 This is Dave Cahill. Dave Cahill, Dick Sears, and Senator DeSherry. Happy New Year. And we look forward to hearing from you in a few minutes, but Eric is going to walk us through the bill as presented. I know that a number of people have suggested changes, including yourself, which is normal. We did introduce a bill that we, the members of the Justice Oversight Committee, heard a great deal of testimony about the situation in White River Junction, and obviously the situation in Shannon County where charges were dropped, and then the Attorney General's office took them over. So I think we all agree there's a problem. It's the solution that is part of the difficulty. So hopefully, we can come up with something that will work that's fair to all sides. So Eric, do you want to? Yeah. Walk through the bill to start with. And David, thank you for being with us. Are you still at the State Attorney's Office or are you now in private? I'm in limbo. I'm in my office in White River Junction doing my jobs, but my state email got cut off. Here we are on the phone. Well, I can't help you with this. I didn't know they did that. All right, Eric, go ahead. Yes, thank you, Senator Sears. This is Eric Fitzpatrick with the Office of Legislative Counsel here to walk you through S183, an act to do competency to stand trial and insanity as a defense. Senator Sears, as you were mentioning earlier, this is a subject that the Justice Oversight Committee was looking at this summer and this fall, just for a moment of where the genesis of the language in the bill came from. As Justice Oversight looked at the issue, they asked Dave Cahill and James Pepper to make a proposal. The proposal came in from them. I did some rewriting, some restructuring, that sort of thing. But policy-wise, and there's policy choices you see in the bill in front of you or the proposal, still the proposal that James and David made. So I'm gonna certainly walk you through the language of the bill, help with any questions about what it does, but to the extent that you have questions about why a certain choice was made, why it was one policy over another. I think David and James will be better at answering those questions than I will. Another background point, just to keep in mind, I remember mentioning this to the committee when we were having our discussion about committee priorities. There's a United States Supreme Court case that's pending, it was actually the first case that was argued this term in the first Monday in October and has to do with the constitutionality of an insanity, or actually of Kansas' approach to actually repeal the insanity defense completely. So they don't have an insanity defense in Kansas and there's a big picture, a constitutional question pending before the US Supreme Court of whether that's constitutional at all. Now that isn't done in this bill, it doesn't do the same thing, repeal the insanity defense completely, but to the extent that the court says something in its opinion about how the state is or isn't free to regulate the insanity defense, it may be relevant to the resolution of the ideas and I'll certainly keep an eye on that in case that it is. So with those two points as background, let's look at what is going on in S183, a big picture for the moment. The general statutory approach to the insanity defense and competency to stand trial is to set out the details of the procedure very carefully in statute. So the statutes are very explicit, they're very specific about what the procedures are for a defendant raising the insanity defense for how the procedure happens. And the big picture of what's going on in S183 is it essentially makes a card out to those procedures. There's an exception established in the bill to the general approach to the procedures involving the insanity defense and it specifically applies to only a particular type, a particular group of cases. And these are cases in which a defendant has been adjudicated not guilty by a reason of insanity for either a homicide or an attempted homicide. So that's what's going on in the bill, that's the big picture nutshell. It takes the general procedures that apply in these cases and the insanity defense cases and establishes a separate set of procedures that apply in a particular type of case. And those cases are, as I said, when a defendant is acquitted by a reason of insanity for homicide or attempted homicide. So the question that obviously comes up and what you need to look at the language to answer is, well, what are these different procedures? How is it different than what ordinarily applies when someone raises the insanity defense? So that starts over on page two of the bill and we just want to pass out the language really quick about the insanity defense itself to the few extra copies that we'll pass these around. This is the statute that's not in the bill, that's the existing insanity defense statute in title 13 and it lays out right there what the standard is for what a defendant has to prove in order to establish the defense of insanity. So you see in A1, the language I just passed out, that's the operative language that we're looking at here, the person is not responsible for criminal conduct and at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect and I should point out here that that's obviously archaic outdated language that has been in the statutes for a long time and we're only using the terminology now because what it says in the statute and the case law has developed for many, many years around that phrase, that's why it's still what it is. Because of that mental disease or defect, he or she lacks adequate capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law. So you've got two pieces there. You've got a causation piece and an actual mental status piece. So you have to show two things. One, that the defendant couldn't understand the nature of their criminal nature of their conduct or conform their conduct to the requirements of the law and as a result of that, that happened as a result of their mental disease or defect. In other words, there was a connection between the mental illness and the inability of the defendant to either understand what they were doing was illegal or to act illegally. So that's the nature of the defense. Procedurally, as I was saying, the statutes lay out pretty specifically what happens around a defendant making this defense. And over on page two, where I just mentioned that it starts the existing language starts on line five. And the big picture point here is that when a person is found not guilty by reason and sentence. So in other words, they meet the standard that's on the language that I just passed out and the defendant successfully makes that defense. The court has to hold a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant is to be committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health. So there has to be this hearing in order to make that determination. And whether or not the person gets committed turns on whether or not the person is found to be a danger to themselves or others. Which is a standard I know that we've talked about a lot in this committee. It's familiar to everybody. The language is on line six, that existing language five and six. The court finds that the person is a person in need of treatment or a patient in need of further treatment. And that's a legal term that essentially is defined to me, danger to yourself or to others. The court makes that finding, then they have to be committed to the image. You see a line for an indeterminate period is the language and the statute. What has been developed through case thought through the application of the statute is that the initial commitment order is for a period of 90 days, generally speaking. That's an important point that you're gonna see the first change to that general procedure is on that exact point. So let me go back to, I wanna, I think I know the answer to this question, but in the current statute of two questions. One is in one, A1, at the time of such conduct. So it means that the time that the offense occurred, but not, it could be that the person is completely sane when they're, you know, when the episode is over. Yes, it totally turns on the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, exactly. And the defendant has the burden of proof to prove that they were insane at the time of the offense. It doesn't matter that they have schizophrenia or whatever else has been diagnosed. It's at the time of the offense. Correct. Whether or not they're competent to stand trial is a separate question. The insanity defense turns on the defendant's ability at the time of the offense. If one was a serious mental illness, they may be found to not be competent to stand trial. But if they had a jealous rage, could that be, you know, against a spouse that was leaving them or whatever, you know, think of the situations where sometimes people murder other people in a jealous rage? Or would that be an insanity defense? The rage was over once they completed the act. They're angered at that person. Wouldn't that be second degree? Well, I think if I'm specifically manslaughter, if there's a sudden passing as a result of propagation, if there's no sudden passing as a result of propagation that it's murder chain. Okay. Can I ask on the