 I have the pleasure of introducing the concluding panel, which will be chaired by Jean-Claude Trichet and will include Charles-Pine, Jean-Pizanie Ferri, Beatrice Véde Di Maro, and Vitor Constancio. We will have a panel discussion. André Sapir, I'm very sorry. André Sapir, who kindly agreed to step in. Apologies for that mistake. So the floor is yours. To see whether the microphone works, which seems to be the case. So as you can see, we changed the panel. We had a good reason for that, obviously the Brexit, and that the reason why we will concentrate on the reason why we do not have the same panel, namely Brexit. And we will try to concentrate on the European and world economy situation fallout after Brexit. So it's a very, very large scope issue. And it reminds me the story of those when I reflect on what has happened that very day of the votations on Brexit. The two gentlemen, British gentlemen that were in Scotland in a very remote area and were anxious to have the Financial Times to know what were the news. So they go in a newsstand and they say, Madam, could we have the Financial Times? And the lady surprisingly said, do you want today Financial Times? Or yesterday Financial Times? And to the extent that there were some kind of votations on Brexit or whatever. They said, well, we would prefer today's Financial Times. And the lady, very serene, said, gentlemen, if you want today's Financial Times, why don't you come back tomorrow? This surprise of the votations on Brexit has been really extraordinary. I have no memory, frankly speaking, of such big events that came against the polls, against the survey, against the smart money betting the day before and the very day of the votations and to have to say some kind of stupid faction of the rest of the world. But, OK, that is really history and an old story. But I think it's a very wise idea that the organizers and you, particularly Mr. Vice President, had to concentrate on this issue. It's a very complex one, obviously. And when I was reflecting on what we should cover, you should cover your members of the panel. I was thinking, first of all, I have a matrix with three columns, three lines. The lines are very short, medium, and long term. And the column could be followed for the real economy and the financial, I would say, situation in the UK, in EU, and in the world. That makes nine small squares. And then I would say the same, not for the real economy and for the financial situation, but for the political situation. Because it's obviously something which is extraordinarily important from the political standpoint. And I expect the four panelists to cover most of these squares. And of course, we will give the floor, if he wishes, to Charles first. After all, you are a brilliant citizen. You know better, sir. You know better. Please. OK, I'm going to start with a few words about the referendum campaign and the politics. Because that provides a background to the economics, which I'll try and say a few words about at the end. Now, the intent of this referendum was to try and deal with the longstanding divide within the Conservative Party, which has been split for a long time between those who support being in Europe and those who are more skeptic. But the effect of the referendum, instead of dealing with that divide, has actually been to expose divides across the country along many different dimensions. So if you look at the voting patterns as distinct divergences by region, Scotland voted in every local authority to remain, and Northern Ireland voted to remain. If you look at England and Wales, basically London and a strip out along the M4, a relatively prosperous corridor, voted to remain, pretty much everywhere else in England and Wales voting to leave. Splits by age, older voters much more likely to have voted to leave than the young by class. So the lower socioeconomic classes were more likely to vote to leave than the upper socioeconomic classes. That was equally true of educational attainment. So I think it's fair to say that my country today is anything but united. We should be called the disunited kingdom at the current juncture. And certainly the strong vote in Scotland to remain reopens the question of whether Scotland will leave the Union. I should say it was also a deeply disquieting campaign in many ways. There was a lot of misleading statistics used, facts which were not facts, exaggerated claims. And I have said this on both sides in the campaign fault there. It's not one alone. There were three primary themes, though, in the campaign. Firstly, the economic gains from membership of the EU, or more strictly, the economic costs from leaving, which they remain camp-focused most heavily on. And then the consequences of uncontrolled migration and associated with that the desire to reclaim sovereignty and control. Now in the end, it was the issues of migration and sovereignty that triumphed over the economic costs argument. There's just a couple of things I'll say here. First of all, on migration, just to give you a bit of sense of the numbers involved, roughly speaking in the UK at the moment, inward migratory flows are about 200,000 a year from the rest of the EU, about 200,000 a year from outside the EU. And then there's about 100,000 a year of UK nationals going in the other direction. And that's relative to a population of about 60 million, working population of a bit over 30 million. But of course, those migratory flows are not equally distributed across the country. And there is certainly a strong sense in those parts that were most affected that that migration was putting pressure on local services, competing for jobs locally, and so forth. It's worth saying, though, that the academic evidence, the serious research that had been done, certainly suggested that inflows from the European Union actually added to UK GDP per capita and that those inward migrants were actually a net fiscal