 Chapter 11 of Napoleon a Short Biography. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Napoleon a Short Biography by R. M. Johnston. Chapter 11. Napoleonic Policy 1806-1808. Napoleon's Ambition. Fall of the Germanic Empire. War and Finance. Tilsit. Commercial War on England. Copenhagen. Juno occupies Lisbon. Continental Policy. Spanish Intrigue. Occupation of Madrid. Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain. It is now time to consider the questions of policy that underlay the wars we have just followed, and that soon drove Napoleon to new and less fortunate enterprises. And first the personal element. The man must engage attention. His successes, his ambitions, his plans were immoderate. They were the result of an insensit craving to satisfy the selfish appetites of a gigantic intellect. The good of others was with Napoleon nothing more than a means for attaining some personal end, and France was rather the instrument than the object of his achievements. To Cromwell and to Washington, even in a way to Caesar, their country had been a sufficient world of action, but Bonaparte's imagination ever soared to fresh fields of conquest. The Corsican Lieutenant of Artillery had made France his and now stretched his hand over Europe. Had he made Europe his, nothing can be more certain than that he would thence have risen to the conquest of Asia or America. He was the embodiment of man struggling to better himself as conceived by utilitarian or Darwinian philosophers, and the field of ambition in which he strove for existence was only bounded by planetary space. Nor was his aggressiveness veiled. It was the man himself and came out in all his acts. In his bulletins and familiar soldiers' talk he used the most offensive language towards his opponents, sparing not even a woman such as Queen Louisa of Prussia. In his diplomatic encounters he showed no greater generosity. When his opponent was down he took from him everything he could and even when possible more than was bargained for. Thus it was after the Treaty of Pressburg that followed Austerlitz. By the terms of peace Napoleon extorted every session of territory and of money he could, yet he took more in the months that followed. Having by the terms of the treaty increased the South German states, especially Bavaria at the expense of Austria, he subsequently proceeded to form a South and West German body which he called the Confederation of the Rhine and took under his protectorate. Bavaria and Württemberg, which he now raised to the rank of kingdoms, with Westphalia later, were the principal among the numerous German states that, either through necessity or ambition, joined the new Confederation. But these states had been component parts of the Germanic body or Germanic Holy Roman Empire, of which the head was the Emperor Francis of Habsburg Lorraine. The Empire had long been a weak and tottering institution, this thrust of Napoleon overthrew it, for the Emperor Francis thereupon issued a declaration announcing the dissolution of the Germanic Empire and his assumption of the style of Francis, first hereditary Emperor of Austria. There was another feature of Napoleon's system of politics that became strongly emphasized immediately after Austerlitz. This was that he intended war to be self-supporting. Here to fore in European politics, war had been an abnormal condition entailing abnormal expenditure on the country waging it with this consequence that on a piece armaments were reduced. With Napoleon all this was changed. After Austerlitz the French battalions were not reduced by one man. The army was, to its master, what the tool is to the craftsmen and he would not admit of its efficiency being diminished. At the same time it appeared in every way contrary to Napoleon's interests that the abnormal charge for maintaining this great army should be borne by France. He consequently entered on the policy of quartering on his enemies, if possible, otherwise on his allies, large bodies of troops which they were called on to maintain and in many cases to pay. For seven years, 1806 to 13, the greater part of Germany thus served as pasture ground and so evil and burdensome was the system that even the placid people of that prosperous country were nearly driven into open rebellion. When the victory of Friedland forced his last great continental antagonist to confess defeat, Napoleon touched the summit of his power. The days of the struggling consulate appeared long past. Already after Austerlitz a great change had come over him physically. He was no longer the lean, intriguing Corsican struggling to reach the front rank, but had filled out and assumed a better satisfied corporal aspect. He had now established his equality with the greatest sovereigns of Europe. Eighteen months later, at Tilsit, equality no longer satisfied him and he decided to divide the hegemony of the continent with the Tsar. Providing that sovereign would consent to follow his policy against Great Britain. France and Russia could clearly dictate terms, for Prussia was reduced to a secondary rank while Austria alone retained a claim to military power. It was on this basis that Napoleon framed his policy at Tilsit. He was prepared to be friendly with Russia. Of Alexander he claimed no territory save the little island of Corfu. All he asked was cooperation in his struggle against England. He took pains to charm the Tsar and succeeded, for his fascination could be as great as his invective was brutal. Alexander agreed to all that Napoleon asked of him, was content to see peace made at the expense of Prussia, and was repaid by gaining a free hand to take Finland from Sweden and various provinces from Turkey. The Tsar begged hard for his ex-ally King Frederick William, but Napoleon was bent on crushing the Prussian monarchy under his heel. By the terms of peace, Prussia was not only despoiled of much territory, but was also charged with an enormous war indemnity, pending payment of which French troops were to occupy Berlin and her most fruitful provinces. So loose were the terms of the treaty that Prussia remained saddled with the French occupation until after the great catastrophe of November to December, 1812. But the point of greatest interest in the agreement arrived at by the two emperors was that which concerned Great Britain. Alexander, glad to pay for Austerlitz and Friedland at so little direct cost, fascinated by the cajolaries of the great captain, agreed to turn against his ancient ally. This part of the negotiations was intended to be kept secret for the present, but the British cabinet secured information and determined to forestall a projected move of the two great continental powers. Instead of accepting a proposal for the mediation of Russia with a view to a general peace, the government of King George sent an expedition to Copenhagen to seize the Danish fleet. This event, September 1807, rendered prospects of a peace with Great Britain even more remote. It ruined Napoleon's naval projects and it prompted him to a counter-stroke at England. Nearly every country of the continent except Sweden and Turkey was now closed to British trade, but in Portugal her commerce found free outlet and Napoleon determined as an offset to Copenhagen to close the Portuguese ports to Great Britain. To effect this military action became necessary and a small army under General Junot was marched through Spain and occupied Lisbon at the end of November 1807. The Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil. This incursion into Portugal, though it appeared merely a counter-stroke for the British seizure of the Danish fleet, was in reality an integral part of a vast scheme which Napoleon's mind had long been maturing. The war of 1805 had drawn him from the Channel. Trafalgar and Copenhagen had deprived him of the naval strength he required and the invasion of England had faded into the background of possibilities. But, though invasion was no longer possible, the commercial attack was. If Napoleon could no longer march an army to London, he might yet hope to starve and ruin her. His first step towards effecting this was when the conquest of Prussia gave him the power to stretch his hand over the northwestern sea ports. In November 1806 he issued the famous Decree of Berlin whereby it was ordered that no port in the French Empire or its dependencies should receive any ship coming from Great Britain or any of her colonies. That Great Britain herself was in a state of blockade and that all British goods were caesible wherever found. To this the British reply was an order in council practically forbidding neutral vessels to trade except through British ports and later proclaiming all French ports blockaded. Napoleon answered this by declaring all neutral vessels carrying British papers denationalized and caesible. This last decree was in November 1807. The whole force of Napoleon's intellect was now turned towards making this extraordinary economic policy effective. He had not only to devise means whereby English cottons and colonial products should not be smuggled through his extensive cordons of custom house officers, but he had to devise means of bringing the whole of the continent into his policy, for it was only on the largest scale that it could be effective. Having secured the Tsar's promise of cooperation, having a strong hold on the coasts of the Baltic and North Seas, his attention was now more closely directed to the south. Italy was his as far as the Strait of Messina, for the Treaty of Pressburg had added Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy. The papal dominions were virtually under French control. The Bourbons had been driven from Naples, where Joseph Bonaparte was installed king in 1806. The Treaty of Tilsit had given Corfu to France, and now in the winter of 1807-08 Napoleon was revolving plans whereby, acting from that island and in concert with Russia, he might arrange to partition Turkey and thence launch a Franco-Russian expedition through Persia towards India. These schemes were inordinately vast, and their execution never passed the initial stages, but leaving the eastern for the western basin of the Mediterranean, there was another detail of the Napoleonic plans that required attention, but appeared to offer little or no difficulty. Junot's march to Lisbon in the autumn of 1807 has already been noticed. Portugal had fallen without resistance, and the capital had not fired a shot to stop the paltry force that captured it. Spain appeared as rotten, as effete as Portugal. The king, Charles IV, was perhaps the most inept of all bourbon sovereigns, and to make matters worse, the queen and the favorite Godoy were little better than the king. In 1795 Spain had abandoned the struggle against the French Republic, and ever since had dragged by her side in an unconvinced and ineffective alliance. But the people and even the minister tired of French dictation, and in 1806, shortly before Gena, Godoy showed clear indications that he only awaited a favorable opportunity to turn against Napoleon. The Spaniard chose his time badly. The Corsican played his game more deliberately. He