind of transformation. And this should be incorporated and all this transformation so between, it's almost 15 at all. It's almost 16, it's almost 17. These all beginnings of some events should be identified. But there is another transformation which is so we start with some presentations and you put one side and you put another. Okay, so you are within some kind of extended event. And there you have a sequence of different states. So these states should not be identified. There are two transformations and I think the problem, it seems to me that it probably comes from just conflating them. So, I mean the fact that you have identified transformations about what is the real hour in which we begin your presentation it doesn't mean that you need to identify the states within your presentation. So you could still have dynamics in so far as you do not like collapse your symmetry within your presentation but you will also have the absence of indeterminacy because you will have identified this different time transformations about the begin of your presentation. So what do you think of this kind of solution. I will answer your first question because I'm not sure I understood your second one. The first one so you asked me what I'm defending exactly so yeah I'm defending firstly but the change is local notion and that time is a notion that is built on this change so that you have a proper time as actually a real time differently built on the change. And I know in the second time I'm exploring other aspects of change that I think are necessary to have genuine change because I am not satisfied with the symmetry where people are going to change in physics. And so I'm claiming yes that we should go beyond the instantaneous account of events, but are just succession of events because I don't think it's genuine change. And your second question, I'm not quite sure I've understood what you meant. So yeah, we will also have a question from Brian just to finish quickly. So, I propose to distinguish between two kinds of time transformations one is on your example. So one one is when when exactly does your presentation start as this should the different times where it could start should be identified if these are just different and then you have another transformation which is sequence of slides in your presentation there. So the order in which you are showing them these time steps should not be identified so I basically propose to distinguish two time transformations and apply the reductive solution to one of them but not to another. So is there another you still have that dynamics and as a first you have the absence of indetermination. Yeah, I have to say I was going to start a question. Sorry. Okay, so this was a proposal. I'm really sorry. Yeah, so let's move to another question by Brian. Partly as a matter of vocabulary. Thank you. I'm wondering maybe you should say that you're looking for an ultra local notion of change, because you want one that doesn't involve derivatives and I know philosophers don't all know that word but it probably be good if we learned it. And that would distinguish what you're looking for from a definition of change in terms of the derivatives let's say which would be my own preference. I think a local notion of change is already in hand, and what you're looking for is an ultra local notion. I apparently in line with Bergson, I guess. Does that seem like a friendly way to rephrase your project. Well, I guess so yes, much of distinction. Ultra local doesn't involve derivatives. Yeah. Okay. So I guess the usual way to find derivative. At least for velocity, I don't think it's a good notion. I have a lot of the more I read about the change in time, the more I don't understand what it's interest velocity supposed to be. So, I guess, yeah, if I can find change without having to use derivative. Yeah, because, yeah, yeah. The derivative is a structure that you have to add on top of to do physics, you have to add that on top of your just my job there manifold. But I have to do more of it. It's a different geometry to see how it's implemented or different different chargers is implemented by default. But if I can have change with odds, I think to use the derivative it would be better for me I guess. Thank you very much for your comments. I need to think about that a lot. Thanks. Thank you all for this discussion. So either we have some last question or we finish this case part. Okay, so thank you very much. And I hope your experience was encouraging enough so that you continue with making presentations and research. So thanks again everybody for your participation. So thank you for that, goodbye Brian and let's continue with the last talk. Let's continue now, hope everybody has a short break and our second speaker today as a very last but conclusion our meetings is a new remuner's. history of science in Berlin and is currently finishing her visit in Zell's work. So she will just work in with Patricia Palacios and Kevin is working, I was working with, and he's working with Alexander Gi. Okay, so Nuri's talk is entitled, Inter- and Inter-Cancellary Forms of Compensability Between Images and Reduction in Philosophy of Science. So now Nuri, please begin the talk. Okay, thank you. Thanks for the introduction and for organizing this series of meetings, Valeria, and thank you everyone for being here. As Valeria said, I will be talking about the compatibility between emergence and reduction and what I've called inter-category compatibility and intracategory compatibility, which I will explain in a bit. And in the end, I will argue for the latter for intracategory. So just to give you a bit of context for the talk, um, this will be part of my thesis, which is a historical research on the condense matter physicist Philip Anderson, and more specifically on his work on emergence in physics, which he presented for the first time in this paper, More is Different, from 1972, which has become like a manifesto for emergence, not only in physics, but also in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology has become very famous. And basically, in this paper, the concept of emergence that he presents is one of novelty and unpredictability of properties or behaviors or laws that arise out of the complex interaction between many particle systems. That's why it's called More is Different, that's the slogan. And in that paper also, he very clearly accepts reductionism, but he says that reductionism doesn't imply constructivism, which would be the ability to reduce everything to fundamental laws, does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. So based on this, we can see that in this paper, and like his notion of emergence is compatible with that of reductionism. It would not be compatible with this idea of