 It's a great pleasure for me to be there and to have this very, very important issue on how globalization is mutating, morphing, transforming itself, how it is in crisis, as many said. And for that we benefit from an exceptional wealth of eminent personalities, which I have to say, and it is really extraordinary to see the complementary experiences and responsibilities that we have around this panel. Let me present the members of the panel, Mazud Ahmed, president of the Center for Global Development, 35 years career in the IFIs, which is, it seems to me, a global record. And you are in a unique position. I had the privilege to work with you a lot of time, if I may, recently in various G20 groups. And I was always impressed by your talent and very deep involvement, which goes on, if I may. Bertrand Badré, managing partner and founder of Blue Like an Orange, which demonstrates some poetry behind the financier, Sustainable Capital, former managing director and CFO of the World Bank, with, again, a lot of experience and particularly, of course, experience in environment, green transition, its financing, as well as all World Bank activities. Marc Daio, former minister of trade of Korea, present on the NCO, global law firm. You participated, and you participate in the Global Trilateral Commission report on global capitalism in transition. We expect from you, of course, a lot of vision on the trade issue, which is at the heart, of course, of globalization. Thomas Gomar, director of the French E-free, most important French think tank that Thierry knows very well, and one of the most important in the world, according to the ranking of think tank. You have an unique experience in international affairs and globalization and geo-strategy, if I may. Yushi Osoya is not there, but Mati is there, and Marie is there, Marie Kivinyemi, 41 first prime minister of Finland. You served at the OECD deputy secretary general with a great determination, which was admired as you were setting up the conditions for strong and inclusive growth. You know, you're an expert in managing a country, in global governance, and in inequalities also. Maybe you could say word on inequalities. So I don't want to be long because I am asking all participants to stick to the six, seven minutes in order for us to have the appropriate dialogue with the audience. So I will be as strict as possible, but you know that. Let me only say that, as I said, this issue is really of the essence. In a way, globalization always existed when I am in Palmyra, in Petra. When I see the Silk Road, east, west, north, south trade, it started, you know, a thousand years ago. But it has formally amplified since industrial revolution and formally accelerated in the most recent period with, of course, the technology surge, IT, transportation, much lower cost. And I have to say the fall of Soviet Union and the communist world, at least to the extent that it was attached to centralized economy and not to market economy. So we have a formidable acceleration of globalization over the last 30 years. At the same time, we could see a de-globalization trend, which was, of course, also amplified and accelerated by the successive crisis that we had to cope with, but not only started before many of those crises. And the impressive observation is that it comes both from the left and the criticism of the negative externalities of market economies when they are generalized. Negative externalities in climate, negative externalities in inequalities, and that criticism is very, very powerful. On the other hand, there is also the criticism from the, I would say, right-wing sensitivities, nationalism, protectionism, populism, as we say. And that, of course, has been also terribly amplified in the most recent period of time. So under those two criticism, what can we say on globalization? And I would say some of the questions which we could consider important in the present juncture. And I would expect that the conference can be enlightened by the complementary vision of the panelists. First, can we address the negative externalities of globalization on climate, on health, on the economic and financial instabilities which were demonstrated in the last years on inequality without losing the benefit of the division of labor at a global level and all the benefit of the catching up of poor countries, developing countries, to become emerging countries and tomorrow as wealthy as the present advanced economy. And of course, this complicated question has to be, to take into account the fact that the global governance, the ideal global governance has to cope with major trends, including digitalization, including the green transition already mentioned, and of course, taking into account the fact that the present world is made of market economies, so-called, quote-unquote, capitalist economies, but with very different ideology behind, at least in the social, political dimension. Social democrat, market economies, pure liberal market economies, or more liberal market economies, state capitalism, authoritarian societies. So that complicates, it seems to me, formatively the task of the panelists to respond to the question. So I now turn to the first panelist, Mazoud, you have the floor. Thank you very much, Jean-Claude, and thank you, Thierry, for organizing this miracle. I think for many of us, it is the first in-person international event that we have attended in close to two years, so thank you for that. I want to pick up, Jean-Claude, from where you left off, and set out why, how I think the process of globalization and the management of globalization is going to become more complicated in the years to come. Let me suggest that we can think of this in terms of different forces that are going to be working not necessarily in the same direction, and which have to be balanced and managed, and I'll offer you five very quickly. The first one is economics. The law of comparative advantage has not gone away. It still suits corporations to think of having a supply chain around the world that enables them to be effective and to produce their products as cheaply as possible. Technology and trade have now expanded that into services, so you see finance, you see other areas where the same kind of globalization is happening, and there's also a huge investment that's been made in global supply chains, so it will be very difficult to unwind them even if the political forces want you to do that, so the economics is going to push us in that direction. The second big force that is going to keep pushing us is demographics. This week in Europe, there is a lot of discussion about the shortage of truck drivers and how that is holding up the transport of vital goods, but shortages of labor are going to be a feature of European life for decades to come because the labor force is shrinking, and at the same time, in other parts of the world, notably in Africa, population is growing, labor force is growing, we're going to have the population of Africa double and then increase again by the end of this century. On top of that, there's a movement of people that is going to be triggered by conflict, by environmental degradation, so the demographics are going to lead to a lot of global movement of people, and this is the one area where actually we are least developed in terms of how to manage it. Our systems are not very