 Part 4, Section 14 of the Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards. This Leberbach's recording is in the public domain. The conclusion. Whether the things which have been alleged are liable to any tolerable answer in the way of calm, intelligible and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge. But I am sensible, they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not unlikely that some who value themselves on the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern fashionable divinity will have their indignation and disdain raised at the site of this discourse and on proceeding what things are pretended to be proved in it. If they think it worthy of being read or of so much notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual exclamations with additional vehemence and contempt about the fate of the heathen, Hobbes's necessity, and making men mere machines, accumulating the terrible epithets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable, irresistible, etc. They may be with addition of hard and blasphemous and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things which have been said in colors which shall be shocking to the imaginations and moving to the passions of those who have either too little capacity or too much confidence of the opinions. They have imbibed and contempt of the contrary to try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination. Or difficulties may be stated and insisted on, which do not belong to the controversy because let them be more or less real and hard to be resolved. They are not what are owing to anything distinguishing of the scheme from that of the Armenians and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the former and adhering to the latter. Or some particular things may be picked out which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the generality. And these may be glossed and discounted on with tart and contemptuous words and from thence the whole discourse may be treated with triumph and insult. It is easy to see how the decision of most of the points in controversy between Calvinists and Armenians depends on the determination of this grand article concerning the freedom of the will requisite to moral agency. And that by clearing and established in the Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the chief arguments are obviated by which Armenian doctrines in general are supported and the contrary doctrines demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest that God's moral government over mankind is treating them as moral agents, making them the objects of His commands, counsels, calls, warnings, expostulations, promises, threatening, rewards and punishments is not inconsistent with a determining disposal of all events of every kind throughout the universe in His providence, either by positive efficiency or permission. Indeed, such a universal determining providence infers some kind of necessity of all events, such a necessity as implies an infallible previous fixedness of the futurity of the event, but no other necessity of moral events or volitions of intelligent agents is needful in order to this than moral necessity, which does as much ascertain the futurity of the event as any other necessity. But as has been demonstrated, such a necessity is not at all repugnant to moral agency and a reasonable use of commands, calls, rewards, punishments, etc. Yet not only are objections of this kind against the doctrine of an universal determining providence removed by what has been said, but the truth of such a doctrine is demonstrated as it has been demonstrated that the futurity of all future events is established by previous necessity, either natural or moral. So it is not a test that the sovereign creator and disposer of the world has ordered this necessity by ordering his own conduct, either indesignedly acting or forebearing to act. Whereas the being of the world is from God, so the circumstances in which it had its being at first both negative and positive must be ordered by Him in one of these ways, and all the necessary consequences of these circumstances must be ordered by Him. In God's active and positive interpositions after the world was created and the consequences of these interpositions, also every instance of his forebearing to interpose and the sure consequences of this forbearance must all be determined according to his pleasure. And therefore every event, which is the consequence of anything whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or circumstances, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence must be ordered of God, either by a designing efficiency and interposition, or a design forbearance to operate or interpose. But as has been proved, all events whatsoever are necessarily connected with something foregoing, either positive or negative, which is the ground of its existence. It follows therefore that the whole series of events is thus connected with something in the state of things, either positive or negative, which is original in the series. That is something which is connected with nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate conduct, either his acting or forebearing to act. From whence it follows that as God designedly orders his own conduct and its connected consequences, it must necessarily be that he designedly orders all things. The things which have been said obviate some of the chief objections of Armenians against the Calvinistic doctrine of the total depravity and corruption of man's nature, whereby his heart is holy under the power of sin, and he is utterly unable without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believing Christ or do anything that is truly good and acceptable in God's sight. For the main objection against this doctrine that it is inconsistent with the freedom of man's will, consisting in indifference and self-determining power, because it supposes man to be under a necessity of sinning, and that God requires things of him in order to his avoiding eternal damnation, which he is unable to do, and that this doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the sincerity of counsels, invitations, etc. Now, this doctrine supposes no other necessity of sinning than a moral necessity which, as has been shown, does not at all excuse sin, and supposes no other inability to obey any command or perform any duty, even the most spiritual and exalted, but a moral inability which, as has been