 I'd like to start this session, which is on equity, by paying a small tribute, and in fact, by dedicating the session to Paul Bear, who is a friend and colleague to several and maybe even many of the people in this room. Paul was a deep and passionate and insightful thinker on climate equity. And his ideas have infused the thinking that went into putting this session together. And indeed, his ideas have infused the climate community with a deeper understanding of climate equity. And so with the will to carry on the struggle that he was fighting so passionately for, I'd like to open the session. So this session is on equity and just transitions. And the first question that we're going to try and elaborate on a bit is, what is equity? In the context of climate policy and specifically supply side policy, we're going to try and bring into focus across the course of the several panelists' presentations. What are the various dimensions that arise? How can we make it more concrete and understand it a bit better? And the second is, we can define what equity is. Is equity matter? We like the idea of equity. But even if we can define a broadly satisfying understanding of what equity means with supply side policy, so what? Does it matter? And so here I'll cite the IPCC because we always like to cite the IPCC. It's kind of comforting in a Pavlovian sense. They said to paraphrase, agreements that are widely seen as fair are more likely to actually work. And that gets back to a point that was made at least once, maybe a couple of times this morning, that climate change is a commons problem. No country can solve their own climate change problem. Any country's reduction in their emissions or reduction in their supply of fossil fuels doesn't go very far as far as solving their own climate problem, even if you're a big country, even if you're a US or China. What you're really trying to do is engage in a global cooperative effort, because a global cooperative effort is the only way we can solve the problem. And if you want to try and help bootstrap a global cooperative effort, you're only going to be successful if your scene is doing your fair share. And if you're not, then other countries will see you as a free rider. And their most sensible course going forward would be to invest in things other than suppressing their emissions and suppressing their supply and instead focusing on their own development and dealing with the increasingly inevitable impacts of climate change. So with that, I'd like to start with our first presenter, which is Navarose Dubash. Navarose is one of the leading thinkers on climate change in India. He's the director of the climate program at the Center for Policy Research. He's a lead author in the most recent IPCC assessment in the chapter on national policies and in the synthesis report. And Navarose, welcome to the stage. Good afternoon. Thank you, Sivan. And I'm really glad that we are remembering and dedicating Paul in this session. So I am going to, in the time that I have, can we get a little bit? So what I'm going to try and do is give some content to this idea of equity through the lens of one country, which is India, not the only country that deals with equity issues by any means, but one of the bigger and perhaps countries that have a big role in shaping the debate. Now I want to start, actually, with a, let me see. Once I figure this thing out, yes to this. It's the PDF, it seems to have messed up. Sorry, folks. Yeah, maybe I'll use the arrows on that. Yeah, it's messing it up. But I'll do what I can with what I have. OK, let me, where I want to start is to talk about, and I hear this in this discussion here today as well, what seems to be an emerging, very important global narrative around the fossil fuel transition. And in that narrative, what is the role of India? So the kinds of stories we're seeing in very important research articles, I'm going to give you a few of these quotes. The growing use of renewable power sources, but rising emissions from China, India, and other developing nations are swamping that progress. This is from Science, a very nice paper by Steckel and all, and I think he's here actually today, which says a global renaissance of coal driven by poor fast growing economies. And then, of course, we have the Indian minister who sort of plays into the story by talking about how we're going to target a doubling of coal production to a billion tons in the next five years. Now, there's also research that backs all this up. So what I have here is a slide from BNEF, and this was shown actually in an earlier session in the afternoon, which shows that India is on track to actually increase its emissions by about 112% compared to 2010 levels. So what this kind of narrative is growing towards, apart from the very important point about fossil fuels, is a story that says the only thing that's really important is what happens from here on out. What happened before doesn't really matter. What the context is need not necessarily matter. And so I think what I've seen this over the last couple of months, I've been trying to ask myself, what makes sense in terms of narratives that emerge from developing countries that take seriously both development, but also climate change, that kind of bring those two things together? So today I'm going to try and give you four elements what I think a useful narrative might be for India. And I might be hamstrung by the fact that the bottom of my slides are being cut off, but I'll just tell you what they say. So the first part of this is what Sivan started by alluding to. What happened before today, 2010, which is the year in that BNEF study, actually does matter. And there's lots and lots of work on this. The most important of which is actually the work that Sivan, Tom and Paul have done together, which is represented here. And the India story looks very different by this graph. So these are the green part of these graphs are fair shares and India's INDC projections are comfortably within those fair shares. And it looks a very different story if you look at this graph versus the other graph. Indian research, the yellow slice here that's cut off is India. Indian research on the carbon budget says, well India should get about 17% of the future carbon budget. If we get 17%, it would more than accommodate the kinds of numbers that the BNEF analysis shows. So obviously we all know there are many ways of slicing all this up. But the point is that story about historical responsibility and responsibility, the UN FCC principle of responsibility understood as culpability is still very much salient to the discussion. And some of the new narratives, I think, risk forgetting that. The second, this is a more problematic cut off but we'll try and deal with it. Is that the context in the starting point matters a lot. So what I tried to do here is I said, okay, what if you take on this axis is per capita, mean per capita income of various countries and on this axis down here which you can't see is greenhouse gas emissions per capita. And essentially what we did is we looked at this over a number of years. So at the bottom you have to imagine the axis down here that's 2003 to 2011 down here. So let's start up here, right? So this is the US and its per capita emissions have been decreasing but of course at a very high level. And the interesting thing is the decrease in per capita emissions doesn't do a whole lot to income. Whereas all the countries down here and India is actually down below in the black border down here, India and Africa down here, the lines are pretty much vertical which means that a unit of additional GHG is giving you an awful lot more in terms of income, right? So where you are on this kind of plot really matters. If you're down here perhaps you do a lot more with every unit of every ton of fossil fuels. So that has to play into how we think about the sort of immersion narrative. In a sense it's a different view on the old capability part of the CBDR RC principle. So this is the second point that I want to make. The third point then is to turn it around a little bit and say okay, it's not okay to only talk about the context, history, the fact that India's in a difficult position but to also say what are the hard questions a country like India has to ask about its own future. So we basically have been looking for the last year or so and what Indian researchers and other researchers have been saying about this future, right? So this is now a different gloss on responsibility. So responsibility as culpability versus responsibility understood as duty, right? So we're trying to look at both sides of that responsibility concept. And interestingly in this slightly confusing graph, all the solid lines refer to basically reference scenarios for 2030 or 2031 or 2032, somewhere in that range. The two green lines represent the envelope of policy scenarios and we looked at about eight studies and multiple scenarios. So the first thing you see is just the enormous range even in the reference case. This is actual current emissions. So according to this, India's emissions will double or maybe triple depending on what study you look at which again sort of echoes some of the points about the quite correct care with which one should interpret model results that we talked about this morning. The policy envelopes, some of them actually overlap the reference envelopes and the reason we broke the reference envelopes up into two is because there are two different time periods when people, when the modelers use current use scenarios. So the current policy circa 2011 or the current policy circa 2014 with the latter being much lower. Now in the policy scenarios you see one all the way down here which is the only one that shows a slight increase in greenhouse gas. This is, I should say this is just carbon from energy and industry. Most the rest are up here, right? So what this seems to say is very few people think that India can get to 2030 without at least some carbon emissions probably