good at coping with the movement of people. We have developed the capacity to regulate the movement of goods, little less services, but least of all people. Now, against this, however, I would say there's also one other political objective which pushes us to globalize, and that is what I will think of as the rise of global public goods. So there's a growing recognition that our lives are impacted by events that can only be managed through global coordination. Obviously the pandemic, this is the one that becomes so clear, obviously climate change, but beyond that, if you think about AMR, you think about rules on the use of artificial intelligence, you think about cyber terrorism, biological terrorism, all of these will require rules that have to be global, at least covering a large part of the global community. At the same time, look at the difficulties we are having today in coming up with an effective global response even to the current problem of the pandemic, which shows that there are other forces that stop us from moving in response to these three factors that are pushing us to coordinate globally. And these two forces are one, the one you just raised, very much the populist backlash from left and right. So they come from very different values, their visions of society may be very different, but some of the problems are similar that drive this reaction. The inequality, it's the sense that the rules don't benefit everyone, some people get left behind, it's the sense of financial crisis, I think people are still recovering from the shock of 2008. And I would say it's also a sense of not being in control of one's own destiny, feeling that your lives are controlled by some abstract group of people or some institution with which you don't relate. And that's why it is pulled back to want to take more control. And so much of this is driven by the slogans around taking back control, putting yourself first. Of course, the evidence shows that all these attempts to take back control are more rhetorical than they are real, but rhetorical things better. And the final thing I would say, which is going to be a big force also, is the growing rivalry between the US and China. And if you sit in Washington, that's where I sit, it's very hard to escape. Just how all pervasive the rivalry with China is in thinking about policy. It makes cooperation quite hard. Give you a case in point. Last week, the White House hosted a global summit on COVID, 100 countries and partners at this summit. China is the largest producer of vaccines. It was not present at that summit. Give you another example. Some of you may have seen this statement by China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi, responding to John Kerry's plea to cooperate on climate. And I'll quote his sentence, what he said. He said, the US side hopes that climate cooperation can be an oasis in China-U.S. relations. But if an oasis is surrounded by desert, it will also become desertified sooner or later. So the big question is, how can you, how effectively can we find ways to coordinate and cooperate when the two major economies are going through a process where they are rivals in ways that are spilling over into this effort to cooperate and coordinate? So where does this leave us? We'll have a lot of discussion about where this leaves us. But let me just say, conclude by saying, I think we have to recognize that the management of globalization is going to be not simply a question of economics and finance left on its own. It has to be much more integrated into thinking about domestic and international considerations of political reality and of security, and trying to bring those things together will make the process much more complicated and will require a degree of whole of government engagement in managing the elements of globalization, which up to now we have tended to leave to some parts of government and mostly to the private sector. So let me stop with that, Joe Claude, and look forward to other comments. Thank you very, very much indeed, Masoud. It was very clear. I like very much your stress on these global public goods that we have to preserve and the fact that global governance is more and more complex with the particular political element which is stepping in. Now I turn to Bertrand, the metaphor of the oasis with the desert around that was mentioned by Masoud is a good transition to your statement, please. Thank you, thank you, Jean Claude, and merci, Thierry, for your miracle. I will echo what Masoud just said. It's great to be in presence again. Yes, we are months exactly ahead of the beginning of COP26 in Glasgow, which is supposed to be one of the key milestones on the mutation of globalization. We are a few months away from COP15 in China on biodiversity and nature, which is another key milestone in our way to mutate globalization in the right direction. So let me focus on one of the lubricants of globalization. The question we are facing is, has finance changed for real, or is it just another folk that is covering basically something that has not really changed? Everybody is talking about green finance, sustainable finance, ESG, etc. You can't open a newspaper without any reference to these terms. And it seems in a way too good to be true. And so my question today is, because this will be a key ingredient, if we really want to change in the direction that was highlighted by Jean Claude and Masoud, are we basically on track or not? Let me make three points to be brief to open first. We now realize that the choices that we collectively made and endorsed, actually, we all signed, including the US back now in the climate agreement in 2015, so in particular, the adoption of the sustainable development goals in September 2015 in New York, and the adoption of the climate objectives in Paris in December, were predicated on the fact that it will go okay. The market will align, people will transition, and it will not be that difficult. I mean, there was this kind of, you put massive figures, people say it will cost 4, 5, 6 trillion per annum, but it's okay because if you compare that to basically the size of the money of the capital pool, if you compare this to the size of the economy, it's a little painful, but the invisible end will make its way. That was kind of the rough assumption. And of course, we realize that it's not working. Even with COVID, we are not there at all. And so that's the real question behind the ESG. E stands for environment, S for social and G for governance. Let me focus on E and S. E, the main issue is climate. I mean, now more and more people are familiar. I think the ideas are well understood. The price of carbon is a pretty well qualified issue. So I think we are getting there, but despite getting there, we are not there at all. I mean, the process is just starting. Then when you dig deeper into the E, in particular on nature and biodiversity, we are nowhere near where we are on climate and so on and so forth. So the E is already a tough thing. When you move to S, social, it's even more difficult. Because again, people agree that slavery is not good. But when you go beside that, you have huge discrepancies in the world. And so it's great to say, yes, we focus on social, but then when you enter into the details, then that's when the problem starts. And of course, as Masoud has said, between E, S, I don't