 Thank you very much, Prof. I think we as a people have neglected security in this nation for a pretty long time and government has a casual attention to security. Security is expensive and if you neglect it over a long time it will collapse in your hands. And I looked at UbiDati manifesto and I think it has very well captured the problems with the Nigeria security. One of them is looking at the security sector reform. The security sector needs indeed a thorough reformation. If you check our security they are working in isolation. The police has no relationship with the armed forces more often than not. Even with the armed forces, instead of having an integrated command, there are separate commands and there is no way they can harmonize in such a way as to achieve the desires of Nigeria. So let me begin by asking him, General Henry, are you allowed, whose focal person on security and defence in our policy review and future view team is on? General, are you allowed? Yes, sir. Okay, wonderful, wonderful general. Yeah, perhaps you can orient us on the position of the UbiDati team on security and defence. When we had the glitch, we had the privilege of general UbiUmahi beginning to speak to issues of, if you will, integration for seamless policy execution. But give us, if you may, the seven pillars and less than have a conversation here. Okay, thank you very much. And a good day of participants is a great opportunity for us as a nation to retake our nation and to craft a system that will work. I like to say from the outset that the state of the insecurity of the nation is premised on what I will call some precedent conditions of what was on ground before the challenges came on board. And hence the ability to address the challenges have been also hampered by the state we found ourselves before those challenges came in. So in the UbiDati and the liberal party security sector agenda for the nation, I'm going to highlight the seven main points, the seven pillars, if you like. Number one, is there going to be a holistic review of the national security architecture? I mean, the national security architecture must again and again in recent times. But what exactly it is and why is it what it is? What has it been? Has it been a default architecture? Or has it been a deliberately crafted architecture premised on appropriate analysis, threat analysis, vulnerability evaluation, risk assessment of the nation from which you then move on to review the security architecture and craft one that will address all the issues in the holistic pattern. That's number one. Number two, there are also going to be a review and strengthening of the national security council. The national security council is simply a creation of the constitution. Just simply mentioned, and not much is said as to this organization other than the list of the members and what the working system and the checklist for doing those things should be. So that would be addressed appropriately. And the office of the national security advisor, which provides the secretariat for the national security council, we then be strengthened also. And we be indeed a coordination centre as relating to national security intelligence and all of that. Number three, there also going to be an expansion of the national intelligence community. One of the things we have not done well as a nation is putting in place a framework that enables us to put forward our best foot concerning any issue. Nigeria is so endowed by very many gifted, highly talented people and extraordinary collection of people who have so much to offer. But the way we have designed our system thus far is only those in government that have the opportunity of even having to bring in their ideas. And sometimes when you write papers, there have been a thousand and one papers written. But once you are not the one there, it's like, you know, they look at the excuse me and if you know what to do, how come you are not the one here? But it ought to be a matter of a system where the best, the elected best of the nation is what we are putting forward in solving any national issue. Okay, so that is going to be entrenched. Number four, there is going to be an introduction also of the security and the sub sectors of the system. Sub sectors of the security, particularly the defense and all the others, a higher management system that ensures certain instruments and tools for control of those apparatus, structures, institutions and the entire process and procedure. Now that would be entrenched. That also has been lacking since independence. We are neither here or there as to where we stand in some of these things. I mean, the such tools like having a, you know, of course, for several years until 2001, we did not even have a national security strategy. And what we got in 2001 was a 10 page grant strategy for national security. And thereafter we had the national security strategy in 2014, which was revealed in 2019, you know, and all of that. And okay, there are several other acts and policies that need to be converged and be focused on in designing that this kind of system that works in other places. And several examples we can learn from. Number five is to craft a strategic framework for unified operations. Now what do we mean by that? We have seen so much of the armed forces being called out to solve problems when the crisis go beyond what the police and other paramilitary agencies can handle. But when they are called out, what framework is there for them to work in collaboration and who handles what and all of that. It needs to be put as a laid down regulation, not just at the instance of who is holding the office as a time. You know, we have done so much of that. And sometimes it's like, well, if you like the face of the man who is there, you collaborate or cooperate with him. If you don't, you do something otherwise. No, it's not supposed to be left to the whims and caprices of the operators. There should be appropriate framework at each level of those organizations and services. Who and who is relating with who and what needs to be done. Okay, that's number five. And