 I'm saying that I have a more difficult task than the previous speaker because I have five minutes to react, improvising on their presentations. So I will make some comments that on points that were touched by Sapo, Campo and Lawrence, basically based on Latin American experience. 30 years ago in 1985, we were here in a research, one of the first research project of Wider, led by Jerry Heliner, which is here, and Lance Taylor, in which Ocampo participates as a young researcher, believe it, and also Nora Lustig and other researchers that I present now in this conference. At that time, we were discussing in this project the adjustment of Latin Americans to the debt crisis, which was the first international crisis, because the whole region entered into crisis in 1981 and 1982. It was the first crisis of the financial globalization process that were starting at that time and so it was, as Lawrence commented, the reform of international system, if we can call it system or non-system, maybe better, was pushed by crisis and this crisis, the Latin American debt crisis, pushed the IMF and the Fed to new roles in the management of this new type of crisis that were different than the current account crisis of the previous Bretton Wood system and were basically capital account crisis for which the IMF didn't have enough resources to act as a lender or law resort if it wanted to do, but they didn't want it, but even though they haven't enough resources to do. So the period of the 90s was the period of the Washington Consensus in the Latin American countries became highly in debt and almost all the major countries of the regions suffer financial and balance of payment crisis in the 90s, huge crisis like the Argentine crisis 2000 of 1995, the Mexican crisis of 1995, the Argentine crisis of 2001, another crisis, the Brazilian crisis of 1998, so there was this first 30 years of financial globalization were marked by a succession of crisis in emerging market economies. In the night in the 2000s, particularly between 2002-2003 after the Argentine, Uruguay and Turkey crisis, there were the last crisis suffered by emerging market economies. Latin American countries may perform much better. Well, everybody knows that in part it was the behavior was improving in the behavior of this economy was helped by the improving in the terms of trade basically caused by the demand of commodities by the Chinese and Indian, but basically Chinese economy and this, but it wasn't that only, it wasn't that the countries learn from previous experience and for instance they flexibilized the exchange rate systems, the exchange rate regimes, for instance, all the crisis, all the crisis that the developing economy suffered during the first 30 years of financial globalization were in situations in which the exchange rate were fixed or quasi fixed or predetermined. So, and there was no other crisis in after the 90s, in the 2000s there were no new crisis, even in the context of the American global financial crisis of 2008, 2007, 2008. So there was not contagion to emerging market economy, which is a very interesting issue and in part has to be with this change in the exchange rate regimes, but also the Latin American countries on average up to 2008 had a relatively depreciated real exchange rate, experienced current account surpluses, except Colombia, the rest of Latin America, South America show current account surpluses results and accumulated, I was mentioned, accumulated reserves based on these current account results and capital, and capital and capital inflows. But there's a problem there in the system, or there's no system that there's a system that lacks of any coordination of exchange rate policies or regimes and lacks of a significant last resort lender. And so even if Latin American countries did better during the 2000s, now when the countries are confronting the new situation of declining terms of trade and the immediate possibility of a rise in the international interest rate, the countries found themselves in a situation a very appreciated exchange rate and with the need of this AI experience is huge devaluation that do not found the exchange rate do not find in the economy any tradeable sectors that could respond to the new stimuli generated by the depreciated, presently more depreciating exchange rate because they all serve, all these countries suffer Dutch disease, Dutch disease. And the countries, why the IMF push in the end of the 90s, the flexibilization of exchange regimes, the client of the institution is a pure floating exchange regime, inflation targeting, full-fledged inflation targeting means for the IMF a pure floating exchange regime. But the countries didn't do that, but minus design, practical design is a flexible exchange regime, but managed, we call managed exchange rate regimes that allowed central banks to intervene, to buy in intervention, and this was what the main source of accumulating reserves. But the interventions strongly were very strong enough to accumulate substantial reserves in the cases of Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, less in Mexico and Chile that were more orthodox in the sense that leave the exchange rate floating for more freely. But the interventions were not intended to stop the appreciation trend that the countries were suffering as from the beginning of 2003-2004. So now this appreciation trend caused the