proved, does not excuse persons in the non-performance of any good thing or make them not to be the proper objects of commands, counsels, and invitations. And, moreover, it has been shown that there is not and never can be, either in existence or so much as in idea, any such freedom of will consisting in indifference and self-determination for the sake of which this doctrine of original sin is cast out, and that no such freedom is necessary in order to the nature of sin and a just dessert of punishment. The things which have been observed do also take off the main objections of Armenians against the doctrine of the efficacious grace, and at the same time prove the grace of God in a sinner's conversion, if there be any grace or divine influence in the affair to be efficacious, yay, and irresistible to if by irresistible is meant that which is attended with a moral necessity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by any resistance. The main objection of Armenians against this doctrine is that it is inconsistent with their self-determining freedom of will, and that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue that it should be wrought in the heart by the determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its being owing to self-moving power, that in that case the good which is wrought would not be our virtue, but rather God's virtue, because not the person in whom it is wrought is the determining author of it, but God that wrought it in him. But the things which are the foundation of these objections have been considered, and it has been demonstrated that the liberty of moral agents does not consist in self-determining power, and that there is no need of any such liberty in order to the nature of virtue, or does it at all hinder, but that the state or act of the will may be the virtue of the subject, though it be not from self-determination, but the determination of an intrinsic cause, even so as to cause the event to be morally necessary to the subject of it. As it has been proved that nothing in the state or acts of the will of man is contingent, but that on the contrary every event of this kind is necessary by a moral necessity, and has also been now demonstrated that the doctrine of an universal determining providence follows from that doctrine of necessity, which was proved before, although that God does decisively in his providence order all the volitions of moral agents, either by positive influence or permission, and it being allowed on all hands that what God does in the affair of man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or less is by some positive influence, not by mere permission as in the affair of a sinful volition. If we put these things together it will follow that God's assistance or influence must be determining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of the event, and so that God gives virtue, holiness, and conversion to sinners by an influence which determines the effect in such a manner that the effect will infallibly follow by a moral necessity, which is what Calvinists mean by efficacious and irresistible grace. The things which have been said do likewise answer the chief objections against the doctrine of God's universal and absolute decree and afford infallible proof of this doctrine and of the doctrine of absolute eternal personal election in particular. The main objections against these doctrines are that they infer a necessity of the volitions of moral agents and of the future moral state and acts of men and so are not consistent with those eternal rewards and punishments which are connected with conversion and impenitence. There can be made to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the precepts, calls, councils, warnings and expostulations of the word of God or with the various methods and means of grace which God uses with sinners to bring them to repentance. And the whole of that moral government which God exercises towards mankind and that they infer an inconsistence between the secret and revealed will of God and make God the author of sin. But all these things have been obviated in their preceding discourse and the certain truth of these doctrines concerning God's eternal purposes will follow from what was just now observed concerning God's universal providence. How it infallibly follows from what has been proved that God orders all events and the volitions of moral agents amongst others by such a decisive disposal that the events are infallibly connected with his disposal. For if God disposes all events so that the infallible exemptions of the events is decided by his providence, then doubtless he thus orders and decides all things knowingly and on design. God does not do what he does nor orders what he orders accidentally and unawares either without or beside his intention. And if there be a foregoing design of doing and ordering as he does, this is the same with a purpose or decree. And as it has been shown that nothing is new to God in any respect, but all things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity. Hence it will follow that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views or appearances, but are all eternal purposes. And as it has been now shown how the doctrine of determining efficacious grace certainly follows from things proved in the foregoing discourse, hence will necessarily follow the doctrine of particular eternal absolute election. For if men are made true saints, no otherwise than as God makes them so, and distinguishes them from others by his efficacious power and influence that decides and fixes the event. And God thus makes some saints and not others on design or purpose and, as has been now observed, no designs of God are new. It follows that God thus distinguished from others all that ever become true saints by his eternal design or decree. I might also show how God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree and how such a decree can be proved to a demonstration from it, but that this discourse may not be linked out too much. That must be omitted for the present. From these things it will inevitably follow that however Christ in some sense may be said to die for all and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the whole world by his death. Yet there must be something particular in the design of his death with respect to such as he intended should actually be saved thereby as appears by what has been now shown. God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in