 Good morning. I'm Sharon Squisony director of the proliferation prevention program. We are webcasting this this morning So this is completely on the record. I ask you to Turn your cell phones off, please so that we don't have any Untoward disturbances and I would also ask you if you're towards the back of the room I know it's nice to look out the window, but why don't we come forward? We have some Empty spaces if anybody wants to come a little closer Any takers or people on the side who are sitting on the side you can welcome to join us at the table, please So it is my pleasure To welcome Manpreet Seti today The last time I saw you was in Vietnam It could be at another meeting, but dr. Seti Is here in town on some other business, so we thought we would take advantage of her travel and Welcome her to CSIS She is a senior fellow at the Indian Council of Social Science Research Which is affiliated with the Center for Airpower Studies in New Delhi And she has her PhD. I'm assuming JNU is Chawahol Nehru University Author of two books nuclear strategy India's March Towards Credible Deterrence and also a book about Argentina's nuclear policy and she is also a member of the Prime Minister's informal group on disarmament and Does a lot of track-to initiatives one of which we were together on in Vietnam recently? so She has some slides we will I think we have until 1030 this morning, so We'll Let Manpreet speak for I don't know 20 minutes or 30 minutes whatever and then we will open the floor to questions. We do have you know coffee tea refreshments outside There is no exit from this room over here So I've been fooled many times you have to go back that way So if you need to exit the room need to move towards the back, so I will hand it over to Manpreet Thank you so much Sharon and good morning to everyone It really is such a pleasure to be at this swanky new building of the CSIS In fact last year when I happened to meet Sharon in Vietnam I had expressed a desire to come to the CSIS and since I was going to be visiting Washington She was kind enough to set this up and It really I mean I really appreciate in this cold weather for you to come out so early in the morning But I hope we will have a good discussion on a subject which is of Great concern to me and I think it is of interest to everyone around the world And what we are looking at you know is India's nuclear challenges which is What Sharon and I thought we could broadly structure it but In order to look at it in a more focused way, I have divided India's nuclear challenges into three sets of groups The first one that I want to look at is in the strategic sphere, which is deterrent stability The complexities of establishing nuclear deterrence for a country like India which has I think unprecedented nuclear challenges no other nuclear weapons state has the Set of complex deterrence relationships that India is having to Find its way around so that's one you know basket that I want to look at the other one is in the energy sphere because India does have an ambitious nuclear power program and While there were roadblocks earlier in terms of India's non participation in the NPT and therefore non participation in international nuclear commerce That has been taken away But it has been sort of replaced by a set of other challenges that I want to talk about in the second part And in the third part, I want to look at the non proliferation challenges that India still faces and these are largely coming from As I say the old shibbolets, you know where people are still stuck to the old guard thinking on non proliferation despite the fact that India Has made several attempts to be a part of the non proliferation regime which is wider than just the NPT and It's in that context that I want to look at the third set of challenges. So this is largely how I'm going to go about it Let's start by looking at the challenges of nuclear deterrence and as I want to point out to you It's not news. It's something that many of you would be aware of but let me just try and structure What is India's nuclear reality and you know in order to explain what those complexities are when we look at deterrence as a challenge What India has are you know with us is to geographically contiguous nuclear powers So India is literally sandwiched between China and Pakistan, which are the two geographically contiguous Nuclear weapon states that we have with both of these countries There is there are territorial disputes and there is a history of wars and I'm very consciously putting here territorial disputes It's not just border disputes, which is one aspect of it, but it's more than that entire states of India are claimed by Pakistan on one hand in terms of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh 80,000 square kilometers of a state of India which is claimed by China. So there are territorial disputes here with nuclear weapons states Both of these countries have different nuclear doctrines and capabilities Both have different tragic trees in terms of the kind of capabilities they are building up Different doctrines China has a no first use doctrine Pakistan has a first use doctrine Different levels of capability that they want to hit at in order to have deterrence Different threat perceptions that they have while for Pakistan. It's completely India centric and nothing beyond that for China There's a different set of deterrence challenges that they face. So this is what India is looking at both of these countries with which India has territorial disputes are in a robust Nuclear and missile proliferation relationship. So between themselves There is a very close nexus that we have seen in the past and it continues in the same format Many of you might be aware and this is common knowledge now that through the 1970s and 80s and 90s There was this Large amount of transfer of nuclear material Technology weapon tests weapon designs, which were which came in from China to Pakistan AQ Khan who is the father of the Pakistani nuclear program is on record to have put this down as to the amount of you know Amount of help that came on how many aircraft which came from China to Pakistan carrying the material that they needed to get a nuclear power nuclear weapons program And there's an American scholar who said that if one was to subtract the Chinese help from the Pakistani nuclear program There wouldn't be a Pakistani nuclear program. So it's that closer relationship that the two have shared in the past on The nexus between nuclear and missile Number of missiles in the Pakistani arsenal have a Chinese origin Both these countries use proxies to complicate security So it's not just the use of the non-state actor the terrorist organizations by Pakistan It's also the use of Pakistan by China as a proxy in order to complicate security not just for India I would say even for the US. So this is again, you know a huge Reality that India faces So what we end up having are two nuclear dyads with India Pakistan India China and one nuclear triangle And as I said, this is Unprecedented no other nuclear weapon state has faced this kind of a relationship and therefore when we get to establishing deterrence stability in this kind of a relationship You land up with lots of complexities which are different from what was and rather Nostalgically, I found people look back at the Cold War period when there was just a bipolar, you know confrontation that one had to Cater for it's so different today There are existential risks of nuclear war and during the Cold War We've lived with them between the US and the USSR and by extension the world has lived with them in terms of accidents miscalculation miscalculations unauthorized launches all those possibilities have always been there wherever there are nuclear weapons and With geographically contiguous powers You can understand how much these complexities go up Especially if capability build up absence of a certain type and we'll talk about that and the last threat that India faces Which is India's reality is the threat from the non-state actor The non-state actor which has been Created sponsored Supported armed by a state which believes that terrorism is a viable tool of foreign policy In recent times it has been claimed that Pakistan itself has become a victim of a lot of non-state actor Activity and therefore they have realized the folly of doing this But up till now what India has faced is this reality and therefore the challenges of nuclear terrorism With or without state complicity Becoming active in a region which is prone to terrorism is something that we cannot actually you know dismiss easily So this is the kind of reality that India has on the nuclear front What are some of the visible nuclear weapons trends as we seen you know in the region? There is inventory build up China has the biggest arsenal after US and Russia Even though it's claimed to be between 250 and 450 nuclear warheads But even then it is the largest that we have amongst the nuclear weapon states after US and Russia Pakistan is likely to be the fifth largest At the rate at which they are growing with their facile material We see improvements happening in the range accuracy and reliability of missiles So they're moving from liquid to solid fuel mobile missiles and this is happening across the board in the three countries Dispersal of missiles over the triad all the three countries have expressed an interest in having a triad They are at different levels of getting to that's you know situation where the sea-based leg of the triad will become operational over the decade improvements in Penetrability of missiles because and that's especially in the case of China Which is looking at the US as its terms of a term of reference And if that is the point that they are looking at for their threat perception The American BMD the ballistic missile defense Creates a lot of complications Despite the fact that the Americans have been arguing in every forum to say it it's not meant to impact either Russia or China But that's not how it's being perceived outside And they're looking at how they would be able to penetrate defeat Saturate the missile defenses and some of the effect some of the developments which are happening Therefore our missiles which are equipped