constructing everything from first principles without even knowing what you want to achieve. But curiously, after the 80s or so, which is when he actually became acquainted with the philosophical debates of emergence and reduction, he starts using from time to time the word anti-reductionism to defend or to present his claims. And yeah, from the 80s to the 2000s, he will use scattered here and there the word that he accepts reductionism, but in other places he would say that his emergentism is a form of anti-reductionism. So there is a bit of confusion in his way of using these terms. And then therefore, there's also a bit of confusion in interpreting his idea or his notion of emergence in comparison to reductionism. And this is why in this talk, which will become hopefully a part of the last chapter of my thesis, I will study the notion of compatibility between emergence and reduction to hopefully give a better interpretation of Anderson's position. And first of all, let's give some naive definitions of emergence and reduction. I say naive because there is a huge taxonomy on these words. And yeah, so here I will just concentrate on what are the main concepts that we identify with both emergence and reduction in the literature. So emergence and reduction are relations between two relata. And this relata can be properties or laws, entities or theories. So for example, emergence would be based on concepts like novelty of these properties or laws or theories, autonomy with respect to more fundamental properties or laws, universality, which could be also related to the notion of multiple realizability in philosophy of mind, robustness, and in definitive, like a sort of independence of these new properties and laws that emerge out of more fundamental properties, laws or entities, but also some degree of dependency. So it's not a complete break from the lower level laws or entities, but there is a sort of independence and dependence relationship with the substrate. And reduction is associated with notions of deduction, derivability, predictability, explainability, which would be epistemic concepts to relate to laws or to theories. And in a more ontological sense, we could also talk about aggregativity or micro physicalism, which would be the idea that all natural phenomena in the end are fundamentally constituted by micro physical entities. So these are the two notions that we are talking about. And yeah, now I would like to say that emergence and reduction are typically presented in the literature in philosophy of science or philosophy of mind, they are presented as opposed. And I just took like a cover of one of these textbooks on emergence and reduction, which you clearly see this opposition, emergence or reduction, one or the other, we cannot have both. In another famous text on a recollection of text on emergence by Bedouin Humphries, in the introduction, they say irreducibility is one of the leading ideas about emergence. So a failure to be reduced often is viewed as a necessary condition for something to be emergence, which would be the idea that I want to challenge and that this compatibilism wants to challenge. Why? Because there are two main problems with this opposition. One is that it doesn't allow for a positive definition of emergence. So what I mean by that is that we it seems that we are defining emergence always as a failure of reductionism. So whatever is not reducible then is emergent. And of course, it would be better to find ways to define emergence on its own. What does it mean to really capture what we want to say? And also because I think it doesn't account for scientists' intuition about emergence, since they majority also accept reductionism. So that's why there has been recent an increasing interest in reconciling these both terms. The following, especially Jeremy Butterfield, who in 2011 wrote a paper on that, Leslie Stiffen, which we will see in a bit. And so in these recent discussions on how to make emergence and reduction compatible, I identify two main forms of compatibilism. One is what I've called intercategory, which is a compatibility between different categories of emergence and reduction. What I mean by categories would be if we are talking more about an ontological sense or an epistemological sense of emergence and reduction. For example, then intercategory compatibility would be, for example, that an epistemic notion of emergence would be compatible with an ontological notion of emergence. And then there could be another option, which I don't think has been really explored, which could be intra-category compatibility. So talking, for example, of ontologic emergence compatible with ontologic reductionism. And this idea also implies some sort of complementarity between the two terms. So and I will argue in the end that although both are interesting and valid to defend different types of notions of emergence and reduction, intra-category maybe deserves more attention since it seems to be better suited to solve the two above problems that I mentioned. This is the outline for the talk. So that was the introduction. Now we will see in more detail what I mean by categories of emergence and reduction. We will see the two kinds. And then we will talk about a case study to support my support to intra-category compatibilism. And then we'll start with some, finish with some conclusions. So in the categories of emergence and reduction, I follow a paper by Gea and Satanaer called a new look at emergence or when after is different, because they make a very nice classification of all the different types of emergence that we can think about. And so they give the first six types or categories. And I included the last two. So the first one ontological refers to new laws, powers, or entities. And then in epistemological, it would be related with some degree of unexplained ability under the reliability or unpredictability of those new laws, powers, entities. Then we have the distinction between weak and strong emergence in which, and both of them can be given a more epistemic sense and a more ontological sense. So weak, strong emergence in the epistemological sense would be a reducibility in principle or in practice of the of the emergent property. And in the more ontological sense, it would be a challenge or not challenge to micro physicalism. So a weak emergent property would not challenge the idea that everything is in the end micro physically constituted. And therefore it would not challenge the the causal closure of physics. Then there are the other these other two categories, synchronic and diachronic, as Kevin also mentioned, that have to do with time in the sense that synchronic is is a relation between different levels of description at the same time. While diachronic would be