wanted the full use of the Spanish naval resources against England. He viewed with contempt the bourbon occupant of the throne. He did not contemplate as possible a serious resistance from Spain to the conqueror of Austria, Prussia and Russia. Without showing his hand very clearly, without perhaps quite deciding what his precise policy should be, he pushed on supporting columns behind Junot's army of Portugal and gradually established a considerable force in the northern provinces of Spain. In the early months of 1808, Napoleon showed his hand more clearly. A large French army was now moving towards Madrid, and Murat was given supreme command. This steadily increasing pressure applied by Napoleon proved too much for the bourbons, dislodged them from their throne. There were recriminations between Charles IV, his son Ferdinand and his minister Godoy. Popular discontent broke out. Charles IV resigned. A mob nearly massacred Godoy who was barely saved by the French troops. Murat, who had quietly installed himself at Madrid, declined to recognize Ferdinand as king, and Charles repented his hasty abdication. Father and son proceeded to Bayonne to lay their case before Napoleon, and he, by menace and cajolery, obtained from them a renunciation of their rights in his favor. Spain was now apparently his, and he appointed to its throne his brother Joseph, giving in turn that of Naples to Murat. It was on the 5th of May that the renunciation of his crown by Charles IV gave Napoleon Spain with a stroke of the pen. But the people of Madrid had demonstrated that they were no willing parties to the shameful transaction of their king three days earlier. A street insurrection broke out which Murat subdued with much trouble and punished severely. It was the precursor of a national rising continued for five years, and that ended in success. France had hitherto conquered by means of a national army. She was now to be met with the same arm she had so triumphantly used and abused. French troops were now advancing in every direction, but a provisional government organized resistance, and within a few weeks the imperial arms received the most decisive check they had yet met with. South of Madrid, the French general Dupont allowed his communications to be cut, and failing to force a passage was compelled to surrender with twenty thousand men at Bayonne, July 19. A few weeks later a similar disaster occurred in Portugal. A British force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, landed close to Lisbon, fought and defeated Juno's army, Vimiero, August 21. A capitulation was signed at Sintra a few days later, whereby the French evacuated Portugal. These unexpected reverses roused Napoleon. His army in Spain was made up mostly of new levees. He now ordered several corps of the Grande Armée to leave their cantonments in Germany for the peninsula. Other corps were formed in France and hurried to the frontier, and Napoleon determined to take command in person. He joined his troops in November. They were then concentrated between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, faced by several Spanish armies, for the most part poorly drilled, insufficiently equipped, and miserably led. A few rapid strokes to the right and left shattered resistance, and Napoleon marched irresistibly on Madrid, which he entered on the 4th of December. This first success was elusive. There were several peculiarities that rendered campaigning in Spain a far more difficult task than in Italy or Germany. The country was poor, and troops had to be accompanied by long convoys. The peasantry, fanaticized by the priests, took up arms, cut off detached parties, and isolated the French columns. The mountain ranges of the peninsula ran generally east and west, that is across the line of invasion, making movements slow and arduous, and affording continuous openings for rapid flank attacks up the valleys. While Napoleon was marching south on Madrid, a British army under Sir John Moore was moving east from Lisbon, and nearly succeeded in striking the French line of communications in the neighborhood of Valladolid. No sooner did Napoleon realize the presence of this new enemy than he turned all his available force towards the British, and, taking command, pushed forward to attack Sir John Moore. It was now winter, and the mountain passes were covered with snow, but the French pressed on rapidly, and the British general, heavily outnumbered, hastily retreated. He eventually reached Corona after severe losses and hardships, and there succeeded in embarking his army, but lost his life in the fighting. Napoleon had not pursued the British as far as Corona. Midway, important dispatches had reached him from Paris. Handing over the command to Marshal Sou, he took a few personal attendants and galloping as fast as saddle and post-horses could carry him, unexpectedly reached his capital on the 23rd of January, 1809. Chapter 12 of Napoleon a Short Biography This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Napoleon a Short Biography by R. M. Johnston. Chapter 12 Wagrum Austrian Jealousy French Discontent Napoleon leaves Spain War with Austria Aspern and Essling Dispossession of the Pope Wagrum Peace There were two causes that brought Napoleon suddenly back from Spain to Paris, one general and widely known, the other of a more intimate and obscure character. The first of these was connected with the relations of France with the great powers of northeastern Europe. To understand it we must go back a little and pick up the thread of policy spun by Napoleon at Tilsit in 1807. With Prussia reduced to impotence and largely occupied by French troops, there were now as military factors but two powers in the northeast, Russia and Austria. The friendly advances of Napoleon to the former indicated beyond question that his policy in that quarter would turn on the balancing of these two powers, one against the other. And further, his friendship with Russia was held at Vienna to imply hostility to Austria. The inference was obvious, and told more deeply owing to the repeated humiliations Austria had met with, though Napoleon would doubtless have been pleased to remain at peace with her. From the time when Islau opened anew the possibility of shaking off the Napoleonic yoke, the cabinet of Vienna made great efforts to reorganize its army and resources. But the emperor's relations with Alexander, though outwardly friendly, had already developed slight points of friction, and in the summer of 1808 an interview between the two was arranged for the discussion of their interests. It took place at Erfurt. Here, amid much pomp, surrounded by the princes of Germany and of the French Empire, they privately debated the questions of Poland, of Prussia, of Great Britain, and in short, the whole political field from St. Petersburg to Kediz, and from Norway to India. The nature of these conferences was not generally known, and it was only a few of the best-placed and most astute observers, such as Talleyrand, who detected the fundamental incompatibility of views between Napoleon and Alexander that must, sooner or later, break down their alliance. The general opinion was that France and Russia were in perfect accord, and that jointly they could control the whole of continental Europe. In reality, the Tsar chafed at the pressure of the French Empire eastwards in Prussia, in Poland, in the Balkan peninsula. The conference at Erfurt alarmed Austria. Her statesmen were not sure that Napoleon had not given Russia a free hand against Sweden and Turkey as a price for her abstention from interfering against his carrying out some design against Austria. Was it his intention to reduce the Emperor Francis to the position of King Frederick William, or perhaps even to steal his throne as he had that of Charles IV? There was little present ground for fear, yet Austria pressed her armaments forward. Napoleon declared to Count Metternich, Austrian Ambassador at Paris, that if Austria armed she could never afford to disarm without fighting, and that war must therefore follow, and he disclaimed, probably sincerely, all hostile intention. Yet the dangerous process continued during the autumn and winter months of 1808. By the beginning of 1809 Austria had gone so far that war was inevitable, and it became clear that sooner or later Napoleon must leave Spain and return to Germany. It does not appear probable, however, that he would have abandoned the pursuit of Sir John Moore quite so precipitately as he did had there not been another matter of importance that required his presence in Paris without delay. In 1799 Bonaparte's advent to power had been eagerly supported by reasonable men of many shades of political opinion. His early steps as a ruler tended to confirm the hopes of those who looked to him to provide stability, and even if he aimed openly at personal power, yet through him was introduced such sound administration, finance, and justice as France had never known. Many therefore viewed his personal rule so far as a blessing, but the development of Napoleon's policy after the proclamation of the Empire, after Austerlitz, after Gena, and especially after Tilsit, frightened those who dared think for themselves, and whose insight was not obscured by apparent prosperity, large salaries, and unaccustomed titles. Tallerand, after long directing the ministry for foreign affairs, had held back strongly from the Tilsit policy, and had been transferred to the non-political functions of High Chamberlain. Fouché, the ex-terrorist and Jacobin, head of the secret police, thought that Napoleon was going too far, saw in the Spanish war the possibility of a personal or military disaster for the Emperor, and, ever on the lookout for political evolutions, viewed with complacency an eventual vacancy of the throne, and the possible promotion of his friend, the dashing, popular, liberal-minded, and liberal-handed Joaquin Murat, King of Naples. Nothing much was actually done, yet a political demonstration of the greatest significance occurred. For many years Tallerand and Fouché had been estranged and barely on speaking terms. One night, while Napoleon was toiling through the snow-clad passes of revolted Spain after Sir John Moore, these two important political personages made their entrance at a fashionable reception arm in arm, and ostentatiously promenaded their alliance before the astonished guests. It was a little thing, and yet it was a great one. For Tallerand and Fouché were the two most delicate political weathercocks in France, and if they both veered together it was safe to conclude there was something in the wind. So Napoleon thought as he spurred and galloped back to Paris. He publicly disgraced Tallerand. He privately admonished Fouché, but continued to employ him. But though on the surface this was the close of the incident, there can be little doubt when the course of events is noted that Napoleon now had brought into stronger prominence before him than ever the perplexing question of the imperial succession. He was now the most powerful sovereign of Europe. He had already established his fame as the greatest legislator