his proper absolute design and of a certain number only and therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in anything God does in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect and giving Christ to die and prosecute such a design with respect to no other most strictly speaking for it is impossible that God should prosecute any other design than only such as he has. God certainly does not in the highest propriety and strictness of speech pursue a design that he has not and indeed such a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge as from that of the decree for it is as impossible in strictness of speech that God should prosecuted design or aim at a thing which he at the same time most perfectly knows will not be accomplished as that he should use endeavors for that which is beside his decree. Other things which have been proved are obviated some of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible and necessary perseverance of saints and some of the main foundations of this doctrine are established. The main prejudices of Armenians against this doctrine seem to be these, they suppose such a necessary infallible perseverance to be repugnant to the freedom of the will that it must be owing to man's own self determining power. He first becomes virtuous and holy. And so in like manner it must be left the thing contingent to be determined by the same freedom of will, whether he will persevere in virtue and holiness. And that otherwise his continuing steadfast faith and obedience would not be his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and rewardable, nor could his perseverance be properly the matter of divine commands, councils and promises, nor as apostasy we properly threaten and then warned against it. Whereas we find all these things in scripture there we find steadfastness and perseverance and true Christianity represented as the virtue of the saints spoken of as praiseworthy in them and glorious rewards promise to it. And also find that God makes it the subject of his commands, councils and promises, and the contrary of threatenings and warnings, but the foundation of these objections has been removed by showing that moral necessity and infallible certainty of events is not inconsistent with these things. And that as to freedom of will, lying in the power of the will to determine itself, there neither is any such thing or is there any need of it in order to virtue, reward, commands, councils, etc. And as the doctrines of applications grace and absolute election do certainly follow from the things proved in a preceding discourse. So some of the main foundations of the doctrine of perseverance are thereby established. If the beginning of true faith and holiness, and a man becoming a true saint at first does not depend on the self determining power of the will, but on the determining efficacious grace of God, it may well be argued that it is also with respect to men being continued saints or persevering in faith and holiness, the conversion of a center being not owing to a man's self determination but to God's determination and eternal election, which is absolute and depending on the sovereign will of God, and not on the free will of man as is evident from what has been said it being very evident from the scriptures that the eternal election of saints to faith and holiness is also an election of them to eternal salvation hence their appointment to salvation must also be absolute and not depending on their contingent self determining will. From all which it follows that it is absolutely fixed in God's decree that all true saints shall persevere to actual eternal salvation. But I must leave all these things to the consideration of the impartial reader, and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propose it to his consideration whether many of the first reformers and others that succeeded them whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his church and the greatest instruments of their deliverance from terror and darkness, and of the support of the cause of piety among them have not been injured in the contempt with which they have been treated by many late writers for their teaching and maintaining such doctrines as are commonly called Calvinistic. Indeed, some of these new writers at the same time that they have represented the doctrines of these ancient and eminent divines, as in the highest degree ridiculous and contrary to common sense in an ostentation of a very generous charity have allowed that they were honest well meaning men. Yeah, it may be some of them as though it were in great condescension and compassion to them have allowed that they did pretty well for the day in which they lived and considering the great disadvantages they labored under when at the same time their manner of speaking has naturally and plainly suggested to the minds of their readers that they were persons who through the lowness of their genius and the greatness of that bigotry with which their minds were shackled and their thoughts confined living in the gloomy caves of superstition. Finally embraced and demurely and zealously taught the most absurd silly and monstrous opinions worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen possessed of that noble and generous freedom of thought, which happily prevails in this age of light and inquiry. When indeed such is the case that we might if so disposed speak as big words as they and on far better grounds and really all the Armenians on earth might be challenged without arrogance or vanity to make these principles of theirs wherein they mainly differ from their fathers whom they so much despise consistent with common sense. Yeah, and perhaps to produce any doctrine ever embraced by the blindest bigot of the church of Rome or the most ignorant muscle man or extravagant enthusiast that might be reduced to more demonstrable inconsistencies and and repugnances to common sense and to themselves, though their inconsistencies indeed may not lie so deep or be so artfully veiled by a deceitful ambiguity of words and an indeterminate signification of phrases that will not deny that these gentlemen, many of them are coming of great abilities and have been helped to hire attainments in philosophy than those ancient divines and have done great service to the church of God in some respects, but I humbly concede that they're differing from their fathers with such magisterial assurance and these points