benefit. Nevertheless, migration was a big issue. It is worth noting that it wasn't authorities which had high absolute levels of migrants that were most inclined to vote to leave, but it was those that had experienced rapid rises in the migrant share. And I think this is indicative of a key point, that it's when the environment is changing rapidly, that's when people start feeling that their environment is changing, they can't control what's happening, and so forth. The other thing I would say is that there was a fairly remarkable sort of disparaging of expert analysis. There was particularly a notable comment by Michael Gove, dismissing experts, saying nobody wants to hear from the experts now when a journalist on a newspaper program listed all of the experts and heads of this, that and the other institution, who'd come out saying how big the cost of leaving would be. And I think this reveals an important lack of general trust in decision makers and elites on the part of large sways of the population who haven't seen incomes rise much, jobs more precarious. The elites fail to predict the financial crisis. They've seen the bankers rescued. They've seen a small number of people getting away with most of the proceeds of growth. So there's that general discontent bubbling away. Now going forward, what happens next? First, both the key political parties are in a state of turmoil. Nothing much of substance can happen until there's a new prime minister in place in the autumn. What then? Several people here over the last couple of days have said to me, well, you're not really going to trigger Article 50, IU, which would set the withdrawal process in place. The answer is it probably will be triggered, but not necessarily. In the UK, parliament is sovereign. The referendum doesn't have any legal basis constitutionally. It's purely advisory. But Cameron did commit when he announced the referendum that the government would respect the outcome of that referendum, whichever way it went. So there's a very strong moral obligation to act on it. And as far as I can see, the only way of not ending up triggering Article 50 is if a party stands, say, at a general election explicitly on a platform of not taking us out or promises a second referendum, which subsequently reverses the earlier results. So either way, there's been a new plebiscite which overrides the earlier plebiscite. A key point, though, about the referendum is it wasn't a choice between option A and option B. It was basically between option A and option not A. And we've ended up choosing not A, with it being unclear exactly what the alternative is meant to be. Now, as far as trading relations go, there's a spectrum of possibilities running from the so-called Norwegian model, which involves being a member of the European Economic Area, and really very close to what we have at the moment, but just with the absence of any say in the decision-making capacity of the European Union. And then through things like the Canadian model, which has a free trade arrangement with the EU, took seven years or so to negotiate, right through to just being a regular member of the World Trade Organization. Now, the levers promised to maintain good trade access, but at the same time as limiting migration. And the trouble is that access to the single market is at present, at least, inconsistent with imposing some restrictions or controls on the mobility of labor. So those negotiating exit terms are going to need to accept there are trade-offs here. And those trade-offs are going to have to be managed. Parliament is going to need to endorse whatever point on that trade-off the UK is seeking. Clearly, the Norwegian model doesn't satisfy the key requirement of many of those who voted for leave of giving control over migration. But it might possibly serve as a staging post to one of the other options. Now, I'm out of time at this point, but I know André is going to talk a little bit more about what those various models mean. And during the general discussion, I can talk a bit about monetary policy responses if people want. I never observed such a timely exposition. You terminated exactly at 10. Mind you, I had another three pages to talk about. I could not see looking at your watch. So I'm absolutely amazed. Oh, it's over there. Oh, it's over there. It's flashing at me going red. It's in my timer, too, as you could hear. So thank you so much. I was struck by what you said on the rapidity of the changes, which is the main problem. And I was reflecting our people are infuriated because everything goes too rapidly. Globalization, technological changes and surges, even aging of the population. I turn to Beatrice. Beatrice, perhaps you would concentrate a little bit on the 27th and on the 19th. And what's left behind, if I may? Please, you have the floor. Thank you. Yes, my pleasure. The left behind ones, how are we coping? Well, one way to cope is with dry humor, which is why we love the bridge so much. Another way of coping, and this is what I did on Friday, I looked for some ancient consolation and found it, if you think this is consolation. But of course, what we are facing is the danger or the fear that there may be a danger of further disintegration that is not only concerning the British. So how are we coping? When I read the German press these days, there are two camps, and this does not only concern Germany. One camp says, stay calm. Let's contain the spillovers. Not jump to hasty conclusions. And more importantly, in the words of a senior leader from Europe, not German, the lesson from Brexit will not be if it happens that we need more closer union, but implied in that rather less. And the other camp is saying, this is the wake-up call. The wake-up call that was possibly needed because there are many things that especially the Eurozone needs to do. And we have been debating them for several years now. There are many proposals out there. This is