 You're all very welcome, perhaps you'd like before we begin to do as I did not do it just before we started, switch off your mobile phones in case they go off during the meeting. We're very happy to have Dr. Bovolo here with us again. You were here with us four years ago, I understand, in 2015. Dr. Bovolo is an associate research fellow at the Institut Francais de Relation Internationale, but he tells us that he's based in Brighton, and is a contributor to worthy thoughts on Russia and China and the World Order in a number of other frameworks as well as IFRI. His presentation today, I think, couldn't be more interesting, Russia, China and World Order. I think all of us, and we were talking about it a little over lunch, are struck by the speed of the rise of China as a factor in World Order thinking, and we all ask what we can do about it, and that connection, the relation of China with Russia, is particularly pecan, let's say, which is a reason why we very much look forward to hearing what you have to say. So the floor is yours. Thank you. Let's check this. Yeah. Bodre, thank you very much for this welcome. When I came here four years ago, I have to say it was one of the most delightful visits I've had for many years, and I'm really delighted to be here again. Thank you so much for inviting me. So the title, Russia, China and World Order, the reason I picked this was because there's growing consensus in the West, particularly in the United States, about the threat that Russia and China together pose to World Order, and they're said to form an axis of authoritarianism whose purpose is no less than to destroy the post-World War II international system. But I wanted to ask today, is their partnership quite what it seems? Are Moscow and Beijing engaged in a common nefarious enterprise? Or does the real threat to the World Order come from within? Namely, the failure of Western democracies to live up to its ideals. So in answering these questions, I want to discuss four broad themes. The first is what I see as the state of the World Order. The second is the Sino-Russian partnership. The third theme focuses on what I think are the real threats to global order. And the fourth I want to finish up with is what we in the West should do about the threats to global order. So starting with the state of the world, I think the international environment today is more fluid and unpredictable than at any time since the end of the Cold War. It's clear that the US-led global order is in crisis, but at the same time, there is very little evidence of a post-American or post-Western order to emerge in its place. Instead, what we have, in my view, is a colossal void, a colossal strategic, political, economic, normative void. We don't have, in other words, a world order. What we have is a world disorder. And so what is this disorder? One of the main characteristics of this disorder, although several, the first is it highlights the limitations of great powers. Despite the use of military force, for example, in Syria, the great powers have rarely been weaker in their capacity to make others do their bidding. We've seen this not just in Ukraine, but obviously in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Libya, and many other places. Second characteristic, the de-universalization of international norms. We were talking before over lunch about the rules-based international order. Well, in my view, this no longer exists, this very idea of a rules-based international order has been thoroughly discredited, as has the pretense of so-called universal values. Global governance has become an oxymoron. Narrow self-interest is the dominant ethos of our time. And for many countries, it's not rules or norms or ethics that are the determining forces, it's power and the right to exercise it freely. Third characteristic, which is very closely related to the last one, we are seeing here a profound crisis of leadership in democracies and non-democracies alike. Not since the 1930s has there been such a poor quality of leadership across the world. This is evident in the inability, or is it the unwillingness, to work together to address fundamental collective problems such as climate change, mass migration, arms proliferation. Tactical opportunism abounds at the expense of longer-term strategic thinking. And this, of course, has encouraged xenophobic nationalism, political cynicism, and widespread public disillusionment. Fourth characteristic of this new world disorder, the shortcomings of multilateralism. There have never been so many multilateral organizations, nor a greater need for them, but they have rarely been so ineffective. And the problem is not with traditional institutions like the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, WTO. The problem is also these organizations, which are decaying, have not been replaced by new organizations. The new organizations, BRICS, the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, they're at least as ineffective. They're not capable of filling the growing vacuum of authority. We are witnessing, here's another feature, a new ideological divide. I'm sure there's no communism versus capitalism divide, I agree with that. But there are new ideological conflicts, new schisms, between, on the one hand, conservative authoritarian nationalism and liberal internationalism, between centrism and between immoderation of various kinds. I think the new world disorder is also seeing, has also increased the likelihood of military conflict. Now, I'm not saying that serious military conflict is about to happen. I don't want to exaggerate, but I think conflict between the great powers is more likely today than it has been for, I would say, let's see, 1983, how much is that, sort of, my maths is very poor, 35 years, something like that, but for decades. You often hear about the end of globalization. I think this is a nonsense. Globalization is not ending. If anything, we are more globalized than we've ever been, because despite countries pursuing egoistical approaches to their interests, globalization is continuing at pace. We live in a world where interests and problems cross boundaries, where information is ubiquitous, where culture is global, and where addressing major problems is far beyond the capacity of individual nation-states, no matter how great. Western-led globalization now, I think that's over, but globalization, as a phenomenon, is continuing unrestraint. The only real issue, I think, when we talk about globalization in the 21st century, is on whose terms it will be and on what terms. So now I want to move to the Sino-Russian partnership. There's