industrialization of Dutch disease. The IMF has a role, played a role in these performances of the Latin American economies because the IMF always, the idea of the IMF was, well, we don't know which the equilibrium exchange rate is. Let the market define what the equilibrium exchange rate is. And really, if we don't know what the equilibrium exchange rate is, a prudent attitude towards monetary policy would have been to preserve some stability of the real exchange rate in order to avoid what is going on now, which is huge devaluations that impact inflation and generate recessionary trends without finding, because of previous Dutch disease, tradeable sectors that could react to the new stimuli generated by the now more depreciated exchange rate. Well, let's continue in the debate. Thank you very much, Roberto, for bringing us back from the stratosphere of international to the realities of actually managing these economies. And it was very, very, very useful to know. So perhaps we should have real exchange rate coordination, not just nominal ones, perhaps. Anyway, you're now going to talk to us about the African perspective on this. Thank you. Thank you very much. And I'm happy to be here. But of course, I only have 10 minutes to say, is it five? Oh, when did you change the base? Oh, sorry. Okay. Fantastic. They're all given five and take 10. Oh, you took 10. So I'll take 15, because I've come from, I've come from, I've come from far away. Anyway, thank you very much. And I'm happy to be here. And of course, sitting here and talking about this issue is always very difficult for me, having I've just finished my two terms in the central bank of Kenya, eight years of public service has been quite devastating for me. I'm trying to decompress it down. But the most important thing is that some of the issues that have been raised here are very, very pertinent and they are very, very true. But let me make four points. First, I just want from where I was sitting, I've been sitting. And what I've been observing is that domestic financial systems in Africa and even emerging markets have improved. The regulatory capacity and even regulatory technology has improved. And for the last few years, we have seen that even the standard setting bodies have really improved. So not only have we improved domestic capacity for regulation, we have improved the regulatory technology, but also we have recent and we have seen what this standard setting bodies like financial action task force or even basso have done. And of course, that is the point. We're making that point so that I can come to perhaps Lauren's point about what do we need in terms of reforms? Because essentially, we are not saying that that technology is actually going to help. We talk about so many things in terms of improving the domestic financial system. Of course, too big to fail bonds has been quite a big problem. But the most important thing is that we have seen those results. They are quite commendable. The second point, of course, when you're talking about that, we also have to talk about what has happened in the last few years, in the couple of years, especially the 30 years that emerging markets, emerging economies and even developing economies have actually managed to access international markets, international financial markets. And for us, this is very important. You can see that in the financial crisis 2008, most countries actually survived because they had accumulated adequate reserves. But that doesn't mean that the demand for reserves is actually really has helped them. But of course, the most important thing is that those countries realize that reserves are going to help them in terms of accessibility of reserves and even saving those reserves are going to help the domestic market. But of course, you can see the turn around in terms of reserves themselves and reserves management and reserve currencies, what has happened to, especially African countries. First, you can see that as we talk today since 2008, it's actually like we pay to maintain those reserves. Of course, we made our own regulations about you have to invest those reserves in triple A institutions. And those triple A institutions were only to be found mostly in developing countries. But right now, you can see that it's like we pay to keep those reserves in those countries. So you can see that all of a sudden it was a precious gain, then all of a sudden it's turning out to be quite a difficult aspect. So essentially, when you talk about international architectural reforms, reforms is actually important to look at that, because we still think that reserves are very, very important to cushion the markets, because let's talk about capital accounts liberalization. We still think that we need to cushion this nascent market. The third point I wanted to talk about is actually development financing. These are interesting aspects, but there are two dimensions to it. One of them is development financing institutions themselves and how they are structured. And the other one is actually access to capital, international development capital. And you can see the wave in Africa, while most of the countries have realized that they can go for sovereign bonds to help roll out public investments, especially to cross the infrastructure gap. That is good. But of course, it means that you also have to understand that you have to deal with that as