diachronic emergence would be related with the same level, so a property emerging at the same level of description, but at a different time, at a later time. I have also added the categories inter theoretic and few many, because they will be useful for our analysis later. So inter theoretic would be an emergence that comparing two different theories. And few many would be the emergence from from the many. So a little bit like the sense in which Anderson was speaking about emergence, which would be that new properties emerge when you have many components interacting together. And so in the paper what they do is a very interesting classification like like this, putting all the categories in a cube and then seeing how can they how can they combine with each other so that there are like eight different possible combinations. And they defend a view that they call diachronic weekly and ontological emergence diachronic, because as we have seen, they they analyze system in the in the same level, but in a different time. So system one in T1 and the same system, but at a later time would be system two. It is weak because it doesn't challenge micro physicalism. And it's ontological because as they say the new laws and properties that emerge in system two are forbidden by the laws that were governing the same system, but at a previous time T1. And just as they do this classification of categories for emergence, I thought that we could also do the same for reduction, although there are some nuances. They don't translate perfectly to each other. So ontological and epistemological is quite similar. So ontological would be talking about constitution and causation and micro physicalism. And epistemological, it will be talking about explainability, so the ability of explain and derive or predict the properties from more fundamental properties. In weak and strong, I don't think there's a perfect translation because I don't think there's a weak and strong ontological sense in which like you can be strongly micro physicalist or weakly micro physicalist, but in the epistemic sense we could see that weak would be that the emergent properties reducible only in principle and that strong would be that the emergent properties reducible also in practice. In the synchronic and diachronic distinction, I also don't think it makes sense to see it in a temporal way because I don't think reduction is a matter of time, but we can talk about a reduction between descriptions in different levels or we could talk about a reduction of properties at the same level. And intertheraetic, the same reduction of properties between theories and few many, if we consider a few many reduction, it would be that we can successfully extrapolate the behavior of the many just from the behavior of a few particles. Okay, so now we will start the part on intercategory compatibility. And for that we will start with Butterfield, Jeremy Butterfield's paper, Less is Different, which as I said really started this conversation in philosophy of science to try to make these terms compatible, although there had been previous accounts of that, but this really became like it gave momentum for this view. So in this paper, he says, for my main point of view will be that although emergence is usually opposed to reduction, many examples exhibit both. So my title, Less is Different, is meant as an organic combination of the two parties slogans. Here by two parties, he's talking about the emergentist side and the reductionist side. And he says that the emergentist side is represented by Yanderson, this condensed matter physicist who wrote More is Different, as I was telling you, and the reductionist side by Stephen Weinberg, a particle physicist known for having dreams of finding final theories. And so he, just quick parentheses, I would like to say that this opposition between emergence and reduction should not be seen as an opposition between Anderson and Weinberg, because Anderson and Weinberg had a debate on a very particular debate on the construction of a superconducting supercollider in the 80s, in which they had different views. So in that particular debate, they had opposed views about whether they should build this superconducting supercollider or not. But I don't think that their opposition was because they represent these two sides of emergence and reduction that should be seen as opposed. Because as I said, I do think that Anderson still accepts reductionism. So it's not that he should represent some anti reductionism. But having said that, let's go back to Jeremy Butterfield's paper in which he presents emergence and reduction like that. So emergence would be novelty and robustness from the composite system with respect to its components. And from the limiting system, like when you take the thermodynamic limit with respect to the finite system. And for him, reduction, he takes a Nagelian account of reduction based on deduction, but also including some bridge principles linking the two theories, vocabularies. And in the paper, he says that there are examples that exhibit both emergence and reduction in the way that he has defined them. One of the examples would be phase transitions in which he says that the emergent behavior, so in phase transitions, basically the problem in terms of categorizing it as emergent or reduction, is that they are only describable once you take the limit to infinite components. Because the transition occurs when some thermodynamic variables tend to infinity or they have non-analyticities. And this can only be recovered when you take the thermodynamic limit. So in this case, Jeremy says that the emergent behavior can be deduced, so in his sense of deduction, only after taking the limit. So in this sense, it would be a successful reduction even though it's only after taking the thermodynamic limit. But that the emergent behavior also occurs before taking the limit, for a finite system. So that he would say that even though, for example, a phase transition of a ferromagnet, even though the sharp transition from magnetization on minus one, for example, two plus one, can only be defined sharply for an infinite system, he would say that if you have very large but still finite system, you still have a quite sharp change of, sudden change of magnetization. So this is his idea of compatibility. And then John Norton in this paper called Confusions of Reduction and Emergence in the Physics of Phase Transitions, he takes the idea of Jeremy Butterfield, and he makes an important point that we will see now. So he says, what I add to Butterfield's analysis is that the reconciliation must take note of the multiple senses of levels invoked and the fact that the parties in contention refer to different levels. So here when Norton talks about levels, it's what