with countermeasures in order to be able to penetrate the missile defense Murved missiles which China has not had in the past though They have demonstrated the capability to have multiple Independently retargetable vehicles on their missiles and even marved missiles which are maneuverable reentry warheads Which can you know take different trajectories in order to evade interception. So these are some of the trends that we see Cruise missile proliferation if ballistic missile defense is what these countries are talking about then one way of Defeating that missile defense is through cruise missile proliferation and we have seen how the cruise missiles of different Ranges have been coming up in the region Very quickly. Let me try and disaggregate this deterrence relationship between India China and India Pakistan and how you know I view it with China. There is a general sense of nuclear stability Surprisingly even though India does see it as a long-term nuclear threat in the near and medium term There is a sense of nuclear stability, which I think is largely coming from a set of factors Firstly, there is similar nuclear doctrines Declared doctrines of both countries express no first use which mean they will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons Which allows even if it's a declaratory doctrine It it show it reflects or the seriousness of the commitment of no first use reflects in the capability build up So if you're not going towards first strike weapons, but developing more of survivability measures in your nuclear arsenal It tends to indicate that you're serious about no first use So largely the trajectories have been in that direction up till now Focus of both the countries is on economic growth and social development None of them wants to be distracted from what is seen as the objective of bringing up, you know The billion of population that each one of us has and remaining stuck remaining focused on economic growth High bilateral economic trade between the two countries, which has led to you know the creation of the constituencies of peace and business The volume of trade is going up phenomenally though it is queued against India in terms of what we Export to them many levels of political engagement that exists between the two countries mechanisms for Talking about a range of issues including, you know military exercises on Counterterrorism which has which have taken place and there is an acceptance of mutual vulnerability to unacceptable damage Which has been the bedrock of deterrence which goes to you know Reinforce stability in deterrence Some of the worrisome trends however with China are that there is a growing military capability We are all aware of that there is lack of clarity on intentions and this is not just an Indian worry It's a worry in the region as to how would China use the capability that is coming up And China has started becoming much more assertive than it used to be display of confidence in that military capability Through certain measures of assertiveness which have happened in different parts of of Asia With India particularly there is a low interest in settling territorial issues and as I pointed out to you earlier There are border issues and there are territorial issues and the nettles some behavior on Arunachal Pradesh Where for instance China when there are You know people from Arunachal Pradesh applying for visas to go to China They they've been told you don't need to apply for a visa because you are Chinese You know things like that or stapled visas being provided for people from Kashmir. So those kind of little irritants There was for instance an incursion from China into Indian territory in this region And they stayed put in India for 30 days But as I said the focus was on economic growth And therefore all efforts were made to resolve it diplomatically So despite the kind of media hype that happened in India and China in fact chided India for the media You know which was creating this kind of a situation But these are some of the irritants that keep happening in the relationship We've seen the anti-satellite test of China in 2007 We've seen BMD tests in 2010 which go to show that the military capability build-up and the use of Asymmetric what China calls its assassins may strategy where it's not going to be just looking at direct military capability built up in terms of tank for tank you know aircraft for aircraft but Built asymmetric capabilities in order to defeat what it thinks are its rivals Large deployment of conventional missiles conventionally tipped medium-range short-range ballistic missiles Looking towards India nearly 1500 of them are already deployed and the ambiguity comes in because the second artillery force Which also looks after nuclear capable missiles is also in charge of conventional missiles So that brings in an element of you know uncertainty in in what could be the missiles that get launched in a moment of crisis And of course the relationship with Pakistan which I've mentioned to you earlier Remains one of the worrisome trends Let's look now at Pakistan's nuclear strategy For Pakistan the role of its nuclear weapons is very clear and I think it's very well known It is to deter a conventionally superior military. It is conventional deterrence that they're looking at Nuclear deterrence that is deterrence of India's nuclear capability is the least important function of Pakistan's nuclear weapons It's meant to deter the conventional capability Now if it remained at that it was fine things would be stable because they want to deter conventional capability fine That's how it has worked for many nations But they want to deter this conventional capability while acts of terrorism continue and that then becomes Provocative because then you know there will be a response at some point from India Which is exactly what they're trying to shield themselves against with the presence of that nuclear weapons And obviously you can understand that that creates all kinds of problems for India The manner in which Pakistan exercises this strategy is by a deliberate projection of uncertain behavior to heighten the nuclear danger And I particularly want to put this out for an audience like this because there is so much writing that comes out from From Western sources which tends to put the owners of responsibility on you know The sober and the mature India that you should be able to take these provocations but remain Sober about it because what you have on the other side is an irrational actor But what I'm trying to you know explain that this is a projected irrationality and in deterrence theory We've we've I think all read out the article on political uses of madness where projected irrationality Goes to enhance deterrence and that is exactly what Pakistan is doing and this brinkmanship this irrationality is not just aimed at India It's aimed at the international audience as well in order to convince them that it's a uncertain situation It's a dangerous neighborhood and you don't know if there was any response that India was to do In the conventional realm it will sky it'll spiral out of control and lead to nuclear escalation They move towards tactical nuclear weapons is exactly in order to reinforce that instability You know India and and I agree with Pakistan when it says that they have the tactical nuclear weapons They're going towards that direction in order to as General Khalid Kidwai who was in charge of the SPD the strategic plans division of Pakistan till just about a month ago Said the the purpose of tactical nuclear weapons of Pakistan is to pour cold water over cold start Cold start is the Indian doctrine Military doctrine which has now been disclaimed and it's called proactive strategy But the purpose of this doctrine has been that there would be a rapid response from India in case of an act of terrorism which is traced back to Pakistan and There wouldn't be the conventional build-up as we have seen in the past but it'll be a much more rapid response to that and Pakistan obviously if the purpose of their nuclear weapons has been to stop Such a response and if India begins to claim that there is possibility of carrying out such a response Under the nuclear overhang that you know you you can conduct a conventional war without nuclear weapons coming into play Then it defeats the purpose of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and therefore they have to find a way of reclaiming that space That India says exists for a conventional war by suggesting that you don't have that space because the moment you come in We will use a tactical nuclear weapons So the early use of a battlefield weapon on a military target, perhaps in Pakistani territory Is being is being projected with the assumption that India will then not retaliate That it'll happen in Pakistani territory it led to hardly any damage and therefore a soft country like India Will probably not be able to retaliate to this. So that's the assumption on the Pakistani side now The Indian nuclear doctrine on this is very clear irrespective of the yield the damage done irrespective of the target There will be a response from India and deterrence stability is manipulation of this perception that there is credibility in what India is saying in terms of there being a response To the use of any kind because it breaches a certain level a certain red line and any use of a nuclear weapon will result in a use of a nuclear retaliation but as far as The Pakistani strategy their mindset is concerned They are trying to derive deterrence from the kind of instability that has been generated through the projection of tactical nuclear weapons I have my doubts about whether they will actually deploy tactical nuclear weapons at any stage It's it's probably just a policy of brinkmanship in order to deter India further And over and above that On the strategic stability front with Pakistan. There's been an unsatisfactory experience of confidence building measures Though India both countries actually started out on nuclear CBMs very soon after their nuclear tests in 1998 We have a Lahore understand Lahore memorandum of understanding of 1999 Which lays down some very useful steps on CBMs But then Kargil the incursion of Pakistan into India in a covert