same question, if somebody is medicated and with their medication, they're judged and they not have a mental disease that would prevent this, but they were off their medication when they committed the crime. Is that a viable use of this? So in other words, somebody, when they committed the crime, they were off their meds and then they're brought into jail. The medicated began. And can they avoid responsibility in that way? I believe that because the question turns on the mental state of the defendant at the time of the offense, that it is possible regardless of how it happened that the defendant might not have been able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or were packed in accordance with the law for that reason. What I'm getting at is, I should have asked it more clearly, person is judged to be incompetent when they committed the act. Well, when they committed the act, the competency is not an issue. Competency has to do with standing trial. They could be insane when they committed the act. Well, they're insane when they committed the act. Okay. But they're not insane today. Right. They are then released. They could be. That's when it turns on the exact phase that we were just talking about. It depends whether they are determined to be a danger to themselves or others, whether they are a person in need of treatment. The court finds after this hearing that they're gonna a danger to somebody else or to themselves, then they would be committed. But if they're not, then yes, they could be released. And since this language is so archaic, should we be changing that in the law too? That's something, yeah, that's entirely possible. Interesting point, I think it was 2013 when that language was changed for a while. Within the context, remember, there was a big discussion at that time about whether a person with traumatic brain injury would fall under and how that person would be treated by which department. Ultimately, there was a big debate around expense, actually. It was gonna be a costly endeavor. It was unclear which state department would handle treatment of TBI patients. Turned out to be Dale that was placed into the statute. But there was a delayed effective date and it was a venture repeal because of discussion, I think, about money involved and whether TBI patients could be treated. But at the time, temporarily, yes, that language was changed to mental illness or developmental disabilities. So you might want to, if you're gonna make other changes, certainly could make that change as well. Can I just ask? So first, somebody has found either confident or incompetent in the STAM trial. I mean, that would be, and if they are found confident to STAM trial, then they could use the insanity defense. Is that right? I mean... Well, I think the insanity defense goes to the first point of whether or not they had the mental state at the time of the offense. And then if they did, they could still argue that they were incompetent to STAM trial. At the time when the trial proceedings were to happen, they couldn't either participate in their own defense or understand the nature of the charges against them. When would you do the... Well, never, I'll pick up on this. I'd probably, as we go through. Let's get back to the bill, I think the verdict is far enough. Yeah. Well, it's all relevant, that's for sure. So the first proposed change that the bill makes to insanity defense proceedings when you've got a charge involving homicide or attempted homicide, you'll see is at the very bottom of page two. I remember I said that the initial order of commitment, generally speaking, is for 90 days, for other types of offenses. The proposal here is that the initial order of commitment is for not less than three years, and this is gonna go from page two over page three. Not less than three years if the person committed under the order was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity for homicide or attempted homicide. Everybody see that? So that's a proposed different policy for this universe of defendants. And so that means that the court hearing, how does a court hearing fit into that three year time? Well, the initial court hearing still happens to determine whether or not the person is dangerous or not. The court finds, yes, the person is, they gotta be committed to DMH. This initial order has to be for three years. After that, they have to be re-evaluated every year. So they would still have to make a determination within the next year, whether or not the person's still posed a danger to themselves or others. If they do, they could keep them committed. If they don't, then the person can be released. Could it be their hospitalized or not in hospital order? That's an interesting question. I came up during Justice Oversight as well. The, do you mean under this language, the commitment language? Because it says committed and they can be committed under either hospital order or non-hospitalism. I would ask the department that question. When we asked that question at Justice Oversight, the thought was possibly they wanted to look into it further. I'm just a little confused. So this language seems to say that it's three years regardless. Yes. But you just said they would be re-evaluated every year and they could be released. After the three years. After. Yes, exactly. Are they evaluated during the three years? They might, I don't know. That's another question for the department. They might be, but they could not be, the commitment order could not be for less than three years initially. So it doesn't matter under this language what's the actual state of affairs according to the medical health professionals. Doesn't matter if they say they're not in danger to themselves or others. It's going to be three years for God. Correct. Everybody good with that? That piece of it? All right, so the next difference between the general proceedings and the ones that are proposed here for defendants who are charged with homicide or attended homicide usually kind of goes from pages three and four. This talks about the general process for what happens when a person might be discharged. Everybody see that? That's on line five, existing law. So this sort of sets up what happens when a person they've been committed, right? Got this initial order in this case, a three year order, although the existing language you see on page three that would apply generally. So those initial orders are 90 days. But there are then specific procedures laid out for what happens when somebody may get discharged from DMH custody and their specific provisions about at least 10 days before this discharge. There has to be a hearing. It has to be in the family division and that sort of thing, some specifics. So over on page four, what the proposal does is it provides a different type of procedure, different set of parameters around the potential for discharge than you have with respect to these defendants charged with other offenses. So you'll see top of page four, two A lays it out specifically. It says this subdivision applies when a person is committed after they've been adjudicated, not guilty by reason of standing for homicide or attempted homicide. See, that's sort of setting up. These procedures are different than the other ones. And all right, what characteristics of this procedure are different? You see they start being set out there in subdivision B, 10 day thing is similar. So at least 10 days prior to discharging the person that has to be hearing, that's similar. But you see there's two other on lines five through seven types of actions that the department might take that also require hearing. It's not just discharge. At least 10 days prior to discharge, can discontinue treatment of the person in a secure residential recovery facility. At least 10 days prior to that or determining not to apply for an order for continued treatment for the person. Everybody see that, line six through seven? Those are not in the general and say in the defense line that we just looked at. So in any one of those situations, and those are all different actions that the department might take with respect to somebody who's been committed. At least 10 days before any of those happens the commissioner has to provide notice to the state's attorney, see that line nine and the victim of the defense and the criminal division that helps the initial hearing. So see those are two other differences right there. The victim has to get notice and the hearing is in the criminal division not the family division, what do you see there? So that's distinct from the procedure that you saw on the previous page for other defendants as well. So there has to be notice of the proposal that the court's gonna do this whether it's discharge the person discontinue treatment at the secure facility or not apply for a continued treatment. Any one of those things might happen the department has to give notice 10 days beforehand and then the court has to have a hearing that's lines 12 and 13. Criminal division has to hold a hearing on whether or not this proposed action whether it's discharge, discontinuance, et cetera should occur. You see that line 13 and 14, the state's attorney and the victim have standing to be heard at the hearing. That's also a unique feature of this procedure. And then you'll see line 