the moment to make the EU slash. I'm putting here Eurozone because most of these proposals concern the Eurozone, more robust, complete the architecture. Now, of course, when you have two camps like that, one of the danger is that they may entrench over the next weeks and start engaging each other rather than moving. And therefore, one of the dangers may be that reforms, if they come, are too little and too late. Well, I am certainly belong to the camp of those who think that the reforms that the Eurozone already needed before are needed even more so now. And I'm also in the fortunate situation to have in this room quite a number of co-authors with whom we have made a proposal that I want to briefly outline here. It starts from two reforms or two sort of long-run desirabilities that are quite easy to agree on. On the one hand side, the Eurozone should have a fiscal regime that contains a credible commitment device which prevents excess debt, build up both public debt and assumption of private debt. And the financial regime, which is diversified and not vulnerable to own sovereign risk, so default in the sovereign could actually be absorbed. And the delinking between banks and sovereigns is achieved. And therefore, these two types of long-run features should be compatible with each other. So at this very general level, a lot of people would agree. We have made this more specific in a report that was very recently published by CPR called Monitoring the Eurozone 2. And here are some of the co-authors. Many of them, as I said, in the room. What is the concrete translation of these long-run principles? Well, a fiscal regime in which the ESM lending policies set clear limits to how much can be lent into doubtful debt dynamics. And these should be limits that are inside the boundaries of what the IMF has set, so as not to have a conflict between IMF and ESM, as we're witnessing just now. This should help set credible limits for preventing the accumulation of excess debt. But there also should be complemented by a mechanism that helps deal with debt crisis should they occur. This is what more of the lawyers and American type of thinking tend to be around sovereign insolvency regimes. It's how to deal with them when they occur. Complementary with that, a financial regime which has sovereign risk rates, includes sovereign risk rates on capital requirements for banks consistent with the ESM parameters, regulatory incentives to hold a diversified portfolio on sovereign debt, and again, regulatory incentives to create private safe assets through pooling and tranching. This is the shortest way I was able to summarize this. The long way is available on the CPR website. Now, the third element of this is very important. And this is the element that is very often missing in proposals, and that's the problem of transition. Even if we agree that those are desirable long-run reforms, the question is how to get there. And it's also hard to dispute that if these were implemented tomorrow, they would be destabilizing rather than stabilizing. Implementing sovereign risk rates right now is not gonna help in the present situation, but this was already the argument a few months ago and actually two years ago, and people would say also two years from now, if as long as we are living with excess debt, as long as we have a debt over hand. So this is the transition problem and that's the third element that in our view needs to be addressed. There are quite a number of ways of addressing the attitudes towards the transition problem that are not productive. I'm listing some here. So we are suggesting that they need to be addressed at the same time, solve the transition problem and implement the reform simultaneously. And the way that we are suggesting the transition problem could be solved, respecting the no mutualization of legacy debt red line is through a one-time operation that would bring all countries in the Eurozone out of the zone of vulnerability in one step. It's not easy to do this. It would be a buyback operation which can be funded through a capitalization of a long-run income stream. This could be fed by different sources depending on the countries. There could be some transfer element in it. We have done in the various reports different simulations and so if you're interested, this is all available. It could even have some element of debt equity swap with the GDP index bonds as a result which may have some desirable stabilization features for the future. Now that I've given this little outline and of this particular proposal, the question is, is this enough? Would it have prevented the Brexit years from voting for Brexit? And the answer is obviously not because it concerns the Eurozone. It doesn't concern the EU. There are also missing elements in this or elements that some people think would need to also be included in the Eurozone proposal. So this one here does not include a solution for non-performing loans. There is no inbuilt fiscal stabilization function. I mean, in that sense, this proposal is a, what we would, I tend to think let's do a old control reset or control delete and then start with a better program. That's the kind of thinking behind the deleting part is of course the excess debt. But faced with Brexit and faced with a situation that we are seeing right now, it sort of becomes obvious that there are deeper issues that are not only, even not only in the Eurozone or in Europe, I mean, there are also concerned countries mostly advanced countries outside Europe or the EU. I would include also Switzerland and those deeper issues concerning political and socioeconomic shifts that we have probably not paid enough attention to. There are profound misunderstandings, obviously in the population about what Brussels actually does, a can and its size. So how come that we have not been able to educate better? Then there is this rise of populism on left and right and I was