and conqueror of history. Yet two of his subjects could venture to suggest publicly that they and not he might eventually decide to whom his magnificent empire should revert. Josephine could not give him an heir. He had no faith in the power of any of his brothers to retain his throne. Yet he could not live forever, more especially if continually exposing his life to the dangers of the battlefield. It was in no pleasant mood that Napoleon now faced the fast-approaching war with Austria, a war he did not seek, from which he could gain little, and that interfered with the completion of the conquest of Spain. It came at the last somewhat unexpectedly. On the 10th of April 1809 the Archduke Charles crossed the Bavarian frontier, announcing in his proclamations that Austria was championing the cause of European liberty and calling on all Germans to rise against their oppressors. It was making the courageous stand of the people of Spain a text for all the nations of Europe. For a few days the Archduke held a great strategic advantage, and had he pressed forward among the scattered French corps would probably have won considerable successes. Napoleon hurried on from Paris, and by a series of rapid maneuvers which he always considered the most brilliant he ever carried out, concentrated his corps, forced the passage of the Isar and brought to the Archduke to a general engagement at Ekmul. The interest of these operations depends on an examination too minute and lengthy to be followed out here. All that it will be possible to say is that at Ekmul the Archduke Charles was severely defeated and Napoleon found himself, as after Ulm, on the high road to Vienna. On the 10th of May occurred a slight incident of which the interest is of a character rarely to be found in the life of Napoleon. The French had arrived in front of Vienna, and although the Archduke Charles with the great mass of the Austrian army was on the further bank of the Danube, there was an attempt at resistance. The invaders brought artillery into position and opened fire on the city. Napoleon was now informed that the young Archduchess Maria Louisa had not been able to leave the palace owing to illness. He immediately gave orders to have the guns trained in another direction. He probably little guessed that the princess for whom he showed this consideration would, in less than twelve months, be empress of the French. The resistance of Vienna was not serious, and the French army quickly occupied it. While Napoleon was maturing a plan for crossing to the north side of the Danube, whence the Archduke Charles was watching his movements with a large army, he issued a decree annexing Rome to the empire May 17. The army was now moved a few miles east of Vienna. Bridges were constructed, and on the 21st the leading brigades began to deploy on the further bank between the villages of Aspern and Essling. At this point desperate fighting took place during the 21st and 22nd. The Archduke Charles attacked in force. The French numbers on the northern bank gradually increased until, on the second day, a rise of the Danube broke down the bridges. Then it became a question of whether the French could hold their ground. While engineers worked desperately to re-establish communications, Lawn and Messena held the Austrians at bay with dogged obstinacy, fought on till night, and thus enabled the troops to retreat in safety. But Napoleon had lost twenty-five thousand men, including Marshal Lawn, who was mortally wounded at the close of the day, and whatever excuses there might be to offer, he had been defeated by the Archduke Charles. The French army had now retreated from the northern bank into the large island of Lobau, and the marshals whom Napoleon consulted were all of opinion that the retreat should be continued to Vienna or at all events to the southern bank. Napoleon's decision admirably illustrates a cardinal principle of strategy. It is nearly invariably the rule that, of two armies, one is attacking the other defending. One has the offensive, the other the defensive. So long as that relation holds, the army on the offensive has the move. That is, it may within certain limits choose a line of operations which its opponent is compelled to devise methods to defend. The offensive, in the hands of a competent general, is an immense military advantage to be retained at any cost, and for this reason Napoleon decided to keep his army in the island of Lobau rather than seek safety on the southern bank of the Danube. For in that position he still threatened Aspern and Essling, which the Archduke could not abandon. But had he fallen back, then the offensive would have passed to the enemy, and he would have been obliged to reply to whatever move the Archduke chose to make. Napoleon therefore remained cooped up with his army in the island of Lobau, while the Austrians daily entrenched themselves along his front. The Czech was not unlike that at Islau, and all Europe was eagerly on the watch for several weeks to see what the next move would be. The opponents of Napoleon plucked up courage. The more so as Sir Arthur Wellesley was once more operating in Portugal and had defeated Sule at Oporto. Germany appeared on the point of rising. The dispossessed Pope fulminated a degree of excommunication against his spoilers and had to be removed from Rome as a prisoner. A British fleet and army occupied the island of Ischia in the Bay of Naples and threatened Joachim Murat in his capital. Once more, as at Austerlitz, as at Friedland, Napoleon cleared a threatening situation by a great military stroke. At the northwest corner of the island of Lobau where his bridges had been established opposite the heavily fortified Austrian lines at Aspern and Essling, he placed his largest guns and opened a fierce bombardment. He wanted the Austrians to believe that he intended forcing their position by a frontal attack. In the meanwhile secret preparations were made for another move. On the night of the 4th of July, bridges were rapidly thrown over the Danube from the lower or southeastern end of the island, and in the early hours of the 5th the army had got a footing on the northern bank in the Marchfeld, thus turning the Archduke's position at Essling. The Austrians changed front and during that day there was considerable fighting between the two armies. On the 6th was fought the memorable battle of Wagrum, in which about 250,000 men were engaged. The Austrians, having abandoned their Essling-Aspurn position, had now fallen back a few miles to the west. Napoleon faced them and made dispositions not dissimilar to those that had given him such a complete victory at Austerlitz. The Archduke's right was extended towards the Danube, nearly opposite Vienna, and it was clearly to his interest not to be driven back at this point. There was a further incitement to strengthen this wing, because if the opposite wing of the French could be made to give away, Napoleon's line of retreat through the island of Lobaut would be compromised. The Emperor, divining his opponent's thoughts and relying on his own numerical superiority, decided to encourage the Archduke to attack this part of his line, but placed Messena the most resolute and resourceful of all the marshals in command. In the meantime, the French right under Davoust strongly attacked the Austrian left. The Archduke Charles met with some measure of success at first, though pressed by Davoust on his left, his centre held its ground, and his right was slowly driving back Messena. As success began to appear possible on this part of the field, the Austrian supports were gradually pushed out from the centre towards the right, until at last Napoleon judged the moment had come for the decisive movement. A battery of 120 guns was suddenly massed within short range of the Austrian centre. Bernadotte and MacDonald were pushed forward, and the Archduke found his line too weak to resist. His right wing was in the greatest danger of being cut off and separated, and there was no alternative but to order a retreat along the whole line. He drew off his army, defeated, but far from routed. Some 50,000 men were killed and wounded, the losses being fairly equally divided, but though beaten the Austrians left behind them practically no prisoners. Shortly afterwards an armistice was concluded, and for the fourth time Austria accepted defeat at the hands of Napoleon. This was recorded in the Treaty of Chonbrun, whereby she lost with other territory Trieste and Illyria, thus becoming an inland power. But however humbled and weakened for the moment, an unexpected event a few months later gave the House of Habsburg renewed importance in the politics of Europe. That event must be discussed in the next chapter. End of Chapter 12. Recording by Linda Johnson Chapter 13 of Napoleon A Short Biography This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Wilson Ames, Iowa Napoleon A Short Biography by R. M. Johnston Chapter 13 The Austrian Marriage and the Campaign of Russia Dynastic question. Napoleon marries Maria Luisa, jealousy of Russia, causes for war, preparations, campaign of Russia, Borodino, Moscow, the retreat. Having concluded the Treaty of Chonbrun with Austria, Napoleon left Vienna for France, but he returned in a far different mood to that in which he had returned from Tilsit in 1807. Then an unclouded series of successes lay behind him, and before him arose great schemes that were to lead to the glorious day when Great Britain should be at his feet. But now his preoccupations were on a smaller scale, for the security of his own throne shared his thoughts with the overthrow of his hated enemy. There were many reasons for the Emperor's dissatisfaction. The defeat of Austria had proved a harder task than ever before. At Essling, the Archduke Charles had claimed a victory. At Valgram he had withdrawn his army from the field virtually intact. In Spain too, a British general was proving more than a match for the best marshals of the Empire, while from one end of the peninsula to the other insurrection blazed, and King Joseph could barely maintain himself at Madrid. Greatest of all his anxieties was the dynastic question. Whose was to be the reversion of the imperial throne? The idea had long been working in his head. The question had now become an acute one. Perhaps an incident that occurred during his stay at Vienna drove him finally and reluctantly to an act that he had first contemplated on his return from Egypt in 1799. While the peace negotiations were progressing, a German student named Staps approached the Emperor as he was inspecting the guards in the court of the Palace of Schönbrunn. His movements were suspicious. He was arrested and on him was found a knife that could leave no doubt as to his intentions. Brought before Napoleon he avowed with perfect composure his intention of killing him as an enemy of the human race, and on the Emperor's asking him what he would do if he were released, he replied flagmatically that he would take the earliest opportunity of assassinating him. This courageous student was necessarily shot, but he had evoked before the Emperor the specter of revenge