 Part 1 of the Introduction to Plato's Republic. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Part 1 of the Introduction to Plato's Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Republic of Plato is the longest of his works, with the exception of the Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer approaches to modern metaphysics in the Philippus and in the Selfist. The politicus, or statesman, is more ideal. The form and institutions of the state are more clearly drawn out in the Laws. As works of art, the symposium and the portagoras are of higher excellence. But no other dialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same perfection of style. No other shows an equal knowledge of the world, or contains more of those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not of one age only, but of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony, or a greater wealth of humor, or imagery, or more dramatic power. Nor in any other of his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and speculation, or to connect politics with philosophy. The Republic is the center around which the other dialogues may be grouped. Here philosophy reaches the highest point, to which ancient thinkers ever attained. Plato, among the Greeks, like Bacon among the moderns, was the first to conceive the method of knowledge, although neither of them distinguished the bare outline or form from the substance of truth, and both of them had to be content with an abstraction of science which was not yet realized. He was the greatest metaphysical genius whom the world has ever seen, and in him, more than in any other ancient thinker, the germs of future knowledge are contained. The sciences of logic and psychology, which have supplied so many instruments of thought to after ages, are based upon the analyses of Socrates and Plato. The principles of definition, the law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, the distinction between essence and accidents of a thing or notion, between means and ends, between causes and conditions, also the division of the mind into the rational, concupitant, and irascible elements, or of pleasures and desires into necessary and unnecessary. These and other great forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic, and were probably first invented by Plato. The greatest of all logical truths, and the one of which writers on philosophy are most apt to lose sight, the difference between words and things, has been most strenuously insisted on by him, although he has not always avoided the confusion of them in his own writings. But he does not bind up truth in logical formulae. Logic is still veiled in metaphysics, and the science which he imagines to contemplate all truth and all existence is very unlike the doctrine of the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered. Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still larger design, which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as well as a political and physical philosophy. The fragment of the Cretias has given birth to a world-famous fiction, second only in importance to the tale of Troy and the legend of Arthur, and is said as a fact to have inspired some of the early navigators of the 16th century. This mythical tale, of which the subject was a history of the wars of the Athenians against the island of Atlantis, is supposed to be founded upon an unfinished poem of Solon, to which it would have stood in the same relation as the writings of the logographers to the poems of Homer. It would have told of a struggle for liberty intended to represent the conflict of Persia and Hellas. We may judge from the noble commencement of the Timaeus, from the fragment of the Cretias itself, and from the third book of the Laws, in which manner Plato would have treated this high argument. We can only guess why the great design was abandoned, perhaps because Plato became sensible of some incongruity in a fictitious history, or because he had lost his interest in it, or because advancing years forbade the completion of it. We may please ourselves with the fancy that, had this imaginative narrative ever been finished, we would have found Plato himself sympathizing with the struggle for Hellenic independence, singing a hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis, perhaps making the reflection of Herodotus where he contemplates the growth of the Athenian Empire. How brave a thing is freedom of speech which has made the Athenians so far exceed every other state of Hellas in greatness, or, more probably, attributing the victory to the ancient good order of Athens and to the favor of Apollo and Athena. Again, Plato may be regarded as the captain, or leader of a goodly band of followers, for in the Republic is to be found the original of Cicero's De Repubblica, of St. Augustine's City of God, of the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary states which are framed upon the same model. The extent to which Aristotle or the Aristotelian School were indebted to him in the politics has been little recognized, and the recognition is the more necessary because it is not made by Aristotle himself. The two philosophers had more in common than they were conscious of, and probably some elements of Plato remain still undetected in Aristotle. In English philosophy, too, many affinities may be traced not only in the works of the Cambridge Platonists, but in the great original writers like Berkeley or Coleridge to Plato and his ideas, that there is a truth higher than experience, of which the mind bears witness to herself, is a conviction which in our generation has been enthusiastically asserted and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the great authors who, at the Renaissance, brought a new life into the world, Plato has had the greatest influence. The Republic of Plato is also the first treatise upon education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean-Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, he has a revelation of another life. Like Bacon, he is profoundly impressed with the unity of knowledge. In the early church, he exercised a real influence on theology, and at the revival of literature on politics. Even the fragments of his words, when repeated at second hand, have in all ages ravished the hearts of men who have seen reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of idealism in philosophy, in politics, in literature, and many of the latest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the unity of knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality of the sexes, have been anticipated in a dream by him. The argument of the Republic is the search after justice. The nature of which is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless old man, then discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and Polymarcus, then caricatured by Thrasimachus, and partially explained by Socrates, reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimontus, and having become invisible in the individual, reappears at length in the ideal state, which is constructed by Socrates. The first care of the rulers is to be education, of which an outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model, providing only for an improved religion and morality, and more simplicity in music and gymnastics, a manlier strain of poetry, and greater harmony of the individual and the state. We are thus led on to the conception of a higher state, in which no man calls anything his own, and in which there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage, and kings are philosophers, and philosophers are kings. And there is another and higher education, intellectual as well as moral and religious. Of science as well as of art, and not only of youth, but of the whole life. Such a state is hardly to be realized in this world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal succeeds the government of the soldier and the lover of honor, this again declining into democracy and democracy into tyranny, into an imaginary but regular order having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When the wheel has come full circle, we do not begin again with a new period of human life, but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we end. The subject is then changed, and the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy, which has now been more lightly treated in the earlier books of the Republic, is now resumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is discovered to be an invitation Christ removed from the truth, and Homer, as well as the dramatic poets, having been condemned as an imitator, is sent into banishment along with them, and the idea of the state is supplemented by the revelation of a future life. The division into books, like all similar divisions, is probably later than the age of Plato. The natural divisions are five in number. Book one and the first half of book two, down to the paragraph beginning, I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adei Montes, which is introductory, the first book containing a refutation of the popular and sophisticated notions of justice, and concluding like some of the earlier dialogues without arriving at any definite result. To this is appended a restatement of the nature of justice according to common opinion, and an answer is demanded to the question, what is justice stripped of appearances? The second division, two, includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and fourth books, which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first state and the first education. The third division, three, consists in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books, in which philosophy rather than justice is the subject of inquiry, and the second state is constructed on principles of communism and ruled by philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea of good takes the place of the social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books, four, the perversions of states and of the individuals who correspond to them are reviewed in secession, and the nature of pleasure and the principle of tyranny are further analyzed in the individual man. The tenth book, five, is the conclusion of the whole in which the relations of philosophy to poetry are finally determined, and the happiness of the citizens in this life, which has now been assured, is crowned by the vision of another. Or, a more general division into two parts may be adopted. The first, books one through four, containing the description of a state framed generally in accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the second, the Hellenic state is transformed into an ideal kingdom of philosophy, of which all other governments are the perversions. These two points of view are really opposed, and the opposition is only veiled by the genius of Plato. The republic, like the fidress, is an imperfect whole. The higher light of philosophy breaks through the regularity of the Hellenic temple, which at last fades away into the heavens. Whether this imperfection of structure arises from an enlargement of the plan, or from the imperfect reconcilement in the writer's own mind of the struggling elements of thought which are now first brought together by him, or perhaps from the composition of the work at different times are questions, like the similar question about the Iliad and the Odyssey, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a distinct answer. In the age of Plato, there was no regular mode of publication, and an author would have less scruple and altering or adding to a work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no absurdity in supposing that he might have laid his labors aside for a time, or turned from one work to another, and such interruptions would be more likely to occur in the case of a long then of a short writing. In all attempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on internal evidence, this uncertainty about any single dialogue being composed at any one time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to affect longer works such as the republic and the laws more than the shorter ones. But on the other hand, the seeming discrepancies of the republic may only arise out of the discordant elements which the philosopher has attempted to unite in a single whole, perhaps without being himself able to recognize the inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a judgment of after ages which few great writers have ever been able to anticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the want of connection in their own writings, or the gaps in their own systems, which are visible enough to those who come after them. In the beginnings of literature and philosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and language, more inconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of speculation are well-worn in the meaning of words precisely defined. For consistency, too, is the growth of time, and some of the greatest creations of the human mind have been wanting only in unity. Tried by this test, several of the Platonic dialogues, according to our modern ideas, appear to be defective, but the deficiency is no proof that they were composed at different times or by different hands. In the supposition that the republic was written uninterruptedly and by continuous effort, he is in some degrees confirmed by the numerous references from one part of the work to another. The second title, concerning justice, is not the one by which the republic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and, like the other second titles of the Platonic dialogues, may therefore be assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the definition of justice, which is the professed aim or the construction of the state, is the principal argument of the work. The answer is that the two blend in one, and are two faces of the same truth, for justice is the order of the state, and the state is the visible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human society. The one is the soul, and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of the state as of the individual is a fair mind and a fair body. In Hegelian phraseology, the state is the reality of which justice is the idea, or described in Christian language, the kingdom of God is within, yet develops in a church or external kingdom. The house, not made with hands, internal in the heavens, is reduced to the proportions of an earthly building. Or to use a Platonic image, justice and the state are the warp and the wolf, which run through the whole texture. And when the constitution of the state is completed, the conception of justice is not dismissed, but reappears under the same or different names throughout the work, both as the inner law of the individual soul, and finally as the principal of rewards and punishments in another life. The virtues are based on justice, of which common honesty in buying and selling is the shadow, and justice is based on the idea of good, which is the harmony of the world, and is reflected both in the institutions of states and in the motions of the heavenly bodies. The Timaos, which takes up the political rather than the ethical side of the republic, is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning the outward world, yet contains many indications that the same law is supposed to reign over the state, over nature, and over man. Too much, however, has been made of this question, both in ancient and modern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether of nature or of art, are referred to design. Now, in ancient writings and indeed in literature generally, there remains often a large element which was not comprehended in the original design, for the plan grows under the author's hand. New thoughts occur to him in the act of writing. He has not worked out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks to find one idea under which the whole may be conceived must necessarily seized on the vaguest and most general. Thus, Stalbaum, who is dissatisfied with the ordinary explanations of the argument of the republic, imagines himself to have found the true argument in the representation of human life in a state perfected by justice and governed according to the idea of good. There may be some use in such general descriptions, but they can hardly be said to express the design of the writer. The truth is that we may as well speak of many designs as of one, nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas and which does not interfere with the general purpose. What kind or degree of unity is to be sought after in a building and the plastic arts and poetry and prose is a problem which has to be determined relatively to the subject matter. To Plato himself, the inquiry, what was the intention of the writer, or what was the principal argument of the republic would have been hardly intelligible and therefore had better be at once dismissed. And of introduction, Part 1. Part 2 of the introduction to Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Part 2 of the introduction to Plato's Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett. Is not the Republic the vehicle of three or four truths which, to Plato's own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the state. Just as in the Jewish prophets, the reign of Messiah, or the day of the Lord, or the suffering servant, or people of God, or the son of righteousness with healing in his wings, only convey to us at least their great spiritual ideals. So, through the Greek state, Plato reveals to us his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of good, like the sun in the visible world, about human perfection, which is justice, about education beginning in youth and continuing in later years, about poets and sophists and tyrants, who are the false teachers and evil rulers of mankind, about the world, which is the embodiment of them, about a kingdom which exists nowhere upon earth but is laid up in heaven to be the pattern and rule of human life. No such inspired creation is at unity with itself any more than the clouds of heaven when the sun pierces through them. Every shade of light and dark, of truth and of fiction, which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a work of philosophical imagination. It is not all on the same plane. It easily passes from ideas through myths and fancies, from facts to figures of speech. It is not prose but poetry, at least a great part of it, and ought not to be judged by the rules of logic or the probabilities of history. The writer is not fashioning his ideas into an artistic whole. They take possession of him and are too much for him. We have no need therefore to discuss whether a state such as Plato has conceived is practicable or not, or whether the outward form or the inward life came first into the mind of the writer. For the practicality of his ideas has nothing to do with their truth, and the highest thoughts to which he attains may be truly said to bear the greatest marks of design, justice, more than the external framework of the state. The idea of good more than justice. The great science of dialectic or the organization of ideas has no real content. It is only a type of the method or spirit in which the higher knowledge is to be pursued by the spectator of all time and all existence. It is in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books that Plato reaches the summit of speculation, and these, although they fail to satisfy the requirements of a modern thinker, may therefore be regarded as the most important, as they are also the most original portions of the work. It is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been raised by Bohac, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation was held. The year 411 BC, which is proposed by him, will do as well as any other. For a work of fiction, and especially a writer who, like Plato, is notoriously careless of chronology, only aims at general probability. Whether all the persons mentioned in the Republic could ever have met at any one time is not a difficulty which would have occurred to an Athenian reading the work 40 years later, or to Plato himself at the time of his writing, any more than the Shakespeare respecting one of his dramas, and need not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a question having no answer, which is still worth asking, because the investigation shows that we cannot argue historically from the dates in Plato. It would be useless, therefore, to waste time in inventing far-fetched reconcilments of them in order to avoid chronological difficulties. Such, for example, as the conjecture of C. F. Herman, that Glaucon and Adéimantus are not the brothers but the uncles of Plato, or the fancy of Stalbaum, that Plato intentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which some of his dialogues were written. The principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polymarcus, Therasimachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adéimantus. Cephalus appears in the introduction only. Polymarcus drops at the end of the first argument, and Therasimachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adéimantus. Among the company is Lysius, the orator, and Euthydemus, the sons of Cephalus, and the brothers of Polymarcus, and unknown Charmontides. These are mute auditors. There is also a kleitophon, who at once interrupts, where, in the dialogue which bears his name, he appears as the friend and ally of Therasimachus. Cephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged in offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost done with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He feels that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger about the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to visit him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the consciousness of a well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the tyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation, his affection, his indifference to riches, even his agorality, are interesting traits of character. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because their whole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges that riches have the advantage of placing men above the temptation to dishonesty or falsehood. The respectful attention shown to him by Socrates, whose love of conversation, no less than the mission imposed upon him by the oracle, leads him to ask questions of all men, young and old alike, should also be noted. Who better suited to raise the question of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the expression of it? The moderation with which old age is pictured by Cephalus, as a very tolerable portion of existence, is characteristic not only of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the exaggeration of Cicero in De Senectute. The evening of life is described by Plato in the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest possible touches. As Cicero remarks, the age Cephalus would have been out of place in the discussion which follows, and which he could neither have understood nor taken part in, without a violation of dramatic propriety. His son and heir, Polymarcus, has the frankness and impetuousness of youth. He is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and will not let him off on the subject of women and children. Like Cephalus, he is limited in his point of view and represents the proverbial stage of morality which has rules of life rather than principles, and he quotes Simonides, as his father had quoted Pindar. But after this he has no more to say. The answers which he makes are only elicited from him by the dialectic of Socrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of the Sophists like Glaucon and Adeamontus, nor is he sensible of the necessity of refuting them. He belongs to the pre-socratic or pre-dialectical age. He is incapable of arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree that he does not know what he is saying. He is made to admit that justice is a thief, and that the virtues follow the analogy of the arts. From his brother, Lysius, we learn that he fell a victim through the Thirty Tyrants, but no illusion is made here to his fate, nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and his family were a Syracusean origin and had migrated from Thury to Athens. The Calcedonian Giant, Thrasymachus, of whom we had already heard in the Fidris, is the personification of the Sophists according to Plato's conception of them in some of their worst characteristics. He is vain in blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of making an oration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates. But a mere child in argument and unable to foresee that the next move, to use a platonic expression, will shut him up. He has reached the stage of framing general notions, and in this respect is in advance of Cephalus and Polymarcus, but he is incapable of defending them in a discussion, and vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and insolence. Whether such doctrines, as are attributed to him by Plato, were really held either by him or by any other Sophist is uncertain. In the infancy of philosophy, serious errors about morality might easily grow up. They are certainly put into the mouths of speakers and Thucydides, but we are concerned at present with Plato's description of him and not with the historical reality. The inequality of the contest adds greatly to the humor of the scene. The pompous and empty Sophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of dialectic who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in him. He is greatly irritated by the irony of Socrates, but his noisy and imbecile rage only lays him more and more open to the thrust of his assailant. His determination to cram down their throats, or put bodily into their souls, his own words, elicits a cry of horror from Socrates. The state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to continue the discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent goodwill, and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two occasional remarks. When attacked by Glaucon, he is humorously protected by Socrates, as one who has never been his enemy and is now his friend. From Cicero and Quintilian, and from Aristotle's rhetoric, we learn that the Sophist whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note whose writings were preserved in later ages. The play on his name, which has been made by his contemporary, Herodicus, was, lost ever bold in battle, seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of verisalimitude. When Throsimachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents, Glaucon and Adeimontus, appear on the scene. Here, as in Greek tragedy, three actors are introduced. At first sight, the two sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two friends Cymius and Cabeus in the phyto, but on a near examination of them, the similarity vanishes and they are seen to be distinct characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can just never have enough of fetching. The man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love, the uvinus qui gaudit cannibus, who improves the breed of animals. The lover of art and music who has all the experiences of youthful life, he is full of quickness and penetration, piercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Throsimachus to the real difficulty. He turns out to the light, the seamy side of human life, and yet does not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may be turned the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world, to whom a state of simplicity is a city of pigs, who is always prepared with the jest when the argument offers him an opportunity, and who is ever ready to second the humor of Socrates and to appreciate the ridiculous, whether in connoisseurs of music, or in the lovers of theatricals, or in the fantastic behavior of the citizens of democracy. His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates, who, however, will not allow him to be attacked by his brother, Adeimontus. The soldier, and, like Adeimontus, has been distinguished at the Battle of Megara. The character of Adeimontus is deeper in graver, and the profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more demonstrative, and generally opens the game. Adeimontus pursues the argument further. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth. Adeimontus has the mature judgment of a grown-up man of the world. In the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall be considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimontus remarks that they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their consequences. And, in a similar vein of reflection, he urges at the beginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens happy, and is answered that happiness is not the first, but the second thing, not the direct aim, but the indirect consequence of the good government of a state. In the discussion about religion and mythology, Adeimontus is the respondent, but Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about music and gymnastics to the end of the book. It is Adeimontus again who volunteers the criticism of common sense on the Socratic method of argument, and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question of women and children. It is Adeimontus who is the respondent in the more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more imaginative portions of the dialogue. For example, throughout the greater part of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimontus. Glaucon resumes his place of principal respondent, but he has a difficulty in apprehending the higher education of Socrates and makes some false hits in the course of the discussion. Once more, Adeimontus returns with the allusion to his brother Glaucon, whom he compares to the contentious state. In the next book, he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end. Thus, in a succession of characters, Plato represents the successive stages of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who is followed by the practical man of that day, regulating his life by proverbs and saws. To him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, who know the Sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them and desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These two, like Cephalus, Polymarcus, and Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one another. Neither in the Republic nor in any other dialogue of Plato is a single character repeated. The delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In the first book, we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in the memorabilia of Xenophon in the earliest dialogues of Plato and in the Apology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning the old enemy of the Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silanus, as well as to argue seriously. But in the sixth book, his enmity towards the Sophists debates. He acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the corruptors of the world. He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, passing beyond the range either of the political or the speculative ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage, Plato himself seems to intimate that the time has now come for Socrates, who had passed his whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be always repeating the notions of other men. There is no evidence that either the idea of good or the conception of a perfect state were comprehended in the Socratic teaching, though he certainly dwelt on the nature of the universal into final causes. And a deep thinker like him, in his 30 or 40 years of public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch on the nature of family relations, for which there was also some positive evidence in the memorabilia. The Socratic method is nominally retained, and every inference is either put into the mouth of the respondent or represented as the common discovery of him in Socrates. But anyone can see that this is a mere form, of which the affectation grows wearisome as the work advances. The method of inquiry has passed into a method of teaching, in which, by the help of interlocutors, the same thesis is looked at from various points of view. The nature of the process is truly characterized by Glaucon, when he describes himself as a companion, who is not good for much in an investigation, but can see what he has shown, and may perhaps give the answer to a question more fluently than another. Neither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the immortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the Republic. Nor is there any reason to suppose that he used myths or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction, or that he would have banished poetry, or have denounced the Greek mythology. His favorite oath is retained, and a slight mention is made of the dimonium, or internal sign, which is alluded to by Socrates as a phenomena peculiar to himself. A real element of Socratic teaching, which is more prominent in the Republic than in any other dialogues at Plato, is the use of example and illustration. Let us apply the test of common interests. You, says Ademontus ironically in the sixth book, are so unaccustomed to speak and images. And this use of examples, or images, though truly Socratic in origin, is enlarged by the genius of Plato, into the form of an allegory or parable, which embodies the concrete which has been already described or is about to be described in the abstract. Thus the figure of the cave in book seven is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in book six. The composite animal in book nine is an allegory of the parts of the soul. The noble captain in the ship and the true pilot in book six are a figure of the relation of the people to the philosophers in the state which has been described. Other figures such as the dog, or the marriage of the portionless maiden, or the drones and wasps in the eighth and ninth book, also form lengths of connection and long passages, or are used to recall previous discussions. Plato is most true to the character of his master, when he describes him as, not of this world. And with this representation of him, the ideal state and the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance, though they cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To him, as to the other great teachers, both philosophical and religious, when they looked upward, the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and evil. The common sense of mankind has revolted against this view, or has only partially admitted it. And even in Socrates himself, the sterner judgment of the multitude at times passes into a sort of ironical pity or love. Men in general are incapable of philosophy, and are therefore at enmity with the philosopher. But their misunderstanding of him is unavoidable, for they have never seen him as he truly is in his own image. They are only acquainted with artificial systems, possessing no native force of truth, words which admit of many applications. Their leaders have nothing to measure with, and are therefore ignorant of their own stature. But they are to be pityed or laughed at, not to be quarreled with. They mean well with their nostrums. If they could only learn that they are cutting off a hydra's head. This moderation towards those who are in error is one of the most characteristic features of Socrates in the Republic. In all the different representations of Socrates, whether in Xenophon or Plato, and admit the differences of the earlier or later dialogues, he always retains the character of the unwirried and disinterested seeker after truth, without which he would have ceased to be Socrates. Persons in the Republic Dialogue Socrates, who is the narrator, Glaucon, Adeimantus, Polymarcus, Cephalus, Thrasymachus, Clytofon, and others who are mute auditors. The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus, and the whole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to Timaeus, Hermocrates, Cretius, and a nameless person who are introduced in the Timaeus. End of introduction. Book 1, Part 1 of Plato's Republic This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by M.B. The Republic by Plato Translated by Benjamin Jowett Book 1, Part 1 I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess, Bendis, the Thracian Artemis. And also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants, but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city, and at that instance, Polymarcus, the son of Cephalus, chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said, Polymarcus desires you to wait. I turned round and asked him where his master was. There he is, said the youth, coming after you if you will only wait. Certainly we will, said Glaucon, and after a few minutes, Polymarcus appeared, and with him adamantus, Glaucon's brother, Nicaratus, the son of Nicaus, and several others who had been at the procession. Polymarcus said to me, I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city. You are not far along, I said. But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are? Of course. And are you stronger than all these? For if not, you will have to remain where you are. May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go. But can you persuade us if we refuse to listen to you? He said. Certainly not, replied Glaucon. Then we are not going to listen, of that you may be assured. Adamantus added, Has no one told you of the torch race on horseback in honor of the goddess which will take place in the evening? With horses, I replied, that is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race? Yes, said Polymarcus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival. There will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse. Glaucon said, I suppose, since you insist that we must. Very good, I replied. Accordingly, we went with Polymarcus to his house, and then we found his brothers, Lysius and Euthedemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Tramanthides the Pneon, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonimus. There was, too, Cethilus, the father of Polymarcus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court. And there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semi-circle upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said, you don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought. If I were still able to go and see you, I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For let me tell you that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort, and keep company with these young men. We are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us. I replied, there is nothing which for my part I like better, Cethilus, than conversing with aged men. For I regard them as travellers who have gone on a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to inquire, whether the way is smooth and easy or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call the threshold of old age. Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it? I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together. We are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says. And at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is. I cannot eat, I cannot drink. The pleasures of youth and love are fled away. There was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old and every other old man would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age? Sophocles, are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied, most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak. I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom. When the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, We are freed from the grasp, not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets and also the complaints about relations Are to be attributed to the same cause which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers. For he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, But to him who is of an opposite disposition, youth and age are equally a burden. I listened in admiration and wanting to draw him out that he might go on. Yes, Sophocles, I said, but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus. They think that old age sits lightly upon you not because of your happy disposition, But because you are rich and wealth is well known to be a great comforter. You are right, he replied. They are not convinced, and there is something in what they say. Not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Serpian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, Not for his own merits, but because he was an Athenian. If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous. And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made, For to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself. May I ask, Sophocles, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you? Acquired. Socrates, do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather, For my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, That which he inherited being much what I possess now. But my father Lysenius reduced the property below what it is at present, And I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received. That is why I asked you the question, I replied, Because I see that you are indifferent about money, Which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes, Than of those who have acquired them. The makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, Resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, Or of parents for their children, Besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit, Which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, For they can't talk about anything but the praises of wealth. That is true, he said. Yes, that is very true, But may I ask another question? What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth? One, he said, Of which I could not expect easily to convince others, For let me tell you, Socrates, That when a man thinks himself to be near death, Fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before. The tales of a world below and punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here Were once a laughing matter to him, But now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true, Either from the weakness of age, Or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, He has a clearer view of these things. Suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, And he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great, He will many a time, like a child, start up in his sleep for fear, And he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, Sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, Is the kind nurse of his age. Hope, he says, Tearishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, And is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey. Hope, which is the mightiest to sway the restless soul of man. How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, But to a good man, is, That he has no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, Either intentionally or unintentionally. And when he departs to the world below, He is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods, Or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind, The possession of wealth greatly contributes. And therefore I say that, Setting one thing against another, Of the many advantages which wealth has to give To a man of sense, this is, in my opinion, the greatest. Well said, Cephalus, I replied, But as concerning justice, what is it? To speak the truth and to pay your debts, No more than this? And even to this, are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend, when in his right mind, Has deposited arms with me, And he asks for them what he is not in his right mind, Art I to give them back to him? No one would say that I art, Any more than he would say That I ought always to speak the truth, And to one who is in his condition. You are quite right, he replied. But then I said, Speaking the truth and paying your debts Is not a correct definition of justice. Quite correct, Socrates, If Simonides is to be believed, Said Polymarcus interposing. I fear, said Cephalus, That I must go now, For I have to look after the sacrifices, And I hand over the argument to Polymarcus And the company. I said, To be sure, he answered, And went away laughing to the sacrifices. Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, What did Simonides say, And according to you truly say, About justice? He said that the repayment of a debt Is just, and in saying so He appears to me to be right. I should be sorry to doubt The word of such a wise and inspired man, But his meaning, though probably clear to you, Does not mean, as we were just now saying, That I ought to return a deposit of arms Or anything else to one who asks for it When he is not in his right senses. And yet, a deposit cannot be denied To be a debt. True. Then when the person who asks me Is not in his right mind, I am by no means to make the return? Certainly not. When Simonides said that the repayment Of a debt was justice, He did not mean to include that case? Certainly not. For he thinks that a friend Are always to do good to a friend And never evil. You mean that the return of a deposit Of gold which is to the injury of the Receiver, if the two parties are friends, Is not the repayment of a debt? That is what you would imagine him to say? Yes. And are enemies also to receive What we owe to them? To be sure, he said, They are to receive what we owe them. And an enemy, as I take it, Simonides then, after the manner of poets, Would seem to have spoken darkly Of the nature of justice. For he really meant to say that justice Is the giving to each man what is proper To him. And this, he termed, a debt. That must have been his meaning, He said, By heaven, I replied, And if we ask him what do or proper Thing is given by medicine and to whom, What answer do you think that he would Make to us? He then gives drugs and meat And drink to human bodies. And what do or proper thing Is given by cookery and to what? Seasoning to food. And what is that which justice Gives and to whom? If Socrates were to be guided at all By the analogy of the preceding Inconsiders, then justice is the art Which gives good to friends and evil To enemies. That is his meaning then? I think so. And who is best able to do good For the time of sickness? The physician. Or when they are on a voyage Amid the perils of the sea? The pilot. And in what sort of actions Or with a view to what result Is the just man able to do harm To his enemy and good to his friend? In going to war against the one And in making alliances with the other? But when a man is well, My dear Polymarcus, there is no need Of a physician? No. Then in time of peace justice Will be of no use? I am very far from thinking so. You think that justice may be of use In peace as well as in war? Yes. Like husbandry for the acquisition Of corn? Yes. Or like shoemaking for the Acquisition of shoes. That is what you mean? Yes. And what similar use or power Socrates' justice is of use? And by contracts you mean partnerships? Exactly. But is the just man or the skillful Player a more useful and better Partner to game with droughts? The skillful player. And in the laying of bricks and stones Is the just man a more useful Or a better partner than the builder? Quite the reverse. Then in what sort of partnership Is the just man a better partner Than the harp player? As in playing the harp The harp player is certainly a better Partner than the just man. In a money partnership? Yes, Paul and Marcus, But surely not in the use of money For you do not want a just man To be your counselor in the purchase Or sale of a horse. A man who is knowing about horses Would be better for that, would he not? Certainly. And when you want to buy a ship The shipwright or the pilot Is to be preferred When you want to deposit to be kept safely You mean when money is not wanted But allowed to lie? Precisely. That is to say justice is useful When money is useless? That is the inference. And when you want to keep a pruning hook Safe then justice is useful To the individual and to the state But when you want to use it Then the art of the vine dresser Clearly. And when you want to keep Surely that justice is useful But when you want to use them Then the art of the soldier Or the musician. Certainly. And so of all other things Justice is useful when they are useless And useless when they are useful That is the inference. Then justice is not good for much. End of book one part one Book one part two Of Plato's Republic This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Recording by M.B. The Republic by Plato Translated by Benjamin Jowett Book one part two But let us consider this further point Is not he who can best strike a blow In a boxing match or in any kind of fighting Best able to ward off a blow? Certainly. And he who is most important And he who is most scuffle in preventing Or escaping from a disease Is best able to create one? True. And he is the best guard of a camp Who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy? Certainly. Then he who is a good keeper of anything Is also a good thief That I suppose is to be inferred Then if the just man Is good at keeping money He is good at stealing it That is implied in the argument Then after all the just man Has turned out to be a thief And this is a lesson which I suspect You must have learned out of Homer For he speaking of Etolicus The maternal grandfather of Odysseus Who is a favourite of his Affirms that he was excellent above all men In theft and perjury And so you and Homer And Simonides are agreed That justice is an art of theft To be practised however For the good of friends And for the harm of enemies Though I do not know what I did say But I still stand by the latter words Well there is another question By friends and enemies Do we mean those who are so really Or only in seeming? Surely he said A man who may be expected to love Those whom he thinks good And to hate those whom he thinks evil Yes but do not persons often Ur about good and evil Many who are not good Seem to be so and conversely That is true And in that case They will be right in doing good To the evil and evil to the good Clearly But the good are just And would not do any justice True Then according to your argument It is just to injure those Who do no wrong Nay Socrates the doctrine is immoral Then I suppose that we ought To do good to the just And harm to the unjust I like that better Many a man who is ignorant Of human nature has friends Who are bad friends And in that case he ought to do harm To them And he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit But if so we shall be saying The very opposite of what we have affirmed To be the meaning of Simonides Very true he said And I think that we had better Correct an error into which we seem To have fallen in the use of the words Friend and enemy Assumed that he is a friend who seems to be Or who is thought good And how is the error to be corrected We should rather say That he is a friend who is As well as seems good And that he who seems only And is not good Only seems to be and is not a friend And of an enemy the same may be said You would argue that the good Are our friends and the bad Our enemies Yes Simply as we did at first That it is just to do good to our friends And harm to our enemies We should further say It is just to do good to our friends When they are good and harm to our enemies When they are evil Yes that appears to me to be the truth But ought the just to injure Anyone at all Undoubtedly he ought to injure Those who are both wicked and his enemies When horses are injured Are they improved or deteriorated The latter Deteriorated that is to say In the good qualities of horses Not of dogs Yes of horses And dogs are deteriorated In the good qualities of dogs And not of horses Of course And will not men who are injured Be deteriorated in that Which is the proper virtue of man Certainly And that human virtue Is justice To be sure Then men who are injured Are out of necessity made unjust That is the result But can the musician by his art Make men unmusical Certainly not Or the horsemen by his art Make them bad horsemen Impossible And can the just by justice Make men unjust Or speaking generally Can the good by virtue make them bad Assuredly not Any more than he can produce cold It cannot Or drought moisture Clearly not Nor can the good harm anyone Impossible And the just is the good Certainly Then to injure a friend Or anyone else is not the act Of a just man But of the opposite Who is the unjust I think what you say is quite true Socrates Then if a man says that justice Consists in the repayment of debts And that good is the debt Which a just man owes to his friends And evil the debt Which he owes to his enemies To say this is not wise For it is not true If, as has been clearly shown The injuring of another Can be in no case just Then you and I Are prepared to take up arms Against anyone who attributes Such a saying to Simonides Or bias or pitticus Or any other wise man or seer I am quite ready to do battle at your side He said Shall I tell you Whose I believe the saying to be Whose I believe that Periander Or Perdiccus Or Xerxes And mighty man Who had a great opinion of his own power Was the first to say that justice is Doing good to your friends And harm to your enemies Most true He said Yes, I said But if this definition of justice Also breaks down what other can be offered Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasimachus had made an attempt To get the argument into his own hands And had been put down by the rest Of the company who wanted to hear the end There was a pause He could no longer hold his peace And gathering himself up He came at us like a wild beast Seeking to devour us We were quite panic stricken at the sight of him He roared out to the whole company What folly Socrates has taken possession Of you all And why silly billies do you knock Under to one another I say that if you really want to know What justice is you should not only ask But answer And you should not seek honour to yourself Who can ask and cannot answer And now I will not have you say That justice is a duty or advantage Or profit or gain or interest For this sort of nonsense Will not do for me I must have clearness and accuracy I was panic stricken at his words And could not look at him without trembling Indeed, I believe that if I had Not fixed my eye upon him I should have been struck dumb But when I saw his fury rising I looked at him first And was therefore able to reply to him Thrasymachus, I said with a quiver Don't be hard upon us Polymarcus and I may have been guilty Of a little mistake in the argument But I can assure you that the error Was not intentional If we were seeking for a piece of gold You would not imagine that we were Knocking under to one another And so losing our chance of finding it And why when we are seeking for justice A thing more precious than many pieces of gold Do you say that we are weakly yielding Our utmost to get at the truth Nay, my good friend, we are most willing And anxious to do so But the fact is that we cannot And if so, you people who know all things Should pity us and not be angry with us How characteristic of Socrates He replied with a bitter laugh That's your ironical style Have I not already told you That whatever he was asked He would refuse to answer And try irony or any other shuffle In order that he might avoid answering You are a philosopher I am very proud and well know That if you ask a person what numbers Make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him Whom you ask from answering twice six Or three times four Or six times two Or four times three For this sort of nonsense will not do for me Then obviously if that is your way Of putting the question, no one can answer you But suppose that he were to retort The Thracomapus, what do you mean If one of these numbers which you interdict Be the true answer to the question Am I falsely to say some other number Is that your meaning How would you answer him Just as if the two cases were at all Like he said Why should they not be I replied and even if they are not But only appear to be so to the person Who is asked, are not he to say What he thinks, whether you and I Forbid him or not I presume that you are going to make One of the interdicted answers I dare say that I may not Was standing the danger if upon reflection I approve of any of them What if I give you an answer About justice, other and better He said, than any of these What do you deserve to have done to you Done to me As becomes the ignorant I must learn from the wise That is what I deserve to have done to me What and no payment A pleasant notion I will pay when I have the money I replied But you have Socrates said Glaucon And you Thracomapus Need be under no anxiety about money Yes, he replied And Socrates will do as he always does Refuse to answer himself But take and pull to pieces the answer Of someone else Why, my good friend, I said How can anyone answer who knows And says that he knows just nothing And who, even if he has some Fate notions of his own Is told by a man of authority Not to utter them The natural thing is That the speaker should be someone Like yourself Glaucon and the rest of the company Joined in my request And Thracomapus, as anyone might see Was in reality eager to speak For he thought that he had an Excellent answer and would distinguish himself But at first he affected to insist On my answering At length he consented to begin Behold, he said The wisdom of Socrates He refuses to teach himself And goes about learning of others To whom he never even says Thank you I am grateful I wholly deny Money I have none And therefore I pay in praise Which is all I have And how ready I am to praise Anyone who appears to me to speak well You will very soon find out when you answer For I expect that you will answer well Listen, then, you said I proclaim that justice is nothing else Than the interest of the stronger And why now do you not praise me But of course you won't Let me understand you, I replied Justice, as you say What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamus, the pancrethias Is stronger than we are And finds the eating of beef Condusive to his bodily strength That to eat beef is therefore Equally for our good Who are weaker than he is And right and just for us That's abominable of you, Socrates You take the words in the sense Which is most damaging to the argument No, not at all, my good sir I understand them And I wish that you would be a little clearer Well, he said Have you never heard that forms of government differ? There are tyrannies And there are democracies And there are aristocracies Yes, I know And the government is the ruling power In each state Certainly And the different forms of government Make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical With a view to their several interests And these laws which are made by them Are the justice which they deliver To their subjects And him who transgresses them They punish as a breaker of the law And unjust And that is what I mean when I say that In all states there is the same principle Of justice which is the interest Of the government And as the government must be supposed To have power, the only reasonable conclusion Is that everywhere there is one principle Of justice which is the interest Of the stronger Now I understand you Will try to discover But let me remark that in defining justice You have yourself used the word interest Which you forbid me to use It is true, however, that in your definition The words of the stronger are added A small addition you must allow He said Great or small, never mind about that We must first inquire Whether what you are saying is the truth Now we are both agreed that justice Is interest of some sort But you go on to say About this addition I am not so sure And must therefore consider further Proceed I will And first, tell me Do you admit that it is just for subjects To obey their rulers I do But are the rulers of states Absolutely infallible Or are they sometimes liable to err To be sure, he replied They are liable to err Then in making their laws True When they make them rightly They make them agreeably to their interest When they are mistaken Contrary to their interest You admit that Yes And the laws that they make Must be obeyed by their subjects And that is what you call justice Doubtless Then justice according to your argument Is not only obedience to the interest Of the stronger I am only repeating what you are saying I believe But let us consider Have we not admitted that the rulers May be mistaken about their own interest In what they command And also that to obey them is justice Has that not been admitted Yes Then you must also have acknowledged Justice not to be for the interest of the stronger When the rulers unintentionally Command things to be done Which are to their own injury This is the obedience which the subject Renders through their commands In that case, oh wisest of men Is there any escape from the conclusion That the weaker are commanded to do Not what is for the interest But what is for the injury of The stronger Nothing can be clearer, Socrates Said Polymarcus Yes, said Clytophon interposing If you are allowed to be his witness But there is no need of any witness Said Polymarcus For Thrasymachus himself acknowledges That what is not for their own interest And that for subjects to obey them is justice Yes, Polymarcus Thrasymachus said That for subjects to do what was commanded By their rulers is just Yes, Clytophon But he also said That justice is the interest of the stronger And while admitting both these propositions He further acknowledged That the stronger may command the weaker Who are his subjects to do what is not For his own interest That is to say quite as much as the interest Of the stronger But said Clytophon He meant by the interest of the stronger That the stronger thought to be his interest This was what the weaker had to do And this was affirmed by him to be justice Those were not his words rejoined Polymarcus Never mind, I replied If he now says that they are Let us accept his statement Tell me, Thrasymachus I said Justice What the stronger thought to be his interest Whether really so or not Certainly not He said Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken The stronger at the time when he is mistaken Yes, I said My impression was that you did so When you admitted that the ruler was not infallible But might be sometimes mistaken End of Book 1, Part 2 Book 1, Part 3 Of Plato's Republic This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information Or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Recording by M.B. The Republic by Plato Translated by Benjamin Jowett Book 1, Part 3 You argue like an informer of Socrates Do you mean for example That he who is mistaken about the sick Is a physician in that he is mistaken Or that he who urs in arithmetic or grammar Is an arithmetician or grammarian At the time when he is making the mistake In respect of the mistake True, we say that the physician Or arithmetician or grammarian Has made a mistake But this is only a way of speaking For the fact is that neither the grammarian Nor any other person of skill Ever makes a mistake Insofar as he is what his name implies They none of them ur Unless their skill fails them And then they cease to be skilled artists No artist or sage or ruler Urs at the time when he is what his name implies Though he is commonly said to ur And I adopted the common mode of speaking But to be perfectly accurate Since you are such a lover of accuracy We should say that the ruler Insofar as he is a ruler Is honoring And being honoring always commands That which is for his own interest And the subject is required to execute his commands And therefore as I said at first And now repeat The stronger Indeed, Thrasymachus And do I really appear to you to argue Like an informer? Certainly, he replied And do you suppose that I ask these questions With any design of injuring you In the argument? Nay, he replied Suppose is not the word I know it But you will be found out And by sheer force of argument You will never prevail Would any misunderstanding occurring Between us in future let me ask In what sense do you speak of a ruler Or a stronger whose interest As you were saying He being the superior It is just that the inferior should execute Is he a ruler in the popular Or in the strict sense of the term In the strictest of all senses He said And now cheat and play the informer If you can I ask no quarter at your hands But you never will be able, never And do you imagine I said That man is to try and cheat Thrasymachus, I might as well shave a lion Why, he said You made the attempt a minute ago And you failed Enough, I said, of these civilities It will be better that I should ask you a question Is the physician taken in that strict sense Of which you are speaking A healer of the sick or a maker of money And remember that I am now speaking Of the true physician A healer of the sick He replied And the pilot, that is to say A sailor's or a mere sailor A captain of sailors The circumstance that he sails in the ship Is not to be taken into account Neither is he to be called a sailor The name pilot by which he is distinguished Has nothing to do with sailing But is significant of his skill And of his authority over the sailors Very true, he said Now I said Every art has an interest Certainly For which the art has to consider And provide Yes, that is the aim of art And the interest of any art Is the perfection of it This and nothing else What do you mean I mean what I may illustrate negatively By the example of the body Suppose you were to ask me Whether the body is self-sufficing Or has wants I should reply Certainly the body has wants For the body may be ill And intention of medicine As you will acknowledge Quite right, he replied But is the art of medicine Or any other art faulty or deficient In any quality in the same way That the eye may be deficient in sight Or the ear fail of hearing And therefore requires another art To provide for the interests Of seeing and hearing Has art in itself, I say Any similar liability to fault Or defect And does every art require Or have the arts to look Only after their own interests Or have they no need Either of themselves or of another Having no faults or defects They have no need to correct them Either by the exercise of their own art Or of any other They have only to consider The interest of their subject matter For every art remains pure And faultless while remaining true That is to say, while perfect And unimpaired Take the words in your precise sense Medicine does not consider The interest of medicine But the interest of the body True, he said Nor does the art of horsemanship Consider the interests of the art of horsemanship But the interests of the horse And either do any other arts Care for themselves For they have no needs They care only for that Which is the subject of their art True, he said But surely Thresymachus The arts are the superiors No science or art considers Or and joins the interests Of the stronger or superior But only the interest of the subject And weaker He made an attempt To contest this proposition also But finally acquiesced Then I continued No physician insofar as he is a physician Considered his own good in what he prescribes But the good of his patient For the true physician Is also a ruler having the human body As a subject And the pilot likewise In the strict sense of the term Is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor That has been admitted And such a pilot and ruler Will provide and prescribe For the interest of the sailor Who is under him and not for his own Or the ruler's interest He gave a reluctant yes Then I said Thresymachus there is no one in any rule Who insofar as he is a ruler Considered or enjoins what is for his own interest But always what is for the interest Of his art To that he looks and that alone He considers in everything which he says and does When we had got to this point in the argument And everyone saw that the definition of justice Had been completely upset Thresymachus instead of replying to me said Tell me Socrates Have you got a nurse Why do you ask such a question I said When you ought rather to be answering Because she leaves you to snivel And never wipes your nose And she has not even taught you To know the shepherd from the sheep When he heard fattens or tends the sheep Or oxen with a view to their own good And not to the good of himself or his master And you further imagine that the rulers Of states if they are true rulers Never think of their subjects as sheep And that they are not studying Their own advantage day and night Oh no and so entirely astray Are you in your ideas about the just And unjust as not even to know That justice and the just are in reality Another's good that is to say The interest of the ruler and stronger And the loss of the subject and servant And injustice the opposite For the unjust is lord over the truly Simple and just He is the stronger and his subjects Do what is for his interest And minister to his happiness Which is very far from being their own Consider further most foolish socrates That the just is always a loser In comparison with the unjust First of all in private contracts Whenever the unjust is the partner Of the just you will find That when the partnership is dissolved The unjust man has always more And the just less Secondly in their dealings with the state When there is an income tax The just man will pay more And the unjust less on the same amount Of income and when there is anything To be received the one gains nothing And the other much Observe also what happens when they Take an office there is the just man Neglecting his affairs and perhaps Suffering other losses and getting Nothing out of the public because he Is hated by his friends And acquaintances for refusing to serve Them in unlawful ways But all this is reversed in the case Of the unjust man I am speaking as Before of injustice on a large scale In which the advantage of the unjust Is most apparent and my meaning Will be most clearly seen if we turn To that highest form of injustice In which the criminal is the happiest Of men and the sufferers or those Who refuse to do injustice are the Most miserable that is to say tyranny Which by fraud and force takes away The property of others Not little by little but wholesale Comprehending in one things sacred As well as profane private and public For which acts of wrong if you were Detected perpetrating any one of them Singly he would be punished And incur a great disgrace They who do such wrong in particular Cases are called robbers of temples And man stealers and burglars And swindlers and thieves But when a man besides taking away The money of the citizens has made Slaves of them then instead of Approach he is termed happy and blessed Not only by the citizens but by all Who hear of his having achieved The consummation of injustice For mankind censure injustice Fearing that they may be the victims Of it and not because they shrink From committing it and thus As I have shown Socrates injustice When on a sufficient scale Has more strength and freedom And mastery than justice and as I said at first justice is The interest of the stronger whereas Injustice is a man's own profit Thressomachus when he had thus spoken Having like a bath man Deluged our eyes with his words Had a mind to go away But the company would not let him They insisted that he should remain And defend his position And I myself added my own humble request That he would not leave us Thressomachus I said to him Excellent man How suggestive are your remarks And are you going to run away Before you've fairly taught or learned Whether they are true or not To determine how life may be passed By each of us to the greatest advantage And do I differ from you He said as to the importance of the inquiry You appear rather I replied to have no care or thought About us Thressomachus Whether we live better or worse From not knowing what you say you know Is to you a matter of indifference Pretty friend do not keep your knowledge to yourself We are a large party And any benefit which you confer upon us Will be amply rewarded For my own part I openly declare And that I do not believe in justice To be more gainful than justice Even if uncontrolled And allowed to have free play For granting that there may be An unjust man who is able to commit injustice Either by fraud or force Still this does not convince me Of the superior advantage of injustice And there may be others Who are in the same predicament with myself Perhaps we may be wrong If so, you in your wisdom Should convince us that we are mistaken In preferring justice to injustice If you are not already convinced By what I have just said What more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily Into your souls? Heaven forbid, I said I would only ask you to be consistent Or if you change, change openly And let there be no deception For I must remark Thressomachus If you will recall what was previously said That although you began by defining The true physician in an exact sense You did not observe a like exactness When speaking of the shepherd As a shepherd tends the sheep Not with a view to their own good But like a mirrored diner or banker With a view to the pleasures of the table Or again as a trader for sale in the market And not as a shepherd Yet surely the art of the shepherd Is concerned only with the good of his subjects He has only to provide the best for them Since the perfection of the art Is already ensured whenever all the requirements Of it are satisfied And that was what I was saying just now About the ruler That the art of the ruler Considered as ruler Whether in a state or in private life Could only regard the good of his flock Or subjects Whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states That is to say the true rulers Like being in authority Think, nay, I am sure of it Then why in the case of lesser offices Do men never take them willingly without payment Unless under the idea that they govern For the advantage not of themselves But of others Let me ask you a question Are not the several arts different By reason of their each having a separate function And my dear illustrious friend Do say what you think That we may make a little progress Yes, that is the difference He replied And each art gives us a particular good And not merely a general one Medicine, for example, gives us health Navigation, safety at sea, and so on Yes, he said And the art of payment Has the special function of giving pay But we do not confuse this with other arts Any more than the art of the pilot Is to be confused with the art of medicine Because the health of the pilot May be improved by a sea voyage You would not be inclined to say Would you that navigation is the art of medicine At least if we are to adopt Your exact use of language Certainly not Or because a man is in good health When he receives pay You would not say that the art of payment Is medicine Nor would you say that medicine Is the art of receiving pay Because a man takes fees When he is engaged in healing Certainly not And we have admitted, I said, That the good of each art Is specially confined to the art Yes Then if there be any good Which all artists have in common That is to be attributed to something Of which they all have the common use True, he replied And when the artist is benefited Of pay Which is not the art professed by him He gave a reluctant assent to this Then the pay is not derived By the several artists From their respective arts But the truth is That while the art of medicine Gives health and the art of the builder Builds a house Another art attends them Which is the art of pay The various arts may be doing their own business And benefiting that over which they preside But would the artist receive But does he therefore confer no benefit When he works for nothing Certainly he confers a benefit Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer Any doubt that neither arts nor governments Provide for their own interests But as we were before saying They rule and provide for the interests Of their subjects who are the weaker And not the stronger To their good they attend And not to the good of the superior And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, Why, as I was just now saying No one is willing to govern Because no one likes to take in hand The reformation of evils Which are not his concern Without remuneration For in the execution of his work And in giving his orders to another The true artist does not regard his own interest But always that of his subjects And therefore in order that rulers May be willing to rule They must be paid in one of three modes Of payment Money or honour Or a penalty for refusing Said Glaucon The first two modes of payment Are intelligible enough But what the penalty is I do not understand Or how a penalty can be a payment You mean that you do not understand The nature of this payment Which to the best men Is the great inducement to rule Of course you know that ambition And avarice are held to be As indeed they are A disgrace Very true And for this reason I am only demanding payment for governing And so to get the name of hirelings Nor by secretly helping themselves Out of the public revenues To get the name of thieves And not being ambitious They do not care about honour Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them And they must be induced To serve from the fear of punishment And this as I imagine Is the reason why the forwardness To take office Instead of waiting to be compelled Has been deemed dishonourable And he who refuses to rule Is liable to be ruled By one who is worse than himself And the fear of this as I conceive Induces the good to take office Not because they would But because they cannot help Not under the idea that they are going to have Any benefit or enjoyment themselves But as a necessity And because they are not able to commit The task of ruling To anyone who is better than themselves Or indeed as good For there is reason to think As much an object of contention As to obtain office is at present Then we should have plain proof That the true ruler is not meant by nature To regard his own interest But that of his subjects And everyone who knew this Would choose rather to receive A benefit from another Than to have the trouble of conferring one So far am I from agreeing with Rasmakas that justice Is the interest of the stronger The latter question Is further discussed at present But when Rasmakas says That the life of the unjust Is more advantageous than that of the just His new statement appears to me To be of a far more serious character Which of us has spoken truly And which sort of life Glockon do you prefer I for my part Deem the life of the just To be the more advantageous He answered Did you hear all of the advantages Yes I heard him He replied But he has not convinced me Then shall we try to find some way Of convincing him if we can That he is saying what is not true Most certainly he replied If I said He makes a set speech And we make another accounting All the advantages of being just And he answers and we rejoin There must be a numbering And measuring of the goods Which are claimed on either side As we greatly did By making admissions to one another We shall unite the offices Of judge and advocate in our own persons Very good He said And which method do I understand You to prefer I said That which you propose End of Book 1 Part 3 Book 1 Part 4 Of Plato's Republic This is a Librivox recording For more information or to volunteer Please visit Librivox.org Recording by MB The Republic by Plato Translated by Benjamin Jowett Book 1 Part 4 Well then Thrasumachus I said You say that perfect injustice Is more gainful than perfect justice Yes that is what I say And I have given you my reasons And what is your view about them Would you call one of them virtue And the other vice Certainly I suppose that you would call Justice virtue and injustice vice What a charming notion So likely too seeing that I affirm Injustice to be profitable And justice not What else then would you say The opposite He replied And would you call justice vice No I would rather say sublime simplicity Then you would call injustice malignity No I would rather say discretion And do the unjust appear to you To be wise and good Yes he said At any rate those of them who are Able to be perfectly unjust And who have the power of subduing States and nations But perhaps you imagine me to be talking Of cut purses If undetected has advantages Though they are not to be compared With those of which I was just now speaking I do not think that I misapprehend Your meaning Thrasymachus I replied But still I cannot hear without amazement That you class injustice with wisdom And virtue and justice with the opposite Certainly I do so class them Now I said You are on more substantial And almost unanswerable ground For if the injustice which you were Being to be profitable Had been admitted by you as by others To be vice and deformity An answer might have been given to you On received principles But now I perceive that you will call Injustice honorable and strong And to the unjust you will attribute All the qualities which were attributed By us before to the just Seeing that you do not hesitate to rank Injustice with wisdom and virtue You have guessed most infallibly He replied Then I certainly ought not to shrink So long as I have reason to think that you Thrasymachus are speaking your real mind For I do believe that you are now In earnest and are not amusing yourself At our expense I may be in earnest or not But what is that to you To refute the argument is your business Very true I said That is what I have to do But will you be so good as answer Yet one more question Does the just man try to gain Far otherwise if he did He would not be the simple amusing creature Which he is And would he try to go beyond just action He would not And how would he regard the attempt To gain an advantage over the unjust Would that be considered by him as just Or unjust He would think it just And would try to gain the advantage But he would not be able Whether he would or would not be able I said is not to the point That the just man While refusing to have more than Another just man would wish and claim To have more than the unjust Yes, he would And what of the unjust Does he claim to have more than The just man and to do more than Is just Of course He said for he claims to have more Than all men And the unjust man will strive And struggle to obtain more than The unjust man or action More than all True We may put the matter thus I said the just Does not desire more than his like But more than his unlike Whereas the unjust Desires more than both his like And his unlike Nothing, he said Can be better than that statement And the unjust is good and wise And the just is neither Good again, he said And is not the unjust Good and the just unlike them Of course, he said He who is of a certain nature Is like those who are of a certain nature He who is not, not Each of them, I said Is such as his like is Certainly, he replied Very good Thresymachus, I said And now to take the case of the arts You would admit that One man is a musician And another not a musician Yes And which is wise and which is foolish Clearly, the musician is wise And he who is not a musician Is foolish And he is good in as far as he is wise And bad in as far as he is foolish Yes And you would say the same Sort of thing of the physician Yes And do you think, my excellent friend That a musician when he adjusts A desire would desire Or claim to exceed or go beyond A musician in the tightening And loosening the strings I do not think that he would But he would claim to exceed The non-musician Of course And what would you say of the physician In prescribing meats and drinks Would he wish to go beyond Another physician or beyond The practice of medicine He would not But he would wish to go Yes And about knowledge and ignorance In general See whether you think that any man Who has knowledge ever would wish To have the choice of saying or doing More than another man who has knowledge Would he not rather say or do the same As he is like in the same case That I suppose can hardly be denied And what of the ignorant Would he not desire to have more Than either the knowing or the ignorant I dare say And the knowing is wise Yes And the wise is good True Then the wise and good Will not desire to gain more than his like But more than his unlike and opposite I suppose so Whereas the bad and ignorant Will desire to gain more than both Yes But did we not say, Thrasymachus That the unjust goes beyond His like and unlike Were not these your words They were And you also said That the just will not go beyond his like But his unlike Yes Then the just is like the wise and good And the unjust like the evil and ignorant That is the inference And each of them is such as his like is That was admitted Then the just has turned out to be wise And good and the unjust Evil and ignorant Thrasymachus made all these admissions Not fluently as I repeat them But with extreme reluctance It was a hot summer's day And the perspiration poured from him in torrents And then I saw what I had never seen before Thrasymachus blushing As we were now agreed That justice was virtue and wisdom And injustice, vice and ignorance I proceeded to another point Well, I said Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled But were we not also saying That injustice had sprank? Do you remember? Yes, I remember, he said But do not suppose that I approve Of what you are saying or have no answer If however I were to answer You would be quite certain To accuse me of haranguing Therefore either permit me to have my say out Or if you would rather ask Do so and I will answer very good As they say to storytelling old women Certainly not, I said If contrary to your real opinion Yes, he said I will to please you Since you will not let me speak What else would you have? Nothing in the world, I said And if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer Proceed Then I will repeat the question Which I asked before In order that our examination Of the relative nature of justice A statement was made That injustice is stronger And more powerful than justice But now justice, having been identified With wisdom and virtue Is easily shown to be stronger than injustice If injustice is ignorance This can no longer be questioned By anyone But I want to view the matter Of Razumakis in a different way You would not deny that a state may be Unjust and may be unjustly attempting To enslave other states Or may have already enslaved them True, he replied And I will add that the best And most perfectly unjust state Will be most likely to do so I know, I said That such was your position But what I would further consider is Whether this power which is possessed By the superior state can exist Or be exercised without justice Or only with justice If you are right in your view And justice is wisdom Then only with justice Then without justice I am delighted, Razumakis, to see you are not Only nodding assent and dissent But making answers which are quite excellent That is out of civility to you, he replied You are very kind, I said And would you have the goodness also to inform me Whether you think that a state Or an army or a band of robbers and thieves Or any other gang of evil doers Could act at all if they injured one another No indeed, he said they could not But if they abstained from injuring one another They might act together better Yes And this is because injustice creates divisions And hatreds and fighting And justice imparts harmony and friendship Is that not true, Razumakis? I agree, he said Because I do not wish to quarrel with you How good of you, I said But I should like to know also Whether injustice having this tendency To arouse hatred wherever existing Among slaves or among freemen Will not make them hate one another And set them at variance And render them incapable of common action And certainly And even if injustice be found in two only Will they not quarrel and fight And become enemies to one another And to the just They will And suppose injustice abiding in a single person Would your wisdom say That she loses or that she retains Her natural power Let us assume that she retains her power Yet is not the power which injustice Exercises of such a nature That wherever she takes up her abode Whether in a city, in an army, in a family Or in any other body That body is to begin with Rendered incapable of united action By reason of sedition and distraction And does not become its own enemy And at variance with all that opposes it And with the just Is this not the case? Yes, certainly And is not injustice equally fatal When existing in a single person In the first place, rendering him incapable of action Because he is not at unity with himself And in the second place, making him an enemy To himself and the just Is that not true, Thrasymachus? Yes And oh my friend, I said Surely the gods are just Granted that they are But if so The unjust will be the enemy of the gods And the just will be their friend Feast away in triumph And take your fill of the argument I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company Well then proceed with your answers And let me have the remainder of my repast For we have already shown That the just are clearly wiser and better And abler than the unjust And that the unjust are incapable of common action Name more that to speak as we did Of men who are evil acting at any time Vigorously together It is not strictly true For if they had been perfectly evil They would have laid hands upon one another But it is evident that there must have been Some remnant of justice in them Which enabled them to combine If there had not been They would have injured one another As well as their victims They were but half villains in their enterprises For had they been whole villains And utterly unjust They would have been utterly incapable of action That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter And not what you said at first But whether the just have a better and happier life Than the unjust Is a further question which we also proposed To consider I should think that they have And for the reasons which I have given But still I should like to examine further For no light matters at stake Nothing less than the rule of human life Proceed I will proceed by asking a question Would you not say that a horse has some end? I should And the end Or use of a horse or of anything Would be that which could not be accomplished Or not so well accomplished By any other thing I do not understand He said Let me explain Can you see, except with the eye Certainly not Or hear, except with the ear No Then these may be truly said To be the ends of these organs They may But you can cut off a vine branch With a dagger or with a chisel Of course And yet not so well as with a pruning hook Made for the purpose True May we not say that this is the end Of a pruning hook We may Then now I think you will have no difficulty In understanding my meaning when I asked the question Whether the end of anything would be that Which could not be accomplished Or not so well accomplished By any other thing I understand your meaning, he said And ascent The end is appointed Also has an excellence Need I ask again whether the eye has an end? It has And has not the eye an excellence? Yes And the ear has an end and an excellence also? Truth And the same is true of all other things They have each of them an end And a special excellence That is so Well, and can the eyes fulfill their end If they are wanting in their own proper excellence And have a defect instead How can they, he said If they are blind and cannot see You mean to say If they have lost their proper excellence Which is sight But I have not arrived at that point yet I would rather ask the question more generally And only inquire Whether the things which fulfill their ends Fulfill them by their own proper excellence And fail of fulfilling them by their own defect Certainly, he replied I might say the same of the ears When deprived of their own proper excellence They cannot fulfill their end True And the same observation will apply To all other things I agree Well, and has not the soul an end Which nothing else can fulfill For example, to superintend and command And deliberate and the like Are not these functions proper to the soul And can they be rightly assigned To any other To no other And is not life to be reckoned Of the soul Assuredly, he said And has not the soul an excellence also Yes And can she or can she not fulfill Her own ends when deprived of that excellence She cannot Then an evil soul Must necessarily be an evil ruler And superintendent And the good soul a good ruler Yes, necessarily And we have admitted that justice Is the absence of the soul And injustice the defect of the soul That has been admitted Then the just soul and the just man Will live well and the unjust man Will live ill That is what your argument proves And he who lives well Is blessed and happy And he who lives ill The reverse of happy Certainly Then the justice happy And the unjust miserable But happiness and not misery is profitable Of course Then my blessed Thrasomachus Injustice can never be more profitable Than justice Let this, Socrates he said Be your entertainment at the Bendidae For which I am indebt to you I said Now that you have grown gentle Towards me and have left off scolding Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained But that was my own fault and not yours As an epicure snatches a taste Of every dish which is successively brought to table He not having allowed himself time To enjoy the one before So have I gone from one subject to another Without having discovered what I sought at first The nature of justice I left that inquiry and turned away To consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom Or evil and folly And when there arose a further discussion About the comparative advantages Of justice and injustice I could not refrain from passing on to that And the result of the whole discussion has been That I know nothing at all For I know not what justice is And therefore I am not likely to know Whether it is or is not a virtue Nor can I say whether the just man Is happy or unhappy End of book one Book two part one Of Plato's Republic This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings Are in the public domain For more information Or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Recording by M.B. The Republic by Plato Translated by Benjamin Jowett Book two part one With these words I was thinking that I had made An end of the discussion But the end in truth Proved to be only a beginning For Glaucon, who is always the most Pugnacious of men He wanted to have the battle out So he said to me Socrates, do you really wish to persuade us Or only to seem to have persuaded us That to be just is always better Than to be unjust I should wish really to persuade you I replied if I could Then you certainly have not succeeded Let me ask you how How would you arrange goods Are there not some which we welcome For their own sakes and independently Of their consequences As, for example, harmless pleasures And enjoyments which delight us At the time, although nothing Follows from them I agree in thinking that there is Such a class, I replied Is there not only a second class Of goods such as knowledge, sight, health Which are desirable not only in themselves But also for their results Certainly I said And would you not recognize A third class such as gymnastic And the care of the sick And the positions are Also the various ways of money making These do us good But we regard them as disagreeable And no one would choose them For their own sakes but only for the sake Of some reward or result which flows from them There is, I said This third class also But why do you ask Because I want to know In which of the three classes You would place justice In the highest class I replied For the sake of their results Then the many are of another mind They think that justice Is to be reckoned in the troublesome class Among goods which are to be pursued For the sake of rewards and of reputation But in themselves are disagreeable And rather to be avoided I know, I said That this is their manner of thinking And that this was the thesis Thrasomachus was maintaining just now When he censured justice And praised injustice But I am too stupid to be convinced by him He said That you would hear me as well as him And then I shall see whether you and I agree For Thrasomachus seems to me like a snake To have been charmed by your voice Sooner than he ought to have been But to my mind The nature of justice and injustice Have not yet been made clear Setting aside their rewards and results I want to know what they are in themselves And how they inwardly work in the soul If you please then I will revive the argument of Thrasomachus And first I will speak of the nature According to the common view of them Secondly I will show that all men who practice justice Do so against their will of necessity But not as a good And thirdly I will argue that there is reason In this view For the life of the unjust is after all Better far than the life of the just If what they say is true Socrates Since I myself am not of their opinion But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed When I hear the voices of Thrasomachus And myriads of others dimming in my ears And on the other hand I have never yet heard the superiority of justice To injustice maintained by anyone In a satisfactory way I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself Then I shall be satisfied And you are the person from whom I think That I am most likely to hear this And therefore I will praise the unjust life To the utmost of my power And my manner of speaking will indicate The manner in which I desire to hear You too praising justice and centering injustice Will you say whether you approve Of my proposal Indeed I do Nor can I imagine any theme about which A man of sense would often or wish to converse I am delighted, he replied To hear you say so And shall begin by speaking as I proposed Of the nature and the origin of justice They say that to do injustice Is by nature good To suffer injustice evil And that the evil is greater than the good And so when men have both done And suffered injustice And have had experience of both Not being able to avoid the one And obtain the other They think that they had better agree Among themselves to have neither Hence there arise laws and mutual covenants And that which is ordained by law Is termed by them lawful and just This they affirm to be the origin And nature of justice It is a mean or compromise Between the best of all Which is to do injustice and not be punished And the worst of all Which is to suffer injustice Without the power of retaliation And the middle point between the two Is tolerated not as good But as the lesser evil And honored by reason of the inability Of men to do injustice For no man who is worthy to be called a man Would ever submit to such an agreement If he were able to resist He would be mad if he did Such is the received account socrates Of the nature and origin of justice Now that those who practice justice Do so involuntarily And because they have not the power To be unjust To be worthy of this kind Having given both to the just And the unjust power to do what they will Let us watch and see wither desire Will lead them Then we shall discover in the very act The just and unjust man To be proceeding along the same road Following their interest Which all natures deem to be their good And are only diverted into the path of justice By the force of law The liberty which we are supposing May be most completely given to them In the form of such a power That the king of the cities The ancestor of cresis the Lydian According to the tradition Gaijes was a shepherd In the service of the king of Lydia There was a great storm And an earthquake made an opening In the earth at the place Where he was feeding his flock Amazed at the sight He descended into the opening Where, among other marvels He beheld a hollow brazen horse Having doors at which He's stooping and booking in This he took from the finger of the dead And re-ascended Now the shepherds met together According to custom That they might send their monthly report About the flocks to the king Into their assembly he came Having the ring on his finger And as he was sitting among them He chanced to turn the collet of the ring Inside his hand When instantly he became invisible To the rest of the company And they began to speak of him As if he were no longer present In the trials of the ring And always with the same result When he turned the collet inwards He became invisible When outwards he reappeared Whereupon he contrived to be chosen One of the messengers who were sent to the court Whereas as soon as he arrived He seduced the queen And with her help conspired against the king And slew him and took the kingdom Suppose now that there were two such magic rings And the just put on one of them And the unjust the other No man can be imagined Fast in justice No man would keep his hands off What was not his own When he could safely take what he liked Out of the market or go into houses And lie with anyone at his pleasure Or kill or release from prison whom he would And in all respects be like a god among men Then the actions of the just Would be as the actions of the unjust They would both come at last To the same point And we may truly affirm to be a great proof That a man is just not willingly Or because he thinks that justice is any good To him individually but of necessity For wherever anyone thinks that he can Safely be unjust There he is unjust For all men believe in their hearts That injustice is far more profitable To the individual than justice And he who argues as I have been supposing Will say they are right If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power To become invisible and never doing any wrong Or touching what was in others He would be thought by the lookers on The most wretched idiot Although they would praise him to one another's faces And keep up appearances with one another From a fear that they too might suffer injustice Enough of this Now if we are to form a real judgement Of the life of the just and unjust We must isolate them There is no other way And how is the isolation to be affected I answer Let the unjust man be entirely unjust And the just man entirely just Nothing is to be taken away from either of them And both are to be perfectly furnished For the work of their respective lives First let the unjust be like other distinguished Masters of craft Like the skilful pilot or physician Who knows intuitively his own powers And keeps within their limits And who if he fails at any point Is able to recover himself So let the unjust make his unjust attempts In the right way And lie hidden if he means to be great In his injustice He who is found out is nobody For the highest reach of injustice is To be deemed just when you are not Therefore I say That in the perfectly unjust man We must assume the most perfect injustice There is to be no deduction But we must allow him While doing the most unjust acts To have acquired the greatest reputation For justice If he have taken a false step He must be able to recover himself He must be one who can speak with effect If any of his deeds come to light And who can force his way where force is Required by his courage and strength And command of money and friends And at his side Let us place the just man In his nobleness and simplicity Wishing, as Escalus says, To be and not to seem good There must be no seeming For if he seemed to be just He will be honoured and rewarded And then we shall not know Whether he is just for the sake of justice Or for the sake of honours and rewards Therefore let him be clothed in justice only And have no other covering And he must be imagined in a state of life The opposite of the former Let him be the best of men And let him be thought the worst Then he will have been put to the proof And we shall see whether he will be affected By the fear of infamy and its consequences And let him continue thus to the hour of death Being just and seeming to be unjust When both have reached the other most extreme The one of justice and the other of injustice Let judgment be given which of them Is the happier of the two Heavens, my dear Glaucon, I said How energetically you polish them up for the decision First one and then the other As if they were two statues I'd do my best, he said And now that we know what they are like There is no difficulty in tracing out The sort of life which awaits either of them This I will proceed to describe But as you may think the description A little too coarse I ask you to suppose, Socrates, That the words which follow are not mine Let me put them into the mouths Of the eulogists of injustice They will tell you that the just man Who is thought unjust will be Scorched, wracked, bound Will have his eyes burnt out And, at last, after suffering Every kind of evil, he will be impaled Then he will understand That he ought to seem only And not to be just For the words of Escalus Then at the just For the unjust is pursuing a reality He does not live with a view to appearances He only wants to be really unjust And not to seem only His mind has a soil deep and fertile Out of which spring his prudent councils In the first place he is thought just And therefore bears rule in the city He can marry whom he will And give in marriage to whom he will And also he can trade and deal where he likes And always to his own advantage He has no misgivings about injustice And at every contest Whether in public or private He gets the better of his antagonists And gains at their expense and is rich And out of his gains He can benefit his friends and harm his enemies Moreover he can offer sacrifices And dedicate gifts to the gods Abundantly and magnificently And can honour the gods Or any man whom he wants to honour In a far better style than the just And therefore he is likely to be Deerer than they are to the gods Gods and men are said to unite In making the life of the unjust Better than the life of the just I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon When Adamantus, his brother, interposed Socrates, he said Do you not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged? Why, what else is there? I answered The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned He replied Well then, according to the proverb Let brother help brother If he fails in any part Do you assist him? Although I must confess that Glaucon has already said Quite enough to lay me in the dust And take from me the power of helping justice Nonsense, he replied But let me add something more There is another side to Glaucon's argument About the praise and censure of justice And injustice Which is equally required in order to bring out What I believe to be his meaning Parents and tutors are always telling their sons And their wards that they are to be just But why? But for the sake of character and reputation In the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed Just some of those offices, marriages and the like Which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others For they throw in the good opinion of the gods and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, reign upon the pious And this accords with the testimony of the first of whom says that the gods make the oaks of the just To bear acorns at their summit and bees in the middle And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces And many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them And Homer has a very similar strain For he speaks of one whose fame is As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, maintains justice To whom the black earth brings forth wheat and barley whose trees are bowed with fruit and fish Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Mousseus and his son vouchsafe to the just They take them down into the world below where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands Their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest mead of virtue Some extend their rewards yet further The posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third while in which they praise justice But about the wicked there is another strain They bury them in a slew in Hades and make them carry water and a sieve Also, while they are yet living they bring them to infamy and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust Nothing else does their invention supply Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other Once more Socrates I will ask you to consider this which is not confined to the poets but is found in prose writers The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honorable but grievous and toilsome and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment and are only censured by law and opinion They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy and to honor them both in public and in social while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor even though acknowledging them to be better than the others But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods They say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men and good and happiness to the wicked and the mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have to offer vices and charms with rejoicings and feasts and they promise to harm an enemy whether just or unjust at a small cost with magic arts and incantations binding heaven as they say to execute their will and the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod vice may be had in abundance without trouble the way is smooth then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men for he also says the gods too may be turned from their purpose and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by libations and the odor of fat when they have sinned and transgress and they produce a host of books written by Museus and Orpheus who were children of the moon and the Muses that is what they say according to which they perform in their cities that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour and are equally at the service of the living and the dead the latter sort they call mysteries and they redeem us from the pains of hell but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us he proceeded and now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice and the way in which gods and men regard them how are their minds and are quick-witted and like bees on the wing light on every flower and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they make the best of life probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days for what men say is that if I am really just and am not also thought just and lost on the other hand are unmistakable but if though unjust I acquire the reputation of justice a heavenly life is promised to me since then as philosophers prove appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness to appearance I must devote myself I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox and the man's but I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult to which I answer nothing great is easy nevertheless the argument indicates this if we would be happy to be the path along which we should proceed with a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs and there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies and so partly by persuasion they are punished still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived neither can they be compelled but what if there are no gods or suppose them to have no care of human things why in either case should we mind about concealment and even if there are gods and they do care about us yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets and these are the very persons who say they may be influenced and turned by offerings let us be consistent then and believe both or neither if the poets speak truly why then we had better be unjust and offer of the fruits of injustice for if we are just although we may escape the vengeance of heaven we shall lose the gains of injustice but if we are unjust we shall keep the gains and by our sinning and praying and praying and sinning the gods will be propitiated and we shall not be punished and suffer for our unjust deeds yes my friend will be the reflection but there are mysteries and atoning deities and these have great power that is what mighty cities declare and the children of the gods who were their poets and prophets bear a like testimony on what principle then shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice when if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances we shall fare to our mind and to our death as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us knowing all this Socrates how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth be willing to honour justice or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised and even if there should be someone who is able to disprove the truth of my words and who is satisfied that justice is best still he is not angry with the unjust but is very ready to forgive them so unless per adventure there be someone whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice or who has attained knowledge of the truth but no other man he only blames injustice who owing to cowardice or age or some weakness has not the power of being unjust and this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be the cause of all this Socrates and when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing Panagyrists of justice beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us and ending with the men of our own time no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories honours and benefits which flow from them no one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him justice is the greatest good and injustice the greatest evil had this been the universal strain had you sought to persuade us from this from our youth upwards we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong but everyone would have been his own watchman because afraid if he did wrong of harboring in himself the greatest of evils I dare say that Thrasomachus and others in the language which I have been merely repeating and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice grossly as I conceive perverting their true nature but I speak in this vehement manner as I must frankly confess to you because I want to hear from you the opposite side and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him to exclude the reputations for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false we shall say that you do not praise justice but the appearance of it we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark and that you really agree with Thrasomachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest though injurious to the weaker now as you have admitted that justice which are desired indeed for their results but in a far greater degree for their own sakes like sight or hearing or knowledge or health or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them let others praise justice and censure injustice magnifying the rewards and honors and abusing the other that is a manner of arguing which coming from them I am ready to tolerate but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question unless I hear the contrary from your own lips I expect something better and therefore I say not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice but show what they either of them due to the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil whether seen or unseen by gods and men this is part 2 part 2 of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox Record all LibriVox Recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Veran Miao the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joet part 2 part 2 I had always admired the genius of Lorden the genius of Gorgon and as I meant it, but on hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said, Sons of an illustrious father, that was not at that beginning of the Elegant Versus, which the admirer of Gorgon made in honour of you after you had distinguished yourselves hath a battle of Magaba. Sons of Ariston, he sang, divide offspring of an illustrious hero. The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced. This I infer from your general character, for hath I judged only from your speeches, I should have mistrusted you. But now the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say, for I am in a strait between two. On the one hand, I feel that I am unequal to the task, and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you are not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasi Marcus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice hath over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, long breath and speech remain to me. I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of, and not lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I hath best gift such help as I can. Glawkin and the rest entreated me, by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about the relative advantages. I told them what I really thought, that the inquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits. I think that we had better adopt a method, which I may illustrate thus. Suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by someone to read small letters from a distance, and it occurred to someone else that they might be found in another place which was larger, and in which the letters were larger. If they were the same, and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser, this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune. Very true, said Adimentus, that how this illustration applied to our inquiry. I will tell you, I replied, justice, which is the subject of our inquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as a virtue of an individual, and sometimes as a virtue of a state. True, he replied. And is not a state larger than an individual? It is. Then in the larger, the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easy to signable. I propose therefore that we inquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first, as they appear in the state, and secondly, in the individual, proceeding from the greater to lesser and comparing them. That, he said, is an excellent proposal. And if we imagine the state in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the state in process of creation also. I dare say, when the state is completed, there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered. Yes, far more easily. But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said, for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore. I have reflected, said Edamontis, and am anxious that you should proceed. A state, I said, arises as I conceive, out of the need of mankind. No one is self surprising, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a state be imagined? There can be no other. Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose, and another for another. And when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation, the body of inhabitants bestowed a state. True, he said. And the exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, and the idea that the exchange will be for a decade. Very true. Then, I said, let us begin and create an idea a state. And yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention. Of course, he replied. Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence. Suddenly, the second is a dwelling in the third clothing, and the like. True. Then now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand. We may suppose that one man is a husband man, another a builder, someone else a weaver. Shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants? Quite right. The various notions of a state must include four or five men. Clearly. And how will they proceed? Well, each bring the results of his labours into a common stock. The individual has men, for example, producing for four and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food, with which he supplies others as well as himself. Or will he have nothing to do with others and not be the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time, the employed in making a house, or a coat, or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants? Audimantes thought that he should aim at producing food, only and not at producing everything. Probably, I replied, that would be the better way. And when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all like. There are diversities of natures among us, which are adapted to different occupations. Very true. And will you have a work that are done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one? When he has only one? Further, there can be no doubt that our work is bought, but not done at the right time. No doubt. The business is not disposed away until the doer of the business is at leisure, but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object. He must, and if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily, and offer better quality when one man does one thing, which is natural to him, and does it at the right time, and leaves other things undoubtedly. Then, more than four seasons will be required, for the husbandmen will not make his own plow or meadow, nor other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools, and he too needs many, and unlike many other weaver and shoemaker. True. Then Carpenters and Smiths, and many other artisans, though we share us in our little state, which is already beginning to grow, true. Yet even if we at Lithert, Shepard, and other hutsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plow with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draft cattle, and couriers and weavers, fleecers and hights, still our state will not be very large. That is true, yet neither will it be a very small state, which contains all these. Then again there is the situation of the city, to find a place where nothing needs to be imported, is well-nigh impossible, impossible. Then there must be another class of seasons, who will bring the required supply from Analysty, there must. But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require, or with supply his need, he will come back empty-handed. That is certain. Then therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied. Very true. Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required. They will, not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants. Yes. Then we shall want merchants. We shall. And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed and inconsiderable numbers. Yes, inconsiderable numbers. Then again within the city, how will they exchange their productions to secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a state. Clearly they will buy and sell. Then they will need a marketplace and a money token for purposes of exchange. Certainly. Suppose now that a husbandman or an artisan brings some production to market, when he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him, is he to leave his calling and sit idle in a marketplace? Not at all. He will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In our audit states they are commonly those who are the rikers in bodily strengths, and therefore of little use for any other purpose. Their duty is to be in the market and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy. This wants, then, creates a class of retail traders in our state. It's not material that the term which is applied to those who sit in the marketplace, engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants. Yes, he said. And there is another class of servants who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship. Still they have plenty of bodily strengths for labour, which accordingly they sell and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of the labour. True. Then hirelings will help to make up our population. Yes, and now, as I mantis, is our state mature and perfected. I think so. And now, part two, part two, Recording by Vera Mille. Book two, part three of Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Allman. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joatt. Book two, part three. Where then is justice? And where is injustice? And in what part of the state did they spring up? Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found anywhere else. I daresay that you are right in your suggestion, I said. We had better think the matter out and not shrink from the inquiry. Let us consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, will they work in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter, substantially clothed and shod? They will feed on barley meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves. These they will serve up on a mat of reeds or of clean leaves, themselves reclining, the while upon bed strewn with the you or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praise of the gods in happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means, having an eye to poverty or war. But, said Laocan, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal. True, I replied, I had forgotten. Of course they must have a relish, salt and olives and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare. For dessert we shall give them figs and peas and beans, and they will roast myrtleberries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them. Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts? But what would you have, Laocan, I replied. Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style. Yes, I said, now I understand. The question which you would have me consider is, not only how a state, but how a luxurious state is created. And possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a state we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion, the true and healthy constitution of the state is the one which I have described. But if you wish to also see a state at fever heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas and tables and other furniture, also dainties and perfumes and incense and courtesans and cakes. All these not of one sort only, but in every variety. We must go beyond the necessities of which I was first speaking, such as houses and clothes and shoes. The arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of material must be procured. True, he said. Then we must enlarge our borders, for the original healthy state is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with the multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want. Such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colors, another will be the votaries of music poets, and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors. Also makers of diverse kinds of articles including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants, will not tutors also be in request, and nurses wet and dry, tire women and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks and swine herds too, who are not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our state, but are needed now. They must not be forgotten, and there will be animals of many other kinds of people eat them. Certainly. And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before, much greater, and the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough. Quite true. Then a slice of our neighbor's land will be wanted by us for pastor-intelligence, and they will want a slice of ours if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth. That, Socrates, will be inevitable. And so we shall go to war, Glockon, shall we not? Most certainly, he replied. Then without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all evil in states, private as well as public, undoubtedly. And our state must once more enlarge, and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as those things in persons whom we were describing above. Why, he said, are they not capable of defending themselves? No, I said. Not if we were right that the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the state, the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practice many arts with success. Very true, he said, but is not war and art, certainly, and an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking? Quite true. And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder, in order that we might have our shoes well made. But to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other. He was not to let opportunity slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now, nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done, but his war and art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan. Although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not for his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else, no tools will make a man a skilled workman or master of defense, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of a war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy armed or any other kind of troops? Yes, he said. The tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price. And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time and skill and art and application will be needed by him. No doubt, he replied. Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling? Certainly. Then it will be our duty to select, if we can. Natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city, it will. And the selection will be no easy matter, I said, but we must be brave and do our best. We must. Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and watching? What do you mean? I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him. And strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him. All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them. Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well. Yes. And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable his spirit and how in the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable? I have. Then we now have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian. True. And also of the mental ones. His soul is to be full of spirit. Yes. But are not these spirited natures have to be savage with one another and with everybody else? A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied. Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies and gentle to their friends. If not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them. True, he said. What is to be done then? I said, how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit? For the one is the contradiction of the other. True. He will not be a good guardian who is wanting either of these two qualities, and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible. I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied. Here feeling perplexed, I begin to think over what had preceded. My friend, I said. No wonder that we are in a perplexity, for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us. What do you mean, he said? I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with these opposite qualities. And what do you find them? Many animals, I replied. Furnished examples of them. Our friend, the dog, is a very good one. You know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances and they're averse to strangers. Yes, I know. Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities? Certainly not. Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian besides the spirited nature need to have the qualities of a philosopher? I do not apprehend your meaning. The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog and is remarkable in the animal. What trait? Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry. When in acquaintance he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious? The matter never struck me before, but I quite recognize the truth of your remark. And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming. Your dog is a true philosopher. Why? Why? Because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance? Most assuredly. And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy? They are the same, he replied. And may we not say confidently of man also that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge, that we may safely affirm. Then he is to be a really good and noble guardian that the state will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength, undoubtedly. Then we have found the desired natures. And now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is this not an inquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater inquiry which is our final end? How do justice and injustice grow up in states? For we do not want either to omit what is the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length. Adamentsus thought that the inquiry would be of great service to us. Then I said, my dear friend, the test must not be given up, even if somewhat long. Certainly not. End of Book Two, Part Three, Recording by Jim Allman, Houston, Texas. Book Two, Part Four of Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Allman. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joett. Book Two, Part Four. Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in storytelling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes. By all means, and what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort? And this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body and music for the soul. True. Shall we begin education with music and go on to gymnastic afterwards? By all means. And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not? I do. And literature may be either true or false. Yes. And the young shall be trained in both kinds and we begin with the faults? I do not understand your meaning, he said. You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious, and these stories are told to them when they are not of age to learn gymnastics. Very true. That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics. Quite right, he said. You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing. For that is the time at which characters being formed in the desired impression is more readily taken. Quite true. And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up? We cannot. Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good and reject the bad. And we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales even more fondly than they would mold the body with their hands. But most of those which are now in use must be discarded. Of which tales are you speaking, he said. You may find a model of the lesser and the greater, I said. For they are necessarily of the same type and there is the same spirit in both of them. Very likely, he replied, but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater. Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod and the rest of the poets, which have ever been the great storytellers of mankind. But which stories do you mean, he said, and what fault do you find with them? A fault which is most serious, I said, the fault of telling a lie and, what is more, a bad lie. But when is this fault committed? Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes, as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original. Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blamable. But what are the stories which you mean? First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie, too. I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons. If possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common illusion pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim, and then the number of the heroes will be very few indeed. Why, yes, he said, those stories are extremely objectionable. Yes, Adamantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our state. The young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous, and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods. I entirely agree with you, he said. In my opinion, those stories are quite unfit to be repeated. Neither if we mean future guardians to regard the habit of quarreling among themselves as of all things the basest, should anything be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fighting of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments, and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us, we would tell them that quarreling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens. This is what old men and old women should begin telling children, and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Hera his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her apart when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods and Homer, these tales must not be admitted into our state, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal. Anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable, and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts. There you are right, he replied, but if anyone asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking, how shall we answer him? I said to him, you and I, Edimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a state. Now the founders of a state ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them. But to make the tales is not their business. Very true, he said. But what are these forms of theology which you mean? Something of this kind, he replied, God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric, or tragic in which the representation is given. Right. And is he not truly good? And must he not be represented as such? Certainly. And no good thing is hurtful, no indeed. And that which is not hurtful, hurts not. Certainly not. And that which hurts not does no evil, no. And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil? Impossible. And the good is advantageous, yes. And therefore the cause of well-being yes. It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only. Assuredly. Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert. But he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils. And the good is to be attributed to God alone. Of the evils, the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him. That appears to me to be most true, he said. Then we must not listen to Homer to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casts, lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lads, one of good, the other of evil lads. And that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good. But that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, him wild hunger drives or the beauty's earth. And again, Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us. And if anyone asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandaris, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Thamus and Zeus, he shall not have our approval. Neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Asgillus thus. God plans guilt among men who, when he desires, utterly to destroy a house. And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Nairobi, the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur, or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan War, or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking. He must say that God did what was just and right, and that they were the better for being punished. But that those who are punished are miserable and that God is the author of their misery, the poet is not to be permitted to say. Though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God, but that God being good is the author of evil to anyone is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by anyone whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious. I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law. Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform, that God is not the author of all things, but of good only. That will do, he said. And what do you think of his second principle? Shall I ask whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape and now in another, sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations, or is he one in the same immutably fixed in his own proper image? I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought. Well, I said. But if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be affected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing, most certainly. And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed. For example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigor also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes. Of course. And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence? True. And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things. Furniture, houses, garments, when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances. Very true. Then everything which is good, or they're made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without. True. But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect? Of course they are. Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes. He cannot. But may he not change and transform himself? Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he has changed at all. And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly? If he changes at all, he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty. Very true, Adamantus. But then would anyone, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse? Impossible. Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change. Being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and forever in his own form. That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment. Then I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us, the gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms, and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let anyone, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Harry disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking in alms, for the life-giving daughters of Enochus the River of Argos. Let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths. Telling how certain gods, as they say, go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers in diverse forms, but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods. Heaven forbid, he said. But although the gods themselves are unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they make us think that they appear in various forms, perhaps, he replied. Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself? I cannot say, he replied. Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men? What do you mean, he said? I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters. There, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him. Still, he said, I do not comprehend you. The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my words, but I am only saying the deception or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie is what mankind like least. That, I say, is what they utterly detest. There is nothing more hateful to them. And as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie. For the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure, unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right? Perfectly right. The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men. Yes. Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful. In dealing with enemies, that would be an instance. Or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive. Also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking. Because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account. Very true, he said. But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity and therefore has recourse to invention? That would be ridiculous, he said. Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God? I should say not. Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies. That is inconceivable. But he may have friends who are senseless or mad. But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God. Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie. None whatever. Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood. Yes. Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed. He changes not. He deceives not. Either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision. Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own. You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type of form in which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who transform themselves. Neither do they deceive mankind in any way. I grant that. Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon. Neither will we praise the verses of Escalus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptals was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven, he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that the world of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, he who said this, he it is who has slain my son. These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger. And he who utters them shall be refused a course. Neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as fair as men can be, should be true worshipers of the gods and like them. I entirely agree, he said, in these principles and promised to make them my laws. End of Book Two. Recording by Jim Ollman, Houston, Texas. Book Three, Part One of Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Ollman. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joett. Book Three, Part One. Such then, I said, are our principles of theology. Some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards. If we mean them to honor the gods and their parents and to value friendship with one another. Yes, and I think that our principles are right, he said. But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous while he has the fear of death in him? Certainly not, he said. And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible? Impossible. Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales, as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors. That will be our duty, he said. Then I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses. I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have come to naught. We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared, lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods of horror should be seen both of mortals and immortals. And again, oh heavens, verily in the house of Hades there is soul in ghostly form, but no mind at all. Again of Thereseus, to him even after death did Persephone grant mind, that he alone should be wise, but the other souls are flitting shades, again. The soul flying from the limbs has gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, leaving manhood and youth. Again, and the soul with shrilling cry pass like smoke beneath the earth, and as bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved. And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these in similar passages, not because they are unpoetical or unattractive to the popular ear, but because they're great at the poetical charm of them, the lesser they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free and who should pierce slavery more than death, undoubtedly. Also, we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below. Costs at us and sticks, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shutter to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind, but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them. There is a real danger, he said. Then we must have no more of them. True. Another and nobler strain must be composed and sung by us. Clearly. And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men? They will go with the rest. But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect. Our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who was his comrade. Yes, that is our principle. And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friends as though he had suffered anything terrible. He will not. Such a one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself in his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. True, he said. And for this reason the loss of a son or brother or the deprivation of fortune is to him of all men least terrible, assuredly. And therefore he will be least likely to lament and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him. Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another. Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men and making them over to women and not even to women who are good for anything or to men of a baser sort that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like. That will be very right. And then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face, then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea, now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and pouring them over his head while weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseaching, rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name. Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying, Alas, my misery, alas, that I bore the bravest to my sorrow. But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods as to make him say, O heavens, with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round and round the city and my heart is sorrowful. Or again, woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpadon, dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Mautius. For if, my sweet adamantus, our youth seriously listens to such unworthy representations to the gods instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonored by similar actions. Neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like, and instead of having any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions. Yes, he said, that is most true. Yes, I replied, but that surely is what ought not to be as the argument has just proved to us, and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better. It ought not to be. Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter, for a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction, so I believe. Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed. Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied. Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he described how, inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods when they saw have fast as bustling about the mansion. On your views, we must not admit them. On my views, if you like to farther them on me, that we must not admit them as certain. Again, truth should be highly valued. If, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods and useful only as medicine to men, then the use of such medicine should be restricted to physicians. Private individuals have no business with them. Clearly not, he said. Then if anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the state should be the persons, and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind. And although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the people of the gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illness to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew and how things are going with himself for his fellow sailors. Most true, he said. If then, the ruler catches anybody besides himself lying in the state, any of the craftsman, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter, he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or state. Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the state is ever carried out. In the next place, our youth must be temperate, certainly, are not the chief elements of temperance, generally speaking, obedience to commanders and self-control and central pleasures, true. Then we shall approve such languages that of Diomedy and Homer. Friend, sit still and obey my word, and the verses which follow. The Greeks marched breathing prowess in silent awe of their leaders and other sentiments of the same kind. We shall. What of this line? O heavy with wine, who has the eyes of a dog in the heart of a stag and of the words which follow? Would you say that these or any similar impertences which private individuals are supposed to address their rulers, or their inversor prose are well or ill-spoken? They are ill-spoken. They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance, and therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men. Would you agree with me there? Yes. And then again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than when the tables are full of bread and meat and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups. Is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? Or the verse, the saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger. What would you say again to the tale of Zeus? Who, while other gods and men were asleep and heed the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust and was so completely overcome with the sight of Harry that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another without the knowledge of their parents? Or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Aries and Aphrodite? Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing. But any deeds of endurance which are done are told by famous men, these they ought to see in here, as for example, what is said in the verses, he smote his breast and thus reproached his heart, endure my heart, far worse hast thou endured. Certainly, he said. In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money, certainly not. Neither must we sing to them of, gifts persuading gods and persuading Reverend Kings. Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them, but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger? Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do so. Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved. Loving Homer, as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles or in believing that they are truly attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo where he says, thou hast wronged me, oh far darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I would be even with thee if I only had the power or his insubordination to the river god on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair which had been previously dedicated to the other river gods Barcaus and that he actually performed this vow or that he dragged Hector around the tomb of Patroclus and slaughtered the captives at the pyre. Of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Charon's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Pellus who was the gentless of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men. You were quite right, he replied, and let us equally refuse to believe or allow to be repeated the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon or a parathas son of Zeus going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them or that they were not the sons of gods. Both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil and that heroes are no better than men. Sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true. We have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods, assuredly not. And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them. For everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by the kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in the air on the peak of Ida, and who have the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins. And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young. By all means, he said, But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes in the world below should be treated has already been laid down. Very true. And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject. Clearly so. But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my friend. Why not? Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men, poets and storytellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy and the good miserable, and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but the justice is a man's own loss in another's gain. These things we shall forbid them to utter and command them to sing and say the opposite. To be sure we shall, he replied. But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle for which I have been all along contending. I grant the truth of your inference. That such things are, or are not to be said about men, is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is and how naturally advantage is to the possessor, whether he seems to be just or not. Most true, he said. End of Book 3, Part 1, recording by Jim Allman, Houston, Texas. Book 3, Part 2 of Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer. Please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jim Allman. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joatt. Book 3, Part 2. Enough of the subjects of poetry. Let us now speak of the style and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated. I do not understand what you mean, said Adamantus. Then I must make you understand and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come. Certainly, he replied. And narration may be either simple narration or imitation or a union of the two. That again, he said, I do not quite understand. I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet says that Crissus prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him. Whereupon Crissus, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the god against the Achaeans. Now, as far as these lines, and he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people. The poet is speaking in his own person. He never leads us to suppose that he is anyone else. But in what follows, he takes the person of Crissus, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithica and throughout the Odyssey. Yes. And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages. Quite true. But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak? Certainly. And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes. Of course. Then in this case, the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation. Very true. Or if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear and that you may no more say, I don't understand, I will show how the change might be affected. If Homer had said, the priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the acans, and above all the kings, and then if, instead of speaking in the person of crisis, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows. I am no poet and therefore I drop the meter. The priest came and prayed to gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter and take the ransom which he brought and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented, but Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, thus the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him. The daughter of crisis should not be released, he said. She should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed, and the old man went away in fear and silence. And when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples or in offering sacrifices, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the God, and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative. I understand, he said. Or you may suppose the opposite case, that the intermediate passages are omitted and the dialogue only left. That also, he said, I understand. You mean, for example, as in tragedy, you have conceived my meaning perfectly. And if I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative. Instances of these are supplied by tragedy and comedy. There is likewise the opposite style in which the poet is the only speaker. Of this the dithiram affords the best example, and the combination of both is found in epic and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me? Yes, he said. I see now what you met. I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style. Yes, I remember. In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the memetic art, whether the poets in narrating their stories are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter in what parts? Or should all imitation be prohibited? You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our state? Yes, I said. But there may be more than this in question. I really do not know as yet, but whither the argument may blow that there we go. And go we will, he said. Then, Adamantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well and not many, and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any, certainly. And this is equally true of imitation. No one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one. He cannot. Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well. For even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same person cannot succeed in both as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy. Did you not just now call them imitations? Yes, I did. And you were right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both, any more that they can be rhapsodist and actors at once? True. Neither are comic and tragic actors the same, yet all these things are but imitations. They are so. And human nature, Adamantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies. Quite true, he replied. If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the state, making this their craft, and engaging in no work which it does not bear on this end. They ought not to practice or imitate anything else. If they imitate it all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession, the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like. But they should not depict or be skillful at imitating any kind of a liberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length grown to habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind? Yes, certainly, he said. Then I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say they ought to be good men to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarreling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods and conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction or sorrow or weeping, and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labor. Very right, he said. Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves, they must not. And truly not bad men, or their cowards or any others, who do the reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other men are sin against themselves in their neighbors in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad, for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practiced or imitated. Very true, he replied. Neither may they imitate smess or other artificers or oarsmen or bosons or the like. How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the calling of any of these? Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers, and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing. Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behavior of madmen. You mean, I said, if I understand you are right, that there is one sort of narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite character in education? And which are these two sorts, he asked? Suppose I answered that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes upon some saying or action of another good man. I should imagine that he would like to personate him and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation. He will be most ready to play the part of a good man when he is acting firmly and wisely, in a less degree when he is overtaken by illness or love or drink or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that. He will disdain such a person and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action, and other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practiced, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models. He feels the employment of such an art and less ingest to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it. So I should expect, he replied. Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer. That is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative, but there will be very little of the former and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree? Certainly, he said, that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take. But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be. Nothing will be too bad for him, and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels and pulleys, and the various sound of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments. He will bark like a dog, bleed like a sheep, or crow like a crock. His entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration. That, he said, will be his mode of speaking. These then are the two kinds of style, yes. And would you agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes, and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony for the changes are not great, and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm. That is quite true, he said, whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms if the music and the style are to correspond because the style has all sorts of changes. That is also perfectly true, he replied, and do not the two styles or the mixture of the two comprehend all poetry and every form of expression in words. No one can say anything except in one or the other of them are in both together. They include all, he said, and shall we receive into our state all the three styles or one only of the two unmixed styles? Or would you include the mixed? I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue. Yes, I said, Adimentis, but the mixed style is also very charming. And indeed, the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children in their attendance and with the world in general. I do not deny it, but I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our state in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only, yes, quite unsuitable. And this is the reason why in our state and in our state only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dikist also, and a soldier, a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout, true, he said. And therefore, when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen who are so clever that they can imitate anything comes to us and makes a proposal to exhibit himself in his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being, but we must also inform him that in our state, such as he are not permitted to exist, the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with murder and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for ourselves the rougher and severer poet or storyteller who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers. We certainly will, he said, if we have the power. Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished, for the matter and manner have both been discussed. I think so too, he said. Next in order will follow melody and song. That is obvious. Everyone can see already what we ought to say about them if we are to be consistent with ourselves. I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word everyone hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be, though I may guess. At any rate, you can tell me that a song or ode has three parts, the words, the melody, and the rhythm. That degree of knowledge I may presuppose, yes, he said, so much as that, you may. And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not, said to music. Both will conform to the same laws, and these have already been determined by us. Yes. And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words. Certainly. We were saying, when we spoke of the subject matter, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow, true, and which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow. You are musical, and can tell me. The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor lydian, and the full tone or bass lydian, and such like. These then, I said, must be banished, even to women who have a character to maintain, they are of no use, and much less to men. Certainly. In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians. Utterly unbecoming. And which are the softer drinking harmonies? The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian. They are termed relaxed. Well, and are these of any military use? Quite the reverse, he replied. And if so, the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left. I answered, of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger at stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure, and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer or man by instruction and admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances and acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave. The strain of necessity and the strain of freedom. The strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate. The strain of courage and the strain of temperance. These I say, leave. And these, he replied, or the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking. Then I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, shall we not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale? I suppose not. Then we shall not maintain the artificers of liars with three corners in complex scales. Are the makers of any other many stringed curiously harmonized instruments? Certainly not. But what do you say to flute makers and flute players? Would you admit them into our state when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together? Even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute? Clearly not. There remain only the lyre and the harp for use in the city and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country. That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument. The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marcius and his instruments is not at all strange, I said. Not at all, he replied. And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the state, which not long ago we termed luxurious. And we have done wisely, he said. Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next, in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules. For we ought not to seek out complex systems of meter or meters of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life. And when we have found them, we shall adopt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit. Not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty. You must teach me, as you have already taught me the harmonies. But indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four notes out of which all the harmonies are composed. That is an observation which I have made. But what sort of lives there are several of the imitations I am unable to say. Then I said we must take Damon into our councils, and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness or insolence or fury or other unworthiness and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex critic rhythm. I am a pteroactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand at making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating. And unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an imbic as well as of a trochaic rhythm and assigned them the short and long quantities. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm, or perhaps a combination of the two. For I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself. For the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know? Rather so, I should say. But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm. None at all. End of Book 3, Part 2 Recording by Jim Allman Houston, Texas Book 3, Part 3 of Plato's Republic This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jim Allman The Republic by Plato Translated by Benjamin Joatt Book 3, Part 3 And also the good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style. And that harmony and discord in like manner follow style. For our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words and not the words by them. Just so, he said, they should follow the words. And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul? Yes. And everything else on the style? Yes. The beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity. I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character. Not that other simplicity which is only a euphemism for folly. Very true, he replied. And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim? They must. And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them. Weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture. Also nature, animal and vegetable. In all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature. As grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness. That is quite true, he said. But shall our superintendents go no further and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our state? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists? And are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts? And is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practicing his art in our state, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture and their brows and feet upon many of baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful. Then will our youth dwell in a land of health amid fair sights and sounds and receive the good in everything, and beauty, the effluence of fair works shall flow into the eye and ear like a health-giving breeze from a pure region and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason. There can be no nobler training than that, he replied. And therefore, I said, Glockon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated, graceful, or of him who is ill-educated, ungraceful, and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why, and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar. Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention. Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are very few in all the recurring sizes and combinations. Not sliding them is unimportant whether they occupy a space large or small, but everywhere, either to make them out and not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognize them wherever they are found. True. Or as we recognize the reflection of letters in the water or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves, the same art and study giving us the knowledge of both. Exactly. Even so, as I maintain, neither we, nor our guardians, whom we have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as well as the contrary forms in all their combinations. And can recognize them in their images whenever they are found. Not sliding them either in small things are great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study. Most assuredly. And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mold, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it. The fairest indeed. And the fairest is also the loveliest? That may be assumed. And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest, but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul, that is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul. But if there be any merely bodily defect in another, he will be patient of it and will love all the same. I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I agree. But let me ask you another question. Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance? How can that be, he replied? Pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain. Or any affinity to virtue in general? None whatever. Any affinity to wantedness and intemperance? Yes, the greatest. And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love? No, nor a matter. Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order, temperate and harmonious, quite true, he said. Then no intemperance or manish should be allowed to approach true love. Certainly not. Then mad or intemperant pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover in his beloved. Neither of them can have any pardon in it if their love is of the right sort. No indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them. Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son. And then only for a noble purpose. And he must first have the other's consent. And this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse that he is never to be seen going further or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste. I quite agree, he said. This much of music which makes a fair ending. For what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty? I agree, he said. After music comes gymnastic in which our youth are next to be trained. Certainly. Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years. The training in it should be careful and should continue throughout life. Now my belief is, and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own, but my belief is, not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul but on the contrary, that the good soul by her own excellence improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say? Yes, I agree. Then to the mind when adequately trained we should be right in handing over the more particular care of the body and in order to avoid prolixity we may now only give the general outlines of the subject. Very good. That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us. For of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is. Yes, he said, that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him as ridiculous indeed. But next, what shall we say of their food? For the men are in training for the greatest contest of all. Are they not? Yes, he said. And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them? Why not? I am afraid, I said, that the habit of bodies such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their lives and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart in ever so slight a degree from their customary regimen? Yes, I do. Then I said a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes who are to be like wakeful dogs and to see and hear with the utmost keenness amid the many changes of water and also a food of summer heat and winter cold which they will have to endure when on a campaign they must not be liable to break down in health. That is my view. The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing. How so? Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple and good and especially the military gymnastic. What do you mean? My meaning baby learned from Homer. He, you know, feeds his heroes at their feasts when they are campaigning on soldiers fair. They have no fish although they are on the shores of the Hellespont and they are not allowed boiled meats but only roast which is the food most convenient for soldiers. Requiring only that they should light a fire and not involving the trouble of caring about pots and pans. True. And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular. All professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind. Yes, he said. And knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them. Then would you not approve of Syracuse and dinners and the refinement of Sicilian cookery? I think not. Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend? Certainly not. Neither would you approve the delicacies as they are thought of Athenian confectionery? Certainly not. All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by este melody and song composed in a pan-harmonic style and in all the rhythms. Exactly. Their complexity engendered license and hear disease, whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul and simplicity in gymnastics of health in the body. Most true, he said. But when intemperance and disease is multiplied in a state, halls of justice and medicine are always being opened and they answer the doctor and the lawyer give themselves heirs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves, but the freemen of the city take about them. Of course. And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this? That not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first rate physicians and judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful and a great sign of want of good breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physics because he has none of his own at home and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him? Of all things, the most disgraceful. Would you say most? I replied. When you consider that there is a further stage of evil in which a man is not only a lifelong litigant passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness. He imagines that he is a master in dishonesty, able to take every crooked turn and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice. And all for what? In order to gain small points, not worth mentioning. He not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is that not still more disgraceful? Yes, he said. That is still more disgraceful. Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because by indolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with waters and winds as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and Qatar, is this not to a disgrace? Yes, he said. They do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to diseases. Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of asclepius, and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypolis, after he had been wounded in Homer, drinks a positive premium wine well besprinkled with parley meal and grated cheese, which are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of asclepius who are at the Trojan War do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink or rebuke Patroclus who is treating his case. Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition. Not so extraordinary, I replied. If you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodocus, the guild of asclepius did not practice our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodocus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctrine found out a way of torturing, first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world. How was that, he said? By the invention of lingering death, for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian. He could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age. A rare reward of his skill. Yes, I said, a reward which a man might fairly expect to never understood that. If asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine. But because he knew that in all well ordered states, every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort. How do you mean? He said. I mean this. When a carpenter is ill, he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure, animatic or purge or caudery or the knife. These are his remedies, and if someone prescribes for him a course of dietetics and tells him that he must swath and swaddle his head and all that sort of thing. He replies at once that he has no time to be ill and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment. And therefore, bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble. Yes, he said. A man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only. Has he not, I said, an occupation? And what profit would be there in his life if he were deprived of this occupation? Quite true, he said. But with the rich man, this is otherwise. Of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which he must perform if he would live. He is generally supposed to have nothing to do. Then you never heard of the saying of facilities that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practice virtue? Nay, he said. I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner. Let us not have a dispute about this, I said. But whether to ask ourselves, is the practice of virtue obligatory on a rich man or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question. Whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of facilities? Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt. Such excessive care of the body when carried beyond the rules of gymnastics is most inimical to the practice of virtue. Yes indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state. And what is most important of all, irreconcilable with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection. There is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy and hence all practicing or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped. For a man is always fancying that he is being made ill and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body. Yes, likely enough. And therefore, our politic asclepias may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment, such as these he cured by purges and operations and made them live as usual, herein consulting the interest of the state. But bodies, which diseases had penetrated through and through, he would not have attempted to cure by gradual process of evacuation and infusion. He did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives or have weak fathers beginning weaker sons. If a man was not able to live in the ordinary way, he had no business to cure him. For such a cure would have been of no use either to himself or to the state. Then, he said, you regard asclepias as a statesman. Clearly. And his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that they were heroes in the days of old and practiced the medicines of which I am speaking at the Siege of Troy. You will remember how, when Pandaris wounded menilaus, they sucked the blood out of the wound and sprinkled soothing remedies. But they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of menilaus, any more than in the case of uriplis. The remedies as they conceived were enough to heal any man who, before he was wounded, was healthy and regular in his habits. And even though he did happen to drink a positive premium wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others. The art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of asclepias would have declined to attend to them. They were very acute persons, these sons of asclepias. Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pandaris obeying our behests, although they acknowledged that asclepias was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death. And for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe them when they tell us both. If he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious. Or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god. End of book three, part three. Recording by Jim Allman, Houston, Texas. Book three, part four, Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Allman. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joatt. Book three, part four. All that, Socrates, is excellent. But I should like to put a question to you. Aught there not to be good physicians in a state? And are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? And are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures? Yes, I said. I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good? Will you tell me? I will if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same. How so, he asked? Why, I said, you joined physicians and judges. Now the most skillful physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease. They had better not to be robust in health and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body. In that case, we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly. But they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick and cure nothing. That is very true, he said. But with the judge it is otherwise. Since he governs mind by mind, he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds and to have associated with them from youth upwards and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness. The honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had experience or contamination of evil habits while young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple and are easily practiced upon by the dishonest because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls. Yes, he said. They are far too apt to be deceived. Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young. He should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others. Knowledge should be his guide, not personal experience. Yes, he said. That is the ideal of a judge. Yes, I replied. And he will be a good man, which is my answer to your question. For he is good who has a good soul, but the cunning and suspicious nature of which we spoke, he who has committed many crimes and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by himself. But when he gets into the company of men of virtue who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions. He cannot recognize an honest man because he has no pattern of honesty in himself, at the same time as the bad are more numerous than the good. And he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself and is by others thought to be rather wise than foolish. Most true, he said. Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the other. For vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature educated by time will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice. The virtuous and not the vicious man has wisdom, in my opinion, and in mine also. This is the sort of medicine and this is the sort of law which you will sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, giving health of both soul and of body, but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to themselves. This is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the state. And thus our youth having been educated only in that simple music which, as we said, inspires temperance will be reluctant to go to law. Clearly, and the musician who keeping to the same track is content to practice the simple gymnastic will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case. That I quite believe. The very exercises and tolls which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature and not to increase his strength. He will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles. Very right, he said. Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training of the body. What then is the real object of them? I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul. How can that be? He asked. Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastic or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music? In what way shown, he said. The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness and effeminacy, I replied. Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him. Yet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit which, if rightly educated, would give courage. But, if too much intensified is liable to become hard and brutal, that I quite think. On the other hand, the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness and this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness but, if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate. True. And in our opinion, the guardians ought to have both these qualities? Assuredly. And both should be in harmony? Beyond question. And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous? Yes. And the inharmonious is cowardly and borish? Very true. And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy eras of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song. In the first stage of the process, the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron and made useful instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul. And he becomes a feeble warrior. Very true. If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him, the change is speedily accomplished. But if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable. On the least provocation he flames up at once and is speedily extinguished. Instead of having spirit, he grows spiritable and passionate and is quite impractical. Exactly. And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit and he becomes twice the man that he was. Certainly. And what happens? If he do nothing else and holds no converse with the muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him having no taste of any sort of learning or inquiry or thought or culture grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment and his senses not being purged of their mists. True, he said. And he ends by being a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion. He is like a wild beast, all violence and fierceness and knows no other way of dealing. And he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions and has no sense of propriety and grace. That is quite true, he said. And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirit and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them and only indirectly to the soul and body in order that these two principles like the strings of an instrument may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized. That appears to be the intention. And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportion and best attempers them to the soul may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of strings. You are quite right, Socrates. And such a presiding genius will always be required in our state if the government is to last. Yes, he will be absolutely necessary, such then are our principles of nurturing education. Where would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle and having found that we shall have no difficulty in discovering them. I dare say that there will be no difficulty. Very good, I said. Then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers in whose subjects? Certainly. There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger, clearly, and that the best of these must rule. That is also clear. Now are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry? Yes. And as we are to have the best guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians? Yes. And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient and to have a special care of the state? True. And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves to be sure. And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interest with himself and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own? Very true, he replied. Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests. These are the right men. And they will have to be watched at every age in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution and never under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the state. How cast off? He said. I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will. With his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth. I understand, he said, the willing laws of the resolution, the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn. Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth in evil and to possess the truth of good? And you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth? Yes, he replied. I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will. And it's not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft or force or enchantment. Still, he replied, I do not understand you. I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget. Argument steals the way the hearts of one class and time of the other. And this I call theft. Now you understand me? Yes. Those again who are forced are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion. I understand, he said, and you are quite right. And he would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure or the sterner influence of fear. Yes, he said. Everything that deceives may be said to enchant. Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must inquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the state is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth upwards and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived. And he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected. He who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way? Yes. And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities. Very right, he replied. And then I said, we must try them with enchantments. That is the third sort of test and see what will be their behavior. Like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind and again pass them into pleasures and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned and retaining under all circumstances are rhythmical and harmonious nature such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the state. And he who at every age as boy and youth in immature life has come out of the trial victorious and pure shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the state. He shall be honored in life and death and shall receive sepulcher and other memorials of honor the greatest that we have to give but him who fails we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally and not with any pretension to exactness. And speaking generally I agree with you he said. And perhaps the word guardian in its fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home that the one may not have the will or the others the power to harm us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers. I agree with you he said. How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke. Just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers if that be possible and at any rate the rest of the city. What sort of lie he said. Nothing new I replied only an old Phoenician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places as the poets say and have made the world believe though not in our time and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again or could now even be made probable if it did. How your words seem to hesitate on your lips. You will not wonder I replied at my hesitation when you have heard. Speak he said and fear not. Well then I will speak although I really know not how to look you in the face on what words utter the audacious fiction which I propose to communicate gradually first to the rulers then to the soldiers and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream and the education and training which they received from us and appearance only in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth where they themselves and their arms and appurtences were manufactured when they were completed the earth their mother sent them up and so their country being their mother and also their nurse they are bound to advise for her good and to defend her against attacks and her citizens there to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers. You had good reason he said to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell. True I replied but there is more coming. I have only told you half. Citizens we shall say to them in our tale you are brothers yet God has framed you differently. But some of you have the power of command and in the composition of these he has mingled gold where for also they have the greatest honor. Others he has made of silver to be auxiliaries. Others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he is composed of brass and iron and the species will generally be preserved in the children but as all are of the same original stock a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son or a silver parent a golden son and God proclaims as the first principal to the rulers and above all else that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard or of which they are to be such good guardians as the purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an enmixture of brass and iron then nature orders a transposition of ranks and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful toward the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan. Just as there may be sons of artisans who have an enmixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honor and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the state it will be destroyed such as the tale. Is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it? Not in this present generation he replied. There is no way of accomplishing this but their sons may be made to believe the tale and their sons sons and posterity after them. I see the difficulty I replied yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another enough however of the fiction which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumor while we arm our earth-born heroes and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look around and select a spot once they can best suppress insurrection if any proof refractory within and also defend themselves against enemies who like wolves may come down on the fold from without. There let them encamp and when they have encamped let them sacrifice to the proper gods and prepare their dwellings. Just so he said and their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer. I suppose you mean houses he replied. Yes I said but they must be the houses of soldiers and not of shopkeepers. What is the difference he said? That I will endeavor to explain I replied to keep watchdogs who from want of discipline or hunger or some evil habit or other would turn up on the sheep and worry them and behave not like dogs but wolves would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd. Truly monstrous he said. And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries being stronger than our citizens may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies. Yes great care should be taken and when not a really good education furnish the best safeguard but they are well educated already he replied. I cannot be so confident my dear Glaucon I said. I am much more certain that they ought to be and that true education whatever that may be will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another and to those who are under their protection. Very true he replied. And not only their education but their habitations and all that belongs to them should be such as will neither impair their virtuous guardians nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that. He must. Then now let us consider what will be their way of life if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary. Neither should they have a private house or store closed against anyone who has a mind to enter. Their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors who are men of temperance and courage. They should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more. And they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God. The diviner medal is within them and they have therefore no need of the draw switches current among men and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture. For that commoner medal has been the source of many unholy deeds but their own is undefiled. And they alone of the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold or be under the same roof with them or wear them or drink from them. And this will be their salvation and they will be the saviors of the state. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or monies of their own they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens. Hating and being hated plotting and being fluttered against. They will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies and the hour of ruin both to themselves and to the rest of the state will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our state be ordered and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for guardians concerning their houses and all other matters. Yes, said Glockon. End of Book 3 Recording by Jim Allman Houston, Texas Book 4 Part 1 of Plato's Republic This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by B. G. Oxford The Republic by Plato Translated by Benjamin Joette Book 4 Part 1 Here, Ademantus interposed a question How would you answer Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people miserable and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness The city in fact belongs to them but they are none the better for it whereas other men acquire lands and build large and handsome houses and have everything handsome about them offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account and practicing hospitality Moreover, as you were saying just now they have gold and silver and all that is usual among the favorites of fortune but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard Yes, I said and you may add that they are only fed and not paid in addition to their food like other men and therefore they cannot if they would take a journey of pleasure they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy which as the world goes is thought to be happiness and many other accusations of the same nature might be added But, he said let us suppose all this to be included in the charge You mean to ask I said what will be our answer Yes, if we proceed along the old path my belief, I said is that we shall find the answer and our answer will be that even as they are our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men but that our aim in founding the state was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class but the greatest happiness of the whole We thought that in a state which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice and in the ill ordered state injustice and having found them we might then decide which of the two is the happier At present I take it we are fashioning the happy state not piecemeal or with a view of making a few happy citizens but as a whole and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of state Suppose that we are painting a statue and someone came up to us and said why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body The eyes ought to be purple but you have made them black To him we might fairly answer Sir you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes consider rather whether by giving this and the other features their due proportion we make the whole beautiful and so I say to you do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel and set crowns of gold on their heads and bid them till the ground as much as they like and no more our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches and feast by the fireside passing round the wine cup while their wheel is conveniently at hand and working at pottery only as much as they like in this way we might make every class happy and then as you imagine the whole state would be happy but do not put this idea into our heads for if we listen to you the husbandmen will be no longer a husbandmen the potter will cease to be a potter and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the state now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society and pretensions to be what you are not is confined to cobblers but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians then see how they turn the state upside down and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the state we mean our guardians to be true saviors and not the destroyers of the state whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival who are enjoying a life of revelry not of citizens who are doing their duty to the state but if so we mean different things and he is speaking of something which is not a state and therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the state as a whole but if the latter be the truth then the guardians and auxiliaries and all others equally with them must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way and thus the whole state will grow up in a noble order and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them I think that you are quite right I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me what may that be there seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts what are they wealth I said and poverty how do they act the process is as follows when a potter becomes rich will he thank you any longer take the same pains with his art certainly not he will grow more and more indolent and careless very true and the result will be that he becomes a worse potter yes he greatly deteriorates but on the other hand if he has no money and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments he will not work equally well himself nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well certainly not then under the influence of either poverty or of wealth workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate that is evident here then is a discovery of new evils I said against which the guardians will have to watch or they will creep into the city unobserved what evils wealth I said and poverty the one is the parent of luxury and indolence and the other of meanness and viciousness and both of discontent that is very true he replied but still I should like to know Socrates how our city will be able to go to war especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful if deprived of the sinews of war there would certainly be a difficulty I replied in going to war with one such enemy but there is no difficulty where there are two of them how so he asked in the first place I said if we have to fight our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men that is true he said and do you not suppose Ademantus that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers hardly if they came upon him at once what now I said if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up and supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun might he not being an expert overturn more than one stout personage certainly he said there would be nothing wonderful in that and yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practice of boxing than they have in military qualities likely enough then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number I agree with you for I think you are right and supposing that before engaging our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities telling them what is the truth silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have but you may do you therefore come and help us in war and take the spoils of the other city who on hearing these words would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs rather than with the dogs on their side against the fat and tender sheep that is not likely and yet there might be a danger to the poor state if the wealth of many states were to be gathered into one but how simple of you to use the terms state at all of any but our own why so you ought to speak of other states in the plural number not one of them is a city but many cities as they say in the game for indeed any city however small is in fact divided into two one the city of the poor the other of the rich these are at war with one another and in either there are many smaller divisions and you would be all together beside the mark if you treated them all as a single state but if you deal with them as many and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies and your state while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her will be the greatest of states I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance but indeed and truth though she number not more than a thousand defenders a single state which is her equal you will hardly find either among helens or barbarians though many that appear to be as great and many times greater that is most true he said and what I said will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the state and the amount of territory which they are to include and beyond which they will not go what limit would you propose I would allow the state to increase so far as is consistent with unity that I think is the proper limit very good he said here then I said is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians let our city be accounted neither large nor small but one and self-sufficing and surely he said this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them and the other said I of which we are speaking before is lighter still I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes when naturally superior the intention was that in the case of the citizens generally each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him one to one work and then every man would do his own business and be one and not many and so the whole city would be one and not many yes he said that is not so difficult the regulations which we are prescribing my good adimantos are not as might be supposed a number of great principles but trifles all if care be taken as the saying is of the one great thing a thing however which I would rather call not great but sufficient for our purpose what may that be he asked education I said and nurture if our citizens are well educated and grow into sensible men they will easily see their way through all these as well as other matters which I omit such for example as marriage the possession of women and the procreation of children which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common as the proverb says that will be the best way of settling them also I said the state if once started well moves with accumulating force like a wheel for good nurture and education implant good constitutions and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals very possibly he said then to sum up this is the point to which above all the attention of our rulers should be directed that music and gymnastics be preserved in their original form and no innovation made they must do their utmost to maintain them intact and when anyone says that mankind most regard the newest song which the singers have they will be afraid that he may be praising not new songs but a new kind of song and this ought not to be praised or conceived to be the meaning of the poet for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole state and ought to be prohibited so Damon tells me and I can quite believe him he says that when modes of music change the fundamental laws of the state always change with them yes said adimantus and you may add my suffrage to daimans and your own then I said our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music yes he said the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in yes I replied in the form of amusement and at first sight it appears harmless why yes he said and there is no harm were it not that little by little this spirit of license finding a home imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs whence issuing with greater force it invades contracts between man and man and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions in utter recklessness ending at last socrates by an overthrow of all rights private as well as public is that true I said that is my belief he replied then as I was saying our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system for if amusements become lawless and the youths themselves become lawless they can never grow up into well conducted and virtuous citizens very true he said and when they have made a good beginning in play and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order then this habit of order in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them and if there be any fallen places in the state will raise them up again very true he said thus educated they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have all together neglected what do you mean I mean such things as these when the young are to be silent before their elders how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit what honor is due to parents what garments or shoes are to be worn the mode of dressing the hair department and manners in general you would agree with me yes but there is I think small wisdom in legislating about such matters I doubt if it is ever done nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting impossible it would seem adimantes that the direction which education starts a man will determine his future life does not like always attract like to be sure until someone rare and grand result is reached which may be good and may be the reverse of good that is not to be denied and for this reason I said I shall not attempt to legislate further about them naturally enough he replied end of book four part one recording by B. G. Oxford December 2008 book four part two of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recorded by B. G. Oxford the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joett book four part two well and about the business of the Agora and the ordinary dealings between man and man or again about agreements with artisans about insult and injury or the commencement of actions and the appointment of juries what would you say there may also arise questions about any impositions and exactions of market and harbor dues which may be required and in general about the regulations of markets police harbours and the like but oh heavens shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars I think he said that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves yes I said my friend if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them and without divine help said Ademantos they will go on forever making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection you would compare them I said to those invalids who having no self-restraint will not leave off their habits of intemperance exactly yes I said and what a delightful life they lead they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try such cases are very common he said with invalids of this sort yes I replied and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth which is simply that unless they give up eating and drinking and winching and idling neither drug nor coterie nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail charming he replied I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right these gentlemen I said do not seem to be in your good graces assuredly not nor would you praise the behavior of states which act like the men whom I was just now describing for are there not ill-ordered states in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skillful in anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman do not these states resemble the persons whom I was describing yes he said the states are as bad as the men and I am very far from praising them but do you not admire I said the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption yes he said I do but not all of them for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen and these are not much to be admired what do you mean I said you should have more feeling for them when a man cannot measure and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high can he help believing what they say nay he said certainly not in that case well then do not be angry with them for are they not as good as a play trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts and other rascalities which I was mentioning not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of hydra yes he said that is just what they are doing I conceive I said that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an ill ordered or in a well ordered state for in the former they are quite useless and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations what then he said is still remaining to us of the work of legislation nothing to us I replied but to apollo the god of delphi there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all which are they he said the institution of temples and sacrifices and the entire service of gods demigods and heroes also the ordering of the repositories of the dead and the rights which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below these are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves and as founders of a city we should be unwise entrusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity he is the god who sits in the center on the navel of the earth and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind you are right and we will do as you propose but where amid all this is justice son of a wrist on tell me where now that our city has been made habitable light a candle and search and get your brother and polymarcus and the rest of our friends to help and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice and in what they differ from one another and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion whether seen or unseen by gods and men nonsense said Gaukon did you not promise to search yourself saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety I do not deny that I said so and as you remind me I will be as good as my word but you must join we will he replied well then I hope to make the discovery in this way I mean to begin with the assumption that our state if rightly ordered is perfect that is most certain and being perfect is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just that is likewise clear and whichever of these qualities we find in the state the one which is not found will be the residue very good if there were four things and we were searching for one of them wherever it might be the one sought for might be known to us from the first and there would be no further trouble or we might know the other three first and then the fourth would clearly be the one left very true he said and is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues which are also foreign number clearly first among the virtues found in the state wisdom comes into view and in this I detect a certain peculiarity what is that the state which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in council very true and good council is clearly a kind of knowledge for not by ignorance but by knowledge do men counsel well clearly and the kinds of knowledge in a state are many and diverse of course there is the knowledge of the carpenter but is that the sort of knowledge which gives the city the title of wise and good in council certainly not that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements certainly not nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots I said nor as possessing any other similar knowledge not by reason of any of them he said nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth that would give the city the name of agricultural yes well I said and is there any knowledge in our recently founded state among any of the citizens which advises not about any particular thing in the state but about the whole and considers how a state can best deal with itself and with other states there certainly is and what is this knowledge and among whom is it found I asked it is the knowledge of the guardians he replied and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians and what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge the name of good and counsel and truly wise and will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths the smiths he replied will be far more numerous will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge much the smallest and so by reason of the smallest part or class and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself the whole state being thus constituted according to nature will be wise and this which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least most true thus then I said the nature and place in the state of one of the four virtues has somehow or other been discovered and in my humble opinion very satisfactorily discovered he replied again I said there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the state how do you mean why I said everyone who calls any state courageous or cowardly will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the state's behalf no one he replied would ever think of any other the rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly but their courage or cowardice will not as I conceive have the effect of making the city either the one or the other certainly not the city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislators educated them and this is what you term courage I should like to hear what you are saying once more for I do not think that I perfectly understand you I mean that courage is a kind of salvation salvation of what of the opinion respecting things to be feared what they are and of what nature which the law implants through education and I mean by the words under all circumstances to intimate that in pleasure or in pain or under the influence of desire or fear a man preserves and does not lose this opinion shall I give you an illustration if you please you know I said that dyers when they want to dye wool for making the true sea purple begin by selecting their white color first this they prepare and dress with much care and pains in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection the dyeing then proceeds and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color and no washing either with lies or without them can take away the bloom but when the ground has not been duly prepared you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other color yes he said I know that they have a washed out and ridiculous appearance then now I said you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers and educating them in music and gymnastic we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection and the color of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training not to be washed away by such potent lies as pleasure mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lie or by sorrow fear and desire the mightiest of all other solvents and this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage unless you disagree but I agree he replied for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage such as that of a wild beast or of a slave this in your opinion is not the courage which the law ordains and ought to have another name most certainly then may I infer courage to be such as you describe why yes I said you may and if you add the words of a citizen you will not be far wrong hereafter if you like we will carry the examination further but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice and for the purpose of our inquiry we have said enough you are right he replied two virtues remain to be discovered in the state first temperance and then justice which is the end of our search very true now can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance I do not know how that can be accomplished he said nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of considering temperance first certainly I replied I should not be justified in refusing your request then consider he said yes I replied I will and as far as I can at present see the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding how so he asked temperance I replied is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires this is curiously enough implied in the saying of a man being his own master and other traces of the same notion may be found in language no doubt he said there is something ridiculous in the expression master of himself for the master is also the servant and the servant the master and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted certainly the meaning is I believe that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle and when the better has the worse under control then a man is said to be master of himself and this is a term of praise but when owing to evil education or association the better principle which is also the smaller is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled yes there is reason in that and now I said look at our newly created state and there you will find one of these two conditions realized for the state as you will acknowledge may be justly called master of itself if the words temperance and self mastery truly express the rule of the better part over the worse yes he said I see that what you say is true let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants and in the free men so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class certainly he said whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion are to be found only in a few and those the best born and best educated very true these two as you may perceive have a place in our state and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few that I perceive he said then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires and master of itself ours may claim such a designation certainly he replied it may also be called temperate and for the same reason yes and if there be any state in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule that again will be our state undoubtedly and the citizens being thus agreed among themselves in which class will temperance be found in the rulers or in the subjects in both as I should imagine he replied do you observe that we are not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony why so why because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom each of which resides in a part only the one making the state wise and the other valiant not so temperance which extends to the whole and runs through all the notes of the scale and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth or anything else most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior as to the right to rule of either both in states and individuals I entirely agree with you and so I said we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our state the last of those qualities which make a state virtuous must be justice if we only knew what that was the inference is obvious end of book four part two recording by B. G. Oxford December 2008 book four part three of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by B. G. Oxford the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joett book four part three the time then has arrived Glaucon when like Huntsman we should surround the cover and look sharp that justice does not steal away and pass out of sight and escape us for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her and if you see her first let me know would that I could but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him that is about as much as I am good for offer up a prayer with me and follow I will but you must show me the way there is no path I said and the wood is dark and perplexing still we must push on let us push on here I saw something hello I said I began to perceive a track and I believe that the query will not escape good news he said truly I said we are stupid fellows why so why my good sir at the beginning of our inquiry ages ago there was justice tumbling out at our feet and we never saw her nothing could be more ridiculous like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands that was the way with us we looked not at what we were seeking but at what was far off in the distance and therefore I suppose we missed her what do you mean I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice and have failed to recognize her I grow impatient at the length of your exordium well then tell me I said whether I am right or not you remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the state that one man should practice one thing only the thing to which his nature was best adapted now justice is this principle or part of it yes we often said that one man should do one thing only further we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business and not being a busy body we said so again and again and many others have said the same to us yes we said so then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice can you tell me whence I derive this inference I cannot but I should like to be told because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the state when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted and that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them and while remaining in them is also their preservative and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us justice would be the fourth or remaining one that follows of necessity if we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the state whether the agreement of rulers and subjects or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers or whether this other which I am mentioning and which is found in children and women slave and free men artisan ruler subject the quality I mean of everyone doing his own work and not being a busy buddy would claim the palm the question is not so easily answered certainly he replied there would be a difficulty in saying which then the power of each individual in the state to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues wisdom temperance courage yes he said and the virtue which enters into this competition is justice exactly let us look at the question from another point of view are not the rulers in a state those to whom you wouldn't trust the office of determining suits at law certainly and our suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's nor be deprived of what is his own yes that is their principle which is a just principle yes then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own and belongs to him very true think now and say whether you agree with me or not suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties or the same person to be doing the work of both or whatever be the change do you think that any great harm would result to the state not much but when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers or any like advantage attempts to force his way into the class of warriors or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians for which he is unfitted and either to take the implements or the duties of the other or when one man is trader legislator and warrior all in one then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the state most true seeing then I said that there are three distinct classes any meddling of one with the other or the change of one to another is the greatest harm to the state and maybe most justly termed evil doing precisely and the greatest degree of evil doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice certainly this then is injustice and on the other hand when the trader the auxiliary and the guardian each do their own business that is justice and will make the city just I agree with you we will not I said be over positive as yet but if on trial this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the state there will be no longer any room for doubt if it be not verified we must have a fresh inquiry first let us complete the old investigation which we began as you remember under the impression that if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual that larger example appeared to be the state and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could knowing well that in the good state justice would be found let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual if they agree we shall be satisfied or if there be a difference in the individual we will come back to the state and have another trial of the theory the friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls that will be in regular course let us do as you say I proceeded to ask when two things a greater and less are called by the same name are they like or unlike insofar as they are called the same like he replied the just man then if we regard the idea of justice only will be like the just state he will and the state was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the state severally did their own business and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes true he said and so of the individual we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the state and he may be rightly described in the same terms because he has affected in the same manner certainly he said once more then oh my friend we have a lighted upon an easy question whether the soul has these three principles or not an easy question nay rather Socrates the proverb holds that hard is the good very true I said and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question the true method is another and a longer one still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous inquiry may we not be satisfied with that he said under the circumstance I am quite content I too I replied shall be extremely well satisfied then faint not in pursuing the speculation he said must we not acknowledge I said that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the state and that from the individual they pass into the state how else can they come there take the quality of passion or spirit it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality when found in states is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it for example the Thracians Scythians and in general the northern nations and the same may be said of the love of knowledge which is the special characteristic of our part of the world or of the love of money which may with equal truth be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians exactly so he said there is no difficulty in understanding this none whatever but the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one whether that is to say we learn with one part of our nature are angry with another and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action to determine that is the difficulty yes he said there lies the difficulty then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different how can we he asked I replied as follows the same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time in contrary ways and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same we know that they are really not the same but different good for example I said can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part impossible still I said let us have a more precise statement of terms lest we should hear after fall out by the way imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment to such a mode of speech we should object and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest very true and suppose the objector to refine still further and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops but whole tops when they spin around with their pegs fixed on the spot are at rest and in motion at the same time and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot his objection would not be admitted by us because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference and that the axis stands still for there is no deviation from the perpendicular and that the circumference goes round but if while revolving the axis inclines either to the right or left forwards or backwards then in no point of view can they be at rest that is the correct mode of describing them he replied then none of these objections will confuse us or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time in the same part or in relation to the same thing can act or be acted upon in contrary ways certainly not according to my way of thinking yet I said that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections and prove at length that they are untrue let us assume their absurdity and go forward on the understanding that hereafter if this assumption turned out to be untrue all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn yes he said that will be the best way well I said would you not allow that assent and dissent desire and aversion attraction and repulsion are all of them opposites whether they are regarded as active or passive for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition yes he said they are opposites well I said and hunger and thirst and the desires in general and again willing and wishing all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned you would say would you not that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desire or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess or again when a person wants anything to be given him his mind longing for the realization of his desire intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent as if he had been asked the question very true and what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection certainly admitting this to be true of desire generally let us suppose a particular class of desires and out of these we will select hunger and thirst as they are termed which are the most obvious of them let us take that class he said the object of one is food and of the other drink yes and here comes the point is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink and of drink only not of drink qualified by anything else for example warm or cold or much or little or in a word drink of any particular sort but if the thirst be accompanied by heat then the desire is of cold drink or if accompanied by cold then of warm drink or if the thirst be excessive then the drink which is desired will be excessive or if not great the quantity of drink will also be small but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple which is the natural satisfaction of thirst as food is of hunger yes he said the simple desire is as you say in every case of the simple object and the qualified desire of the qualified object but here a confusion may arise and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only but good drink or food only but good food for good is the universal object of desire and thirst being a desire will necessarily be thirst after good drink and the same is true of every other desire yes he replied the opponent might have something to say nevertheless I should still maintain that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation others are simple and have their correlatives simple I do not know what you mean well you know of course that the greater is relative to the less certainly and the much greater to the much less yes and the sometime greater to the sometime less and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be certainly he said and so of more and less and of other correlative terms such as the double and the half or again the heavier and the lighter the swifter and the slower and of hot and cold and of any other relatives is not this true of them all yes and does not the same principle hold in the sciences the object of science is knowledge assuming that to be the true definition but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge I mean for example that the science of housebuilding is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture certainly because it has a particular quality which no other has yes and it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind and this is true of the other arts and sciences yes end of book 4 part 3 recorded by bg oxford book 4 part 4 of plateaus republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by bg oxford the Republic by Placo translated by Benjamin Joett book 4 part 4 now then if I have made myself clear you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives my meaning was that if one term of a relation is taken alone the other is taken alone if one term is qualified the other is also qualified I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate or that the science of health is healthy or of disease necessarily diseased or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil but only that when the term science is no longer used absolutely but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease it becomes defined and is hence called not merely science but the science of medicine I quite understand and I think as you do would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms having clearly a relation yes thirst is relative to drink and a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little nor of good nor bad nor of any particular kind of drink but of drink only certainly then the soul of the thirsty one in so far as he is thirsty desires only drink for this he yearns and tries to obtain it that is plain and if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink for as we were saying the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same impossible no more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls exactly so he replied and might a man be thirsty and yet unwilling to drink yes he said it constantly happens and in such a case what is one to say would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink and something else forbidding him which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him I should say so and the forbidding principle is derived from reason and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease clearly then we may fairly assume that they are two and that they differ from one another the one with which a man reasons we may call the rational principle of the soul the other with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the fluttering of any other desire may be termed the irrational or appetitive the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions yes he said we may fairly assume them to be different then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul and what of passion or spirit is it a third or akin to one of the proceeding I should be inclined to say akin to desire well I said there is a story which I remember to have heard and in which I put faith the story is that Leon Teos the son of Aglion coming up one day from the Piraeus under the north wall on the outside observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution he felt a desire to see them and also a dread and abhorrence of them for a time he struggled and covered his eyes but at length the desire got the better of him and forcing them open he ran up to the dead bodies saying look you wretches take your fill of the fair sight I have heard the story myself he said the moral of the tale is that anger at times goes to war with desire as though they were two distinct things yes that is the meaning he said and are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason he reviles himself and is angry at the violence within him and that in this struggle which is like the struggle of factions in a state his spirit is on the side of his reason but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself nor as I should imagine in anyone else certainly not suppose that a man thinks he has done wrong to another the nobler he is the less able he is to feel indignant at any suffering such as hunger or cold or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him these he deems to be just and as I say his anger refuses to be excited by them true he said but when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong then he boils and chafes and is on the side of what he believes to be justice and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer his noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain or until he hears the voice of the shepherd that is reason bidding his dog bark no more the illustration is perfect he replied and in our state as we were saying the auxiliaries were to be dogs and to hear the voice of the rulers who are their shepherds I perceive I said that you quite understand me there is however a further point which I wish you to consider what point you remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire but now we should say quite the contrary for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle most assuredly but a further question arises is passion different from reason also or only a kind of reason in which latter case instead of three principles in the soul there will only be two the rational and the concupacent or rather as the state was composed of three classes traders auxiliaries counselors so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason yes he said there must be a third yes I replied if passion which has already been shown to be different from desire turn out also to be different from reason but that is easily proved we may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born whereas some of them never seem to attain the use of reason and most of them late enough excellent I said and you may see passion equally in brewed animals which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying and we may once more appeal to the words of Homer which have been already quoted by us he smoked his breast and thus rebuked his soul for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it very true he said and so after much tossing we have reached land and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the state exist also in the individual and that they are three in number exactly must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way and in virtue of the same quality which makes the state wise certainly also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the state constitutes courage in the individual and that both the state and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues assuredly and the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the state is just that follows of course we cannot but remember that the justice of the state consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class we are not very likely to have forgotten he said we must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just and will do his own work yes he said we must remember that too and ought not the rational principle which is wise and has the care of the whole soul to rule and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally certainly and as we were saying the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into a chord nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm quite true he said and these two thus nurtured and educated and having learned truly to know their own functions will rule over the concupacent which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain over this they will keep guard lest waxing great and strong with the fullness of bodily pleasures as they are termed the concupacent soul no longer confined to her own sphere should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects and overturn the whole life of man very true he said both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without the one counseling and the other fighting under his leader and courageously executing his commands and councils true and he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear right he replied and him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules and which proclaims these commands that part to being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole assurantly and would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony in whom the one ruling principle of reason and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule and do not rebel certainly he said that is the true account of temperance whether in the state or the individual and surely I said we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just that is very certain and is justice dimmer in the individual and is her form different or is she the same which we found her to be in the state there is no difference in my opinion he said because if any doubt is still lingering in our minds a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying what sort of instances do you mean if the case is put to us must we not admit that the just state or the man who is trained in the principles of such a state will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver would anyone deny this no one he replied will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft or treachery either to his friends or to his country never neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements impossible no one will be less likely to commit adultery or to dishonor his father and mother or to fail in his religious duties no one and the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business whether in ruling or being ruled exactly so are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice or do you hope to discover some other not I indeed then our dream has been realized and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice has now been verified yes certainly and the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business and not another's was a shadow of justice and for that reason it was of use clearly but in reality justice was such as we were describing being concerned however not with the outward man but with the inward which is the true self and concernment of man for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another or any of them to do the work of others he sets in order his own inner life and is his own master and his own law and at peace with himself and when he has bound together the three principles within him which may be compared to the higher lower and middle notes of the scale and the intermediate intervals when he has bound all these together and is no longer many but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature then he proceeds to act if he has to act whether in a matter of property or in the treatment of the body or in some affair of politics or private business always thinking and calling that which preserves and cooperates with this harmonious condition just and good action and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom and that which at any time impairs this condition he will call unjust action and the opinion which presides over it ignorance you have said the exact truth socrates very good and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just state and the nature of justice in each of them we should not be telling a falsehood most certainly not may we say so then let us say so and now I said injustice has to be considered clearly must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole an assertion of unlawful authority which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince of whom he is the natural vassal what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance and every form of vice exactly so and if the nature of justice and injustice be known then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust or again of acting justly will also be perfectly clear what do you mean he said why I said they are like disease and health being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body how so he said why I said that which is healthy causes health and that which is unhealthy causes disease yes and just actions cause justice and unjust actions cause injustice that is certain and the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order true and is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order exactly so he said then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same true and do not good practices lead to virtue and evil practices to vice assuredly still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered which is the more profitable to be just and act justly and practice virtue whether seen or unseen of gods and men or to be unjust and act unjustly if only unpunished and unreformed in my judgment socrates the question has now become ridiculous we know that when the bodily constitution is gone life is no longer indurable though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks and having all wealth and power and shall we be told that when the very essence of the viper principle is undermined and corrupted life is still worth having to a man if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue or to escape from injustice and vice assuming them both could be such as we have described yes i said the question is as you say ridiculous still as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes let us not faint by the way certainly not he replied come up hither i said and behold the various forms of vice those of them i mean which are worth looking at i am following you he replied proceed i said the argument seems to have reached a height from which as from some tower of speculation a man may look down and see that virtue is one but that the forms of vice are innumerable there being four special ones which are deserving of note what do you mean he said i mean i replied that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the state how many there are five of the state and five of the soul i said what are they the first i said it is that which we have been describing and which may be said to have two names monarchy and aristocracy accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many true he replied but i regard the two names as describing one form only for whether the government is in the hands of one or many if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed the fundamental laws of the state will be maintained that is true he replied end of book four recording by vg oxford december 2008 book five part one of play does republic this is a leber box recording all leber box recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit leber box dot org the republic by play do translated by benjamin joe it book five part one such as the good and true city or state and the good and true man is of the same pattern and if this is right every other is wrong and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the state but also the regulation of the individual soul and is exhibited in four forms what are they he said i was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another when pala marcus who was sitting a little way off just beyond adamantis began to whisper to him stretching forth his hand he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder and drew him towards him leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear of which i only caught the words shall we let him off or what shall we do certainly not said adamantis raising his voice who is it i said to whom you are refusing to let off you he said i repeated why am i especially not to be let off why he said we think that you are lazy and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story and you fancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding as if it were self-evident to everybody that in the matter of women and children friends have all things in common and was i not right adamantis yes he said but what is right in this particular case like everything else requires to be explained for community may be of many kinds please therefore to say what kind of community you mean we have been long expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens how they will bring children into the world and rear them when they have arrived and in general what is the nature of this community of women and children for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the state for good or for evil and now since the question is still undetermined and you are taking in hand another state we have resolved as you heard not to let you go until you give an account of all this to that resolution said glockon you may regard me as saying agreed and without more ado said drasimakis you may consider us all to be equally agreed i said you know not what you are doing and thus assailing me what an argument you are raising about the state just as i thought that i had finished and was only too glad that i had laid this question to sleep and was reflecting how fortunate i was in your acceptance of what i then said you asked me to begin again at the very foundation ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are stirring now i foresaw this gathering trouble and avoided it for what purpose do you conceive that we have come here said drasimakis to look for gold or to hear discourse yes but discourse should have a limit yes socrates said glockon and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assigned to the hearing of such discourses but never mind about us take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way what sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians and how shall we manage the period between birth and education which seems to require the greatest care tell us how these things will be yes my simple friend but the answer is the reverse of easy many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions for the practicability of what is said may be doubted and looked at in another point of view whether the scheme if ever so practicable would be for the best is also doubtful hence i feel a reluctance to approach the subject lest our aspiration my dear friend should turn out to be a dream only fear not he replied for your audience will not be hard upon you they are not skeptical or hostile i said my good friend i suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words yes he said then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had i myself believed that i knew what i was talking about to declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honors and loves among wise men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating inquirer which is my condition is a dangerous and slippery thing and the danger is not that i shall be laughed at of which the fear would be childish but that i shall miss the truth where i have most need to be sure of my footing and drag my friends after me in my fall and i pray nemesis not to visit upon me the words which i'm going to utter for i do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of laws and that is a risk which i would rather run among enemies than among friends and therefore you do well to encourage me glock on laughed and said well then socrates in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide and shall not be held to be a deceiver take courage then and speak well i said the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt and what holds at law may hold an argument then why should you mind well i replied i suppose that i must retrace my steps and say what i perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place the part of the men has been played out and now properly enough comes the turn of the women of them i will proceed to speak and the more readily since i'm invited by you for men born and educated like our citizens the only way in my opinion of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started when we said that the men were to be the guardians and the watchdogs of the herd true let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations then we shall see whether the result accords with our design what do you mean what i mean maybe put in the form of a question i said our dogs divided into he's and she's or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in all the other duties of dogs or do we entrust the males to the entire and exclusive care of the flogs while we leave the females at home under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labor enough for them no he said they share alike the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker but can you use different animals for the same purpose unless they are bred and fed in the same way you cannot then if women are to have the same duties as men they must have the same nurture and education yes the education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic yes then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war which they must practice like the men that is the inference i suppose i should rather expect i said that several of our proposals if they are carried out being unusual may appear ridiculous no doubt of it yes and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the side of women naked in the palestra exercising with the men especially when they are no longer young they will certainly not be a vision of beauty any more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia yes indeed he said according to present notions the proposal will be thought ridiculous but then i said as we have determined to speak our minds we must not fear the gist of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and gymnastic and above all about their wearing armor and riding upon horseback very true he replied yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious not long ago as we shall remind them the hellenes were of the opinion which is still generally received among the barbarians that the side of a naked man was ridiculous and improper and when first the cretins and then the lack of demonians introduced the custom the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation no doubt but when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other site but that of folly and vice or seriously inclined to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good very true he replied first then whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman is she capable of sharing either holy or partially in the absence of men or not at all and is the art of war one of those arts in which she cannot share that will be the best way of commencing the inquiry and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion that will be much the best way shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves in this manner the adversaries position will not be undefended why not he said then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents they will say socrates and glockon no adversary need convict you for you yourselves at the first foundations of the state admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature and certainly if i'm not mistaken such an admission was made by us and do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed and which shall reply of course they do then we shall be asked whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different and such as are agreeable to their different natures certainly they should but if so have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women whose natures are so entirely different ought to perform the same actions what defense will you make for us my good sir against anyone who offers these objections that is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly and I shall and do back of you to draw out the case on our side these are the objections glockon and there are many others of a like kind which I first saw long ago they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children by Zeus he said the problem to be solved is anything but easy why yes I said but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean he has to swim all the same very true and must we not swim and try to reach the shore we will hope that Arians dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us I suppose so he said well then let us see if any way of escape can be found we acknowledge did we not that different natures ought to have different pursuits and that men's and women's natures are different and now what are we saying that different natures ought to have the same pursuits this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us precisely verily glockon I said glorious is the power of the art of contradiction why do you say so because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will when he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing just because he cannot define and divide and so know that if which he's speaking and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not a fair discussion yes he replied such is very often the case but what has that to do with us and our argument a great deal for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition in what way why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth that different natures ought to have different pursuits but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature or why we distinguished them when we decide different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures why no he said that was never considered by us I said suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men and if this is admitted by us then if bald men are cobblers we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers and conversely that would be a jest he said yes I said a jest and why because we never meant when we constructed the state that the opposition of nature should extend to every difference but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged we should have argued for example that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be sent to have the same nature true whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures certainly and if I said the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits very true he said next we shall ask our opponent how in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life the nature of a woman differs from that of a man that will be quite fair and perhaps he like yourself will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy but after a little reflection there is no difficulty yes perhaps suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the state by all means let us say to him come now and we will ask you a question when you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily another with difficulty a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal whereas the other after much study and application no sooner learns than he forgets or again did you mean that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind while the body of the other is a hindrance to him would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted no one will deny that and can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving and the management of pancakes and preserves in which woman kind does really appear to be great and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd you're quite right he replied in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex although many women are in many things superior to many men yet on the whole what you say is true and if so my friend I said there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman or which a man has by virtue of his sex but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man very true then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women that will never do if a woman has a gift of healing another not one is a musician and the other has no music in her nature very true and one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics certainly and one woman is a philosopher and another is an enemy of philosophy one has spirit and another is without spirit that is also true then one woman will have the temper of a guardian and another not was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort yes men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness obviously and those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character very true and ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits they ought then as we were saying before there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians to that point we come round again certainly not the law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration and the contrary practice which prevails at present is in reality a violation of nature that appears to be true we had to consider first whether our proposals were possible and secondly whether they were the most beneficial yes and the possibility has been acknowledged yes the very great benefit has next to be established quite so you will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian for their original nature is the same yes end of book five part one book five part two of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joe it book five part two I should like to ask you a question what is it would you say that all men are equal in excellence or is one man better than another the latter and in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up in our model system to be more perfect men or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling what a ridiculous question you have answered me I replied well and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens by far the best and will not their wives be the best women yes by far the best and can there be anything better for the interests of the state than that the men and women of a state should be as good as possible there can be nothing better and this is what the arts of music and gymnastics when present in such a manner as we have described will accomplish certainly then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the state true then let the wives of our guardians strip for their virtue will be their robe and let them share in the toils of war in the defense of their country only in the distribution of labors the lighter are to be assigned to the women who are the weaker natures but in other respects their duties are to be the same and as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives in his laughter he is plucking a fruit of unright wisdom and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at or what he is about for that is and ever will be the best of sayings that the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base very true here then is one difficulty in our law about women which we may say that we have now escaped the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the constancy of the argument with itself bears witness yes that was a mighty wave which you have escaped yes I said but a greater is coming you will not think much of this when you see the next go on let me see the law I said which is the sequel of this and of all that has proceeded is to the following effect that the wives of our guardians are to be common and their children are to be common and no parent is to know his own child nor any child his parent yes he said that is a much greater wave than the other and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable I do not think I said that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common the possibility is quite another matter and will be very much disputed I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both you imply that the two questions must be combined I replied now I meant that you should admit the utility and in this way as I thought I should escape from one of them and then there would remain only the possibility but that little attempt is detected and therefore you will please to give a defense of both well I said I submit to my fate yet grant me a little favor let me feast my mind with the dream as daydreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone for before they have discovered any means of affecting their wishes that is a matter which never troubles them they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities but assuming that what they desire is already granted them they proceed with their plan and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wishes come true that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much now I myself am beginning to lose heart and I should like with your permission to pass over the question of possibility at present assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal I shall now proceed to inquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements and I shall demonstrate that our plan if executed will be of the greatest benefit to the state and to the guardians first of all then if you have no objection I will endeavor with your help to consider the advantages of the measure and hereafter the question of possibility I have no objection proceed first I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other the guardians must themselves obey the laws and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to their care that is right he said you I said who are their legislator having selected the men will now select the women and give them to them they must be as far as possible of like natures with them and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals none of them will have anything specially his or her own they will be together and will be brought up together and will associate it gymnastic exercises and so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other necessity is not too strong a word I think yes he said necessity not geometrical but another sort of necessity which lovers know and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind true I said and this Glockon like all the rest must proceed after an orderly fashion in a city of the blessed lies anxiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid yes he said and it ought not to be permitted then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred exactly and how can marriages be made most beneficial that is a question which I put to you because I see in your house dogs for hunting and of the nobler sort of birds not a few now I beseech you do tell me have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding in what particulars why in the first place although they are all of a good sort are not some better than others true and do you breed from them all and differently or do you take care to breed only from the best from the best and do you take the oldest or the youngest or only those of ripe age I choose only those of ripe age and if care was not taken in the breeding your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate certainly and the same of horses and animals in general undoubtedly good heavens my dear friend I said what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principal holds of the human species certainly the same principal holds but why does this involve any particular skill because I said our rulers will have often to practice upon the body corporate with medicines now you know that when patients do not require medicines but have only to be put under a regimen the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough but when medicine has to be given then the doctor should be more of a man that is quite true he said but to what are you alluding I mean I replied that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage and we were very right and this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births how so why I said the principal has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often and the inferior with the inferior as seldom as possible and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union but not of the other if the flock is to be maintained in first rate condition now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know or there will be a further danger of our herd as the guardians may be termed breaking out into rebellion very true had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymenial songs composed by our poets the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers whose aim will be to preserve the average of population there are many other things which they will have to consider such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies in order as far as this is possible to prevent the state from becoming either too large or too small certainly he replied we shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together and then they will accuse their own ill luck and not the rulers to be sure he said and I think that our braver and better youth besides their other honors and rewards might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them their bravery will be a reason and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible true and the proper officers whether male or female or both for offices are to be held by women as well as by men yes the proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter but the offspring of the inferior or of the better when they chance to be deformed will be put away in some mysterious unknown place as they should be yes he said that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure they will provide for their nurture and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes her own child and other wet nurses may be engaged if more are required care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protected too long and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants you suppose the wise of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they're having children why said I and so they ought let us however proceed with our scheme we were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life very true and what is the prime of life may it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life and thirty in a man's which years do you mean to include a woman I said at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the state and continue to bear them until forty a man may begin at five and twenty when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest and continue to be get children until he be fifty five certainly he said both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigor anyone above or below the prescribed ages who takes apart in the public hymenals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing the child of which he is the father if he steals it into life will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers which at each hymenial priestesses and priests the whole city will offer that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust very true he replied and the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the state uncertified and unconsecrated very true he replied this applies however only to those who are within the specified age after that we will allow them to range at will except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter or his mother or his mother's mother and women on the other hand are prohibited for marrying their sons or fathers or sons son or father's father and so on in either direction and we grant all this accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light and if any force away to the birth the parents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained and arrange accordingly that so he said is a reasonable proposition but how will they know who are fathers and daughters and so on they will never know the way will be this dating from the day of the hymenial the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons and the female children his daughters and they will call him father and he will call their children his grandchildren and they will call the elder generation fathers and grandmothers all who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters and these as I was saying will be forbidden to intermarry this however is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters if the lot favors them and they receive the sanction of the pithian oracle the law will allow them quite right he replied such as the scheme Glockon according to which the guardians of our state are to have their wives and families in common and now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity and also that nothing can be better would you not yes certainly shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a state what is the greatest good and what is the greatest evil and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil by all means can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign or any greater good than the bond of unity there cannot and there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow no doubt yes and where there is no common but only private feeling a state is disorganized when you have one half of the world triumphant and the other half plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens certainly such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms mind and not mine his and not his exactly so and it's not that the best ordered state in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms mind and not mine in the same way to the same thing quite true or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual as in the body but when a finger of one of us is hurt the whole frame drawn towards the soul as a center and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected and we say that the man has a pain in his finger and that the same expression is used about any other part of the body which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering very true he replied and I agree with you that in the best ordered state there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil the whole state will make his case their own and will either rejoice or sorrow with him yes he said that is what will happen in a well ordered state it will now be time I said for us to return to our state and see whether this or some other is most in accordance with these fundamental principles very good our state like every other has rulers and subjects true all of whom will call one another citizens of course but is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other states generally they call them masters but in democratic states they simply call them rulers and in our state what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers they are called saviors and helpers he replied and what do the rulers call the people their maintainers and foster fathers and what do they call them in other states slaves and what do the rulers call one another in other states fellow rulers and what in ours fellow guardians did you ever know an example in any other state of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend yes very often and the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest exactly but would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger certainly he would not for every one whom they meet will be regarded by them as either brother or sister or father or mother or son or daughter or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him capital I said but let me ask you once more shall they be a family and name only or shall they in all their actions be true to the name for example in the use of the word father would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man are these to be or not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kids spoke these he said and none other for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them and of book five part two book five part three of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joe it book five part three then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other as I was describing before when anyone is well or ill the universal word will be with me it is well or it is ill most true and agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common yes and so they will and they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will all alike call my own and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain yes far more so than in other states and the reason of this over and above the general constitution of the state will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children that will be the chief reason and this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good as was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered state to the relation of the body and the members when affected by pleasure or pain that we acknowledge and very rightly then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the state certainly and this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property their pay was to be their food which they were to receive from the other citizens and they were to have no private expenses for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians right he replied both the community of property in the community of families as I am saying tend to make them more truly guardians they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about mine and not mine each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them and therefore they all tend toward a common end certainly he replied and as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own suits and complaints will have no existence among them they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion of course they will neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them for that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honorable and right we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity that is good he said yes and there is a further good in the law viz that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there and not proceed to more dangerous lengths certainly to the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger clearly nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder unless the magistrates command him nor will he slight him in any way for there are two guardians shame and fear mighty to prevent him shame which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents fear that the injured one will be suckered by the others who are his brothers sons fathers that is true he replied then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another yes there will be no want to peace and as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another none whatever I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid for they are beneath notice such for example as the flattery of the rich by the poor and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household borrowing and then repudiating getting how they can and giving money into the hands of women and slaves to keep the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough and not worth speaking of yes he said a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that then from all these evils they will be delivered and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed how so the Olympic victor I said is deemed happy in receiving part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance of the public cost for the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole state and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fullness of all that life needs they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living and after death have an honourable burial yes he said and glorious rewards they are do you remember I said how in the course of the previous discussion someone who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy they had nothing and might have possessed all things to whom we replied that if an occasion offered we might perhaps hereafter consider this question but that as that present advised we would make our guardians truly guardians and that we were fashioning the state with a view to the greatest happiness not of any particular class but of the whole yes I remember and what do you say now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors is the life of shoemakers or any other artisans or of husbandmen to be compared with it certainly not at the same time I ought here to repeat what I've said elsewhere that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian and is not content with this safe and harmonious life which in our judgment is of all lives the best but infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself then he will have to learn how wisely has he had spoke when he said half is more than the whole if he were to consult me I should say to him stay where you are when you have the offer of such a life you agree then I said that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described common education common children and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war they are to keep watch together and to hunt together like dogs and always and in all things as far as they are able women are to share with the men and in so doing they will do what is best and will not violate but preserve the natural relation of the sexes I agree with you he replied the inquiry I said has yet to be made whether such a community be found possible as among other animals so also among men and if possible in what way possible you have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest there is no difficulty I said in seeing how war will be carried on by them how why of course they will go on expeditions together and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough that after the manner of the artisan's child they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up and besides looking on they will have to help and be of use in war and to wait upon their fathers and mothers did you never observe in the arts how the potters boys look on and help long before they touch the wheel yes I have and shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practicing their duties then our guardians will be the idea is ridiculous he said there is also the effect on the parents with whom as with other animals the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valor that is quite true Socrates and yet if they are defeated which may often happen in war how great the danger is the children will be lost as well as their parents and the state will never recover true I said but would you never allow them to run any risk I'm far from saying that well but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when if they escape disaster they will be the better for it clearly whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter for the sake of which some risk may be fairly incurred yes very important this then must be our first step to make our children spectators of war but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger then all will be well true their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war but to know as far as human foresight can what expeditions are safe and what dangerous that may be assumed and they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones true and they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers very properly still the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen there is a good deal of chance about them true then against such chances the children must be at once burnished with wings in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape what do you mean he said I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth and when they have learned to ride take them on horseback to see war the horses must not be spirited and warlike but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had in this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their own business and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape I believe you're right he said next as to war what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another into their enemies I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms or is guilty of any other act of cowardice should be degraded into the rank of a husband men and artisan what do you think by all means I should say and he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies he is their lawful prey and let them do what they like with him certainly but the hero who has distinguished himself what shall be done to him in the first place he shall receive honor in the army from his youthful comrades every one of them in succession self crown him what do you say I approve and what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship to that too I agree but you will hardly agree to my next proposal what is your proposal that he should kiss and be kissed by them most certainly and I should be disposed to go further and say let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts so that if there be a lover in the army whether his love be youth or maiden he may be more eager to win the prize of valor capital I said that the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others in order that he may have as many children as possible agreed again there is another manner in which according to Homer brave youth should be honored for he tells how I acts after he had distinguished himself in battle was rewarded with long chains which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age being not only a tribute of honor but also a very strengthening thing most true he said then in this I said Homer shall be our teacher and we too at sacrifices and on the like occasions will honor the brave according to the measure of their valor whether men or women with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning also with seats of precedents and meats and full cups and in honoring them we shall be at the same time training them that he replied is excellent yes I said and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say in the first place that he is of the golden race to be sure nay have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead they are holy angels upon the earth authors of good avertors of evil the guardians of speech gifted men yes and we accept his authority we must learn of the God how we are to order the sepulcher of divine and heroic personages and what is to be their special distinction and we must do as he bids by all means and in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes and not only they but any who are deemed preeminently good whether they die from age or in any other way shall be admitted to the same honors that is very right he said next how shall our soldiers treat their enemies what about this in what respect do you mean first of all in regard to slavery do you think it right that Helene's should enslave Hellenic states or allow others to enslave them if they can help should not their custom be to spare them considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians to spare them is infinitely better then no Helene should be owned by them as a slave that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Helene's to observe certainly he said they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another next as to the slain ought the conquerors I said to take anything but their armor does not the practice of disboiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle cowards skulk about the dead pretending that they are fulfilling a duty and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder very true and is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant quarreling with the stones which strike him instead very like a dog he said then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial yes he replied we most certainly must neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods least of all the arms of helene's if we care to maintain good feeling with other helene's and indeed we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself very true again as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses what is to be the practice may I have the pleasure he said of hearing your opinion both should be forbidden in my judgment I would take the annual produce and no more shall I tell you why pray do why you see there is a difference in the names discord and war and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic the other of what is external and foreign and the first of the two is termed discord and only the second war that is a very proper distinction he replied and may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship and alien and strange to the very good he said and therefore when helene's fight with barbarians and barbarians with helene's they will be described by us as being at war when they fight and by nature enemies and this kind of antagonism should be called war but when helene's fight with one another we shall say that hell us is then in a state of disorder and discord they being by nature friends and such enmity is to be called discord I agree consider then I said when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs and the city is divided if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another how wicked does the strife appear no true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother there might be reason in the conquered depriving the conquered of their harvest but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting forever yes he said that is a better temper than the other and will not the city which you are founding be in Hellenic city it ought to be he replied then will not the citizens be good and civilized yes very civilized and will they not be lovers of helas and think of helas as their own land and share in the common temples most certainly and any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only a coral among friends which is not to be called a war certainly not then they will coral as those who intend someday to be reconciled certainly they will use friendly correction but will not enslave or destroy their opponents they will be correctors not enemies just so and as they are helene's themselves they will not devastate helas nor will they burn houses nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city men women and children are equally their enemies for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends and for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and raise their houses their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction i agree he said that our citizens should thus deal with their helenic enemies and with barbarians as the helene's now deal with one another then let us enact this law also for our guardians that they are neither to devastate the lands of helene's nor to burn their houses agreed and we may agree also in thinking that these like all our previous enactments are very good end of book five part three book five part four of play does republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the republic by play do translated by benjamin joe it book five part four but still i must say socrates that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside is such an order of things possible and how if at all for i'm quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose if only feasible would do all sorts of good to the state i will add what you have omitted that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors and will never leave their ranks for they will all know one another and each will call the other father brother son and if you suppose the women to join the armies whether in the same rank or in the rear either as a terror to the enemy or as auxiliaries in case of need i know that they will then be absolutely invincible and there are many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which i also fully acknowledge but as i admit all these advantages and as many more as you please if only this state of yours were to come into existence we need say no more about them assuming then the existence of the state now let us turn to the question of possibility and ways and means the rest may be left if i loiter for a moment you instantly make a raid upon me i said and have no mercy i have hardly escaped the first and second waves and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third which is the greatest and heaviest when you have seen and heard the third wave i think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which i have now to state and investigate the more appeals of this sort which you make he said the more determined are we that you shall teach us how such a state is possible speak out and at once let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice true he replied but what of that i was only going to ask whether if we have discovered them we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice or may we be satisfied with an approximation and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men the approximation will be enough we were inquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just and into injustice and the perfectly unjust that we might have an idea we were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resemble them but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact true he said would a painter be any worse because after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed he would be none the worse well and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect state to be sure and is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described surely not he replied that is the truth I said but if it's your request I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest I must ask you having this in view to repeat your former admissions what admissions I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language does not the word express more than the fact and must not the actual whatever a man may think always in the nature of things fall short of the truth what do you say I agree then you must not insist on my proving that the actual state will in every respect coincide with the ideal if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed as nearly as we proposed you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand and will be contented I am sure that I should be contented will not you yes I will let me next endeavor to show what is that fault in states which is the cause of their present mal administration and what is the least change which will enable a state to pass into the true reform and let the change of possible be of one thing only or if not of two at any rate let the changes be as few and slight as possible certainly he replied I think I said that there might be a reform of the state if only one change were made which is not a slight or an easy though it's still possible one what is it he said now then I said I go to meet that which I like into the greatest of the waves yet shall the word be spoken even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonor and do you mark my words proceed I said until philosophers are kings or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy and political greatness and wisdom meet in one and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside cities will never have rest from their evils nor the human race as I believe and then only will this our state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day such was the thought my dear Glockon which I would feign have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant for to be convinced that in no other state can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing Socrates what do you mean I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons and very respectable persons to in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment and seizing any weapon that comes to hand will run you at might and main before you know where you are intending to do heaven knows what and if you don't prepare an answer and put yourself in motion you will be paired by their fine wits and no mistake you got me into a scrape I said and I was quite right however I will do all I can to get you out of it but I can only give you goodwill and good advice and perhaps I might be able to fit answers to your questions better than another that is all and now having such an auxiliary you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right I ought to try I said since you offer me such invaluable assistance and I think that if there is to be a chance of our escaping we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the state then we shall be able to defend ourselves there will be discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the state and others who are not born to be philosophers and are meant to be followers rather than leaders then now for a definition he said follow me I said and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation proceed I dare say that you remember and therefore I need not remind you that a lover if he is worthy of the name ought to show his love not to some one part of that which he loves but to the whole I really do not understand and therefore beg of you to assist my memory another person I said might fairly reply as you do but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards is not this a way which you have with the fair one has a snub nose and you praise his charming face the hook nose of another has you say a royal look while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity the dark visage is manly the fair are children of the gods and as to the sweet honey pale as they are called what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth in a word there is no excuse which you will not make and nothing which you will not say in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the springtime of youth if you make me an authority in matters of love for the sake of the argument I sent and what do you say of lovers of wine do you not see them doing the same they are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine very good and the same is true of ambitious men if they cannot command an army they are willing to command a file and if they cannot be honored by really great and important persons they are glad to be honored by lesser and mean people but honor of some kind they must have exactly once more let me ask does he who desires any class of goods desire the whole class or a part only the whole and may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover not of a part of wisdom only but of the whole yes of the whole and he who dislikes learning especially in youth when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not such and one we maintain not to be a philosopher or lover of knowledge just as he who refuses his food is not hungry and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one very true he said whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied may be justly termed a philosopher am I not right Glockon said if curiosity makes a philosopher you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name all the lovers of sites have a delight in learning and must therefore be included musical amateurs too are folks strangely out of place among philosophers for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion if they could help while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus whether the performance is in town or country that makes no difference there they are now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes as well as the professors of quite minor arts are philosophers certainly not I replied they are only an imitation he said who then are the true philosophers those I said who are lovers of the vision of truth that is also good he said but I should like to know what you mean to another I replied I might have a difficulty in explaining but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make what is the proposition that since beauty is the opposite of ugliness they are two certainly and in as much as they are two each of them is one true again and of just and unjust good and evil and of every other class the same remark holds taken singly each one of them is one but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another they are seen in all sorts of lights and a fear many very true and this is the distinction which I draw between the sight loving art loving practical class and those of whom I am speaking and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers how do you distinguish them he said the lovers of sounds and sights I replied are as I conceive fond of fine tones and colors and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty true he replied you are they who are able to attain to the side of this very true and he who having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty or who if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow of such in one I ask is he awake or in a dream only reflect is not the dreamer sleeping or waking one who likens dissimilar things who puts the copy in the place of the real object I should certainly say that such in one was dreaming but take the case of the other who recognizes the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in place of the objects is he a dreamer or is he awake he is wide awake and may we not say that the mind of the one who has the knowledge and that the mind of the other who opines only has opinion certainly but suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits we must certainly offer him some good advice he replied come then and let us think of something to say to him shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have and that we are rejoiced it is having it but we should like to ask him a question does he who has knowledge know something or nothing you must answer for him I answer that he knows something something that is or is not something that is for how can that which is not ever be known and are we assured after looking at the matter from many points of view that absolute being is or may be absolutely known but that the utterly nonexistent is utterly unknown nothing can be more certain good but if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being yes between them and as knowledge corresponded to being an ignorance of necessity to not being for that intermediate between being and not being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge if there be such certainly do we admit the existence of opinion undoubtedly as being the same with knowledge or another faculty another faculty then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties yes and knowledge is relative to being and knows being but before I proceed further I will make a division what division I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves they are powers in us and in all of the things by which we do as we do sight and hearing for example I should call faculties have I clearly explained the class which I mean yes I quite understand then let me tell you my view about them I do not see them and therefore the distinctions of figure color and the like which enabled me to discern the difference of some things do not apply to them in speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result and that which has the same sphere in the same result I call the same faculty but that which has another sphere and another result I call different would that be your way of speaking yes and will you be so very good as to answer one more question would you say that knowledge is a faculty or in what class would you place it certainly knowledge is a faculty and the mightiest of all faculties and his opinion also a faculty certainly he said for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion and yet you are acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion why yes he said how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which airs an excellent sir proving I said that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them yes then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subject matters that is certain being is the sphere or subject matter of knowledge and knowledge is to know the nature of being yes and opinion is to have an opinion yes and do we know what we opine or is the subject matter of opinion the same as the subject matter of knowledge nay he replied that has been already disproven if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subject matter and if as we are saying opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same then if being is the subject matter of knowledge something else must be the subject matter of opinion yes something else well then is not being the subject matter of opinion or rather how can there be an opinion at all about not being reflect when a man has an opinion has he not an opinion about something can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing impossible he who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing yes and not being is not one thing but properly speaking nothing true of not being ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative of being knowledge true he said then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not being not with either and can therefore neither be ignorance or knowledge that seems to be true but his opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them in a greater clearness than knowledge or in a greater darkness than ignorance in neither then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge but lighter than ignorance both and in no small degree and also to be within in between them yes then you would infer that opinion is intermediate no question but were we not saying before that if anything appeared to be a sort of which is and is not at the same time that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not being and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance but will be found in the interval between them true and in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion there has then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not being and cannot rightly be termed either pure and simple this unknown term when discovered we may truly call the subject of opinion and assign each to their proper faculty the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean true this being premised I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold he I say your lover of beautiful sights who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one and the justice one or that anything is one to him I would appeal saying will you be so very kind sir as to tell us whether of all these beautiful things there is one which will not be found ugly or of the just which will not be found unjust or of the holy which will not also be unholy no he replied the beautiful will in some point of you be found ugly and the same is true of the rest and it may not the many which are doubles also be halves doubles that is if one thing and halves of another quite true and things great and small heavy and light as they are termed will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names true both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them and can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this he replied there are like the punning riddles which are as that feast or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat with what he hit him as they say in the puzzle and upon what the bat was sitting the individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle and have a double sense nor can you fix them in your mind either as being or not being or both or neither then what will you do with them I said can they have a better place than between being and not being for they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not being or more full of light and existence than being that is quite true he said thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in some region which is halfway between pure being and pure not being we have yes and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion and not as matter of knowledge being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty quite true then those who see them any beautiful and who yet neither see absolute beauty nor can follow any guide who points the way thither who see the many just and not absolute justice and the like such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge that is certain but those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know and not to have opinion only neither can that be denied the one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge the other those of opinion the latter are the same as I dare say you will remember who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colors but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty yes I remember shall we then be guilty of any impropriety and calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them I shall tell them not to be angry no man should be angry at what is true but those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion assuredly end of book five book six part one of Plato's Republic this is a liver vox recording all liver vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liver vox.org recording by James Wadsworth the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joett book six part one and thus Locken after the argument has gone a weary way the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view I do not think he said that the way could have been shortened I suppose not I said and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider and what is the next question he asked surely I said the one which follows next in order in as much as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our state and how can we rightly answer that question whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our state let them be our guardians very good neither I said can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes there can be no question of that and are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing and who have in their souls no clear pattern and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty goodness justice and this if not already ordered and to guard and preserve the order of them are not such persons I ask simply blind truly he replied they are much in that condition and shall they be our guardians when there are others who besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular virtue also know the very truth of each thing there can be no reason he said for rejecting those who have the greatest of all great qualities they must always have the first place unless they fall in some other respect suppose then I said that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellencies by all means in the first place as we began by observing the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained must come to an understanding about him and when we have done so then if I am not mistaken we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible and that those whom they're united and those only should be rulers in the state what do you mean let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption agreed and further I said let us agree that they are lovers of all true being there is no part whether greater or less or more or less honorable which they are willing to renounce as we said before of the lover and the man with ambition true and if they are to be what we were describing is there not another quality which they should also possess what quality truthfulness they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood which is their detestation and they will love the truth yes that may be safely affirmed to them maybe my friend I replied is not the word say rather must be affirmed for he whose nature is amorous of anything that cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections right he said and is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth how can there be can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood never the true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth as far as in him lies desire all truth assuredly but then again as we know by experience he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel true he whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul and will hardly feel bodily pleasure I mean if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one that is most certain such a one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous for the motos which make another man desirous of having and spending have no place in his character very true another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered what is that there should be no secret corner of illiberality nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human most true he replied then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existent think much of human life he cannot or can such a one account death fearful no indeed then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy certainly not or again can he who's harmoniously constituted who's not covetous or mean or a boaster or a coward can he I say ever be unjust or hard in his dealings impossible then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle or rude and unsociable these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical true there is another point which should be remarked what point whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning for no one will love that which gives him pain and in which after much toil he makes little progress certainly not and again if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns will he not be an empty vessel that is certain laboring in vain he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation yes then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophical natures we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory certainly and once more the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion undoubtedly and do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion to proportion then besides other qualities we must try to find a naturally well-reported and gracious mind which move spontaneously towards the true being of everything certainly well and do not all these qualities which we have been enumerating go together and are they not in a manner necessary to a soul which is to have a full and perfect participation of being they are absolutely necessary he replied and must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory and is quick to learn noble gracious the friend of truth justice courage temperance who are his kindred the god of jealousy himself he said could find no fault with such a study and to men like him I said when perfected by years and education and to these only you will entrust the state here idiomitis interposed and said to these statements socrates no one can offer a reply but when you talk in this way a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers they fancy that they're let astray a little at each step in the argument owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions these little accumulate and at the end of the discussion they're found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be have turned upside down and as unskillful players of draughts or at last shut up by their more skillful adversaries and have no peace to move so they too find themselves shut up at last for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are counters and yet all the time they are in the right the observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring for any one of us might say that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument he seems as a fact that the votaries of philosophy when they carry on the study not only in youth as a part of education but as the pursuit of their mature years most of them become strange monsters not to say usher rogues and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol well and you think that those who say so are wrong i cannot tell you're applied but i should like to know what is your opinion here my answer i am of opinion that they are quite right then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them you ask a question i said to which a reply can only be given in a parable yes socrates and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed i suppose i perceive i said that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion but now hear the parable and then you will be still more amused at the meagerness of my imagination for the manner in which the best man are treated in their own states is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it and therefore if i had to plead their cause i must have recourse to fiction and put together a figure made up of many things like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures imagine then a fleet or ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight and his knowledge of navigation is not much better the sailors are quarreling with one another about the steering everyone is of opinion that he has a right to steer though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned and will further assert that it cannot be taught and they are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says the contrary they throng about the captain begging and praying him to commit the helm to them and if at any time they do not prevail but others are preferred to them they kill the others or throw them overboard and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores thus eating and drinking they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them he who is the partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion they complement with the name of sailor pilot abel seaman and abuse the other sort of man whom they call a good for nothing but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and wind and whatever else belongs to his art if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship and that he must and will be the steerer whether other people like or not the possibility of this union of authority with the steer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers how will the true pilot be regarded will he not be called by them a praetor a stargazer a good for nothing of course said adamantus then you will hardly need i said to hear the interpretation of the figure which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the state for you understand it already certainly then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised finding that philosophers have no honor in their cities explain it to him and try to convince him that they're having honor would be far more extraordinary i will say to him that in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world he is right but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them and not to themselves the pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him this is not the order of nature neither are the wise to go to the doors of the rich and the ingenious author of this saying told a lie but the truth is that when a man is ill whether he be rich or poor to the physician he must go and he who wants to be governed to him who is able to govern the ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors and the true helmsman to those who are called by them good for nothings and stargazers precisely so he said for these reasons and among men like these philosophy the noblest pursuit of all is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction not that the greatest and most lasting injuries done to her by her opponents but by her own professing followers the same of whom you suppose accuse her to say that the greatest number of them are errant rows and the best are useless in which opinion i agreed yes and the reason why the good or useless has now been explained true end of book six part one recording by james wadsworth book six part two of playtoe's republic this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org recording by filipa the republic by playto translated by benjamin joe it book six part two then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other by all means and let us ask and answer in turn first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature truth as you will remember was his leader whom he followed always and in all things failing in this he was an impostor and had no part or lot in true philosophy yes that was said well and is not this one quality to mention no others greatly at variance with present notions of him certainly he said and have we not a right to say in his defense that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being that is his nature he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only but will go on the keen edge will not be blunted nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being having begotten mind and truth he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly and then and not till then will he cease from his travail nothing he said can be more just than such a description of him and will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature will he not utterly hate a lie he will and when truth is the captain we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads impossible justice and health of mind will be of the company and temperance will follow after true he replied neither is there any reason why i should again set in array the philosophers virtues as you will doubtless remember that courage magnificence apprehension memory were his natural gifts and you objected that although no one could deny what i then said still if you leave words and look at facts the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless and the greater number utterly depraved we were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusations and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher exactly and we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling i am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked and when we have done with them we will speak of the inotators of philosophy what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy and then by their manifold inconsistencies bring upon philosophy and upon all philosophers that universal reprobation of which we speak what are these corruptions he said i will see if i can explain them to you everyone will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men rare indeed and what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures what causes in the first place there are their own virtues their courage temperance and the rest of them every one of which praise worthy qualities and this is a most singular circumstance destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them that is very singular he replied then there are all the ordinary goods of life beauty wealth strength rank and great connections in the state you understand the sort of things these also have a corrupting and distracting effect i understand but i should like to know more precisely what you mean about them grasp the truth as a whole i said and in the right way you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks and they will no longer appear strange to you and how am i to do so he asked why i said we know that all germs or seeds whether vegetable or animal when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil in proportion to their vigor are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not very true there is reason in supposing that the finest natures when under alien conditions receive more injury than the inferior because the contrast is greater certainly and may we not say at amantus that the most gifted minds when they are ill educated become preeminently bad do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fullness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil there i think that you are right and our philosopher follows the same analogy he is like a plant which having proper nurture must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue but if sown and planted in an alien soil becomes the most noxious of all weeds unless he be preserved by some divine power do you really think as people so often say that our youths are corrupted by sophists or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of are not the public who say these things the greatest of all sophists and do they not educate to perfection young and old men and women alike and fashion them after their own hearts when is this accomplished he said when they meet together and the world sits down at an assembly or in a court of law or a theater or a camp or in any other popular resort and there is great uproar and they praise some things which are being said or done and blame other things equally exaggerating both shouting and clapping their hands and the echo of the rocks and the placing which they're assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame at such a time will not a young man's heart as they say leap within him will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion or will he be carried away by the stream will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have he will do as they do and as they are such will he be yes Socrates necessity will compel him and yet I said there is a still greater necessity which has not been mentioned what is that the gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death which as you are aware these new sophists and educators who are the public apply when their words are powerless indeed they do and in right good earnest now what opinion of any other sophist or of any private person can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest none he replied no indeed I said even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly then either is nor has been nor is ever likely to be any different type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion I speak my friend of human virtue only what is more than human as the proverb says is not included for I would not have you ignorant that in the present evil state of governments whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God as we may truly say I quite assent he replied then let me crave your assent also to a further observation what are you going to say why that all those mercenary individuals whom the many call sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries do in fact teach nothing but the opinion of the many that is to say the opinions of their assemblies and this is their wisdom I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him he would learn how to approach and handle him also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse and what is the meaning of his several cries and by what sounds when another utter them he is soothed or infuriated and you may suppose further that when by continually attending upon him he has become perfect in all this he called his knowledge wisdom and makes of it a system or art which he proceeds to teach although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking but calls this honourable and that dishonourable or good and evil or just or unjust all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary having never himself seen and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either all the difference between them which is immense by heaven would not such a one be a rare educator indeed he would and in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude whether in painting or music or finally in politics differ from him whom i have been describing for when a man consorts with the many and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the state making them his judges when he is not obliged the so-called necessity of diamede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise and yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good did you ever hear any of them which were not no nor am i likely to hear what you recognize the truth of what i've been saying then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind certainly not then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher impossible and therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world they must and of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them that is evident then do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end and remember what we were saying of him that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence these were admitted by us to be the true philosophers gifts yes will not such and one from his early childhood being all things first among all especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones certainly he said and his friends and fellow citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes no question falling at his feet they will make requests to him and do him honour and flatter him because they want to get into their hands now the power which he will one day possess that often happens he said and what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances especially if he be a citizen of a great city rich and noble and a tall proper youth will he not be full of boundless aspirations and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of helens and barbarians and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fullness of vain pomp and senseless pride to be sure he will now when he is in this state of mind if someone gently comes to him and tells him that he's a fool and must get understanding which can only be got by slaving for it do you think that under such adverse circumstances he will be easily induced to listen far otherwise and even if there be someone who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions there can be no doubt of it and how can one who is thus circumstances ever become a philosopher impossible then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may if he be ill-educated divert him from philosophy no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life we were quite right thus my excellent friend is brought about all that ruin and failure which i've been describing of the nature's best adapted to the best of all pursuits they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to states and individuals and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to states that is most true he said and so philosophy is left desolate with her marriage right incomplete for her own having fallen away and forsaken her and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life other unworthy persons seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors enter in and dishonour her and fasten upon her the reproaches which as you say her reprovers utter who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing and that the greater number deserves the severest punishment that is certainly what people say yes and what else would you expect I said when you think of the puny creatures who seeing this land open to them a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary take a leap out of their trades into philosophy those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts for although philosophy be in this evil case still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts and many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses as their bodies are by their trades and crafts is not this unavoidable yes are they not exactly like a ball's little tinker who has just got out of endurance and come into a fortune he takes a bath and puts on a new coat and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter who is left poor and desolate a most exact parallel what will be the issue of such marriages will they not be vile and bastard there can be no question of it and when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is a rank above them what sorts of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear having nothing in them genuine or worthy of or akin to true wisdom no doubt he said then adamantus i said the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant perchance some noble and well educated person detained by exile in her service who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her or some lofty soul born in a mean city the politics of which he contends and neglects and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts which they justly despise and come to her or by adventure there are some who are restrained by our friend the aegis bridle for everything in the life of the aegis conspired to divert him from philosophy but ill health kept him away from politics my own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning for rarely if ever has such a monitor been given to any other man those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude and I know that no politician is honest nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved such a one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the state or to his friends and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others he holds his peace and goes his own way he is like one who in the storm of dust and sleep which the driving wind hurries along retires under the shelter of a wall and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness he is content if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness and depart in peace and goodwill with bright hopes yes he said and he will have done a great work before he departs a great work yes but not the greatest unless he finds a state suitable to him for in a state which is suitable to him he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country as well as of himself the cause is why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained the injustice of the charges against her has been shown is there anything more which you wish to say nothing more on that subject he replied end of book six part two book six part three of Plato's republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Philippa the republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joeet book six part three but i should like to know which of the government's now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her not any of them i said and that is precisely the accusation which i bring against them not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature and hence that nature is warped and estranged as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized and is won't to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil even so this growth of philosophy instead of persisting degenerates and receives another character but if philosophy ever finds in the state that perfection which she herself is then we'll be seen that she is in truth divine and that all other things whether natures of men or institutions are but human and now i know that you are going to ask what that state is no he said they were wrong for i was going to ask another question whether it is the state of which we are the founders and inventors or some other yes i replied ours in most respects but you may remember my saying before that some living authority would always be required in the state having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws that was said he replied yes but not in a satisfactory manner you frightened us by interposing objections which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult and what still remains is the reverse of easy what is there remaining the question how the study of philosophy may be so altered as not to be the ruin of the state all great attempts are attended with risk hard is the good as men say still he said let the point be cleared up and the inquiry will then be complete i shall not be hindered i said by any want of will but if at all by a want of power my zeal you may see for yourselves and pleased to remark in what i'm about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly i declare that states should pursue philosophy not as they do now but in a different spirit in what manner at present i said the students of philosophy are quite young beginning when they are hardly past childhood they devote only the time saved from money making and housekeeping to such pursuits and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject i mean dialectic take themselves off in afterlife when invited by someone else they may perhaps go and hear a lecture and about this they make much ado for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business at last when they grow old in most cases they are extinguished more truly than heraclitus' son in as much as they never light up again heraclitus said that the sun was extinguished every evening and relighted every morning but what ought to be their course just the opposite in childhood and youth their study and what philosophy they learn should be suited to their tender years during this period while they are growing up towards manhood the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy as life advances and the intellect begins to mature let them increase the gymnastics of the soul but when the strength of our citizens fails and his past civil and military duties then let them range at will and engage in no serious labor as we intend them to live happily here and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another how truly in earnest you are Socrates he said I'm sure of that and yet most of your hearers if I'm not mistaken I like you to be still more earnest in their opposition to you and will never be convinced racymachus least of all do not make a quarrel I said between racymachus and me who have recently become friends although indeed we were never enemies for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again and hold the like discourse in another state of existence you are speaking of a time which is not very near rather I replied of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity nevertheless I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy consisting of words artificially brought together not like these of ours having a natural unity but a human being who in word and work is perfectly molded as far as he can be into the proportion and likeness of virtue such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image they have never yet seen neither one nor many of them do you think that they ever did no indeed no my friend and they have seldom if ever heard free and noble sentiments such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy of which the end is opinion and strife whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society they are strangers he said to the words of which you speak and this was what we foresaw and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit not without fear and hesitation that neither cities nor states nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled whether they will or not to take care of the state and until alike necessity be laid on the state to obey them or until kings or if not kings the sons of kings or princes are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy that either or both of these alternatives are impossible I see no reason to affirm if they were so we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries am I not right quite right if then in the countless ages of the past or at the present hour in some foreign climb which is far away and beyond our ken the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by superior power to have charge of the state we are ready to assert to the death that this our constitution has been and is yay and will be whenever the muse of philosophy is queen there is no impossibility in all this that there is a difficulty we acknowledge ourselves my opinion agrees with yours he said but do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude I should imagine not he replied oh my friend I said do not attack the multitude they will change their minds if not in an aggressive spirit but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of over education you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed if they view him in this new light they will surely change their notion of him and answer in another strain who can be at enmity with one who loves them who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy nay let me answer for you that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of mankind I quite agree with you he said and do you not also think as I do that the harsh feeling which the many entertain towards philosophy originate in the pretenders who rush in uninvited and are always abusing them and finding fault with them who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this it is most unbecoming for he adamantus whose mind is fixed upon true being has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth or to be filled with malice and envy contending against other men his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another but all in order moving according to reason these he imitates and to these he will as far as he can conform himself can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse impossible and the philosopher holding converse with the divine order becomes orderly and divine as far as the nature of man allows but like everyone else he will suffer from detraction of course and if a necessity be laid upon him or fashioning not only himself but human nature generally whether in states or individuals into that which he beholds elsewhere will he think you be an unskillful artificer of justice temperance and every civil virtue anything but unskillful and if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth will they be angry with philosophy will they disbelieve us when we tell them that no state can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern they will not be angry if they understand he said but how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking they will begin by taking the state and the manners of men from which as from a tablet they will rub out the picture and leave a clean surface this is no easy task but whether easy or not herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator they will have nothing to do either with individual or state and will inscribe no laws until they have either found or themselves made a clean surface they will be very right he said having affected this they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution no doubt and when they are filling in the work as i conceive they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards i mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance and again at the human copy and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man and this they will conceive according to that other image which when existing among men homer calls the form and likeness of god very true he said and one feature they will erase and another they will put in until they have made the ways of men as far as possible agreeable to the ways of god indeed he said in no other way could they make a fairer picture and now i said we are beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main that the painter of constitutions is such and one as we are praising at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the state and are they growing a little karma at what they've just heard much karma if there is any sense in them why where can they still find any ground for objection will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being they would not be so unreasonable or that his nature being such as we have delineated is akin to the highest good neither can they doubt this but again will they tell us that such a nature placed under favorable circumstances will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was or will they prefer those whom we have rejected surely not then will they still be angry at our saying that until philosophers bear rule states and individuals will have no rest from evil nor will this our imaginary state ever be realized i think that they will be less angry shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle and that they have been converted and for very shame if for no other reason cannot refuse to come to terms by all means he said then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been affected will anyone deny the other point that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers surely no man he said and when they have come into being will anyone say that they must of necessity be destroyed that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape who will venture to affirm this who indeed but said i one is enough let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous yes one is enough the ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them certainly and that others should approve of what we approve is no miracle or impossibility i think not but we have sufficiently shown in what has preceded that all this if only possible is assuredly for the best we have and now we say not only that our laws if they could be enacted would be for the best but also that the enactment of them though difficult is not impossible very good and so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject but more remains to be discussed how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies certainly i omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women and the procreation of children and the appointment of the rulers because i knew that the perfect state would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment but that piece of cleverness was not a much service to me or i had to discuss them all the same the women and children are now disposed of but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning we were saying as you will remember that they were to be lovers of their country cried by the test of pleasures and pains and neither in hardships nor in dangers nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism he was to be rejected who failed but he who always came forth pure like gold tried in the refiner's fire was to be made a ruler and to receive honors and rewards in life and after death this was the sort of thing which was being said and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face not liking to stir the question which has now arisen i perfectly remember he said yes my friend i said and then i shrank from hazarding the bold word but now let me dare to say that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher yes he said let that be affirmed and do not suppose that there will be many of them for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together they're mostly found in shreds and patches what do you mean he said you are aware i replied that quick intelligence memory sagacity cleverness and similar qualities do not often grow together and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner they are driven anyway by their impulses and all solid principle goes out of them very true he said on the other hand those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned they're always in a torpid state and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil quite true and yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted and who are to share in any office or command certainly he said and will they be a class which is rarely found yes indeed then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all or both faint under them as in any other studies and exercises yes he said you are quite right in testing him but what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge you may remember I said that we divided the soul into three parts and distinguished the several natures of justice temperance courage and wisdom indeed he said if I have forgotten I should not deserve to hear more and do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them to what do you refer we were saying if I'm not mistaken that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more secure at us way at the end of which they would appear but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded and you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you and so the inquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner whether you were satisfied or not it is for you to say yes he said I thought and the other thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth but my friend I said a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further not an uncommon case when people are indolent yes I said and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the state and of the laws true the guardian then I said must be required to take the longer circuit and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which as we were just now saying is his proper calling end of book six part three book six part four of Plato's republic this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anna Simon the republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joett book six part four what he said is there a knowledge still higher than this higher than justice and the other virtues yes I said there is and of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely as at present nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us when little things are elaborated with an infinity of paints in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy a right noble thought but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge nay I said ask if you will but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times and now you either do not understand me or as I rather think you are disposed to be troublesome for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this you can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak concerning which as you have often heard me say we know so little and without which any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness assuredly not you are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good but the final sort of wits say it is knowledge yes and you are aware too that the letter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good how ridiculous yes I said that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good and then presume our knowledge of it for the good they define to be knowledge of the good just as if we understood them when they used the term good this is of course ridiculous most true he said and those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good certainly and therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same true there can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved there can be none further do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honorable without the reality but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good the reality is what they seek in the case of the good appearance is despised by everyone very true he said of this then which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions having a presentiment there is such an end and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things of a principle such and so great as this or the best man in our state to whom everything is entrusted to be the darkness of ignorance certainly not he said i am sure i said that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them and i suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them that he said is a shrewd suspicion of yours and if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our state will be perfectly ordered of course he replied but i wish that you would tell me whether you can see if the supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure or different from either i i said i knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters true socrates but i must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others and never telling his own well but has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know not he said with the assurance of positive certainty he has no right to do that but he may say what he thinks as a matter of opinion and do you not know i said that all mere opinions are bad and the best of them blind you would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind man who feel their way along the road very true and do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base when others will tell you of brightness and beauty still i must implore you socrates said glockon not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and yellow virtues we shall be satisfied yes my friend and i shall be at least equally satisfied but i cannot help fearing that i shall fail and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me no sweet sirs that is not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me but the child of the good who is likeest him i would faint speak if i could be sure that you wish to hear otherwise not by all means he said tell us about the child and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent i do indeed wish i replied that i could pay and you receive the account of the parent and not as now of the offspring only take however this letter by way of interest and at the same time have a care that i do not render a false account although i have no intention of deceiving you yes we will take all the care that we can proceed yes i said but i must first come to an understanding with you and remind you of what i've mentioned in the course of this discussion and at many other times what the old story that there is a many beautiful and a many good and so of other things which we describe and define to all of them the term many is applied true he said and there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good and of other things to which the term many is applied there is an absolute for they may be brought under a single idea which is called the essence of each very true the many as we say are seen but not known and the ideas are known but not seen exactly and what is the organ with which we see the visible things the sight he said and with the hearing i said we hear and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense true but have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived no i never have he said then reflect as the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard nothing of the sort no indeed i replied and the same is true of most if not all the other senses you would not say that any of them require such an addition certainly not but you see that without the addition of some other nature there's no seeing or being seen how do you mean sight being as i conceive in the eyes and he who has eyes wanting to see color being also present in them still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colors will be invisible of what nature are you speaking of that which you term light i replied true he said noble then is the bond which links together sight and visibility and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature for light is their bond and light is no ignoble thing nay he said the reverse of ignoble and which i said of the gods in heaven what you say was the lord of this element who's is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear you mean the sun as you and all mankind say may not the relation of sight to this deity be described as flows how neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun no yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun by far the most like and the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispense from the sun exactly then the sun is not sight but the author of sight who is recognized by sight true he said and this is he whom i call the child of the good whom the good beget in his own likeness to be in the visible world in relation to sight and the things of sight what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind will you be a little more explicit he said why you know i said that the eyes when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining but the moon and stars only see dimly and are nearly blind they seem to have no clearness of vision in them very true but when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines they see clearly and there is sight in them certainly and the soul is like the eye when resting upon that on which truth and being shine the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing then she has opinion only and goes blinking about and is first of one opinion and then of another and seems to have no intelligence just so now that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what i would have you term the idea of good and this you will deem to be the cause of science and of truth in so far as the letter becomes a subject of knowledge beautiful too as are both truth and knowledge you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either and as in the previous instance light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun and yet not to be the sun so in this other sphere science and truth may be deemed to be like the good but not the good the good as a place of honor yet higher what a wonder of beauty that must be he said which is the author of science and truth and yet surpasses them in beauty for you truly cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good god forbid i replied but may i ask you to consider the image in another point of view in what point of view you would say would you not that the sun is not only author of visibility in all visible things but of generation and nourishment and growth though he himself is not generation suddenly in like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known but of their being and essence and yet the good is not essence but far exceeds essence in dignity and power glockens said with a ludicrous earnestness by the light of heaven how amazing yes i said and the exaggeration may be said down to you for you made me utter my fancies and pray continue to utter them at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun yes i said there is a great deal more then omit nothing however slight i will do my best i said but i should think that a great deal will have to be omitted i hope not he said you have to imagine then that there are two ruling powers and that one of them is set over the intellectual world the other over the visible i do not say heaven lest you should fancy that i'm playing up on the name may i suppose that you have this distinction of a visible and intelligible fixed in your mind i have now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts and divide each of them again in the same proportion and suppose the two main divisions to answer one to the visible and the other to the intelligible and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness and you will find the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images and by images i mean in the first place shadows and in the second place reflections in water and in solid smooth and polished bodies and the like do you understand yes i understand imagine now the other section of which this is only the resemblance to include the animals which we see and everything that grows or is made very good would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth and that the copy is to the original as a sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge most undoubtedly next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided in what manner thus there are two subdivisions in a lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images the inquiry can only be hypothetical and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end in the higher of the two the soul passes out of hypotheses and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses making no use of images as in the former case with proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves i do not quite understand your meaning he said then i will try again you will understand me better when i've made some preliminary remarks you are aware that students of geometry arithmetic and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and alike in their several branches of science these are their hypotheses which they and everybody are supposed to know and therefore they do not deem to give any account of them either to themselves or others but they begin with them and go on until they arrive at last and in a consistent manner at their conclusion yes he said i know and do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reasons about them they are thinking not of these but of the ideals which they resemble not of the figures which they draw but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter and so on the forms which they draw or make and which have shadows and reflection in water of their own are converted by them into images but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves which can only be seen with the eye of the mind that is true and of this kind i spoke at the intelligible although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses not ascending to a first principle because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images they having a relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness and therefore a higher value i understand he said that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts and when i speak of the other division of the intelligible you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic using the hypotheses not as first principles but only as hypotheses that is to say as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object from ideas through ideas and in ideas she ends i understand you he replied not perfectly for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous but at any rate i understand you to say that knowledge and being which the science of dialectic contemplates are clearer than the notions of the arts as they are termed which proceed from hypotheses only these are also contemplated by the understanding and not by the senses yet because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them although when a first principle is added to them they are cognisable by the higher reason and the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences i suppose that you would term understanding and not reason as being intermediate between opinion and reason you have quite conceived my meaning i said and now corresponding to these four divisions let there be four faculties in the soul reason answering to the highest understanding to the second faith or conviction to the third and perception of shadows to the last and let there be a scale of them and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth i understand you replied and give my assent and accept your arrangement end of book six book seven part one of playtoe's republic this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org recording by lini the republic by playto translated by benjamin book seven part one and now i said let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened behold human beings living in an underground den which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den here they have been from their childhood and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move and can only see before them being prevented by the chains from turning around their heads above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way and you will see if you look a low wall built along the way like the screen which marionette players have in front of them over which they show the puppets i see and do you see i said men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials which appear over the wall some of them are talking others silent you have shown me a strange image and they are strange prisoners like ourselves i replied and they see only their own shadows or the shadows of one another which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave true he said how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads and of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows yes he said and if they were able to converse with one another would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them very true and suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow no question he replied to them i said the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images that is certain and now look again and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error at first when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light he will suffer sharp pains the glare will distress him and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows and then conceive someone saying to him that what he saw before was an illusion but that now when he's approaching nearer to being and his eyes turn towards more real existence he has a clearer vision what will be his reply and you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them will he not be perplexed will he not fancy that the shadows which he formally saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him far truer and if he's compelled to look straight at the light will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can't see and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him true he said and suppose once more that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascend and held fast until he's forced into the presence of the sun himself is he not likely to be pained and irritated when he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities not all in a moment he said he will require to grow accustomed to the side of the upper world and first he will see the shadows best next the reflections of men and other objects in the water and then the objects themselves then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day certainly less of all he will be able to see the sun and not mere reflections of him in the water but he will see him in his own proper place and not in another and he will contemplate him as he is certainly he will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold clearly he said he would first see the sun and then reason about him and when he remembered his old habitation and the wisdom of the Dan and his fellow prisoners do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change and pity them certainly he would and if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before and which followed after and which were together and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future do you think that he would care for such honors and glories or envy the possessors of them would he not say with Homer better to be the poor servant of a poor master and to endure anything rather than think as they do and live after their manner yes he said I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner imagine once more I said such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness to be sure he said and if there were a contest and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den while his side was still weak and before his eyes had become steady and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable would he not be ridiculous man would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes and that it was better not even to think of ascending and if anyone tried to lose another and lead him up to the light let them only catch the offender and they would put him to death no question he said this entire allegory I said you may now append dear Glockon to the previous argument the prison house is the world of sight the light of the fire is the sun and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief which at your desire I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows but whether true or false my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears less of all and is seen only with an effort and when seen is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed I agree he said as far as I am able to understand you moreover I said you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell which desire of theirs is very natural if our allegory may be trusted yes very natural and is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner if while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness he is compelled to fight in courts of law or in other places about the images or the shadows of images of justice and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice anything but surprising he replied anyone who has common sense will remember that the bewilderment of the eyes are of two kinds and arise from two causes either from coming out of the light or from going into the light which is true of the mind's eye quite as much as of the bodily eye and he who remembers this when he sees anyone whose vision is perplexed and weak will not be too ready to laugh he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excessive light and he will count the one happy in his conditioned state of being and he will pity the other or if you have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which grits him who returns from above out of the light into the den that he said is a very just distinction but then if I am right certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before like sight into blind eyes they undoubtedly say this he replied whereas our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being and learn by the grease to endure the sight of being and of the brightest and best of being or in other words of the good very true and must there not be some art which will affect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner not implanting the faculty of sight for that exists already but has been turned into the wrong direction and is looking away from the truth yes he said such an art may be presumed and whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable or on the other hand hurtful and useless did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue how eager he is how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end he's the reverse of blind but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil and his mischievous in proportion to his cleverness very true he said but what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth and they had been severeed from those central pleasures such as eating and drinking which like leaden weights were attached to them at their birth and which dragged them down and turned the vision of their souls upon the things that are below if I say they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now very likely yes I said and there is another thing which is likely or rather unnecessary inference from what has preceded that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth nor yet those who never make an end of their education will be able ministers of state not the former because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions private as well as public nor the latter because they will not act at all except upon compulsion fencing that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blast very true he replied then I said the business of us who are the founders of the state will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now what do you mean I mean that they remain in the upper world but this must not be allowed they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den and partake of their labors and honors whether they are worth having or not but it's not this unjust he said ought we to give them a worse life when they might have a better you have again forgotten my friend I said the intention of the legislator who did not aim at making anyone class in the state happy above the rest the happiness was to be in the whole state and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity making them benefactors of the state and therefore benefactors of one another to this end he created them not to please themselves but to be his instruments in binding up the state true he said I had forgotten observe Glaucon that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a cure and providence of others we shall explain to them that in other states men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics and this is reasonable for they grow up at their own sweet will and the government would rather not have them being self-taught they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received but we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive kings of yourselves and of the other citizens and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated and you are better able to sharing the double duty where for each of you when his turn comes must go down to the general underground abode and get the habit of seeing in the dark when you have acquired the habit you will see 10 000 times better than the inhabitants of the den and you will know what the several images are and what they represent because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth and thus our state which is also yours will be a reality and not a dream only and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other states in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power which in their eyes is a great good whereas the truth is that the state in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed and the state in which they are most eager the worst quite true he replied and will our pupils when they hear this refuse to take their turn at the toiles of state when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light impossible he answered for they are just men and the commands which we impose upon them are just there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity and not after the fashion of our present rulers of state yes my friend I said and there lies the point you must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler and then you may have a well-ordered state for only in the state which offers this will they rule who are truly rich not in silver and gold but in virtue and wisdom which are the true blessings of life whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs poor and hungering after their own private advantage thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good order there can never be for they will be fighting about office and the civil and domestic royals which does arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole state most true he replied and the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy do you know of any other indeed I do not he said and those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task for if they are there will be rival lovers and they will fight no question end of book seven part one book seven part two of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Linny the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joe at book seven part two who then are those whom we shall compelled to be guardians surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of state and by whom the state is best administered and who at the same time have other honors and another in a better life than that of politics they are the men and I will choose them he replied and now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced and how they are to be brought from darkness to light as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods by all means he replied the process I said is not the turning over of a noister shell but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being that is the ascend from below which we affirm to be true philosophy quite so and should we not inquire what sort of knowledge has the power of affecting such a change certainly what sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being and another consideration has just occurred to me you will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes yes that was sad then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality what quality usefulness in war yes if possible there were two parts in our former scheme of education were there not just so there was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption true then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover no but what do you say of music which also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme music he said as you will remember was the counterpart of gymnastic and trained the guardians by the influences of habit by harmony making them harmonious by rhythm rhythmical but not giving them science and the words whether fabulous or possibly true had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them but in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking you are most accurate I said in your recollection in music there certainly was nothing of the kind but what branch of knowledge is there my dear Glocken which is of the desired nature since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us undoubtedly and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded and the arts are also excluded what remains well I said there may be nothing left of our special subjects and then we shall have to take something which is not special but of universal application what may that be a something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common and which everyone first has to learn among the elements of education what is that the little matter of distinguishing one two and three in a word number and calculation do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them yes then the art of war partakes of them to be sure then palamides whenever he appears in tragedy proves a commandant ridiculously unfit to be a general did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number and had numbered the ships and sat in array the ranks of the army at Troy which implies that they had never been numbered before and that amendment must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet how could he if he was ignorant of number and if that is true what sort of general must he have been I should say a very strange one if this was as you say can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic certainly he should if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics or indeed I should rather say if he is to be a man at all I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study what is your notion it appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking and which leads naturally to reflection but never to have been rightly used for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being will you explain your meaning he said I will try I said and I wish you would share the inquiry with me and say yes or no when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is as I suspect one of them explain he said I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further inquiry is imperatively demanded you are clearly referring he said to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance and by painting in light and shade no I said that is not at all my meaning then what is your meaning when speaking of an inviting objects I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite inviting objects are those which do in this latter case the sense coming upon the object whether at a distance or near gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular then of its opposite an illustration will make my meaning clearer here are three fingers a little finger a second finger and a middle finger very good you may suppose that they are seen quite close and here comes the point what is it each of them equally appears a finger whether seen in the middle or at the extremity whether white or black or thick or thin it makes no difference a finger is a finger all the same in these cases a man is not compelled to ask a thought the question what is a finger for the site never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger true and therefore I said as we might expect there's nothing here which invites or excites intelligence there is not he said but is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers can site adequately perceive them and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity and in like manner does the touch adequately perceives the qualities of thickness or thinness of softness or hardness and so the other senses do they give perfect intimations of such matters is not their mode of operation on this wise the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft you are quite right he said and must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft what again is the meaning of light and heavy if that which is light is also heavy and that which is heavy light yes he said this intimations which the soul receives are very curious and required to be explained yes I said and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two true and if they turn out to be two is not each of them one and different certainly and if each is one and both are two she will conceive the two as in a state of division for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one true the eye certainly did see both small and great but only in a confused manner they were not distinguished yes whereas the thinking mind intending to light up the chaos was compelled to reverse the process and look at small and great as separate and not confused very true was not this the beginning of the inquiry what is great and what is small exactly so and thus arose a distinction of the visible and the intelligible most true this was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect or the reverse those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions invite thought those which are not simultaneous do not I understand he said and agree with you and to which class do unity and number belong I do not know he replied think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the side or by any other sense then as we were saying in the case of the finger there would be nothing to attract towards being but when there is some contradiction always present and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality then thought begins to be aroused within us and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks what is absolute unity this is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being and surely he said this occurs notably in the case of one for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude yes I said and this being true of one must be equally true of all number certainly and all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number yes and they appear to lead the mind towards truth yes in a very remarkable manner then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking having a double use military and philosophical for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops and the philosopher also because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being and therefore he must be an arithmetician that is true and our guardian is both warrior and philosopher certainly then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe and we must endeavor to persuade those who are to be the principal man of our state to go and learn arithmetic not as amateurs but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only nor again like merchants or retail traders with a view to buying or selling but for the sake of their military use and of the soul herself and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being that is excellent he said yes I said and now having spoken of it I must add how charming the science is and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher and not of a shopkeeper how do you mean I mean as I was saying that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect compelling the soul to reason about abstract number and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument you know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule anyone who attempts to divide absolute unity when he's calculating and if you divide they multiply taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions that is very true now suppose a person were to say to them oh my friends what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning in which as you say there is a unity such as you demand and each unit is equal invariable and divisible what would they answer they would answer as I should conceive that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth yes that is a marked characteristic of it and have you further observed that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge and even the dull if they have had an arithmetical training although they may derive no other advantage from it always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been very true he said and indeed you will not easily find a more difficult study and not many as difficult you will not and for all these reasons arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained and which must not be given up I agree let this then be made one of our subjects of education end of book 7 part 2 book 7 part 3 of Plato's republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Linny the republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joed book 7 part 3 and next shall we inquire whether the kindred science also concerns us you mean geometry exactly so clearly he said we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war for in pitching a camp or taking up a position or closing or extending the lines of an army or any other military maneuver whether in actual battle or in a march it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician yes I said but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough the question relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good and then as I was saying all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place where is the full perfection of being which she ought by all means to behold true he said then if geometry compels us to view being it concerns us if becoming only it does not concern us yes that is what we assert yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians how so they have in view practice only and are always speaking in a narrow and ridiculous manner of squaring and extending and applying and the like they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science certainly he said then must not a further admission be made what admission that the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal and not of odd perishing and transient that he replied maybe readily allowed and is true then my noble friend geometry will draw the soul towards truth and create the spirit of philosophy and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down nothing will be more likely to have such an effect then nothing should be more sternly laid down then that the inhabitants of your first city should by all means learn geometry moreover the science has indirect effects which are not small of what kind he said there are the military advantages of which you spoke I said and in all departments of knowledge as experience proves anyone who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not yes indeed he said there is an infinite difference between them then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study let us do so he replied and suppose we'll make astronomy the third what do you say I am strongly inclined to it he said the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor I am amused I said at your fear of the world which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which when by other pursuits lost and dimmed is by these purified and re-illumined and is more precious far than 10 000 bodily eyes for by it alone is truth seen now there are two classes of persons one class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning and will naturally deem them to be idle tales for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them and therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue you will very likely say with neither and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf then take a step backward for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences what was the mistake he said after plain geometry I said we proceeded at once to solids in revolution instead of taking solids in themselves whereas after the second dimension the third which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth ought to have followed that is true socrates but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects why yes I said and for two reasons in the first place no government patronizes them this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them and they are difficult in the second place students cannot learn them unless they have a director but then a director can hardly be found and even if he could as matters now stand the students who are very conceited would not attend to him that however would be otherwise if the whole state became the director of these studies and gave honor to them then disciples would want to come and there would be continuous and earnest search and discoveries would be made since even now disregarded as they are by the world and main of their fair proportions and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them still these studies force their way by their natural charm and very likely if they had the help of the state they would someday emerge into light yes he said there is a remarkable charm in them but I do not clearly understand the change in the order first you began with a geometry of plain surfaces yes I said and you placed astronomy next and then you made a step backward yes and I have delayed you by my hurry the ludicrous state of solid geometry which in natural order should have followed made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy or motion of solids true he said then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the state let us go on to astronomy which will be forth the right order he replied and now socrates as he rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before my praise shall be given in your own spirit for everyone as I think must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another everyone but myself I said to everyone else this may be clear but not to me and what then would you say I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards what do you mean he asked you I replied have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above and I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling you would still think that his mind was the recipient and not his eyes and you are very likely right and I may be a simpleton but in my opinion that knowledge only which is of being enough the unseen can make the soul look upwards and whether a man games at the heavens or blinks on the ground seeking to learn some particular sense I would deny that he can learn for nothing of that sort is matter of science his soul is looking downwards not upwards whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land whether he floats or only lies on his back I acknowledge he said the justice of your rebuke still I should like to a certain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking I will tell you I said the starry heaven which would be whole is wrought upon a visible ground and therefore although the fairest and most perfect of visible things must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness which are relative to each other and carry with them that which is contained in them in the true number and in every true figure now these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence but not by sight true he replied the spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently brought by the hand of deadless or some other great artist which we may chance to behold any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double or the truth of any other proportion no he replied such an idea would be ridiculous and will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the creator of them in the most perfect manner but he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day or of both to the month or of the month to the year or of the stars to these and to one another and any other things are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation that would be absurd and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth i quite agree though i never thought of this before then i said in astronomy as in geometry we should employ problems in that the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use that he said is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers yes i said and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them if our legislation is to be of any value but can you tell me of any other suitable study no he said not without thinking motion i said has many forms and not one only two of them are obvious enough even to with snow better than ours and there are others as i imagine which may be left to wiser persons but where are the two there's a second i said which is the counterpart of the one already named and what may that be the second i said would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes for i can see that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars so are the ears to hear harmonious motions and these are sister sciences as the Pythagorean say and we often agree with them yes he replied but this i said is a laborious study and therefore we had better go and learn of them and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences at the same time we must not lose sight of our own higher object what is that there is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach and which our pupils ought also to attain and not to fall short of as i was saying that they did in astronomy for in the science of harmony as you probably know the same thing happens the teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only and their labor like that of the astronomers is in vain yes by heaven he said and is as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes as they call them they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbor's wall one side of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same either parties setting their ears before their understanding you mean i said those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and wreck them on the pegs of the instrument i might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives and make accusations against the strings both of backwardness and forwardness to sound but this would be tedious and therefore i will only say that these are not the man and that i am referring to the Pythagoreans of whom i was just now proposing to inquire about harmony for they too are in error like the astronomers they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard but they never attain to problems that is to say they never reach the natural harmonies of number or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not that he said is a thing of more than mortal knowledge a thing i replied which i would rather call useful that is if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good but if pursued in any other spirit useless very true he said now when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion in connection with one another and come to be considered in their mutual affinities then i think but not till then will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects otherwise there is no profit in them i suspect so but you are speaking socrates of a vast work what do you mean i said the prelude or what do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn for you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician surely not he said i have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning but do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them neither can this be supposed and so glaucon i said we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic this is that strain which is of the intellect only with which the faculty of site will nevertheless be found to imitate for sight as you may remember was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars and last of all the sun himself and so with dialectic when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only and without any assistance of sense and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world as in the case of sight at the end of the visible exactly he said then this is the progress which are called dialectic true but the release of the prisoners from chains and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light and the ascent from the underground den to the sun while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water and are the shadows of true existence this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material invisible world this power is given as i was saying by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described i agree in what you are saying he replied which may be hard to believe yet from another point of view is harder still to deny this however is not a theme to be treated of in passing only but will have to be discussed again and again and so whether our conclusion be true or false let us assume all this and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain and describe that in like manner say then what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic and what are the paths which lead bitter for these paths will also lead to our final rest dear glochan i said you will not be able to follow me here though i would do my best and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth according to my notion whether what i told you would or would not have been a reality i cannot venture to say but you would have seen something like reality of that i am confident doubtless he replied but i must also remind you that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last and assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men or are cultivated with a view to production and construction or for the preservation of such productions and constructions and as to the mathematical sciences which as we were saying have some apprehension of true being geometry and the like they only dream about being but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined and are unable to give an account of them for when a man knows not his own first principle and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science impossible he said then dialectic and dialectic alone goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure the eye of the soul which is literally buried in an outlandish slew is by her gentle aid lifted upwards and she uses as handmade and helpers in the work of conversion the sciences which we have been discussing custom terms them sciences but they ought to have some other name implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science and this in our previous sketch was called understanding but why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider why indeed he said when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness at any rate we are satisfied as before to have four divisions two for intellect and two for opinion and to call the first division science the second understanding the third belief and the fourth perception of shadows opinion being concerned with becoming and intellect with being and so to make a proportion as being is to becoming so is pure intellect to opinion and as intellect is to opinion so is science to believe and understanding to the perception of shadows and of book seven part three book seven part four of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Leni the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joed book seven part four but let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect for it will be a long inquiry many times longer than this has been as far as I understand he said I agree and do you also agree I said in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing and he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception in whatever degree he fails may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence will you admit so much yes he said how can I deny it and you would say the same of the conception of the good until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections and is ready to disprove them not by appeals to opinion but to absolute truth never faltering at any step of the argument unless he can do all this he would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good he apprehends only a shadow if anything at all which is given by opinion and not by science dreaming and slumbering in this life before he's well awake here he arrives at the world below and has his final quietess and all that I should most certainly agree with you and surely you would not have the children of your ideal state whom you are nurturing and educating if the ideal ever becomes a reality you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts having no reasoning them and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters certainly not then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions yes he said you and I together will make it dialectic then as you will agree is the coping stone of the sciences and is set over them no other science can be placed higher the nature of knowledge can no further go I agree he said but to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way they are to be assigned our questions which remain to be considered yes clearly you remember I said how the rulers were chosen before certainly he said the same natures must still be chosen and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest and if possible to the fairest and having noble and generous tempers they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education and what are these such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics the toil is more entirely the mind's own and is not shared with the body very true he replied further he of whom we are in search should have a good memory and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labor in any line or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which will require of him certainly he said he must have natural gifts the mistake at present is that those who study philosophy have no vocation and this as I was before saying is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards what do you mean in the first place her votary should not have a lame or halting industry I mean that he should not be half industrious and half idle as for example when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting and all other bodily exercises but a hater rather than a lover of the labor of learning or listening or inquiring or the occupation to which he devotes himself maybe of an opposite kind and he may have the other sort of lameness certainly he said and that's the truth I said it's not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies but is patient of involuntary falsehood and does not mind wallowing like a swinnish beast in the mire of ignorance and has no shame at being detected to be sure and again in respect of temperance courage magnificence and every other virtue should be not carefully distinguished between the true son and the bastard for where there's no discernment of such qualities states and individuals unconsciously err and the state makes a ruler and the individual a friend of one who being defective in some part of virtue is in a figure lame or a bastard that is very true he said all these things then will have to be carefully considered by us and if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training our sound and body and mind just as herself will have nothing to say against us and we shall be the saviors of the constitution and of the state but if our pupils are men of another stamp the reverse will happen and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy that she has to endure at present that would not be creditable certainly not I said and yet perhaps in this turning just into earnest I am equally ridiculous in what respect I had forgotten I said that we were not serious and spoke with too much excitement for when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace and my anger made me to vehement indeed I was listening and did not think so but I who am the speaker felt that I was and now let me remind you that although in our former selection we chose old men we must not do so in this solan was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things for he can no more learn much than he can run much youth is the time for any extraordinary toil of course and therefore calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction which are a preparation for dialectic should be presented to the mind in childhood not however under any notion of forcing our system of education why not because a free man ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind bodily exercise when compulsory there's no harm to the body but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind very true then my good friend I said do not use compulsion but let early education be a sort of amusement you will then be better able to find out the natural bend that is a very rational notion he said do you remember that the children too were to be taken to see the battle on horseback and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and like young have a taste of blood given them yes I remember the same practice may be followed I said in all these things labors lessons dangers and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number at what age at the age when the necessary gymnastics are over the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose for sleep and exercise are unprofitious to learning and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected certainly he replied after that time those who are selected from the class of 20 years old will be promoted to higher honor and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being yes he said that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root yes I said and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical I agree with you he said these I said are the points which you must consider and those who have most of this comprehension and who are most steadfast in their learning and in their military and other appointed duties when they have arrived at the age of 30 have to be chosen by you out of the select class and elevated to higher honor and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses and in company with truth to attain absolute being and here my friend great caution is required why great caution do you not remark I said how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced what evil he said the students of the art are filled with lawlessness quite true he said do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case or will you make allowance for them in what way make allowance I want you I said by way of parallel to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth he's one of a great and numerous family and has many flairers when he grows up to manhood he learns that his alleged are not his real parents but who the real are he's unable to discover can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his flairers and his supposed parents first of all during the period when he's ignorant of the false relation and then again when he knows or shall I guess for you if you please then I should say that while he's ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honor his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flairers he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need or to do or say anything against them and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter he will but when he has made the discovery I should imagine that he would diminish his honor and regard for them and would become more devoted to the flairers their influence over him would greatly increase he would now live after their ways and openly associate with them and unless he were of an unusually good disposition he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations well all that is very probable but how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy in this way you know that there are certain principles about justice and honor which were taught us in childhood and under their parental authority we have been brought up obeying and honoring them that is true there are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract the soul but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right and they continue to obey and honor the maxims of their fathers true now when a man is in this state and the question in spirit asks what is fair or honorable and he answers as the legislator has taught him and then arguments many and the verse refute his words until he is driven into believing that nothing is honorable any more than dishonorable or just and good any more than the reverse and so of all the notions which he most valued do you think that he will still honor and obey them as before impossible and when he ceases to think them honorable and natural as here before and he fails to discover the true can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires he cannot and from being a keeper of the law he's converted into a breaker of it unquestionably now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described and also as I was just now saying most excusable yes he said and I may add pitable therefore that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now 30 years of age every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic certainly there is a danger last they should taste the dear delight too early for youngsters as you may have observed when they first get the taste in their mouths argue for amusement and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them like puppy dogs they rejoice in pooling and tearing at all who come near them yes he said there's nothing which they like better and when they have made many conquests and receive defeats at the hands of many they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believe before and hence not only they but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world too true he said but when a man begins to get older he will no longer be guilty of such insanity he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth and not the heuristic who is contradicting for the sake of amusement and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honor of the pursuit very true he said and did we not make special provision for this when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast not as now any chance aspirant or intruder very true suppose i said the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise will that be enough would you say six or four years he asked say five years i replied at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold in this way they will get their experience of life and there will be an opportunity of trying whether when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation they will stand firm or flinch and how long is the stage of their lives to last 15 years i answered and when they have reached 50 years of age then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things and behold the absolute good for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the state and the lives of individuals and the remainder of their own lives also making philosophy their chief pursuit but when their turn comes toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good not as though they were performing some heroic action but simply as a matter of duty and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and let them in their place to be governors of the state then they will depart to the islands of the blessed and dwell there and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honor them if the pithy and oracle consent as demigods but if not as in any case blessed and divine you are a sculptor socrates and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty yes i said glockon and of our governesses too for you must not suppose that what i have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go there you are right he said since we have made them to share in all things like the man well i said and you would agree would you not that what has been said about the state and the government is not a mere dream and although difficult not impossible but only possible in the way which has been supposed that is to say when the true philosopher kings are born in a state one or more of them despising the honors of this present world which they deem mean and worthless esteeming above all things right and the honor that springs from right and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things whose ministers they are and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city how will they proceed they will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than 10 years old it will take possession of their children who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents these they will train in their own habits and laws i mean in the laws which we have given them and in this way the state and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most yes that will be the best way and i think socrates that you have very well described how if ever such a constitution might come into being enough then of the perfect state and of the man who bears its image there's no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him there is no difficulty he replied and i agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said end of book seven book eight part one of playtoe's republic this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by anostimon the republic by playtoe translated by benjamin joett book eight part one and so glocon we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect state wives and children are to be in common and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings that replied glocon has been acknowledged yes i said and we have further acknowledged that the governors when appointed themselves will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing which are common to all and contain nothing private or individual and about their property you remember what we agreed yes i remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind they were to be warrior athletes and guardians receiving from the other citizens in the view of annual payment only their maintenance and they were to take care of themselves and the whole state true i said and now that this division of our task is concluded let us find the point at which we digress that we may return into the old path there is no difficulty in returning you implied then as now that you had finished the description of the state you said that such a state was good and that the man was good who answered to it although as now appears you had more excellent things to relate both of state and man and you said further that if this was the true form then the others were false and of the false forms you said as i remember that there were four principal ones and that their defects and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them were worth examining when we'd seen all the individuals and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest and the worst the most miserable i asked you what were the full forms of government of which he spoke and then polo marcus and adamantas put in their word and you began again and i found your way to the point at which we've now arrived your recollection i said is most exact then like a wrestler he replied you must put yourself again in the same position and let me ask the same question and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then yes if i can i will i said i shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking that question i said is easily answered the four governments of which i spoke so far as they have distinct names are first those of creed and spotter which are generally applauded what is termed oligarchy comes next this is not equally approved and is a form of government which teams with evils thirdly democracy which naturally follows oligarchy although very different and lastly comes tyranny great and famous which differs from them all and is the fourth and worst disorder of a state i do not know do you of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character there are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold and some other intermediate forms of government but these are nondescripts and may be found equally among hellings and among barbarians yes he replied we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them do you know i said that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other for we cannot suppose that states are made of oak and rock and not out of the human natures which are in them and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them yes he said the states are as the men are they grow out of human characters then if the constitutions of states are five the dispositions of individual minds will also be five suddenly him who answers to aristocracy and whom we rightly call just and good we have already described we have then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures being the contentious and ambitious who answer to the spartan polity also the oligarchical democratical and tyrannical let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice the inquiry will then be completed and we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice as thrasamachus advises or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice certainly he replied we must do as you say shall we follow our old plan which we adopted with a view to clearness of taking the state first and then proceeding to the individual and begin with the government of honor i know of no name for such a government other than timeocracy or perhaps time or key we will compare with this the like character in the individual and after that consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man and lastly we will go and view the city of tyranny and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision that way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable first then i said let us inquire how timeocracy the government of honor arises out of aristocracy the government of the best clearly all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power a government which is united however small cannot be moved very true he said in what way then will our city be moved and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another shall we after the manner of homer pray the muses to tell us how discord first arose shall we imagine them in solemn mockery to play and jest with us as if we were children and to address us in a lofty tragic vein making belief to be in earnest how would they address us after this manner a city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken but seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end even a constitution such as yours will not last forever but will in time be dissolved and this is a disillusion in plants that grow in the earth as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed which in short-lived existences pass over short space and in long-lived ones over a long space but to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense but will escape them and they will bring children into the world when they are not now that which is of divine birth as a period which is contained in a perfect number but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike waxing and waning numbers make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another the base of these with a third edit when combined with five and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies the first a square which is a hundred times as great and the other a figure having one side equal to the former but up long consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square the side of which is five each of them being less by one or less by two perfect squares of a rational diameters and a hundred cubes of three now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of birth for when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births and unite bride and bridegroom out of season the children will not be goodly or fortunate and though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors still they will be unworthy to hold their father's places and when they come into power as guardians they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us the muses first by undervaluing music which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic and hence the young man of your state will be less cultivated in the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races which like asiats are of gold and silver and bras and iron and so iron will be mingled with silver and bras with gold and hence the will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war this the muses affirm to be the stock from which this court has sprung wherever arising and this is their answer to us yes and we may assume that they answer truly why yes i said of course they answer truly how can the muses speak falsely and what do the muses say next when this court arose then the two races were drawn different ways the iron and bras felt acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver but the gold and silver races not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things there was a battle between them and at last they agreed to distribute their lands and houses among individual owners and they enslaved their friends and maintainers whom they had formally protected in the condition of freemen and made of them subjects and servants and they themselves are engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them i believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change and the new government which does arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy very true such will be the change and after the change has been made how will they proceed clearly the new state being in a meme between oligarchy and the perfect state will partly follow one and partly the other and will also have some peculiarities true he said in the honor given to rulers in the abstinence of the warrior class from agriculture handicrafts and trade in general in the institution of common meals and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training in all these respects this state will resemble the former true but in the fear of admitting philosophers to power because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest but are made up of mixed elements and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances and in the waging of everlasting wars this state will be for the most part peculiar yes yes i said and men at this temp will be covetous of money like those who live in oligarchies they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver which they will hoard in dark places having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them also castles which are just nests for their eggs and in which they will spend large sums on their wives or on any others whom they please that is most true he said and they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law their father they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force for they have neglected her who is the true muse the companion of reason and philosophy and have honored gymnastic more than music undoubtedly he said the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil why there is a mixture i said but one thing and one thing only is predominantly seen the spirit of contention and ambition and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element shortly he said such is the origin and such the character of this state which has been described in outline only no more perfect execution was not required for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust and to go through all the states and all the characters of men omitting none of them would be an interminable labor very true he replied now what man answers to this form of government how did he come into being and what is he like i think said adamantas that in the spirit of contention which characterizes him he is not unlike our friend glaucon perhaps i said he may be like him in that one point but there are other respects in which he is very different in what respects he should have more of self assertion and be less cultivated and yet a friend of culture and he should be a good listener but no speaker such a person is apt to be rough with slaves unlike the educated man who is too proud for that and he will also be courteous to free men and remarkably obedient to authority he is a lover of power and a lover of honor claiming to be a ruler not because he is eloquent or on any ground of that sort but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase yes that is the type of character which answers to democracy such a one will despise riches only when he is young but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him and is not single-minded towards virtue having lost his best guardian who was that said adamantas philosophy i said tempered with music who comes and takes up her abode in a man and is the only savior of his virtue throughout life good he said such i said is a time of critical youth and he is like the time of critical state exactly his origin is as follows he is often the young son of a brave father who dwells in an ill-governed city of which he declines the honors and officers and will not go to law or exert himself in any way but is ready to wave his rights in order that he may escape trouble and how does the son come into being the character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that their husband has no place in the government of which the consequences that she has no precedence among other women further when she sees her husband not very eager about money and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly taking whatever happens to him quietly and when she observes that his thoughts always center in himself while he treats her with very considerable indifference she is annoyed and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easygoing adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing yes said adamantas they gave us plenty of them and their complaints are so like themselves and you know i said that the old servants also who are supposed to be attached to the family from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son and if they see anyone who owes money to his father or is wronging him in any way and he fails to prosecute them they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort and be more of a man than his father he is only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing those who do their own business in the city are called simpletons and held in no esteem while the busy bodies are honored and applauded the result is that the young man hearing and seeing all these things hearing to the words of his father and having a nearer view of his way of life and making comparisons of him and others is drawn opposite ways while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive and he being not originally of a bad nature but having kept bad company is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion and becomes arrogant and ambitious you seem to me to have described his origin perfectly then we have now i said the second form of government and the second type of character we have end of book eight part one book eight part two of playtoe's republic this is a libra fox recording all libra fox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librafox.org recording by anasimum the republic by playto translated by benjamin joet book eight part two next let us look at another man who as as carlis says is set over against another state or rather as our plan requires begin with the state by all means i believe that oligarchy follows next in order and what manner of government do you term oligarchy a government resting on a valuation of property in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it i understand he replied all time not to begin by describing how the change from democracy to oligarchy arises yes well i said no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other how the accumulation of gold and the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of democracy they invent illegal modes of expenditure for what do they or their wives care about the law yes indeed and then one seeing another grow rich seeks to rival him and thus the great miles of the citizens become lovers of money likely enough and so they grow richer and richer and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance the one always rises as the other falls true and in proportion as riches and rich man are honored in the state virtue and the virtues are dishonored clearly and what is honored is cultivated and that which has no honor is neglected that is obvious and so at last instead of loving contention and glory men become lovers of trade and money they honor and look up to the rich man and make a ruler of him and dishonor the poor man they do so they next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship the sum is higher in one place and lower in another as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government these changes in the constitution they affect by falls of arms if intimidation has not already done their work very true and this speaking generally is the way in which oligarchy is established yes he said but what are the characteristics of this form of government and what are the defects of which we are speaking first of all i said consider the nature of the qualification just think what would happen if pilots would be chosen according to their property and a poor man were refused permission to steer even though he were a better pilot you mean that they would shipwreck yes and is not this true of the government of anything i should imagine so except a city or would you include a city nay he said the case of a city is the strongest of all inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all this then will be the first great defect of oligarchy clearly and here is another defect which is quite as bad what defect the inevitable division such a state is not one but two states the one of poor the other of rich man and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another that surely is at least as bad another discreditable feature is that for a light reason they're incapable of carrying on any war either they arm the multitude and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy or if they do not call them out in the hour of battle they are oligarchs indeed few to fight as they are few to rule and at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes how discreditable and as we said before under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings their husband men tradesmen warriors all in one does that look well anything but well there is another evil which is perhaps the greatest of all and to which this state first begins to be liable what evil a man may sell all that he has and another may acquire his property yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a pot being neither trader nor artisan nor horseman nor hoplite but only a poor helpless creature yes that is an evil which also first begins in this state the evil is certainly not prevented there for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty true but think again in his wealthy days while he was spending his money was a man of this sort a bit more good to the state for the purposes of citizenship or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject but just a spendthrift as you say he seemed to be a ruler but was only a spendthrift may we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb and that the one is the plague of the city at the other is of the hive just so socrates and god has made the flying drones at imantus all without stings whereas of the walking drones is made some without stings but others have dreadful stings of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers of the stingers come all the criminal class as they are turned most true he said clearly then whenever you see paupers in a state somewhere in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and cut purses and robbers of temples and all sorts of malefactors clearly well i said and in oligarchical states do you not find paupers yes he said nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler and may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them rogues who have stings and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force certainly we may be so bold the existence of such persons is to be attributed to a want of education ill training and an evil constitution of the state true such then is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy and there may be many other evils very likely then oligarchy or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth may now be dismissed let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this state by all means does not the time of critical man change into the oligarchical on this wise how a time arrives when the representative of democracy has a son at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the state as upon a sunken reef and he and all that he has is lost he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers and either put to death or exiled or deprived of the privileges of a citizen and all his property taken from him nothing more likely and the son has seen and known all this he's a ruined man and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion had foremost from his bosom's throne humbled by poverty he takes the money making and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together it's not such a one likely to see the concupisant and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him girt with tiara and chain and skimitar most true he replied and when he has made reason and spirits sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign and taught them to know their place he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich man or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it of all changes he said there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the ever issues one and the ever issues i said is the oligarchical youth yes he said at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the state out of which oligarchy came let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them very good first then they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth certainly also in their penurious laborious character the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites and confines his expenditure to them his other desires he subdues under the idea that they are unprofitable true he's a shabby fellow who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud is he not a true image of the state which he represents he appears to me to be so at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the state you see that he's not a man of cultivation i said i imagine not he said had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his course or given him chief honor excellent i said yet consider must we not further admit that ewing to this want of cultivation that will be found in him drone like desires as of pauper and rogue which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life true do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogue race where must i look you should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly as in the guardianship of an orphan i it will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue not making them see that they are wrong or taming them by reason but by necessity and fear constraining them and because he trembles for his possessions to be sure he has indeed my dear friend but you'll find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own yes and it will be strong in him too the man then will be at war with himself he'll be two men and not one but in general his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones true for these reasons such a one will be more respectable than most people yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him i should expect so and surely the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a state for any prize of victory or other object of honorable ambition he will not spend his money in the contest for glory so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle in true olacarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money very true can we any longer doubt then that the miser and moneymaker answers to the olacarchical state that can be no doubt next comes democracy of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us and then we will inquire into the ways of the democratic man and bring him up for judgment that he said is our method well i said and how does the change from olacarchy into democracy rise is it not on this wise the good at which such a state aims is to become as rich as possible a desire which is insatiable what then the rulers being aware that their power rests upon their wealth refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spencer of youth because they gain by their ruin they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance to be sure that can be no doubt that a love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable extent one or the other will be disregarded that is tolerably clear and in olacarchical states from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance men of good family have often been reduced to beggary yes often and still they remain in the city there they are ready to sting and fully armed and some of them owe money some have forfeited their citizenship a third class are in both predicaments and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property and against everybody else and are eager for revolution that is true on the other hand the man of business stooping as they walk and pretending not even to see those whom they've already ruined insert their sting that is their money into someone else who is not on his guard against them and recovered the parents some many times over multiplied into a family of children and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the state yes he said there are plenty of them that is certain the evil blazes up like a fire and they will not extinguish it either by restricting a man's use of his own property or by another remedy what other one which is the next best and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters let there be a general rule that everyone shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk and there will be less of this scandalous money making and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the state yes they will be greatly lessened at present the governors induced by the motives which I have named treat their subjects badly while they and their adherents especially the young men of the governing class are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind they do nothing and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain very true they themselves care only for making money and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue yes quite as indifferent such as the state of affairs which prevails among them and often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way whether on a journey or on some other occasion of meeting on a pilgrimage or a march as fellow soldiers or fellow sailors I and they may observe the behavior of each other in the very moment of danger for where danger is there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich and very likely the wary sunburned poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoiled his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh when he sees such a one puffing at his wits and how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to spoil them and when they meet him private will not people be saying to one another our warriors are not good for much yes he said I'm quite aware that this is their way of talking and as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within in the same way wherever there is weakness in the state there is also likely to be illness over which the occasion may be very slight the one party introducing from without their oligarchical the other the democratical allies and then the state falls sick and is at war with herself and may be at times distracted even when there's no external cause yes surely and then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents slaughtering some and banishing some while to their remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot yes he said that is the nature of democracy whether the revolution has been affected by arms or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw end of book eight part two book eight part three of Plato's republic this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by anasimone the republic by Plato translated by benjamin joett book eight part three and now what is their manner of life and what sort of a government if they for as the government is such will be the man clearly he said in the first place are they not free and it's not the city full of freedom and frankness a man may say and do what he likes this that's so he replied and where freedom is the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases clearly then in this kind of state there will be the greatest variety of human natures there will this then seems likely to be the fairest of states being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower and just as women and children think a variety of colors to be of all things most charming so there are many men to whom this state which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind will appear to be the fairest of states yes yes my good sir and there will be no better in which to look for a government why because of the liberty which reigns there they have a complete assortment of constitutions and he who has a mind to establish a state as we have been doing must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them and pick out the one that suits him then when he has made his choice he may found his state he will be sure to have patterns enough and there being no necessity i said for you to govern in this state even if you have the capacity or to be governed unless you like or go to war when the rest go to war or to be at peace when others are at peace unless you are so disposed there being no necessity also because some law forbids you to hold office or be a diecast that you should not hold office or be a diecast if you have a fancy it's not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful for the moment yes and it's not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming have you not observed how in a democracy many persons although they have been sentenced to death or exile just stay where they are and walk about the world the gentleman parades like a hero and nobody sees or cares yes he replied many and many a one c2 i said the forgiving spirit of democracy and that don't care about trifles and the disregard which he shows of all the fine principles which we suddenly laid down at the foundation of the city as when we said that except in the case of some rarely gifted nature there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman and promoting to honor anyone who professes to be the people's friend yes she is of a noble spirit these and other kinder characteristics are proper to democracy which is a charming form of government full of variety and disorder and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike we know her well consider now i said what manner of man the individual is or rather consider as in the case of the state how he comes into being very good he said it's not this the way he is the son of the miserly and olacarchical father who has trained him in his own habits exactly and like his father he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sold being those which are called unnecessary obviously would you like for the sake of clearness to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures i should are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us and they are rightly called so because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary and cannot help it true we are not wrong therefore when calling them necessary we are not and the desires of which a man may get rid if he takes pains from his youth upwards of which the presence moreover does no good and in some cases the reverse of good shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary yes certainly suppose we select an example of either kind in order that we may have a general notion of them very good well not the desire of eating that is of simple food and condiments insofar as they are required for health and strength be of the necessary class that is what i should suppose the pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life yes but the condiments are only necessary insofar as they are good for health suddenly and the desire which goes beyond this of more delicate food or other luxuries which might generally be got rid of if controlled and trained in youth and is hurtful to the body and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue may be rightly called unnecessary very true may we not say that these desires spent and that the others make money because they conduce to production certainly and of the pleasures of love and all other pleasures the same holds good true and the drone of whom we spoke was he who was served the pleasures and desires of this sort and was the slave of the unnecessary desires whereas he who was subjected to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchal very true again let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical the following as i suspect is commonly the process what is the process when a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing in a vulgar and miserly way has tasted drones honey and has come to associate with fears and crafting natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasures then as you may imagine the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical inevitably and as in the city like was helping like and that change was affected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him that which is a kin and a like again helping that which is a kin and a like certainly and if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him whether the influence of a father or of kindred advising or rebuking him then there arises in his soul affection and an opposite faction and he goes to war with himself it must be so and there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical and some of his desires die and others are banished a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored yes he said that sometimes happens and then again after the old desires have been driven out fresh ones spring up which are akin to them and because he their father does not know how to educate them wax fears and numerous yes he said that is apt to be the way they draw him to his old associates and holding secret intercourse with them breed and multiply in him very true at length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words which make their abode in the minds of men who adhere to the gods and are their best guardians and sentinels none better false and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their place they are certain to do so and so the young man returns into the country of the lotus eaters and takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him the aforesaid vain concedes shut the gate of the king's fastness and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter nor if private advisors offer the fatherly council of the aged will they listen to them or receive them there is a battle and they gain the day and then modesty which they call silliness is ignominiously thrust into exile by them and temperance which they nickname unmanliness it trampled in the mire and cast forth they persuade man that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness and so by the help of a rebel of evil appetites they drive them beyond the border yes with will and when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who's being initiated by them in great mysteries the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads and a great company with them hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names insolence they term breeding and anarchy and liberty and waste magnificence and impudence courage and so the young man passes out of his original nature which was trained in the school of necessity into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures yes he said the change in him is visible enough after this he lives on spending his money and labor and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as unnecessary ones but if he be fortunate and is not too much disordered in his wits when years have elapsed and the heyday of passion is over supposing that he then readmits into the city some part of the exiled virtues and does not wholly give himself up to their successes in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium pushing the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn and when he has had enough of that then into the hands of another he despises none of them but encourages them all equally very true he said neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice if anyone says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires and others of evil desires and that he ought to use and honor some and chastise and master the others whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike and that one is as good as another yes he said that is the way with him yes I said he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour and sometimes he's leapt in drink and strains of the flute then he becomes a water drinker and tries to get thin then he takes a turn at gymnastics sometimes idling and neglecting everything then once more living the life of a philosopher often he is busy with politics and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head and if he is emulous of anyone who is a warrior of he is in that direction or of man of business once more than that his life has neither law nor order and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom and so he goes on yes he replied he is all liberty and equality yes I said his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many he answers to the state which we described as fair and spangled and many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him just so let him then be set over against democracy he may truly be called the democratic man let that be his place he said last of all comes the most beautiful of all man and state alike tyranny and the tyrant these we have now to consider quite true he said say then my friend in what manner does tyranny arise that it has a democratic origin is evident clearly and does not tear any spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy I mean after sold how the good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth am I not right yes and the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy true and democracy has our own good of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution what good freedom I replied which as they tell you in a democracy is the glory of the state and that therefore in a democracy alone will the free man of nature dain to dwell yes the saying is in everybody's mouth I was going to observe that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy which occasions a demand for tyranny how so when a democracy which is thirsting for freedom as evil presiding over the feast and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom then unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draft she calls them to account and punish them and says that they are cursed oligarchs yes he replied a very common occurrence yes I said and loyal citizens are insultingly turned by her slaves who hug their chains and men of naught she would have subjects who are like rulers and rulers who are like subjects these are men after her own heart whom she praises and honors both in private and public now in such a state can liberty have any limit certainly not by degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them how do you mean I mean that the father grows accustomed to dissent to the level of his sons and to fear them and the son is on a level with his father he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents and this is his freedom and the medic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the medic and the stranger is quite as good as either yes he said that is the way and these are not the only evils I said there are several lesser ones in such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars and the scholars despise their masters and tutors young and old are all alike and the young man is on a level with the old and is ready to compete with him in word or deed and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety they are loath to be thought morose and authoritative and therefore they adopt the manners of the young quite true he said the last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bored with money whether male or female is just as free as his or her purchaser nor must I forget to tell the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other why not as ascla says utter the word which rises to our lips that is what I am doing I replied and I must add that no one who does not know would believe how much greater is the liberty with the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other state for truly the she dogs as the proverb says are as good as their she mistresses and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them and all things are just ready to burst with liberty when I take a country walk he said I often experience what you describe you and I have dreamt the same thing and above all I said and as the result of all see how sensitive the citizens become they crave impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length as you know they cease to care even for the laws written or unwritten they will have no one over them yes he said I know it too well such my friend I said is the fair and glorious beginning out of which spring's tyranny glorious indeed he said end of book eight part three book eight part four of Plato's republic this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anno Simon the republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Joet book eight part four but what is the next step the ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty over master's democracy the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life but above all in forms of government true the excess of liberty whether in states or individuals seems only to pass into excess of slavery yes the natural order and so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty as we might expect that however was not as I believe your question you rather desire to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy and is the ruin of both and just so he replied well I said I meant to refer to the class of idle spend thrifts of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers the same whom we were comparing to drones some stingless and others having stings a very just comparison these two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated being what phlegm and bile are to the body and the good physician and lawgifter of the state ought like the wise be master to keep them at a distance and prevent if possible they're ever coming in and if they have anyhow found a way in then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible yes by all means he said then in order that we may see clearly what we're doing let us imagine democracy to be divided as indeed it is into three classes for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than they were in the oligarchical state and that is true and in the democracy they are certainly more intensified how so because in the oligarchical state they are disqualified and driven from office and therefore they cannot train or gather strength whereas in a democracy they're almost the entire ruling power and while the keyness sought speak and act the rest keep buzzing about the beemer and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones very true he said then there's another class which is always being severed from the mass what is that they are the orderly class which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest naturally so they are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honing to the drones why he said there's little to be squeezed out of people who have little and this is called the wealthy class and the drones feed upon them that is pretty much the case he said the people are third class consisting of those who work with their own hands they are not politicians and have not much to live upon this when assembled is the largest and most powerful class in democracy true he said but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey and do they not share I said do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves why yes he said to that extent the people do share and the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as best they can what else can they do and then although they may have no desire of change the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy true and the end is that when they see the people not of their own accord but through ignorance and because they are deceived by informers seeking to do them wrong then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality they do not wish to be but a sting of the drones to immense them and breed revolution in them that is exactly the truth then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another true the people have always some champion whom they set over them and nourish into greatness yes that is their way this and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs when he first appears above ground he is a protector yes that is quite clear how then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Laikian Zeus what tale the tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf and did you never hear it oh yes and the protector of the people is like him having a mob entirely at his disposal he's not restrained from shedding a blood of kinsmen by the favorite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them making the life of man to disappear and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens some he kills and others he banishes at the same time hinting at the abolition of deaths and partition of lands and after this what will be his destiny must not either perish at the hands of his enemies or from being a man become a wolf that is a tyrant inevitably this I said is he who begins to make a party against the rich the same after a while he's driven out but comes back in spite of his enemies a tyrant full grown that is clear and if they are unable to expel him or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation they conspire to assassinate him yes he said that is their usual way then comes the famous request for a bodyguard which the devise of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career let not the people's friend as they say be lost to them exactly the people readily assent all their fears are for him they have none for themselves very true and when a man who's wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this then my friend as the oracle said decreases by pebbly Hermas sure he flees and rests not and is not ashamed to be a coward and quite right too said he for if he were he would never be ashamed again but if he's caught he dies of course and he the protector of whom we spoke is to be seen not larding the plain with bulk but himself the overthrow of many standing up in the chariot of state with the reins in his hand no longer protector but tyrant absolute no doubt he said and now let us consider the happiness of the man and also the state in which a creature like him is generated yes he said let us consider that at first in the early days of his power he's full of smiles and he salutes everyone whom he meets he to be called a tyrant who's making promises in public and also in private liberating debtors and distributing land to the people and his followers and wanted to be so kind and good to everyone of course he said but when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty and there's nothing to fear from them then he is always stirring up some war or other in order that the people may require a leader to be sure has he not also another object which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him clearly and if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom and of resistance to his authority he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war he must now he begins to grow unpopular unnecessary result then some of those who joined in setting him up and who are in power speak their minds to him and to one another and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done yes that may be expected and the tyrant if he means to rule must get rid of them he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who's good for anything he cannot and therefore you must look about him and see who's valiant who's high-minded who is wise who is wealthy happy man he's the enemy of them all and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no until he has made a purgation of the state yes he said and a rare purgation yes i said not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body for they take away the worse and leave the better part but he does the reverse if he is to rule i suppose that he cannot help himself what a blessed alternative i said to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad and to be by them hated or not to live at all yes that is the alternative and the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require suddenly and who are the devoted band and where will he procure them they will flock to him you said of their own accord if he pays them by the dog i said here are more drones of every sort of from every land yes he said there are but will he not desire to get them on the spot how do you mean he will rob the citizens of their slaves he will then set them free and enroll them in his bodyguard to be sure he said and he will be able to trust them best of all what a blessed creature i said must this tyrant be he has put to death the others and as these first trusted friends yes he said they are quite of his sort yes i said and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence who admire him and are his companions or the good hate and avoid him of course verily then tragedy is a wise thing and euripides a great tragedian why so why because he is the author of the prep and saying tyrants are wise by living with the wise and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions yes he said and he also praises tyranny as godlike and many other things of the same kind are set by him and by the other poets and therefore i said the tragic poems being white's man will forgive us and any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our state because they are the eulogists of tyranny yes he said those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us but they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies very true moreover they're paid for this and receive honor the greatest honor as might be expected from tyrants and the next greatest from democracies but the higher they are sent our constitution hill the more the reputation fails and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further true but we are wondering for the subject let us therefore return and inquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever changing army of his if he said there are sacred treasures in the city he will confiscate and spend them and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people and when these fail why clearly he said then he and his boon companions whether male or female will be maintained out of his father's estate you mean to say that the people from whom he has derived his being will maintain him and his companions yes he said they cannot help themselves but what are the people fly into a passion and ever that a grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father but that the father should be supported by the son the father did not bring him into being or settle him in life in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions but that his son should protect him and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic as they are termed and so he bids him and his companions depart just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates by heaven he said then the parent will discover what her monster he has been fostering in his bosom and when he wants to drive him out he will find that he is weak and his son strong why you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence what beat his father if he opposes him yes he will having first disarmed him then he is a parasite and a cruel guardian of an aged parent and this is real tyranny about which there can be no longer a mistake as the saying is the people who would escape this smoke which is the slavery of freemen has fallen into the fire with the tyranny of slaves thus liberty getting out of all order and reason passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery true he said very well and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny and the manner of transition from democracy to tyranny yes quite enough he said end of book eight book nine part one of Plato's republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jeffrey Edwards the republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Jowett book nine part one last of all comes the tyrannical man about whom we have once more to ask how is he formed out of the democratical and how does he live in happiness or in misery yes he said he's the only one remaining there is however I said a previous question which remains unanswered what question I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites and until this is accomplished the inquiry will always be confused well he said it is not too late to supply the omission very true I said and observe the point which I want to understand certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful everyone appears to have them but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason and the better desires prevail over them either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak while in the case of others they are stronger and there are more of them which appetites do you mean I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep then the wild beast within us gorged with meat or drink starts up and having shaken off sleep goes forth to satisfy his desires and there's no conceivable folly or crime not accepting incest or any other unnatural union or parasite or the eating of forbidden food which at such a time when he has parted company with all shame and sense a man may not be ready to commit most true he said but when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers and fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries collecting himself in meditation after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little but just enough to lay them to sleep and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown whether in past present or future when again he has allayed the passionate element if he has a quarrel against anyone I say when after pacifying the two irrational principles he rouses up the third which is reason before he takes his rest then as you know he takes truth most nearly and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions I quite agree in saying this I have been running into a digression but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us even in good men there's a lawless wild beast nature which peers out in sleep pray consider whether I am right and you agree with me yes I agree and now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man he was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly parent who encouraged the saving appetites in him but discounted the unnecessary which him only at amusement and ornament true and then he got into the company of a more refined licentious sort of people and taking to all their modern ways rushed into the opposite extreme for an abhorrence of his father's meanness at last being a better man than his corruptors he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life not a vulgar enslaved passion but of what he deemed modern indulgence in various pleasures after this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch yes he said that was our view of him and is so still and now I said years will have passed away and you must conceive this man such as he is to have a son who's brought up in his father's principles I can imagine him then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires and the opposite party assists the opposite ones as soon as these dire magicians and tyrant makers find that they are losing their hold on him they can try to implant in him a master passion to be lured over his idle and spin thrift lusts a sort of monstrous winged drone that is the only image which will adequately describe him yes he said that is the only adequate image of him and when his other lusts made clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines and all the pleasures of a dissolute life now let loose come buzzing around him nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in his drone like nature then at last this lord of the soul having madness for the captain of his guard breaks out into a frenzy and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation and there isn't him any sense of shame remaining to these better principles he puts an end and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full yes he said that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated and is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant i should not wonder further i said has not drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant he has and you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind will fancy that he is able to rule not only over men but also over the gods that he will and the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when either under the influence of nature or habit or both he becomes drunken lustful passionate oh my friend is not that so assuredly such is the man and such is his origin and next how does he live suppose as people facetiously say you were to tell me i imagine i said that the next step in his progress that there will be feasts and carousels and revelings and courtesans and all that sort of thing love is the lord of the house within him and orders all the concerns of his soul that is certain yes and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable and their demands are many they are indeed he said his revenues if he has any are soon spent true then comes debt and the cutting down of his property of course when he has nothing left must not his desires crowding in the nest like young ravens be crying aloud for food and he voted on by them especially by love himself who is in a manner the captain of them is in a frenzy and would feign discover whom he can defraud or to spoil of his property in order that he may gratify them yes that is sure to be the case he must have money no matter how if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs he must and as in himself there was a succession of pleasures and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother and if he has spent his own share of the property he will take a slice of theirs no doubt he will and if his parents will not give way then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive them very true and if he fails then he will use force and plunder them yes probably and if the old man and woman fight for their own what then my friend will the creature feel any compunction at curinizing over them nay he said i should not feel at all comfortable about his parents but oh heavens adamantus on account of some new fangled love of a harlot who is anything but a necessary connection can he believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence and would place her under the authority of the other when she's brought under the same roof with her or that under like circumstances he would do the same to his withered old father first and most indispensable of friends for the sake of some newly found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable yes indeed he said i believe that he truly then i said a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother he is indeed he replied he first takes their property and when that fails and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul then he breaks into a house or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer next he proceeds to clear temple meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child and which gave judgment about good and evil are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated and are now the bodyguard of love and share his empire these in his democratic days when he was still subject to the laws and to his father were only let loose in the dreams of sleep but now that he is under the dominion of love he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only he will commit the foulest murder or eat forbidden food or be guilty of any other horde act love is his tyrant and lives lordly in him and lawlessly and being himself a king leads him on as a tyrant leads a state to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates whether those whom evil communicates have brought in from without or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself have we not hear a picture of his way of life yes indeed he said and if there are only a few of them in the state and the rest of the people are well disposed they go away and become the bodyguard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war and if there is no war they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city what sort of mischief for example they are thieves burglars cut purses footpads robbers of temples man stealers of the community or as they are able to speak they turn in formers and bear false witness and take bribes a small catalog of evils even if the perpetrators of them are few in number yes i said but small and great are comparative terms and all these things in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a state do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength assisted by the infatuation of the people they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul and him they create their tyrant yes he said and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant if the people yield well and good but if they resist him as he began by beating his own father and mother so now if he has the power he beats them and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland as the Cretans say in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters this is the end of his passions and desires exactly when such men are only private individuals and before they get power this is their character they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools or if they want anything from anybody they and their turn are equally ready to bow down before them they profess every sort of affection for them but when they have gained their point they know them no more yes truly they're always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship certainly not I may not we rightly call such men treacherous no question also they are utterly unjust if we were right in our notion of justice yes he said and we were perfectly right let us then sum up in a word I said the character of the worst man he is the waking reality of what we dreamed most true and this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes that is certain said Glaucon taking his turn to answer and will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest be also the most miserable and he who has tyrannized longest and most most continually and truly miserable although this may not be the opinion of men in general yes he said inevitably and must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical state and the democratical man like the democratical state and the same of the others certainly and as state is the state in virtue and happiness so is man in relation to man to be sure and comparing our original city which was under a king and the city which is under a tyrant how do they stand us to virtue they are the opposite extremes he said for one is the very best and the other is the very worst there can be no mistake I said as to which is which and therefore I will at once inquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery and here we must not allow ourselves to be panic stricken at the apparition of the tyrant who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about and then we will give our opinion a fair invitation he replied and I see as everyone must the tyranny is the wretchedest form of government and the rule of a king the happiest and in estimating the men too may I not fairly make a like request that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder but let him be one who has a clear insight may I suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge and is dwelt in the same place with him and been present at his daily life and known him in his family relations where he may be seen strict of his tragedy attire and again in the hour of public danger he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men that again he said is a very fair proposal shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person we shall then have someone who will answer our inquiries by all means let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual in the state bearing this in mind and glancing in turn from one to the other of them will you tell me their respective conditions what do you mean he asked beginning with the state I replied would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved no city he said could be more completely enslaved and yet as you see there are free men as well as masters in such a state yes he said I see that there are a few but the people speaking generally and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved then if the man is like the state I said it's not the same rule prevail his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity the best elements in him are enslaved and there's a small ruling part which is also the worst and maddest inevitably and would you say that the soul of such a one is the soul of a free man or of a slave he has the soul of a slave in my opinion and the state which is enslaved under tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily utterly incapable and also the soul which is under tyrant I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole is least capable of doing what she desires there is a gadfly which goads her and she's full of trouble and remorse certainly and is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor poor and the tyrannical must be always poor and insatiable true and must not such a state and such a man be always full of fear yes indeed is there any state in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain certainly not and is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man who is in a fury of passions and desires impossible reflecting upon these and similar evils he held the tyrannical state to be the most miserable of states and I was right he said certainly I said and when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man what do you say of him I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men there I said I think that you are beginning to go wrong what do you mean I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery then who is more miserable one of whom I am about to speak who is that he who is of a tyrannical nature and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant from what has been said I gather that you are right yes I replied but in this high argument you should be a little more certain and should not conjecture only for of all questions this respecting good and evil is the greatest very true he said end of book nine part one recording by Jeffrey Edwards book nine part two of Plato's Republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jeffrey Edwards the Republic by Plato translated by Benjamin Jowett book nine part two let me then offer you an illustration which may I think throw a light upon this subject what is your illustration the case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition for they both have slaves the only difference is that he has more slaves yes that is the difference you know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants what should they fear nothing but do you observe the reason of this yes the reason is that whole city is leaked together for the protection of each individual very true I said but imagine one of these owners the master say of some 50 slaves together with his family and property and slaves carried off by a god into the wilderness where there are no free men to help him will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves yes he said he will be in the utmost fear the time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter diverse of his slaves and make many promises to them of freedom and other things much against his will he will have to cajole his own servants yes he said that will be the only way of saving himself and suppose the same god who carried him away to surround him with neighbors who will not suffer one man to be the master of another and who if they could catch the offender would take his life his case will be still worse if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies it is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrants will be bound he who being by nature such as we have described is full of all sorts of fears and lusts his soul is dainty and greedy and the other alone of all men in the city he is never allowed to go on a journey or to see the things which other freemen desire to see but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest very true he said and many evils such as these will not he who is ill governed in his own person the tyrannical man i mean whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all will not he be yet more miserable when instead of living a private life he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant he has to be master of others when he is not master of himself he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life not in retirement but fading and combating with other men yes he said the similitude is most exact it's not his case utterly miserable and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life he determined to be the worst certainly he who is the real tyrant whatever men may think is the real slave and is obliged to practice the greatest adulation and servility and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind he is desirous which he is utterly unable to satisfy and has more wants than anyone and is truly poor if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him all his life long he's beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions even as the state which he resembles and surely resemblance holds very true he said moreover as we were saying before he grows worse from having power he becomes and is of necessity more jealous more faithless more unjust more friendless more impious and he was at first he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself no man of any sense will dispute your words come then i said and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaim the result do you also decide who in your opinion is the first in a scale of happiness and who second and in what order the others follow there are five of them in all they are the royal democratical old agarchical democratical tyrannical the decision will be easily given he replied they shall be choruses coming on the stage and i must judge them in the order in which they enter by the criterion of virtue and vice happiness and misery need we hire a herald or shall i announce that the son of erestone the best has decided that the best and justice is also the happiest and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his state makes a proclamation yourself he said and shall i add whether seen or unseen by gods and men let the words be added then this i said will be our first proof and there is another which may also have some weight what is that the second proof is derived from the nature of the soul seeing that the individual soul like the state has been divided by us into three principles the division may i think furnish a new demonstration of what nature it seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond also three desires and governing powers how do you mean he said there is one principle with which as we were saying a man learns another with which he is angry the third having many forms has no special name but is denoted by the general term appetitive from the extraordinary strength and behemoths of the desires of eating and drinking and the other central appetites which are the main elements of it also money living because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money that is true he said if we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were concerned with gain we should then be able to fall back on a single notion and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as letting gain or money i agree with you again it's not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame true suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious would the term be suitable extremely suitable on the other hand everyone sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth and cares less than either the others for gain or fame far less lover of wisdom lover of knowledge are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul certainly one principle prevails in the souls of one class of men another in others as may happen yes then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men lovers of wisdom lovers of honor lovers of gain exactly and there are three kinds of pleasure which are their several objects very true now if you examine the three classes of men and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others the moneymaker will contrast the vanity of honor or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver true he said and the lover of honor what will be his opinion will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar while the pleasure of learning if it brings no distinction is all smoke and nonsense to him very true and are we to suppose i said that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth and in that pursuit of hiding ever learning not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure does he not call the other pleasure is necessary under the idea that if there were no necessity for them he would rather not have them there can be no doubt of that he replied since then the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute and the question is not which life is more or less honorable or better or worse but which is the more pleasant or painless how shall we know who speaks truly i cannot myself tell he said well but what ought to be the criterion is any better than experience and wisdom and reason there cannot be a better he said then i said reflect of the three individuals which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated has the lover of gain in learning the nature of essential truth greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain the philosopher he replied has greatly the advantage for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards but the lover of gain in all his experience has not a necessity tasted or i should rather say even had he desired could hardly have tasted the sweetness of learning and knowing truth then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain for he has a double experience yes very great again has he greater experience of the pleasures of honor or the lover of honor of the pleasures of wisdom nay he said all three are honored in proportion as they attain their object for the rich man and the brave man and the wise men alike have their crowd of admirers and as they all receive honor they all have experience of the pleasures of honor but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only his experience then will enable him to judge better than anyone far better and he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience certainly further the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man but only by the philosopher what faculty reason with whom as we were saying the decision not to rest yes and reasoning is peculiarly his instrument certainly if wealth and gain were the criterion then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would certainly be the most trustworthy ah surely or if honor or victory or courage in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest clearly but since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges the only inference possible he replied is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest and so we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life unquestionably he said the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life and what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next and the pleasure which is next clearly that of the soldier and lover of honor who is nearer to himself than the moneymaker last comes the lover of gain very true he said twice in succession then has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict and now comes the third trial which is dedicated to olympian Zeus the savior a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true in fear all others are a shadow only and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls yes the greatest but will you explain yourself i will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions proceed say then is not pleasure opposite to pain true and there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain there is a state which is intermediate and a sort of repose of the soul about either that is what you mean yes you remember what people say when they are sick what do they say that after all nothing is pleasanter than health but then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill yes i know he said and when persons are suffering from acute pain you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain i have and there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain and not any positive enjoyment is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure yes he said at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest again when pleasure ceases that sort of rest or cessation will be painful doubtless he said then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain so it would seem but can that which is neither become both i should say not and both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul are they not yes but that which is neither is just now shown to be rest and not motion and did i mean between them yes how then can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure or that the absence of pleasure is pain impossible this then is an appearance only and not a reality that is to say the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful and painful in comparison of what is pleasant but all these representations when tried by the test of true pleasure are not real but a sort of imposition that is the inference look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose as you perhaps may have present that pleasure is only the cessation of pain or pain of pleasure what are they he said and where shall i find them there are many of them take as an example the pleasures of smell which are very great and have no antecedent pains they come in a moment and when they depart leave no pain behind them most true he said let us not then be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain or pain of pleasure no still the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort they are reliefs of pain that is true and the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature yes shall i give you an illustration of them let me hear you would allow i said that there is a nature in upper and lower and middle region i should and if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region would he not imagine that he is going up and he was standing in the middle and sees once he has come would imagine that he is already in an upper region if he has never seen the true upper world to be sure he said how can you think otherwise but if we were taken back again he would imagine and truly imagine that he was descending no doubt all that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions yes end of book nine part two recording by jeffrey edwards book nine part three of playdough's republic this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jeffrey Edwards the republic by playto translated by Benjamin Jowett book nine part three then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth as they have wrong ideas about many other things should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state so that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real and in like manner when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state they firmly believe that they've reached the goal of satiety and pleasure they not knowing pleasure air in contrasting pain with the absence of pain which is like contrasting black with gray instead of white can you wonder i say at this no indeed i should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite look at the matter thus hunger thirst and alike are inanitions of the bodily state yes and ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul true and food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either certainly and is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer clearly from that which has more what classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your judgment those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue put the question in this way which has a more pure being that which is concerned with the invariable the immortal and the true and is of such a nature and is found in such natures or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal and is itself variable and mortal far pure he replied is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable and does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence yes of knowledge in the same degree of truth in the same degree? Yes. And conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence? Necessarily. Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul? Far less. And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul? Yes. What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real? Of course. And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure, whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure? Unquestionably. Those then who know not wisdom and virtue and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality go down and up again as far as the mean, and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world. Thither they never look, nor do they ever find their way. Neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining table. They fatten and feed and breed, and in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoops, which are made of iron, and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust, for they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent. Fairly, Socrates, say Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle. Their pleasures are mixed with pains. How can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true and are colored by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves, and they are thought about, as Tezikoras says, that the Greeks thought about the shadow of Hellenic Troy in ignorance of the truth. Something of that sort must inevitably happen. And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man, who carries his passions into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honor and victory in the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense? Yes, he said. The same will happen with the spirited element also. Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honor, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures, which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree, which is attainable to them, in as much as they follow truths, and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him? Yes, certainly. The best is the most natural. And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy several of the best and truest pleasures, of which they are capable? Exactly. But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only, and which is not their own? True. And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and elusive will be the pleasure? Yes. And is not that far this from reason, which is at the greatest distance from law and order? Clearly. And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw at the greatest distance? Yes. And the royal and orderly desires are nearest? Yes. And the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at least? Certainly. But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly? Inevitably. Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them? Will you tell me? There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious. Now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond spurious. He has run away from the region of law and reason, and takes up his abode with certain slave pleasures, which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure. How do you mean? I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch, the democrat was in the middle? Yes. And if there is truce in what is preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure, which is thrice removed as to truce from the pleasure of the oligarch? You will. And the oligarch is third from the royal, since we count his one royal and aristocratical? Yes, he is third. Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three? Manifestly. The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure, determined by the number of lengths, will be a plain figure. Certainly. And if he raises the power and makes the plane a solid, there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from the king? Yes, the errant's petition will easily do the sum. Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by which the king is parted from the tyrant in truce of pleasure, he will find him when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by the same interval. What a wonderful calculation, and how enormous is the distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain. Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years, 729 nearly equals the number of days and nights in the year. Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them. And if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and in virtue? Immeasurably greater. Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither. Was not someone saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just? Yes, that was said. Now then, having demonstrated the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him. What shall we say to him? Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes. Of what sort? An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one. There are said to have been such unions. Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will? You suppose marvelous powers in the artist, but as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose. Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the third, and the third smaller than the second. That, he said, is an easier task, and I have made them as you say. And now join them, and let the three go into one. That has been accomplished. Next, fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he, who is not able to look within and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature. I have done so, he said. And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged to vote as the mercy of either of the other two, and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another. He ought rather to suffer than to fight and bite and devour one another. Certainly, he said, that is what the approver of injustice says. To him, the supporter of justice makes answer that should he ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed monster, like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the Gentile qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing. He should be making the lion heart his ally, and in common care of them all, should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself. Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say. And so, from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong, and false and ignorant? Yes, from every point of view. Come now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. Sweet sir, we will say to him, what think you of things esteem noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the God in man, and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast? He can hardly avoid saying yes, can he know? Not if he has any regard for my opinion. But if he agrees so far, we may ask him to answer another question. Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver, on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? Will anyone say that he is not a miserable catef, who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable? Irrifiably took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin. Yes, said Glaucon, far worse, and I will answer for him. Has not the intemperate been censured of old because in him the huge multi-form monster is allowed to be too much at large? Clearly. And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength? Yes. And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken the same creature and make a coward of him? Very true. It is not a man reproached for flattering and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and for being a lion to become a monkey? True, he said. And why are mean employments and manual arts reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle, the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but he has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them. Such appears to be the reason. And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the divine rules, not as sarcemic as supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because everyone had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him, or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals. True, he said. And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city, and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principal analogous to the constitution of a state, and, by cultivation of this higher element, have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done, they may go their ways. Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest. From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness? From no point of view at all. What shall he profit if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized. The gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honorable than the body. Certainly, he said, to this nobler purpose, the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life, and in the first place, he will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul and will disregard others. Clearly, he said. In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures that he will guard even health as quite a secondary matter. His first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul. Certainly he will, if he has true music in him. And in the acquisition of wealth, there is a principle of order and harmony, which he will also observe. He will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm? Certainly not, he said. He will look at the city, which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as may derives either from superfluity or from want, and upon this principle, he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means? Very true. And for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honors as he deems likely to make him a better man, but those, whether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid? Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman. By the dog of Egypt, he will, in the city which is his own, he certainly will, though in the land of his births perhaps not, unless he have a divine call. I understand. You mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only, for I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth. In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, me thinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding may set his own house in order, but whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter, for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other. I think so, he said. End of Book 9. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Book 10, Part 1 of Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by J. C. Gwan. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joet. Book 10, Part 1. Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our state, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the role about poetry. To what do you refer? To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received, as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished. What do you mean? Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe, but I do not mind saying to you that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them. Explain the purport of your remark. Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth have an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company. But a man is not to be referenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out. Very good, he said. Listen to me, then, or rather answer me. Put your question. Can you tell me what imitation is? For I really do not know. A likely thing, then, that I should know. Why not? For the doler I may often see a thing sooner than the keener. Very true, he said. But in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not master courage to utter it. Will you inquire yourself? Well, then, shall we begin the inquiry in our usual manner? Whenever a number of individuals have become a name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form. Do you understand me? I do. Let us take any common instance. There are beds and tables in the world. Plenty of them are there not? Yes. But there are only two ideas or forms of them. One, the idea of a bed. The other, of a table. True. And the maker of either of them makes a bed, or he makes a table for our use in accordance with the idea. That is our way of speaking in this and similar instances. But no artificer makes the ideas themselves. How could he? Impossible. And there is another artist. I should like to know what you would say of him. Who is he? One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen. What an extraordinary man. Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels for every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things, the earth and heaven, and the things which aren't heaven or under the earth. He makes the gods also. He must be a wizard and no mistake. Oh, you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator? Or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things, but in another, not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself? What way? An easy way enough. Or rather, there are many ways in which defeat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round. You would soon enough make the sun and the heavens and the earth and yourself and other animals and plants and all the other things of which we were just now speaking in the mirror. Yes, he said, but there would be appearances only. Very good, I said. You are coming to the point now, and the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another, a creator of appearances, is he not? Of course. But then, I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue, and yet there is a sense of which the painter also creates a bed? Yes, he said, but not a real bed. And what of the maker of the bed? Were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea which, according to your view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed? Yes, I did. Then, if he does not make that which exists, he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence. And if anyone were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth. At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth. No wonder then that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth. No wonder. Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered, we inquire who this imitator is. If you please. Well then, here are three beds, one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say. For no one else can be the maker. No. There is another which is the work of the carpenter. Yes. And the work of a painter is a third. Yes. Beds then are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them. God, the maker of the bed, and the painter. Yes. There are three of them. God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only. Two or more such ideal beds neither have been, nor ever will be made by God. Why is that? Because even if he had made but two, a third would still appear behind them, which both of them would have for their idea. And that would be the ideal bed, and not the two others. Very true, he said. God knew this, and he desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not the particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore he created a bed which is essentially, and by nature, one only. So we believe. Shall we then speak of him as the natural author or maker of the bed? Yes, he replied, inasmuch as by the natural process of creation, he is the author of this and of all other things. And what shall we say of the carpenter? Is not he also the maker of the bed? Yes. But would you call the painter a creator and maker? Certainly not. Yet, if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed? I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make. Good, I said. Then you call him, who is third in the descent from nature, an imitator? Certainly, he said. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is twice removed from the king and from the truth? That appears to be so. Then about the imitator, we are agreed. And what about the painter? I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists? The latter. As they are, or as they appear, you have still to determine this. What do you mean? I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely, or directly, or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different. But there is no difference in reality, and the same of all things. Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent. Now, let me ask you another question. Which is the art of painting designed to be? An imitation of things as they are, or as they appear, of appearance, or of reality, of appearance? Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he likely touches on a small part of them, and that part, an image. For example, a painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts. And if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or a simple person, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter. Certainly. And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man, whoever tells us this, I think, that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he taught all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyze the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation. Most true. And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, but that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he, who has not this knowledge, can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them. They may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were, but imitations tries removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities. Or after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem, to the many, to speak so well. The question, he said, should by all means be considered? Now, do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the rolling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him? I should say not. The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not imitations, and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair. And, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the same of them. Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honor and profit. Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer, not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer. We are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has courage-patience like a Skelipius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Skelipiids were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second hand. But we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems. And we may fairly ask him about them, friend Homer. Then we say to him, if you are only in the second remove from truth, in what you say of virtue, and not in the third, not an image-maker or imitator, and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what state was ever better governed by your help. The good order of Lassadiman is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities, great and small, have been similarly benefited by others. But who says that you have been a good legislator to them, and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Corontus, and there is Solon who is renowned among us. But what city has anything to say about you? Is there any city which he might name? I think not, said Glockon, that even the homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator. Well, but is there any war on record which was carried unsuccessfully by him, or aided by his councils when he was alive? There is not. Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales, the Mylesian, or Anne of Caesis, the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him? There is absolutely nothing of the kind. But if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or a teacher of any? Had he, in his lifetime friends, who loved to associate with him, and who handed down to posterity any Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras, who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him? Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely Socrates, Cree of Phylas, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as he said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive? Yes, I replied. That is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glockon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind, if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator, can you imagine, I say, that he would not have any followers, and been honored and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera and Prodigus of Theos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries, you will never be able to manage either your own house or your own state until you appoint us to be your ministers of education. And this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master could not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere until they had got education enough? Yes, Socrates, that I think is quite true. Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators. They copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach. The poet is like a painter, who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler, though he understands nothing of cobbling, and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colors and figures. Quite so, in like manner, the poet, with his words and phrases, may be set to lay on the colors of the several arts. Himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them. And other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else in meter and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well. Such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colors which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose. Yes, he said. They are like faces, which were never really beautiful, but only blooming, and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them. Exactly. There is another point. The imitator, or maker of the image, knows nothing of true existence. He knows appearances only. Am I not right? Yes. Then let us have a clear understanding. And not be satisfied with half an explanation. Proceed. Of the painter, we say that he will paint rains, and he will paint a bit. Yes. And the worker in leather and brass will make them. Certainly. But does the painter know the right form of the bit and rains? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them. Only the horseman knows how to use them. He knows of their right form. Most true. And of book 10, part one. Recording by J. C. Guan. Montreal, December 2008. Book 10, part two of Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by J. C. Guan. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joet. Book 10, part two. And may we not say the same of all things? What? That there are three arts, which are concerned with all things. One, which uses. Another, which makes. A third, which imitates them. Yes. And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use of which nature or the artist has intended them. True. Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker of the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use. For example, the flute player will tell the flute maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer. He will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions. Of course. The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes. While the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him. True. The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it, the maker will only attain to a correct belief, and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him, and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge. True. But will the imitator have either, will he know from use whether or know his drawing is correct or beautiful, or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw? Neither. Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations. I suppose not. The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations. Nay, very much the reverse. And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude. Just so. Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets whether they write in iambic or in heroic bars are imitators in the highest degree. Very true. And now tell me I conjure you. Has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth? Certainly. And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed? What do we mean? I will explain. The body, which is large once in near, appears small once in at a distance. True. And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water. And the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colors to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us. And this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring, and of deceiving, by light and shadow, and other ingenious devices and poses, having an effect upon us like magic. True. And the art of measuring, and numbering, and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding. There is the beauty of them. And the apparent greater or less or more or heavier no longer have the mastery over us. But give way before circulation and measure and weight. Most true. And this surely must be the work of the calculating and rational principle of the soul, to be sure. And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction. True. But were we not saying that such a contradiction isn't possible? The same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing. Very true. Then that part of the soul, which has an opinion contrary to measure, is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure. True. And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation. Certainly. And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul. No doubt. This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive, when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth. And the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us, which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim. Exactly. The imitative part is an inferior, who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring. Very true. And this is confined to the sight only. Or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry? Probably the same would be true of poetry. Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting. But let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad. By all means, we may state the question thus. Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more? No, there is nothing else. But in all this variety of circumstances, is the man at unity with himself, or rather, as in the instance of sight, there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things. So here also, is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted, and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment. And we were right, he said. Yes, I said. Thus far we were right. But there was an omission which must now be supplied. What was the omission? Were we not saying that a good man who has the misfortune to lose his son, or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another? Yes. But will he have no sorrow? Or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow? The latter, he said, is the truer statement. Tell me, will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals or when he is alone? It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not. When he is by himself, he will not mind saying or doing any things which he would be ashamed of anyone hearing or seeing him do? True. There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune, which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow. True. But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him, certainly, one of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law. How do you mean? The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil, and nothing is gained by impatience. Also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required. What is most required? He asked that we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown, order our affairs in the way which reason deems best, not like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul, force with, to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art. Yes, he said. That is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune. Yes, I said. And how your principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason? Clearly. And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them. We may call the rational, useless, and cowardly. Indeed, we may. And thus not the latter. I mean the rebellious principle. Furnish a great variety of materials for imitation, whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equal, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which there are strangers. Certainly. Then the imitative poet, who aims at being popular, is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to place or to affect the rational principle in the soul. But he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated. Clearly. And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways. First, it as much as his creations have an inferior degree of truth. In this I say he is like him. And he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul. And therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered state, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution. For he indulges the irrational nature, which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small. He is a manufacturer of images, and is very far removed from the truth. Exactly. But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation, the power which poetry has of harming even the good, and there are very few who are not harmed. It's fairly an awful thing. Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say. Herein judge. The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the Tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawing out his sorrows in elongation, or weeping and smiting his breast. The best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and our enraptors at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most. Yes, of course I know. But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality. We would feign to be quiet and patient. This is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman. Very true, he said. Now, can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person? No, he said. That is certainly not reasonable. Nay, I say, quite reasonable from one point of view. What point of view? If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poet. The better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's. And the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles. He thinks that the pleasure is again. And why should he be so persilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own. How very true! And thus not the same hold also of the ridiculous. There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself. And yet, on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness. The case of pity is repeated. There is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh. And this, which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again. And having stimulated the risable faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home. Quite true, he said. And the same may be said of lust and anger, and all the other affections of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action. In all of them poetry feeds and waters, the passions, instead of drying them up. She lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue. I cannot deny it. Therefore, Glockon, I said, whatever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer, declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again, and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him. We may love and honor those who say these things. They are excellent people, as far as their lights extend, and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers. But we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the God and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our state. For if you go beyond this, and allow the honeyed views to enter, either in the epic or lyric verse, not the law and the reason of mankind which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers of our state. That is most true, he said, and now, since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let us our defense serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending a way out of our state and art having the tendencies which we have described. For a reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness. Let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of, quote, the helping hound howling at her lord, end quote, or of one, quote, mighty in the vain talk of fools, end quote, end quote, the mob of sages circumventing Zeus, end quote, and the, quote, subtle thinkers who are beggars after all, end quote. And there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them, notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered state, we shall be delighted to receive her. We are very conscious of her terms, but we may not, on that account, betray the truth. I dare say, Glockon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer. Yes indeed, I am greatly charmed. Shall I propose then that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only, that she makes a defense of herself in lyrical or some other meter? Certainly. And we may further grant to those of her defenders, who are lovers of poetry, and yet not poets, the permission to speak in prose on her behalf. Let them show not only that she is pleasant, but also useful to states and to human life. And we will listen in a kindly spirit. For if this can be proved, we shall surely be the gainers. I mean, if there is a use in poetry, as well as a delight. Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. If her defense fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamored of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interest, so too must we, after the manner of lovers, give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry, which the education of noble states has implanted in us. And therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest, but so long as she is unable to make good her defense, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains, that we may not fall away into the childish love of her, which captivates the many. At all events, we are well aware that poetry, being such as we have described, is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth. And he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law. Yes, he said, I quite agree with you. Yes, I said, but dear Glockon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honor, or money, or power, I, or under the excitement of poetry? He neglect justice and virtue. Yes, he said, I have been convinced by the arguments, as I believe that anyone else would have been. And yet, no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue. What, are there any greater still? If there are, there must be of an inconceivable greatness. Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity. Say rather nothing, he replied, and should, an immortal being, seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole? Of the whole, certainly, but what do you ask? End of Book 10, Part 2, Recording by J. C. Guan, Montreal, December 2008. Recording by Don Oneworld, The Republic by Plato, Translated by Benjamin Joett, Book 10, Part 3. Are you aware, I said, that the soul of a man is immortal and imperishable? He looked at me in astonishment and said, No, by heaven, and are you really prepared to maintain this? Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too. There is no difficulty in proving it. I see great difficulty, but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light. Listen then, I am attending. There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil? Yes, he replied. Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good? Yes. And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil, as ophthalmia is an evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body, as mildew is of corn and rot of timber or rust of copper and iron. In everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease? Yes, he said. And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies? True. Then vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each. And if this does not destroy them, there is nothing that will. For good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil. Certainly not. If then we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction. That may be assumed. Well, I said. And is there no evil which corrupts the soul? Yes, he said. There are all the evils which we were just now passing in review, unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But does any of these dissolve or destroy her? And here do not let us fall into the air of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, parishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body. The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body. And all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption, attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true? Yes. Consider the soul in a like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they be attaching to the soul and inhering in her at the last bring her to death and so separate her from the body? Certainly not. And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own. It is, he replied. Consider, I said, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body. Although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is the disease brought on by this, but that the body being one thing can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection. This we shall absolutely deny. Very true. And on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, which we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another. Yes, he said, there is reason in that. Either then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body, but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man. And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death. But if someone who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural and inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which at present the wicked receive death at the hands of others as a penalty for their deeds. Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, would not be so very terrible to him, for he would be delivered from evil, but I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keep the murderer alive, I, and well awake too, so far removed as her dwelling place from being a house of death. True, I said, and if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to destroy or kill her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction. Yes, that can hardly be. But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist forever, and if existing forever must be immortal, certainly. That is the conclusion I said, and if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed, they will not diminish in number, neither will they increase, for the increase of their mortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality, very true. But this we cannot believe, reason will not allow us, any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity. What do you mean, he said? The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements. Certainly not. Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs. But to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity, and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice, and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far we have spoken the truth concerning her, as she appears at present, but we must remember also, that we have seen her only in a condition, which may be compared to that of the sea god Glaucas, whose original image can hardly be discerned, because his natural members are broken off, and crushed and damaged by the waves, in all sorts of ways, and in crustaceans have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster, than he is to his own natural form, and the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills, but not there Glaucan, not there must we look. Where then? At her love of wisdom, let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks, in virtue of her near kindred, with the immortal and eternal and divine. Also how different she would become, if wholly following the superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean, in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells, and things of earth and rock, which in wild varieties spring up around her, because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by good things of this life, as they are turned, then would we see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape or many, or what her nature is, of her affections and of the forms which she takes, in this present life, I think that we have now said enough. True, he replied, and thus I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument. We have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hazard, but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gaius or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gaius, he puts on a helmet of Hades. Very true. And now Glocken, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards, which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death. Certainly not, he said. Will you repay me then, what you borrowed in the argument? What did I borrow? The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just. For you're aware of the opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of God and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember? I should be much to blame if I had forgotten. Then as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation of which she is held by gods and men, and which we acknowledge to be her due, should now be restored to her by us, since she has been shown to confer reality and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance, which is hers also, and which she gives to her own. The demand, he said, is just. In the first place, I said, and this is the first thing which you will have to give back, the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods. Granted, and if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning, true. And the friend of the gods must be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, accepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. Certainly. Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him, in life and death, for the gods have a care of anyone whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness by the pursuit of virtue. Yes, he said, if he is like God, he will surely not be neglected by him. And of the unjust, may not the opposite be supposed? Certainly. Such then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just? That is my conviction. And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners who run well from the starting place to the goal, but not back again from the goal. They go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears dragling on their shoulders, and without a crown. But the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just. He who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow. True. End of Book 10, Part 3 Recording by Don Oneworld Waukesha, Wisconsin Now you must allow me to repeat of the just, the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older they become rulers in their own city if they care to be. They marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will. All that you said of the others I now say of these. And on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course. And when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen. They are beaten, and then come those things unfit for ears polite as you truly term them. They will be wracked and have their eyes burnt out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true? Certainly, he said, what you say is true. These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides. Yes, he said, and they are fair and lasting. And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you want to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them. Speak, he said, there are a few things which I would more gladly hear. Well, I said, I will tell you a tale. Not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alsonus, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Ur, the son of Arminius, a pamphillion by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up, already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body, he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth. They were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space, there were judges seated, who commanded the just after they had given judgment on them, and had bound their sentences in front of them to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand. And in like manner, the unjust were bitten by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand. These also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bait him here and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw, on one side, the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them, and at the two other openings, other souls, some ascending out of the earth, dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven, clean and bright, and arriving ever into none, they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival, and those who knew one another embraced and conversed. The souls which came from earth curiously inquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath, and they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth. Now the journey lasted a thousand years, while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story Glaucon would take too long to tell, but the sum was this. He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one, they suffered tenfold, or once in a hundred years, such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies or been guilty of any other evil behavior, for each and all of their offenses they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children, dying almost as soon as they were born, of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers, there were refributions other and greater far, which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, where is Ardeus the Great? Now this Ardeus lived a thousand years before the time of Ur. He had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes. The answer of the other spirit was, he comes not hither and will never come. And this, said he, was one of the dreadful sites which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reassend when of a sudden Ardeus appeared in several others, most of whom were tyrants, and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals. They were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar whenever any of these incurable sinners, or someone who had not been sufficiently punished, tried to ascend, and then wild men of fiery aspect who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off, and Ardeus and the others, they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carting them on thorns like wool and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell. And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said, there were none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice. And when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Ur, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in color resembling the rainbow only brighter and purer. Another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above. For this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the under girders of a trireme. From these ends has extended the spindle of necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel, and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is informed, like the whorl used on earth, and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl, which is quite scooped out, and into this has fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another. The whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on the lower side, altogether form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which has driven home through the center of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions. The sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth, then comes the eighth, the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest, or fixed, stars is spangled, and the seventh, our sun, is brightest. The eighth, or moon, colored by the reflected light of the seventh, the second and fifth, Saturn and Mercury, are in color like one another, and yellower than the preceding. The third, Venus, has the whitest light. The fourth, Mars, is reddish, the sixth, Jupiter, is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion, but as the whorl revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth. Next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together. Third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion, the fourth. The third appeared fourth, and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of necessity, and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren who goes round with them, hemming a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony, and round about at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne. These are the fates, daughters of necessity, who are clothed in white robes, and have chaplets upon their heads. Lakasus and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens. Lakasus singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future, Clotho from time to time, assisting with a torch of her right hand, the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand, touching and guiding the inner ones, in Lakasus, laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other. When Ur and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lakasus, but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order, then he took from the knees of Lakasus lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows. Hear the word of Lakasus, the daughter of necessity, mortal souls behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius, and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honors or dishonors her, he will have more or less of her. The responsibility is with the chooser. God is justified. When the interpreter had thus spoken, he scattered lots and differently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Ur himself. He was not allowed, and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives, and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition, and there were tyrannies among them, some lesting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary, and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or again for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors, and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise. There was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty and disease and health, and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucan, is the supreme peril of our human state, and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if per adventure he may be able to learn, and may find some other one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life, as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue. He should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, or private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul and the operation of them when conjoined. He will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse, and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just. All else he will disregard, for we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, but there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil. Lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others, and suffer yet worse himself, but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side as far as possible, not only in this life, but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness, and according to the report of the messenger from the other world, this was what the Prophet said at the time, Even for the last Comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair. And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward, and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny, his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the Prophet, for instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered state, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others, who were similarly overtaken, that the great number of them came from heaven, and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth, having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil, or an evil for a good, for if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life had returned to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle, sad and laughable and strange, for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been orpheus, choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers. He beheld also the soul of Thammerus, choosing the life of a nightingale, birds on the other hand like the swan and other musicians wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the 20th lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telemann, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta. She, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation, and after her there followed the soul of Aepius, the son of Panopius, passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts, and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the gesture Thercides was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus, having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former Toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares. He had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else, and when he sought, he said that he would have done the same, had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals, tame and wild, who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures, the good into the gentle, and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations. All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Locustus, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiler of the choice. This genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each, and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Otropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible. Once without turning round, they passed beneath the throne of necessity, and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of forgetfulness, which was a barren waste, destitute of trees and verger, and then, towards evening, they encamped by the river of unmindfulness, as water no vessel can hold. On this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary, and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say, only in the morning, waking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre. And thus, Glockon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken, and we shall pass safely over the river of forgetfulness, and our soul will not be defiled, wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way, and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul was immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we ever live, dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us, both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years, which we have been describing. End of Book 10. End of Plato's Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett. Recording by Preston McConkey, Annabella, Utah.