the fourth point I was making, what happens to the future currency and even reserve currencies themselves, because essentially that development finance, accessibility to that development finance, accessibility to those resources is going to depend very much in terms of how reserve currencies behave. Most of the instability we have seen since 2008 has actually been currencies themselves, stability of the currencies themselves, because we are hooked to the currencies and obviously when there is a big fight between the Dora and the Euro, obviously you can see what happens in terms of those markets and agents rushing for Dora denominated assets and vice versa. So essentially that is where most of the instability is coming. So even when we talk about the instability of the financial system, we have to come back and ask ourselves, actually, what are the spirit of us in developing countries? And even including their, even if you start talking about even their monetary policy, their monetary policy stance, how are they going to survive in terms of that kind of, most countries in Africa will have independent monetary policy driven by the fact that of course they have floating currencies. But you can see what kind of pitfalls that we have. And also that moves back into even the stability of currencies driven by also capital flows. We liberalize the capital account, but essentially most of the time you find that we attract portfolio flows. And portfolio flows will always in necessity move the nominal exchange rates. And the nominal exchange rates, our politicians react very viciously when currencies are depreciating. They tend to have this belief that currencies should actually appreciate never depreciate. But of course there's also real threat because currency depreciation also feeds into domestic inflation. Obviously when there are supply constraints, because if you have to import food, like I come from the north of the Horn of Africa, where devastating droughts would affect around the food prices, but also energy prices at the same time. Then you can see what it means when there's a currency depreciation. It's going to feed straight into inflation. So these are real threats to domestic financial systems and even monetary policymaking. But finally let me of course go back to the issue of we all talk about financial system, domestic financial system. We look at international financial system, but most of the time we don't make a difference in terms of actually who participates in these financial systems from where we come from, developing countries, especially in Africa. And you'll find that for many years they were driven by multinational corporates and multinational banks. And then it is all of a sudden there are perhaps, let me say, 10 years that we find that domestic financial systems are coming up. They were very inaccessible. There were so many barriers to entry. So all of a sudden there are 10 years we've realized that we can actually create an environment where domestic financial systems can also improve and thrive. And of course I've been accused myself that I've been promoting banks in Kenya and they have covered the region, which was good to do. And I argued that I promoted domestic banks in Kenya to become strong banks to serve the East African region. I did not want to promote big banks because we don't have the technology to regulate big banks. Those are the too big to fail banks. No, no, we didn't have that. And that has become very important. It has become very important because all of a sudden accessibility of markets has created strong banks. Strong banks have realized that they have capacity to serve in future. But the most important thing is what actually happens when you look at the totality of the international financial architecture. We have popularized that you can actually have banks. Thank you. We can actually create strong banks at the financial system who are actually allowing domestic investors, private investors to participate in those markets. We do agree and we know that markets are everything. But they are also pivoted by, of course, all the issues that have been talked about here. We can talk about from the point of view of the lingering debt overhung problems that may arise because African governments are contracting sovereign bonds. Of course, some of them are doing fine because they are rolling out huge infrastructure projects that are reducing transactions cost immensely and creating complementarity to private investment and even enhancing profitability of private investors because of transactions cost. That's one side of it. One of them is how would they be paid? Some of them are actually relying very much on the future flows of natural resources. Of course, that's bad because actually you're losing forward contracts. But the most important thing is that so many things have changed. They are complementary to the kind of changes that have, that kind of reforms that I've listened to Roland's talking about in terms of international financial system and how we view the regulatory structures in our own domestic economy and they have to be ascribed to international financial systems. For example, we will find that the typical IMF program in African countries is actually to give you balance of payment support. And you believe that that's going to be the most critical thing because you liberalized your capital markets, but