close to a doubling. This is where everything is clustered. And if you have, and the other point that you have to take from this is maybe you can do a lot better than that, say 150% increase with some very serious policy measures. And it's unpacking those policy measures that I think is the hard work that we have to do. How much time do I have left? All this said, well let me make one point when I go back to this. When we look at all these, the big difference between all of these different lines is actually the demand side. If you actually can bring down your demand levels, then India's quite ambitious renewable energy targets take you a long, long way. If you don't bring down demand, there's really no way other than a lot more coal. And how much more coal? So this is those same model results with the coal numbers in grave pulled out. And again, coal, according to the reference cases, goes up two and a half times, give or take, depending on the more modest reference cases may be doubling. In the policy cases, you're still looking at at least very close to a doubling or a little bit more than that. So this is, again, the question is, are these models the best we have? Probably not, but this is the current state of the knowledge. And I think this is the kind of questioning that's going on in India. The other point I wanna make is these are sort of top down models. These are the folks who basically say, let's look at capacity that's being planned and under construction. And the numbers vary enormously depending on what you start with. So this is the proposed line. I think this is Carbon Action Tracker's proposed coal plant line. And this in here, 134 gigawatts, is the approved projects. What's unfortunately lost down here is I have a separate set of, a separate bullseye for 2022. And that's very interesting because it shows a projection for 2022 that says if you start with serious demand side measures, you can keep it as low as 65 gigawatts. And if you include increased RE uptake, it's as low as 50 gigawatts. Whereas if you look at it just in terms of the number of plants that are on the anvil in some way or shape or form, it's 110. So my point is there's an enormous range and we have a lot of studies out there right now talking about how sort of the coal bomb and so on and so forth. We have to put that in context and we have to talk about in particular the uptake of that amount of coal. Because I think some of these discussions about stranded assets and so on are very, very salient in India. The fourth element of all of this is the story about equity at home. Which often in the Indian discourse tends to get set aside. And I won't go into this. This is work in progress, but it's basically an update of quite a famous study by Chakravarti and all this one one billion large emitter story. I get the message. Got it. So but this basically updates that with much more fine grained data and shows that you'll actually have a lot more high emitters than you otherwise thought on the order of 20 or 30, well, on the order of 10 million now and on the order of 20 or 30 at least by 2030. And this is probably gonna go up as we get some new data. So I'm just gonna end here. I wanna just make a couple of points. I think in the post-Paris world, equity is about the stories you tell. The idea of getting some sort of everybody agrees to this as our version of equity, that's long gone. And so people are basically weaving equity into a whole set of different narratives and how we tell those stories and how we support them is really important. Internationally, I really think this fossil fuel transition story that's emerging is a very important one. The supply side story is very important. If it is not leavened with some considered attention to equity, I think it could really backfire. Because what it does, if it says, keep fossil fuels in the ground and that's true of all fossil fuels everywhere, irrespective of context and history, what are you doing? You're basically creating an incentive to grandfather yourself and join China. For India, the obvious thing would be to do, would be to say, look, all of this keep in the ground stuff will take another five, seven years to get some momentum. Let's dig it up as fast as we can and let's lock in as much coal infrastructure so we have the flexibility. You really risk creating that kind of dynamic and I think that's very problematic, not least for us. And then the national narratives then is to both locate country and historical and comparative context and ask these hard questions about the future, including the internal equity story. Excellent, thank you, Nehru. No, if we stay here, can we stay here? If there are any clarifying questions, hold them and you can catch the rose and the breaker and the reception and I'm gonna use moderator's privilege to ask a question. So one of the main points you're making is that really there's a whole span of different possible futures for India. And more and more, we're hearing a framing that really we're in a post-carbon development world. The coal benefits are huge of going away from carbon, the busbar costs of wind and solar are going through the floor and they'll be coal anyway. So to what degree is some degree, some amount of continued use of fossil fuels and maybe expansion of coal actually necessary for development in India? And if there is another path, what would make that possible? So this came up again this afternoon. And as you know, Shivan, and many of you, I've been banging on this co-benefits drum for a few years and I believe very strongly in it. The challenge really is that I think that looking at 2030 and out, if we haven't solved this problem by then, if we haven't substantially transitioned, we're done anyway. The real difficulty is, can you make the transition over the next 10 to 15 years? And that's where it starts becoming hard. So for example, a non-fossil fuel-based electricity strategy, and India has put these, frankly quite outrageous targets out there of 175 gigawatts, nobody's sure whether they can actually be achieved at home. But even if you do achieve them or make a lot of progress towards them, based on the kinds of numbers we have now, it doesn't look likely that you could meet India's development needs. And the big story in India at the moment is a job story, right? So India is going through this demographic transition. We're talking about having to generate between 10 and 12 million jobs a year. No other country has done anything like this without a serious manufacturing push. Manufacturing means industry, industry means steel, cement, and so on and so forth. A lot of energy. So the ask is really tough. And renewable energy uptake at that pace seems difficult challenge. We did a back of the envelope calculation and said that if India does its 40% fossil fuel-free target for the INDC, it would basically displace somewhere between 5% and 7% of India's 2030 greenhouse gas emissions. That's it. On the other hand, that 5% to 7% is about 60 to 70% of South Africa's entire INDC gain. So that's the kind of dilemma that we face, I think, right now in India. Thank you, thanks. Our next presenter is Numa Basi, former Director General of Friends of the Earth International, current Director of the Health of Mother Earth Foundation in Nigeria and Oil and Watch International. And also, I should say, recipient of the Right Live Live Award, which many of us may recognize as the alternative Nobel Prize for his steadfast support. I'm very honored to have him join us. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, brothers and sisters. Don't respond to greetings. Ha ha ha. Hey, you're all here. Ha ha ha. All right, that's okay. Now, I'm sure you've seen enough graphs for today. So I've determined not to use not even one graph. But I love those graphs, especially the one shooting above the roof. Ha ha ha. Now, the fossil fuel industry is incapable of operating in any sense in a way that's equitable. There's no equity with the sector. It's a sector that depends on exploitation without responsibility. It's the worst form of extraction, the worst form of relationship with people, with the environment, and with mother earth generally. So, talk about equity with regard to fossil fuel industry or dependence on fossil civilization is neither here nor there. And the same thing is operating in the climate negotiations because the climate negotiations as epitomized by the Paris Agreement has nothing to do with equity. The cutting our point is the nationally determined contributions. And as Shivan said earlier, this is not based on a global scientifically calculated requirement or action that needs to be taken to keep the temperature at another 1.5 or well below two degrees. There's nothing. It's just a shot in the dark. You do what you feel like doing and I do what I feel like doing. And so, it's business as usual in a way that is so nice that every country is signing on to it. And so, it's a real problem we're confronting to have a big, big problem. And it has historical roots because it appears that mankind always looks for the cheapest source of energy. And if you can take it either through negotiation or you take it by force. And so, whether it's energy from humans or from fossil fuels or whatever, it's the same paradigm, the same mentality. And the worst thing is that many parts of the world, including where I come from, we are forced to adopt the catch-up mentality without interrogating whether this is where we want to go. What, who defines development? Who defines growth? The GDP service has been called by an intellectual, the gross domestic problem because it does not really measure up the truth about what's going on in any country. And so, that's the real problem. We have this problem of the narrative and the historical realities. And so, oil, coal, gas, as I said earlier, exploitation without responsibility, resulting in massive human rights abuses, in massive livelihood destruction. And just this morning, during the first break time, I got information