want to discuss the G, but I'll be to talk later. We should also add probably a letter T on technology because this is a new wave. How do we handle technology? I mean, we're a little bit submerged by everything you say. So that's my first point. We realize that 2015, the objectives were okay, but we did not really seriously discuss the ways and means to get there. And now it's a tough wake up call. My second point is that we also realize that it's more difficult than we think. I mean, the depth of the changes required is more difficult. I mean, all the reports which were published in particular, the G covers a summer show, it's a long way ahead. In that context, people start to question what's happening with finance. On the one hand, the BIS recently released a report saying that there was a green bubble. And basically too much money willing to look green is chasing two little green assets. So this is really a bad signal. I wish there were more assets and less value, but that's again, the temperature is what it is. On the other hand, there was a very interesting report released by a French business school called Edek last week, which was really reviewing all the green indices. You know, the MSCI of the world, they all pretend to be green sustainable, etc. So they've rechecked in and they realize it's not even ambiguous. They realize that it's 12% green or sustainable and 88% no. So you're selling to people products which are labeled green and which actually are not. So it's not yet very well known. I was questioned by journalists on top of that. Maybe you've heard that DWS, which is a German asset manager, is under investigation by the SEC about potential greenwashing. And the journalist asked me, is it a diesel gate of finance? Is it the way you realize that finance is again lying to us? So I think this is the moment of truth and the moment of truth is close. And I think it's very important for the financial actors to be serious about that. Again, we're not too far from the financial crisis. I think the financial world is still under supervision, under rehabilitation maybe. And so if there is another big issue, it will be very detrimental to everything we are discussing. My last point is, when we discuss this green and sustainable finance, we naturally tend to focus on large listed entities. I would say the Johnson or Unilever or Boeing of this world. But we tend to forget the rest of the world. So there are a few bits and pieces. First of all, the private companies, but also the SMEs, which are not really addressed and which are the bulk of the economy. And more importantly as well, is the emerging and developing economies. And I think this is really where it's important. The question is, who is going to decide the rules for the world? I'm talking about the textbook for finance for the next 20 or 30 years. And it's a difficult question because it will basically say what is good and what is bad. And I can be very specific to give you an example. People talk a lot about diversity and inclusion. I can tell you this has different meaning in every country. When you are in the US, people say it's about ethnic diversity. That's the first point. When you go to France, you are prevented from talking about ethnic diversity. So in 20 years, do you want the French parliament to decide whether you discuss ethnic diversity or do you want S&P or BlackRock to decide? That's your question. And there are many more like this to come. And this is the emerging and developing economies which is dear to our heart on stage. The big issue is, what type of norms will we set? And I have this conversation with many leaders in the past few months. Basically, if I would say the bubble of the world, the rich people say, OK, we want to have a cleaner world, a more social world, these are the rules. And they put the bar in effect too high for a number of countries. In that case, when people could tell me, it's like the Washington consensus 2.0. Instead of having the textbook of the 1980s and 1990s, you will have a textbook on finance basically saying, yes, you have to do this, this and this, which is not reachable. And so people will say, no, but in today's world, there is an alternative to the Washington consensus. You have China, for instance. So you will have a real thing. You have no master of the world. So who will decide and the competition will be there? So are we capable of being inclusive with all the world? And channeling the necessary money needed to go to the sustainable development goals, to go to climate? Or will we be too comfortable within the OECD country and say, yes, we know the rules and protect ourselves? The alternative is as bad. The alternative is really to say, OK, the emerging and European economies are incapable of reaching our standards. So we'll have a two-tier system, a premium impact, a premium green in advanced economy and a low-cost green and low-cost impact in developing economies. So let me conclude there. I think it's ample time that we work on our operating system. Again, to be simplistic, we are still in a world led by Friedman's mantra that the social purpose of business is to make profit, which is really irrigating the way we account for things, the way we pay for things, et cetera. I believe we have to move to a system where the objective of business is to create profitable solutions to the problem of this planet and to discuss them and the problem of its people. It's not to say profit is bad. Profit is legitimate when it has a purpose. And the question is, how do we get there? How do we open the hood? How do we take our toolbox, put our hands on the engine when, as I say, there is no master of the world? Or where there are too many willing masters of the world? Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you indeed, Bertrand, for your statement. Je vais dire un mot en français. Vous êtes friend speaking, mon cher Bertrand. Simplement pour vous dire que ce que vous avez dit sur la bulle verte, sur le verdissement artificiel était très intéressant. Et je dois dire très à la mode en ce moment, si je lis les différents rapports qui sont faits, vous êtes au coeur de ce financement sain de la transition verte. Et c'est vraiment bien ce que vous faites si je peux me permettre au passage. Nous avons maintenant à aborder la question, peut-être, du commerce. Si Barc Taillot veut bien nous éclairer de sa propre expérience, it would be for us a great privilege to have your own experience as a Minister of Trade. On this element of globalization, we had, as I said, the formidable expansion of global trade, some weakening of global trade at least of the correlation between global growth and global trade. Could you enlighten us on the present situation and the future? Please, Minister, you have the floor. Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. I also want to congratulate Chairman Monbriel for holding this miraculous conference at this time. And I also want to thank WPC organizers for inviting me. For this morning, I would like to share with you some of my thoughts on the topic of this session from the perspective of trade specialists because my background is mostly in the trade field. I would like to begin my brief remarks with my observations of some recent trends related to international trade. First, we can see in many countries these days the general public's view on free trade and globalization have been changed to be somewhat negative. In other words, the general public tend to think free trade and globalization are some of the major reasons or causes of high unemployment and income polarization. As you know very well, in this case, politicians use this sentiment for their political campaign in the election and often argue that more jobs can be created through less imports and more domestic production. Bi-American, higher American, and also reshoring incentives are some examples of recent US government policies aiming to boost domestic employment and production. The second observation is the areas of US-China disputes are being expanded from trade to national security and high-tech competition. The US claim that unfair industrial subsidies of the Chinese government is the key issue. And accordingly, the US government launched expert restriction measures against China. Interestingly, on the other hand, China argued that US expert restrictions are causing a global market failure. Therefore, the intervention of the Chinese government should be strengthened. I heard this from Chinese experts arguing these kind of stories when they hear about the US sanction against China. Third, intensified political competition between the United States and China, as well as difficulties coming from the COVID-19 pandemic, have led the US to build its own secure so-called resilient supply chain for high-tech products such as semiconductors and batteries for electric vehicles. Fourth, the responses to climate change are being strengthened, and the scale of digital trade is rapidly increasing. Well, these trends have directly or indirectly affected globalization. However, according to some OECD experts, although certain products and specific firms have been negatively somewhat affected by these trends, aggregated data collected by the OECD has not yet shown any significant change of the global value chain structure. We understand each government can use policy measures to pursue its specific national goal, such as building its supply chain at the national level to protect national security and promote industrial self-reliance. Even in this case, however, firms will try to bypass these measures in order to achieve their own goals of profit maximization. Firms can do this through various means. For example, diversifying their supply sources, shortening, regionalizing, or even redesigning global value chain, and so on. In other words, firms are always considering various factors such as cost, including wages, access to the resources, availability of intrinsic assets, proximity of consumers, and so on when they construct their supply chain. Of course, firms cannot ignore completely the policies of the government as well as its alliance partner countries. In the case of Korea, as you know, maybe leading firms such as Samsung, LG, and SK have recently decided to make a huge investment in the United States as the US tried to build its own supply chain for semiconductors and batteries. However, if other major countries which are closely related to Korea insist on establishing supply chain at their own national levels, Korean firms may have to invest in Europe, in China, or in Korea. So there are some concerns that maybe this could lead to over investment and all excessive facilities of the Korean companies in the end. So I think in the future, rapid digitalization, increasing risks of climate change, rapidly growing AI technology, sophistication of manufacturing and so on will influence more on globalization than government policies. Of course, firms will somehow be able to adapt to these trends and continue their globalization activities. In order to see globalization evolving in the right direction in the future, it would be crucial to provide right business environment with transparent and fair multilateral rules for various fields. However, today, we do not have any clear multilateral trade rules for important issues which may significantly affect globalization of the firm, such as industrial subsidies, measures related to climate change, like carbon border adjustment taxes and digital trade. As we are all aware, the multilateral trading system of the WTO does not properly function these days. In fact, it faces most serious crisis since its launch in 1995. Although the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference, the highest making body of the WTO, will be held in Geneva at the end of the next month. But experts do not expect much about the results. So furthermore, we don't find any leadership among major countries in strengthening the multilateral trading system. In conclusion, the World Trade Order will remain unstable, and the WTO will not play a constructive role for future globalization. I'm a little bit pessimistic, but I'm sorry for that. Our staff here, thank you very much, yeah. Thank you, thank you very, very much indeed, Minister. You are terminating your statement on a rather somber note, obviously. But unfortunately, I think it's realistic. Let me say that we are very, very happy because Yushi Osoya, who's in Japan, is joining us. And so welcome to Yushi Osoya. He's a professor of international politics at the Keio University and managing director of the Asian Pacific Initiative. So he has a deep knowledge of the contemporary East Asian international politics. If he agrees, he will intervene after Thomas Gommart and before the former Prime Minister of Finland. So welcome again to Yushi Osoya. He's with us. And Thomas, I already introduced you. I said what we expect of you. Essentially, maybe remarks on geo-strategies, globalization and geo-strategies. You are the director of French and Free. And I understand that you are going to speak French. You have the floor. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I will indeed express myself in French. I would like to begin by thanking Thierry and the whole team of the World Policy Conference to have made this meeting possible. So I have two remarks to try to reflect on this mutation of globalization. The first is, from my point of view, this mutation will be mostly oriented by the nature of relations between China and the United States. A few figures to convince. The two countries represent more than 40% of the global GDP, more than 40% of the world CO2 emissions. AO2 represents more than 1,000 billion per year of military spending. And when you look at the 100 most profitable companies in the world, 76 are either Chinese or American. The second thing to make a point of introduction is that when we think about globalization, as we have been doing since the beginning of this session, I think that a lot depends on the choice of the cycle that we observe. Do we focus on the financial economic cycle or are we trying to find other cycles with other historical landmarks, other chronological landmarks? I think we should also try to replace that with the strategic cycle, the political cycle or the technological cycle that we can identify. So the first thing I would like to express is that, from my point of view, the mutation of globalization to which we assist is first of all a correlation of cycles. I explain to myself that we are, in my opinion, in a strategic cycle that englobes the economic cycle and which, from my point of view, began in 1950 by the Korean War. In reality, globalization, as we think