15 through 17 an important distinction. The party seeking the proposed action that means the person who's proposing that the defendant be discharged or their treatment be discontinued something like that. They have the burden of approving by a preponderance of the evidence more likely than not. That the proposed action would not cause an unreasonable risk to public safety. That's different than your sort of ordinary approach to other defendants that I just pointed you to. In that case, the burden is not on the party seeking discharge, it's on the state to show that the person is no longer at risk to themselves or others. So it's sometimes, depending on the facts and who wants the person discharged or their treatment discontinued. It could potentially place the burden on a different party. Cool. Cool. The guardian. It could be the defendant him or herself. Or their family. Correct. I think it would be the defendant. I mean, someone from the outside could come in on their behalf other than say they're guardian or lawyer. Well, no, I mean that guardian. Oh, okay. Exactly. Because it do. Sorry, they would have the least means probably. In other words, a group on the outside could come in and do it. Right, it'd be someone with a stand. Someone with a stand. Right. Not just any random person. No, I didn't mean to ask. Right, exactly. And that standard is similar to the federal standard, just FYI, that the burden is on the party seeking action. That's sort of where that language originated. So that's the evidence here in the court is to make the determination that they do find by proponents of the evidence. This is very bottom of the page now, that the proposed action would not cause an unreasonable risk of public safety. Then the issue of disorder, saying the commissioner can go ahead and proceed with the proposed action. But if they don't, then they act just in order directing the commissioner not to proceed. Whether it's not to proceed with discharge or discontinued treatment, that sort of thing. Whatever's in the proposed action to begin with. So then what happens there? Is there another court hearing to determine that there should be another three years? The three years is only for the initial. Okay. The initial. All right. After that, it's up to one year after that. But yes, you're right, that there could be another hearing and there does have to be another hearing at least every year. And does it say that someplace here? Yes, that's not here, but it's cross-reference by virtue of referring to the civil commitment statutes. Yes. And that's essentially the stuff of the differences to the insanity defense. Oh, perfect timing. I was literally gonna just say the sections related, come after that are related to data gathering, reporting by various entities, the court, the state's attorney's office, the department of state attorneys, I should say, defender general. And those pieces were ones that Katie put together, committee could also look at. Also explain it, and we will hear from some of them later as we work on this bill. But we did hear in justice oversight quite a bit from the families of victims of some of these crimes. And they're concerned that they're left out in the dark. They have no idea what's happened because it's considered medical information once that insanity has been made. And they can't even be told when this person's gonna be released. And it will take some exemptions, I think you're gonna get into that. That was also one of the goals of the bill is to have a better way to hold people, but it's also to at least have the victim involved similar to what we do in the juvenile system where a victim can be aware of what's happening with the juvenile, but is not allowed to talk about it and tell other people. That's one of the points that I wanna make about this. It's, you know, you keep thinking back to Hinkley and how everybody knew about it, someone shot Baker and tried to assassinate Reagan. Everybody knew all the information about him but that wasn't before yet. If it happened in the bottom, we wouldn't have a clue. Right? Yeah, on the HIPAA point that you're raising Senator Sears, there is an exception in HIPAA for disclosures of protected health information that are required by law. Remember, we did that in the Herpo, the Pritzker-Cherry protection order. We crafted some language, put it in there. The government vetoed it. Not the Herpo one, I think. Oh, you mean the one, yes, the one that was in the, S-179 from last, the S-179, yep, yep. Wherever you go. That's right. The government didn't like that. I don't think he had a problem with that. But we encouraged you to do it. Right. But we could come up with, if you decide you want to go that route, we could come up with similar language. We do need to provide some information to victims. Right. In some way, they need to at least know what's happening. I can't imagine if you were the subject of an attempted murder and you are, you're shopping downtown Bennington and a murderer, a person with attempted murder on you just happens to be in the next aisle. Anyway, do you want to give Katie the... Sure, sorry, that's, it works, yep. Can you work on this? I'll walk through the second half of the bill. Yeah, sounds great. That includes you. And we've got a number of witnesses on it. We've got David Cahill on the phone and Matt Valerio on the dating chart here. Can't remember if Pepper's on this. Pepper's here, but is David representing you or something? David can, but, you know, from a department standpoint, I'd be happy to testify. How come you weren't down in Bennington yesterday? But he was also there. There's no one else down there, yeah. The impulse on the front page of the Bennington banner. What was happening? Let him know that he pushed a campion right off the front page. I'm not taking what I'm doing. It was a 30-year-old sex assault case. Oh, the guy from Landwell. It has been, the guy was adjudicated, guilty, and then had a, there was a missed trial declared and they've been trying to try him. He claims that he has a heart condition, he's down in Florida, and he claims to have a heart condition that we've got a trial to kill him in, going on for like 30 years. It's a bizarre case and Jeff Amistoy, John Campbell, and Brian Burgess are special prosecutors. They've taken, is it the state's attorneys or is the attorney general's taken it over? It was an attorney general case, but then we hired, the department hired the attorney general who was assigned to it. So he became a deputy state's attorney, but he kept his base. Oh, thank you. So it's an odd sort of situation now. And we have special prosecutors assigned from, well, the Brian Burgess and Jeff Amistoy. And? And the Amistoy was still practicing. I think he, he originally, Brian Burgess originally had this case. He was involved in the case. Speaking of interesting cases, I don't know, but anyway, Campbell took a campion off the front. Go ahead. All right. Can you look at Office of Legislative Council? As Eric said, the second half of the bill turns to various reporting requirements, data collection, so I'll walk you through those sections. Starting at section two, this has to do with the availability of psychiatric support services. So a determination by the department of state's attorneys and sheriffs and the defender general is required as to whether each has sufficient and comparable resources to fund psychiatric support or evaluative services. And this report would be due by November 1st of this year. Moving on to the next page, the report would include an inventory of how existing funds are used to fund psychiatric support services or evaluative services. In section three, this has to do with an assessment of mental health services that are provided in a corrections setting. So again, by November 1st of this year, DMH and DOC would jointly submit an inventory and evaluation of mental health services provided by the entity that DOC contracts with for healthcare services. The evaluation would include a comparison as to how the type, frequency and timeliness of mental health services provided in a correctional setting differ from those offered within the community. So just a comparison of services in correctional facility versus in the community. Also the report is to address how the MOU that was executed between DMH and DOC impacts mental health services that are provided by the department of corrections healthcare vendor. I think this one should go to Senator Ntukutian as well. Because I think there may be a discussion of a forensic unit at some point. Like similar to what is available in other states. And there's been some discussion of that as they consider the different facilities. And Senator Benning's committee should also receive that report. I wouldn't be surprised to see some recommendations in that. I think I have an idea of building that's gonna be available in July. I do too. You do, but yours and mine may not match. You may not. The next section, section four, creates a forensic care working group. By August of this year, DMH is to convene a work group of stakeholders, including the department of corrections, the department of state's attorneys and sheriffs, the defender general, the office of the attorney general. And then the purpose of this work group would be to identify