in divinity must be owing to some other cause than superior wisdom. It may also be worthy of consideration whether the great alteration which has been made in the state of things in our nation and some other parts of the Protestant world in this and the past age by exploding so generally Calvinistic doctrines and alteration so often spoken at as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the friends of truth and understanding and virtue as an instance of that great increase of light in the Christian church be indeed a happy change owing to any such cause as an increase of truth knowledge and understanding in the things of religion, or whether there is not reason to fear that it may be owing to some and I desire it may be considered whether the boldness of some writers may not deserve to be reflected on who have not scrupled to say that if these and those things are true which yet appear to be the demonstrable dictates of reason as well as the certain dictates of the mouth of the most high and God is unjust and cruel and guilty of manifest to see and double dealing and the like. Yay some have gone so far as confidently to assert that if any book which pretends to be scripture teaches such doctrines that alone is sufficient warrant for mankind to reject it as what cannot be the word of God. Some who have not gone so far have said that if the scripture seems to teach any such doctrines so contrary to reason we are obliged to find out some other interpretation of those texts where such doctrines seem to be exhibited. Others express themselves yet more modestly they express a tenderness and religious fear less they should receive and teach anything that should seem to reflect on God's moral character or be a disparagement to his methods of administration and his moral government and therefore express themselves as not daring to embrace some doctrines though they seem to be delivered in scripture according to the more obvious and natural construction of the words. But indeed it would show a true or modest in humility if they would more entirely rely on God's wisdom and discernment who knows infinitely better than we what is agreeable to his own perfections and never intended to leave these matters to the decision of the wisdom and discernment of men. The truth of the case is that if the scripture plainly taught the opposite doctrines to those that are so much stumbled at these the Armenian doctrine of free will and others depending there on it would be the greatest of all difficulties but attend the scriptures incomparably greater than it's containing any even the most mysterious of those doctrines of the first reformers which are late free thinkers have so super ciliously exploded. Indeed it is a glorious argument of the divinity of the holy scriptures that they teach such doctrines which in one age and another through the blindness of men's minds and strong prejudices of the hearts are rejected as most absurd and unreasonable by the wise and great men of the world which yet when they are most carefully and strictly examined appear to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstrable certain and natural dictates of reason by such things it appears that the foolishness of God is wiser than men first Corinthians one nineteen twenty for it is written I will destroy the wisdom of the wise I will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent where is the wise where is the scribe whereas the dispute of this world have not God made foolish the wisdom of this world and as it was in time past so probably it will be in time to come as it is also written verses twenty seven through twenty nine but God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise and God have chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty and base things of the world and things which are despised have God chosen gay and things which are not to bring to not things that are that no flesh should go in his presence. Amen. In the part for section 14 part for section 15 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this Libra box recording is in the public domain appendix section 15 containing remarks on the essays on the principles of morality and natural religion in a letter to a minister of the church of Scotland Reverend sir the intimations you have given me of the use which has by some been made of what I've written on the freedom of the will etc to vindicate what is said on the subject of liberty and necessity by the author of the essays on the principles of morality and natural religion as occasion my reading this office essay on that subject with particular care and attention and I think it must be evident to everyone that has read both his essay and my inquiry that our schemes are exceedingly different from each other. The white difference appears particularly in the following things. This author supposes that such a necessity takes place with respect to all men's actions as is inconsistent with liberty and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting. Thus page 168 after he had been speaking of the necessity of our determinations as connected with motives he concludes with saying in short if motives are not under our power or direction which is confessively the fact we can at bottom have no liberty. In other words I have abundantly expressed it as my mind that man in his more actions has true liberty and that the moral necessity which universally takes place is not in the least inconsistent with anything that is properly called liberty and with the utmost liberty that can be desired or that can possibly exist or be conceived of. I find that some are apt to think that in that kind of moral necessity of men's volitions which I suppose to be universal at least some degree of liberty denied that though it be true I allow a sort of liberty yet those who maintain a self determining power in the will and a liberty of contingents and indifference hold a higher sort of freedom than I do but I think this is certainly a great mistake. Liberty as I have explained it is the power opportunity or advantage that anyone has to do as he pleases or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable and I think has been demonstrated that no necessity of men's volitions that I maintain is inconsistent with this liberty and I think it is impossible for anyone to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than this. If any imagine they desire and that they conceive of a higher and greater liberty