 Since this is the last time I will open this conference as chair of the SRB, I wanted to reflect on the development of macroprudential policy over the course of the past eight years. In that time, it has evolved from an idea that mostly existed on paper into policy instruments that have been widely implemented. Europe is now better placed to prevent or mitigate risk to financial stability than it was in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet there is still unfinished business. Analytical tools to assess systemic risk need to be enhanced. Macroprudential instruments to prevent or mitigate systemic risk need to keep pace with the evolution of the financial system. And the policy framework needs to be further developed. At the start of my term in 2011, Europe was still dealing with the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Other financial stability risks, notably those associated with the sovereign debt crisis, were also crystallizing. The costs to society from the crisis were substantial. By 2013, unemployment had risen by 10 million and EU GDP was some 13% below its pre-crisis trend. The build-up of excessive and unperceived leverage in the financial system was a key element leading up to the financial crisis and policymakers were unable to adequately address systemic risk. While many central banks communicated on financial stability issues prior to the crisis, very few countries had established national macroprudential authorities with a specific mandate and precise instruments for policy action. Some of the tools that we would today call macroprudential instruments were used by central banks in Europe during the post-war period, albeit usually for the purpose of demand management. But most were no longer used or were dismantled by the financial regulation during the 80s and the 90s. And without means of enforcement, warnings published in financial stability reports prior to the crisis often went unheeded. It was only after the crisis that there was widespread recognition of the importance of the macro dimension of financial stability. An internet search on the word macroprudential yields 5,000 hits for the eight-year period from 2000 to 2007. By contrast, the past eight years yield 120,000 hits. Despite that recognition, macroprudential policy in Europe was far from operational in 2011. Indeed, when European rules established in a common legal basis for macroprudential instruments for banking came into effect in January 2014, 10 member states still had not implemented them in their primary national legislation. Even where national authorities had been created, there was uncertainty over the right way to assess risk, which instruments to use, and how to calibrate interventions. Moreover, there was a real risk of inaction bias since the costs of macroprudential policy are visible and are felt immediately, but the benefits accrue over time and are difficult to quantify. Given this somewhat tentative start for macroprudential policy in Europe, substantial progress has been made over the past eight years. Macroprudential authorities now exist in all but one member state. The gaps in our framework and knowledge have slowly been filled through research and experience. And the SRB has certainly played an integral part in this process. The framework has also helped to counter the risk of inaction bias. National macroprudential authorities have mandates and legal tools to act. At the European level, the SRB also holds a mandate to monitor risk and vulnerabilities and has a number of legal instruments at its disposal. Again, for example, issue warnings if it has identified a significant risk to financial stability, as well as recommendations setting out remedial steps to be taken on an act or explained basis. National authorities have slowly demonstrated their willingness to use the tools at their disposal. Most EU countries currently have at least one measure in place to address risks in the residential property sector and half have measures to tackle risks in commercial real estate. Twelve member states have decided to impose a positive rate on the counter-signical buffer. The SRB has likewise taken action. In 2016, it issued warnings to eight countries drawing attention to the medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sectors. In six of these countries, the SRB judges that the vulnerabilities have not been sufficiently addressed and on Monday published recommendations setting out remedial action to be taken. Five further countries were issued with warnings. Yet, the overall framework for macro-proof policy in Europe remains incomplete. We need progress in three key areas to counter systemic risk more effectively, better analytical tools, new instruments that counter the development of risk outside the banking sector and a clearer framework to govern policy actions. The past decade has seen a sustained improvement in the tools available to assess risk to financial stability. Better data and better modeling techniques have revealed important insights. Developing the analytical toolkit to adequately monitor interconnectedness and contagion requires granular databases and the ability to map and link data across entities and markets. The subprime crisis in US banking sector spread to European banks through their direct exposures, but it also spread to insurers through the use of credit default swaps. Only holistic view of the system will allow potential contagion channels to be identified and modeled, and that requires investing in new technologies for data analytics and enhancing the capacity for authorities to link and share data and technical knowledge. The second area of improvement for the macro-prudential framework in Europe involves keeping pace with the developments in the financial system. That requires the broadening, that requires the broadening the range of macro-prudential instruments beyond those currently available. We'd focus almost exclusively on the banking sector. For the insurance sector, the contours of such instruments are taking shape. They include solvency instruments such as symmetric capital requirements for cyclical risk, liquidity instruments for insurers with a vulnerable liquidity profile, and instruments to target bank-like activities to ensure macro-prudential policy is consistent across sectors. The third area for improvement in macro-prudential policy involves establishing a clear conceptual framework to govern policy discussions and interventions. Such framework would facilitate communication with market participants and the general public, as well as help mitigate any risk of inaction bias. For monetary policy, the framework is well known, and the reaction function of central banks is normally well understood by markets. By contrast, the framework that governs macro-prudential policy interventions is much less developed. Due in no small part to our limited experience to using these tools, but also because the objective of financial stability is broader than the objective of price stability, so is less easily defined by a single numerical measure. Developing the policy framework is challenging and will take time. The SRB approach uses the concept of residual risk, which is the difference between the level of risk and the current resilience of the financial system. In setting up the framework, policymakers need to establish the level of residual risk that they consider acceptable. Now, as you can see from this very sketchy definition, it's far from being easy. Regular macro-prudential policy decisions will then follow a two-stage process. Policymakers assess the level of residual risk in the system, and if that diverges from the acceptable level, they then assess the policy tightening or loosening required to realign it. Let me conclude it. Over the past eight years, the implementation of macro-prudential policy in Europe has substantial improvement. The SRB has played a valuable role in facilitating that process. And I think I said something like that this morning in the meeting of the General Board. The SRB's success derives from its broad membership. Systemic risk takes different forms over time, so discussions incorporated in a wide range of viewpoints and experience are vital if policymakers are to successfully safeguard the stability of the financial system. And I welcome you to this conference. Thank you.