today, is a kind of Chinese intellectual victory since the horizon of time that we have all assimilated is in fact 2049. And this idea that in 2049, true or false, it remains an open question, but it is now in the heads of 2049, the date of the centenary of the popular republic of China, China is ambitious to be the first world power in all the fields. And in fact, it has become our horizon of time and we think of cycles according to this horizon of time. So the first cycle is the strategic cycle. The second is the political cycle. And here we are indeed in a discussion because we do not know if it is the spirit of Beijing or if it is the spirit of Berlin that suffers. I explain to myself that in 1989, it is obviously the fall of the wall and the fact that there is a very narrow association between the movement of globalization, economic, market and political pluralism, particularly in Europe, which is going to lead to the spread of Europe. But as you know, the fall of the Berlin Wall was preceded by the repression of Tiananmen. And basically, what is today, several decades later, the dominant blow? Is it Beijing or is it Berlin? I think it is a very widely open question. The technological cycle now, we could choose a lot of different dates, but the one that seems to me the most striking is certainly the creation of the Arpanet in 1969 with its double roots, both libertarian and military. And I will come back to this duality which in my opinion is at the center of the change of globalization. And then the last cycle, maybe we can try to trace it at a very high rate, is the ideological cycle. We can do it there too, how it differs from date, but 1979 is an interesting date because it is both the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the arrest of otage to the man, and it shows that we are in a world today very contrasted in religious terms, with both very advanced secularization forms in certain parts of the world and in other parts of the world, forms of religious arrogance which also explains, in my opinion, the difficulties that we can encounter in terms of reciprocal incomprehension. The second point I wanted to address is that this globalization has, for all of its background, a more rapid convergence than expected, probably, between environmental degradation in these three main components, climate change, the loss of biodiversity, pollution, and technological propagation. The technological propagation, having a paradoxical evolution is both an hyperindividualization and at the same time a hyperconcentration in terms of value creation. On this background, in my opinion, there are three things to do to try to describe the change in course. The first thing to do is, of course, redistributing the power and a return to the strategic in a hard way. We are, from my point of view, in a nuclear third-party, in terms of strategic. The second point is that this convergence creates the envelope of sovereignty and jurisdiction which makes navigation very delicate. In fact, according to the systems used under which jurisdiction we are, and under which law we are, and finally, it has been mentioned several times since the beginning of our discussion, the accentuation of inequalities that we observe, at the same time between countries and within countries. So, what is going to be the third point, at a very high level, if we try to do a forecast effort with the horizon 2049? First of all, I think there is a phenomenon that is appearing. It is the phenomenon of cognitive confrontation, which has become very evident during the different confinements. That is to say, the confinements have been the blockage of bodies at home, but of bodies with brains that have never been as interconnected through the media platforms. And this cognitive confrontation, I can use the term confrontation because, in my opinion, it announces a fight for political models and also for consumption modes or attitudes in reality that are being shaped by these channels. The second thing that is very important to identify and draw is the appearance of what we call the civilisation, that is to say a more and more strong duality between civil activities and military activities, whether it is in terms of innovation or research, and a duality that we could do between what is raised by the economy and what is raised by security, which is less and less done, particularly by the two main actors, China and the United States. And from this point of view, the other actors are in a very uncomfortable situation in relation to this fusion between civil and military activities. What poses a very immediate question is the question of the transfer of technology in relation to military alliances in the future. The third trait that distinguishes itself is the ambition, in particular, of China, to be neutral on the carbon level in 2060, the ambition announced by the President Xi in September 2020, and which forces us to think about the modality of carbon power. What does that mean? What is carbon power in relation to a power model based on the fossil, which has been the model of the United States since the first world war? I will stop here, maybe by thinking about it, which comes from the recent re-reading that I have been able to do many of them. Brodell explains that it is not capitalism that creates the relationship of power, but capitalism loves the relationship of power and needs a boss. And I think one of the keys to the question on the mutation of globalization is, will there be one boss or several bosses? Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much indeed, Thomas. What you are mentioning, and particularly, Fernand Brodell, reminds me that he made the point that capitalism was not born out of the industrial revolution, but was commercial capitalism, was flourishing long, long, long before, and of course was really at the heart of the concept. But thank you very much for your description, impressive description of what's happening today over 100 years with, I would say, some kind of historical understanding of the long-term evolution. Now, I turn to Yushi Osoya. As I already said, he knows better than anybody contemporary East Asian international politics. China was mentioned by Thomas a moment ago. What would you say, dear professor? You have the floor. Well, thank you very much, Indy, for your very kind introduction. I hope that you can hear my voice. Yes. Okay, thank you. Let me first express my greatest gratitude to the organizers of this conference to make this possible, particularly of course, I'm really grateful for Mr. Yushi Osoya to make this meal possible. And I think that this is not just a real comment, this is also a very good sign to see the receipt of the spread of coronavirus, if not the end of coronavirus disease. But anyway, I'd like to present a point of view of East Asia or from in the Pacific region, because I believe that the current globalization largely comes from Indo-Pacific region. Likewise, the future of the virus and the globalization of the state, we now know that globalization has not ended with the spread of the coronavirus. However, we are seeing the globalization that is quite different from globalization therefore it is important for us to understand the nature of this situation. And to do that, I'd like to focus on the three points. The first important point is that we need to look at