than this they are deceived and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words instead of ideas. If anyone should hear it say yes I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducting himself in any respect as he pleases. These are liberty of choosing as he pleases such and one if he reflected would either blush or laugh at his own proposal for is not choosing as he pleases conducting himself in some respect according to his pleasure and still without determining how he came by that pleasure. If he says yes I came by that pleasure by my own choice. If he be a man of common sense by this time he will see his own absurdity for he must need see that his notional conception even of this liberty does not contain any judgment or conception how he comes by that choice which first determines his pleasure or which originally fixed his own will respecting the affair. For Vinnie shall say that a man exercises liberty in this even in determining his own choice but not as he pleases or not in consequence of any choice preference or inclination of his own. But by determination arising contingently out of a state of absolute indifference this is not rising higher in his conception of liberty as such a determination of the will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing something not according to his own choice or from his choice has not a higher notion of it than he that places it in doing as he pleases or acting from his own election. If there were a power in the mind to determine itself but not by its choice or according to its pleasure what advantage would it give and what liberty worth contending for would be exercised in it. Therefore no Armenian, Pelagian or Epicurean can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than the notion of it which I have explained which notion is perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men's actions which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion or form a higher imagination of liberty. Let them talk of sovereignty of the will self determining power self motion self direction arbitrary decision liberty and ultra me was power of choosing differently in given cases etc etc as long as they will. It is apparent that these men in their strenuous dispute about these things aim at they know not what fighting for something they have no conception of substituting a number of confused unmeaning words instead of things and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have but they never can answer the challenge. The author of the essays through his whole essay on liberty and necessity goes on the supposition that in order to the being of real liberty and man must have a freedom that is opposed to moral necessity. In Yeti supposes page 175 that such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting without an against motives a power of acting without any view purpose of design and even of acting in contradiction to our own desires and aversions and to all our principles of action. And is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with the rational nature. Now whoever imagines such a liberty is this a higher sort or degree of freedom than a liberty of following one's own views and purposes and acting agreeably to his own inclinations and passions who will ever reasonably suppose that a liberty which is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with the rational nature is about that which is consistent with the nature of rational intelligent designing agent. The author of the essay seems to suppose such a necessity to take place as is inconsistent with some supposable power of arbitrary choice or that there is some liberty conceivable where by men's own actions might be more properly in their power and by which events might be more dependent on ourselves. Contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my enquiry what way can be imagined of our actions being more in our power from ourselves or dependent on ourselves and their being from our power to fulfill our own choice to act from our own inclination pursue our own views and execute our own designs. Certainly to be able to act this is as properly having our actions in our power and dependent on ourselves as a being liable to be the subject of acts and events contingently and fortuitously without desire view purpose or design or any principle of action within ourselves as we must be according to this author's own declared sense. If our actions are performed with that liberty that is opposed to moral necessity. This author seems everywhere to suppose that necessity, most properly so called attends all men's actions, and that the terms necessary unavoidable impossible etc are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In page 173 he says the idea of necessary and unavoidable equally agrees both to moral and physical necessity and in page 184 all things that fall out in the natural and moral world are alike necessary. Page 174 this inclination and choice is unavoidable caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the necessity of our actions that in such circumstances it was impossible we could act otherwise. He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere speaking in strong terms of men's actions as unavoidable, but they cannot forbear having no power over their own actions, the order of them being unalterably fixed and inseparably linked together etc. On the contrary, I've largely declared that the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills which is called moral necessity is called by the name of necessity improperly, and that all such terms as most cannot impossible enable irresistible unavoidable invincible etc when applied here are not applied in their proper signification and are either used nonsensically and with perfect insignificance or in a sense quite diverse from their original improper meaning and their use in common speech and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's will is more properly called certainty than necessity, it being no other than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence. Agreeably to what is observed in my inquiry. I think it is evidently owing to a strong prejudice arising from an insensible habitual perversion and misapplication of such like terms as necessary and possible unable unavoidable invincible etc that they are ready to think that to suppose a certain connection of men's volitions without any foregoing motives or inclinations or any