very recently at a conference where this was discussed in a very extensive form and with a lot of very, very good people. And there I was called attention to a new, something I had not known about, the precarious, the new dangerous class, something that I've been reading and I actually recommend, not because I share the conclusions, but because I think this mangy standing here has identified a problem and analyzes the problem of uncertainty, of economic uncertainty in different groups of the population and it's not a well-identified class, it's not just the losers of globalization or the working poor, it's much, much deeper and broader at the same time than that. And I think we have to start understanding, very much in the sense like you were doing Charlie, what are the causes of people going to the left and right populist movements and to the extent that they are economic insecurity, there is something that we should be able to do about it. So my conclusion is even we macroeconomists cannot ignore these risks any longer. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Beatrice. We turn to André, you have the floor, André. Thank you very much, Jean-Claude. Thanks for the invitation to speak. I will address two issues, one that relates to what Charlie discussed, the relationship between the UK and the EU and one that relates to what Beatrice just discussed. What about the remaining 27 countries? Now, as far as the relationship between the EU and the UK is concerned, I think factually, there are basically five options and obviously a number of variants around those options. But the five options, without taking into account the politics as number one, in the end the UK does remain in the EU. I think it's potentially a option. The other extreme is the WTO option. The UK leaves the union, there's no special relationship between the UK and the EU. It's just one country among all the WTO members and that's what is our relationship with the EU. More interesting is what are the intermediate options? I think there are three intermediate options. One, Charlie already discussed this famous Norway option, being a member of the European Economic Area. What does it mean in terms of the single market? It means that the UK would have full access and full participation in the single market. It would have to bear a full responsibility for adopting all of the EU regulation or maintain all the EU regulation that are necessary for the functioning of the single market, but it would get the full access. But it would mean obviously full access goes both ways. It includes free mobility of labour. In the case of Norway, in the case of Liechtenstein, in the case of Iceland, those three countries that are part of the EU together with the EU countries, there is free mobility of good services, capital and labour. They are fully members of the single market except for fisheries and agriculture and they also obviously do not participate in the common commercial policy. The UK would have its own commercial policy vis-à-vis third countries. With a free trade with the EU, but as far as its relation with other countries, it would need to have its own relationship. So that's the Norway case. Seems to me that if the UK decided in the end to actually leave the EU, the Norway situation would be very difficult politically. So if the politics in the UK, if the politics in the UK would have said, we don't want to be members of the EU, it seems to me the politics would not want to be a member of the EA because there would be free mobility of labour. There would be participation basically in the EU budget. It's not called EU budget, but it's called something else, but it would have to make contribution to some fund that would essentially amount to participation into the EU budget. But the great advantage, obviously, as far as most of the people in this room is concerned, is that they would be passporting right. London would continue to be exactly in the same situation as far as the EU access is concerned as it is today. Second option is the famous Swiss option. What is the Swiss option? It's a little bit less access to the single market than it is the case for the Norway option. For instance, Swiss banks do not have passporting rights. There is free mobility of labour between Switzerland and the EU at the moment, but we know that the Swiss voted against this free mobility of labour to continue, and therefore it's not even clear that the Swiss option is a viable option even between the EU and Switzerland for the longer term. Third option is the Canadian option. The Canadian option is a free trade area, a free trade area in goods and in services, but it's not participation in the single market. It's certainly not adoption of EU rules and not adopting EU rules means it doesn't give full access to the single market. So there is free trade in goods and in services, but not to the same extent as if you were in the EA, and again, it would mean that as far as London is concerned, there would be no passporting rights. Now, if you ask me what is my expectation, even though I don't want to get into the UK politics about what will happen, I would say either the UK in the end will decide to remain in the EU and will remain in the EU as it was a member a year ago on those terms, not on the terms that had been negotiated in February, or I think the relationship will go to a Canadian model. I don't think that the EA model, nor the Swiss model, would be viable if the UK decided to leave the EU. Again, this is a purely domestic matter for the UK. Second issue, what about the other countries, the remaining countries, the 27? Now, my starting point as Beatrice is that indeed, I think we do need to read this vote in the light of a broader trend, and which means a rejection of the elite. I think there is nothing that is proper here about rejection of the EU of Brussels. I think it's as much a rejection of London or as the