that underlaid German opinion, and Napoleon was profoundly affected by the incident. On his return to France his resolve was fixed. He had decided that there must be a direct heir to the Empire and he promptly announced her fate to Josephine. After a painful scene she consented to all that was asked of her and a divorce was decided on. The Pope refusing his consent a somewhat irregular form was gone through by the complacence of a committee of cardinals, but had Napoleon pronounced the decree of his own will and authority it is not likely that anyone would have dared question its efficacy. In the meanwhile it was necessary to find a suitable consort for the Emperor and the alliance between France and Russia immediately suggested the Grand Duchess Anna, sister of the Tsar. Informal overtures were made at St. Petersburg they met with doubtful answers. It appeared possible that an eventual no would be the result and this was an affront Napoleon could not bear to face. Just at this delicate moment Austrian diplomacy now under the wary guidance of Count Metternich succeeded in suggesting the Archduchess Maria Luisa who in point of age was far more suitable than the young Russian princess. Metternich whom the Emperor had liked as ambassador promptly seized the opportunity placed it beyond doubt that a favorable reply would be given to any proposal made and secured this enormous politico matrimonial prize for his master's daughter. The rapid conduct of the preliminaries, the pomp and magnificence of the ceremonies, the effusions of the French and Austrian courts, the gratification of Napoleon with his Habsburg bride, the amicable married life that ensued. All these are matters of which the details can find no space here. It is the grim reverse of the medal that must be dwelt on, the political aspects of the marriage, the so called reasons of state that made the bringing of one child into existence the cause for the destruction of hundreds of thousands of lives. Metternich had come into power at the moment when Austria had touched her lowest point. He was determined to restore her fortunes and to do that he saw clearly that she must not again bear the brunt of war but leaving that to others quietly prepared to throw in her sword when next the scale balanced and her intervention might be decisive. He followed up the French marriage closely, anxious to profit, clearly perceiving that France must lean either on Russia or on Austria and already convinced that the Tsar and Napoleon were fast drifting apart. Two new and grave causes of disagreement had arisen between France and Russia as a consequence of the war of 1809. One was the sudden manner in which Napoleon had dropped the proposal for marrying the Grand Duchess Anna. The other was of an even more serious character. At the piece of 1807 partly to reward the Poles who had long served France, partly to obtain a political support in the North East, Napoleon had formed of Prussian Poland the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the rule of his ally the King of Saxony. This was virtually reconstituting Polish independence and caused great uneasiness to the Tsar. When the war of 1809 broke out, Napoleon called on Alexander as his ally to place an army in the field. This the Tsar did but in an inefficient way that did nothing to help Napoleon's operations. The Poles of the Grand Duchy however, ably led by Polnietowski, made a strong diversion in Galicia and Napoleon duly rewarded them with a large slice of Austrian Poland when peace was signed after Wagram. Nothing could have been more calculated to alarm and alienate the Tsar who was now declaredly offended at the course of French policy. The year 1810 was not old before it was common report that a war between the two great empires must surely ensue and it appears that from that date both Napoleon and Alexander began quietly to make preparations for the gigantic struggle all felt was coming. But in its essential aspect this great war arose from Napoleon's policy of the continental blockade. For a brief moment it looked as though that policy might meet with success. In 1810 British funds fell to 65, commercial ruin appeared imminent, bread was at famine prices, the Tory cabinet was falling to pieces. Wellington's generalship probably saved his country from a humiliating peace. Driven from Spain by Masena he fell back on the lines of Torres Vedras in front of Lisbon and there successfully stopped the French advance to the sea. His foresight and strategy had turned the scale in the Spanish war for from this moment the Anglo-Spanish position grew steadily stronger and it may be said with little exaggeration that the lines of Torres Vedras mark one of the great turning points in Napoleonic history. For it was essentially the commercial necessities of the war against Great Britain that led to the rupture between France and Russia in 1812. Even in Northern Germany not withstanding armies of custom house officers repressive and inquisitive laws, wholesale burnings and destroyings, British goods still found a market though at exorbitant rates. The Baltic trade was still carried on under the neutral flag and Russia in defiance of the continued representations of the French ambassador did not defend herself very strenuously against the importation of British luxuries. The court party at St. Petersburg constantly opposed the French policy and Alexander was easily convinced that he must arm and prepare to struggle against Napoleon's dictation. In the spring of 1811 both empires were openly preparing for war yet in Paris all appeared prosperous. Never had Napoleon enjoyed the splendor of reigning as he did at this period and his last wish was gratified when on the 20th of March 1811 the Empress Marie-Louisa gave birth to a son whom he named King of Rome. The title of this ill-fated child taken from what was now the second city of the empire was reminiscent of the King of the Romans the appointed successor to the crown of the Germanic Roman Empire that Napoleon had destroyed. In the early part of 1812 came the long expected crisis in the relations of France and Russia. Napoleon summoned Alexander to carry out his obligations and exclude British commerce. Elusive answers were returned and the troops received marching orders. Napoleon had often declared that an invasion of Russia was a full hardy undertaking and that he would never as Charles the 12th had lead an army to destruction in the steps. He had always disliked the enterprise and it was only the alternative of seeing the continental blockade policy fail that drove him into it. His preparations were of the most elaborate nature the army he assembled was gigantic. In 1811 the movement of these masses from France Germany and Italy towards Poland and Russia had begun. Every little detail of organization and especially of transport received the Emperor's personal attention. Austria was summoned to affirm her alliance by placing an army in the field and sent 30,000 men to the frontier under Schwarzenberg. This body formed Napoleon's extreme right. Unfortunate pressure was compelled at the point of the sword also to furnish a body of troops which together with a French corps under the command of Marshal McDonald was to operate along the Baltic and form the extreme left. In the center came the vast hosts that Napoleon in person was to lead. The old corps of the Grande Armée under such leaders as de Voust, Ney, Udino, Sincere, Bessières, Junot, Victor. The massed cavalry, chasseurs, lancers, dragoons and cuirassiers under the king of Naples. The Westphalians under King Jerome. The Italians under Prince Eugene. The Poles under Poniatowski. The Saxons, the Bavarians, the magnificent divisions of the old and young guard with its veteran bodies of grenadiers and vultures and its superb horse artillery and cavalry. All made up a central army of more than 300,000 men. Including the flanking armies and the supports that followed the main columns, it is calculated that over 500,000 men marched into Russia that summer. As had been the case in 1807, it was well on in June before active operations became possible. Napoleon and Maria Louisa made a short stay at Dresden, capital of their ally the king of Saxony. There they met the emperor and empress of Austria with many of the princes of Germany. Thence the emperor proceeded to join his army whose columns were already converging on the Niemen. The French army crossed that river nearly 1,000 miles from the frontiers of France on the 24th of June 1812. Napoleon hoped to be opposed, to crush the Russian generals with his superior numbers and to conclude a prompt peace without advancing far. But in all this he was disappointed. The advance of the French was opposed only by Cossacks or light cavalry. The Russians showed no sign of effective resistance. On the 28th Napoleon reached Vilna and so disinclined was he to plunge further into the half-desert country beyond that he stayed there three weeks hoping for some arrangement. But Alexander gave no sign. He had long foreseen the situation that now faced him and both he and his advisors believed that Napoleon could be defeated. More than 200,000 Russians were in the field, but the Tsar had decided not to rely on his troops alone but also on the nature of his country. From the Niemen to Moscow was a distance of some 700 miles through thinly peopled steps in which supplies could only be obtained during the summer months. Moscow was nearly 2,000 miles from Paris and between them lay hostile Europe. Was it possible that Napoleon could maintain himself there? Such was the Tsar's reasoned attitude and the Russian armies were given orders not to engage but to fall back before the French advance until a favorable opportunity should arise. Finding the occupation of Vilna fruitless, Napoleon advanced into the interior of Russia and after an action with the enemy's rearguard occupied Smolensk on the 18th of August. His line was now extremely extended. His transport arrangements had broken down. The army was much disorganized. Yet against the feeling of all the marshals, he decided that the war must be brought to a conclusion by a decisive move and ordered the advance to Moscow. The Tsar now departed from his policy of retreat, for it was impossible and impolitic to resist the clamor of the Russian army to fight. It was decided to make a stand before Moscow and Kutuzov selected a strong position barring the road at Borodino on the Moskva. Here on the 7th of September the two armies met. The French numbering rather more, the Russians rather less than 120,000 men. The fighting was of a desperate character and might have ended in a decisive victory for Napoleon had he consented to employ the guard, but he probably already viewed his position so far from France with secret anxiety and would not risk impairing the efficiency of that splendid body. As it was, a bare victory was won at the frightful cost of not less than 30,000 men to each side and Kutuzov retreated during the night, leaving Moscow at the mercy of the French. Napoleon entered the ancient capital of Russia on the 14th of September and there awaited once more