the Indo-Pacific region, what happens in the Indo-Pacific region. I'm particularly glad that WAPOC conference has been quite kind to Asia or Indians, Asian participants. That's why, in addition, we have two Asians, just one. I fully understand that Korea is an important country and that Korea can represent Asian voices. But two is better than one, let's say. So that's why I think that double PST really reflects the current international politics. So in this case, I think that the globalization or dynamism of globalization now largely comes from the Indo-Pacific region. Secondly, I'd like to focus on the importance of digitalization as we just already mentioned. I'd like to say that today we are seeing the digitalized globalization. Therefore, I can join in this session by using the benefit of the internet. It is sometimes very difficult to see, directly see cyberspace. But on the other hand, we have to feel and be aware of the importance of cyberspace. And the large part of globalization actually comes from this cyberspace. So that the combination of the dynamism, both in the Pacific region and the digital cyberspace, is nowadays very important here, let's say. Thirdly, I'd like to focus on the importance of structural confrontation between the United States and China as also previous speakers mentioned well. The important point is that we are now seeing the evolution of compartmentalized globalization. Now China is trying to realign supply chain and realign the economic space in Asia. Because both United States and Europe have become much more hostile to Chinese activities, that's why I think that China is trying to be closer to the ASEAN. Nowadays, the ASEAN is the biggest trading partner to China. So under the current coronavirus situation, China is trying to create a very deep, strong Asian economic space. So the question is how United States, China, sorry, United States, Europe and Japan try to face the current difficulty. The United States government under the President Joe Biden is trying to create much stronger cooperation among democracies. So in the US-Japan summit meeting in April this year, and also in the last week's summit meeting in Washington, DC, I think that the United States government is focusing on the importance of emerging technologies and the cooperation among democracies or the poor democracy in the United States, Japan, India and Australia in the areas of emerging technologies. So we need to realize that now globalization is much more divided and compartmentalized. The question we are facing now is Feather. We try to end this compartmentalization, or Feather, we try to focus on the importance of cooperation among... Sorry, perhaps one question is... So I try to reconnect. I will end. Yes, I'd like to say that both the United States and Europe see the importance of the current quite rapid transformation of the nature of globalization. So we, I mean, both the European country and Japan are now responding to the American agenda of creating cooperation among democracies. But how to respond to China's challenge maybe this will become the big question for us in the current law policy conference this year. Thank you very much, Mr. Tsvistin, for your very kind invitation to the session. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed, Professor, for this impressive vision. We appreciate enormously the effort you are making to be connected to this room. It was great, great pleasure to hear you. Let me turn now to Marie-Kévinier-Mi for the first Prime Minister of Finland, as I already said. And what we are expecting from you, you have the last word, that's all, Marie. So please, we will benefit from your understanding of the very complex and multi-layered and multi-dimensional issue that we are dealing with. Please. Thank you very much and thank you first of all for the invitation. So happy to be here. Again, thank you, Thierry and the organizers for letting us discuss this interesting theme here today. And a lot has been already said and it's always difficult to be the last speaker and find new angles to the discussion. But a question I would like to actually answer is that what did COVID-19 change something? I mean, did it kind of mutate globalized into a certain direction? And actually, it kind of did good for globalization and at least it brought some new elements. And I think that the positive aspect really is that it underlined the essence of international cooperation and multilateralism. It brought very high on the agenda the need for global action, like cooperation in vaccine production and delivery and also joint measures preventing the virus to spread. And it showed how dependent we are from each other. And also in that sense kind of made us all see how important it is also in the future to make sure that we can assure the global value change to function. But also it made visible that it's utmost important to have a very good international cooperation but also it showed us some flaws when it comes to taking care of the pandemic and organizing everything. But positive also is that it actually didn't trigger an increased willingness to implement unnecessary trade and trade related protectionist measures in the area of goods. And Minister Bach already actually referred to this fact. And when you look at, for example, the report prepared to the G20 countries by WTO, Ungtet and OECD, you can see there that since the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, 140 trade and trade related measures in the area of goods have been implemented by G20 economies. And 72 percent of them were trade facilitating trade facilitating nature. And 28 percent only could be considered trade restrictive. But then when you look at the rollback of those measures, the trade facilitating measures has been, the rollback of them has been shifted and the rollback of trade restrictive measures. So really you have to be careful in order to watch what's happening. And another good example of that positive progress is the tax agreement in June, where 130 tourist addictions are updated to international tax agreement concerning multinational enterprise prices. So very good steps forward have been made. But many of you already pointed out that it is challenging to govern the international order and really make sure that the rules-based international order is able to kind of manage the biggest challenges we are facing. And I think that COVID really made visible to megatrends where these international rules-based order is needed, namely digitalization and climate change. So it's the most important in these areas to achieve better multilateral governance frameworks and international rules. For example, when it comes to digitalization, we really have to be able to facilitate the digital transformation of our economies and really create effective value-based digital regulatory frameworks and state-of-the-art global standards. And Berndtrand already mentioned when it comes to climate change, the need for a comprehensive global carbon pricing system that is one of the really concrete tools which we should reach in order to tackle the climate change by the rules decided together at the global level. But it is still kind of a bit disappointing and that despite the fact that we all have seen during this pandemic how important it is to have deep global cooperation, and how useful globalization is