manner happened in May 1999 And these CBMs have never gotten anywhere because every once in a while. There's this hiccup of Terrorist activity that happens and it derails whatever process has been in place Okay, let's move on now to the challenges in nuclear energy expansion The present status of nuclear energy in India is like this. There are 21 operational nuclear power plants Two of these are boiling water reactors that are of the American vintage Tarapur 1 and 2 and then there are 18 phw us pressurized heavy water reactors Which indigenously have been built the largest capacity factor that India has right now is a 540 megawatt Two plants of those in Tarapur 3 and 4 The first light water reactor has come up in the southern part of India a place called Kudankulam Which went critical last year and it's going to start Providing commercial electricity early this year 3% of the total electricity generation of India is coming from nuclear power right now Which is at 4780 megawatt, which will become 5000 the moment the light water reactor gets connected to the grid What India has is roughly 350 reactor years of experience running these 21 operational plants a full fuel fuel cycle capability from so from uranium mining To reprocessing it's all being done in-house Train manpower to be able to cater for this and a mature nuclear industry because since India was isolated from any international commerce in This field all of it has been indigenously catered for so the industry itself is Mature enough to provide the kind of Wessels equipment material that is needed for a 540 megawatt But what India is building now are all 700 megawatt plants and that is what is going to be the standardized format of plants in the future The ambition is that we need that we we should be able to get to 20,000 megawatts by 2020 which means only six years from now and we are nowhere near it 63,000 megawatts is what the Prime Minister has stated by 2032 Which will come largely from 20 imported light water reactors in eight new nuclear parks? And this is where the problem lies because after Fukushima public acceptance Has become such an important issue that Acquisition of new land for these eight new nuclear parks is where the biggest hurdle will be Indigenous 700 megawatt plants are coming up in sites which were already existing so this part of the program is on track and the the prototype fast breeder reactor Which is the only one of its kind that is being built in the world Will become operational this year It was to become operational in 2012 and then 2013 and what we've been told now is that this year Definitely will become operational But the plan is to go in for two 500 megawatt fast breeder reactors over the next Decade or so now if you look at the ability to achieve these goals This is what what has been laid down on paper But how do we get to that in the past India was handicapped by international sanctions and isolations This we managed to get over after Between 2005 and 2008 9 there was this whole series of steps at the multilateral level And at the bilateral level with the US which allowed India to enter international nuclear commerce When this happened and the opportunities opened up between 2008 and 2011 There were cooperation nuclear cooperation agreements that were signed with 10 countries in just three years So these were waiting to happen It led to a spurt of nuclear fuel availability and therefore the capacity factors of plants which had come down drastically between In the early 2000s till about 2010 or so went up to 90% Because fuel was the immediate benefit that India could get once it was exceptionalized by the NSG The import of larger reactors now the agreements have been signed in terms of memorandums work is going on However land acquisition on the Indian side and the conclusion of commercial contracts Bilaterally is something which is held up for various reasons and we'll talk about that But this is in principle what was approved that we will get to 30,000 megawatts Quickly when we were looking at it from 2008 to about 2010 perspective Fukushima happens in 2011 and I would say it happened just at the wrong time for India It's a wrong time for any such thing to happen at any time But particularly for India which was looking at a rapid expansion of its nuclear power program after the initial You know bottleneck had been cleared has run into several other bottlenecks now firstly restoring public confidence because That has been completely shaken Even though there has been no fatality to radioactivity actually at Fukushima It's largely been the earthquake and the tsunami which has created the trouble but in public mind nuclear safety has come under a cloud and therefore What we need in order to get over this hurdle is a proactive engagement for the nuclear establishment in India at two levels And in the past I would say this hasn't really happened because the tendency was that the DAE the Department of Atomic Energy Says this is where we want to set up a plant the land is acquired by the state and you go ahead and you know set up the plant It's no longer possible like that, especially not in a vibrant democracy like India So what we need to do now is to explain the strategic requirement for nuclear electricity at one level And have an inclusive approach for the population of the location where the plant is to come up at the tactical level So people you know need to know more about why you want to set up this plant here Why is it my land which has to be taken up for this? What is the purpose? How is my life going to benefit from it? How are my children going to benefit from it? So a whole range of proactive strategy in terms of reaching out to people and That is happening very quickly if you look at how the outreach activities and if anybody is interested you can look at the Website of the Department of Atomic Energy Which lays down every month as to what is the kind of outreach activity? They've done reaching out to schools colleges all kinds of constituencies to make people understand The need for nuclear power and why it needs to come up in a particular place The other issue is the liability issue and I think that will be of great concern everywhere Investors the nuclear industry in India and internationally have shown concerns about the nuclear liability law because And there is a background as to why the liability law came up in such a manner one It was a requirement because the US nuclear industry wanted to invest in nuclear power in India And that was a part of the Indo-US nuclear deal arrangements But the liability issue the law was passed in 2011 the rules of implementation came out later in late 2011 it has put down certain restrict certain Areas of concern for the investors by suggesting that they will be liable for For providing compensation in case of an accident over a period of time Now one way of getting around this this is Indian law So it it really can't be gotten over unless there is an amendment to the law Which is not going to happen quickly because there is a background as I said to why the liability law came up in this manner At the moment when the liability law was being negotiated and legislated was also the time when the Bhopal gas tragedy Verdict was to come up in India and that is a huge baggage that the country carries in terms of an MNC Getting away from providing adequate compensation Despite the chemical blast that happened in Bhopal In India and the other was Fukushima so it's in the backdrop of these two events that the liability law gets enacted and therefore it is quite stringent and and gets The operator the nuclear power corporation of India, which is the operator of all Indian plants And so will it be for imported plants that come in For them to have recourse to the supplier for liability and that is where the problem is how we are trying to get over this problem is by Getting probabilistic safety analysis done of each component in order to get the atomic energy Regulatory board to specify the life of that component or the or the licensing of the plant which is done over five year periods and therefore you will be able to have the Recost to liability from the supplier only for that five-year period Also, the NPC IL might have the right to Wave off the right to recourse in its commercial contracts that get negotiated with the nuclear industry So that's how largely the debate is within the country on how you try and get over this problem But there is a recognition that there are issues here that that have to be addressed very lastly on the challenges from the non-proliferation shibbolets that and These largely come I think from The non-proliferation wallahs who are still have that angst over the Indo-US nuclear deal So there is a tendency to smart over this exceptionalization that was granted to India Obviously, I mean not everyone is happy that this came about But I would say it was one way of accommodating, you know a country which had shown a certain record a certain behavior Which had certain amount of needs in the nuclear energy sector and therefore needed to be accommodated So a via media was found on how you would be able to do that But the tendency is to blame the USA for not extracting enough from India for the deal that was granted to them in terms of not getting a you know a more Credible guarantee on the CTBT the comprehensive test ban treaty or on some other aspects and the tendency is to blame India For anything that is going wrong in the non-proliferation regime and the latest is the Sinopak nuclear cooperation So the justification for that is that there this was a precedent that was set by the Indo-US nuclear deal So it's fine now that you know, there is this cooperation going on between China and Pakistan and I want to really you know Point that out that it's just not Factually correct and it should not be accepted in that sense There's little appreciation of Indian efforts to be a part of the non-proliferation regime I mean India has not been a part of the NPT, but it has supported the principles of the NPT and The larger regime in its many other dimensions that has always been what India's approach and strategy has been Some of the facts on the Indo-US nuclear deal Between 2005 and 2008 it was a