from Nigeria that there's been a massive pipeline explosion in Ogonilan in a place that at a point, just a few meters away from where the military surveillance team is camped. And it really, really broke my heart because the governor of Nigeria just agreed, together with Sher, who is a major corporate in this area, to begin a cleanup of the territory. And but at the same time, we're still having these explosions on such a regular basis. These photos are from today. And I'm sure the picture may be worse than this by this time. But it's not only Nigeria. I spent a lot of my time going around Africa and some parts of the Global South just encouraging communities that the hopes they have when instructive activities are about to start in their territory will be dashed. And so I tried to get people prepared for the worst scenario. And I've seen it in the Global North. I've seen a community in Rhineland where whole communities had been relocated, where church was desecrated so that it could be demolished for mining coal. So when you find an industry that doesn't take anything sacred, doesn't respect territories, doesn't respect people, is just concerned with profit, it's very difficult to deal with this kind of industry. Except, I mean, you cannot find a way to say, okay, we can do this responsibly. It's impossible. There's no responsible mining. I'm sorry to say that. I'll take that back. It's hard to get responsible mining. Now, three cases. Lake Turkana is the biggest desert lake in the world. And it's located in Northern Kenya. The environment is almost like a lunar landscape, beautiful, pristine. And guess what? When you look from the air, it looks blue, on the ground is green. And oil has been found around there. And that is the UNESCO heritage site. The Rift Valley of Uganda is a national reserve where mining should not take place. And these are the same places where the oil industry is busy trying to extract. They're extracting already in Uganda. And locally for Turkana, as my friend would agree with me, I think the people have managed to, I get the government to say no drilling in Lake Turkana. But in the whole region, there's drilling, there's exploration. And without any barrier being extracted, we're already having some environmental issues there. In Ghana, half a city is the name of the territory along the coast. Fisheries purchase Ghana for one billion US dollars a year. Oil has been found where a lot of the species are endemic and fishermen cannot get to those areas anymore because it's a military blockade that doesn't allow fishermen to get to where they should catch the best fish. And so we're forced to compare the economy of oil and fisheries. And oil is not going to bring Ghana one billion US dollars a year anytime soon. Oil will not employ up to 5,000 Ghanaians, but millions are dependent on small scale fisheries keeping their families and livelihoods. And all this is going to be destroyed because somebody is looking for crude oil. And so we, some of us are, we've seen that because in Africa, you have to search very hard to find a country where oil is not being either prospective for or is not being explored or extracted already. And a lot of this is offshore except for those who are, even the inland, those who are landlocked, oil is found in and around lakes and rivers. And so we're thinking of building resistance around with the fisher folks across, around the continent and all across the continent. And so there's a movement that is growing about on fish, not oil, using the example of Ghana. And this is what we believe can be replicated around the world. Ghana was on friends in Lofoten, Norway. They don't, a very high fisheries area. They don't want drilling offshore Lofoten either. And so the movement against extraction can be built from different strands on different perspectives, either from the economic argument or from the livelihoods argument, from agricultural arguments. We have all the arguments to stop extraction. The only difficulty is how do we, how can we survive in a non-phosphory civilization? A former foreign minister of, oil minister of Saudi Arabia once said that the stone age did not end for lack of stones. Oil age would not have to end for lack of crude oil. Now, we talk about keeping the oil in the ground. I firmly believe in this. I've been, we've been campaigning on this ever in my country that depends almost 80%, 85% on fossil fuels. We've been campaigning on this very strongly. And Oguni people have succeeded in keeping oil in the ground since 1993. More community, the first shell out of their territory. They still have explosions and pollution because there are pipelines crossing their territory. But a small set of people have succeeded in keeping a big multinational corporation for taking crude oil from their territory. I believe this shows to me that it can be replicated around the world. Don't you think so? Think so. Now, thank you for agreeing on that. Now, Yasuni ITT was defective in formulation. In the sense that it was about exchanging keeping crude oil and getting half of the money. Now, keeping crude oil in soil is not, it should not be dependent on funds on, I mean, I have something to do because of the global fund proposal that we saw this morning. The real thing is to preserve, more than a preserved life. We have more kind is brilliant enough to look for another form of civilization. So the economic consideration and all this, we're just going to keep us locked into the same track. Now, so oil was international, proposed our next zero countries, in line with our next one of the formulation in the Kyoto protocol. So our next one are the rich polluting industrial countries such as UK. Can you feel the pollution? You can feel it, okay. All right. Of course, you can come to Oguni, you see the pollution. If you come to the bottom of the pipe where Shell is extracting, you look at the whole lake, the whole water is covered with crude oil and it stays that way for a year. And I don't have time to talk more about that. But our next zero is saying, it's proposing that the UNFCCC should recognize territories and countries and communities who have kept or make efforts to keep fossil fuels under the ground. I mean, this is real climate action. It's not artificial carbon capture, sequestration and storage. You leave it where it belongs. Don't bring it out and capture it. Just leave it there. I think I believe I'm so happy that the International Criminal Court has decided that first extractive industries and those who destroy the environment can now be brought before it. And I think it's time to take the chief executive of these corporations before that criminal court. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. So your work has had its impact and had its power because you're bringing the concerns and the voices of people in these areas where extraction is happening to a level where decisions and policies are being made in part. There are also within these communities, well, I ask you, within these communities, do you also see local, fully legitimate voices of people who are being impacted who feel compelled to support extraction because of livelihoods or because they see it as their way to expand their energy access? Do those voices exist? And to the extent they do, how do you reflect those voices? Don't ask me a fair question. That's my job. Okay. Yeah, of course, there are some voices in communities, especially in places where fossil fuels are just discovered. People always believe that, look, we're gonna get the best of everything. Economic improvements, livelihood improvements, we're gonna have all the fast leases we need. We're going to have the best of everything. And I just give it a few years and all is gone. And so those voices, of course, everybody has a right to demand whatever they want to, but it never plays out in reality. And so my own unfortunate job is to continually douse the hopes of communities and individuals who think that they can be sustainable extraction of fossil fuels. I've not seen it anywhere. I've not seen it in Canada. I've not seen it in the US. I've not seen it in Germany. I've not seen it in Nigeria. In South Africa, people are working calls, caves. I mean, coal mines on fire for decades. And people are having sinkholes and all kinds of things happening to the environment. So anybody who thinks, I mean, I agree they have a legitimate right to think the way they want to think, but it's all leading nowhere. Next speaker is Samantha Smith. Very happy to have on this panel. She's currently the director of a new Just Transition Center. But she has a very interesting past. This work is in collaboration with the ITUC, International Trade Union Confederation. Previous lives, she was with World Wildlife Fund heading up their Climate and Energy International Program. In another previous life, she was with Statoil Energy, helping develop CO2 projects and wind projects. So Sam, we're very happy to have you on the panel. And I don't know how you'll manage to balance all those different tasks. Get the front of views of the world, but please do. Yes, so thanks for that, Siobhan. It's true, I have lived a few different lives, but I'd like to think that they add up to something consistent. So as you mentioned, I am the director of a new center that's been established by the ITUC. And the ITUC is the peak body for almost all of the world's unions. So its union affiliates represent over 180 million people in 165 countries. And I wanted to just, for many people, especially my brothers and sisters from North America, unions aren't so familiar, right? I grew up in the US. I studied unions at university and when I moved to Scandinavia and there were real live unions, it was really exciting for me as a progressive person. So I just want to be sure that we all understand what we're talking about when we talk about workers and unions, right? So for many people in the climate field, when we think of workers and unions, we think of coal miners, for example. We