proposals for peace from Alexander, but they came not and Moscow itself was burned down by incendiaries. It was difficult to feed the army from day to day and the Cossacks made foraging difficult. The total of the Grande Armée after its losses in detachments and in action was barely 90,000 men. The King of Naples was hard-pressed to maintain his line of outposts against Kutuzov and suffered one severe reverse. Autumn was now nearly spent and to delay longer was madness. On the 18th of October Napoleon began his retreat. He attempted to follow a road to the south of that by which he had advanced so as to pass through country not yet wasted by war. But Kutuzov barred the way and for some days there was heavy fighting and marching. It appears probable that Napoleon could have forced a passage but he dared not draw too largely on his reserves of ammunition and abandoned the road through Kaluga to return to that by which he had advanced. Past the ghastly fields of Borodino where the remains of thousands of their unburied comrades greeted the returning troops. In the first week of November when midway to Smolensk the Grande Armée was suddenly struck by the first wave of the Russian winter. The roads became frozen sheets of ice and in a week nearly all the horses perished. The cavalry was dismounted and could no longer patrol and ward off the Cossacks. Many of the guns had to be abandoned and there was no artillery to fight a big battle. The convoy was in large part unhorsed and the army's supplies had to be abandoned. Food had been scanty enough from the first but now the soldiers had little else than what they could find in the desolate villages they had already plundered in their advance. The marauders were cut down and captured by the Cossacks and the army began to melt at a frightful rate. There was nothing to do now but to press forward giving Kutuzov no time to catch up the fugitives before they reached Smolensk. At that point were large magazines and there Napoleon hoped he would be able to restore order and perhaps take winter quarters. But the disintegration and demoralization of the starving army made such alarming progress that Napoleon was only able to stay a few hours at Smolensk. The first column of the fugitives to reach the town threw themselves on the magazines and before the last passed out it had been completely pillaged and gutted. Just beyond Smolensk Kutuzov succeeded in throwing his leading division across the road cutting off the French rearguard under Ney. The marshal succeeded in holding his ground all day crossed the neaper on the ice during the night made a long detour and finally rejoined the army a few days later. But his corps had dwindled away to less than a hundred men. The army was now reduced to some fifteen thousand men. It presented an appalling spectacle of misery and appeared doomed. At its head marched Napoleon clad in furs and supporting himself with a stick. His face covered with a beard his expressions set but curiously placid. Behind him marched a new formed corps in which the rank and file were captains or lieutenants and officers of the highest rank acted as majors and captains. Then on the road came a few harnessed wagons with the emperor's papers and war chest and behind him a long column of men in which only here and there was there any semblance of alignment or discipline. Towards the end came the stragglers unarmed limping half frozen some wandering away with ravenous looks others dropping by the roadside thus marched the army in several divisions from Smolensk westwards between Smolensk and the river Berazina a few days march distant was the most critical point of the retreat to the north of Smolensk Udenno and Victor had been operating to cover the line of communications against a Russian army under Wittgenstein. They were now retreating before him to join Napoleon with some eighteen thousand men in fair fighting condition. So here were two French armies converging on the Berazina one from the east the other from the northeast each with a superior Russian force in hot pursuit but there was a third Russian army marching from a totally different direction the south that army under the command of Chechagov was on the further side of the Berazina and reached its southern bank just in time to oppose the passage of the French to make matters worse for Napoleon the wave of cold was now spent a thaw had set in the ice was broken up and the rivers were impassable to steal a passage across the Berazina between the three converging Russian armies was now the only means of escape and Napoleon solved the problem on familiar lines he demonstrated ostentatiously at the point where he did not mean to cross and thus persuaded Chechagov to draw off his troops from the point he had decided on victors and udino's cores were drawn up so as to hold off Wittgenstein and Kutuzov and the long train of fugitives began to cross the bridges the passages closed in disaster Wittgenstein drove in the French rearguard long before the crowd of fugitives had finished crossing many of the stampeded mob were crowded into the river the Russian artillery found them an easy target and most horrible of all the French rearguard core whose efficiency made them too precious to lose received orders to force their way through to the bridge by firing on their disbanded and unarmed comrades last of all the bridges were broken down amid the despairing shrieks of the wretched beings who saw in them their only avenue to safety the tragic passage of the Berezina cost the French army about 18,000 lies roughly one half of its strength no sooner had the remnant of the army crossed than a second and more severe cold wave overtook it the Russian pursuit save that of the Cossacks was now fairly distanced but nature proved an even more terrible destroyer the few remaining thousands struggled on but hunger and cold killed the greater part every morning fewer men arose from the snowy bivouacs that had lain down the night before advancing supports fared no better than the exhausted men who had marched the whole weary way from Moscow two regiments of light horse of the Neapolitan royal guard freshly arrived from the south were nearly entirely destroyed in two nights without even seeing the enemy at Gombinin near the frontier Napoleon decided to leave the army for Paris where his presence was urgently required he handed over the command to the king of Naples and wrote the famous 29th bulletin of the Grand Armée in which he acknowledged such parts of the catastrophe that had overtaken him as it was useless to deny but in what light did that great calamity that direct and awful warning of nature as many thought it appeared to him on whose shoulders was its responsibility he closed the bulletin with the words the emperor has never been in better health the awful destruction and death and sorrow the loss of so many brave lives all counted but as an incident in the personal career of a soldier of fortune on the 6th of December the fugitives reached Vilna still numbering 20 000 men footnote the discrepancy in figures is only apparent as the army retreated it picked up some detachments left in garrison and met others advancing from the base end of footnote when marshal ney the bravest of the brave musket in hand brought the rear guard into königsberg some days later he counted less than 1000 men under arms end of chapter 13 recording by jeffrey wilson aims iowa chapter 14 of napoleon a short biography this is a libervox recording all libervox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libervox.org recording by russel newton napoleon a short biography by r.m. johnson chapter 14 the struggle for germany and italy 1813 effects of the russian catastrophe lutsin and bachsen austrian intervention dresden leipzig mirat and italy the great catastrophe of russia had a two-fold effect material and morale it destroyed the veteran army that had for so long imposed its master's will on the continent and it broke the spell of invincibility that had so often paralyzed napoleon's enemies schwarzenberg who had done little or nothing concluded a military convention with the russian general and withdrew his troops the prussians serving under mcdonald deserted him and before many weeks had passed the prussian government plucked up enough courage to approve this course officially signed a treaty of alliance with russia kelish february 27 and declared war the king of napoles soon abandoned his trust as commander-in-chief to return to his capital and prince eugene and prince eugene who assumed command then gradually withdrew the small army he had collected from the vestula to the odor and then from the odor to the elb his numbers were quite insufficient to meet the russians and prussians in the field meanwhile napoleon in paris was making gigantic efforts to retrieve his impaired fortunes new levies were raised amounting for the whole year 1813 to over a million men women children and old men did the work of the fields while every able-bodied man and boy was seized by the conscription passed through the barricade armed uniformed and marched on the road to germany by the month of april napoleon once more had a large army across the rine rapidly advancing to join that of prince eugene the emperor took command in person and pushed on toward leipzig he affected his junction with the prince and was preparing to march on berlin when he was attacked in flank by the russians and prussians under vittgenstein and blusher at lutsin made two here a great battle was fought and the french conscripts astonished their generals and brought victory back to the imperial standards but lutsin was a hard fought field barely one and napoleon's lack of cavalry prevented his impeding the retreat of the allies three weeks later another battle was fought with much the same results at bottson in the pursuit that followed induced salasia napoleon once more sadly missed an efficient force of cavalry and on the fourth of june he agreed to an armistice that gave him saxony and the line of the elb he hoped by this means to gain time to bring up his strength in men and horses but as events turned out the suspension of a hostilities proved more to the advantage of the allies during this armistice came the news of wellington's decisive victory at vittoria which drove the french from spain and austria notified france that she was prepared to offer her mediation with a view to peace as soon as metternich had realized the magnitude of the disaster that had overtaken the french army in russia he determined to prepare to take advantage of it but advance with prudence the austrian army was rapidly increased and placed on a war footing and after many hesitations due to the timidity of the emperor frances austria finally put forward her conditions these were broadly that the great duchy of war saw should be abolished that prussia should regain her boundaries of 1805 that the confederation of the rine should be dissolved and that austria should regain trust and del masia there followed interviews between napoleon and metternich extensions of the armistice a peace congress at prog but the emperor never