negotiation between two democracies and two very vibrant democracies With bureaucracies which are extremely conservative and it's only the push at the highest political level that got us this agreement Otherwise left to the bureaucracies that largely would have you know died very quickly But the media which was so skeptical on both sides and always crying foul that you know There was some kind of underhand Deals which were being stuck between India and Pakistan India and USA in order to get this So this is the kind of environment with the transparency That the negotiations actually went on between 2005 and 2008 due legislative process in both the countries was undertaken to create the legal conditions and I remember the the the Anger that was in India with the Hyde Act when it was passed as to how it is going to bind India in certain ways When India was negotiating legislative processes within the country the amount of you know Two and four that went on between the two But in the end it's not just a bilateral agreement between India and USA There is a one-two-three agreement which has been signed on nuclear cooperation But the exceptionalization has come from a larger process, which is more multilateral So you've got compliance with the IAEA In terms of the additional protocol that India has signed with IAEA and the NSG process Which is 46 countries working by consensus providing that exceptionalization to the country So it's not something which has come easily which you know hasn't followed the due process The exceptionalization therefore as I put it has been earned by India on two grounds consistent behavior responsible behavior on on the nuclear front and Non-proliferation commitments if you look at what some of these non-proliferation commitments are and they're not You know easily dismissible sustained moratorium on nuclear testing and if you remember when India made this claim made this Provided this guarantee that we will stick to moratorium on nuclear testing, which is unilateral It was in the backdrop of a debate which was happening within the country Whether the nuclear tests which had happened had performed to yield So it was a great risk that the country that the government was taking in terms of sticking with the unilateral commitment on nuclear testing support for FMCT the Fasal material cut-off treaty signing of the additional protocol with the IAEA and we had just last year the director general of IAEA visiting India in order to oversee the implementation of the safeguards procedure and He did say that everything was going very smoothly and he was happy with the progress that the country had made in Implementing the separation plan, which was offered as part of the deal Cyrus which is the research reactor that India had been running for producing plutonium for the nuclear weapons program has been shut down The safeguards on the 14 other facilities that India had offered as part of the separation plan are going on Participation in the nuclear security summit. I think has been one of the highlights In which has been extremely important From the Indian point of view in bringing the focus on nuclear terrorism So material security given that we are in a region which is prone to any such kind of activity as I pointed out earlier with or without state complicity is something that India is extremely conscious of and Very keen on getting that nuclear security summit process in its many dimensions actually being implemented. Well the Prime Minister had Had committed to setting up a global center on nuclear energy partnership and just last month The foundation stone for setting up the center has been put in place harmonization of export controls Negotiations with the Hague code of conduct on missiles All of this has been going on over a period of time and the trigger lists According to the foreign secretary of the country is Actually sometimes going ahead of just the export controls which are available in in the international regime and yet The NSG membership is not yet in sight for India And that does create its own problems within the country because there is a keenness to join the The larger regime through the various You know NSG and the MTCR Australia group was in our agreements which are in in in existence And you want to engage with them, but that is not coming about very quickly Now just in the last slide I want to contrast how India went about getting that in the US nuclear deal With what is the situation on the Sino Park nuclear cooperation because if that owners of responsibility is being shifted to the US nuclear deal, I think We need to look at some facts the Sino Park nuclear cooperation predates the deal It was in 1986 that this relationship first started in civilian nuclear cooperation the military You know arrangement was much earlier than that, but in 1986 is when for the first time the agreement gets signed it's in 1991 that they set up the the contract first for Constructing Chashma one Which is the first Chinese nuclear power plant to come up in Pakistan it became operational in 1999 and Just before China joined the NSG in 2004 The agreement was signed for setting up another plant Chashma two Which China then claimed was Part of the earlier deal Two more plants have since been claimed as being grandfathered Under the same arrangement and what we're talking about in today's times are four more plants Which are to come up in Karachi, which is a different site altogether Which will be 1,000 megawatt plants compared to what the Chashma plants were 300 megawatt and While China claims that this is part of the under the IAEA safeguards. It's certainly not Living up to the rules of the NSG as China's membership would should You know keep them up with and Largely there is NSG silence on this. No procedures have been followed. No processes are being put into place There is a de facto exemption which has been you know given to Pakistan on the arrangement that China has on nuclear energy cooperation and Therefore the question that I want to end with is to throw it open to you as to who is undermining the NSG credibility Is it the the relationship that actually went through the entire process of of legally, you know Establishing that it was possible to create that exceptionalization or is it a relationship which is in complete violation of any of these processes? Which is not willing to even discuss in the NSG as to what this is So is that silence undermining the credibility of the NSG or is it what was followed by law? And I'll stop here and look forward to your comments criticism views On this subject. Thank you so much Thank you, Manpreet. I I asked you to put a lot on the table and you really did so We have a lot to talk about this morning I'm gonna just say for those of you who want to get some coffee or something now would be a good time While you gather your thoughts. Do you need any? Bobby or Jay, could you get Manpreet some water just a glass of water should take a moment to stretch Thank you so much for coming Just saying that always a pleasure to hear from you Sharon Michael you're looking pretty stylish So are you it's good to see you. Thanks for this. You miss the first part of Manpreet's Talk where she talked a lot about deterrence and everything else, so I hope you only we talked about that yesterday But yes, I would have liked you to see the way My error I get this meeting down for 9 30 But if I could see all right, I think we have a quorum to get started again. We have three Basic sets of topics one is Deterrence and nuclear relationships Another is sort of civilian nuclear energy and the third is the non-proliferation regime so what I propose to do is Let's focus first on the Deterrence relationships. Let's kind of group our questions together because even though in my head, they're all related sometimes You know folks tend to specialize on One or the other and I guess in the non-proliferation regime set there's also this question of nuclear security and terrorism and I See a couple folks in the audience who might be interested in that We don't have name tags or name plates so And the visibility isn't great from my end So I'm going to ask you to raise your hand and when use a microphone that's closest to you and Identify yourself and your affiliation so While you're waiting or while you're getting your thought that I do see some so we're gonna start on the nuclear deterrence Relationship in the back and then this John okay, dr Dr. Siri, thank you for a very lucid presentation. I'm a Khurram. I'm the Pakistan scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and At the outset, let me also say that I belong and have for many decades belong to a couple of decades belong to that community within Pakistan which has opposed the nuclearization of the subcontinent and Watched with dismay the accelerating Nuclear arms race taking place over there But when you tell the story the story that we hear from within the peace community in Pakistan and in India because I've been part of Track two diplomacy and I've spoken with the counterparts in India who also feel similarly and there are communities in both countries that feel similarly they tell the story somewhat differently about how India landed up in a situation where it is seeing such complex almost labyrinthine deterrence challenges and part of it, I suppose comes down to where you begin the story from and So the very basic question is what was India's strategic intent behind going openly nuclear and testing nuclear weapons in May? 1998 in the first place because What that event did and I mean not only testing nuclear weapons But then turning to the western neighbor and rattling their sabers at the in you might recall LK Advani at that time and Other members of the BJP government turning towards Pakistan and saying ha ha now We'll show you and now we claim the right of hot pursuit and we will pursue our terror your terrorist back into your territory and You might recall the most absurd of the statements made in that moment of sort of hyper nationalistic Jubilation that was sparked after that moment Which came from the late Baal Thackeray saying that we had to do this event because we have to prove to the world that We are not you know You know you might I invite you to