 Abdulaziz, to add another theater to the conflicts we are speaking about, in any confrontation between Iran and either the United States or its neighbors in the Gulf or Israel, whatever, Saudi Arabia would probably be at the receiving end as it already looked when Saudi oil installations were attacked by whoever it was who attacked them. Saudi Arabia itself has come under close scrutiny of the international community and also of its friends in the United States, particularly in Congress, related to human rights issues, the murder of our friend Jamal Khashoggi, the Yemen war, and it seems to have reduced its regional engagement a bit, not in Yemen, but in Syria, where also with your participation Saudi Arabia was very instrumental at some point, very active. Saudi Arabia overreached a bit and now is trying to limit its engagement, trying not to get into the limelight of international attention with regard to Yemen and human rights, and withdrawing a little bit to trying to mend its own affairs, or is that the wrong interpretation? Well, that's a bit complex situation, I think. If I look at the current situation in Yemen today, for instance, it is very much directly linked to the conflict with Iran, because without the Iranian support to this militia, which is to my surprise how the rest of the world and the community call them the de facto government or reality on the ground. If we are supporting a reality on the ground, a militia that threw a legitimate government and took over, and then we try to endorse those behavior, I think there is something wrong, because that's where do you stop and where do you put the limitation there. On the agenda today, of course, yes, we were involved in Syria. On the beginning, we tried to help the Syrian people to reorganize themselves. We extended a lot of support with the coordination with the international community. But I think in the Syrian situation, today, it's more of the three levels have failed. The direct discussion on the Arab circles have failed through the OIC, the organization of Islamic country have failed also that one. So it went into the international level. And once it is in the international level, it started in Syria as a request for a little bit of a freedom and ended to a platform for a major international conflict zone that everybody trying to exercise their power, their interest on that territory. No, there is no disengagement in Saudi Arabia. I think the engagement is still there. But at the same time, if you look at today to the US agenda, you will say China, Iran, and then North Korea. If you look at the Saudi agenda today, yes, for me, the first priority will be Yemen. I have 1,450 kilo borderline with that. And my second, of course, will be the Iranian aggression sort of policy interventionist and expansionist policy that has been adopted to Iran. So I need to deal with that situation as a second priority. Of course, today, Iran and Saudi at a very strategic challenge in both border north and south. Because in the north side, Iran continuously supporting all the militia group, we call them El-Hashdi Sha'bi in Iraq, which they're fully funded, trained, supported by the Iranian Revolution Guard. And at the same time in Yemen. So being on both sides and having also in the Gulf waters seeing the threat coming also, I mean, 14th of September is a changing name of the game. If the international community today is not condemning a real act, which I think the good thing that Europe at least recognize that despite the strong relation between Europe and Iran. I was in New York and I was very happy to hear President Rouhani saying that he would like to have a new hormones sort of regional security framework, which will be based in two principles. One is the non-aggression and the second is the non-interventionist. This is what we have been suffering from regarding the Iranian policy. But what I will add to that, that we would like to see an international guarantor, a role for the United Nations, to play the guarantor for such a policy to be implemented. If they are willing to do and to move toward real implementation of non-intervention and non-aggression, trust me, we will all be happy to move toward that regional arrangement. And we do not wish to see more international presence. I mean, somebody like President Trump coming out and say, why do we need to be involved in the Middle East war? We should be out of that one. I think he's mistaken by two things. He has the two strongest enemy and a friend. I mean, Israel is the strongest friend for the United States, and it is within that Middle East geographical location. And Iran, which is his biggest enemy, or the second top in the list for him, is there. So by this engagement or by having double standard, in one way, yes, you would draw your soldier from the north, Syria. But at the same time, you're willing to send 3,000 soldiers to Saudi Arabia, yet you will say we have agreed with the Saudi to pay for the cost of that one. If it's really a matter of course and pricing, and so maybe we should have an international tender and see who's the cheapest price and come up with the right R of B and then see who will provide the better security at a cheaper rate, if that's the way. It is unfortunate to see such a policy coming out of the US where we would have expected to see a much more real engagement in bringing peace and stability. The invasion of 2003 into Iraq, did that really brought the stability to Iraq? Are we having a stable, secured, safe, unified Iraq today? We don't. So back to your first question when we start, is the involvement and the engagement of the external power, is it in the best interest or the worst interest of the region? It debays how that involvement play roles. I mean, without a withdrawal of Obama, President Obama's red line as you called it, we would have not seen the Russian back into the region with such a strong desire and presence. And today in Saudi Arabia, we are receiving President Putin's visit. So that makes it a much more complex scene in the region. So we will still Saudi Arabia, they will be involved through the four different layers, of course, their own interest with each one of the countries, second, through the GCC despite of whatever current situation in the GCC, through the Arab League and through the OIC and then through the United Nations. So they have all these different multilayered. Saudi did condemn the Turkish role in the North part of Syria. And despite of that personally, I understand the interest of the different. I don't think Turkey would have taken such a step without consensus, at least, or I wouldn't call it consensus, but no disagreement from the different strong player in the region, being it Russia, US, and the other power there. That could well be, I mean, you already pointed to that, that Saudi Arabia compared to the Kurds in Syria, has the advantage you can pay for American soldiers, even though not many Saudis have probably fought in the Normandy as they wouldn't have been called Saudis at that point. Anyway, I think there's one important point which I would like to stress and I don't know how far you want to reveal things. I know that you are involved personally with your research center in second tracks with the Iranians. And without going into too much details, you don't want to reveal. Would you see real opportunities for de-escalation and security building across the Gulf based on the contacts you are having with the Iranian counterparts? I think it was very, I mean, WikiLeaks did leak the information, so it's not any more secret about our track too, which we have started in 2012. But at the same time, last meeting, it was in New York in the end of September after the assembly. My feeling today since the Iranian came for the first time saying, yes, we will have regional security based on the two, you know, principle, non-intervention and non-aggression. I think, you know, with a strong presence of the UN as a guarantee, as I said, it will be welcomed. And I don't think there will be any rejection from the Saudi side, you know, toward that. And we have indicated very clearly. And also when we talked about, you know, Yemen and how situation will be in Yemen, you know, Iran realized that it is not even in their best interest because they do also have a different militia. They do have, you know, different groups. So if the international community is not recognizing the role of the violent non-state actor and giving them a role to play, where do we stop there? Every country then will have its own problem in that one. But am I pessimistic or optimistic? I think it all depends on Iran today. Iran, if they realize that they can't live in a leg of hatred in the region, then they need to fix their relation in that one. And they need to address the various issues. They need to address issues from Hezbollah to the militia in Syria that they have created through the Afghani, Pakistani, and through the Iraqi also militia. They need to look at al-Hajd al-Shaab in Iraq. They need to look at, you know, al-Houthi on the south. If they change that sort of attitude and willing to be a response, because they have chosen, by the way, to deal with through this militia for two reasons. One, to support the regime that they want, if they decided to, like what they did with Hezbollah in Syria. The second is to leverage with them to use it as a disturbance tools that, you know, the same thing, it's like what they did in Lebanon when they have delayed the government role in that one and became much more aggressive in that one. I think I would still call for a real major constructive global engagement, you know, in solving a lot of the, you know, regional problem that we have starting from Libya all the way to Yemen, you know, going through the whole things here. Thank you.