number six is going to be a review of national emergency response system. We have seen our capacity to respond to national emergency has not been the best. And that's because we've tried some model or the other without being neither here or there. And sometimes you find, I say, never used to be a preceded under the presidency reporting to the vice president. And I've been put under the Ministry of Humanitarian Intervention. Okay, and still it doesn't get the work done that way because the other agencies that are supposed to be coordinated are not even under NEMA. Neither are they under Ministry of Humanitarian Intervention. In other climes, what you do is to aggregate the first responders and the major responding agencies and put them under one umbrella like the Ministry of Interior. So when there is an emergency, it's not a matter of begging people to respond. Because there will be people who have been training together, who have been operating together, who have done several rehearsals and disaster games and so they can really relate. So when there is a real emergency, it's not then they are trying to get what to do. They will have been used to working with one another. So that's what will be put there. And all of these great ideas will not, of course, find proper footing until the number seven pillar, which is making a list of several agenda items for the legislation, for legislature to handle. Of course, we know that if we are going to review existing policies and acts, then of course we get to go back to the legislature. Okay, so that is the seventh pillar. And with all this, we hope that we will be able to address the perennial insecurity in Nigeria. Of course, we all know the criticality of security. Without security development, progress and all of that cannot follow. Thank you very much. I hope I've been able to highlight those. There is no question that the central place of security in progress in development is there. In fact, the AU had a special conference on this subject in Morocco. I was privileged to give a presentation at it last December, I think. And so our work is cut out for us. How do we operationalize these ideas in the document that we have here? Let's start with General Umahi here, and then Captain Maru from their experience will give us a sense for what is critically required. And then I want to talk to you about a particular issue. Unfortunately, we have joining us from Atlanta, Olivia Diokbara, who is in security services out there. Because I want in this relationship between agencies to ask her when she is going to come on. In the U.S., you have besides the military command and all of that and policing. You have what you call the reserves. And it's a particular one that's almost escaping me at this moment. National Guard. National Guard. We've talked about this. National Guard. How the governor activates the National Guard versus where police capacity is limited. And ultimately, when the military comes in, how all of that later would like her to probably open that conversation. But do you, General Umahi, what do we need to do to begin to implement? Well, thank you, Prof. And thank you, General, for all you have presented. I think the way to start is that we need to reform the security sector. If we properly reform the security sector, we'll be addressing issues like unity of command. When there is an operation that involves more than a service, there must be a unified command where orders will flow from. Now what we have is disjointed. Each service issues orders. In fact, the chief of defense staff has no troops. So how can he implement his dream policies? So that issue should be addressed. By the way, in talking about that, how does our chief of defense staff differ from the chairman of joint chiefs in the U.S. structure? The chairman of U.S. joint chiefs of staff is that he has the powers of command. All the troops are under him in terms of operations. All the pacific command, the European command, they are under him. Even the African high command. Even the African high command, they are right directly under him. So he issues directives and then the various commands interpreted as it affects them. And then do the analysis, estimate process and come up with the approach they require to carry out. Within each of these commands, you find out that a force is there, a man is there, a force is there, a navy is there. And where appropriate are the security services. But in Nigeria it is a different ball game. I am not subtracting from the fact that the security agencies are trying their best. But there are things we need to do to make things work seamlessly, to make us harness all the advantages we should have. Because we have the defense, we have other security agencies. Secondly, it is very gladdening that Obidachi has been brave enough to say that Nigeria requires state police. Nobody can shoot and normally cry more than they believed. The governors are chief security officers in their cities. But they do not have troops, they do not have the security agencies they can use to effect that role. So Obidachi had the courage to tell Nigerians that this is part of the critical problem we have in Nigeria. And that is why the state governors resorted to this vigilante. And when you begin to give, it is a good thing they have done. But the problem is it has a lot of implications. You give arms to people who are not trained to bear arms. You give instruments of violence to people who are not trained to manage them. So what could happen is that such people could eventually begin to use the arms as some of them are using it now for their selfish interests. And if you study the history of Pakistan, that is what gave rise to warlords that have territories carved out for themselves. You have a political leader in a position. He cannot take any policy decision without consulting the warlords. That is where we are going. And I think we should... Even in Somalia it went. Captain Mara, what is your perspective on how we can really enforce a system that will secure and unite Nigeria? Indeed securing and uniting Nigeria is a straightforward