remember that moment in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests in May 1998 and The view there is a view in the peace community as well in Pakistan Which says that it's in fact that event which sparked the nuclear arms race on the subcontinent Because prior to that event Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were restrained and perhaps had the best restraints that they would ever have had Which was that they were Pakistanis were forced to pursue their nuclear ambitions covertly So Having gone openly nuclear what were the strategic objectives that India was trying to achieve? As a result of that event and do you think that India's better off having gone openly? Nuclear and found itself in the middle of this labyrinthine deterrents a challenge Thank you, and I'm so glad you've you know put out this formulation of What is the strategic intent that India has by doing that nuclear testing when it did and as you've Pointed out how you construct the story is exactly where you start You know, what is your starting point to be able to get to what happened in 1998? I would say What were what were the reasons as to why India went for testing in 1998? Why why didn't it happen earlier because the threat perception had existed from much before that? What was the significance of the testing only in 1998 and there are two ways of looking at this one is of course the security perspective With China going ahead with its nuclear weapons program the tragic tree was beginning to pick up after the economic growth of the country we saw it You know from the late 1970s onwards, so there is that which is happening in China There is news which is coming in about the nexus that is developing between China and Pakistan on the nuclear weapons program And then you have in 1987 the Interview which is given by a Q Khan the father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program To an Indian journalist claiming that Pakistan now has the nuclear weapon and therefore, you know, India cannot do anything 1980s is also the period as you know where there were Borders commission of several types particularly in the Siachen region So the security environment is shaping up in a certain way for India China Pakistan the nexus between the two and the kind of borders commissions which are going on during this period in 1988 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi went to the special session on disarmament with what is Commonly known as the Rajiv Gandhi action plan, which was an essentially a plan to work towards universal nuclear disarmament Because of the understanding that for India its best security interests Lie in nuclear disarmament and that is also the The understanding even today despite having acquired nuclear weapons that the best approach for India's National security. It's not just because it's legally correct or morally correct or ethically correct to argue for nuclear disarmament But it's in India's national security interest that there is nuclear disarmament because what we've seen is that with the nuclear weapons with Pakistan The insurgency in India goes up in 1989 1987 the interview happens and we see from 1988 1989 onwards the insurgency in Kashmir goes up which I don't know whether it's correct or not You will have a different narrative to tell but in India it leads to that linkage between the presence of nuclear weapons with Pakistan Providing them with a shield which leads to greater Acts of terrorism in India and we saw 1998 India test 1999 Kargil happened Which again in our mind provides the linkage that it was felt in Pakistan that now there is a carte blanche You can do what you want to do and the nuclear weapons will bind India's hands The threat of escalation will not allow any any reaction to take place Now what is the significance of India testing in 1998 and here? I think as Sharon pointed out these things are just so interconnected There's a deep linkage between the non-proliferation pressures that India was beginning to feel through the 1990s Leading to the decision of testing in 1998 and Irrespective of which government had been in power if it had not been the BJP had it been any other government in power India had to take a call between 1996 and 1999 which is when the CTBT was concluded and put out for entry for you know coming for entry into force Signatures were demanded from 44 countries, which were part of the annex To the CTBT and the time which was given to them was between 1996 and 1999 1999 there was going to be a meeting of the CTBT members to decide on what would be the response For those nations that had not signed on to the CTBT which could end you know Sanctions military action all of which was to be under chapter 7 of the United Nations Security Council So it was very clear that if India had to take a call on getting off the fence either on this side or on that side it had to be during this period and Given the kind of security situation having lost hope that there was ever going to be nuclear disarmament The 1995 the NPT review an extension conference had granted that indefinite and unconditional extension to the NPT So that wasn't going to get us anywhere either So there was a whole host of Developments in the security environment which led to that conclusion that we had to test and it happened to be in 1998 now is India better off after testing Yes and no The game has become much more complex But there was no option and therefore what India for India the nuclear weapons have become something like the necessary evil While you don't want to do it. You don't want to have these weapons. There is no way that you can defend yourself I remember reading an article You know when I started looking at nuclear deterrence issues and the title of that article which is stuck in my mind Is that you don't go to a gunfight with a knife in your hand So if there are nuclear weapons with the other two Neighbours with which there are problems that India has and you don't have nuclear weapons of your own Deterrence becomes extremely difficult and you're open to nuclear coercion and blackmail and you know all kinds of issues So therefore it became necessary for India to develop those nuclear weapons But I'm ready to concede that it has brought in lots more challenges Which is why the Indian nuclear doctrine which is meant to operationalize your credibility of deterrence Actually starts with the desire for a nuclear weapons free world and it ends with that same aspiration people call this hypocritical that you know on the one hand you're developing your capability on the other hand you're Still harping about about disarmament But I think this twin-track approach has a particular sense because it's coming from the Security requirement of the country where you still see a nuclear weapons free world as the best guarantee of your security But since we are not likely to get there and quickly In the meantime, we have to protect our interests with the presence of that nuclear weapon So that's the way I would you know try and answer your question Another you know twice you raised the issue about it being that we are in a situation of nuclear arms race. I Would agree with that either because what India Pakistan and I would say even China to some extent are doing at this moment in time I'm building what is in their understanding credible minimum deterrence, which is the requirement for establishing that deterrence stability It's not a situation of arms race and particularly not From India because the doctrine laid out as to what the requirements will be for having deterrence Credibility and therefore right in the doctrine in 1999 itself It has been put down that there will be certain Survivability issues which will have to be taken care of which meant that the triad will come into force at some time You will need enough to cause unacceptable damage So it's the country's understanding of what would be unacceptable damage and it's a doctrine that lays down that it will be a Short retaliation so in order to ensure that there is a short retaliation. There is a certain force structure Number that has to be put in place and the software that goes with it in terms of command and control All those other issues. So that is what we are engaged in at this moment in time I don't think it's become an arms race right now Of course nuclear weapons have a tendency to acquire a life of their own Which is why my concern and whenever I get a chance to talk to my government It is to say that we have to stick and remain loyal to the doctrine that we've put in place Which seems like an excellent doctrine. We don't need to exceed the requirements of that doctrine at any point but I've I mean As we saw during the Cold War the nuclear weapons in the superpowers acquired a life and momentum of their own and You know, they had their logic So the three armed forces in each country were looking at building up their particular Part of the arsenal. I hope, you know, we've learned from that experience and that will not happen in the case of India Pakistan and China hopefully You know for China too The American estimates the DOD estimates have always been that the increase in the arsenal is going to happen The numbers are going to go up to 1500 1300 at different points in time That has never happened because the logic of understanding deterrence that we have seen up till now in China Is the same as what is in India that you need? You don't need much for deterrence. It is only to be able to threaten punishment That you will cause unacceptable damage, which doesn't call for much actually So I would be happy if we would stabilize at between 100 and 150, you know nuclear warheads But how it actually pans out we'll get to see but we are presently not in a situation of arms race Okay, we have we had one question over here, and then Michael Crapon I would actually encourage everyone to Limit it to questions and keep it short Sir, did you have your hand up before no, okay, so Michael Thank you for the presentation Nobody has ever tried Let alone succeeded in Stabilizing a triangular competition in nuclear arms So what India is facing is It's just it's a whole new territory I wonder if you can tell us What are the key requirements for a stable triangular competition