preceding moral influence whatsoever is truly improperly to suppose a strong irrefragable chain of causes and effects as stand in the way and makes utterly vain opposite desires and endeavors like immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass and impeds art liberty like walls of adamant gates of brass and bars of iron whereas all such representations suggest ideas as far from the truth as the east is from the west nothing that I maintain supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity from doing and even willing and choosing as they please with full freedom yet with the highest degree of liberty that ever it was thought of or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive I know it is in vain to endeavor to make some persons believe this or at least fully and steadily to believe it for it be demonstrated to them still the old prejudice remains which has been long fixed by the use of the terms necessary must cannot impossible etc the association with these terms of certain ideas inconsistent with liberty is not broken and the judgment is powerfully warped by it as a thing that has been long dead in the event and grown stiff if it be straightened will return to its former currency again and again the author of the essays most manifestly supposes that if men have the truth concerning the real necessity of all their actions clearly in view they would not appear to themselves or one another as at all praise worthy or culpable or under any moral obligation or accountable for their actions which proposes that men are not to be blamed or praise for any of their actions and are not under any obligations are truly accountable for anything they do by reason of this necessity, which is very contrary to what I have endeavored to prove throughout the third part of my inquiry. I believe it is there shown that this is so far from the truth that the moral necessity of men's actions, which truly take place is requisite to the being of virtue and vice or anything praise worthy or culpable that the liberty of indifference and contingent which is advanced in opposition to that necessity is inconsistent with the being of these. I suppose that men are not determined and what they do by any virtuous or vicious principles nor act for many motives and tensions or aims whatsoever, or have any and either good or bad in acting. And is it not remarkable that this author should suppose that in order to men's actions truly having any dessert, they must be performed without any view purpose design or desire or any principle of action or anything agreeable to a rational nature as it will appear that he does if we compare pages 206 207 with page 175. The author of the essay supposes that God has deeply implanted the man's nature of strong and invincible apprehension or feeling as he calls it of a liberty and contingent of his own actions opposite to that necessity which truly attends them in which in truth does not agree with real fact is not agreeable to strict philosophical truth is contradictory to the truth of things in which truth contradicts not tallying with the real plan and that therefore such feelings are deceitful and are in reality of the delusive kind. He speaks to them as a wise delusion as nice artificial feelings merely that conscience may have a commanding power, meaning plainly that these feelings are a cunning artifice of the author of nature to make men believe they are free when they are not. He supposes that by these feelings, the moral world has a disguised appearance, etc. He supposes that all self-approbation and all remorse of conscience, all commendation or condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of dessert and all that is connected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which are present are suggested by the words ought should arise from this delusion and would entirely vanish without it. All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly insisted on and endeavour to demonstrate in my inquiry and where I have largely shown that it is agreeable to the natural sense of mankind that the moral necessity or certainty that attends men's actions is consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment, and that it is agreeable to our natural notions that moral evil with its dessert of dislike and abhorrence and all its other ill-deservings consist in a certain deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart and not in the evil of something else diverse from these supposed to be their cause or occasion. I might well ask here whether anyone is to be found in the world of mankind who is conscious to a sense or feeling naturally and deeply rooted in his mind that in order to a man's performing any action that is praised with your blame worthy he must exercise the liberty that implies and signifies a power of acting without any motive. View, design, desire or principle of action for such a liberty this author supposes that must be which is opposed to moral necessity as I have already observed. Supposing a man should actually do good independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle, and is it a dictative, invincible, natural sense that his act is more meritorious or praiseworthy than if he had performed it for some good in and had been governed in it by good principles and motives. And so I might ask on the contrary with respect to evil actions. The author of the essay supposes that the liberty without necessity of which we have a natural feeling implies contingence and speaking of this contingency sometimes calls it by the name of chance. And it is evident that his notion of it or rather what he says about it implies things happening loosely fortuitously by accident and without a cause. Now I can see the slightest reflection may be sufficient to satisfy anyone that such a contingence of men's actions according to our natural sense is so far from being essential to the morality or merit of those actions that it would destroy it. And that on the contrary, the dependence of our actions on such causes as inward inclinations, incitements and ends is essential to the being other natural sense teaches men when they see anything done by others about good or evil tendency to acquire what their intention was. What principles and views they were moved by in order to judge how far they are to be justified or condemned and not to determine that in order to their being approved or blamed at all. The action must be performed altogether