 Okay, so great pleasure to be here again. I'm going to try and be quick and have the same strategy some of you will remember for tomorrow. That is just make a few comments on the papers and presentation, which were all great and I enjoyed very much. And then have a bit of a rant about something. Less of an outrageous rant I think today. But maybe just then to start with the papers and presentations, which again, I thought illustrate the kind of high quality of work that people are doing now in empirical finance and on implementation issues. It's maybe a common question to Clice and Shafiq actually, which is just to get your sense of where do you think we're headed on the structure of the corporate tax? And that's partly prompted by Alex this morning. Alex Cobb and said, obviously we're headed for formular apportionment at the end of the day. And I can see where that's coming from. When we think about kind of analogies with subnational corporate tax, they all have some element of formular apportionment there. But you know, more generally it seems to me if you ask where are we headed? I think the short term you could say we're headed for a mess, particularly if pillar one, I suppose for a moment pillar one happens. You have pillar one on top of pillar two and the minimum tax. I mean, how many people in the world understand how that all plays out? It's hugely complex. So you could say it's kind of unsustainable. The good thing you could then say, I'm gonna resist the half cup thing, an energy metaphor like the plague. I'm not gonna say anything about cups and water. You could say, well the good thing is that, again, Alex's point, Alex pointed out that really the pillar one has thrown out the principle of arm's length pricing. In an intellectual sense, the defense of the arm's length pricing is the only way you can do things that's kind of now gone. That's sort of the genius out of the bag. But of course there's another genius out of the bag which is the destination element, which is in pillar one. And you could say that, but if it weren't for four or five US senators, we'd be talking here about a destination-based cash flow tax worldwide. So I'm curious to know where Shafiq and Klyce think we might be beheaded in that long term, whether they, how is this all gonna ultimate? It seems to be things are kind of up in the air, which is very exciting. All these new principles we're now allowed to talk about. Five years ago you couldn't go to the OECD, talk about former apportionment, talk about destination-based taxes, now it's all over the place. So whereas where are the pieces all going to fall? So that was a kind of, that wasn't a rent, that was a question for Klyce and Shafiq. Nadine, I really had very little to say, I think it was very nicely constructed paper. I was curious why you didn't use the export price data, but I think you kind of explained that. I suppose South Africa always makes me think, what about mining? Is there anything to say about mining in this context? So we know, for example, mining companies might well have zero profits for a very long time. And I don't quite remember how the kind of ring fencing and so on works out in South Africa, but I'd be curious to know more about, little bit more about the mining. It's a very small comment. I think Petta is, I think very convincing that non-linearities, we have to take very seriously, two thoughts on that. I suppose one is, what does that mean in terms of what a sensible minimum would be? Does it mean, because it's so non-linear, all we need is a very low minimum, because that will cut pretty much everything up. Are we done if we have a minimum of 5%, 10%? So in that sense, did it actually weaken the case for an aggressive minimum, it's very non-linear. I don't know, but I'd be curious how that plays out in terms of how we think about what the minimum should be. And I guess as a more general point, I mean, we don't really talk much about what the minimum rate should be or how we're gonna change it if we want to change it, but that's maybe not for today. So let me, I have a few more minutes turn to the small, not really a rant and it's gonna been anticipated by Shafiq, maybe not too surprisingly, since we come from a common intellectual heritage, so to speak, which is this question, which has also come up a couple of other times in sessions here, which is what do we focus too much on profit shifting as a DRM, as a DRM issue? And by we, I should say, I mean academics, I mean policymakers, and I mean not least donors, people who are supporting work in this kind of area. And okay, I'm gonna overstate the argument just to be clear. So of course, it's well-established profit shifting in the developing country context is important. So let's say one, somewhere between one and 2% of GDP maybe, it's important. Clearly it's interesting. Intellectually challenging, corporate tax issues are always super interesting. But the correlation between things that are important and interesting isn't always one, right? I mean, there can be things that are important, but actually not very interesting. And between ourselves, don't tell us to anybody, but I think carbon taxation kind of fits into that category. It's kind of, it's economists, okay, what are you gonna say, have a tax? But anyway, that was a digression. So I think the question becomes, well, given the administrative and human constraints in many low-income countries, is counteracting profit shifting? Well, crudely, is it the best way to go about meeting the kind of revenue needs that we know are huge? Or what is its place within an overall portfolio of measures? And of course, it would be great if we could capture that one to 2% of GDP in revenue, but we pretty much know we're not gonna do that. Just as an aside, we're often given numbers for how initiatives, this initiative on international tax, it's raised X million dollars, which is always kind of interesting and impressive. But when you ask, well, what is that in percent of GDP? Given the kind of scale of the problems we face, it's often not so impressive. But I think we know too that measures are hard. I think the deans, while kind of interpret as being, these measures are not a kind of, they don't sort of solve the problem without a lot more effort. I think in count on contrast, one might say, well, there's profit shifting, but there's really coordination. Coordination becomes the issue. So I remember some numbers we did on when the OECD 2015 figures