I've called categories. And so the two parties in contention here, so basically Norton is talking about physicists and philosophers who tend to see phase transitions differently. And so physicists on the one side, Norton says that they divide scientific knowledge according to scale, and therefore they see phase transitions as successful cases of emergence. And he says that their sense of emergence here would be this few many emergence, so the fact that the emergent property in this case of a phase transition, like the appearance of a sudden magnetization in a ferromagnet, only appears when you go from few components to too many, to an infinite system. But on the other hand, philosophers, Norton says, divide scientific knowledge into theories, and therefore they see phase transition as successful reduction, which he calls inter theoretic reduction, which is the idea that you can successfully reduce the emergent properties between theories, by taking, even if you are taking limits or approximations. So he ends up saying that emergence and reduction are only compatible because they relate different levels of descriptions. So what I've called, because they relate different categories of emergence and reduction, what I've called intercategory. So from here, we can already have a couple of questions. For example, is it true that philosophers only care about relating theories and physicists only divide knowledge into scale when talking about emergence and reduction? And also, is it true that emergence and reduction can only be compatible when referring to different categories? And before answering this and going to see this other notion that I've called intracategory compatibilism, before that, let's just see another alternative to compatibilism to solve the disopposition between emergence and reduction that I introduced in the beginning. This alternative was given by Karin Krauser in a paper in 2015 called The Coupling Emergence and Reduction in Physics. And yeah, basically her aim is to the couple both terms and not speak about reduction when we are speaking about emergence because it brings all this sort of confusion and defining emergence in terms of failures of reduction. And she bases her analysis of emergence in effective field theories, which are theories that capture the relevant physics at a given length or energy scale and presents us with a tower of theories ordered hierarchically according to energy scale. And so for her, emergence in the case of effective field theories is understood as novelty and autonomy of the levels, so of the higher levels with respect to the lower levels, without reference to concepts associated with reduction between levels or deduction or derivation. Emergence is then given a positive definition, not one in terms of failure of reduction. The benefits and disadvantages I see in Krauser's proposal is that it clarifies maybe physicist intuition about the essential features of emergence in these particular cases where systems are described by theories depending on scale, but it also it doesn't provide a similar understanding of reduction in those cases, which I think is still relevant for physicists, like I still think that physicists would like to talk about reduction when talking about emergence. So far to recap, we have seen two options to dissolve this opposition between emergence and reduction, the first one by Norton and Jeremy, which is separating the categories to which they refer, and the other one is separating the concepts altogether, like with Krauser, like the coupling, emergence and reduction. The problems that I see with one is that emergence would still be defined as a failure of reduction of the same category. So if you still want to defend an ontological claim of emergence, you would still define it as a failure of an ontological reduction. So the compatibilism is not quite complete. And the problems I see with two is that, as I said, physicists might still be interested in talking about reduction while talking about emergence. And so I see that there could be a third option, which is, is there a way to make emergence and reduction compatible for the same category at the same level, what I've called intra-category. And to defend that first, I will very briefly go through two accounts of two authors, Samuel Alexander and Aaron Snagel, which I think can be seen as examples of what I'm describing as intra-category compatibilism. And I will just use them to inspire a little bit this idea. And then we will go to a more precise example in physics, which will be the symmetry breaking in superconductivity. You have 10 minutes. 10 minutes. Okay. Perfect. Okay. Yeah. Then I will be very brief on Samuel Alexander. Basically, what I want to say about him is that I believe that in his metaphysics, Samuel Alexander was one of the first proponents of emergence belonging to the British emergentists who presented and defined the concept in the late 19th century. And in Alexander's view, I think that emergence and reduction are naturally compatible. So for him, he has a metaphysical picture of the world in which space-time is the most fundamental substance. So he's monist about space-time, which as Kevin has said, we should abandon this view maybe. But basically for him, even though he's monist about the substance of space-time, he sees that things can differentiate from space-time and emerge from it through the different constellations of space-time points or point instance. So basically, emergence is for him very embedded in his metaphysical picture of how the universe creates novel entities from the same substance. But at the same time, he says that even emergent qualities are new, they are also reducible or expressible without residue in terms of the processes proper to the level from which they emerge. Because for him, the different levels are comparison to one another. So basically, to go quickly on this, I would say that this notion that emergence and reduction would be so naturally compatible already challenges a little bit the narrative of this long-standing opposition between emergence and reduction. Since for him, for example, one of the first proponents of emergence, they were not opposite. And it also challenges the idea that emergence and reduction can only be compatible when referring to different categories. And the second example is Snagel, which who very famously wrote a lot about reduction in his book, The Structure of Science of 1961. So also quickly, his model of reduction is an inter theoretic concept of deduction between theories between a high level often discovered earlier theory from a low level and often posterior theory. And it can also include some bridge laws or auxiliary assumption that link the concepts in the different theories, which tend to