no question that the level of Sino-Russian cooperation is better than it's ever been. You've got to hand it to them. It's been a remarkable success story. Beijing and Moscow agree on many things. They agree that they should restrain the United States. They oppose liberal interventionism. They believe in consolidating regimes in the face of democratic pressures. Their views on many issues are pretty similar, whether it's cyber or missile defense. There are no serious disputes between them. That's important. Nothing to spoil the relationship. And Xi Jinping, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin get on very well. I'm a little bit suspicious they get on quite as well as they're portrayed to be, but clearly this is a pretty comfortable relationship between two world leaders. China and Russia also derive considerable comfort from their relationship in the face of pressure from the United States. So for the Russian, the Russians see the Chinese as a really handy geopolitical counterweight, a normative counterweight to the United States. They also benefit from a kind of success by association. Basically, Russia thinks if we're with China, we're with a cool gang. We're with the rising powers as opposed to the clapped out West. That's a really, you know, it's an important part of Russian self-affirmation today. Economic ties are more developed than ever. Russia is Russia's largest country partner. Russia is the largest source of Chinese oil imports as well. They've concluded several major arms agreements and they do joint military exercises. So in many respects, this relationship has emerged as the very model of a modern strategic partnership. An oasis of stability in an otherwise disorderly chaotic world. You know, I'll argue to you that this is not the authoritarian, much less authoritarian entente or authoritarian alliance that it's often portrayed to be, again, particularly in the United States. This relationship between Russia and China, good though it is, is a relationship of strategic convenience. It's formed by individual national priorities, geopolitical calculus and tactical expediency. China and Russia, we make a mistake if we bracket them together. They are independent, separate actors, their perspectives, interests and priorities diverge in key respects. Where do they diverge? I'll name five areas. One, they differ in their perceptions of the international system. They differ in their views of what a future world order might look like. They differ in their attitudes towards cooperation with the United States. They have different priorities and interests in Eurasia and in the Asia Pacific. So just if I tease this out a little bit more, perceptions of the international system. The Chinese have been the prime beneficiary of the Western-led international system over the last four decades. Russia, however, has been the prime loser. So guess what? The Chinese think, well, actually, we quite like to preserve the existing international system. We want to tweak it. We believe we're deserving of more respect within that international system, but we don't want to break it. We want to reform it. Whereas the Russians say, this international system done us wrong. We've been screwed out of everything. They've not given us our rightful place in history. And so naturally, they have no interest in maintaining such an international system, which they regard as iniquitous and discriminatory. There's another aspect here, which is that Beijing looks at the world, at this international system and thinks it may not be great, but it's the only international system. It's the only order that exists. If it breaks, then what we're going to have is just horrendous chaos and disorder, and we hate that. That's bad for China, bad for Chinese interests. So that's another incentive. And besides, if it breaks, then everyone's going to look to us to come up with a new order, and we're just not ready for that. They differ when we talk about a new world order, visions of a future world order. I think Putin really, what he wants is a kind of Yalta in 1945, big three, only the big three obviously different. The big three would be Washington, United States, China, and Russia, and they would effectively co-manage the world. The Chinese, however, do not put, much as they flatter the Russians, they do not put Russia at the same level. They see a future world as being essentially determined by the prime interaction between China and the United States. Now, of course, Russia would still be a great power, but it would be a secondary great power, along with the EU, maybe India, Japan, whatever. But China and the United States would be those key players, with Russia definitely occupying a rung or two below that. Now, we in the West have been confused by this, because we see Russia-West relations deteriorating at a fierce rate. But we should be under no illusions. There is a fundamental tension between Putin's vision of the world as the three great powers and the Chinese vision of the future world order being two great powers plus additional bits and pieces, including multilateral institutions. Third aspect where they disagree, they have, strangely enough, contrasting views of the United States. Now, of course, they want to constrain US power. Of course, they see US leadership of a global order as unsatisfactory. However, the Chinese default mode with the Americans is accommodation. Now, that's not a guarantee against a future conflict. But as we've seen with the US-China trade negotiations, for example, the Chinese are desperately looking for a solution. They want to fix this problem. Then they don't want a conflict with the United States, because they see this as fundamentally bad for Chinese interests. There's nothing altruistic about it. It's blatantly self-interested. The Russians, however, because they have a much more meagre and more hostile bilateral relationship with the United States, they have no stake. They think relations are terrible anyway. There is hostility anyway. Why should we, what advantage is there in having cooperation with the United States? What they really, for the Kremlin, the main purpose of the United States is as chief enemy, as a sort of Russia. See how bad the United States is? We are virtuous by comparison. That is the main function of the United States in the Russian worldview. China and Russia have different priorities in the Asia Pacific. China sees itself as the number one power in the Asia Pacific. Russia, however, it has an interest in the Asia Pacific, but it's much more focused on Eastern Europe, on post-Soviet Eurasia, and most of all, the creation of a new global order on Russian terms. And if it has an agenda for the Asia Pacific, it's for a regional environment that is multipolar. It doesn't want to see the United States be the dominant power in the Asia Pacific, but nor does it want to see China replace the United States as that dominant power. That would be terrible. And different visions for Eurasia. There's been a lot of talk in the last two years, particularly about Putin's concept of a greater Eurasia. And this greater Eurasia would be centered on the Sino-Russian partnership. But in fact, this vision is aspirational rather than realistic. People talk about our so-called division of labor, where Russia is the primary security and political actor, whereas China does the sort of the money stuff. But in fact, China's Belt and Road Initiative isn't just about economics and trade. Because this idea that somehow you can neatly divide economic influence from geopolitical weight is laughable. Because when economic influence grows to such an extent, it automatically has geopolitical, broader strategic consequences. So that if ever a greater Eurasia does materialize, it will be on Chinese, not Russian terms. So where is this all going with the Sino-Russian partnership? Well, I think it's basically a pretty stable relationship. And if anything, Trump's shenanigans have reinforced it. Because people look at the United States and look at Trump's behavior and thinking, well, actually, let's hold on to stuff that is relatively stable. And the Sino-Russian partnership is at least that. On the other hand, this is not going to be an alliance in any time soon. Because neither side entirely trusts the other to behave rationally. The Chinese are particularly worried about Putin's foreign policy adventurism. And the Russians certainly don't want to get involved into a Sino-American conflict, say, in the Western Pacific. Putin wants to position Russia as an independent power, as I mentioned before. And she wants to ensure that China's rise is as smooth and trouble-free as possible. So I don't see an alliance. And in fact, I see problems arising in the future. Because although both sides have a strong interest in maintaining stability, predictability in their relationship, the growing inequality of that relationship and more ambitious and globalizing Chinese foreign policy, strategic tensions in Eurasia, arising from China's expanding influence there, and contrasting visions of global governance, I think these are going to pose real challenges to the relationship. And I think the biggest challenge of all in that Sino-Russian relationship is how both sides, particularly Russia, manage the dynamics of a partnership that is increasingly favoring China. This is a tricky one for particularly Moscow to deal with. So the third aspect is a real threat to global order. Now, let me say that some of Russia's and China's activities do pose a real threat to both Western interests and global order, cyber, political interference, territorial annexation, provocative military behavior. I'm not going to sugarcoat it. Many Russian and Chinese actions have been unhelpful and downright harmful. However, it is wrong to see Russia and China as partners in crime. Because although their bilateral cooperation is flourishing, they have shown little capacity or will in coordinating on grand strategy or trying to establish so-called post-Western norms and institutions. Each country pursues its own selfish agenda. Now, sometimes their interests coincide. Of course they do. But at other times, they do not. And disruption of the existing global order is one area where they do not have a shared aspiration. And I would argue that the real threats to the liberal order come from within. And I would say they're twofold. The first threat to the liberal order is the failure of Western democracies to live up to the principles of an international rules based system. The United States in particular has been a serial rule breaker under the administrations of George W. Bush, some extent under Obama, but particularly, as you well know, under Donald Trump. The second real danger to the liberal world order comes from the domestic policy failings of Western governments, of Western countries. And these failings, which are so well-documented, which you've experienced, I'm sure, yourself, have effectively severed the long-time association, the long-time nexus between liberal democracy and good governance. The 2008 financial crisis dealt not only a savage blow to the economic credibility of the West, but also to its political and moral credibility. And so what Russia and China have done, as you would expect them to do, is exploit the failings of the West. But they did not cause them. And this is really important. In 2016, it was not Moscow's interference that got Trump elected or that decided the outcome of the Brexit referendum. These were self-harming acts made at home reflecting widespread popular disillusionment with mainstream political parties, norms, and institutions. So this brings me to the sort of final part of my address. How the West should respond? What are we going to do about this situation? If we're going to salvage something of the liberal world order from the current mess, I think we must grasp several realities. First, we are moving into a post-American era. Now, the United States will remain the leading power for at least the next decade, probably several decades. But the time of unalloyed American global leadership is over. The only viable future is a collective one. Internationally, Western decision makers must address the fundamental disconnect between liberal internationalist rhetoric rules, this international system, international community, and so on. And what's actually happening on the ground, which is narrow nationalism and real politic. The survival of the liberal order depends not just on regurgitation of platitudes, but on concrete actions. How we address problems such as climate change, global poverty, migration, food and water security, we will be judged. The liberal world order will stand all four on actions, not these sort of flowery, pious sentiments that we hear from all the time. And at home, we need to demonstrate to ourselves and others that liberal democracy is not merely virtuous, but actually the most effective form of governments. We must confront full on xenophobia, social and economic injustice, and the erosion of the rule of law, which leads me to my bottom line. We cannot get our own house in order. We have no hope of persuading others. The future of the liberal world order begins and ends at home. Thank you.