and very, very important. A very, very possible task. Particularly when we take out the nuances and all the what I call on written protocols that inform command on the field. And how can this be done? This can be done... What I want to call low-foot, low-hanging-foot measures is we must be able to demand results from troops on the ground. It doesn't seem to be happening right now because everyone is virtually walking towards getting their own accolades from the man they are loyal to. But when it becomes a result-driven thing, marching results to expectations, marching results to costs, you'll see we begin to take out the frills from the skirt so we can be able to know who can deliver and who has challenges delivering. Let me use a very potent example which my two senior officers have made a mention of. If you go out there on the field and you see the defence for example, the type of defence staff for example, we should recall that he was redeployed from the operations theatre to his present office, but he was troopless. It's like tying one's hands behind his back. We have there a very potent soldier, a soldier-soldier, but then he is somebody that could be akin to one who has a soul willing, but the body is weak. When the body of man to execute is not on ground, there is no way you can achieve any result. Then all the nuances and the shenanigans start creeping in. From the body language of the OBDAC movement, we are seeing people who want to actually take out the meat and get straight to the bone. We are seeing people who want to march costs with results. We are seeing people who want to say, if you can ask for XYZ much, then you must be able to tell us what much we can expect for the XYZ you are getting. Right now, it's virtually like it's open. We see humongous amounts being sunk, and they just end up as sunk costs, because nobody has been able to say, you know what, this is what you have asked for these monies for, and we are going to give it and this is how much we expect. Let me very quickly piggyback on this, the problem of architecture. Intelligence is often said to be an issue. Why does it seem like intelligence agencies are operating in isolation? In many countries intelligence is probably job one. May I boldly respond to your question like this, sir? You see, no matter the intelligence you have, and I've always said this on an order forum, if you are not intelligent, it will be useless to you. The user of intelligence has to be intelligent too. So if you don't match intelligence with intelligent people, then intelligence will be useless. We have a lot of intelligence. Intelligence is virtually all over us every day, particularly when it comes to the kind of threats we have, goat-headers, bandies, localists who haven't really gotten the kind of formal training and upper hands we have. But then if there is not a process that is going to ensure that the intelligence we have is handled by intelligent people, then we will just continue to recycle intelligence that goes in and comes out just the way it went in. There is something very, very critical when you want to improve on your intelligence system. That is what is called civil-military relations. If civil-military relations is seamless, then every Nigerian will be an intelligence source. But now, more often than not, the Nigerians see security agencies as enemies, not as friends. And that is what the system has created. We have a system that use the security agencies against the people. You see, politicians use them against their opponents. So they see the security agencies as enemies to themselves. They have information that intelligence that will help this nation get out of security. They keep it to themselves. And some of them even divulge security information to the militants, to enemy, to adversaries. So we need to deal with the issue of civil-military relations as an important tool to setting security rights in Nigeria. It is a very important point. Professor, let me say a word about that. Okay, General. Yes, thank you for your influence my fellow officers. Joining my, I mean, agreeing with my fellow officers, I just want to put it in the perspective of what we said, a holistic review of the National Spirit Act. Thank you. It's actually to bring a system of systems approach. Some of the reason like Kathioma said and like General Obis said, is the fact that there are loopholes in the current system that we're on because it's not properly structured as a system of systems where the nodes and the joints are all taken care of. So even if you have the best of intelligence, if the operating services and forces are not able to use intelligence, the response time is not enhanced by availability of the required logistics. I mean, I give the very common examples. If a civilian calls a police station nearest to his house and says, I saw something suspicious in so-and-so aggression, so-and-so time and all that. Now, in that police station, they don't have even a vehicle to take off to respond to the system in which the appropriate apparatus are not empowered to respond in such time. Quick response is not achieved because of that. Because we have not taken a serious critical look at what we are on. Even the location of our security agencies and unions and operations centers. Important points being made there. A glitch, but we have to move on very quickly. We are coming towards the end of this panel because there is so much to engage with. But just in one quick 30-second comment, what should be job one, day one, for somebody who wants to secure this country? Quick. For me, it goes beyond security restructure. When you restructure, everything will fall in place. When you review the security sector, appropriate and insist that it has to be enforced, everything will fall in place. Thank you. For me, security will remain that either, that social either, within which all else will thrive. Without it, we just... Very true. I mean, we can't go to the farm if we are going to get kidnapped and if we don't farm, we will not be able to eat. Inflation will hit us and the visual cycle goes around.