be different, like microscopic concepts with microscopic concepts. When you need these bridge laws to have a successful reduction between theories is what he calls an heterogeneous reduction. And then after all his discussion on the reduction, he has a section on emergence in which he says that emergence should be also construed as a thesis concerning only logical relationships between statements and theories, so not about properties or entities or inherent traits of objects. And so an emergent trait is not an absolute thing, but it's relative to a theory. He also says interestingly that emergence should not be seen as a temporary confession of our ignorance. And this is the important point that the necessity of including these bridge laws and independent assumptions in order for deduction to be successful is perhaps the central thesis in the doctrine of emergence. So what I take this to mean is that for him, the fact that different theories use different concepts is the lesson that we have to take from emergence. This heterogeneous reduction would include his account on emergence, which would be represented by this necessity of using these bridge laws. So I also see this as an example of an intra-category compatibility, which would be between inter-theoretic emergence and inter-theoretic reduction, which would be sort of embedded in each other. And now, as I said, these two examples serve as an inspiration to think about another model of compatibilism between same category. And in the following, we will see an example and discuss its benefits. So we will be talking about the symmetry breaking in superconductivity. And so the characteristics that are the characteristic properties of a superconductor, which are the zero electrical resistance and the flux quantization and the Meissner effect. So the expulsion of magnetic field from the superconductor can be explained in two different levels, one macroscopically with the Ginsburg-Landau theory from 1950 and microscopically by the Bardin-Couper-Schwiffer theory, which I will be referring to BCS from 1957. Both these theories can be treated as effective field theories that we have seen before when talking about Crowther's paper, because they start from a low energy equation already, lower energy Hamiltonian or Lagrangian, and they are able to explain these main properties of superconductivity independently from the high energy degrees of freedom. To just see a bit the difference between these two theories, let's see the different assumptions that they take. So the Ginsburg-Landau theory would be more of a top-down approach in which the transition of the metal into the superconducting state is described as a second-order phase transition. So the free energy near the transition is given by an expansion around a complex order parameter psi, which is non-zero below the critical temperature DC. And so this free energy F is expressed by, expresses a Mexican hat potential that would explain the symmetry breaking for when this order parameter is non-zero, so for the superconducting phase. And this symmetry breaking would explain the appearance of a gap in the energy of the superconductor, which then is related to all the basic properties that superconductors have. On the other hand, the BCS theory, which is more of a bottom-up approach, sees all this, can explain all these properties from a more microscopic perspective. So the main assumption is that below DC, electrons and phonons become interacting more relevantly. And through the interaction of a phonon, electrons get paired into what it's called the Cooper pairs. And Cooper pairs, since they are bosons and not fermions, they can condensate. And then this order parameter that we were seeing in Ginsburg-Landau is seen actually as the state of these Cooper pairs. And then in the superconducting phase, it's non-zero. So it's when the phase transition would happen. And then for the superconducting phase, the phase of this Cooper pair state gets a fixed value, which then is what explains the symmetry breaking, which is the U1 electromagnetic gauge symmetry breaking, which also is represented by this Mexican hat potential. And now with this, what I would like to do is try to relate and see the difference between the two theories to claim that they are both an example of inter-theoretic emergence and inter-theoretic reduction. So what I will mean by inter-theoretic reduction of a theory T1 to T2. So T1 would be the reduced theory and T2 the reducing theory. What I consider to be a successful reduction would be a derivation of T1 from T2, in which it can include taking limits or approximations. Also an explanation of the concepts in T1 from concepts in T2. And also that through the reduction or thanks to the reducing theory T2, there is a consolidation of knowledge or a prediction of new knowledge related to that phenomenon. And then for the case of inter-theoretic emergence of T1 from T2, I would say that there has to be some sense of autonomy of the reduced theory with respect to the reducing theory and that there are novel concepts of predictions that only arise at the level of T1 with respect to T2. And so in this sense, I see my claims for inter-theoretic reduction between the Ginsberg-Landau approach and the BCS would be that the Ginsberg-Landau theory can be derived actually from the BCS theory. So close to the critical temperature, the Ginsberg-Landau arises as an effective theory of the microscopic scale, which was already shown by Gorkov only two years after the proposal of the BCS theory. Also, in terms of the better explanation of concepts and linking of concepts between the two, I would say that the BCS theory brought a microscopic explanation of the concepts in the Ginsberg-Landau. So the order parameter was explained in terms of the Cooper pair state. The gap then is actually the sum of the binding energies of these pairs of electrons when entering into in this state. And the Meissner effect, which is the expulsion of magnetic field, is also explained microscopically by the electromagnetic field being coupled to short range photons in the interior of the superconductor. And also, apart from that, apart from explaining better all the mechanisms of a superconductor, it also provided a more detailed explanation of a wider range of phenomena, for example, the Josephson effect. In the analogy to the QED vacuum, how could mass infirmians arise from a QED vacuum? And it also ended up in the formalization of the Nambu-Wollstone theorem and also of the Higgs mechanism. But at the same time, I think it's also a successful case of inter theoretic emergence between the Ginsberg-Landau and BCS because the basic properties of superconductivity were already well described by the phenomenological laws of Ginsberg-Landau. So