gaps in current mental health and the criminal justice structure and opportunities to improve public safety and coordination of treatment. This would include a review of competency restoration models that are used in other states and recommendations for treatment management and the management of individuals who are not guilty by reason of insanity. And then in subsection B, the report with the working group's findings would be submitted by DMH on November 1st of this year and it's to include a survey and literature review of competency restoration programs, including Connecticut's psychiatric security review board and a look at the ability for those type of models to be replicated in Vermont. And lastly, section five is an appropriation and it's an appropriation to DMH for the purpose of funding a public education campaign regarding how the forensic care system operates in Vermont and how it addresses patient needs and public safety. How do we come up with $8,000? It seems a lot of things that they know and would never get their appropriation. I think you should ask Senator Clarkson. Clarkson? One of the co-sponsors. I don't know. Don't, that's a good question. It seems like a very small sum. I think someone made some study that had been done a few years back or something like that. It's a public education campaign, I'm sure of it. I don't remember where that came from. Do you? No. Katie, do you? I can't remember. All right. The number I was given to plug in. So would this be after we've had these other things done or right at the same time? Have that come from the governor's? Maybe there's public education campaign is how bad this is. Yeah, I mean, why are we doing that right now? I think it was just to be a small campaign for people that have information. I think they find out. Did you make that suggestion, David Cale? I didn't claim any ownership or knowledge of anything other than section one. Okay, nice. All right, we'll have an investigation and there were the $8,000 came from. Is it a good idea? The question really for the committee is, is it a good idea and then appropriations would need to figure out what it's going to cost? Does the public really need to know how the prison cares? Do they care? Yeah. Well, they care what the results are, but not... Anyway, no. The way this is written, it's pretty. Okay, I will take ownership of the $8,000. It might really be an idea. I think somebody said, what's the number on that list? I think it was really Senator Clarkson. I'm not saying whether I love this bill or not, but on behalf of victims in that particular statement, it seems to me victims' advocates ought to be vested with that knowledge to be able to explain to them and that might not cost us a dime. Right. Good suggestion, Joe. That's part of the problem with the victims. I've got a letter here that came from a relative of one of the individuals who was murdered. I thought there was a section on victims' notification. What happens to that section on the bill? Well, there are pieces in section one about them victims abstaining from having the ability to appear at the hearing. Okay, okay. Okay, are there any questions for Katie besides the $8,000? Thank you very much. Thank you, Katie. Next is David Cahill. Good morning, everybody. Good morning, we're in. Well, first I just wanted to thank the judge council for giving me a solid half an hour to get my email fixed. That was much appreciated. And now with all the resources in the state, I can give you my two cents on section one. First, it's worth just asking what's got us here. Those of you on Justice Oversight are likely familiar, perhaps more familiar than you'd like to be with what's got us here, but I'll go over it briefly. As currently laid out, Vermont's mental health staff used to make very little distinction between a person who is accused of a crime but is incompetent to fan trial and as a result is never adjudicated on the merits of the crime. The Vermont law does not distinguish well between that person and a person who commits no crime and is admitted into the mental health system by a virtue of having a major mental illness which is being a threat to him for his health. So there are individuals who come into the custody of the commissioner of mental health through a court process or through a first warrant process and have committed no crime. And those individuals are treated remarkably similarly to those who are incompetent. And they're also treated remarkably similarly to those who are insane. Those who are insane are individuals who have gone to trial and it has been determined by the fact finders. Usually a jury, sometimes a judge, they're determined by the fact finder to have committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. And then the fact finder further determined that the defendant has proven by a punter to the evidence that the defendant has released a criminal responsibility by virtue of being insane. And I won't recap the deafness of the sanity hairs went over that with you. So the issue right now is that these three very different populations are treated the exact same once they come into the mental health system. And by that I mean they are entitled to being treated as a patient first. They are a receiver of healthcare services. They are not deemed to be a public safety for the first and foremost. They are a patient in the custody of the care of the commissioner and they're entitled to treatment as a patient and anyone else would including healthcare type of patient. And likewise they all are subject to an initial commitment order that is a maximum 98. And after that 98 a commitment order can be renewed for a period of up to one year. And then again it goes up to one year after that time. But the litmus test is again is medical necessity. What is the least restrictive environment that there is to treat this patient? Are there medical goals that are yet to be achieved? There is very little public safety analysis and to the extent there is a public safety analysis it's really backdoor it is. In that a patient could be a risk to further harm to themselves or others by virtue of committing future crimes and that's how we account for public safety. But it's important to note that under the law as it is now risk the criminal court only has the authority to require a what we would call a discharge hearing where public safety can be taken into account for that first 90 day order. Which is another way of saying that if we have the same murderer who had jury all agreed committed the murder and who had jury all agreed who was insane at the time of putting the murder the court's going to order that if the person is discharged within 90 days and the commissioner of public health or mental health that there needs to be a court hearing on that topic. However, once the initial 90 day order expires it will now on renewed order. The public safety hearing requires a drastic amount. And any person determination regarding whether the person needs to be in custody in a secure facility or in an outpatient facility or not in custody at all walking the street that is a determination that is made by the commissioner of mental health without judicial review. And typically without notification to the state attorney's office to the victim advocate or the victim because do so would be to violate healthcare privacy. None of what I am saying is a criticism of the department of mental health through the commissioner of mental health. It is simply an accurate statement of the law. And we should understand that what DMA does is what we have perhaps read about in the news is them simply doing their job following the law. It is for us to decide however going forward what the law should be. A good example is the Arnoldo Crude case at Springfield, Vermont where he stabbed his girlfriend in the neck in Hilter, an expert witness for the defense agreed, it indicated that he was insane at the time of the offense. The state expert indicated that he could not refuse the defense claim. The civilian witnesses in the case were interviewed by my office indicating great concerns about his mental health and quote unquote describing the crazy. Based upon that, we had a court trial on the issue of insanity. The judge determined based upon the evidence that he was insane. He was placed in the custody of the commissioner for mental health in December. And as I understand it, he was out on the streets of Springfield, Massachusetts by the following October. And the question for all of us is that A, is this a one-off experience? Is this the only insane murderer who's gonna ever walk the streets? And B, if the answer is no, if this is something that could be replicated, is this a concern about that happening? Is there any concern about the notion that someone who is factually committed a murder is out mingling with the public less than a year later? And from my perspective, the answer is that, yes, this is something that is going to happen. It is going to recur. One could take a look at what happened in Chisholm County or take a look at what happened in my county and say, well, you know, blame it on the prosecutor. The prosecutor didn't do the right thing. The prosecutor made the wrong judgment. The jury might have convicted the person and caught them to go to prison. And that may very well be true. But the reality is that the system still needs to be able to properly accommodate insane individuals who have factually committed a homicide and attempted a homicide. And right now our system is not equipped to do that. The Department of Mental Health does not have a facility where they would be still comfortable lodging someone long term. They don't have the statutory authority that really allows them to lodge someone long term. But each of us, deep down, knows that for public safety, if we have someone who has killed one, we really owe it to the public to carefully monitor that person to ensure that they are truly stable before turning them back out on the street. It's not enough to say, we watched them for 90 days, he's on new meds now, he seems happy, he seems calm, he probably won't kill again. We need a greater level of certainty before those types of individuals are out in the public. Which is why in this bill, there's a three year commitment term proposed. Some other jurisdictions have longer commitment terms. New Hampshire commits for five years. There may be some concerns in the room about due process. Well, what can we truly commit someone for a period longer than 90 days without violating their due process rights? And the history is absolutely. First, New Hampshire's five year term is basically valid under the federal constitution. It has not been effectively challenged. Secondly, we need to take note of the fact that insane individuals have had their due process up front. They have been in front of the does or jury. They have their adjudication on them there. They were, the sufficient facts were found to convict. They were used from the conviction by virtue of being insane. That level of due process is very different from insane individuals, or I'm sorry, from incompetent individuals or individuals who have committed no crime. Because those latter categories have not been the subject of adjudication on the merit. But with the same individuals, they had their due process. They had their day in court. Now we need to consider public safety. Now folks might be thinking, well, okay, so this is a narrow bill. Why is it so narrow? Because the idea is to focus on the most egregious circumstances. And that really is the insane murder. I understand there are proposals to broader mental health bills out there. We could discuss those on their own merit. This is intended to be rather mentally focused. And with that, I'll thank you for enduring through my monologue. Senator Baruth has a question. I have a couple small points. So you are tending to use the phrase insane murderer, which I don't necessarily think is the best way to phrase it. But the bill also includes attempted homicide. So the people aren't murderers according to the juries, right? All the time? Well, yes, it's true that the difference between, unfortunately, the difference between a murderer and attempted murder is really how good their aim is. Because they have the same intent. They intend to kill. Well, but they are, am I correct that they're not murderers? So this bill includes murderers plus attempted murder. Right. Then my other question is, if they've had their due process rights upfront, could you change the time from 90 days to 20 years? Well, you know, the interesting thing is that's exactly what we do for individuals who are adjudicated on the merits and found criminally responsible. And I suspect, I suspect that you at the Supreme Court, by virtue of the case that Senator Sears brought up, is gonna give us some insight into that. I am simply noting that the 90 day return to court requirement and then the one year return to court requirements thereafter, is intended to provide a level of due process to individuals who have not had their day in court, who have not had their criminal trial and education. First of all, we went through a series of discussions last year over Jack Sawyer in the attempt language in Vermont. And actually, that was at the years before, I don't know how long ago, it was a long time ago. Might have been two, might have been one. Whenever, anyway. We went through the attempt laws in Vermont and you do have to be pretty much the poor aim to be the attempt. But I want David to, during Justice Oversight, it was testimony from one individual who said, once they have been found to be not guilty by reason of insanity, they're patients. And as patients, the person that had a heart condition, you wouldn't, well, maybe heart condition's a bad point because of this court case. But as patients, you wouldn't necessarily be holding them accountable in the same manner. You look at patients as different. You try to get them healthy. And I think that's part of the push and pull here. But I think most Vermonters agree that what they saw in your jurisdiction and what they saw in Burlington isn't the best outcome. I do think people feel that they need to be a change. That's why I introduced Bill along with Senator Lyons and Clarkson. Is that in the statute? Senator Clarkson is because she went to dinner with State Attorney Cale and they. Is it in the statute that once the person is found to be insane, that it's an automatic? Where does it say that, that it's an automatic, that they're coming to the Department of Mental Health? Is that in the statute? Yes. That's a good point, Senator Nica. And you know, that parking is back to the point that Senator Harris just made, which is the whole notion that these individuals are patients. They are patients because prior general assemblies have created this funnel where disparate groups, you know, the incompetent, the insane, and the civilly committed all funnel into the same statutory scheme. So this is because it was written into law, not because it should be. And I guess that's another way of saying that what we're doing through this, Bill, is really trying to disentangle some groups that really shouldn't be locked together. So can I just ask a question about, oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead. Just about the three years, it sounded very harsh and long to me when I first read it and then I'm thinking, if I shoot Senator Sears right now, I would probably be sent to prison for a fairly long period of time. Clear defense of justifiable homicide. Justifiable homicide, okay. If I shot Senator Benning. That would definitely be a long period of time. Long period of time. But if I had some kind of a break or, so I would be sent to prison for a fairly long time, but if in that defense, I was found to be at the time insane, then I would be essentially sentenced for three years with a potential reprieve after three years. Is that, do I understand? Does that make sense to you, David? So that is right, and let me explain the rationale behind it. So let's say, regrettably, you were found insane for one of those murders, and you were sent to a mental institution in the custody of the Christian Mental Health. And there you're diagnosed, you're put on a new medication regimen. The new Senator White, who is now medicated, seems a little less violent than the old Senator White. You had some effective talk therapy. There's also enormous pressure to get you out of that mental health bed because there's not a lot of them and there are needs for other people who are coming in the pipeline for all those other things, like for being incompetent or for being simply committed or other people who are insane. And so, invariably, there's gonna be some pressure to get you out the door. And the question is, when you're pushed out the door on day 91 or day 180 or day 365, do we really know that you're gonna stay in your meds? Do we really know you're not gonna become the old Senator White who enjoyed being herself without those meds and without the talk therapy? And the idea behind the three-year commitment is to ensure that the folks in the medical facility providing the appropriate level of care to you have the opportunity to see several places of your vacation, to see you being happy, to see you being sad, to see you taking your meds, to see you refusing to take your meds, so that they can get a genuine long-term perspective on whether you've stabilized or not. Right, and so I would be getting a sentence of much less if I was deemed insane than the sentence I would get if I was deemed sane when I shot him. Well, it kind of apples and oranges in the same state. It's a different sentence, but it's like, well, let's think through how it works. So if you get convicted of secondary murder, the presumptive sentence is 20 years to life, which means on year 20, you're eligible for parole, you get to see the parole board, maybe they let you out, maybe you don't, maybe they don't. Maybe there's a good time law by then if you get out on year 15, we don't know. Now, if you get found insane, you're in for three years, and then you can be committed for an additional year subject to a court hearing every year. Right. And so you could be in there, like Dean Tinkley, you could be in there for 36 years, or you could be in there for only three years. Right. That will be informed by public safety. I get my parole hearing after three years, if I'm insane. Right, yes. Okay, okay, I just... Senator Benning, did you have a comment on her or on the bill? It will take too long for me to comment on Senator White, but I would like to talk about the bill. David, I heard you describe earlier the narrowness of this bill. I think that was your word for homicide, attempted homicide, from a prosecutorial standpoint, which is admittedly not one of my fortes. What would you then say to a victim of a serial rapist or a victim who is left in a wheelchair as a result of a conviction for an aggravated assault with weapons? It seems to me that if you're gonna go down this road, there are other offenses that might be just as bad, or even reaching to the point of a Jack Sawyer. What do you... Why are you not addressing that in this bill? Well, I say to them with all honesty, I wish we could have gotten a broader bill through the Senate and through the House. And I don't think we would. Now, Grant, if you're in the room, you're in the building, if you think that there actually would be traction for a broader bill, that would be great. Because frankly, as prosecutors, we recognize that first statutory, the current statutory scheme is like with fees. There are lots of holes. People are falling through them. It's not just this violation. It's also the guy who's committing sexual assault and have a traumatic brain injury and going to the custody of the department of nothing. There's no department that will take them. I don't know whether it would gain traction or not, but I think the answer is if something like that were to be attempted, the three-year automatic placement would probably come up as something that has to be flexible to accommodate those situations. The other question I have is from the other side of the spectrum, this bill vests a victim with not only the right to notice, but also standing in a conversation about whether a person should be continued or discontinued in treatment. I don't understand the connection of how a victim would have the scientific expertise to participate in that conversation. I would submit that what they have is the emotional argument about whether somebody should remain there or not. I see that as particularly problematic. What's your response to that? So again, one of the features of this bill is that it changes that conversation upon renewal of the commitment order to not just the medical necessity, but also the demands of public safety. And one thing I've noticed about old homicide and attempted homicide are that there's really one person who remembers the fact better than anybody else. That's the victim and the victim's family. Obviously, it's the surviving victim only in attempted homicide. Because, you know, in these old cases, does it come and go, prosecutors come and go, commissioners come and go? But the victim and their family always remember and they are there to ensure that the fact finder understands the fact. Well, if this person has been committed for a period of time, in this case, three years, wouldn't the assumption be automatically that they were in a serious crime situation? I mean, I personally, as I read through this, I'm envisioning a case where emotions are brought to the table and not the scientific question of whether or not an individual should continue or be discontinued in treatment. I don't know, I guess I'm gonna ask the rest of the folks who are proposing this to answer that, because that particular piece leaves me a little uncomfortable. I certainly understand why they should have notice. Whether they have standing to actually give testimony on the scientific question of whether they should be continued is leaving me a little uncomfortable. I think the intent, it's a good point. I think the intent of the sponsors was to provide some information about their own feelings of safety. And not necessarily whether or not the person was treated. That standing would be due. If this person who murdered the woman in White River Junction and her family still felt threatened by that individual, that's the idea was the victim would have some kind of a say on that basis. But I think that's Joe's point. Are there feelings to be elevated to the level of the medical thing? I mean, it's something to keep in mind, but the state's attorney, in the case of Elizabeth Teague, went to, that's public because she wasn't under HIPAA, I think. But anyway, I know that the state's attorney made the case that she felt that she was still dangerous and that the community would be worried about her release. From, you know, I don't remember exactly what the details were. So I think there is that through the state's attorney, but you can work on that, it's a good point. They certainly shouldn't have standing on the treatment. Can you just say standing to be heard? Right, yeah. I think the idea was to be heard about their feelings about this individual. There was a case where somebody was, there was an attempted murder, the person failed, and that person didn't even know they were being released. Well, from the defense attorney's perspective, you've shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that their treatment should be discontinued. And when I see the victim having a say in that conversation, it's, they could have all the psychiatrists in the world, but if the emotion in the room is ratcheted up based on the victim's feelings, I don't know how you overcome that, and that's... Well, before we start marking up to identify some problems, I'd like to hear from at least David Shure and Vapilario for the final half hour we have left. Who wants to go first? You want to go? Because all of the state's can go together. All of the state's can go together. I like it. And anyone else who wants to testify on this bill, Chuck with Peggy, she'll be back, and she had to leave at 11.30, but she'll be back shortly, and you can check with Peggy and testify at a future meeting of the committee on this bill. David, thank you for being here. All right, thank you for having me for the record, David Shure. Do you want to hang up? I'll hang up before the state brings off my cell phone as well. Okay. Bye, David, thank you. I'm glad you... Thank you for being here with us. Happy child rearing. All right, for the record, David Shure, with the Attorney General's Office. I'd start out the testimony by saying certainly the Attorney General shares the goals of this bill with respect to ensuring public safety with these most serious crimes, as well as ensuring sufficient victim notification and input on some of these processes. I'm gonna divide my testimony in three general parts. One is some sort of general big picture issues that we wanted to make sure the committee is considering a few technical things which I'll run through quickly because I imagine we'll deal with that in more detail at future hearings. And then briefly wanted to mention competence, which in this bill is addressed with a committee, forensic care working group, but wanted to just mention a couple things on that quickly. So with the general issues, starting with the big picture issues, and I've been working closely with our criminal division on reviewing the bill and thinking through these issues, and I should say our criminal division chief is sitting behind me, Domenica Padillo, we've been discussing this bill. I think one of the big things that we want to emphasize in this, well, this isn't directly on the point of the procedures that are laid out in this bill. It is an important underlying consideration that is going to affect how these things work. But on practical standpoint, when lawyers are litigating in court on these issues, what comes into play is the resource issue in terms of adequate facilities and adequate forensic facilities, especially for these most serious cases, and having everything be funded through Medicaid and the various rules and requirements that come with that, as opposed to general fund dollars, which give the state a little more leeway to set its own rules, which is not to say that there are issues that remain, hit bit issues and things like that, that any medical professional will have to work with, but that underlying issue of everything being funded through Medicaid and not having a dedicated forensic facility that is out of the state general fund is always going in our view as a practical matter, going to limit the options that we have, even if we were to make a big change like this or something similar, the ability to execute on it is going to be severely hampered. And again, I realize that's a little bit outside the purview of just the procedural questions that are addressed in this bill, but we think it's important for the committee to be aware of that as a big picture issue. These procedural solutions really won't be able to, or a procedural solution like this won't be able to be put in place without addressing that larger issue. Another point that I wanted to bring up. Did you mean the forensic unit? That's right. What's that? I agree with you. That's why I really hope that the state will look at that, because it is a problem. If you're trying to get person A out because you got person B coming in who was mentally ill, but it's not a criminal, got the person who committed a murder may or may not be continued dangerous and you're pushing the murderer out. I'm not sure that's the right public safety. That's right. And again, that issue we think is going to underlie and that's what we're trying to do. A practical solution here. But you do raise another question I have of all of this as the Attorney General. Matt, a couple of others can answer for me, but we know there's a number of people who are incarcerated who are seriously mentally ill. Not serious functional impairment, but seriously mentally ill. And those people weren't lucky enough to be found. Incompetent by reason of insanity or, I mean, how does that all work? I hesitate to comment on cases without knowing about it. I don't have a specific case in mind, but it just, it troubles me that I walk into a correctional facility and I see people who are seriously mentally ill. And I can talk to people and I see other people who are dangerously very borderline, developmentally disabled clearly by just their response to questions I ask them or conversations I have. No, wait a minute. This person's in jail, been found guilty of a crime and is doing their time. I had this other person is out because they were deemed mentally ill, they even know they murdered somebody. And this poor sucker just happened to punch the wrong person. I think procedurally speaking, what can happen is that these are cases where with the insanity defense, for example, it really is a question of fact as to what was happening at the time of the crime. And so, I don't know these specific individual cases, but it could be the case that somebody's found insane at the time of crime, or sorry, not found insane at the time of crime is adjudicated guilty, but presents as seriously incompetent moving forward and they are incarcerated under their sentence. That's certainly the law as it stands allows for that outcome. I've got a constituent who's 18 years old has been brought into a correctional facility since the middle of October, after he graduated from DCF, disability, I never get Dale right, but I call him Dale or Dial or whatever that operation is, are actually working with the family, working with the local mental health center to set up programs for him. But he said he did evidently, but his assault wasn't. His assault wasn't bad enough to qualify? Well, his situation wasn't insane. He wasn't insane at the time of the crime, of the assault. So he sits in jail and a guy could murder somebody and be out, he's been in almost 90 days now. So if you think of the 90 day, that person could be out. I think there's a little unfairness there, I think. I think you raise an important point, Senator, and a parallel issue with respect to treatment services that are available for our incarcerated population. And I think that's certainly something that we should discuss. He's being held without bail. So he's not even eligible for a certain treatment, unless he accepts it. It's a very discouraging system that we've created. And I understand why Kansas did what they did. These fundamental fairness issues with regards to who has why out is something that I think we... It's just coming. I mean, I think how we deal with these mental illness issues, we could be doing better. I don't think there's any question about that. And we need to figure out ways so that the results for society, for you, Senator, for all of us feel fair when we see them. I mean, that is a basic outcome that we need to achieve. And I think we would agree that we aren't there and we need to do work. One other issue I'd like to just bring up, and the committee already did discuss this a bit. And I think we have some more work to do, and I'll be honest with the committee, we don't have the answer right now. We are continuing to research and need to look into it and need to figure out a little bit more. But that is, as the committee was discussing, the three-year term of confinement. There is, this does touch on constitutional questions. It does touch on the question of when, under what authority somebody can be held and what processes do for somebody who's being held who under under the laws of our state, there are other ways of doing this, but under the laws of our state has been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity. And as State Attorney Cahill mentioned, we have provisions where we have the 90-day period that's followed by a one-year period. And under our current laws, that one-year period does still afford the ability for review in the midst of those years. So in other words, somebody's being held, or confined I should say, because they are mentally ill, the question that's being asked as to the necessity whether the confinement is necessary is a question of their mental condition. Somebody's being incarcerated because they're guilty, that's a separate issue. And we need to make sure we have sufficient due process in place and consider that issue of periods. Three, it was three years without the ability to check that is a providing adequate due process. State Attorney Cahill is correct in the five-year period essentially the same set of rules. On the flip side, there are Supreme Court cases making it clear that when somebody's being held because they've been adjudicated insane at the time of the crime, there does need to be an inquiry as to whether the confinement is medically necessary, is clinically indicated. And I think that question of terms and periods is probably I think we're not gonna find absolute clarity on that, but I do think we should do a little more work on figuring out what the terms of that need to be, whether it's a default three years with the ability to review before upon motion, whether it's a shorter period without the ability to review whether that is in fact legally adequate that we just need to do more work on that piece. I think the committee is right to ask about those issues. A few, Senator White had a question. Oh, sorry. I just was, the question that I asked earlier about whether the commitment meant either hospitalization or non-hospitalization, order of non-hospitalization, because it isn't clear here. So it could be an order of non-hospitalization the way this reads. Before I answer that question definitively, I would wanna look at Title 18 in full and make sure that I'm not misstating something that's been defined in statute. So I don't want to give you a definitive answer on that right now, but I can certainly check on that and see if that's defined or if it leads open the possibility that you're mentioning. Okay, I think it does, but. You may well be right. A couple technical issues that we did want to note for the committee in when you look on page four, line six, it makes reference to a secure residential recovery facility. In Title 18 there is mention that such a, or there's indication that such a facility is not actually the most secure facility that you might be in. I will say that a review of Title 18 in full, or actually I don't wanna claim that I've read every word, but a more complete review of where that term is used shows that in one place it's clear that they are not talking about the most secure possible facility. And if that's the case, that renders this subsection a little bit confusing because it seems to be talking about a step down from the most secure location, or it seems to be intended to be talking about a step down from the most secure location. I will say that other uses of that phrase in Title 18 are a little ambiguous and that's something we may wanna straighten out. We would also ask that state's attorney, whenever that's used, we also use attorney general, so there's no confusion that attorney general cases. In attorney general cases, the attorney general's office is standing. In subsection C on page four, we'd also just want to make sure that there is, that the state has sufficient access to information to meaningfully litigate the issues. If the state has to lock into those hearings without access to information, such as treatment records and so forth, there won't be a meaningful hearing on those issues and we think that as a matter of fairness and as a matter of achieving the goals that we're trying to achieve with respect to public safety and victim notification, that should be included. And the final piece I'll mention really quick, and I know we don't have to go into this stuff in detail now, just making sure we have the procedure clarified at the end, top of page five, line two, we have the procedure clarified as to what would happen if there is an order issued not to proceed with the release and making sure we clarify what happens next under this new system we're setting up. And the final piece I'll mention for the committee is around section four, which talks about study incompetence. We understand that it's the given section four and it's provisioned for a working group to review competency issues. Competency probably or may not be something that the committee wants to dive into in this session, in this bill, but we would urge the committee to include when we look at that. It already mentions competence restoration, which I think is important. Obviously, that is an important piece of this, which I'm sure will come up, but the final sort of substantive issue is with respect to competency determinations in court at the under a relatively recent Supreme Court ruling, state Supreme Court ruling, which interpreted statutory law to basically say that, or I should say the effect of what this ruling is, is that if there is a psychiatric opinion that somebody is