We tend to look at this in terms of warhead numbers delivery vehicles But that seems to me to be a small piece of it So can you have you thought about what it would actually take? To stabilize This triangular competition Thank you very much, sir. As I said, it's a great pleasure that you are here The first part of my talk was exactly on how the nuclear reality for India is in which I pointed out that there is this Triangular relationship of nuclear deterrence, which is so unique To how it how India is having to you know go over this ground We've seen how it happened in the bipolar con construct Which I mean with out of which there are lessons to be derived, but it certainly can't be transplanted here So it's as you point out completely new territory that India is having to go over now A difficult question to answer in terms of what are the key parts that India is looking at for deterrence stability But let me just try and Break it down as best as I can One is as you said the nuclear hardware part, which is the arsenal in terms of the numbers delivery systems capabilities of those delivery systems ballistic missile defense all of that material construct of the nuclear arsenal But the more important I think aspect is the software aspect aspect of this which is what is going to Convey the sense of credibility of deterrence So the software aspect of this comes with doctrinal clarity And I think that is one part of how India is trying to stabilize the relationship by providing that doctrinal clarity By suggesting and when India actually put out the doctrine in 1999 it came in for a lot of criticism from within the country and from outside within the country people were Completely angry about why minimum? I mean now you've gone down this route. Why are you wanting to restrict yourself to credible minimum deterrence? Why no first use? After having acquired a nuclear weapons capability for security Why is India now binding its hands by suggesting no first use and even today there is a discussion on Within the country to suggest that at least with Pakistan We need to have a first use nuclear doctrine even if it remains no first use with China Which I think is a silly argument because you can't have a doctrine which is divided in this sense The doctrine is meant to direct your capability build up so it leads from strategy to action to policy on the ground and Therefore a doctrine which tells you no first use Directs you to build up a certain capability which will lend credibility to that no first use So doctrinal clarity particularly with a doctrine which is based on no first use where you're not trying to put the adversary on edge So he doesn't have the fear that he better use his capability or he's going to lose it that I think is one software component which is going which is Extremely important for establishing deterrence stability. So one is the doctrine the other is the credibility that gets conveyed through the command and control system That in case there is deterrence breakdown if it's a doctrine if the purpose of India's nuclear weapons is to deter Through the threat of punishment Then it has to be able to show that that punishment will be carried out in case of deterrence breakdown And in order to show that the the backup, you know Requirements are then of a credible command and control system. So that's another component that goes into establishing, you know the key part of Establishing that deterrence stability that you know how you will be able to handle breakdown of deterrence And that's so you know it better than me the paradox of deterrence that you have to be able to show that you want deterrence But in order to have that deterrence you have to have a Structure which will be able to handle deterrence breakdown So I think working on these particular components is one way of conveying the credibility of deterrence So while your material requirements might not be much it's the paraphernalia that goes into establishing Credibility of that deterrence which is necessary for deterrence stability and I think those are some of the aspects that Analysts like me would like my country to be focusing on rather than being Worried about you know whether the hydrogen bomb worked or did not work does India have thermonuclear capability It does not matter with the density of populations that we are looking at carrying out unacceptable damage with With even a 15 or a 20 KT nuclear weapon is not so difficult. So your our focus has to be more on perception Manipulation in order to convey that there will be retaliation to cause unacceptable damage And all of these steps which are needed to make that communication is I think what is necessary for deterrence stability Yeah, please use the microphone right in front of you I'm Marco the cop I'm the former science counselor of the US Embassy in Beijing and the US Embassy in New Delhi I want to take issue with with the remark of Michael Creighton my colleague here that Basically that no one ever stabilized a triangle a relationship because there has been a stable triangular Relationship between Russia China the United States and I think what stabilized that for the Chinese was that enough is enough that basically the Chinese never played the game of Of excessive you excessive the with excessive production nuclear weapons. So is enough enough Enough is enough is that a possible approach India could take since in reality Everything is so close any nuclear weapon even a nuclear weapon that goes off in Pakistan With I said would cause unacceptable damage in India. That's a fair comment But in terms of stabilizing a triangular relationship side just like to point out for instance when the US Was largely in a bipolar confrontation when China Started to become a threat in the nuclear front There was a tendency to go towards the some kind of a rapprochement with China the opening up with China that happened in 1971 as one way of co-opting that threat and not letting it you know Become that much more in today's environment again if you look at the US threat perception What they have is as part of the nuclear posture review is nuclear terrorism and non-proliferation The near peers which are Russia and China are way down in the threat perception of the US It's rather China. I would say which could be in that same situation of trying to arrive at a tripolar, you know Stabilization of nuclear relationship with Russia and India on its borders So and we'll see how that happens, but I'm completely with you that enough is enough is the correct approach to go with nuclear weapons You don't need much Yeah, Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Spear with the United States Army War College You talked about the non-state actors particularly proxies Pakistani proxies that potentially posed a nuclear terrorism threat in India Does India harbor any concerns over homegrown extremist organizations that that are not not from any foreign countries? Yes, certainly we do in fact Naxillism has grown to be a big threat And the government is still trying to find its way around and as to how best to approach that It's largely dis-alienated unaffected population of the country which has felt that it was deprived of The kind of benefits that it that that population should have gotten to The spread of I would say information and communication technology gives a boost to this kind of Disaffected population because they get to see that there are benefits available to others Which are not available to them that the resources of that particular region have been taken out to you know Provide riches to the rest of the country while they've been deprived of it So it's certainly something which the government is very very conscious of the If you read many of the articles on the even if you would just to do a Google search You would realize how much the government itself has accepted that there is the spread of the red corridor where you've got the Naxillism which the the number of areas which they have been able to lay control on is extremely high and that Consciousness is there. The attempt is there to try and get them back into the mainstream And hopefully over a period of time these results will fructify But it's a concern that we have certainly of homegrown, you know Issues which is why material security and as I pointed out the focus that UNSCR 1540 all of the other export control issues the WMD act that India enacted in July 2005 the focus of all of that is to try and take away the chances of unauthorized access possession of any kind of WMD material So it's a concern that we have Just use a microphone How are you Daniel copper also from the defense threat reduction agency working the cooperative reduction program there the nun Lover cooperation program Kind of to tie on some of the comments that were just being made you had mentioned that India is very strong proponent of The anti-terrorism avenue of the nuclear summit Security summit process and as well as one of the commitments that was made was for the Global Center on nuclear energy partnership and that trying to see it when it was originally Announced there seemed to be a little bit of a tie between those two events and that It wasn't just an energy partnership Facility, but maybe one where security components would be integrated and training for for for Indians And the like and a memorandum of understanding between our two governments was signed at that point to assist in some of that Something we've noticed in the interim between those those points and now is some reticence on the side of the Republic of India to engage with The US government on on items of nuclear security and that Global Center Just curious if you have any comments or thoughts on whether that was a short term or more of an immediate term Response to just getting that facility up and moving as you said the foundation was just laid this year and whether there was any type of of Coordinated effort on on the Republic's side of the next summit And trying to continue the thought on nuclear security as opposed to some of the civil side and safeguard components that That have kind of been brought to the fore for this coming summit I Think the reticence that you mentioned between the Indo-U.s relationship on this is