it's sort of autonomous and independent from the from the microscopical details of the BCS theory. It's actually an effective field theory with respect to it. And also, there's an important thing that there's also the phenomenon of high temperature superconductivity in which the superconductor actually arrives at a higher temperature than usual. And this high temperature superconductivity can be described phenomenologically using a GL-Ginsberg-Landau-like theory, but it's not at all explainable microscopically by the BCS theory. And this is seen as one of the main constraints of the BCS theory. So to conclude, I see that the case of superconductivity, and especially related to its symmetry breaking, can be seen as an example of intracategory compatibility between emergence and reduction. And in this account, a successful instance of reduction actually can also be seen as a better way to understand why the phenomenon is emergent. So in a way, both concepts become sort of complementary, as in Nagel's account a little bit, and which I think fits with some physicist's intuition about emergence, especially with Andersons. And I would like to conclude with this quote of Anderson, where I forgot the reference, but it's from a book of his in 2011, where he says, in physics, the two great reductionist discoveries were the renormalization program and the concept of broken symmetry as introduced into particle theory by Nambu and Weinberg. Each of these two developments can be seen conversely as starting from simple and more symmetric underlying theories of the substrate and making different and more complicated emergent entities from them. Thus, the idea of emergence and reduction in are simply two sides of the same coin philosophically. And to conclude, we have seen that there are two approaches in dissolving the position between emergence and reduction. One is to make them compatible at different categories. The other is to decouple them and not talk about reduction when discussing emergence. And I have proposed that there could be a third option, which I've called intra-category compatibilism, which I have exemplified with the case of symmetry breaking in superconductivity. In this account, both emergence and reduction become complementary and not opposed to each other. And the benefits from this account are that it free us from defining emergence as a failure of reduction. And it better aligns with some of his intuitions about emergence. Thank you. Thank you, Maria. Let's say it again. Yeah, I enjoyed this. Okay, great. So, yeah, we'll go back to some questions. I would like to start with mine, because otherwise I will forget them and so on. So, you can keep the slides if you want. So, Maria, yeah, I like very much because we had some discussion about how to organize this talk and I think it is a success. So, because it is structured, it is centered on ideas. It has examples at the end, but also in the previous parts of your talk. So, yeah, I think it's as good as thanks to you and to Patricia for having us with that. So, just two remarks and a question. So, when you were speaking about forms of categories of reduction, which are based on categories of emergence, you transpose them to reduction. And when you were speaking about some chronic and dark chronic reduction, I was puzzled by the fact that time disappeared just like in Kevin's talk, because you were explaining them in terms of there was something about theories, but the time qualifications disappeared. It was strange because time and dark chronic is primarily about the about time and not about serious. Well, for emergence, you had both characterizations. So, second, I'm not familiar with the details of current process approach, but from how you presented it, it looked to me that she's envisaging a third option and it consists in that two theories are independent, because both the reduction and the emergence of some kinds of dependencies. So, they postulate some links between two theories, which but the third option is to consider them as independent, unrelated, and so on. So, that was a possibility, perhaps, that kind of makes or which was considered annually. Okay, and the creation, for your example, the last part of your talk, you were concentrating on why this is the case of emergence and why this is the case of reduction. But I did not notice it to be spelled out. Why is this a case of intercalculation? Okay, to the first question. Yeah, so I removed the time sense just because I don't understand why something like a process would be reducible just by like moving it through time. That's why I just kept the intral level or interlevel distinction. Yeah, it depends on how, I mean, the idea of transporting the classification is the underlying thought is the link between my emergence and reduction. Your idea of that reduction is the converse of emergence, which you which you reject afterwards. But I mean, when you are testing the categories, you are still within this paradigm of reduction being the inverse of emergence and then time, if it is the emergence, then it should also be the reduction in some way. Yeah, I understand. Yeah, actually, I didn't want to give the impression that I think that there is a transpose of all the concepts of emergence into reduction. But I just wanted to use the concepts in which we are familiar to talk about emergence reduction, which some of them are, you can transpose them and some of them not as the case of the diachronic and synchronic reduction, which I don't see. Yeah, perhaps you just need to say that. And here we cannot transpose. Yeah, exactly. I should have been more clear about that. Also, then you asked me about Crowder. The third option was so emergence reduction, but also independence. Independence between emergence and reduction. Yes. No, it depends between the things which could have been emergent or redacted. So like two series ontologically, it's more difficult. But if you have two series, you can have one emergent from another one reduced to another or they can independent. That's the third option. Right. But I think that Crowder doesn't defend that since she precisely bases her account on on effective field theories. So for her precisely, there is an idea of dependency of the theories, but also so independence and dependency at the same time of the theories. So it would be a more weak sense of emergence for her. Okay. And the third and the third one. Can you? So why was this? Why was it in the same level? Oh, right. Because I saw what I want to say is that I relate the Ginsberg-Lando theory with the BCS theory. So I see it as a case of inter-theoretic emergence or reduction. So it's the same level because both are about two series, right? Right. Because when I'm talking about, yeah, that's why I changed