might not remember that coal mining was and in many countries still is one of the most dangerous jobs around with many large scale industrial accidents and sort of average working life for coal miners, it's really quite short because of people's exposure to coal dust and injuries. But actually, unions encompass almost every kind of formal and informal worker in labor that you can think of. So everyone from women who are working in the garment sector to financial analysts to environmentalists, parts of WWF, not many, but some are unionized to people working in the industry, nurses, teachers, people working in shops, the list goes on and on. And of course, where people don't have the right to organize and to be represented, they nonetheless organize themselves. So you have agricultural workers, waste pickers who are in informal associations that are like unions so that they can have a collective voice and so that they have some power over their working conditions. So when we talk now about the just transition, I hope we can have all of those people in mind because the just transition as you'll see in a second is not just about people currently working in coal mines or in coal-fired power plants, it's about everyone who works because climate change is about people and it's going to affect all of our jobs, formal and informal, as we try to bring down emissions in a fast way and to have industrial transition at a speed that has never been done before. So there are many definitions of a just transition. All are welcome, it's a big tent, but from the labor movement's perspective, this is a term that they came up with over a decade ago and what it really means is the social dialogue, the tripartite dialogue between workers, businesses, governments and communities that produces then the plans at all levels from the workplace all the way up to the UN at the national level for sectors, for communities that are gonna bring down emissions but be sure that people still have jobs and that people whose jobs are disappearing are gonna be treated fairly. Last but not least, it's about making sure that no one is left behind. So we've talked a lot about stranded assets and as I was listening to that, I was thinking about something that we're starting to say in the labor movement about stranded workers in stranded communities and you don't have to look too far to the north of England or to coal towns in the US to see what that's all about. So it is not, a just transition is not something that we're gonna get to through just economic modeling or through a top down discussion. People need to be at the table, it's their lives and communities that are involved and it's also, I keep stressing communities because one of the things that we're hearing very consistently from union members is that they want jobs where they live, right? So it's not so helpful if your job is disappearing, if all the cool new jobs in the wind industry are halfway across the country and far away from the place where you might have a house or have raised your kids. Now I'm not gonna go into the sort of detailed policy driven stuff because as my brother Numa said, we've had enough graphs and charts and policy so I won't try to do that. But I will say that the International Labor Organization is social dialogue at the UN level. So that's employers, governments and workers and they have negotiated guidelines for a just transition to environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all. So my presentation is in drop box. Please don't share it, I don't think I have the rights to all the pictures but you will find the links to these guidelines and I suggest if you wanna know what the just transition is, take a look there. It's also in the Paris Agreement. It's in the preamble which discusses the imperative for the just transition of the workforce. And finally there's goal eight of the sustainable development goals also negotiated last year which is about decent work and has elements of just transition. So again with all of those 180 million union members in mind, I would say most of the trade unions, they're members and leaders that I at least have encountered, they want action on climate change just like everybody else. And people who especially work in sectors that are going to be affected by climate change, they really want action. So everyone who's a first responder, we know we're gonna have more natural disasters, more climate emergencies. Everyone working in emergency relief is affected by climate change. Health workers are seeing the impacts of pollution and the use of fossil fuels. They care about climate change. Public transport workers really want action on climate change because they think there will be tons of jobs for their sectors and they have high union density. So just to say that the interests of workers are a bit different depending on the sector but most workers including people in fossil fuel unions understand what's happening. People aren't done. And their main concern is what are they gonna do in the future? How will they have secure lives? Now workers have demands on just transition and the demands you might be surprised to see are not just about retiring coal workers. It's actually about the new jobs. Investing in the opportunities for decent work, the sectors where young people can be trained where they can have careers. Most importantly that those jobs are good quality and organized jobs. So it's not so helpful if you're going from a highly skilled job with a secure contract in North America if that includes benefits for example, to a job on a zero hours contract part time, not skilled, no opportunities to skill up. So when we talk about the creation of new jobs also as environmentalists, it's important to think about the quality of the job and is that job organized so that people can push back on corporate power. They want respect for people who built our prosperity because whether we like it or not and living in Norway I can certainly attest to it, fossil fuel companies built prosperity in some developed countries. And so we should respect the contribution of those workers, not throw them away when they're old and their industry is dying, but instead be sure that they have pensions and medical care. We should have a social floor. It's important for everybody. A social floor that includes unemployment insurance, that includes healthcare, that includes all the things that make it possible for people to transition from one job to another without fear. And finally, we should try to formalize jobs so that all of the vast majority of jobs in this world are actually not formal. People don't have contracts, they don't have rights, they're not protected by laws. So especially in the fields of agriculture but also everyone who's going to be a first responder in disaster relief, this jobs need to be formalized. Now, I see the signs, so I'm gonna try, since I know we're almost done, I'm just gonna try to be really fast. I just wanted to say a few words about the ethical dimension of calling for leaving fossil fuels in the ground and for this very fast transition. You should know that as I said, many people in the labor movement are completely on board with that. But someone who's worked for social change for a good part of my life, it's very exciting to see that things are starting to change. And despite some of the things we've heard today, I actually believe we're in the middle of a gigantic transformation. But having said A, having called for divestment, having called for an end to fossil fuels, we should also say B. And B is about making sure that opportunities, new opportunities are available for all the people who aren't in work today and for people whose industries are going to have to be phased out because of climate change. I'm not gonna say that there's this wonderful world of opportunity and climate change is only about co-benefits and opportunities. It's not, right? You're talking about real transition, transformation and very difficult decisions. But we must be brave enough as environmentalists to take those hard discussions and to come up with the kinds of plans to support people in developing plans for their communities, their companies, their sectors and their countries. Plans that don't just talk about emissions and cost curves, but that talk about what are people gonna do in the future and how can they have safe and decent work. Thank you. Sam? Sam. Sam, what you say is just, it makes so much sense. It's so compelling. We need to worry not just about climate impacts, but also the impacts of the climate transition itself and how to help those who will be affected. But it almost feels like there is a conspiracy of silence. There's a real blind spot in the climate community who loves to talk about co-benefits and loves to talk about all the jobs you will get in the green economy, but arguably who have been really silent on the issue of workers and just transition. And I just wonder if you could speak to what, why? Why is that? What dynamic leads to that? So it depends which part of the climate community you're talking about. So if you're talking about people from social movements or organizations that work a lot with social movements like Friends of the Earth, they're very active on the issue of just transition and job justice and community justice, right? But if you're talking about mainstream environmental organizations like my former employer, WWF, I think a lot of it is actually a class issue and an unfamiliarity issue because many people who are employed by green groups, especially in the North are like myself, middle class. We might have a professional background. If you're from the U.S., as I said, you don't really, you haven't seen too many unions. And you might not think of yourself as a worker, as someone who could and should unionize. And you might not think of workers as people that you know, people in your community, people in your family. So I do think that that is to some extent a barrier. I also think that it's, when you