that we still have protectionism and populism which threaten to unravel kind of the decades of international cooperation and openness. And I think that we really have to put people in the center and this is very much a political question as was mentioned by Masoud earlier in his intervention. So we have to look at the national level and the national policies and there is no silver bullet and I think that we have been discussing kind of the ways how to make everyone see the benefits of globalization and what kind of policies should be implemented in order to make globalization work for all. And I think that we have all the elements on board already. We need more information and also we have to tackle the misinformation and it's kind of alarming that in many countries you don't have specific policies introduced or frameworks to guide kind of the response to miss and disinformation. So spreading information and also tackling the misinformation are those tools which should be used in order to kind of make everyone see the benefits of globalization. But then as I already said kind of the third point when it comes to the recipe, how to make it politically accepted to really move forward in the global governance and also making sure that the globalization really works also in the future is that we have not been able in many countries to make sure that the benefits of globalization are not shared equally and everyone has the opportunity to participate in the society and this is something which we really have to pay attention make sure that everyone has the access to education and also you need active labor market policies social protection and so on. I think there's already those issues mentioned many times when it comes to kind of the recipe how to make people understand the benefits of globalization and also how to make the globalization work better for all. Thank you very very much indeed Marie for the stress you're putting on fair share of the bounties of globalization as one of the major problems we have to cope with. I'm struck by the fact that when I hear all members of this panel one of the element which they underlined was the acceleration of underlying trends the the formidable amplification and acceleration through all possible dimensions and it seems to me that the the speed limit in some respect has been overpassed and our own people are saying it goes too fast. Please cool down try to have a slower speed and we cannot the problem is that we cannot. Anyway it was absolutely stimulating I'm sure that we will have questions from the audience so I open the question part of our session and I would urge the question to be as short and concise as possible and be directed to one of the panelists if it is possible. Who wants to take the floor? Yeah my name is John Andrews. Thank you very much for very interesting interventions in terms of the rivalry between China and the United States. I mean China I think now has more trading partner I mean more countries take China as their main trading partner than do countries take the US as their main trading partner so if we have this confrontation between the US and China at the political level and also at the economic level is they are is the world going to have to make a choice between China and the US or is there a way of avoiding that choice in other words are we on an inexorable pathway to all some kind of divided economic and trading world or can we somehow avoid what I think would be a rather damaging and unfortunate destination thank you. Thank you thank you very much indeed perhaps I could ask Thomas to say world on this very stimulating question and also Yoshio Osoya if he wishes and you minister on this very very stimulating again question very concisely Thomas. It is indeed a very difficult question for me but I think we have to try to answer by distinguishing the attitude of economic and business actors and in my opinion the choice will be very different according to the sectors of activity that is to say that there are sectors of activity that will be that are at the heart of the confrontation with the American others who are less and for those who are at the heart of the confrontation with the American I think it is particularly at the current core on the on the microprocessors that is the first aspect is the aspect of the second aspect for the states I believe that everyone is trying to avoid precisely this choice so there are phenomena of alliance that are accelerating here too and the last date is the announcement of the focus but most of the countries want precisely to avoid being trapped in this in this confrontation with the American so I will answer by distinguishing the two levels thank you very much you have the floor okay this question is frequently asked to Korean companies whether you choose this or not but look at China, China has been a world factory for many many years now it's changing because of high wages in China many firms are already leaving China to ASEAN other countries so for Korean firms they are having different strategies they want to use China as a big market in the future not the production or assembly site so I think they can actually readjust their their destination however if the US want to have a decoupling by force or by strong argument then Korean firms are having some trouble thank you very much indeed Yushi also yeah a world on that question yeah thank you very much it's a great question and I used to say that majority of Asian countries are denying and rejecting their choice let me give you one example Japan single alliance in the United States so we have to enhance our alliance relationship with the United States but on the other hand China is our biggest trading partner not just that Japan has provided the largest amount of mediator China in total my Indian friend told me that the current powerful asset of China is partly opposition I wouldn't say that but anyway China is this means that we need to create a list of regional order or list of global needs of China I would say China needs some of the importance of rules if China would not respect rules and the important rule of law China would damage its own national interests so I think that this is a majority voice in Asia but it depends on how much China is willing to respect that rules and rule of law for international norms and I'm optimistic more or less about Chinese behavior in the future thank you thank you very much indeed so it was really indeed a very important question we will take another question I would like to reserve at least six I would say something like seven minutes for each of us to have the last word but in 60 seconds the main conclusion so we will have a question but I want to terminate terminate in time so a new question from the audience if possible yeah over there please I have god knows how many iPhones when I buy iPhones who do I trade with China or the United States so can somebody answer this question these things are made in the in China I believe but they're American what I'm trying to say is that when I buy something that is made that that is made in China but that is American who am I trading with I'm sorry I'm not sure I got the question but my point is that is that they're they're so integrated yeah yeah that you can't separate them in many things it is so profoundly intertwined that it would be very difficult to