the name and I'm not talking about levels and I'm talking about categories. Because as I said, when Norton says that compatibility is achieved because of talking of different levels, he means different levels of description. Like philosophers are talking about theories, physicists are talking about difference in scale and that's what I've called categories. So you can be talking about that in terms of ontology, in terms of more epistemological claims. And the claim that I wanted to make is about relation between theories. So inter-theoretic emergence or reduction. And there could be more combinations. So the summary of it all is that by doing this, I want to open the possibility of even more combinations of compatibility between emergence and reduction. Okay, that was clear. Okay, thank you. So yeah, let's continue with Alexander. And if anyone else has a question, please ask your hand. Thank you for the talk. I'm a little bit confused because it seems to me that your way to understand emergence is very generous. So if I have novelty of concept and certain kind of autonomy, but a certain theoretical dependence, it's emergent. It's the way I understand your definition. So why should I not say that thermodynamic phenomena or emergence on statistical mechanics, classical physics is emergent on quantum mechanics, chemistry is emergent on physics, biology is emergent on biochemistry. So is your definition including all that? And if yes, why do you need emergence? If everything is emergent, what's the point? So that was Alexander and all the founders trying to find a middle ground between duality and reduction. Yeah, thank you. Thank you. So first of all, of course, I think that I need to think further into my definition of emergence. Because it's true what you say that it can include all these relations between thermodynamics to statistical mechanics and all of the things that you said. But actually, I wanted to be as fair with Anderson's account as possible. And actually, Anderson sees classical mechanics as emergent from quantum mechanics. He sees thermodynamics as emergent from statistical mechanics. That's why I wanted, I mean, I understand the problems of being so generous philosophically. But at the same time, what I'm trying to do here, which is included in my historical research, is to find a way to better understand Anderson, or at least, even if it's not a good philosophical position, at least to be clear on what he was thinking, so that maybe you would not end up with philosophical interpretations of Anderson in which he's an anti-reductionist all of a sudden. So that's why I think my definition was so generous, although I admit that maybe I also have to give it a bit more thought. So it's an historical, okay, it's an historical thesis. Yes, yes, my thesis, yes. Although in this chapter, since I wanted to talk about this, I needed to go and to do a more philosophical approach, but yeah. Okay, if Alexander is satisfied, we have a question for Mattheon, please ask it. I know, yeah. Thanks so much for the presentation. I really enjoyed it. My question, and I apologize for my ignorance in the field. But thank you for explaining it. It was all very clear. I guess my first impression of thinking emergence of reductionism is I think the conclusion is right, that they are both complementary. And certainly that would have been my initial thought about it in the sense that I see both as quite hierarchical in their definitions and assuming different levels on the basis of which something might be emerged. So it was interesting to kind of think that there is an opposition that seems to exist within the literature. And it sounds like that opposition does stem with that particular concern that I think you raised, the one about perhaps emergence being a failure of reductionism. And so that's interesting to think with. But I think the conclusion that you've drawn is at least on my intuition, I think one that seems to fit better. I guess it also very much depends on the ways in which these two definitions would be interpreted. So, or the definitions that would be given for each of them, in which to what extent does the literature basically hold emergentism and reductionism as exclusionary of one another. Because it sounds like what you're doing is the definition that you're drawing is something of a merge that does not exclude one from the other. So in the opposition, sorry this is a long question, but in the opposition that you've set out in the beginning, to what extent does that literature really seek to exclude a property of reductionism from their definition of emergentism. Yeah, yeah, thanks. Thanks for the question. Yeah, actually, this is something that I would also like to investigate because a little bit also the message from the talk I would like to be that actually this idea of long-standing opposition between emergence and reduction is not so true and I don't think that, for example, I think that for Alexander and Nagel, they didn't see emergence as a priori opposed to reduction or that they would exclude each other. At some point it's true that in the literature of philosophy of science and I think especially of philosophy of mind they started to be seen as opposed. And this I haven't had the time to really investigate how this opposition really came about. But I do think that in the philosophy of mind especially they are more inclined to or more interested about metaphysical or ontological claims of emergence and reduction since they are interested in knowing if the mind is emergent from the body and in which sense. And I think in those debates is where the opposition between the two really started to gain force and in a way we have sort of veredited this idea that they should be opposed which I think that we should get rid of. Not because having them as opposed is not interesting for some views but we should explore more combinations and more yeah more combinations between the two. Okay, thank you very much. Patricia, you have questions. Oh no, we have two persons for the last minute. So who is first? Do we have time? One minute at least. We should not be late as I said in the beginning. Just a very very short question. Yeah, let's start with both persons. So begin for the service. Just a very short question. So follow up of Alexandre's question. So I'm not sure how liberal your definition is actually. I don't think it allows everything because you say that emergence needs to fulfill two claims. So dependency claim and an independency claim. And that separates emergence from other notions like dualism for example which doesn't fulfill the dependency claim. So I think I don't see it as a very liberal definition. So how liberal do you think your definition is in the end? Yeah, actually I haven't