start to get to the questions about people and fairness and what's the right thing to happen, we see it all across the climate shop, then the questions start to become very hard. It's easier to engage with numbers and with modeling. So I think that now that we're at the point of implementing, now that we actually have to do where we have five years to get emissions down really quickly, we must be sort of courageous enough to push away these barriers of class and discomfort and to have the hard discussions. The last two things I wanna say about unions is, conflict is not always bad if you're a trade unionist. I mean, people use strikes and walkouts and so forth as methods of negotiations. They're not afraid of conflict, but the point is that you can have conflict and then you can reach agreement afterwards. And the second thing is that unions are democratic. So all of the positions that I've talked about on just transition and climate change, those have been adopted through voting of members of unions and adopted all the way up to the highest level. Union leaders are generally always elected and they're elected on a platform. So you know when you're negotiating with unions, that's the basis for their positions. Fantastic, thank you very much. Our next panelist is Simon Keaney, who's a professor here at Oxford in political theory and really has written many of the seminal pieces on climate inequity. And in fact, I consider him very much to have influenced the way that I think and the work that I've done. So Simon, honored to have you on the panel. Thank you very much, Stephen, for that kind introduction and for the invitation. Thank you also for mentioning Paul Baer, whose work with Tom Athanasio and yourself are greatly admired. So what I want to do in my 10 minute slot is do three things. Firstly, I want to say why we can frame the issue about stranding fossil fuel assets in lots of ways, a scientific way, an economic way, political economy way. I think those are legitimate important ways, but it's also a question of ethics and justice and I want to bring out exactly why that's the case. And then the second and the third bit are to put forward some principles for what you might call supply side ethics. So why should we frame it as an issue of justice? Justice, by which I mean distributive justice, is about the fair distribution of burdens and benefits. So whenever you get a policy decision which confers benefits on some and disadvantages on others, like it or not, whether it's inconvenient to point it out, it's an issue of justice. And one thing we need to consider then is what's the justice distribution of those burdens and benefits? If we take as a given, which I think we should, that we have to keep a lot of fossil fuels in the grounds, quoting the Mcglade and Eakins paper, then we have to confront a series of questions about just rights to extraction. Who has the rights to extract the remaining fossil fuel reserves? How much? On what basis? Who has denied that and why? And should there be compensation for those denied rights to extract? We're just fleshing this out a bit more. When we allocate rights to extract, on what basis? Is it a post-optimization basis, which was mentioned this morning by Professor Eakins? Is it a function of past extraction if you've used a lot in the past or extracted a lot you should have less now? Is it to do with the level of development? Is it some other criterion? These are questions of justice. The second one is compensation. If you're told there's an opportunity that you were relying on to pull yourself out of poverty, are you entitled to compensation? Then there's a question of whose rights? You know, who actually owns the fossil fuel reserves? Is it the private landowner or a company? Is it the government so it can sell them off and then pocket the gains? Is it the members of the country? Or is it the world as a whole? Are we gonna be cosmopolitan and think these resources belong to humanity? Now, my point here is my first contention is however one likes to look at it, we can't help but look at it as an issue of justice because we have to confront these questions. We can ignore them. We can not give answers to them, but they're still those questions. So I don't think we should ignore them. I think we should have an ethics for the extraction side or the supply side. So a lot of climate ethicists have taught a lot about the demand side. So who has the right to emit? How should we distribute emission rights? When we have emissions trading schemes, how should permits to emit be distributed? If we have a carbon tax system, what should be done with the revenues generated? Those are all kind of ethical issues on the demand side, but we clearly have supply side ones. But I think the kind of values that people often invoke on the demand side apply here in a different format. The one, and this follows on very nicely from the previous presentation is, any just transition must honor human rights. So if we're gonna have an outcome, which we will, where some people's assets are stranded and they can't use them, then we need to find a way of stranding them such that their human rights are honored. Now, what would be the implications of this? When first thinking about this, it struck me that some people will say, well, people have a right to develop. We have this limited resource. We should allocate privileged access to extract fossil fuels to those living in severe poverty. So fossil fuel rich developing countries. So in other words, if we appeal to things like the right to develop, should we allocate extractive rights primarily to those in developing countries? So here's a couple of reasons why I don't think we should go down that route, or at least it's a lot harder to make that argument than you might first think. The one is this argument assumes that if you respect the right to develop, it entails a right to extract natural resources there. But if you're thinking about extraction because of domestic consumption, because you want to use the coal for domestic use, then this argument only goes if you haven't got access to other sources of energy. So if we think of hydroelectric or solar or geothermal or wind or other renewables, as soon as we put those into the equation, you can't just go have a right to develop, therefore have a right to extract. You can't for a reason 1B, which is there might be other ways to enable people to develop that don't involve using the natural resources within country. So it's already been mentioned several times already, but the Yusuni ITT kind of initiative could be used as a way of facilitating development, but delinking it from extraction. The other comments I just want to make if anyone thinks that appeals to development, ground extraction rights, then remember the first principle is about human rights and those are rights of individuals. And so they have to ensure that any proceeds, and this is true whether we have a Yusuni ITT type approach or another approach, would have to redound to individual human beings, not political elites who can somehow pocket the money. So for this to genuinely uphold the rights, it has to be done in a way that meets people's rights to food, water, employment, so forth. The other comment is this could only be a short term approach. What I'm trying to say here is I think the right to develop has to be a fundamental part, as indeed are other rights of a transition to a low carbon or zero carbon world, but it doesn't entail necessarily that we just allocate extraction rights to fossil fuel rich developing countries. What about another principle? Historical responsibility. Now we're used to a kind of a polluter pays principle that says if you've polluted a lot you should pay or if you've omitted a lot you should pay, I think there could be an analogue which is on the extraction side, which is the extractor pays principle. Yeah, lots of people give you graphs and other people give you pictures. I give you bodies of text. I'm sorry about that, but the gist of it is, the more that an agent, like a given society, has extracted and benefited from extraction in the past, then the lesser claim they have to the benefits of the remaining fossil fuels. The less that a party has benefited from extraction in the past, then the stronger they have a claim to the existing fossil fuel reserves or the benefits from them. I just want to stress and the benefits from them, because I think this is an intuitively plausible principle. If someone has been using a crop and they've received lots of benefits from it, and there's someone else who hasn't had the opportunity to at any point, it seems a principle of natural justice that the other person who's been denied usage can have a go. But what it doesn't, I think, mean in this case is that they receive their entitlements in the form of extraction rights. It just means if you've been denied access to the benefits of this resource in the past, you're entitled to use and receive benefits from it in the future. It's an ethic of sharing. So again, I think there are different ways of spelling out this intuition, but one of them is compatible with just keeping it in the ground, but it says to those who keep it in the ground who've not had the opportunity to use them in the past, you can receive financial support and investment because you're forgoing an opportunity to which you're entitled. Okay, so this sums up where I want to end. Really, there's three points. One is the stranding of fossil fuel assets inescapably raises questions of justice. Second is we do need an ethics then for the supply side. And then the third is I've given you two principles that I hope will resonate, one about rights, including the right to develop and one about historical responsibility and then try to tease out what that might mean for practical policies up there. Thank you. Thank you, Simon. I find this very compelling, not only because it's grounded in basic fundamental ethical principles, but that's also how we often act within