disentangle okay got the message we had another question there thank you sir I would like to address my question to the minister of Finland which I thought was very stimulating what she was talking about was the need for global solidarity and global cooperation in the light of the pandemic but what I can say is is that the european states have been extremely egoistic in this particular field and this is what we are there is a great deal of inequality between the different countries how they have provided the they have provided the means to to to fight this pandemic it was very unequal and this is what we are very sorry about the lack of global solidarity and the lack of global cooperation in this particular field thank you thank you can I say that you could address the same reproach to all advanced economy not only it seems to me to the european economies but you know what we will start okay matthew yes the conclusion session yes starting with you you have a question thank you I yeah good thank you I'll I'll do we'll conclude good that is a very good question I really think that we we need more solidarity when it comes to kind of action delivery but of course all the countries I mean the developed ones have done they part also the european union united states so you cannot say that they there was no solidarity but more could have been done but they also can understand the ministers in european countries and developed countries they have to answer to their citizens they need the vaccines rapidly but also answering partly to the question of of iphones where they are produced I mean that really shows us how interdependent we are the vaccines going also to developing countries they benefit the developed ones because of the global value chains because of the raw materials so that that sense we really are on the same boat and I hope that now when we are I hope rather soon facing the end of this pandemic that we have also learned from this that more solidarity also is needed because it's it helps everyone also your own own country thank you so much Marie uh wishy 60 seconds for your final message please well thank you very much indeed actually 70 percent around 70 percent iphone they come from japanese and uh maybe we have to wait they're currently friendly it's a national atmosphere to make the price of the iphone possible thank you very much indeed thomas 60 seconds I want to introduce a situation in Geneva surrounding WTO multilateral agreement is almost impossible so they are arguing that maybe plural agreement among like-minded countries should be formed and some people also oppose their approach because it's not very good for the WTO system but yesterday or the day before yesterday Brazilian ambassador argued that if you want to have a choice we want to choice fragmentation with the plural pro retro agreement or irrelevance this is a this this will simplify the situation at the WTO right now you choose fragmentation rather than irrelevance for the future of WTO very well made thank you very much yes I think my point will be very simple we have agreed six years ago on a global roadmap for the 21st century a roadmap for inclusive sustainable and resilient economy the sustainable development goals the agreement on financing for development and the climate agreement it's impossible to withdraw an agreement today so let's stick to what we have it's not perfect it's very difficult to end all but it's been signed by everybody so it's time to be serious about it I think we have all the pieces of the puzzle we never had that much money available we never had that much technology available we have all the institutions we don't need to reinvent the g20 etc they do exist we have probably to make them work it's just say them down obviously and so we have to make the puzzle work and let me conclude with two quotes which basically I like what I think is important today one is from a french writer from 1930s not very well known but actually my daughter had to read it this summer for baccalaureate Jean Giraudu Jean Giraudu wrote a theater play in 1935 called the war of Troy will not happen which of course was an anticipation to the second world war discussion between Odysseus and Hector and of course they see the catastrophe coming and they see the privilege de grand of the rich and powerful is to believe they can watch the catastrophe from the balcony and as we very well know when the catastrophe happened the balcony collapsed as well so I think we are the balcony and we see these things coming we have hopes and we have to make it work it's our particular responsibility in this room and my my last quote is from Theodore Roosevelt which I rediscovered in the US when I visited Montreschmore I didn't know he was the fourth guy on the Montreschmore between Lincoln Jefferson and Washington and Theodore Roosevelt is known for you know the dispensing of the conglomerates the creation of a consumer protection agency the national park etc was accused of being revolutionary and he said I'm not advocating revolution I'm advocating action to prevent revolution and I think this is precisely where we are today thank you thank you very much for your quotations Masoud what would you say I just want to make one point which is that if you take the next 30 years in almost every field no global solution will be possible unless a large number of emerging market and developing countries are part of that solution because that is where the growth is happening that is where emissions will increase that is where populations are growing and the systems that we have to integrate them into the decision making process do not reflect that so we have to really find better ways of integrating those economies into the decision-making process and we have to be more realistic in the promises we make because we are very good on targets and promises very poor on delivery and that's why you see in so many areas we make promises and if the last thing I say is if you were to say what is one of the real costs of the COVID crisis it is a breakdown of trust many people in developing countries have lost trust in the functioning of the current multilateral international system because the promises that were made are not being delivered either in finance or in access to vaccines and I do feel that we have to write that to redress that balance to be able to move forward to address the other issues thank you very much indeed Masoud I would nevertheless if you permit mention the fact that thanks to globalization we have many many many millions billions of citizens that went out of poverty so the benefit the bounties we know exist but inequalities abnormal behavior of the rich against vis-à-vis the poor are of course at stake as you saw eloquently made the point let me myself have a quotation quotation for Noam Shomsky and Noam Shomsky said no sane person is opposed to globalization that is international integration surely not the left and the worker movements which were founded on the principle of international solidarity that's of course a contradiction but of course good globalization good global governance their sharing of the bounties are absolutely at stake at a global level between countries and within countries thank you very very much indeed I think we had a very stimulating session and now we have to turn to the next session all the best thank you