you have not been able to attract capital FDI. What you attract is actually put for your force, but you're going to get then sporadic shocks. You can't be cushioned. So essentially, you refuse to deal with the real disease you want to be dealing with the symptoms as they come. And that is why we would like to perhaps discuss these issues in terms of reforms. Thank you very much. Very much indeed. I thought it was very percipient, particularly this new phenomenon or sense of an emerging banking system in Africa with a capacity for transnational banking, which I think is very interesting. The trade session, I would like to start at least by inviting questions from people under a certain age without specifying it because people got very upset when I said 40 yesterday and then people said, I'm 41, can I speak? So you know perfectly well what I mean. So can we have firstly a round of questions from people who are not quite so mature and then we'll have the mature ones after it? Would you like to start us off? Thank you. Do you need me to stand? You need to know, but you need to say who you are and where you're from. Okay. Alyssa DiCaprio from Asian Development Bank. And I actually have a question about regulation of the international financial system. Now, one problem that we're facing right now is when you talk about the regulation of banks, specifically I'm thinking here of AML and KYC, because it's important what it's supposed to be doing, which is restricting terrorism financing and money laundering. However, it's over-regulated and what we're finding is that there's de-risking from the major banks in our poorest markets. So what we found is our banks are pulling out of the markets where it's most risky. We recently did a survey actually and we found out that 45% of our banks have canceled correspondent relationships with their banks in developing countries. 30% of those canceled relationships, there were no findings of non-compliance. There wasn't even suspicion of non-compliance. It was just that, oh, it's kind of expensive to do it and so it's kind of a high-risk market. It's not really a high return. Let's pull out. So my question is, how much regulation is too much? Clearly this is not good for our developing countries, but do we continue on this vein? Excellent question. Of the overlap of regulatory structures. Any other questions from? No? No? Well, shall we take... Rob, you claim to represent the youth vote to do you? Okay. Okay. Well, well, just, just. We tend to have reports of FEO. Well, we started the discussion saying, well, that the lots of financial reforms have been promised and then we don't get them. In that context, also if we look forward to the new development agenda, it's very disappointing also to see that none of the issues that were discussed here were really discussed at the financing for development conference in Arzababa that is was to provide the financial support backing of the new agenda. So apparently these issues are not there. Now, so the question is then what we could do to move forward. And in that sense, I had a question to Jose Antonio when you said provide the development links to the reserve system and use SDRs or not use SDRs. And you sort of argue against the fiscal use of SDRs. I can see the arguments for it. But at the same time, what we see in practice is that those countries have taken a lot of self-insurance and build up the reserves probably in much larger quantities than they ever need. And now we're seeing that they can make better use of those reserves by putting them into several wealth funds, as well as in BRICS banks and the Asian Infrastructure Bank and so on. So in a way that is using your monetary reserves and then putting them to use for fiscal purposes in the end of the day if they finance the long-term development. So how would you see it also in connection with the SDR? Because there's a lot of excess SDRs also piled up in the IMF, which could be used also for this purpose either as to whether the fiscal use you mean in terms of direct use or you mean also in terms of using it to leverage long-term financing through the development bank. No, well my, you invest your reserves or some other financial asset into a multilateral development bank, I consider that to be a financial use. So you change one form of asset for another form of asset, financial asset. So I think that's fine. So that's why one of my proposals is to allow the excess of SDRs to be invested in bonds or multilateral development banks of any kind, they say. What I disagree with is the idea that you can actually, for example, develop countries have SDRs and they give them as ODA or as climate finance to finance climate change programs. I think that is a fiscal use of a financial asset. So by the way, Stroscan was caught by, I think by surprise with the comment he made at one point in one of the World Economic Forum of using SDRs for that purpose, for climate change financing. And then, of course, he had to ask some of the technicians of the IMF to explain exactly what he meant. And actually they produce a very interesting paper in which they actually made a financial use of the excess SDRs to subscribe the capital of climate change funds. So that's a financial use. And that paper is actually a quite nice paper. So that's my point, that use it financially, don't use it to spend. A very firm use on this. Clearly