something that you might be well aware of in the public domain in India We've not come across any such you know mention of the bus of any kind of Lack of coordination or understanding between the two countries The GCNEP even though the foundation stone has just been laid Has been working off-site already and the idea is to have four schools as part of the GCNEP Which will be looking at the technical as well as on the security safeguards, etc. Issues as part of the Global Center How it's actually going to function will it be performing training activities or will it be doing more of research? are still issues which haven't come out very clearly Though from what have been given to understand from the Department of Atomic Energy that some amount of off-site activity on these in Terms of training of trainers, etc. Is already continuing but I would say There is very little debate within the country on many of these aspects though the The thought of nuclear terrorism, you know is very high the consciousness of the dangers that come from Any kind of unauthorized access of nuclear material is very high You don't see that much of writing on these particular issues coming from the strategic community because they are still completely focused on deterrence issues energy issues and this is relatively new ground where you are largely leaving it to the government to take the lead on many of these issues Now I am not saying that it's the correct approach to be doing There's certainly I mean from the strategic community the more you start writing on this it Raises the the priority that the government would be allocating to a subject like this but that Consciousness in the strategic community is yet to filter down and you know what the report that for instance Deepi brings out on the new on the index Hasn't got its fair share of Interest generated yet Hopefully that'll change over a period of time Just to follow up on that I Was surprised in talking to some IEA folks about Pakistan's nuclear security support center They were quite complimentary They said yeah, Pakistan's doing a great job. They're doing all this training. They're doing regional training I just wondered you know is I mean obviously Pakistani nuclear security Must be an issue in India concerned it Is there any talk about it? How do you feel about Pakistan doing regional training on? Nuclear material security. Let's be clear nuclear material security not clear I would say I'm very happy that that's happening because the kind of experience that we've had with the security Issues in Pakistan if they are taking the lead now in providing Training for material security obviously they have and if the IAE is complimenting them or them on that So obviously they have learned also in the process as to how to carry out that material security And that's a great source of comfort for us that there is that understanding that they're able to provide that and that it is up to certain standards that internationally have been laid down for Establishing that kind of material security Pakistan was I think one of the first centers of excellence that came up and given the background that they had in terms of the amount of criticism that they came under after 2003-4 once the acucon revelations came out BBC China was caught with the you know in in Libya all of that Provided I think the platform for Pakistan to want to change its image By having a certain set center of excellence Which would be doing this kind of work and if it's lived up to whatever Expectations that the IAE had out of the center of excellence I think as an Indian it gives me some comfort So one of the trends just to follow up on that With these centers of excellence there's been this proliferation of these centers One of the trends is to get them to collaborate with each other It's easier said than done, but the IEA has put together this network. I've been working in the Asian sphere Is this an area where India and Pakistan? You know, they're tiny tiny tiny little confidence building measure could actually make some progress Certainly, I think it's it's worth looking at in terms of confidence building one of the measures At least exchange of best practices on nuclear safety and security Whether independently or as part of this network of you know centers of excellence Would certainly help and I think it has been on the On the list of the items that India and Pakistan when they get to sit together talk about on nuclear CBMs As I pointed out earlier some of the best nuclear CBMs were drafted as part of the Lahore agreement Unfortunately that never got anywhere Which is why there is a bitter taste about how to get those CBMs if the political Relationship is as tense at different points in time as it is between India and Pakistan The need for the CBMs is that much more, but it's a chicken and egg situation Do we need political trust to get to CBMs or can CBMs generate political trust over a period of time and I think We would be willing to explore it either way and if there is scope for taking these baby steps of some kind without compromising any kind of You know security concerns that the two countries have it's a great idea In fact amongst the CBMs. I have also recommended That we need to do for instance a joint study on what would be the effect of the detonation of a nuclear weapon on cities like Karachi and Mumbai You know if you know what is the extent of damage that's going to happen as a result of that it goes into establishing deterrence You realize is it going to be worth it to use a nuclear weapon if this is what we're going to end up with So in order to you know get better understanding of what is unacceptable damage It would be good idea to do a joint study on what the impact of explosion is on some of the major cities So there are lots of approaches on CBMs and this is definitely a welcome idea Deep tea stand up in the back So Manpreet, thank you again for what I think I already told you as a tour de force Review of all these issues. I want to pick up on a few strings particularly on the nuclear security and broadly using this term of confidence building measures and I actually want to re characterize India's engagement in the nuclear security summit process I Not sure I would say that it was as active or deep in engagement as You've captured it and One of the reasons that there's been this issue about this center of excellence is that it took some real arm twisting From the US to even get the nuclear security part of the mandate into that center of excellence It's one of like four parts. I think of that mission And so I think that's why you're seeing that hesitancy The Indians really wanted it to be about actually the nuclear the civil civilian nuclear energy training But I want to actually come back to this thing around You know that you're in favor of confidence building measures around best practice exchanges and yet We have seen the Indian and Pakistani Sherpa's trip over themselves in agreeing with one another to weaken language in the current negotiations about Measures just like that About how countries can be Working with one another to build confidence about the effectiveness of their nuclear security practices And that's to me so dismaying when both India and Pakistan Are the two countries that have real security issues at risk and in fact should be engaging in that and yet In these official processes, they're they're actually trying to make sure that They themselves are not accountable other countries aren't accountable for their Possession of these materials So I just wanted to kind of bring that insight into this because this is one of those things that could actually Impact some of those deterrence calculations about the buildup of these materials How do we better understand that non-state actor risk particularly with the Hindu Mujahideen? revelations that They were looking for a nuclear bomb. So I'm just gonna I just wanted to make that comment But thank you Thank you deeply for that comment and you know, I Can't defend I'm not speaking for my government in any case, but Sometimes common sense is not so common So while you might see it as you know a shared threat that you are facing the political environment has not allowed For some steps to be taken which is more out of a Sheer blocking of the mind from taking those steps, you know But despite realizing that there is some benefit for both sides and often CBMs only function when you realize that there's a benefit There's a mutuality of benefit for both sides. So that has to filter down from this fog of Political mistrust that has existed between the two I mean, I always remain hopeful Period of Relative peace will hopefully, you know, allow for these openings to come up but the whole Point about the strategic community on both sides and from outside is to keep some of these ideas ready for when there is an acceptability For them and that's hopefully what we are trying to do. So I really appreciate your Suggestion on this Good morning, I'm Edward from the French embassy. So I'd like to switch to the second part about the civilian nuclear so you mentioned the subject of the 20,000 megawatt of electricity generated by nuclear reactors and so this 20,000 megawatts would come from 20 new reactors So my first question would be where would this reactor come from and The second point that I'd like to mention is you talked about some indigenous Reactors, so does it mean that India has the capabilities to to build Nuclear reactors Yes, basically that's it. Thank you That since over a period of time India was not engaged in any kind of international access to nuclear technology What we've ended up having is completely indigenous nuclear power program So the 21 reactors which are functioning today except for one which has come from Russia Which is the latest reactor the rest are all and two that came from the US All the other nuclear reactors have been indigenously built So the technology exists why India was keen on getting nuclear cooperation from outside is because the Indigenous capability that India has at the moment is only for a 700 megawatt nuclear reactor And if the requirement for nuclear energy is so large What we are keen to have is larger capacity nuclear reactors coming in which