meant to accept peace he was only negotiating to gain time the upshot was that austria on her mediation failing joined the allied powers on the 10th of august hostilities were resumed and napoleon now had to face an austrian army of 200 000 men besides those of russia prussia and sweden or sweden had now joined the allies marshal bernadote had been elected crown prince three years before and now led her army while another frenchman general maro had left the united states and joined the staff of the zhar alexander even marat sick of the war and anxious for his throne had been engaged in negotiations with austria while the french army was utterly dispirited and longed for peace the marshals were weary and entreated the emperor to accept reasonable conditions the conscripts mutilated themselves by thousands so as to be sent home yet napoleon's relentless energy drove his army to victory once more at dresden on the 27th of august the austrians under schwarzenberg were heavily defeated largely owing to the king of naples brilliant leadership of the french right then followed a series of inconclusive maneuvers and partial engagements in which the allies were constantly successful against the detached french troops the weather was inclement the country exhausted and the french army was reduced to some 200 000 men while that of the allies had gradually increased to more than double that figure germany was now partly in arms and as success appeared more hopeful defection spread from one state to another north south and east of the elbe between dresden and magneburg three great allied armies nearly surrounded that of napoleon avoiding battle with them but engaging his marshals when he was absent finally on bavaria joining the allies schwarzenberg moved from bohemia westwards and threatened to strike at the mayans leipzig road in napoleon's rear the emperor now divided his army one half marched northwards under his own orders for a stroke at blusher or bernadoc the other under the king of naples was left to contain schwarzenberg napoleon failed in his attempt to bring the prusso russians or swedes to an engagement and fell back towards leipzig at the same time the king of naples retired towards the same point pressed hard by schwarzenberg's superior numbers all the armies were now converging from south east and north on leipzig 150 000 french 300 000 allies and on the 16th and 18th of october a decisive battle was fought there the french placed in a semicircle fought on the defensive but were slowly and surely driven back a dramatic incident marked the second day's fighting when a corps of saxon troops left their position in the french lines and went over to the enemy on the night of the 19th napoleon though hard pressed and driven back still held positions covering the town but he was virtually defeated and had not enough ammunition in hand to continue the struggle orders for a retreat were therefore issued but to leave leipzig by the road to mayans a bridge over the elster had to be crossed this was insufficient for the passage of the army and napoleon bent as ever on the offensive had neglected to make provision for a retreat on the morning of the 19th the last french corps were caught in the trap and the bridge was blown up when 30 000 men or more were still on the further bank probably napoleon's total losses at leipzig did not fall far short of 60 000 men and a few weeks later the army he led back across the rine only numbered about 70 000 an incident of this retreat must now be mentioned that will lead to a digression on the affairs of italy hitherto somewhat neglected a few days after leaving leipzig wakime murat suddenly left headquarters and traveling post haste returned to naples where he arrived in the first week of november murat like nearly every one of napoleon's generals was heartily sick of war and now considered the emperor irretrievably defeated he hoped for a prompt piece but was anxious whatever happened to maintain his own position as king of naples if fighting were to continue this could only be done so he thought either by treating with the allies or in another way one that opens up a large an interesting question of policy by various consecutive steps by the creation of the kingdom of italy by the conquest of the kingdom of naples by the absorption of the states of the church napoleon had brought all the peninsula of italy under his rule for the first time since the days of rome italyans from north and from south fought under the same flag obeyed similar laws were governed by the same system and this too was the work of a man of italyan race the designation he had chosen for his lombard provinces the declarations he had made during the campaign of 1796 the title he had given his son were all indications of a possible creation of an italyan nationality now the germany and spain were lost now that victorius austria was on the point of invading her lost provinces south of the alps the question arose how were they to be defended prince eugene vice-royal of italy had been sent to assume command of such troops as could be collected but his army was small there was no public spirit behind him and the king of naples persistently declined to move his troops to assist the prince mirat wanted to do one of two things either to obtain a guarantee of his throne from austrian great britain or to obtain from napoleon a declaration creating italy one and giving him the command of her combined and now national resources in the latter case he made sure that joining his troops to those of the vice-roy and supported by the nationalist sentiment of the people he could successfully resist any austrian invasion appealing both to metternich and napoleon he found the former willing the latter unwilling to treat the dream of italy unity faded and mirat turned traitor to his old colors by signing a treaty of alliance with austria on the 11th of january 1814 at that date the austrians had already occupied venetia to the south of the alps while to the north they had crossed the rhine and were marching on paris chronology second of may 1813 lutsin 21st of may bottson 4th of june and 10th of august armistice 21st of june wellington successful at victoria 26th of august dresden 16 through 18 of october leipzig end of chapter 14 chapter 15 of napoleon a short biography this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org recording by russell newton napoleon a short biography by r.m. johnson chapter 15 the campaign of france napoleon's last defense saint disier brion la rothier montmoray leon chattin fall of paris abdication the final scene at fountain blue driven from russia in 1812 from germany in 1813 napoleon was now in 1814 preparing to defend france yet peace had always been within his reach and even after so many disasters when the allies were mustering half a million of men on the frontiers of exhausted france she might still have retained the natural frontiers won by the republic the alps and the rine during the last few months negotiations proceeded at frankfort and chalance but beneath the diplomatic superficialities and wranglings was the unmistakable fact that napoleon was always thinking of victory rather than of peace he aimed at regaining the whole of his position and would not accept a diminished portion he was the man of success and could not acknowledge defeat his strategy usually so sound was weakened by the extravagant possibilities of victory his ardent imagination evoked he forgot that soldiers were not machines always equally responsive to their drivers in pulsion and believed that by military means such as his genius could devise he could plant the french eagles once more in berland and on the vestula to retain his hold on germany he'd left 150 000 men in her fortresses from dresden to hamberg and danzig these were now swallowed up and useless while in france there were not enough soldiers to guard the rine the remnants of the army that had retreated from leitzig had been distributed along the frontier but typhus broke out among the troops and caused immense losses when the austrians prussians and russians some 200 000 strong crossed the rine at the beginning of 1814 they met with no resistance and slowly advanced into a country where there was apparently no army to oppose them to understand the extraordinary military events that followed a glance at the accompanying map is necessary harris was the objective of the allies and there were three converging routes by which they might advance the first of these ran southeast from the rine through namur and leon the second starting from points on the rine between mayans and basal followed roads converging about vitri and chalons and then took the valley of the marne to the capital the third was parallel to the second and to the south of it following the valley of the sin as the campaign opened the great force of the allies under the supreme command of schwarzenberg accompanied by the emperors of austria and russia and the king of prussia had reached the marne and signed unopposed blueshare with 70 000 prussians and russians was on the northern road schwarzenberg with 150 000 austrians on the southern napoleon had now collected about 50 000 men mostly raw recruits at chalons and marked rapidly up the marne valley striking blueshares advance from saint disier on the 27th of january fears fighting followed and blueshares unable to hold his ground retreated abandoning the line of the marne and marching south toward schwarzenberg napoleon followed hard overtook and surprised the prussians at brigham on the 29th and there once more drove them off the field and here it may be as well to note the peculiar advantage napoleon had in this campaign he was fighting on his own ground the name of brigham has once before appeared in this history for here it was that napoleon had passed most of his schoolboy days how little could he foresee then that he would one day surprise and nearly capture a prussian commander-in-chief in the old chateau where he had investigated the initial mysteries of mathematics and literature but the austrians were now at hand on the day following his defeat at brigham blueshare affected his junction with schwarzenberg napoleon determined to make an attempt to bar their advance he selected a strong position at laratier and there fought a desperate defensive battle against immensely superior numbers on the first of february making up for his lack of infantry and cavalry by employing and risking the loss of immense batteries he made a gallant defense and at nightfall was still maintaining the fight but the french army had lost too severely and was too exhausted to renew the engagement and in the night napoleon retreated down the valley of the san eventually taking position at nojant he was now extremely dejected and it may be that for a few days at this time his instructions to calling court for negotiating a peace were sincere but the aspect of affairs soon changed the victory at laratier made blueshare and schwarzenberg lose sight of the extraordinary and indomitable resource of their enemy the original scheme was resumed and blueshare returned to the