the international, especially global, regulation is still evolving and the Basel, for example, on the banks and so forth. So I don't have a very firm view at the moment on what this is. But clearly there could be, there are very different kinds of agents in this operating and companies operating. So there could be cases of over-regulation as well. But this thing is still evolving. So it's very difficult to take a stand on that. Yes, I think, let's visit. I think KYC has been used and sometimes can also be used to overkill the process. And I have defended Kenya in a financial action task force, Prennery, when we talk about KYC because we want to improve the AML CFT regime. And my argument has been, look, financial exclusion is more dangerous for AML CFT regime. Financial inclusion is much better. So essentially when we come to financial inclusion, then you have to ask yourself, how much leverage do we have in terms of KYC? And Kenya is known for mobile phone financial services. And the question was, what kind of KYC do you put in place? And what we have done is used a risk-based approach in terms of proportionality of the risk that is faced. And we have settings in terms of what you, how much you can transact. And we have explained this consistently and very well. And we have seen that it works very well because even the technological platform where KYC the identification is already in store can be verified with ease. So you are right that sometimes KYC and even now the mobile phone financial services was just an entry point in terms of payment system and it solved a great deal of transactions costs for people who could not access banks. And we want now to overkill it. So I had to defend it very, very strongly because I argued that these are transactions and these transactions have seedings. And if you break the seeding, you have now to provide more information. It's a tiered approach that we have actually even written some papers to show and to justify this. But in some cases, for example, you can see the fight between Bakris Bank and Dahab Shield is that we are actually trying to overkill because of this fear of AMR CFT regime. So you are right about that. But I think our advice has been, let's go to a risk-based approach. And in that process, you can have a tiered process in terms of the proportionality of the risk. And we have succeeded in Kenya to do that. And we have now introduced some of those aspects in the East African region. Thank you very much. As I said before, we have time for a second round of comments. And given that Jerry Halliner is here and started off the contribution of wider to these issues, I wonder whether you, Jerry, have any thoughts on looking back and looking forward. Thank you. I may be the most mature here. A couple of questions for Jose Antonio. I was struck in your discussion of sources of liquidity and crisis finance by the absence of any reference to the Fed, which provided crisis finance continues to provide crisis finance in amounts far larger than anything the IMF has been capable of doing. So there has to be some thought about how one moves from the system that we have in which, in fact, the U.S. Fed provides crisis finance to the one which you describe as desirable. I don't know how you move from one to the other. The second question is for Seppo Honkapuja. I would be inclined to be a little more positive about capital liberalization, capital count liberalization. You express desire for caution, and certainly perhaps that's appropriate. But even the IMF now concedes that it can be a capital account policy, can be a conscious macroeconomic policy instrument for capital inflow as well as outflow. It can be deployed as just another macroe instrument. I'm not sure why you were as cautious as you were about that. One last thing for Lawrence. I like all the suggestions that you end up with. They don't seem to be emanating from the toolkit or the absence of a toolkit. Isn't the management of the real exchange rate, or Roberto was suggesting that efforts to stabilize movements in the real exchange rate. Isn't that a tool in the toolkit which was not available in an earlier period and is now deployed regularly for better or worse? It's a powerful one. Thank you very much, Jerry. Professor Singh, I think you had some thoughts for us. Oh good, excellent, fine. Very self-denying. It's unique. People actually give up their chance to speak. But did you have something quick Machiko? Yeah, as quickly as you can. I mean basically cross-border flows particularly to emerging market economy and developing economies is driven by global liquidity cycle and that global liquidity cycle is driven by monetary policy in developed countries in particular US and that links to question which also Antonio mentioned the driven dilemma and we are living in very fragile one and now I mean even after 2007-08 cross-border flows are increasing from bank lending to bond instrument moved but fragility is still continuing in the system and what's happening from developing countries point of view because of this driven cross-border flows push and pull is all driven by monetary policy in developed countries at the same time developing countries losing policy instrument for the managing exchange rate or managing monetary stability so we are living in perfect world and that linked to question to Lawrence that you are schematic saying that we are