included the dependency claim here so it's true that maybe in the way I put it in this slide it doesn't include the dependency claim. But yeah, I do think that it doesn't include dualism for sure. But maybe yes, these distinctions that Alexandre was saying of emergence of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics or thermodynamics from statistical mechanics. I do think that it might include those even if they are also seen as successful inter-theoretic reductions at the same time. So maybe you can make that notion more precise by specifying what novelty means and what these dependencies mean in each case, right? Yeah. Yeah, for sure. Yeah, thank you. Okay, I do have Cristiano and Sebastian. Well, Cristiano crossed this quickly. Okay, Nuri, many thanks for the talk. It was really, really great. My question is more or less related with Alexandre and Patricia just said. I mean, I am very sympathetic with the idea that reduction in emergence can be combined in some cases. But when you start to relax the concepts, the reduction concept or the emerging concept is not so clear. What is the motivation to introduce the concept? And you have to go to ways. One way to say, well, I mean, people use the concept of emerging, the concept of production, and we want to give a nice approach that recover or capture how people use the concept. That's fine. But the other way is, okay, we want to know if there are this kind of relation in the world or if we need philosophically this relation. My concern is that when you start to relax the concepts, it's not so clear where's the motivation to introduce emergence as a substantive relation in the world. Because one of the ideas is that you need some novelty. It could be spelled out in terms of some causal novelty or some powers or whatever. That's clear. But in this case, in this particular case, in the case that you describe, it's not clear to me why if you have real reduction, as you say here, you also need emergence. What is the real novelty that is being there and why it's not captured by production or why is production not capturing in an interesting sense. This novelty is there is some novelty. What is the motivation to, in this particular case, to introduce emergence? Right. Thank you. I guess that the novelty here is that for the case of the Ginsberg Landau, you can actually explain some concepts or explain some behaviors that you cannot explain with the microscopic theory of BCS. I think that the novelty in my case study is reflected on this part. The autonomy is reflected on the part that the Ginsberg Landau would be an effective theory from the BCS. And in this way, this is the independency claim. And the novelty, I think that I wanted to capture it through this idea that there are still some behaviors that the BCS cannot account for and cannot explain. So that it would show that there's a further independency of the microscopic details in this case, maybe. Okay. We have the very last minute for Sebastian. Very quickly, a quick follow-up question after like Alexander, Patricia and Christian. It seems to me that your concept of emergence is also not too liberal. But maybe like the opposite criticism would be it's too close to what Jeremy is doing, you know, Jeremy is like it seems that your sense of autonomy and novelty is very close to what Jeremy was doing. And of course, like one of the main tools used by Jeremy was like the real opposition group like the RG. So maybe like, so the question would be like, you know, how, what would be the kind of tool that you would use to specify your concept of autonomy to make it distinct from Jeremy? You know what, is it some kind of like multiple realizability where you have like a space of models and you can see that they all give you the same order parameter that you would get in the BCS theory or is it something else? Like if you had to just tell us quickly, like as a very last minute question, what kind of tool would you use to specify your concept of autonomy, what would it be? Okay. So yeah, maybe I would need to think more about that. At the same time, I don't see a problem with it being close to Jeremy's account. But so I think that it would be actually closer to Crowther's concept of autonomy that she extracts from effective field theories. So the autonomy would be like this sort of insensibility to microscopic details or high energy details, quickly said. So if I may, in just one second, I think Jeremy emphasizes noality and robustness more than autonomy. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Could you have a last remark? Yeah, I think I'll go back to the audience. Yes, yes. Very quickly, please. Yeah, no, no, no, well, it was just just trying to understand whether Nuria, you're actually perhaps one way of putting would be that rather than perhaps speaking strictly of reduction and emergence, the fact that effective and microscopic versions of a theory in a certain sense are both, they cooperate in a certain sense effectively into like, I don't know, for a heuristic purposes or for explanatory purposes and so on and so forth. So at the end, they are actually kind of intertwined with each other. So even if you reduce, or even if you only consider the emergent level, at the end, these two things are so intertwined in practice that at the end, there is not even point to say, yes, what is the virtue of each single one separated from the other. I don't know, it's just a kind of a thinking along. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think this is definitely in line with what Anderson thinks about this. And yeah, I would also like to reflect this by making it more philosophically clear. And I think that this is the objective that I'm trying to reach here. But yeah, so I will work further on that to try to make this point clear. As you said, I really like this idea that you said that they both cooperate in this sort of heuristic sense, no? Yeah, thank you. Okay, great. So thank you all very much. I'm happy that I had some discussion. Yeah, active discussion of this case as well. So thanks to Nuriya, thanks again to Kevin. Yeah, it was great to have finished in this positive way. I hope for everybody. So thank you all for having attended this meeting or the others and the others for some. So the video as with the previous talks will be available normally at the Surfaces YouTube channel in some time. Okay, so these events were too fast collaboration or just to show some of the conversions of interest between Zansworth and Surfaces groups and even beyond. So yeah, I hope you have enjoyed it. I hope our contacts will continue in some other way. And we will have an occasion sometime to see the development of all the research which was presented at this meeting. So thank you all again. Thank you.