politics. We try and respect human rights and we try and hold people accountable for actions they've taken. But in the rough and tumble of international negotiations where the ethic seems sometimes anything other than an ethical ethic, where to paraphrase Andy Warhol's comment that art is whatever you can get away with, equity is sort of whatever you can get away with. And so how does this link to what we might as a global community come together to agree on? Right, thank you. Yeah, I, knowing that you were gonna ask something like this. Oh, I should have plugged this. Here are like three kind of replies that people have. When I was young, they used to be a cookery program and someone would do something and then they'd say, and here's one I prepared earlier, but it's not quite the answer to the question, but I'll use some of it anyway. Yeah, what I want to say is something about the role of ethics then in this because yeah, people do stretch ethics and this idea of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities is a very nice, doesn't trip off the tongue, but it's a nice framing and it's an ethical framing, but then what it turns out is people just twist and bend it to suit their interests. The three things I kind of want to say when this are, don't dilute the ethical principles here because people fail to comply with lots of moral norms, some people kill, some people rape, some people steal, some people torture. What we don't do then is say, okay, well, a little bit of rape or a little bit of torture is fine. We stick to the ethical principle. So I want to say, let's keep the ethical principles demanding. The next thing people sometimes can say is, sometimes these do motivate people. I agree with Keynes here in the general theory when he says economists and political philosophers, I'm a political philosopher, their ideas both when they're right and when they're wrong do shape ideas and one illustration of this actually is the idea of dangerous anthropogenic interference or dangerous climate change. Many people who think of themselves as hard-boiled real polity think there's an overwhelming imperative to deal with this. I can't make sense of that except as an ethical norm or an ethical value because why on earth would you do this? That the best explanation is, you think it's just wrong to mess up the planet, maybe in itself and for future generations. Now, here, reply three is I think the best way to deal with this which is to say, look people often do have ethical motivations and intentions and the thing we have to do is to try and to tap into it and harness it. So there's this idea in international relations of norm entrapment. People sign something, I think this is meaningless and then what civil society actors can do is latch on to that and say, well you promised transparent governments what are you doing about it or you promised a responsibility to protect what are we doing about it? And so I think things like article 14.1 of the Paris Agreement or the Facility of Dialogue part are kind of opportunities that people can have to say, well politicians profess these moral norms, here are four of which we can try and hold them to account for those. I'm not starry-eyed, I don't think this is gonna revolutionize them but I think you can kind of tap into some of these moral motives and... Thank you very much. Thank you. And our final panelist is Greg Mutit, a senior advisor at Oil Change International and also author of a report, Just Out, The Sky's Limit that I think there might be copies of out there but if not, Greg can provide a URL which is a fantastic report some of which we'll get a glimpse of in this presentation. Thank you very much Greg. I'm gonna give you advanced warning, I do have a couple of crafts. But I understand I'm the last presentation of the day so if you can just get through this one and I hope you've all got as much from today as I have. I'd like to add two things to the discussion at this stage. The first is to share with you this research that we published last week, which Devon mentioned which tries to translate climate limits into what it means for the supply side and then the second is to begin to reflect on the equity dimensions of those limits. Now probably most of you have seen graphs like this before, in fact we saw one like this this morning in Paul Eakin's presentation. We compare the world's reserves of oil, gas and coal with how much we can afford to burn. We find that it's three or four times as much. Now the key question that this graph asks is which of the left hand column sits in a green box within the carbon budget and which sits dashed red box as being unburnable within the limit. Now we took a different approach to Paul and Kristoff to answering that question and we focused just on the reserves whose extraction is locked in by existing physical capital. So we focused on existing coal mines, existing oil fields, existing gas fields where the wells have been drilled, the pits have been dug, the pipeline's constructed. So those are what will come out that's because of the capital that's already been invested. We found this quite striking result that the oil, gas and coal just from existing mines and existing fields where everything has already been built would take us beyond two degrees C, only beyond 1.5 degrees C. Now the obvious conclusion from that is perhaps we should stop developing new mines and new fields. Now let's just think this through a little. If companies or governments were to develop new coal mines, new oil fields, new gas fields, what it will do is it will add to the left hand column. And that can only lead to two possible results. One is it drives us further past two degrees C, larger committed stock of fossil fuels. Or alternatively, we find governments and others and people in general find a way to limit emissions, keep within two degrees or aim for 1.5 degrees and a lot of what's in the left hand column becomes stranded assets. And remember, these aren't just reserves. These are reserves that have been unlocked by physical investment in steel, concrete and so on. Now either way, it implies significant social and economic disruption. Neither is an attractive prospect. And so perhaps the most reasonable solution here is when in a hole, you stop digging. And so that's why we think, that's why we propose a managed decline of the fossil fuel industry. This oil, gas and coal, we're not suggesting shutting the taps overnight as some of our critics like to caricature it. What we're suggesting is if we run down the existing reserves of oil, gas and coal, that gives us time to conduct an orderly transition, a just transition while staying within climate limits. Now I'm gonna move on towards equity. My first conclusion there is that we need to stop developing new extraction infrastructure. But that immediately raises an equity question, which is what about those countries, such as India, for example, which were counting on extraction to drive their development? And so how do we square this? When we look at this chart, it suggests there's no room for anyone to develop. Any rich country or poor country, perhaps a way to square this is by requiring richer countries to support a transition in those countries that have less resources of their own. The third conclusion, it also raises an equity concern, which is that the left hand column is actually bigger than the two degree budget. It's a lot bigger than the 1.5 degree budget. That implies that not only do we need to stop developing new fields of mines, but some existing ones might need to be closed down. And so again, we have the question of which ones. I think Nemo pointed out very well that extraction can often have a negative impact on development for the communities who live there. So a key element of any solution on equity must be to stop extraction where it violates people's rights. And finally, as Sam talked about, a just transition is an essential part of that managed decline. I'm just gonna focus a little bit on the second and third of these and think about how equity relates to them. Now, on the emissions side, there is a very well-accepted and very elegant approach to dealing with, which has been developed by Paul, Tom, and Shivan primarily. And what that does is it looks at each country's capacity to cut emissions, each country's historic responsibility for causing the problem. And in proportion to those, it gives each country a share of the effort that it would need to take. And that allows conclusions such as the gray boxes here are what would be a fair share for each of these countries marked on the map and compared with their Paris INDCs. Now, Shivan and I have been talking over recent weeks about how could we develop this for the supply side? If there is gonna be action on the supply side of fossil fuels, then equity has to come into it. And can we work towards a similar framework to what has been developed on the demand side? We've got some very initial ideas on that, which I want to share with you, but I'd strongly welcome any feedback as to whether this is a useful frame, whether it's going in a good direction. Now, firstly, I want to observe that there are a few difficulties with the supply side when we think about equity. The first is that some countries have geological resources of fossil fuels and others don't. And if we're talking about equity, why should countries that happen to have resources deserve any advantage from that? That's the first problem. The second problem is that the economic benefits are less closely correlated with past extraction than they are with past emissions. This leads me to wonder about whether the historic responsibility for extraction is as useful in the supply side case. Let me give you an example that I know a little bit about, which is Iraq. Now, Iraq, in the 1970s, nationalized its oil industry at almost exactly the same time that oil prices went up. As a result, Iraq was able to develop the best healthcare and the best education in the region. It developed its