fighting IFIs, IFC1 is fighting last war or last battle fire and there is a endogeneity in private sector keep moving with innovation but 2007-08 crisis shows that private sector cannot themselves you know go beyond that innovation they needed public money big money to get the house in place so I think there is a time high time now for us to really think even from private sector point there is a now to face that it is in perfect world and we have to move reserve system from US dominated so-called exorbitant whatever privilege for us I mean because us themselves cannot deal now domestic monetary policies like yesterday it says because of global financial situations China factors they couldn't do monetary policy so there is now coming to the stage that time is ripe for private and public sector point of view something we get serious about the changing reserve system as Antonio Jose said thank you very much that was interesting and challenging idea well I think that I think if you can each respond in your own fashion to those two points and also use that as your concluding remarks it would be helpful so if you could like to start from the left symbolically or the right depending if you look at that way as Jose Antonio if you could all just answer briefly to these points and close yeah vertical to to Jerry's comment you know it's perfectly right actually my analysis of the of the of crisis management I take a look very closely at the issue of the or the role of the Fed I actually you can go back to the 1960s because the the swap almost a major central bank has been a system used at least in the 1960s but the but in recent years yes it is the Fed and the amount of financing by the Fed exceeds by several times with the IMF lens however it is concentrated in a in central in developed country central banks and particularly in the European central bank so the swaps with the European central bank I but far the most important the you know emerging economies only had uh you know a temporary financing uh you know in the program that was what agreed in or launched by the Fed in 2009 that included uh Singapore uh no no no no well Mexico it was Korea you know Singapore Korea uh Mexico and Brazil those four countries but that only lasted one year it was not renewed and and the amounts were very small relative to the to the amounts of the Fed operations with the rest may you know on the on the question I really think well I didn't have time but you know one of the issues that I think has to be brought back into the agenda is issue cross border capital and where the cross border capital flows should have some form of regulation I mean the IMF when in the positive direction during this crisis you know when I accepted the principle that you know regulating cross border capital under some conditions is a legitimate thing to do well it's actually a positive thing to do because legitimacy has always been by the way because you know when Michelle Kandesou failed in 1997 in Hong Kong to impose capital account convertibility uh it uh it failed so I think it should but by the way you know let me say that there is all there has always been an schizophrenia in orthodoxy uh in in the in the view of exchange rates in this way uh and the way I express in my national debate in the basic in my country is that you know we have a very schizophrenic system you know we said free trade is the way to go so export oriented economy okay and then we give to export the most unstable price the exchange rate it's very schizophrenic and by the way it's very schizophrenic also at the global level so there are two solutions to this the european solution which was then you know moving to one currency eliminating exchange rates that's one you know extreme and the other is let exchange rate float as you know as much as possible you know so that reminds me of the you know when I was a student I had to read this uh at the time with the controversy on fixed exchange rate versus floating exchange rates and floating exchange rates we we of course read Milton Friedman okay and on fixed exchange rates we uh um my mind goes uh anyway the I remember this very very close sentence very very clear sentence that that floating exchange rate is a tax on international trade okay uh which I think is perfectly correct uh so we want free trade and at the same time we you know give free trade the most stable prices so it's uh so there are two schizophrenics uh solutions to the same problem thank you very much Rosetta Roberto would you like a brief response or not one minute the present situation is a good example for you said the appreciation of the of the dollar vis a vis the rest of the currencies uh has uh so far uh been very negative for for for for the international trade has not been a mechanism of adjustment and particularly the the the the the Fed has delayed the initiation of the rising of the of the interest rate taking into account the situation of China and the rest of emerging market economy and also probably some consideration of the european situation but even has delayed for a while it has a commitment to start the rising this year and even if you have delayed for a couple of months the rising will be very an an opportune for for the rest of the world and so Lawrence commented that there is no international mandate in either in the in the european central bank or the or the Fed well not only not