valley of the marne leaving schwarzenberg to follow that of the san from nojant napoleon eagerly watched their movements with a detached core he demonstrated in schwarzenberg's front and delayed his advance then timing his march with marvelous precision he suddenly moved north towards the valley of the marne blueshare was advancing westward along the road that follows that valley there being about three days march between his front and rear divisions on the 10th of february napoleon struck this long column at its center destroying that and turning right and left in the course of the next two days completely shattered the prussian army the principal engagements being fought at champeau bear mon moray and vaux champs blueshare beat a disordered retreat and napoleon was so elated at his brilliant success that he confidently declared that one more such victory would carry the french arms to central germany but while this fighting was proceeding in the valley of the marne schwarzenberg had pushed up on the valley of the san and was now getting threateningly near paris the emperor could not pursue blueshare but fell back near the capital to watch the austrian movements and decided to try against schwarzenberg the same strategy that has succeeded so well against blueshare he rapidly transferred his army from the valley of the marne to the valley of the san once more struck the austrian line of advance in flank and severely handled their columns in a series of engagements of which those at nangas and montereau only need be mentioned february 17 to 22 on the 23rd of february napoleon had advanced as far as treyas and schwarzenberg was falling back in full retreat these wonderfully brilliant results this appearance of success proved elusive the reinforcements sent from paris to the army barely sufficed to fill the gaps caused by casualties disease and the wholesale desertions of the conscripts there was a dearth to of muskets and the withdrawal of troops from the southern army under sole had enabled wellington to get a foothold north of the pyrenees while napoleon though successful saw his strength decrease the defeated allies were being daily reinforced a large number of fresh troops had now joined blueshare while other corps had begun operations in the direction of leon and after much hesitation and debate the assembled monarchs statesmen and generals of the allies decided that the march on paris must be resumed blueshare once more advanced down the valley of the marne and this time reached mio before napoleon could arrest his movement no sooner however had blueshare realized that the emperor was once more nearing his flank then he hastily crossed to the further bank of the marne march 3rd and retreated towards the north napoleon pursued and maneuvered to surround the prussians but was unsuccessful partly owing to the advance of fresh allied corps down the nemyr leon paris road on the 7th a severe action was fought at crayon with little result blueshare however retreated and on the 9th at leon once more offered battle and this time with success napoleon was severely defeated and retreated to reims still hoping for success however and learning that schwarzenberg was again on the march for paris he left reims and marched hurriedly southward to attack the austrians once more on the 20th of march the french advance guard came into contact with an austrian column at arcy's suaub soon the whole of napoleon's little army was in action but the emperor discovered when it was too late to disengage himself that it was not an isolated austrian corps but the whole of schwarzenberg's army that faced him the odds were too great and though napoleon rode through the fiercest fire apparently courting death he could not avert a crushing defeat beaten by both prussians and austrians his army shattered all hope of success now seemed lost but napoleon played one last desperate card instead of retreating towards paris he issued orders for the army to march northeast toward the rine his object was to base himself on the frontier fortresses to sweep aside the allied forces blockading them and to operate against schwarzenberg's and blueshares lines of communications it was a defensible move from a strictly military point of view but it was feeble politically for there was now a bourbon movement forming and napoleon had driven france to such a pass that peace would have appeared a cheap blessing to nearly all men at any cost at paris was a weak government the empress the king of roam joseph bonaparte with few troops little hope and no ability an occupation of the city would mean the proclamation of the bourbons and the downfall of napoleon detaching a large force of cavalry to mask his movements schwarzenberg risked his line of communications pushed straight on for paris affected his junction with blueshares in the neighborhood of meo and on the 29th of march arrived under the walls of the capital one day earlier napoleon and doulevin realized that his manure had not drawn his opponents from their objective and that paris was in imminent danger he decided to start for the capital he traveled post haste taking a southerly route by the sand valley leaving the army to follow him on the evening of the 30th he reached fountain blue with his few attendants where he received reports that heavy fighting had been going on before paris and that it had capitulated he continued his journey and a few miles further on met the troops that had just left the city by the terms of capitulation general belliard urged him to give up all thought of proceeding and he turned back to fountain blue where he took up his quarters in the palace the game had been played out to the bitter end and napoleon had lost he could still muster 50 thousand men at fountain blue and for a day or two he threatened to continue the struggle but france was fast turning from him a provisional government of which the chief member was tally ran had proclaimed the restoration of the bourbons and even the marshals were anxious to put an end to the frightful 18 months drama that had cost a million lives and that had shaken their allegiance to their old comrade and emperor the hard facts of the situation were too great for even napoleon to conquer and on the fourth of april he signed a formal abdication a week later he concluded a personal treaty with the allies whereby he was granted the sovereignty of the little island of elba off the coast of tuscany the title of emperor and an annual revenue of two million francs payable by the french government while these negotiations were proceeding the new king louis the 18th had made his entry into paris surrounded by a group of marshals all wearing the white cockade of the bourbons on the 20th of april napoleon's traveling carriage was ready for his conveyance as soon as one last ceremony should have been duly accomplished a few hundred veterans the remains of the old guard were drawn up in the courtyard of the palace for the last parade for the last farewell then at last emotion broke down the indomitable courage the pitiless intellect of the great captain when in front of that splendid setting of presented bayonets and somber faces grim under the tall bearskins he saw the tattered tricolor the flag of lodi of morango of australitz lowered to him for the last time he was suddenly overpowered and seizing the glorious symbol he buried his head in its folds and sobbed that dramatic scene portended much for it was not only the emperor napoleon whom the bourbons were displacing but also napoleon the child of the revolution their white standard had displaced not only the flag of the empire but that of the republic chronology 27 january 1814 st dizier 29 january brian first february larothier 10 february champeau bear 13 february mon marie 17 february nanges seventh of march crayon nine of march leon 13 march 1814 wellington enters bordeaux 20th march rc sueau 30th march paris capitulates fourth of april abdication of napoleon 11th of april treaty of fountain blue end of chapter 15 chapter 16 of napoleon a short biography this is a libervox recording all libervox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libervox.org recording by russell newton napoleon a short biography by r.m. johnson chapter 16 elba return of the bourbons congress of vienna french dissatisfaction napoleon leaves elba his progress to paris changed situation attitude of the powers champ de mai the return of the bourbons which few men thought possible a month before it happened changed the whole aspect of the events that had brought it about it was now clearly perceived that the triumph of the allies meant more than the fall of napoleon and that the autocratic system challenged by the revolution modified by the empire was to be reasserted the powers were now intent on readjusting the territorial divisions of europe on such a footing as the old order of things and their recent successes appeared to make suitable but it was soon found not unnaturally that it would be a difficult matter to settle satisfactorily the numerous points at issue it was therefore decided to call a congress of the great powers at which every outstanding european question should be determined this congress eventually assembled at vienna its first meeting taking place on the 20th of september of the different questions discussed by the powers two appeared likely to lead to difficulties the first of these concerned the parceling out of northeastern germany especially saxony and poland this question created such antagonism that austria opposing russia and prussia finally entered into a secret tree of alliance with france and great britain there seemed in fact a strong prospect of a new european war the question of naples also gave rise to much difficulty marat's course of action during the campaign of 1814 on the po had been nearly as unsatisfactory to the allies as to napoleon and now the two restored bourbon kings of france and of spain were making every effort to get their kinsmen ferdan and reinstated at naples marat prepared for war hoped to take advantage of the apparently approaching conflict between austria and russia and towards the end of february 1815 chose the bold course of directly challenging the recognition of france meanwhile what had become of napoleon the island of elba in which he was cooped up was far too small to hold so great a man this sign had been generally felt immediately after the signing of the treaty that sent him there and proposals had been put forward by bourbon partisans for his removal to the azores and even more distant points it is not credible that napoleon would have ever become reconciled to his diminutive domain it is not credible that even without provocation he would have abstained from once more taking part in that great game of politics that every instinct prompted him to yet he did receive direct provocations that partly excuse the course he eventually adopted he had heavy expenses to meet in elba for no sooner there than he began to improve roads and ports to develop mines to infuse such animation in the island as it had never known he had a thousand veterans in his service whom