 Good morning everyone. My name is Bill Burns. I'm the President of the Carnegie Endowment. It is my great pleasure to welcome all of you to the launch of an important book by my friend and colleague, Dmitry Trenin. Like many of you, I've spent a good bit of my career working and living in Russia. I served in Boris Yeltsin's Russia, a country full of democratic promise, but flat on its back economically and wrestling with a profound sense of humiliation. I returned a decade later as ambassador to Vladimir Putin's Russia. This was a country transformed, full of swagger, surfing on $100 a barrel oil, thirsty for control and order, and hungry to reassert itself as a major power. I witnessed my share of ups and downs in the U.S.-Russia relationship, including the reset efforts in the first term of the Obama administration and mounting tensions in the second term over Russia's aggression in Ukraine, its support for Assad's war crimes in Syria, and its reckless application of cyber tools. Throughout this complicated journey, I learned a great deal from Dmitry. Simply put, I can't think of a better analyst of Russia and its foreign policy, and I can't think of anyone more thoughtful about the drivers of Russia's behavior today and its implications for the future of global order. In his book, Dmitry provides his characteristically independent, informed, dispassionate, and nuanced portrait of Russia, full of its insecurities, grievances, contradictions, ambitions, and self-inflicted wounds. He is equally unflinching about Washington's missteps and misjudgments, and he is exacting in his sketch of the contours of the new normal of mutual adversity. Dmitry does not just admire the problem and the very real risks of this new predicament. He also offers practical ideas on how to navigate this complicated landscape, prevent further backsliding, and maintain channels of communication and cooperation, and manage tension. Dmitry's book exemplifies what institutions like Carnegie can do to help policymakers cope with the storm and stress of today's world. Provide a frame, widen the aperture, look beyond the horizon, offer fresh ideas and shape solutions. Dmitry does all this and more in his own work and through his leadership at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and he's very fortunate to have Andrew Weiss as his partner here in Washington. Together, they have rebuilt and revitalized Carnegie's work in this part of the world, connected it firmly to our other global centers, and elevated new voices from the next generation of thinkers and doers. I'm proud of what they've accomplished together, and I very much look forward to their conversation this morning. So please join me in giving a very warm welcome to Andrew Weiss and Dmitry Trim. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you, Bill, for that very generous introduction. It's a real privilege to be here on stage with Dmitry, who I've known and admired for a long time, and in the last three or so years, I've been able to be a colleague and a close collaborator with. It's a real joy to see so many familiar faces in the room today. It's also nice to have a break from the conversation about should we fear Donald Trump to a conversation about should we fear Russia. So it's a nice pivot. But in all seriousness, I encourage everyone to pick up the book. There's an order form, I think, that was distributed on the table. We're meeting a couple days before publication date, but if you order it with the form that's been provided, I've got a little visual cue here to give you about that. If you use the form, you can get a discount. So anyways, I really encourage people to read it. I've read it myself in recent days, and it's another tribute to Dmitry to be as prolific as he is. He really sets the standard within Carnegie as a whole in terms of the ability to produce on a recurring basis. Really important must-read material in the book is no exception to that. Coming to the topic at hand, and my hope in terms of how organized today's discussion is, I'll ask Dmitry a few questions to get things going. But given the kinds of people in the room today, I very much hope it'll be a real conversation that includes everyone here. On the Trump factor, you've been, I think, a pretty unusual Russian voice in the last three weeks, and that you have not been popping champagne corks. And you've really been looking at the fundamental reasons why the U.S. and Russia have such a complex and recently such a lousy relationship. And I'm scared to sort of draw you out a little more about why you've been somewhat downbeat in the wake of what it's been, I think across the board politically in Russia, a sense of elation, a sense of, you know, that something bad has been averted and that something really promising awaits. Well, Andrew, first of all, good morning, everyone. I'm really thankful to all of you who've beaten the rain and come here. It's a really great pleasure for anyone, any author, to have so many people of such caliber in this room this morning. First of all, I want to thank Bill Burns for his words. I'm not sure I deserve everything that he has said, all the praise that he has heaped on me, but I very much appreciate everything that he has said and even more of what he has done and what he is doing. So with these words, let me turn to your question. I think that there was a sigh of relief in my soul in a way when I heard the very unexpected result of the election. I learned at Spasso House. Actually, we were brought together, a few of us, by the Ambassador, John Teft, to watch the results. And of course, everyone was including myself. Of course, we're surprised to hear the result of the election. But frankly, I was much more downbeat prior to the election. I was thinking, and I was writing about it, that the United States and Russia found themselves within striking distance of actually hitting each other. And I was very concerned that that trajectory continued. There was an increasing likelihood of the United States and