 Paul Cunning was my name, as you heard, the RTA correspondent, and I'm delighted with the order of play that I'm going to speak first, because as you just heard, Jamie Smith was the Europe correspondent for four years, whereas I've only had the job since May, so I would obviously have run out of time, wouldn't have very much to say and would just be saying, Jamie hit it on the head earlier on when he said, but as you also heard from Jill, I was the environment correspondent for ten years, so my perspective on Ireland and how Ireland was viewed by Europe is framed very much by that type of stuff for ten years, where there was a view in Europe that Ireland loved signing things, that we were great Europeans. Give us anything we'll sign it. It was just we had a bit of difficulty when it came to doing, and this would have gone through various different directives. One of them I remember more than anything else was the nitrates directive, a painful exercise in which Ireland was dry kicking and screaming, saying it couldn't for this reason, it couldn't for that reason, and eventually some form of compromise being done. And Commissioner Volstrom was over and just expressing exasperation that how this could be, how can you say yes, and then politically not prepare the ground for the deal to go through and it having to be this protracted affair in which everyone got into a right tiz. And I think to a certain extent that gives us some indication about how Ireland was approaching Europe, and therefore how Europe was also beginning to approach Ireland, which was something like with the arms folded and going, I hear what you're saying, but I'm going to wait to see exactly what you do. And there was also a sense of running out of rope. I know people will always point to things like the stability and growth pact and say, hold on, there's other European nations which are quite happy to sign things, and when they needed to make a few amendments. But in the environment sphere at least, Ireland was one of the worst offenders, it was up more than any other, and I think that if you look at say something like TERF is going to be the time when Europe runs out of patience. When the first spade or first machine goes into a protected bog in February, we're going to be bounced into the European Court of Justice like that because they've had enough and they're not prepared to deal with it anymore. So how big filled deals with that will be interesting because effectively we've run out of time. But on the European thing, while I took up the role in the beginning of January, I only actually became full time in May. So I was coming backwards and forwards. So one of the first things I went to was the political wake of Brian Cowan where he was over negotiating at a summit, but it was clear he was on the way out and he was talking about the future even though he himself didn't have any future in. And around that time I was beginning to speak to other what they call senior EU diplomats, in other words people who want to blab but not necessarily be named. And asking them, well what do you think? Why was it that Ireland finds itself in such a tight corner? And more than anything else what came across was that Europe is a collective in which people negotiate, intervene, interlock, come together even when it isn't necessarily in their national interest. We all pulled together and Ireland had effectively walked away from the table. It wasn't just that we weren't attending meetings. It was also even when we were there we weren't participating. We weren't actually even using something simple like our English language skills when it came to framing motions. We were sitting back. We weren't participating. There was a sense that we had a huge opportunity when many of the Eastern European countries joined the EU that Ireland could have played a leadership role. We had agricultural-based society. We had gone through it. We knew how to access funds. We knew how to play the game. I mean that we could have used that as a method of framing or blocking in a number of countries who might support us on more difficult matters than effective. We just didn't do it. And so while people like me hold Martin and I'd say John Gormley would vigorously reject what I've just said to you, that's what people were saying to me. You walked away and then you had that hubris of the Celtic Tagaeer where we don't even need you Europeans anyway because we're going to change the economic model and move forward. And then of course the House of Cards came down. When Enda Kenny came over it was interesting to see he had this huge enthusiasm and it was going to be interesting to see how that played out. But the biggest thing was that he had been banging away at the European People's Party, the EPP for years, whether he was vice president or whatever different roles that he held. So when he went into these room he knew most of the people. And that also played for Lucinda Crichton. I know that the Department of Foreign Affairs will have a few issues with Europe being pulled over to the Taoiseach's office. But once again she was walking into a room. She knew people, they knew her and we now had this EPP block anyhow throughout Europe where at the moment it's only the Belgians who have gone red. But it is very much a blue block and so there was going to be political capital gain there. But the main message they had was that Ireland is Europe's best chance of success when it came to programme. And this was the message they kept banging away in the hope that if it was accepted, well then once you accept her you're a best chance then you have to make sure that it succeeds. And it gives you political leverage on what you're going to do. And then first it was Ali Ren and Baroso who were talking yes and you heard of Ireland's doing very well. First report of the Troika, very good boys. And then it began to broaden out Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB was mentioning it and then suddenly Merkel was mentioning it and then suddenly our bestest friend when it comes to corporatax. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy was also using Ireland as this fantastic example of a nation which was able to accept the pain which was moving forward. And I think that was part of the strategy and so things were beginning to change because ministers were attending meetings, they were actually trying to participate. And Europe also needed to have a success and so things were beginning to move together. We were no longer on the outside, we could probably call us the best boys in the bailout bunch. Not much of a claim to have but certainly better than how it had been in the earlier part of the year. And when you spoke to officials once again behind closed doors they would talk to you about how there isn't any demonstrations on the streets, you're not rioting. And there wasn't any deceit involved, it was maybe a deceit of your own imagination but there wasn't sort of documents being forged. And when we talk about the Greeks we're pushing the boulder up the hill, it's just that the boulder is getting bigger all the time. Whereas in Ireland there's some sense that things are changing for the better. So once again it was feeding into this idea that Ireland was a positive. And what we saw just at the last summit was Tisha Kenny's great play which was at this difficult time when Europe was trying to forge this big deal. He rolls out the, but why don't you help us on the old question of bank debt. Now how we're going to do that remains to be open but it was now out in the open that this is what Ireland is hoping to do. He's emphatic to keep the Germans inside as he said in two journeys. We will pay back every cent but after that they're looking for any change that it can possibly make to make that money cheaper. And so save us a target of three or four billion a year when it comes to paybacks. And that's what they're starting to do. And that will be most interesting to see how far it goes. And you will see the divergent grooves within the, or positions within the Troika, within the IMF who've got one view as to what should happen, the EU and the ECB. So it will be interesting to see how that plays out. But the difficulty and I think what you'll probably hear from the other two speakers is it's not Ireland anymore, you know, as we reduce our growth rate projection for 2012 down to 1.3. Moody's now says it's going to be 1%. But with things seemingly heading off a cliff, it is effectively out of our hands as to how influential we are going to be next year. And I think that is the difficult thing for the government. I mean it's a question of Ireland hopes to tentatively go back to the bond market at the end of 2012. Will anyone be interested in European bonds? Forget about Irish bonds. How strong is that going to be? How confident can we be in growth when everything is beginning to slow down? And then if we have France beginning to lose its triple A credit rating, which means the EFSF also loses triple credit rating, which means it becomes more expensive for us to borrow money. So I think that's the trajectory which was certainly a sense, just to sum up a sense that Ireland had been bad boys and a cocked it up for many years, that they had come up with a reasonable strategy and it suited European leaders to join in it, which gave us some sort of leverage and that's where we are at the moment, but we're effectively at the mercy of events that don't work out our way. It's very precious little that we're going to be able to do, which is going to be of benefit.