situation in the United States is a rejection of the elites and the rejection of Washington. So I think there is this broad trend that we are observing across the two sides of the Atlantic. Now, it doesn't mean that we in Europe should not listen to this call. Certainly the European project is always some weakness, some potential weakness, and I think that we need in Europe to be especially vigilant about those calls. And I don't think that we can only say that it's a question of putting the national houses in order. Obviously countries at the national level need to do things much better and to conduct both their politics and their economics much, much better. But after all, we are members of a European Union. And I think that means something. So that means that there is a common house. So it's not just putting the national houses in order. I think it's also putting a united house in order. Now, what does that mean in practical terms? I see two areas where there is a need, indeed for more union. I don't want to say more Europe, for more union. One is in the area of economic and monetary union. I think Beatrice, you put forward some ideas. I like to stick for the moment, basically to the blueprint that was put forward by the five presidents, by Mr. Junker and five presidents, including Mario Draghi. Seems to me that this blueprint that at the moment is not receiving much attention is essentially what we need to do. And I think what we heard from Adair this morning goes in the right direction. I don't know whether the EU needs to be a closer political union, but I'm convinced at this stage that the euro area needs to have more political union. And that means indeed the two elements of greater responsibility and greater solidarity. I do think that in the area of monetary union, if we do not move towards more political union, and again we can discuss exactly what we mean by political union, maybe a more modest, obviously political union than what we have elsewhere, but I think nonetheless political union with some further transfer of responsibility at the federal level and also political accountability. I think that needs to be there. The other domain is Schengen. I think it's clear that the migration issue has been at the center of the vote in the UK. It's clear that it's also at the center of preoccupation of citizens throughout the European Union. And one cannot say that the European Union, the union again has done a great job of having a united view, a united response to this issue. And I think it has played very, very badly for our citizens that there is not that capacity, that political capacity to have this common view and solidarity. I have one minute and let me just close by saying this. Although I have argued at the EU level for the 27 to deepen integration, to do institutional reforms on two fronts, monetary union and Schengen, that doesn't mean that I don't believe that there is also a need to act with actual economic measures within the current institutional framework. And I see two areas there. One is in the banking union. Banking union is there. And even within what we have already today, within, without adding anything, I think we need to solve the Italian banking problem, the banking mess. And I think we need to have a European solution. Yes, Italy needs to solve its problem, but it needs to be a European solution to the Italian problem. Because I do fear that Italy could be a big problem. Last point, if I had a possibility to do something, I would very much be in favor of having a bold European investment plan for infrastructure. And that's something that would need to be done very, very rapidly. And we do have the resources to do that. All we need is the political will. Thank you. Thank you very much. While listening to what Beatrice has said and you, André, on this fellow citizens in all advanced economy that are frustrated and are creating the kind of reaction that we see on the political front across the Atlantic in all our countries, in all the advanced economy, I was reflecting on something which I found myself very surprising, because it's not what you read in the articles or what you hear generally as regards the position of our fellow citizens, namely confidence or absence of confidence in institutions in general. I give you the very rapidly the figures. Confidence in the commission, 35%. Okay, it's very low. Absence of confidence, 46%. Difference, minus 11%. In the last Euro barometer which has been published. But confidence in the national government, 27%, instead of 35%. And absence of confidence, 66%. Instead of 46%. Difference, 39%. So absence of confidence in the European institution, yes, clearly. But if you control that absence of confidence with the absence of confidence in national government, you're struck by the fact that it's, you know, an overwhelming position of our fellow citizens that are rejecting their authorities. And the same, and I was even much more surprised for the parliaments, because the open parliament is not very popular obviously. Confidence, 38%. Confidence in national parliaments, 28%. Absence of confidence, 47%. Not very brilliant, minus nine. But absence of confidence in the national parliament, which is amazing for me, 64%. So the difference is 36%. So you see, all institutions that are more or less alike, more or less, of course, we have to reflect much more on that, but we see the powerful drive against the elite, as you said, both against the institution national or international. And I guess that we would have more or less the same figures in the US. Stop there. And then we have the last word of the panel. Monsieur Levis, président, you have the floor. Thank you, Jean-Claude. Indeed, the panel that we had foreseen for understandable reasons had to be canceled. Normally, the concluding panel is an opportunity for policymakers from different parts of the world, either in our forums or in Jackson Hall, to speak about the world economy view, and particularly from the perspective of their own jurisdictions. That being impossible, we thought, nevertheless, that we should have some reflection, meditation, on what could be the prospects for the European and world economy after Brexit. Because Brexit was the reason why they are not here in this panel. But comprehensively, I mean, understandably also, the previous speakers concentrated much more on Brexit and the problems. I don't have the luxury of doing that, as you understand. So I will follow the initial intention of having an economic financial discussion, but in relation, of course, with the events of the UK referendum. So I will speak about market developments and then about economic effects and developments looking forward, because they are different and could be quite different. Regarding the market developments, the first thing I would like to say is that the results of the UK referendum did not create a systemic failure in the financial markets. Markets worked in the sense that prices could be formed, prices dropped, there were buyers and sellers, everything worked. Contrary to all the scarce stories mostly put forward by people from the sector, from the industry, saying that the market liquidity had been killed by regulations, it's not there. If there is a stress, everything will be amplified. Well, the scarce stories did not materialize at all. Alan Greenspan said that this could be another lemon. Well, Mark and Greenspan was wrong. It can still be made right. I'm not excluding that 100%. I'm saying so far what we see is two days of a certain overshooting in markets and I can call it overshooting because in the last two days there were rebounds and recoveries in all market segments. So indeed what we see so far is a certain stabilization, of course, below the levels before the event, no doubt, and we have to wait and see. We all know that market dynamics and earth behavior can drive the markets almost anywhere, but that's true. So nothing has to be excluded, but it does not look like it because the fundamentals of our economies are more or less the same and that is more clear when we talk about the economic effects going forward. Of course, the turmoil in markets was slightly worse for the UK than for the Euro area. That is seen in the way the pound dropped initially and until now is dropping against the dollar 89% whereas the Euro has dropped only 2%. In what regards the Euro area, we saw no problems of liquidity, pressures anywhere in the system. We also did not see any fragmentation in the sovereign bond market, no pressure on the periphery. We also saw that the effects in the bond market in general were not very significant and I'm sure that was also the result of our policies that provide some support to the bond market, both public and private in view of our purchases. So our policies have been a very significant stabilizing factor in this situation and without, say, the Euro and the ECB, the situation certainly would have been worse in the first days. Now, where the most severe effect in markets of Brexit has been on bank stock prices. A little more in the UK than in the Euro area but in both cases quite significant, two days of rebound but nevertheless quite significant. So there seems to be quite a mistrust in banks in Europe in general. Although it's not clear what are the perceptions of factors that led to this sudden drop of such a significant dimension. We have to wait because the rebound that happened now can continue and the fundamentals of the banks have not changed also so dramatically and the problems that exist and that we know about were there before. So why now this sudden movement? Of course, the European banks face difficulties in several countries because if you look to the banks that dropped more, it's not just in one country. There are examples in other countries of individual banks and there must be a reason of course for that but the banks have no problems of liquidity and so there will be no trigger, immediate trigger for any sort of collapse or crisis. We insure that with our policies. The big drop in market capitalizations create immediately three types of risks. First, there is the risk with the present values that banks cannot raise capital in the market if they would need it to do so in the short term, which I think in general it's not the case. The second risk is that they could be bought. There could be some banks coming from somewhere and buy on the cheap because now they are much cheaper. Well, there are no consolidating banks or buyers that will come because I don't think that the big American banks would go right now into a buying spree of European banks but there is a risk and the third risk which is more economic is that in view of this pressure the banks can start a new phase of the leveraging and that would be bad of course for the economy if that happens. Our policies in particular now the new TLTRO will be a big incentive for that not to happen because as you know if the banks will deliver increases in credit above what was the level some months ago they will get money from us at negative rates. We will pay them for them to borrow from the ECB. So these behind besides other incentives shows the appropriateness of that element of our policy. And the vulnerabilities that we know exist NPLs and so on will have to be addressed more quicker that's for sure but that was already true before the Brexit. Now about the more say economic medium term effects. Well there one thing is quite clear I think for all economists the UK will have slower growth going forward perhaps some recession now. JP Morgan and another big investment bank published the projections saying that this year and next the UK may have a recession of 2.5%. I don't know but you know that's what they are saying. Now you have to know that the exports of the Euro area to the UK represent three, four percent of GDP. So if that drop would occur two and a half it means I mean very simply and very restrictive narrow way a drop of 0.1% in growth in the Euro area. I know that the most important effects do not come then from the trade relations come from confidence, investment. And that of course can create a different dynamic and animal spirits are down as a result of this bad surprise and things can happen. No doubt but it will come from that. I mean the UK after all is not a major economic area as not a international currency with a big international role. So the impact is what it is but it can be multiplied by confidence effects in a big way. So one cannot exclude that and I'm not excluding that. And that's why then we have to discuss if any response is now necessary or not. I think we have to wait a little bit to see where the markets go and where these goes. The political aspects that were addressed by my colleagues in the panel are very important to determine that mistakes can be made and things may happen. I have no comments on that but what responses? So we have to wait a little bit. Monetary policy, we still have instruments in our toolkit but it's also true that we have been using a lot of those instruments and we are aware and everyone is aware of that. So if the consequences would be more severe in economic terms, what could be done if anything? Well it's with other authorities. It's not then with the ECB. And here I have to invoke Greenspan in a positive way because when he said that if you, about what I am about to say, if you think you understood what I said it's because I was not clear. So indeed, don't see in my words any recommendation. I'm just mentioning some possibilities or describing possibilities no more. If you look to papers starting with the paper of Elen Ray and Pierre Rivier that come by the way after a long line of papers by Caballero, Faris, Gorinches, Elen Ray and so on about the state of the world in advanced economies and how now the equilibrium in the safe assets market is established by fluctuations of output and recessionary fluctuations and all of that that they illustrated in those models in particular in the model of last year of Pierre Rivier, Caballero and Faris which has non-Ricardian component there. It's clear that in that sort of model as in the model of Olivier Jean of 2009 or the models of Eggerson and Mérotra and so on what comes out as an exit is fiscal policy in such a situation. Well, it's not for us to say, of course, and to decide, although it seems that fiscal policy is now forbidden everywhere in the advanced countries for different reasons, okay. So it's not up with us to solve or address that. But I just quote the best work of academics around this issue. Then comes something, I have to stop. I am afraid you are a little bit over on the book. Okay. I thought I would save you. Okay. Maybe you do, maybe you do. And for that I have to be then grateful. No, but you will compliment. We will have to ask Elen what exactly the previous chairman of the Fed said exactly. My own memory was if you think, Senator, that you have understood what I just said, I probably made a mistake somewhere. Yeah, yeah, okay. Perhaps it was, yeah. Elen is. Yeah, okay. He's nodding. I just, I was using an analogy, so. Anyway, so, no, if you permit, perhaps I would ask the members of the panel if they have to, some very concise reflection. I'm thinking particularly perhaps of Charles because you heard André in particular analyzing the various options. It seems to me that he was very, very much in line with yourself, but do you have any comment? No, no, I think that's right. I mean, there was quite a lot of analysis in the run up to the referendum of the possible quantitative implications of these options. I think it's fair to say that given that we don't know exactly how things are going to unfold, going forward, and which means there's sort of radical uncertainty from the politics, and then when it comes to actually modeling the quantitative impact of these various options, there's a lot of assumptions you have to make. So, there's a lot of uncertainty about the magnitude of the various consequences. But, I mean, all of them are in the same direction that it's essentially a negative supply shock for the UK, a future negative supply shock, and being intermediated into the present through asset prices, and led on top of that the general increase in uncertainty and what that will do in terms of weighing on investment, FDI, and possibly consumer spending as well. So, there may well be the need for a significant policy response to them, and certainly the Bank of England has scope for action. Bank rate is at half a percent, which is where we felt was the economic floor back in 2009, we were worried about squeezing bank margins and that having an adverse effect on aggregate demand, possibly through generating a financial instability event, whereas today, I think the reality is probably a bit different. So, there may be some scope for further bank rate cuts if the Bank of England needs to, and there's asset purchases, and the funding for lending scheme, and so forth. But, exactly like Vitor finished up with, I think this is also a case where fiscal policy may need to take up some of the slack. I did not. Well, you did not. You merely raised it. Well, I could say it, because I'm now an independent. Academic. But, even if it implies more fiscal consolidation in the longer run, at least letting the automatic stabilizers operate in the short run would make sense. Thank you very much indeed. Oh, there's actually one other little thing. I wanted to correct one of Beatrice's slides when he said about the angry old men, because I talked about all the differences across age and region and so forth in the boat. The one thing that there wasn't any difference in was gender, exactly the same. So, angry old men or women? I thought it sounds better. Yeah.