infrastructure and Baghdad became prosperous. During the latter part of the 70s, Saddam Hussein increasingly used that revenue and the political power it generated to repress much of the Iraqi population. In 1980, he started an eight-year war with Iran that did considerable damage to both countries and then 10 years later, he invaded Kuwait. The Iraqi people suffered a lot as a result of a regime that had benefited from the rents from oil. Now, I wouldn't look at Iraqis having benefited from those rents, so perhaps we need to question the linkage on the supply side. The other point, of course, as Nemo has pointed out, is that many communities suffer negative impacts of development. One other problem I'll just raise here is that when we, in the emissions side, what we're doing is we're comparing with the baseline. Now, when we move to the supply side, there's another problem with that, which is that if we set a baseline, it's gonna be somewhat influenced by how many reserves a country has, and we run the risk of what's called the Green Paradox that lots of countries will want to explore more so as to set their baseline higher before any negotiation happens. How do we approach this? I think the first thing to say is that there's no right to extract per se any more than there's a right to pollute. But there are economic rights and arguably a right to socioeconomic development. The way we approach this is that as climate change is a global problem, everyone needs to do their part and it has to be solved cooperatively. And the way to solve it cooperatively is for each to contribute according to their capacity to carry that load. And so when we look at those two requirements from my earlier slide, we need to stop some of the existing extraction to move the committed volume back down towards the carbon budget and forego future extraction. Equity can help us with both of those. Now, finally, I'm just gonna show you some rudiments of how do we begin to think about this. The first is that it's crucial that where extraction violates rights, it needs to be stopped or alternatively, unless it can be reformed in a way that no longer violates rights, but protection of human rights is a fundamental value. When we come into how do we share the effort in proportion to the country's capacity, we need to think what is it we're sharing? How do we measure this effort? And our proposal is that we measure it in relation to the cost of going through a transition. And here I've identified three different ways in which the costs of the transition occur. First is that some countries forego export revenue. Nigeria might be an example of this. A second is that some countries forego fuel to drive their own industrialization. And India might be an example of this. And the third is that there's a potentially socially disruptive transition for the existing fossil fuel production in relation to workers and communities. So to conclude, based on our analysis of the numbers, we propose that no new oil fields, gas fields, or coal mines should be developed. No new extraction infrastructure built. We propose that financial support should be provided for poorer countries to enable their transition away from, to enable a non-carbon development pathway. Some fields and mines will need to be closed before they're fully exploited. And equity should also help us in identifying which those are. The stop extraction, where communities' rights are violated, and we ensure a just transition for workers and communities. My final slide is an advertisement. For the report we released last week, it's on our website at priceofoil.org. Thanks. Thank you, Greg. That was clear and brilliant, and I have no questions. Since we've been talking much and working together, I'll forego my moderator's privilege so that we can get to the round of questions because we're being squeezed for time. Since we started late, we have to end in a little bit less time than we had expected. So I'll take, even though it's not equitable, yes. Okay, I'm gonna take five questions. I'm going to exclude the extroverted males who raised their hand early. Okay, I was advised by Bob Massey to do this. And then we'll just go one by one down the panelist and they can respond to what they want to. One, two, three, four, five, Tom. Thank you very much. They were all excellent presentations. I have to leave the question open. I don't know who to ask, really. It touches upon, I think, a very absent actor in the presentations, the Petro State. Greg mentioned it. I think in equity discussion, it has to be presented as a Petro State. And the question is, what do you, what will you do with this actor in terms of the unions in these states, not being maybe under the model, the NGOs maybe following rentist motives sometimes and the politics and the institutions of these states being very much historically bad dependent created around this, no? Thank you. Your question's relatively short and unfortunately we'll also have to ask the respondents to keep them. Wonderful presentations. Thank you very much. I would like to ask Simon and Greg, maybe, for the historical responsibility, which is the time frame because exploitation in Iraq was, before Iraq was an estate and it did not benefit Iraq before that, at the beginning of the 20th century. Then what is the frame? And the second is, if there is a moral responsibility, then we have to depart from the Pareto efficiency that nobody, that everybody has to be at least the same of, which is a status keeping moral. Okay, thank you. So my question will go to the last presentation by Greg. I'd be very much interested to know your argument for your preference to clean energy finance and not compensation, given that compensation would look more ideal and green finance has inherent challenges that have been in climate finance, for instance, if it's loans of a burden in countries that are already overburdened. We'll be very much interested to know your argument for the distinction. Thanks. So my question is to Sam, really, because I think we need some examples of what this just transition is gonna look like because so many communities just get left behind from post-industrialization, steel, coal, changes in technologies. So some good examples of where this might work and also for positive examples of how this could actually work in practice. I'm speaking in as an exprovert here. Look, the TCFD is looking at financial recommendations on scenario analysis and what to do. We're trying, I mean, I say we, there's a strong movement to try and get them to come out with some reference cases, at least the IEA. Now, we found it hard enough to get these companies to look at the IEA. So I just want to make the point where I totally understand this, but in practical terms, this could really like what reference case you got, I'm taking the IEA, I'm equity adjusting it. You know, the fossil fuel companies are looking for every excuse to say why they're not gonna do this stuff. So just sort of that my commenters might be aware that this is a tricky moment in terms of scenario choosing. Sure. So I think three of the questions were directed to me and I'm gonna do them in reverse order. The first is about finance versus compensation. Just to clarify by finance, I don't mean only loans and you raise a lot of important problems with that. It can also include grants. And in fact, that would make more sense since it's carrying out a responsibility. The reason I don't talk about compensation is because of the sheer scale that would be required to replace the revenues that come from the fossil fuel industry. I mean, we would be talking about trillions and I don't see a way of doing that. Instead, I look at the opportunity cost and hence investment in transition rather than compensation for lost revenues. I think there are also political difficulties with compensation related to why should a country that happens to have done well geologically deserve compensation. On the question about Iraq, the situation now is that since about six or seven years ago, multinationals have been operating the majority of the oil fields. And ever since they arrived, corruption skyrocketed. Again, I think the interesting thing about that is that it raises another dimension of the difficulty of connecting extraction with benefit because given that high level of corruption, over-inflated expenses and claimed by the companies and so on, the benefit aspect of it becomes muddled. And then finally on the question of petro states, let me just throw out a nascent idea on this which relates to OPEC. OPEC is often thought of as a cartel. I don't think it's a very good one insofar as it is a cartel. It hasn't been very successful at keeping prices flat during the time it's existed. It can shift prices in the short term but doesn't have an ability to fight long-term trends. Where OPEC I think was really significant was in the 1960s in its first decade and into the early 70s where one of the most important aspects of international relations was the demand for permanent sovereignty over natural resources. And in that, OPEC facilitated its member countries renegotiating first with the European and American multinationals that were running the oil industries there and ultimately leading to the nationalizations in the 70s. Now the interesting thing for me there is that OPEC as a coordinating and facilitating body enabled oil-dependent countries to go through a really important transition for their future. And an interesting idea for me is can OPEC play a similar role in relation to climate change? Wrap up right after this round. Also feel free panelists to make any parting comments that you'd like. Okay, can I respond to the question on the timeframe and relationship to efficiency? I mean it's a good question but it's a very hard question and time is limited. So can I just say, I think the way to think about the timeframe is it does depend on what you think is the unit. So if you think it's a country is the moral unit, then you go right back to whenever