fortuitously proceeding from nothing arising from no cause concerning this matter I have fully expressed my mind in the inquiry. If the liberty of which we have a natural sense as necessary to dessert consists in the mind self determination without being determined by previous inclination or motive. The same difference is essential to it. Yeah, absolute indifference as is observed in my inquiry. The men naturally have no notion of any such liberty as this as essential to the morality or demerit of their actions. But on the contrary, such a liberty if it were possible would be inconsistent with our natural notions of dessert, as is largely shown in the inquiry. This is due to natural sense that men must be indifferent in determining their own actions, then according to the same the more they are determined by inclination either good or bad, the less they have of dessert. The more good actions are performed from good disposition, the less praiseworthy, and the more evil deeds are from evil dispositions the less culpable. The more men's actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be commended or condemned, which all must know is very contrary to natural sense. More necessity is owing to the power and government of the inclination of the heart, either habitual or occasional excited by motive. But according to natural and common sense the more a man does anything with full inclination of heart, the more is it to be charged to his account for his condemnation, if it be an ill action, and the more to be ascribed to him for his praise, if it be good. If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingents from a state of indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or else the fault would be in being so perfectly indifferent that the mind was equally liable to a bad or good determination. And if this indifference be liberty then the very essence of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itself or the wickedness would primarily and summarily lie in being a free agent. If there were no fault in being indifferent then there would be no fault in the determination being agreeable to such a state of indifference. That is there could be no fault down that opposite determinations actually happen to take place in differently, sometimes good and sometimes bad as contingent governs and decides. And if it be a fault to be indifferent to good and evil then such indifference is no indifference to good and evil but is a determination to evil or to a fault. And such an indifferent disposition would be an evil disposition, tendency, or determination of mind so inconsistent of these notions of liberty as essential to praise or blame. The author of the essay supposes men's natural delusive sense of liberty can of contingents to be in truth the foundation of all the labor care and industry of mankind, and that if man's practical ideas have been formed on the plan of universal necessity, the Ignawa Ratio, the inactive doctrine of the Stoics would have followed and that there would have been no room for forethought about futurity or any sort of industry and care, plainly implying that in this case men would see and note that all their industry and care signified nothing was in vain and no purpose or of no benefit events being fixed in an irrefutable chain and not at all depending on their care and endeavor. As he explains himself particularly in the instance of men's use of means to prolong life, not only very contrary to what I largely maintain in my inquiry, but also very inconsistently with his own scheme and what he supposes of the ends for which God has so deeply implanted this deceitful feeling in man's nature in which he manifestly supposes men's care and industry not to be in vain and of no benefit but of great use of absolute necessity in order to they're obtaining the most important ends and necessary purposes of human life and to fulfill the ends of action to the best advantage as he largely declares. Now how shall these things be reconciled that if men had a clear view of real truth they would see that there was no room for their care and industry because they would see it to be in vain and of no benefit. And yet that God by having a clear view of real truth sees their being excited to care and industry will be of excellent use to mankind and greatly for the benefit of the world. And that therefore the great wisdom and goodness of God to men appears in artfully contriving to put them on care and industry for their good which good could not be obtained without them. And yet both these things are maintained at once and in the same sentences and words by this author. The very reason he gives why God has put this deceitful feeling into men contradicts and destroys itself that God in his great goodness to men gave them such a deceitful feeling because it was very useful and necessary for them and greatly for their benefit or excites them to care and industry for their own good which care and industry is useful and necessary to that end. And yet the very thing for which is a reason this great benefit of care and industry is given is God's deceiving men in this very point and making them think their care and industry to be of great benefit to them when indeed it is of none at all. And if they saw the real truth they would see all their endeavors to be wholly useless that there was no room for them and that the event does not at all depend upon them. And besides what this author says plainly implies as appears by what has been already observed that it is necessary men should be deceived by being made to believe that future events are contingent. And their own future actions free with such a freedom as signifies that their actions are not the fruit of their own desires or designs but altogether contingent fortuitous and without a cause. But how should a notion of liberty consisting in accident or lose chance encourage care and industry should think it would rather entirely discourage everything of this nature for surely if our actions do not depend on our desires and designs and they do not depend on our endeavors flowing from our desires and designs. This author himself seems to suppose that if men had indeed such a liberty of contingence it would render all endeavors to determine or move men's future religions in vain. He says that in this case to exhort to instruct to promise or to threaten would be to no purpose. Why because to see himself gives the reason then our will would be capricious and