he had been allowed to keep for his personal protection and these had to be maintained yet he could get no payment of the revenue secured to him by the treaty of fountain blue there was even a worse grievance than this his wife and his son were denied him maria luisa had left paris with the king of roam at the approach of the allies she had retired to blois and had thought of joining napoleon at fountain blue but she hesitated and presently men and persuaded her into various steps that gradually drew her under her father's influence keeping her away from fountain blue men and eventually persuaded her to vienna he placed as special diplomatic representative near her a dashing amiable and skillful negotiator general count neberg who was destined never to leave her and eventually to marry her in the first few weeks after the abdication of the emperor correspondence passed between him and the empress and she showed some sign of attempting to join him at elba as he desired later as metternix hold tightened the correspondence was intercepted and at last dropped as napoleon brooded over his disasters his mistakes and his wrongs he was silently but intently watching the proceedings of the congress of vienna on the one hand the state of public opinion in france on the other in france the all-important factor was the army as it had been for 20 years past the peace had set free thousands of seasoned soldiers who returned from every part of europe to find their old flag hauled down and a new government in power little inclined to give them employment or help it was inevitable that louis the 18th should reduce the strength of the army it was equally inevitable that such a step should lead to discontent thousands of officers were placed on half pay in 1816 they numbered over 16 000 which meant a trifling allowance rising from 44 francs a year for lieutenants among these old soldiers the feeling against the bourbons was doubly bitter and not a few openly declared their hope that one whom from his favorite flower they called la paire la violette would soon come to their rescue there was another active section of the population militant ex jacobins politicians republicans also actively opposed to the bourbons and pushing eagerly towards a change of government probably the great mass of the people was content to be at peace once more and was not loyal to the new monarch and all events opposed to change yet it is the active section and not the great mass that generally affects a revolution towards the close of february then it was confidently expected in high political quarters that a war was about to break out in northeastern europe and napoleon judged that france was ripe to revolt against the bourbons he determined to risk all and turn that revolt to his profit on the 25th of february he embarked his handful of soldiers in several small vessels set sail happily escaped the observation of the british cruisers and on the first of march disembarked at con turning away from the royalist towns of the coast of province napoleon at once marched north at the head of his little column into the mountains towards savoy on the fifth nearing granobal the result of his adventure was settled troops had been sent to arrest him and were discovered in position barring the road napoleon took with him 40 grenadiers their muskets reversed and advanced on foot when near the opposing line he threw open his long gray coat showing his well-known uniform and the red ribbon of the legion of honor when the soldiers saw once more that little stout man with the square head and piercing eye their companion their leader who had planted the glorious flag that was carried behind him in every capital of europe they could resist no longer someone in the ranks shouted vive lempele the line broke out into vehement cheers and the soldiers crowded around napoleon tearing the hated white cockades from their shackles that scene was repeated with variations at every point at which the emperor met his old soldiers between granobal and paris cerno lebedo yeah his former aid to camp ordered the drums of his regiment to be broken open and drew from that receptacle where they had been sacredly treasured the old flag and the tricolor cockades at leon a large army under mcdonald's orders melted away at the first distant glimpse of the magician attired in the gray coat and little cocked hat louis the 18th in despair entrusted the guard to ney and that marshal declared he would cage the usurper but long before napoleon arrived the contagion had outstripped him and ney and the guard were his long before they met him the emperor accomplished the last stages of his journey in a carriage attended by nothing more than half a dozen polish lancers louis the 18th fled from paris on the 20th of march and a few hours later napoleon entered the capital unescorted and as secure as though he had never left it his arrival at the palace of the tulalis occasioned a remarkable scene it will serve to explain the peculiar quality of that demonstration if the experience of one of the eyewitnesses be recalled general thibault who had fought through all the wars of the republican empire had never been a zealous bonapartist rather the reverse he had accepted the return bourbons and carried out his duty in opposing napoleon's return deserted by his troops he had quietly returned to his house in paris with the firm intention of taking no further active share in the events of the day but the arrival the personality of napoleon was in the air people was restless and decided after dining that he would go out and indulge in a short walk at first he resolutely turned his steps in the opposite direction to the tularis but presently the irresistible magnet began to draw soon he found himself one of a great throng of old soldiers and citizens hurrying to the palace gates presently a traveling carriage drove up in the midst of a hurricane of cheers a wild dash was made for it and from the midst of the turmoil napoleon appeared was hoisted in strong arms from one step to another up to his old apartments on the first floor of the tularis and thibault was one of the crowd and cheering as wildly as the others that night a volunteer guard of general officers did sentry duty at the emperor's door but within a day or two everything had fallen back into the old imperial routine superficially all was the same in reality napoleon's position was vastly changed even about his person many familiar faces were missing berthier who as chief of staff had never left his side since 1796 did not choose to join him now and soul was appointed to that arduous post prince eugène who had taken up his residence in the dominions of his father-in-law the king of bavaria showed no desire to return to paris josephine the wife the friend of early and of late days whom he frequently visited since the divorce and still preferred to all others had died at the malmeson shortly after the abdication and the old home of consular days was deserted tally ran was in vienna upholding the bourbon interests and there helped to define the position of napoleon in a proclamation that was less to the credit of the powers than a confession of the genius of their opponent the assembled monarchs and diplomatists of europe solemnly proclaimed that napoleon was an outlaw outside the pale of social and civil relations and liable to public vengeance it was in plain words an incitement to assassination and showed that the struggle was to be of a new character that negotiation was out of the question and that war must be to the death napoleon on his side declared with more or less sincerity that he was anxious for peace that he intended to abide by the treaties that had closed the war of 1814 and that his return to the throne was merely an incident of internal policy that concerned the french people and himself at the same time he lost not an hour in preparing for hostilities but the greatest change in the position of napoleon was that in his relation to french liberalism before his landing at con a republican revolution was thought to be imminent by many and if he had profited by the agitation and converted it to his own uses he was nonetheless bound to base his position on popular support and to reckon with the leaders of the liberal party he was repeating brumaire but with the weaker case how far the internal necessities of his position carried him may be judged from the fact that one of his earliest measures march 24th was to remove the restrictions on the press this was followed by the selection of two pronounced liberals carno and constant as ministers and by the announcement that the constitution would be amended in a particular direction on the 22nd of april the constitutional changes were announced the most important was that the legislative body or lower house was to be elected by the direct vote of the people in the meanwhile matters looked daily more like war and the stability of the remarkable evolution of french political institutions marked by the return of napoleon was felt to be really dependent on the event of the approaching military operations if there was one sovereign whom napoleon might hope to detach from the european alliance it was his father-in-law the emperor of austria but as it happened his were the first troops engaged mirad had closed his wranglings with the powers by a stroke of despair and immediately after napoleon's departure from elba had ordered his army into northern italy he was opposed by austria after a short campaign he was completely defeated at tolentino his army disbanded and the austrians occupied naples proclaiming ferdinand mirad escaped to the south of france where he arrived just as napoleon was on the point of leaving paris to assume command of the french army for the last time on the first of june there was held a great ceremony known in defiance of all chronological considerations as the champ de mai detachments from every core of the army paraded and received new flags and napoleon solemnly pronounced an oath to maintain the new constitution attired in a theatrical and unbecoming costume he delivered a speech in which he appealed strongly to national and liberal sentiment and declared that as emperor as council and as soldier his every act had been dictated by his devotion to france but these napoleonic apologetics were not of vital importance an anglo prussian army under wellington and blusher were assembled close to brussels a large austrian army under schwarzenberg was nearing the rine all russia and germany were alive with columns marching towards the french frontier here was the all-important problem to be solved could napoleon reassert his military superiority were the french soldiers in generals the equals of those of a few years before were the soldiers in generals of the allies no better than their predecessors chronology 20th september 1814 congress of vienna third january 1815 treaty of alliance austria france and great britain 25 february 1815 napoleon leaves elba one march 1815 disembarks at con 20 march 1815 arrives in paris three may 1815 marat defeated at tonantino one june 1815 shamp demi end of chapter 16