Britain started or France started extracting. If you take an individualistic approach and you just look at individual human beings then you don't go back that far. I think the further you go back that far, the harder it is because you deal with those people who say what's it got to do with me? I didn't extract them. One comment on efficiency, I'm pleased you raised that because I think you could combine it with an equity approach because you could say and I don't know if this will work but I'll say it and then I can get shot down is you might say look who could extract, should be done on who could do it in the most efficient way possible. But then if you are denied access to extraction and you're a developing country, you're entitled to compensation for that. So in other words, you separate the question who extracts from who should receive benefits. You don't want to give it to someone who's very inefficient at extracting, who's very leaky, it doesn't make the best use of it, I think. Could I just say a couple of things in relation to some things Greg had said because I think we're closer than he might think on this. So what I'm calling the extractor pays principle doesn't say Iraq benefited therefore contemporary Iraqis don't because it denies that contemporary Iraqis have benefited, it looks at it from the point of view of individual human beings. So if there's been extraction in the past and it hasn't improved the quality of people's lives then the principle just doesn't apply to them. This also applies to countries like Eritrea or Swaziland which don't have, as I understand it, fossil fuel reserves. What it does say is if you've benefited, if you genuinely benefited from the extraction in the past, you have less claim now to the benefits from the remaining ones. If for whatever reason, whether it's corruptional, you just don't have the stuff in your lands, if you didn't benefit from these resources in the past, then you have a stronger claim to the benefits of these resources now because others have had a go. So contemporary Iraqis are not people who have benefited from it, political elites maybe. Thanks Simon, to see if I can muster my voice for a couple of these questions. So to start with your question about Petro States, right? Several of us in this room are from Norway which we must say is a Petro State, about 50% of the economy, depending on how you count is related to oil and gas. And there's a tight nexus of power between the oil companies, particularly the ones that are state owned, the government, the unions and the political elites. Now it's a small country of four and a half, five million people, so everything is tightly connected. But nonetheless, we really are talking about this concentration of power. When you're going to have a transition in countries where so much of the economy depends on fossil fuel, then you have the question of the rents that the state is getting from extraction which are critical income for the state, that's not only true for Norway, it's true for any fossil fuel exporting country. You have the effects on the currency of the loss and value of their assets. You have, and you also have the general instability of the economy as you start to go through transition. Now, that, from a union perspective, yes, specifically about where are unions on this? They're where you might imagine them to be. I mean, people in energy unions understand the changes coming. They might disagree exactly on when it's coming and should they be affected and is the right time for the end of oil and gas 2050 or 2100, but they understand the changes coming. And especially young people who are working in the oil sector, they want to work on renewables. In fact, it's a recruitment issue for oil companies and for unions, for oil unions to get younger people. That's why the industry as a whole is aging. Young people want to go into the green part of the companies or work in a green job. It's true everywhere. How do you break up that power? Well, some of it's happening from outside, right? The drop in the price of oil has lessened the financial power of the sector on the government, on workers, on different regions. And I think that trend is just going to accelerate. The other way you break up the power is through the efforts of civil society, which even in Norway in these conditions has done a great job trying to illuminate and pull apart this nexus of power. And we're going to get kicked out of this room. Okay, so let me just give one good example. You asked for a good example on just transition. We have almost none, right? That's the problem. So when you say transition to workers, they think job loss and stranded community. But in Canada, there's the start of a process. I can't say it's going to be result in perfect outcomes, but the government and the Canadian Labor Congress are starting a process to appoint a task force on just transition, come up with a national just transition plan. There's going to be money attached to it. There's going to be a massive infrastructure budget coming out in the first part of the year, where some of it's earmarked for green things like public transport. So we must see if that turns into the best example we have so far. Then there's some others I can tell you about later. Thank you, I'm very aware of Chivin. Hovering, ominously. So I'll be, yeah. Right, thank you Chivin, that helps. Let me just make a couple of quick comments. I want to actually, Greg and Chivin's work, where they ended up, make a quick comment on that entire to one of the questions or the comments rather on scenarios. So I think you all ended, Greg, by saying, well, really what this needs to be about then to manage this transition is financial support to enable countries that will have foregone sort of industrial opportunities to make the transition. That was one of the points you made. And I just worry a little bit that we're falling into this game that economists have played with policy makers for so long, which is, well, yes, of course, winners could potentially compensate the losers and therefore it's better to improving and then the compensation never comes. And really that is, we don't have a credible response to that, right? I mean, so let me just give you and tie, when you tie that to the scenarios story, right? The games people are playing with scenarios which I've, I'm not a scenario model type guy, but I've had to engage with it because I've been frustrated by what I see. Let me just sort of spell out a possible story. The scenarios for India that I am seeing getting credibility and resonance in the international era are uniformly the IEAs. There are six different Indian modeling groups never cited in the international literature. So the IEA says, here's the story for India, here's the baseline story. You combine what the new, with the new carbon economy, which again has a lot of muscle power, money power behind it, got a lot of traction. And the new kind of carbon economy says, you know what, co-benefits are so massive that you don't actually have to pay much compensation. You put IEA and NCE together, that's very little money on the table. And that's what's dominating the discourse, right? So there's a, so in the political economy, we really have to worry about that. Where I find the more, where I really think the action is right now, is in India there is a fertile debate about how much coal we need. There are social groups, there are grassroots groups asking this question, pushing back against mining. Here's my worry, this global discourse provides a reason to suppress that dialogue. And that's my real worry, that the perverse incentive politically is that the domestic political process gets skewed by a perception that all the stuff I tried to say about grandfathering and so on and so forth. So I think just quickly one, then the reflection on Simon's point, I think we actually see eye to eye on a lot of this. I don't think that disadvantage necessarily leads to a right to extract. I think you have to absolutely ask the questions, can you get there another way? That's what I meant by saying, ask the hard questions. Are you actually gonna use any gains to bring about development for the poorest, which is the internal equity question. But that's where the conversation has to happen at the national level. And I think we have to find ways of making the international narrative supportive of that and be cautious about it, undermining it. Thank you. Okay, close it up. Very good. All right. Two things. Number one is that it's a very strong link between fossil fuels and war in the world today. And so the narrative about Iraq would not only end with Saddam Hussein, but also aim and also refer to the invasion and the destruction of the country as well as that of Libya and other places. And so when you talk about equity and responsibility, look at oil and war. And the petrol military complex is so strong that fossil fuels don't feature at all in the climate negotiations in the Paris Agreement. Somebody's suppressing it. Even the military missions are not sure they're being completed in terms of carbon emissions and the carbon budget we're talking about. So these guys are completely outlaws, I would say. And then I've not been able to bring myself to a campaign on transparency issues, mostly because I believe there's a big gap in the campaign. It's good, I applaud those who do it to follow the money and all that, but I feel like if I want to know what the oil companies are extracting, they should publish what they extract. When I know what they extract and I know what they're paying, they're not publishing what they're extracting. These guys are stealing the world blind. Thank you anymore. I have nothing that I want to add because I don't want to stand between you and the reception which will occur directly across the quad, except, no, no, just here, directly across the, this, this. Okay, directly out the door. The only thing I want to say is thank you very much, panelists. You made for a fantastic discussion.