arbitrary and we should be thrown loose to all together and our arbitrary power could do as good or ill only by accident. But if such a loose fortuitous state would render vain others endeavors upon us for the same reason would it make useless our endeavors on ourselves for events that are truly contingent and accidental and altogether loose from an independent of all foregoing causes are independent on every foregoing cause within ourselves as well as in others. I suppose that it is so far from being true that our minds are naturally possessed with a notion of such liberty is this so strongly that it is impossible to root it out that indeed men have no such notion of liberty at all, and that it is utterly impossible by any means whatsoever to implant or introduce such a notion into the mind as no such notions as imply self contradiction and self abolition can subsist in the mind as I have shown in my inquiry. I think a mature sensible consideration of the matter is sufficient to satisfy anyone that even the greatest and most learned advocates themselves for liberty have no such notion and that indeed they mean something wholly inconsistent with and directly subversive of what they strenuously affirm and earnestly contend for by man having a power of determining his own will they plainly mean a power of determining his will as he pleases or as he chooses which supposes that the mind has a choice prior to his going about to confirm any action or determination to it. If they mean that they determine even the original or prime choice by their own pleasure or choice as the thing that causes and directs it. I scruple not most boldly to affirm that they speak they know not what and that of which they have no manner of idea because no such contradictory notion can come into or have a moments of assistance in the mind of any man living as an original or first choice being caused are brought into being by choice. After all they say they have no higher or other conception of liberty than that vulgar notion of it which I contend for these a man's having power or opportunity to do as he chooses. If they had a notion that every act of choice was determined by choice, yet it would destroy the notion of the contingents of choice for then no one act of choice would arise contingently or from a state of indifference but every individual act in all the series would arise from foregoing bias or preference and from a cause predetermining and fixing its existence which introduces at once such a chain of causes and effects each preceding link decisively fixing the following as they would by all means avoid. And such kind of delusion and self contradiction is this does not arise in men's minds by nature. It is not owing to any natural feeding which God is strongly fixed in the mind and nature of man but to false philosophy and strong prejudice from a deceitful abuse of words. It is artificial, not in the sense of the author of the essay supposing it to be a deceitful artificial God but artificial as opposed to natural and is owing to an artificial deceitful management of terms to darken and confound the mind. Men have no such thing when they first begin to exercise reason, they must have a great deal of time to blind themselves with metaphysical confusion before they can embrace and rest in such definitions of liberty as are given and imagine they understand them. On the whole, I humbly conceive that whosoever will give himself the trouble of weighing what I've offered to consideration in my inquiry must be sensible that such a moral necessity of men's actions as I maintain is not at all inconsistent with any liberty that any creature has or can have as a free accountable moral agent and subject to a moral government and that this moral necessity is so far from being inconsistent with praise and blame and the benefit and use of men's own care and labor that on the contrary it implies the very ground and reason why men's actions are to be ascribed to them as their own in such a manner as to infer dessert praise and blame and that it establishes the moral system of the universe and God's moral government in every respect with the proper use of motives, exhortations, commands, counsels, promises and threatenings and the use and benefit of endeavors, care and industry. There is therefore no need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all concealed, nor is there any danger in contemplation and profound discovery in these things so far from this that the truth in this matter is of vast importance and extremely needful to be known and the more clearly and perfectly the real fact is known and the more constantly it is indeed the better more particularly that the clear and and full knowledge of that which is the true system of the universe and these respects would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the true Christian scheme of divine administration in the city of God and the gospel of Jesus Christ in its most important articles. Indeed these things never can be well established and the opposite error so subversive of the whole gospel which at this day so greatly and generally prevail be well confuted or the arguments by which they are maintained answer till these points are settled. While this is not done it is to me beyond doubt that the friends of those great gospel truths will but poorly maintain their controversy with the adversaries of those truths. They will be obliged often to shuffle hide and turn their backs and the latter will have a strong fort from whence they never can be driven and weapons to use from which those whom they oppose will find no shield to screen themselves, and they will always puzzle confound and keep under the friends of sound doctrine and glory and vaunt themselves in their advantage over them and carry their affairs with a high hand as they have done already for a long time past. I conclude sir with asking your pardon for troubling you was so much in vindication of myself from the imputation of advancing a scheme of necessity, like that of the author of the essays on the principles of morality and natural religion. Considering that what I have said is not only in vindication of myself, but as I think of the most important articles of moral philosophy and religion, I trust in what I know of your candor that you will excuse your obliged friend and brother, J. Edwards, Stockbridge, July 25, 1757. End of Part 4, Section 15. End of The Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards.