 I'm not sure I'll be successful at that, especially if you indulged in the wine in there, but I'll give it a try. So I'm Don Cohn. I am a member of the Financial Policy Committee at the Bank of England, and I'm at Brookings Institution as well, and I'll be talking about stress tests and how we use them at the Bank of England in the Financial Policy Committee. And I guess I should do the disclaimer thing. These are my views and not necessarily those of the other members of the Financial Policy Committee. So simultaneous, transparent, stress tests are one of the most important innovations and reforms to come out of the global financial crisis. I think they're one of the most important innovations of the 21st century, but up there with iPhones and things, but at least they're the most important to come out of the crisis. They're designed to deal with a serious issue that plagued economies in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the tendency for banking systems to make recessions worse by tightening credit availability when adverse shocks hit the economy. Stress tests inform supervisory judgments about whether banks have enough capital to continue to intermediate and lend even as GDP falls and losses mount. The tests are done concurrently on banking institutions using the same scenario, facilitating systemic judgments and cross-bank comparisons. They are forward-looking, testing bank portfolios against risks that might occur in the future, and they are transparent, affecting judgments of market participants as well as bank management and regulators. In addition, post-crisis stress testing integrated economics and supervision in a way that in my experience hadn't been done before, marrying the modeling expertise and macroeconomic perspective of economists with the deep knowledge of individual banks and banking of supervisors. When the Fed undertook the first such stress test in the depths of the financial crisis in early 2009, we put an economist and a supervisor jointly in charge of those stress tests. Seeing those two people and their teams working so well together and the two of them joined at the hip in their nightly visits to my office to report roadblocks in progress gave me hope that we could make this experiment work. And I think this conference will further develop that critical working partnership between economists and supervisors. In the UK, the stress tests are jointly run by the Financial Policy Committee, which has the macro-prudential mandate and is tilted towards economists, and the Prudential Regulatory Committee, which has a micro-prudential responsibility and is dominated by supervisors and people with experience in individual firms. Stress tests play a major role in the deliberations of the Financial Policy Committee in meeting our legislative mandates to identify risks to financial stability and take steps to build resilience to those risks. Building the scenario each year requires us and our PRC colleagues to identify risks and assess how they've changed over the year. Stress tests show us whether the banking system has enough capital to withstand the crystallization of the risks embodied in the scenario and other risks as well. So I thought it might be useful for you, a room full of researchers, to hear what I, a macro-prudential policymaker, want from the banking system stress tests. And this is my only slide, so you can stare at that and mark off how the sections go. So the first thing I want is guidance for the setting of the counter-cyclical capital buffer. The CCYB was conceived and designated to counter the pro-cyclical tendencies of risk-based capital models to call for less capital when times are good and loans are performing and call for more capital after adverse shocks hit. Indeed, the better the good times, the greater the potential setback in bad times. The CCYB should increase capital on the upswing in the financial cycles. A well-designed stress test built on scenarios geared to those economic and financial cycles will help us make sure enough capital is accumulated on the upside, that it can be safely released to absorb losses and support lending after a shock hits. The stress test should also support that release of the capital cycle, capital buffer. They should show that as risk crystallize and losses are absorbed, less capital will be needed for potential future losses. I will also address another goal that I have for stress tests, which is to improve market discipline on bank risk-taking and bank's abilities to understand and manage their own risks. And the key to that is transparency, I think. Finally, I'll take advantage of this opportunity to highlight some areas for you to focus on that I believe policy makers will find useful and several of these areas are already being addressed at this conference. So let's start with stress test and raising the counter-cycle for capital buffer. The financial policy committee recently raised the resting place for its standard time CCYB to the region of 2%. An important motivation for this decision was a review of the 2004-2007 period that raised questions in our minds about whether stress test results and committee judgment would have prompted us to raise the CCYB high enough, fast enough to avoid a severe credit tightening and taxpayer support that occurred when bank viability was threatened in the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Bank staff estimated that a CCYB in the range of three and a half to five would have been required before the global financial crisis. Their analysis suggests that that would have been enough to give the banking system capital, enough capital to absorb the losses that followed and leave viable banks that would be able to continue accessing markets and making loans on reasonable terms to credit worthy UK businesses and households. Would the stress test have guided the FPC to such a result starting at a 1% standard times resting place, which is where we were until a month or two ago? And the answer we came to would probably not be enough to get us where we needed to go. The severity of the stress test scenarios is based on the FPC's risk tolerance. We have judged that the UK banking system should be resilient to shocks that push key economic and financial variables into the neighborhood of the first percentile of their historic distributions, a 1 in 100 shock, so that they are very severe. When risks are around a standard level, that is near the middle of distribution, that implies a scenario that in a number of dimensions, for example, the rise in UK unemployment, the fall in UK residential real estate prices, the drop in global GDP is more severe than the global financial crisis. The scenarios get more severe as risks rise and less severe as they fall. This is done in two different ways. First, key economic variables are shocked to the same 1% level as the business cycle evolves, so that a scenario based rise in the unemployment rate increases as the rate itself declines in an expansion. And a similar pattern is applied to other cyclical variables. But the FPC also assesses the state of the financial cycle to judge whether the shock to those business cycle variables is likely to be larger or smaller than a straight reading might imply. For example, unusually high levels of household or corporate leverage or bank reliance on short-term funding would tend to exacerbate a shock. In 2019, we judged that high credit growth and rising leverage in the Chinese economy and among U.S. businesses implied that downside risks were unusually large, so we increased the size and duration of the global recession in our 2019 scenario. Critically, this type of risk assessment is not mechanical, but requires policy judgment based on a variety of indicators. Bank staff estimated a hypothetical, severely adverse scenario that could have been employed in 2007 using the process I just described. They started with a level of key variables at the end of 2006, shocked them to around their 1% risk tolerance of the committee. They adjusted the stress levels to approximate how the FPC might have responded in a world where the risk environment had become elevated. The scenario they generated included a drop in UK GDP of about one percentage point larger than the global financial crisis. Applying this scenario to 2017 balance sheets yielded an implied CCYB of about three and three-quarters percent, so that's just in the range of the three and a half to five percent. I said we thought that the UK economy would have required, UK banking system required. It's worth recognizing that post-crisis reforms like central clearing and better margining for derivatives, limits on household indebtedness likely have substantially dampened some of the loss amplifiers at work in the global financial crisis, and those reforms along with the more proactive provisioning under IFRS nine imply that the same elevated risk environment might not map to the same severity of stress capital losses and implied CCYB today. But as this example suggests, the translation of the more severe scenario into sufficiently greater capital is by no means automatic. And the simulation I just talked about, the stress cap, the more severe shock in the global financial crisis produced a stress capital near the lower end of the range of estimates of the capital required for banks to keep lending through the GFC. Indeed, a larger shock need not translate into greater stress capital losses at all because that also depends on what's happening to bank portfolios. Nellie Lang and I looked at US stress test capital losses, and we saw little change in the stress test capital buffer for the GSIBs through 2018, and a material decline in that buffer in 2019 despite more stressful scenarios. Apparently the underlying improvements and the quality of the portfolios, in part as troubled legacy loans were worked off, overwhelmed the effect of more severe scenarios. In my examination of UK stress test results, I did find that stress test capital losses had risen each year, largely reflecting the increasingly severe global shock we applied. Still going forward, I think the FPC will need to pay close attention to the relationship of stress test severity and the implied hit to capital. As the FPC considered the three and a half to 5% CCYB that would have been required prior to the crisis, we could see that it would have been very difficult to get there, starting at a 1% point in standard times. The development of financial risks in the 2000s was highly non-linear, with the risks rising very sharply in the few years just before the crisis. Even as late as 2004, only about 40% of a set of core indicators we referenced were in a zone that suggested elevated risks. Moreover, because the changes in the CCYB have a one-year implementation period, we would have needed to have set a CCYB north of 3% by the end of 2006. And that would have been especially difficult in the face of the FPC's stated intention to raise the CCYB gradually. That's because large changes, requirements to raise a good deal of capital in a short time can have outsized effects on the cost of capital. Meeting capital needs by slowing distributions is probably less expensive and disruptive. In addition, the stress test process itself takes considerable time. We settle on a stress test scenario and publish it by the end of the first quarter. That's what we'll be doing over the next few weeks in London. The results come in by the end of Q3 and we're published in Q4 with the increase in the CCYB effective in Q4 one year later. So it takes quite a bit of time to get this done. And we concluded from all this that starting from 1% CCYB in standard times, we risk falling behind the curve should risk rise to elevated levels. A resting place in the region of 2% greatly increases the odds on getting to the right level at the right time. But it by no means guarantees it. If the committee had begun to recognize the emerging high risk environment in 2004, it would have needed to require a series of material increases in the CCYB to get it within the range I discussed earlier by the end of 2007. Now we've moved in half point increments. I know some countries move in quarter point increments and go to make it even harder to get there. One can envision considerable resistance to sizable increases in capital requirements when loan losses are low and the financial environment looks benign. Stress tests could be very helpful in that regard. If there are ways of helping scenarios and implied capital evolve more quickly as the risk environment move from standard to material to elevated. And my challenge to you is to find ways that the concerns, I'm sorry, that the concerns to find ways that stress tests can better take account of non-linearities in the cycle and lags in the process to help policy makers raise their counter-cyclical capital buffers soon enough and high enough when the risk environment is rising. So on to the second topic, stress tests and releasing the counter-cyclical capital buffer, those non-linearities in lives could pose an even greater challenge to stress testing after risk crystallized and the FPC decides to release the buffer. The reason to raise the buffer is to increase the amount of capital that can be safely released in a downturn to support continued lending. The FPC has emphasized that buffers are there to be used after a shock. The CCYB is a particularly attractive buffer in that regard since banks will be able to utilize the capital released by a cut in the CCYB without incurring distribution restrictions. Concerns about those restrictions say as banks run into the capital conservation buffer might make them reluctant to lend so they can hold down the denominator of their capital requirements. Stress tests will support the release of the counter-cyclical buffer as risk crystallized because the scenario will become less severe. The unemployment rate will rise less following an increase, house prices will fall less after they already decreased, risk environments will be less threatening going forward when some of those risks have already materialized. But there are reasons to question whether the scenarios will keep up with the developments and even if they do, whether they will fully support the release of the capital buffer. An examination of this issue for the U.S. that Nellie and I undertook raised some questions about how this might work out for the U.S. for the most important banks, the CCYBs. The issue we surfaced for the U.S. was that in the second year of a recession, concerns about breaching regulatory minimums and the stress tests might induce banks to cut lending to avoid substantially curtailing dividends, exactly the outcome the tests were designed to avoid. The scenario might lag down-sized shocks because downward adjustments in financial markets tend to be especially sharp when sentiment turns. Think about the dot-com bubble breaking in the 1990s, early 2000s or house prices falling a decade ago. And as I already detailed scenario design and stress testing take time, situation could have changed dramatically by the time the results were public. Moreover, our actual experience with the capital consequences of changing scenarios and stress tests is limited on the upside and non-existent after shocks hit. We don't know how much the stress test-implied capital buffer would be reduced as scenarios adapted after risk crystallize. Some counter-cyclical capital buffer releases may be preemptive, as was ours, the FPCs after the Brexit referendum. In that circumstance, the risk did not materialize. The FPC began to raise the CCYB in line with the original pre-referendum intention a year after it had reduced it. And that was backed by the stress test results. That worked out fine. But one can also imagine situations in which the FPC cuts the CCYB in anticipation of or in the early stages of an actual recession and risk off financial cycle. In those early stages, the macro-prudential authorities may appropriately take aggressive risk, an aggressive risk management approach to buffer setting when threats, threats to financial stability begin to materialize, seeing risk and cost of future credit tightening as greater than the cost of an unnecessary release of the CCYB that could just be reversed. These are circumstances in which the scenario and implied capital might not fully validate the lower CCYB. The consequences of these circumstances might be the FPC publishing a stress test. That, for example, implied say a 1% CCYB when the committee had determined that zero was more appropriate. Explaining an inconsistency between the stress tests and the counter-cyclical buffer in these circumstances is a communications issue. For example, the FPC could say that scenario hadn't caught up with the reality. The FPC was being preemptive to avoid really bad outcomes that would result if a cutback in lending amplified recessionary tendencies. But the challenge is not just about explaining an inconsistency to the public or the parliament. Two other critical target audiences for a well-reasoned explanation of why cutting capital requirements just as the economy weakens and loan losses begin to mount are the micro-predential regulators and market participants. Both may be concerned with the difficulty implied by not knowing just how serious the situation may become and concerned about how banks will fare if the slide deepens materially. Market participants need to have confidence about the viability of their bank counterparties will be protected by adequate capital even as the situation worsens so they will continue to supply the funds the banks need to continue to lend. Communications will need to address the fact that the shock is not likely to be exactly congruent with previous stress test scenario designs. Now we the FPC have prepared for these circumstances in several ways. As already noted, we have stressed the system to a very severe shock. One approximated by key financial and economic variables reaching the neighborhood of the first percentile of their historic values, a more depressed level and several dimensions associated with the global financial crisis. In this way we try to build confidence in our view that banks will have enough capital and standard or elevated risk environments to remain active and viable lenders with access to market sources of financing after a wide variety of very severe shocks. Building on that the FPC has published analysis showing indeed serious situations that differ in key ways from the stress scenarios are encompassed by those scenarios. That is because banks had enough capital in the stress test they would also have more than adequate capital even these other adverse circumstances and we've used this for disorderly Brexit to show the banks would have enough capital and a disorderly Brexit or in a global trade war and we even showed that they would have enough capital if both of those things happen at the same time. When we released the counter cyclical buffer in 2016 as markets adjusted after the Brexit referendum we were able to demonstrate with the results of the 2015 stress test that banks would be resilient even to a very adverse outcome, a tail risk which might conceivably flow from this event but hadn't been anticipated. Judgments like this require not only very stressful base scenario but credible modeling of the effects of alternative adverse shocks to show they are encompassed by the base case. I've dwelt a bit on the interaction of the stress test and the release of the counter cyclical capital buffer because I sense our focus as policy makers and as researchers has been more on detecting and building capital against rising risks than it has been managing capital requirements after the shock hits. Indeed the Bank of England's independent evaluation office also made this point and it's evaluation of stress testing at the bank. Many of the issues are similar. What role can stress test play in helping how policy makers both raise and lower capital requirements in a counter cyclical manner consistent with financial stability and preserving an adequate supply of credit but the down slope of the economic and financial cycles can be especially precipitous and bumpy the double black diamonds of financial cycles. I wrote part of this while I was on ski holidays you can tell and financial stability will depend on sustaining the confidence of market participants. There are a variety of ways the stress test might be made more supportive of the capital cyclical capital buffer release. For example, the whole process might be fast tracked run more frequently scenario design and incorporate to some extent a prediction of the rapidly shifting risk environment. Here again I think we would greatly benefit from modeling and insights that you researchers might have on how to make this happen. Now the third point I wanted to make was about stress test transparency, market discipline and bank risk management. And to some extent we got into this a little bit in the second presentation this morning, the second panel this morning. Earlier I noted that informing the FPCC CYB decisions wasn't the only goal, they can help shape the behavior of private parties as they assess and manage risk. The banks and market participants supplying them funds in ways that are more supportive of financial stability. A key to that is the transparency of the tests. The behavior we were trying to change in that first stress test was fear and flight from banks. Our goal was to build public confidence in the banking system by determining how much capital banks would need to be viable, even if a very bad economic and financial system got much worse and then to force the banks to get that capital from either private or public sources. One key to rebuilding confidence and restarting bank intermediation in the spring of 2009 obviously was having a public source of capital through TARP in the US for those banks that had been effectively cut out of private markets to buy doubts about their viability. But another was to apply very severe stresses and also to be very open about those stresses and how they affected the capital of individual institutions. Only in that way could the public reach the judgment that all banks were being held to very high standards for building resilience, even in the midst of a severe crisis, transparency was required for credibility. A continuing high level of transparency has been important to the effectiveness of the stress tests after that. Transparency helps markets assess the strength of individual institutions and differentiate among them more accurately. Anticipation of market reactions to stress test results should discipline market behavior. In addition, stress test submissions give the micro-prudential authority insight into the quality of the risk management and capital planning of individual banks, which can then be used by supervisors to require upgrades or as inputs into decisions about pillar two capital requirements. In the US, transparency about these management evaluations helped to pressure the banks into substantial improvements in their risk management, capital planning, and governance. Shortfalls relative to expectations were publicly called out and if those shortfalls were serious enough, they could impinge on authorizations to distribute capital. The Federal Reserve has determined to stop the public evaluations of risk management in favor of folding the results into a largely non-transparent supervisory process. Expert observers of US banks have been concerned that this shift will reduce the involvement of boards of directors and slow further improvements in risk modeling and management. In the UK, risk management standards have been subject to supervisory interaction alone, but in 2019, the PRA published a high level, albeit anonymized, overview of findings about the quality of bank risk management based on an assessment of stress test submissions. In addition, the PRC has considered publishing its judgments about individual institutions. If the US is any guide, such a step could accelerate banks' improvements in this important underpinning of financial stability. Finally, on transparency, in the UK, the FPC has gone to pains to be transparent about the impact of management actions in the results of its stress tests. As we said in our December 2019 financial stability report, banks' resilience relies in part on their ability in stress to cut dividends, employee variable remuneration, and coupon payments on additional tier one instruments. Indeed, if banks had not cut their distribution sharply in the 2019 stress test, an aggregate they would not have met the capital hurdle rate, we said. By reinforcing clear expectations about dividend and coupon conversion and the stress, stress tests can promote efficient pricing by the market. Facing a room full of stress test researchers, I can't resist finishing by putting out my agenda for where your work might take you, and I'm encouraged, as I said before, that quite a bit of this has been included in this conference. Obviously, from what I've discussed, a high priority would be to explore how stress tests can best inform the setting of capital buffers. A lot of information goes into our decisions on raising or lowering the counter cyclical capital buffer, but stress test results as utilized in the UK are a valuable input and a cross check on our actions. We have a process that is sound in theory, but largely untested by substantial shifts in business and financial cycles. I'm looking forward to the session right after lunch, which I think covers this topic. Secondly, as I've said, transparency of stress test results is essential to their effectiveness in building confidence, improving market discipline and giving banks incentives to hold adequate capital and model and manage risk well. We're often faced with decisions on how much more to publish about our own modeling and judgments as well as results from the banks. As an economist, I'm usually on the side of arguing that more information makes markets perform better, makes market pricing better, but market participants need the right context to interpret that information. And as we see in the context of stigma at the discount window, information can adversely affect bank incentives to behave in a stabilizing manner. I know there's some literature on the effects of stress test transparency on market discipline in bank incentives, but I wonder whether as data points are added every year across a variety of jurisdictions, this also isn't an area in which economic researchers might have more to say on the optimal degree of transparency. My third point, stress tests are sometimes characterized as micro-prudential tools with a macro-prudential overlay in that they are on a bank-by-bank basis with no explicit accounting for the effects of correlated positions or interconnections. In my view, this characterization undervalues the macro-prudential aspects of these tests. The scenarios are adjusted by the stage of the economic and financial cycle. They're drawn from a history in which correlated positions and interdependencies influence these economic and financial cycles. The scenarios are adjusted to take account of current perceived risks such as business leverage and systemically important institutions are held to higher standards. These are all macro-prudential. Moreover, staff at the Bank of England model the effects of correlations and interconnections using the data submitted by the banks and report those results back to the FPC. No doubt, modeling of these feedback loops is still a work in progress and can be further improved, enhancing macro-prudential aspects of the tests. One method to explore would be running a two-stage stress test with the results of the initial submissions being used to modify this scenario to be used in the second stage. In fact, we are doing this in our biennial exploratory scenario this year which covers bank liquidity shocks. So the banks are given a liquidity shock. They tell us how they're gonna react and we're gonna feed that back to them to see how that affects market prices and structures. Perhaps, and then my final and fourth challenge, perhaps the most profound challenge for stress testing is to extend it beyond the banking sector. The focus of session three tomorrow morning. The FPC regularly examines whether risks beyond banking need our attention or even our suggestions for extending the regulatory perimeter. And these efforts are backed by extensive staff research and modeling. For example, on our 2018 review of non-bank leverage, we looked at risks from hedge funds using bank staff research to identify the potential for rapid shifts and demands for liquidity. The FPC is currently awaiting a joint review by the bank and the FCA, the conduct authority on the financial stability risks posed by liquidity mismatch and open-ended funds. And bank staff have been at the frontier and system-wide stress test simulations. Some of this is now being used by the FSB. Still my answer to the question you get all the time of what keeps me awake at night is drawn from my experience of not seeing the buildup of risks prior to the global financial crisis. So much of that risk involved risky and opaque intermediation away from banks. There will be many rewards from improving our modeling of non-bank risks, including identifying tools required for financial stability and a better night's sleep for me. What greater incentives could you want? So thank you. So we have some time for questions and answers or comments or reactions, critical or supportive. People have been silenced or asleep after lunch. Maybe I can try to break the ice. Okay, so I was very interested about the study you did at the Bank of England on how much CCYB would have prevented a major delivery in the financial crisis. Just wondering whether you can tell us a bit more on the assumptions you used to estimate that in the sense that not everybody believes that the current buffers are not usable. So this is to get to the three. This is to get to the three. Very much on your line of thinking, but how did you convince the ones that have doubts about usability, non-usability of current buffers? So this is to get the three and a half to five before the crisis is what you're thinking about? Yes, and what are the assumptions because you say banks will deliver more the closer they get to minimum requirements. But minimum requirements are made also buffers that in principle could be usable. So the banks could breach. So not everybody believes on this delivering story when banks will get closer to those buffers. I do believe about that, but you have to have some assumption on how banks leverage getting closer to the requirements and what are the consequences of breaching the buffers, the existing buffers that in principle could be. Well, I think what's really neat about the CCYB is that once you release it, that capital is usable without getting close to any restrictions. Now, you don't know how the market and the banks will react. We haven't been there. So it could be they would still worry that even as they went through usable capital buffers, what had been capital buffers, they would still encounter some market resistance or some micro-predential resistance. We just don't have experience with that. But I do think what's key here is getting it high enough beforehand, right? And that's what drove us from the one to the 2% resting place, because we'd never get to three, would be very, very hard to get up to three or three and a half before a crisis starting at one. So I think you got to get it high enough such that you can show people that you've applied this really, really severe stress and the banks still have enough capital, certainly more capital than they had in 2007, lot more capital and therefore could continue to access funding and make loans. Just to repeat, when we haven't been through that process, we don't know what will happen, but there must be some level you can get to that gives people enough reassurance, both the micro-predential regulators and the markets. There's no magic formula, but I think all we can do is try. I mean, that's the whole point here, right? Is to get the capital high enough that banks can use it to make loans and aren't amplifying the cycle. That's the whole point of what we're trying to do. Yes. Thanks very much for the presentation and especially on the point on how to think about releasing the capital. I think it's something I'm sure we need to work more on. The question I had is a bit the interlinkage of the result of the stress test on the one hand for CCYB as you mentioned, but on the other hand on what we call here in Europe, P2G, political guidance, which is also not triggering any MDA if you use it. So how an institution like yours where you do have both sides, the micro-predential and micro-predential, why would you prefer a CCYB compared to a guidance? Because in the end it's not triggering any MDA if you use it. I mean, can you elaborate a bit more on the choice because in the end it's additional capital above what is required. So I don't know enough about the guidance really. What I like about the CCYB is it's very transparent and open it's there. We're releasing X billion sterling of capital that the banks can use to make loans. The governor, after we did this in 2016, translated that into hundreds of billions of loans. I was a little uncomfortable with making that translation, but it was a legitimate point. And I don't know how open guidance is or how transparent. I also like the fact that the CCYB, as opposed I think the guidance and certainly the pillar two kinds of things that transparency helps the accountability of the macro-predential regulators. So we need to go in front of parliament and say why we raised it, why we lowered it, here's how we support it. This is really important in a democracy to be able to do that. So I like the transparency, the CCYB, from a number of dimensions. So how do you, first of all, thanks a lot very interesting presentation. I was very interested in all of the discussion in relation to the CCYB and I have a question also on that. How do you foresee the interaction of stress test and the release phase of the CCYB and don't you see attention with the transparency, given that one of the presenters before, one of the discussants was also mentioning that this is a bit black box which wouldn't undermine a bit the transparency. Well, so that was one of my concerns that we would release the buffer from two down to zero, let's say, but the stress test would imply one because the scenarios, we were doing it a little bit in a proactive way, anticipating things. So I do think it's an issue and as I say Nellie Lange and I in thinking about the US stress test came up with, we did a numerical example of go through year one, now try year two and what's gonna happen there and even though the rise in the unemployment rate would be less the decline in property prices, it was hard to imagine that at least for the GSIBs, for the largest banks that the stress test wouldn't put them right near the hurdle rate, maybe for some of them below it. So I think it's an issue, how to figure that out, I left that as a challenge for you, but I also think it's something we need to think about and one response and a response to the truth I got from colleagues at the bank, at least one colleague was well you just explain it's a communication issue but we're talking about confidence and market confidence. So I do think it's a hard problem, especially since the release tends to be sharper. I mean if we release from two, we go from two to zero if we thought it was a serious enough situation. We go up in halves and down in holes. So how to keep the stress test up with that, I'm not sure, I don't know. As I say that was my, what was the challenge for researchers, but it's something we need to think about and we spent more energy thinking about how are we gonna get it high enough and very little energy about how are we gonna get it down and maybe we need to turn to that. Two questions, first how precisely do you want to announce the conditions under which the CCYB will be released and the second question, how do you think of macro prudential policy and monetary policy jointly? So on the first one I don't think we can be precise. I don't think we can say under this specific situations we would release it. We have said in most of our experience that the FPC has been Brexit related as you can imagine and we've said in the last several announcements we've made over the last year or so is that we're prepared to go either way and everybody knows what that means is in a disorderly Brexit we'd probably release it. But I don't, you'll need to look at a whole variety of indicators and a sense of what's going on and what might go on, particularly if you're releasing in a forward looking way to figure out exactly the circumstances under which you'd release it. I think you'd want to see changes in financial market prices that suggested tough times were coming, there was a risk off situation. You'd want to see things that foreshadowed a recession that might put pressure on banks but we haven't said and I don't, I mean, it's a great question. Again, like in response, we've paid more attention to the indicators you'd look at as risks were building and I think less attention to when you should release it. We have a bunch of indicators, what we call core indicators. We see a chart of those every time we come together how many are in what part of their distributions whether risks seem to be rising or falling but it's not gonna be, it's not gonna be mechanical. On the macro prune monetary policy, I guess my strong preference is that we have strong macro prudential tools so that we don't need to rely on monetary policy to take account of financial stability issues because every time monetary policy does that, say in a risk buildup situation, tightens up, it's gonna miss its inflation target. That's, you're deliberately steering away or taking longer to get back up to your 2% target. Every time you do that, fewer people will have jobs than would otherwise have. You'll miss your macroeconomic targets and I'd prefer not to do that. I think this, the UK is in better shape than most jurisdictions for making monetary policy the last line of defense for financial stability. It's in better shape than the US. So the US has no housing tools. It has housing tools but they're aimed at consumer protection, things like that. They're not aimed at macro prudential authority. We have our insurance companies are state regulated, not federally regulated. So I think we're, the US is badly lagging in this case and we need to build these tools up. So a little bit of advertisement here. Brookings Institution, my other hat, along with the University of Chicago Booth Business School, Neil Kashyp who's a colleague on the FPC has put together a task force on financial stability for the US and we're in the process of over this year coming up with recommendations both for the regulators and for the legislatures about how to strengthen the tools, the macro prudential tools for the US. Right now I don't think that would have a very clear audience but maybe it will in the future but I think it's a problem in the US and obviously it's a problem in the Euro area too because your macro and micro prudential tools are scattered among all those different authorities and coordinating them and putting them in play with taking the pressure off monetary policy is going to be very, very difficult and I hope that Christine Lagarde has announced a framework review for the EU or for the Euro area just as the Fed is and I would hope, I don't know but I would hope that the interaction of monetary policy and financial stability and how to reduce potential conflicts there would be part of that framework review. All right. Thank you.