Russia engaging in what I would call kinetic collision in Syria, in the skies over Syria. I'm still worried about that, but slightly less so. That's one reason for being a little bit relieved at hearing the result, that there is potentially an opportunity to somehow change the trajectory. Which to me was still continues to be pretty dangerous. But beyond that, I never bought the idea of Donald Trump being somehow favorably predisposed toward Russia. I never thought that he was Putin's favorite to win. I don't think that Putin was seriously thinking of Trump winning the election. I think he was as surprised in the Kremlin as people were elsewhere at the result. But there are lots and lots of questions that people have no answers for at this point. And fundamentally, the relationship is unchanged. As Bill Burns has said, it's an adversarial relationship and it's going to stay adversarial. And the change of president in Washington does not change that. There are more uncertainties. But some of the old certainties perhaps could be voided. We could dodge the bullet in Syria. And thank God for small favors. But just one comment on what you've said. The champagne in Moscow was not so much for the victory of Donald Trump. It was mostly for the defeat of Hillary Clinton. And Hillary Clinton was universally seen in negative light by the political class in Russia. So it's more of a schadenfreude. It's less of exuberance with regard to Donald Trump's victory. So if we extrapolate a bit from your suggestion that this is going to remain a competitive or adversarial relationship, what are the lessons of this most recent period? It seems to me, and I just say this rather bluntly, that the lessons are that meddling in U.S. elections is okay, that military intervention on behalf of a bloody dictator like Assad can transform the battlefield, but maybe not change the Middle East, but at least change the course of the Syrian conflict. It's okay to annex your neighbor, or to your neighbor's territory, et cetera, et cetera. And so if, as you know, the discussion in Washington had focused largely in the run-up to the election on forms of pushback or containing that threat, it seems that we're setting ourselves up, potentially, for a new phase where the lessons of the past couple of years are bold steps, reckless risk-taking bold steps can really pay off, at least in the short term. Well, they can. And I think that there are lots of small lessons that can be drawn from that, but I would highlight something else. There was a fundamental change of paradigm in the relationship back in 2014. And the one lesson for us, for all of us, I think, is not to continue to apply the measuring sticks that we used to apply to the relationship between, let's say, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Crimea operation, or annexation, or however you want to call it, to the current period in U.S.-Version relations. You talked about competition. This competition takes all sorts of forms, from cyberspace to airspace over Syria. And basically, we have no rules of the road at this point. And if you can do something, and if the payoff is higher than the cost that you're likely to pay for it in the foreseeable future, go for it. Of course, there are certain limits. Of course, no one wants this ultimate collision. Nuclear deterrence works and will continue to work. But apart from that, it's a very competitive relationship. And it extends to all spheres, from cyberspace to outer space to geopolitical space, information space being one of the most hotly contested territories. And in that book, I argue that the analogies that people draw between the situation today in U.S.-Russian relations and the situation during the Cold War are misleading. Because if you accept the analogy, you'll be looking for things to happen that will not happen because the world is different. And you'll be missing the things that will happen because they did not exist in the times of the Cold War. This situation today could be more dangerous at times than the situation during the Cold War. And we have to be able to digest that and prepare ourselves for this competition which I see lasting a number of years. One area that you didn't, if I remember correctly, go into great detail in the book is the collapsing arms control edifice. And we've seen, especially from Mr. Putin and from other senior members of the Russian leadership, a whole set of talking points about nuclear weapons that are a break with previous post-Cold War and Cold War era norms, where there's talk about escalate to de-escalate, there's talk about even putting nuclear forces on alert during the Crimea annexation operation and bringing nuclear weapons into view as something that might actually be used as opposed to, as you said, the ultimate deterrent for direct confrontation with the United States. What's changed in your mind in how this generation of Russian leaders and the people who are likely to succeed them think about nuclear weapons? And is that something that we should be afraid of? Because I personally think it is. Well, I think, Andrew, that there are three things, well, there are many things, but let me highlight three things that are different today from the Cold War situation and that make the world a more dangerous place. One is the huge asymmetry that exists between the United States and Russia. And this asymmetry calls for a different kind of a toolbox and different kind of tactics that the weaker party, in this case Russia, will be using to compensate for its material weakness. This is something that you've got to expect unless you're expecting Russia to surrender, which I would not recommend. The second thing is the utter lack of respect for each other's leadership. And whereas Putin, President Putin, is routinely demonized in much of the mainstream global media, or Western media, Western leaders are openly lampooned by the Russian state-run media. And I'm not sure which is worse. Never in the Cold War did we have such disrespect for the other party's leadership or the other party's political class. And this is serious. And thirdly, there's a tendency to think, despite all the references to deterrence, that somehow nuclear weapons are out of the equation, that unlike in the Cold War, they are obsolete, they're the day before yesterday's weapons, and they're somehow out there, but even to refer to their existence would be a sort of, it's not a crime, but something that should not be done in international affairs today. Well, I would question that. And I think Mr. Putin, when he sees Russia being treated as if it were not a nuclear power, or should I say nuclear superpower, I see him reaching into his inner pocket and putting his nuclear gun on the table for everyone to see. And that produces the effect that you referred to. In the paradigm of 98, excuse me, 89, 14, that would have been outrageous, because that was the paradigm of prevailing cooperation between Russia and the West. In today's paradigm of prevailing adversity and competition rather than cooperation, even confrontation between Russia and the United States, this is something you don't have to excuse yourself for in the Kremlin's logic. So that's another thing that basically tells us that today's situation is more dangerous, or can be more dangerous, than what we had during the Cold War period. I wanted to shift the conversation a little bit to an issue that Ambassador Burns mentioned in his introduction, which is your skill at looking at the domestic drivers as well of where Russia's going and Russian foreign policy. We saw in the last two to three years since the aggression against Ukraine a real focus on sort of mobilizing patriotic nationalist groups inside Russia, using them as proxies in kinetic activity and covert activity in Ukraine. The idea of Russia being a besieged fortress has had a recurrent benefit to the regime over the last 16, 17 years. The idea that we were surrounded by enemies and only by coming together can Russia defend those enemies. And that's all obviously beneficial to Putin's continued time in office. Does that have to change in light of what we're seeing both in the United States and in the weakening of European views and responding to Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis? Or does that become kind of just fixed and we should assume that that sort of adversarial logic has to be part of Russian foreign policy? Well, I think that this confrontation has become a major factor in enhancement of Russian nationalism. But it was not the source of Russian nationalism. I think Russia, having stopped being imperial as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its fear of influence and ultimately itself, after a period of shock in the 1990s, Russia has gone down the path of nationalism, which is something that empires go through when the empire is gone. This nationalism was evident, I think, since the latter half of the 2000s. Putin's current term was started with a series of steps that I called a policy of sovereignization, expunging all elements of foreign influence in Russia. Coming up with a unified view of Russian history and tons of other things, promoting orthodoxy as the binding glue, patriotism and the orthodoxy as binding glue of modern Russia. And I guess that background, which in my view preceded by many years the crisis in Ukraine and the confrontation between Russia and the United States, this mobilization has played a massive role in dramatically enhancing all that. So that's what we see. There are two things that I believe the Kremlin is highlighting. One is enhancing the unity of Russia, which is still in many ways a brittle place and restoring Russia's status as a major power in the world. In fact, I think that if Mr. Putin's priorities were to be summarized in the most succinct way, I would say he is about keeping Russia in one piece and elevating it back to an international level where it belongs in his view. So yes, it's played a major role, but it was not the source. And I would very much oppose the view that Russia's foreign policy was primarily designed to enhance the stability of the regime at home. I think there is a view, but I think it confuses the source and the effect. I think it certainly helps that. It certainly helps the consolidation of the political system and Putin's popularity at home, but it was not designed originally that way. It was something else. So let's look to the future and I'll ask one more question before opening things up. If we assume that the election of Donald Trump represents an opportunity to at least halt the slide towards some form of collision and maybe creates an opportunity for improving the relationship on a holistic basis, where is that likely to happen? I think part of what happened with the Obama era reset is that most of the promising low-hanging fruit had been picked, and even before Snowden showed up in the Moscow airport, there was a sense of lack of direction and lack of obvious next steps. If you go down to major themes of U.S.-Russian potential cooperation, there aren't too many obvious promising areas. People like President-elect have talked about Syria. There's a broader question about perhaps Iranian dunia polarization and the fate of the JCPOA. But it's hard for me to come up with a great list of promising areas where Russia and the United States, let alone Russia and the West, are going to be cooperating anytime soon. Do you feel differently about that? I do. Again, I would go back to my earlier thesis about the change of the paradigm. I will be not looking for ways to improve the relationship. You can improve cooperation, but what do you do with adversity? You learn to manage it. You don't try to reduce the adversity unless, in doing so, you achieve some of the goals, some of the objectives that you've set yourself. I think that under the current circumstances, the best one could hope for is that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin find a common language to relate to each other, not necessarily to come up with new projects of cooperation or solutions to this or that issue. They think if they somehow manage to understand each other, where each leader is coming from, that would be good for the relationship in the sense of providing it with a bit more stability, a little bit more of predictability. If that happens, I think I would be satisfied with the wrong word, but it would be a good thing in my view. That language that I've referred to can be only described as transactional. You don't talk about values. You don't talk about domestic stuff. You don't talk about a lot of other issues. You address issues from the point of view of those who want to make a deal or at least want to preserve the status quo or want to avoid the worst becoming a reality. Such a relationship, in my view, exists between, let's say, Russia and Israel. They don't see eye to eye to a lot of issues in the Middle East starting with Iran, but they've developed Russian leaders and Israeli leaders have developed a common language in which they perfectly understand where each side is coming from and they manage to keep their relationship more or less on an even keel. I do not suggest that this is a model that can be used in U.S.-Russian relations. It can't. But to a degree, finding a common language could make the relationship more predictable and we'll see whether this is possible. I'm not suggesting that it cannot be done. I think it might be done and if it's done, it will be a good thing in my view. Let me challenge you on that because I think so much of Russia's view of itself as a great power does ultimately fall back on the idea that it needs a sphere of influence and that big powers should make decisions and little guys get out of the way. And there's so much about that that will be a source of heartbreak and to me, simply unacceptable. And the temptation may be that problems will go away if you make those deals, but the reality is that problems won't go away. And I'm just curious what makes you feel that this time it's different. Well, I think that the president-elect is different from his predecessors. He speaks a different language. He is someone who at least, again, to a superficial observer like myself is a deal-maker. And if that's the case, then I think from what I know about Vladimir Putin, I think that there can be some sort of an understanding between them. But I'm not suggesting that the relationship will somehow be transformed. It won't be. I'm not suggesting that the issues will go away. They won't. I think that Ukraine will remain an issue through my lifetime and beyond that. I think by talking about decades and I think that the relationship between Russia and Ukraine will remain extremely adversarial for a very long time. Syria, you can only do a few things with it jointly. And even that is not enough. The U.S. and Russia cannot between the two of them bring peace to Syria even if they tried very hard. They need others to collaborate. And it's not a given that the others will join on U.S.-Russian agreed terms. And many other things will not change. I think that the very negative attitude of a lot of people in the political classes of both countries toward each other will not change. And that's a major issue. So, no, I'm not suggesting that the relationship will be transformed. But as I said at the very beginning, I set the bar very low. To me, the most important thing is to avoid this kinetic collision. Because in my thinking, we've been living with the possibility of a war between the United States and Russia this fall. There's nothing more important than that. In my view, my book, maybe I'm wrong. But that's where I set the bar. Okay, well, on that sobering note, let's open things up a couple of ground rules if you would please all wait for the microphone and identify yourselves before posing your question. If I could start down here with Andrew here. Hold on one second, I'll bring you a microphone. Thank you, Dmitri, for your usual lucid analysis. Another phenomenon, as you know, that's taking place right now is the growth of populism, the criticism of globalization, and this looks as if it's having a direct impact in Europe, coming election in France, Italy, Austria, elsewhere. But what is happening in Russia in that regard? And is this going to infect Russia or is Putin going to be able to avoid that happening in Russia? Unless you feel that some of Putin's support is very much in that vein itself. And what are the long-term consequences of this in terms of the global outlook, if in fact you have a growth of populism somewhat open to Russia, it seems, and what impact will that have in the transatlantic relationship? Thank you. Well, I think that in Russia the wave of populism is something that supports President Putin. Vladimir Putin, early on in his presidential career, has made it very clear that Russia's government had to be two things. A, it had to be popular among the clear majority of the Russian people. That may exclude the intelligentsia that didn't matter that much to Mr. Putin. But it had to have the support of the numerical, let's say, two-thirds of the population. You can only rule Russia with any confidence if you have that sort of support. If you have 51% in Russia, that is an invitation to a civil war. So you have to have two-thirds. This is one thing. The other thing that Mr. Putin has learned that you can only rule the place with that popular support in an authoritarian way, because that's what most people would expect you to do. And this combination of authoritarianism and populism is what cements the current Russian political system. And at this point I don't see it threatened, but as all systems of that nature, they're most vulnerable when transition becomes the reality. Transition from one ruler to another ruler because it cannot be simply passed on by presidential decree. I think that the consequences of this populism, let me put it this way, I see all over the world a backlash against some aspects of globalization. And the backlash takes the form of populism and nationalism. The irony, in my view, that this trend has reached the United States of America. And I see President-elect Donald Trump as an American nationalist militating against US-led globalism, which is, in my view, ironic. We'll see whether it becomes the reality under President Trump. I think that the rise of nationalism has some implications for the United States. It has some implications for Europe already. Even though Brexit was not exactly about British nationalism vis-à-vis the rule of Brussels, there was an element in Britain all the time that made the British different from continental Europeans. In fact, Britain and Russia are the two countries that refer to continental Europe as Europe. When we say we go to Europe, others in continental Europe may not understand it, well, they will understand it now. But that's what the Brits say when they travel from London to Paris, although it's a far shorter ride. But what's happened in Russia, and that I think is of fundamental importance, is Russia having turned its back on the idea that it belongs to Europe politically, even in many ways in terms of civilization, although I understand this is not a very current term nowadays. What Mr. Putin has been able to do, and in which he has been supported by very powerful forces within Russia, is not just revisiting the legacy of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, the legacy of Russia's integration into Europe, but also the legacy of Peter the Great, of Europe being the model, Europe being your future, Europe being what you always want it to be. This has been revisited and continues to be revisited. And I don't think it's a short-term trend. I don't think it will go away with some, let's have a moment of fancy, with some improvement in U.S.-Russian relations. When Russian television starts talking about the value of U.S.-Russian collaboration and things like that, I don't think it will happen. I think that Russia is turning away. Mr. Putin and many people in Russia, I think have accepted the idea of, Toynby an idea, I don't know Toynby, of Europe being divided down that line into European civilization, Western civilization, and Russian Orthodox civilization. Of course, that's that civilization, that Toynby in line runs through Ukraine, as you all remember. But it leaves the Baltic states on the, you would say, safe side of the divide. Please. I'm Benjamin, too, a retired diplomat. Thank you very much, Mr. Trenin. I'd like to bring you back to the Middle East. Given Russia's close relations with Syria, and therefore with Hispala, as well as with relations with Israel, which you mentioned, and also with the Palestinians, do you think the likelihood of significant Middle East could be reached during Trump's presidency, including on the Palestinian-Israeli issue? Well, I don't think it's a priority for the Kremlin, frankly. The Palestinian-Israeli issue. It often is a priority for the White House, but not for the Kremlin. I think the Kremlin understands its limitations. It doesn't want to play the role there that would require big commitment of resources. The Kremlin has been pursuing its policy in the Middle East basically on the cheap. And it has achieved some results, but they know that to be mired into the problems of the Middle East would require the kind of resources that Russia either doesn't have or would not want to spend in the Middle East. So Russia I think will be there. Russia will be doing something. But I wouldn't expect Russia to engage very much on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, except maybe for public relations purposes to show that Russia could convene something with the Israelis and the Palestinians and Mr. Putin hosting them, which would serve a purpose, but a purpose different from Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Yes, but you need to include other big players. I think you need to include Saudi Arabia. No question about that. I don't think that the war in Syria can be ended without very active Saudi cooperation. Turkey, very important. A minor and yet visible player, Qatar. China, not yet in my view. I think China is still testing the waters. China is in the process of getting to know the Middle East. The Chinese are not overplaying their hand. They're watching very intently, but they're not committing themselves very much at this point. And clearly Iran. Iran is vitally important for anything that happens in that part of the world. David Kadir, back there. Thank you. David Kadir, sitting outside. If I may, Dimitri, I'd like to continue the champagne analogy whether champagne cork have been popped in Moscow recently over the win of François Fillon in the French primary and more seriously, more concretely, yesterday there was a Normandy format meeting. No results have been produced according to insiders, neither Moscow nor Kiev want to move according to the roadmap that's been proposed by France and Germany. So my question to you is how do you see the election of Donald Trump, all Fillon-LePenduel in France and the upcoming German election affecting Moscow's strategy regarding the Minsk process and whether you see the Minsk process going in the next six months more generally. Thank you. Well, David, I think that the Minsk process does not go anywhere in the next six months or in the next 12 months or in the next 18 months. In my view, and I made that conclusion pretty early on, Minsk works much more for Russia than it does for Kiev. And I see very little interest in Kiev, frankly. Not just willingness, but interest to move ahead and implement Minsk on the terms agreed in Minsk. For Russia, I can argue that it would give Russia what it wants actually in Ukraine, i.e. an inbuilt obstacle to Ukraine's bid to join NATO. That's what it's all about, in my view. But Minsk, I don't think. No one will repudiate Minsk, least of all Russia, because it works for it and it can always say that Ukraine is not fulfilling its obligation, etc. Russia is not fulfilling its own obligations, but you would be living the fantasy world of you if we thought that Russia would fulfill whereas Ukraine would be stuck. As I said, Minsk in principle works for Russia. Germany, I don't think, will change its leader this year, or its policies toward Russia. I think Germany is becoming at least under the present leadership more and more skeptical toward Russia. Some people would say adversarial. I wouldn't go that far, but Germany is at this point one of the harshest critics of Russia in the European Union. If you exclude the UK which is hard to beat on that score. Fionn, I think there is a hope in Russia that it's not about Fionn, it's about Gholism. Whether Fionn's potential victory at the polls could turn France toward the course charted by Charles de Gulle. If that happens well, there will be big changes. Because if that happens sanctions won't stand. And Paris may find a way, we can be sent back to the geopolitics of the yesteryear which Paris could some issues deal with without Berlin and all sorts of very unusual things might happen. It's still too early to speculate even to speculate about that. But it's interesting, it's something to watch. I mean you are better judges as far as Donald Trump's policies toward Europe are concerned. I would be frankly I would be very skeptical as to major changes in US France and US policies in Europe. Wayne Mary. Thank you. You got your professional start in military to military relationships with the United States which today scarcely exist. And on the basis that you said of the need for a transactional dialogue, do you think if the new American commander in chief told his generals that he wants to restore active military to military contacts with Russia, there would be on the Russian side enough of a reciprocity to make that dialogue truly transactional and beneficial. Or does something else have to precede that before the military to military channel could again become the productive channel that it once was that you and I both remember. I would vote for the latter. I would say that military to as suggested even in the last couple of years by the US has not been acceptable to the Russians. Because basically in the first couple of years of this new confrontation, Russia's strategy was not to make the situation appear more predictable and more manageable. It was just the opposite. I mentioned in response to Andrew's question that if you're the weaker of the two parties and you want to get even, you're not about to surrender. If you're about to surrender, fine. If you're not about to surrender, then you're looking for compensatory measures and some of those compensatory measures could be your willingness to take high risks. Your willingness to operate in a way that keeps the other side guessing about your next move. Your, the boldness and swiftness of your decision-making. All those things are something, and again, it's not about people being bad or people being irrational. I think it's perfectly rational although it's very dangerous to follow that course of action. You don't want NATO planes to come too close to your airspace, your territory, and you direct your own planes to come and fly very close to the planes of the opposing party. You know that it's scary, but you're willing to take more risk and your pilots will be motivated by the thought that they're defending the national territory. Whereas the other guys pilots will be doing just, you know, an operational exercise a few thousand miles away from home doing, you know. So you have an advantage even though you're weaker. And under those circumstances I don't think that the Kremlin was in the mood to have a male-male dialogue. I don't know, but that's my conclusion because they, I understand that there have been a few attempts and they were turned down. In that, if there is this transactional dialogue that I said might ensue from the meeting, the first meeting between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, then I think military to military dialogue could be revived. Certainly if there's some sort of an agreement to collaborate, however in whatever way, in Syria they will have to be serious dialogue between the military commanders in an operation that would involve both countries forces in Syria. And there will be, I think and there should be in my view I never supported the idea that you have to, you know, put the stakes high and high and high so that, you know, I thought that it was just too dangerous, too risky. And, you know, when a plane passes another plane at the speed of 1,000 or whatever kilometers or 2,000 kilometers an hour within, you know, six feet from each other, to me that's too close for comfort. But I think in this transactional sphere of the relationship there is every chance that military to military context will be improved, restored, that there will be a direct line between the chairman of the joint chiefs and the chief of the General Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and maybe commanders at different levels of NATO commands and Russian military districts, that may happen. But I think we're too, it's still too early to talk about that. We'll see how the first meeting goes. One of the things that you did in the spring which I don't know if everyone in the room had a chance to read but I would commend them was speak at the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and there's a version of that presentation in Vieta Misty if I'm not mistaken probably on the Carnegie website as well. But you really and you end the book in this same sort of tone which is that unless Russia really focuses on its domestic house and revitalizing its society, it will consign itself to a development path and a set of opportunities that will be diminished from what they otherwise might be. Everything we've talked about up to now is really about this more great power version and power politics version of Russia and it's very much externally oriented as opposed to what you sort of end the book on this same note which is we've got to get our act together if we're going to be a serious great power. How do you reconcile those two realities because I look at all the things and I can say sure Mr. Putin tried to raise the stakes and he flew his airplanes in ways to make people scared and make us back off and the Ukraine crisis. But I also see man what a series of colossal you know Ukraine which was always a fairly friendly country now for decades if not generations to come will view Russia as the place that needlessly started a war that's cost tens of thousands of lives and to basically destroyed what should have been a normal relationship with Germany, destroyed a normal relationship with most of the outside world. So how do you reconcile those competing elements of what Russia is today and what Putin has taken up? Well I don't think that there is any doubt in anyone's mind seriously speaking that Russia can only be what it wants to be if it rebuilds its economy. I'm not an economist I have no clue about you know the actual ways of performing that feat and I know that my economist friends are always quarreling among themselves about which is the best way to proceed. But it's clear that without a major rebuilding of the economy without a major rebuilding of the state apparatus and I would even go further without an overhaul of the elite we talked about the elite being the culprit in many of those cases of populism versus the status quo it's a failure of the elites everywhere you look in Russia I think that the kind of elite that we have today is absolutely abominable it's for the first time in the entire history of the country that the elite is frankly overtly self-serving they're not serving the state they're not serving the nation they're serving themselves and that's it's not sustainable and we can't achieve much with that kind of an elite we've been talking about something else it's we're talking about short-term scenarios, we're talking about geopolitics but essentially the play some role as they normally call it of the country they call taking order will be determined by how effective its economy is how good its education system is how good its health system is and we have big big problems wherever you look I think it's becoming more obvious to everyone including everyone in the Kremlin the problem in my view that even those who would vote for reform are behind the Kremlin wall would argue that evolving power will bring in chaos and I think that's Mr. Putin's view basically even if he wanted to be a reformer which he's not I said he's about two things keeping the country in one piece elevating it primarily in geopolitical and military terms he's actually using military power because that's the kind of power that he can use if Russia were the United States it would be using sanctions Russia being Russia it's using military force it's what you have that you can use and for the first time in 25 years military force has become a usable instrument I hope that there can be some small reforms in Russia in various sectors partial reforms reforming I don't know well let's say the federal customs service which is notoriously corrupt or something else and inefficient but bigger sweeping reforms in my view will have to wait and in my view they only become possible in the next political cycle and I'm not talking 2018-2024 which maybe Mr. Putin's last term in office I think that they will happen or not happen beyond that beyond 2024 but I may be wrong I tend to be skeptical tend to be cautious I would be very I would want to be surprised including my Mr. Putin and I know that some very good and serious people are working on a whole range of reforms in Russia and they have Mr. Putin's mandate to do that but I still remain somewhat skeptical as to the probability of major reforms in Russia in the next few years but again to me the key issue is the elite and if I were to vote for anything in Russia I would vote meritocracy because that I think could be the the driver of positive changes I don't think that simply devolving power simply allowing a lot of people a lot more freedom will do the job without leadership nothing can be done leadership should not only come from the Kremlin that's not enough it should come from an elite that sees itself as nationally orientated and focused on the national needs and less on their own well-being and their own riches Ilya Panamaryov Thank you Ilya Panamaryov for Russia Dmitry you I want to elaborate more about this transactional type relations between US and Russia to my mind Minister Lavrov recently was more than clear and of course he was voicing Kremlin's position that no longer Russia would allow cooperation on one frontier and another frontier and recent Duma initiative to bundle all kind of problems in one package with a plutonium utilization Act where they bundled Magnitsky Act, sanctions Ukraine like all together in one package I think that shows Kremlin's position that Kremlin wants one deal with many different deals on different directions and I don't think that this kind of deal can be made without resolving the Ukrainian crisis and I 100% agree with your opinion that Minsk agreements they are more pro-Russian but they are not working and not likely that they will be working in future so what do you think is it possible with the new administration to make this kind of deal on Ukraine and what this deal may look like Ilya, well I'm skeptical on this one big deal very skeptical I don't think this can be achieved but I'm also skeptical skeptical is one word I wouldn't necessarily buy each statement that people make at face value statements are made in certain contexts they serve a certain purpose I said something today I wanted to be heard today tomorrow is a new day anyway I say what the president wants me to say so I wouldn't just say that this is some sort of a dogma the plutonium act was more of a political statement it was not it was not meant as an ultimatum as a set of conditions it was more of a litany of concerns or counterclaims on the United States you guys have this now we have this fine we do not expect you to roll back the NATO infrastructure to where it was back in 2000 no sane person would actually expect that to happen I pointed out as a concern and this is what we've done I think the transactional deals are transactional deals because they are not they do not encompass everything you can agree on something in Syria and yet you will leave the sanctions in place and even if as Mr. Putin has said even if the sanctions are lifted or eased it's not a given that Russia will immediately reciprocate by abolishing its own counter sanctions because there's a lobby in Russia we're talking money there's a lobby in Russia that thrives due to thanks to the counter sanction that Russia has imposed and why should we you know do you think it's going to be a transactional relationship or more confrontation that's how I see it Ukraine cannot be Ukraine will take some time and I would add developments within Ukraine of all sorts of all kinds as being one of the factors in this situation Ukraine is also changing Ukraine I'm not suggesting that Ukraine will somehow reverse itself it won't I think that Ukraine has also made like Russia has made a seminal step of turning itself away from Europe let's say away from Europe as a model Ukraine has turned itself away from Russia and I don't expect that to to be reversed and I agree with Andrew that there were huge blunders in Russia's policy these are the Ukraine first of all because for 25 years there has been no policy in Ukraine and the policies that were presented back in 2011 by Vladimir Putin when he was unveiling his plans for the next presidency would have been disastrous for Russia so from my perspective it is so much better for Russia to have Ukraine as a foreign country even under today's conditions Ukraine within the Russian sphere what have you it would have drained our resources it would have blackmailed us every step of the way it would have been a disaster in so many ways so Ukraine has gone it's not such a bad thing so I'm mindful of our time any final questions I've got Doug Wake up front we're going to take them together thanks Doug Wake former Foreign Service Officer and more recently OSCE official I'd like to return back a little bit to the discussion that Andrew and Dmitry had on domestic issues and the economy which I know you said you're not an expert on and neither am I but I'm struck by your comment that you have reform over quite an extended period the next 6-8 years and if we get back to your basic thesis that the strength and power of the current rulers in Russia base that on keeping the country together and keeping the country strong internationally I'm just wondering if you don't see some risks that lack of economic reform and continued difficulty in economic relations with a broad part of the world economy are going to drive domestic politics to a different state than they are in 2016 even a radically different state over the course of the next 4-8 years thanks Doug and there's a question way on the back of our back in the green Hi Pascal Siegel from Ankara Consulting if we move to a more transactional relation with Russia from now on what do the Baltic states and the Central European countries can expect Doug I made a caveat that I did not expect sweeping reforms and I certainly did not expect major political reforms I would expect partial reforms I would expect targeted action here and there improving governance making things more transparent making the country less corrupt I would expect these reforms with a small R but I wouldn't expect major sweeping reforms and for a lot of people major sweeping reforms are primarily liberal reforms paving the way toward democracy I would not expect that but I would expect a bunch of smaller steps that would improve the situation in various sectors of Russia and of course you're dealing with a regime that is very focused on monitoring the sentiments of the population they take no chances they know that the Russian people are notoriously unpredictable as I often say if we were sitting here 100 years ago exactly today say 30 November 1916 I wouldn't be predicting either of the two revolutions that happened in the following 12 months and no one would so these people know that Russian people can be tricky Russian people do not change their leadership every 4 or 6 years through the ballot box but they bring down the entire state and ruin their country on average every 50 years if you take that 20th century so it's the Baltics and Central Europe I think that they're safe they're safe from Russian conquest safe from Russian invasion not safe from Russian influence not safe from other things that Russia is doing maybe doing covertly, overtly I don't know but it's a struggle for influence Russia will not will not stop its efforts to well make the situation in some of those countries more favorable for it than it is today there are some governments that are let's say less hostile toward Russia some governments that are very hostile toward Russia well it's expect more of this but I wouldn't expect I think for Putin this Toinbien Line is the natural dividing line in Europe unfortunately as I said it cuts Ukraine into two but Central Europe Eastern Europe the Baltic states as I said are on the call it the good side of the divide call it the safe side of the divide I'd like to end with a ringing endorsement of Dimitri's work from Henry Kissinger Dimitri Trenin offers a balanced and thoughtful analysis of the ambitions anxieties and interests that have shaped Russian policy toward the West since the end of the Cold War it is a welcome antidote to the one-dimensional views of Russia and President Putin that prevail in Western commentary I think that's what we've heard today it's what we hear every day at Carnegie when we read your work and I think around the world we're grateful to have you as our colleague and we encourage everyone to buy your new book it's been a pleasure to have you here well thank you Andrew, thank you all