only there is not any international mandate but the the the the of Obama the the the Fed has been highly criticized criticized by the republicans for the swaps that helped to stabilize the the mess the the american financial system during the 2007 2008 the crisis so i have highly criticized how should we give money to foreign banks they say no and so there is a system without uh without lender of law resort and the only possible lender of law resort is the Fed but because i like the idea that we can coordinate a kinesian international currency but so far if coordination is so difficult in the european market imagine the difficulty of coordinating at the global level no thank you roberto suppose you have a response to the questions on the final why i was cautionary i mean this was i guess the you know more about making a bigger move from controls to to liberalization where you have where you have to you know consider various aspects and and it's it's a different question to ask about these these what were used in the last financial crisis by very specific some specific countries on on on putting up temporary controls or which were meant for sort of a relatively temporary controls to manage this you know the somewhat crisis situation those those have been now tried tried and and in some cases they clearly were were useful so so this this could be more more way of the future in some sense we are in an intermediate situation now which we think that mostly you don't try to control these movements but if they start to get out of hand then there are then there might be flexible you know new instruments where you might want to try them to use them at the time sometimes of course it's then difficult to get out of these instruments sometimes it has worked fairly well i mean in europe we have two examples cyprus which was you know which is somewhat very special but still they introduced capital controls got out of those controls fairly quickly and then the other island you know much earlier introduced them much earlier in is only now now seeing if they can get out of this was over quite a many years in fact in a crisis situation which was thought to be more temporary than that so these are i mean these experiences are very variable so it's not panacea but it's an understandable idea of having especially in this if you know things situations become extreme have tried to have some new instruments new new new tools which hopefully are relatively temporary and of course the if you regulate your banking system in an open economy in in terms of its current exposure you are in effect have a capital control system even though it's not called that lorence did you have any final just very quickly first for jerry yes indeed jerry i i i fully agree that you know we it is we do have the potential these days to be able to move towards greater attention to partially stabilizing real exchange rates and and we can have some success i would say we can have some success until the next crisis next exchange rate crisis the and for matricor i was really grateful and matricor and i have have a perfect intellectual symbiotic relationship going for going back 40 years so when i'm pessimistic she's optimistic and this is a wonderful example here where i said please give us some optimism and matricor has given it to us with the view that actually we're at a conjuncture where it's in the interest of everybody to move for major reform and therefore we should be able to get it and i do remain pessimistic but matricor so we'll carry on discussing thank you lorence and guma would you like to close for us yeah that's just a final word i think during crisis that's when we start testing our policy position or even what we have been doing in practice and most of the time we realize that we have been doing the wrong things or actually the policy has been wrong for example you find that during the group of financial crisis there's massive capital fright from some of the african countries and currencies depreciated massively but empirical regularity was that some countries that had some map some capital controls had actually more checked depositions but doesn't really tell us whether that is time to change policy but you can see how all all of a sudden we have a burden the debate but obviously that is what actually happened but for me at the end of it all is actually the african countries have to develop strong domestic financial markets and strong domestic financial markets can only be developed using the the root for perhaps integration financial integration and when once they have strong institutions that preserve or protect the financial integration we are going to have a clear cut way of having some policy solutions within those slightly larger markets through integration of course everybody talks about this african community and looks at the european union what is really happening but we actually argue that perhaps it's the institutions that we require to put in place which have already been put in place that are going to help that market in terms of moving in the direction that it wants but of course all these issues are quite pertinent and very important for a party for a policy package thank you very much thank you very much well close i'd like to thank speakers on your behalf and to thank them for their tolerance of my attempts to control their speaking time thank you very much