came out on the revenue loss from profit shifting. So globally, in rule of thumb, that was equivalent to like 2.5 points on the corporate tax rate worldwide. And compared to the kind of changes we've seen in the corporate tax rates, that's not, okay, that's kind of where the action is. It seems to be on the coordination side. Of course, there's also the question that we look elsewhere, and I think Kleis gave a very nice example of that in the EU, looking to losses on the VAT. The analog in developing countries, the number that I remember we cited a while ago, was to say that if you take, okay, C-efficiency is a kind of measure of the effectiveness of the design and implementation of a VAT. But if you look in low income countries, you take the countries in the lowest quartile of C-efficiency, which means a bad kind of VAT, you raise that just to the median, just to the median for low income countries, that's three and a half points of GDP. And that's kind of, we're kind of pretty sure we know how to do that. And of course, I think the other point is, I think sometimes it takes the focus on profit shifting in the developing country context, takes our eyes off the analytical eyes of other kind of issues that are at least as important like customs, who talks about customs other than in the kind of profit shifting context. 25% of revenue in many of these countries. What do academics have to say about that? Pretty much nothing. What do we know about the incidents of customs? We go, well, these little studies of incidents in developing countries, we say customs, we don't really know about customs, let's throw out 25% of revenue. So anyway, this is becoming quite a good rant, which I'll keep going. But the final aspect, I think, is to say for no more minutes, okay, one 30 seconds. No, I'll bear my instructions. Thank you very much. That's it, thank you. Make a quick round and like, so is it answer? So like the first question was for Claes and Shafiq, you got like very short time each. So how he headed for formal apportionment for a mess or for something else? Well, I cannot guarantee that we are headed for a mess, but it's a good guess. No, more seriously, I think it's obvious that if you have a system as we, the architecture that we've built so far is based on the idea that the taxing right goes to where the value is created. And that puts a lot of strain on the transfer pricing disciplines because they are the ones that are the only guardrail we then have against the profit shifting. And we have seen, I think convincingly, that there's a limit to how much work the transfer pricing discipline can do as a safe guard. Now, of course, if you put in place a minimum tax, you do also relieve some of the strain on this transfer pricing system. We have several times in the EU put forward proposals for doing a unitary tax system, and we will do it again. But we have to travel through the unanimity process so that it's a long and winding road. Now, it's also true that pillar one does open the door for another philosophy, right? It does open the door for the philosophy that you allocate some of the taxing rights to where the customers are. And it is obvious that that has an impact on the elasticity of the tax base because if you are in a country where you can call up your prime minister and say, if you don't give me a tax sheet and a deal, I'm gonna move my factory. It's, that is a credible threat, but it's not a very credible threat to call up your prime minister and say, I'm gonna move the customers because they are gonna bloody stay. So I do think that there is some music in thinking about having this transition. But of course, moving the whole ship is enormous. Yeah, okay, so Mick always asks a difficult question. So my take on this is instead of doing prediction is just to make an observation. And that is, we know now, Europe is getting more keen to tax excess profit where excess profit or windfall profits are defined differently in different countries, Italy, among many others. And I think that just suggests that in some sense governments are keen to tax economic rent at the end of the day. And maybe that would be the direction that we'll be moving on. And that would require also coordination. And so let's ask Peter now that the microphone is over here, whether his nice nonlinear results say something about like a reasonable level for the global minimum tax? Not really, but you make a good case that we can, the case for very high. But we both know that we have the 15%. We have the 15% and it's not, if it's going to hold at all, it's not going to change any time soon. But obviously for countries who have effective tax rates around 30%, this floor of 15% is a problem. And I wonder whether using the models that are standard, whether if we estimated using only a sub-sample of countries which have high effective tax rates, you might observe, because now most of the profits are reported around the 0%, right? But if you get rid of that, maybe, it will behave very similarly at the 15%, let's see. And fascinating from Shafiq on the discussion on the pillar two, and that's in case I had more time, that's where I would be going, whether countries should be joining, implementing the reform, whether it pays off, and what about the tax incentives? Looking forward to continuing that. And there are two questions for you Nadine. So one is whether you are nice prices on import prices. Also, when you look at export prices, and the other one is if you know something about mining. Yeah, so export prices will be abstracted from them for now, because we don't see intra and extra firm trade. So that's just a practical reason. So mining is super interesting. So actually over lunch I spoke to a representative of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, and they apparently have like super detailed data. So I think that would be super interesting to look at that. And I also want to support your point about the opportunity cost within tax authorities. So I think this is like a super important point. We pay a lot of attention to implementing very complex measures against multinational profit shifting. And especially within less developed countries, high skilled labor is very scarce, and it can be probably used very effectively elsewhere. And I think we need to pay attention to that. Great. Thank you very much. So the session is over, but that's a plot like our four speakers and Mick for his insightful comments and questions. Thank you.