for instance the French reactor is 1650 megawatts We are nowhere near building indigenously that kind of a capability and Therefore the interest in getting nuclear reactors from outside So whether it's from the US which would be thousand plus Megawatt reactors or from the French or from the South Koreans or from the Russians again between 1,100 and 1,300 megawatt reactors. This is a capability that India does not currently have So what we are standardizing at is a 700 megawatt reactor Which is the highest capacity that India is able to build indigenously now Where is this capacity of 20,000 megawatts going to come from it's going to come from 7,700 megawatt nuclear reactors that India is building indigenously and as I pointed out since fuel is now available from outside Because there is a fuel constraint within the country and also the quality of uranium that India mines is very low In fact, the Australians tell us they discard that as tailings, you know, which we use in our nuclear reactors So the access to good quality uranium from outside will help us to fuel the nuclear reactors That India wants to build in digits indigenously these are to be supplemented with some Imported reactors from outside and from the French for instance There's a site in Maharashtra Jaitapur, which has been allocated for setting up the French reactors now when Fukushima happened Jaitapur was undergoing Some issues about land acquisition and rehabilitation Compensation to be played paid for the land that was being acquired by the government After Fukushima the nuclear safety issue Anti-nuclear energy lobby land acquisition run Rehabilitation all of this has got mixed up and created the kind of trouble that it did in Jaitapur Hopefully, I mean over a period of time these issues have been resolved Now what the status that we are on is the price Negotiations that are going on between the NPC IL and Arriva to get the Jaitapur plants going as quickly as possible Okay, we have time for just two last questions Dan and then this gentleman over here Hi Dan Horner from arms control today I wanted to ask about the nuclear suppliers group you mentioned the actions India has taken and said The NSG is still not ready to accept India And I wanted to ask you why you think that is because I mean I can tell you what I've heard from talking to officials from some of the countries in the NSG that there is first of all this this criterion for membership the NSG that Being a NPT party you're being a member of a nuclear weapons free zone, which India isn't secondly sort of Resentment at the way the countries were pressured to vote in favor of the India exception in 2008 and thirdly a sense that that vote was In some ways damaging to the non-proliferation regime So they're unwilling to take a further step just sort of in that direction. So Is that you're are you hearing that and what is your explanation for for why the NSG is reluctant to Accept India at this point in spite of the actions that India has taken Thanks Okay, thank you for the wonderful presentation and my name is a massage to see and I'm visiting scholar at the Jones Hopkins University at size And originally from METI Japan, so now I have a one only one question about the public acceptance of nuclear power plant So as you mentioned in the presentation, I also think the government the Indian government has confidence to start smoothly but some people claim that the local oppositional movements are aggressive and some Some local government and some local Congress When was that vulnerable vulnerable from the political oppositional movement? So how do you think about the impact on oppositional movements? Do you think that? These movements have an impact on the mix as a project delayed for a couple of years For example, so now could you give me some comment, please? Very interesting last two points and I'm glad, you know, they've come up in some form or the other the NSG membership I mean As far as I can see I know which is the country which is trying to block India from becoming a member of the NSG and I think it should be clear but The two issues that you've mentioned which are taken as loosely the criteria for membership of NSG Membership of the NPT. I think that Became a non-issue when India was granted the exceptionalization as part of the NSG to become a member of international nuclear commerce So NPT is I mean it was with the understanding that India was not a member of the NPT and therefore had to be exceptionalized So this I don't think should be an issue any longer the resentment that they feel on the on the deal that was granted Well, if the countries feel that resentment, they are the ones who've granted that exceptionalization So that's it. That's an issue that they have to treat within themselves as to why should they feel that despite having granted that exceptionalization on certain objective criteria, which was presented to them in terms of India's proliferation non-proliferation behavior Now if I could just extrapolate that situation a little, you know, if you look at it ten years from now Who are the countries that are going to be the active players in the NSG? Germany has phased out its nuclear power program Some of the other members of the NSG in any case are bit players in terms of supplies So what you're looking at in ten years time Essentially are going to be China Emerging as a nuclear supplier. They have expressed great interest in export of their nuclear capability technology power plants Russia South Korea, these are some of the countries which have ambition on being important nuclear suppliers and India which has a capability of setting up at least 220 megawatt nuclear power plants At the moment has not expressed in desire to become a nuclear supplier Which will change over a period of time right now because of the internal demand of nuclear energy within the country The entire focus has been inward oriented in investment So you don't want to extend yourself outside But with the kind of capability with the region Bangladesh You know some of the smaller countries in the region Vietnam having expressed an interest in nuclear energy with the kind of smaller grids that they have it would make ample sense for a Kind of nuclear reactor that India has to be set up in many of these countries to actually be useful for their grids Rather than Bangladesh going in for a Russian reactor, which is going to be a 1000 megawatt reactor with the grid being as small as it is In case there was any trouble you run into a loss of you know, but 1000 megawatt of electricity directly so why not go in for smaller reactors that is going to be the logic and India will emerge as a nuclear supplier over a period of time as you know our own issues get sorted out So in the NSG if you look at who the major players will be and whether it makes sense for India to be a part of the NSG or not It's completely a decision that the NSG has to make from my perspective It makes sense to bring India in if it doesn't it doesn't really matter India is not losing out anything by not being a member of the NSG right now Bilateral arrangements have worked out. Well, things will become smoother if India becomes a part of the NSG, but it's it's not really such a You know live or die issue for the country right now on public acceptance I mean that is the biggest issue that you know has come up in the nuclear energy field across the world everywhere people are facing the same situation And as I try to point out I mean the ways in which India is trying to get over that problem is be by becoming more open and transparent on the nuclear power Program as a whole which wasn't there earlier So the sense of going in for nuclear power the limitations that India has in terms of sourcing electricity from other sources The demand which is so huge. I mean the you know a capital availability of electricity for India right now is at 700 kilowatt hours Per capita whereas in a country like the US it's 13,000 kilowatt hours per capita availability According to the human development index you have to graduate to a developed country You have to have 4,000 megawatt per kilowatt hour capability Per capita. So if you have to reach that kind of a target Whether it's a country like China with 1 billion plus whether it's a country like India with a billion The demand is just so huge that you can't rule out nuclear energy But people have to be over a period of time convinced of the logic of nuclear energy and the and that it's a safe source of energy Fortunately for us. We've never had any major incident in India hopefully that will be how it remains and With efforts of the government we will get around this problem, but it has been politicized There are all kinds of local opposition groups which are with different agendas at play It's a challenge that will have to be gotten over in democracies They sometimes spin out of control, but I think we will be able to get over it Do you think India needs to improve some aspects of its nuclear governance like the independence of its nuclear regulation? Yes, that is an issue that is extremely important for feeding into public acceptance because that's how you build confidence in it India has had an atomic energy regulatory board right from the beginning But the issue came up about the independence of because when Fukushima happened the whole issue about regulatory capture That you've got the same set of people who are also promoting nuclear energy regulating nuclear energy came up and in response to that There is a new nuclear security regulatory Authority which is which has been sanctioned. It is awaiting Parliamentary approval to come into place the parliament hasn't functioned over a period of time for various reasons, but this is how The independence aspect of governance is going to be improved But I would say nuclear safety is never a destination It's always a work in progress and you there's no room for complacency So efforts at improvement across the world will have to just continue. I think we can all agree on that very positive Last note listen. Thank you as an audience. You've been very patient. We've gone over a little in our time Thank you for your questions and please join me in thanking Dr. Manpreet setting. Thank you very much