not competent to stand trial, it does not leave any room for the state to litigate that with evidence that the person with an examination showing that the person might be competent to stand trial. And again, for the sake of fairness, for the sake of making sure that cases are being heard fairly, we do wanna make sure that there's the ability to be heard and we clarify that statute. I should say the ability to be litigated meaningfully and we should clarify that statute to allow that to happen. There's a few ways we could do that and I'll refrain from going into the details on that right now because I understand that's not the thrust of this bill, but I do wanna highlight that for the committee so that you are aware of those issues as well. And that is my testimony, I'm happy to answer questions. I do have questions. So I heard you indicating that your office thought further study of the three years was more to your further discussion. Any first blush thoughts those three years seem initially too much without review? I think the question for us is we're trying to balance this concern around public safety with constitutional requirements. And the pathway there, there's a few different ways we could go when you look at other statutes around the country. And the pathway there I think is not entirely clear. I do think that we support a system that better takes into account questions of public safety and under the current system, which does allow for relatively rapid release potentially of dangerous individuals. We do feel like there isn't sufficient inquiry into that public safety issue and that there has been a push to release for whatever clinical reasons that may be. I think that a big, I guess I'm not prepared to give you a definitive answer on the term of years in part because that is so tied up in the legal and questions and case review that I think we need to do more work on. I think in part this does go back unfortunately to the facility issue and the funding issue. If in fact we did have a facility that was operating out of the general fund and not under Medicaid rules and that had the capacity to deal with persons who were adjudicated, not guilty by reason of insanity. Some of these issues, not all of them, I think there are process issues that need to be worked out that this bill helps address. But some of these issues around assuring public safety would be considerably helped by that, that piece alone. And so I think as we think about how to ensure these things, that part can't, we can't leave that part out. Well, I'm looking at the clock and I'm apologizing to Matt for nothing. Joe, I'm assuming that's gonna have a long reason to do that. I'm assuming it doesn't. Yeah, I'm assuming it wouldn't be a five minute. Not even close, right? Not even close. Would you like an hour? I would. Okay. David, did I understand you just said we're still doing research on all of them? That's right. All right. I have a couple of questions. The first one is, can you at least get some kind of an estimate on what the number of court dates may be added to court dockets as a result of this? The second question, I don't know if this is in your bailiwick, but I would like to know how many additional mental health bed spaces you may be looking at in order to accommodate this. And I guess those are the two things that I have request that research be done on. My next question has to do with the victim participation in this discussion. First off, from a prosecutorial standpoint, I think you and I can both agree that the direct victim in a homicide case is dead. They don't care and will not be participating in the conversation. I cannot understand why a victim in a serial rapist case or a victim in an aggravated assault with weapon case doesn't have the same argument to make as the remaining victims in a homicide case. By that, I'm going to read you the definition of a victim as it's found in our criminal statutes. So as victims means a person who sustains physical, emotional or financial injury or death as a direct result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or act of delinquency, I'll leave that up. And shall also include the family members of, among other things, a homicide victim. So I'm envisioning this statute opens the door for the spouse, the children and the grandchildren or however many relatives you wanna go as following in the definition of a victim in discussion of whether or not a person who is now vested with the burden of having to establish whether their treatment should continue or not. To me, that really muddies up the conversation about is treatment necessary to continue or not? Do you agree or disagree with that theory of our observation? I think the key piece for our office, when we look at that, we did discuss a little bit about victim participation in these or victim presence, is making sure that victims are there, victims have access to information, victims have input with the state's attorney or attorney general's office that's going to be trying these hearings, that's going to be involved in these hearings and making sure that there is a mechanism for victim voice in that. And it may be the better model is something like what we do now in terms of, of our defined way in which they will be heard, which is what's currently provided for under the victim rights aspects of the Title 13. It may need to be reworked a little, Joe, and reworded, I don't disagree with you. I was not the intent of myself or any other sponsors of the bill, of the drafters of the bill, to give victims a say in the treatment of the individual. Any more than I would think a victim has necessarily a say in the treatment of a person in the department of corrections. Once they're committed to the commissioner of corrections and say the victims don't get a say in, well, how's he doing in anger management classes or how's he doing in TV classes or sex offender treatment classes, they don't get a say in that. What they do get a say in a voice in is their own fears and how they, and part of this, the goal really of my perspective was to at least give the victim some notice that this person is being released so that they can be prepared for it. And that's not even available right now in the current law. Yeah, I don't have any problem with the notice there. And that's what the intent was, and whether it, in the way that it comes across, I can understand the point, we can work on the language, but it's not my intent to give the victim a voice any more than we give the victim a voice in a sex offender treatment. Do we have any sense of how, I mean, Joe asked about Ben, but do we have any sense of how many people at any given time are in this category? Is it three or 23 or? I sitting here right now don't have that sense, but we will try to get you. Okay, I would like to, because I think that's... If you're in Chittenden County and what's happened in other cases around the state leads me to believe there's more than four. Yeah, I just, I mean, it has some, whatever we think a number might be, it has some bearing on what the available facilities are and how we... Absolutely. So. I have a really good question to David. Pepper, do you have a comment? We will have to use some of that. James Pepper, I don't want to stay stirring the chair. You know, I think that's actually a question directed at the department and I'm just curious, would you like to know the number of competency and insanity evaluations that have been done and then just limit it to the homicide and intensive homicide case? Well, we're talking about here about a three year potential commitment of people who have been deemed insane. So how many people is that that you would have to make some provisions for, is it? So I think the question really is how many of these evaluations have been done for murder and attempted murder charges? How many of the psychiatrists come back and said this person was insane? Yeah. Well, I'll be interested in, in George's point about the victims of aggravated sexual assault. How many big 12 cases either out there? Okay. I'd really be interested in that. I don't think you necessarily want to go beyond that. I'm leaving it to the state's attorneys to have to explain to a victim of a misdemeanor of some kind. Why they don't have to say it. But I think if you looked at the big 12 offenses, it would be obviously, covers, generally. I don't have any other questions, David, but thank you. Thank you. What I intend to do is bring this up again. And anyone who wants to test it, we will start with Matt and let Pepper have his 15 minutes after Matt has an hour. You can bring any witnesses you'd like with you. Oh, you want me to bring some? No. No, I'm kidding. Well, yes. Well, when we take this up again, Matt needs an hour. Give him 45 minutes. And if he goes over, we'll... He was not that. And then Pepper needs 15 minutes. So that would be the first hour of testimony. I don't know what... We won't get to it next week, but the week after. And then anybody else who wants to testify, let us know. And in order to save our legislative counsel, if the testimony is going to be mainly on section one, I don't want to have... Katie, you have to sit through everything. Maybe Eric, and if there's something comes up about the other section that we could have. Eric. And that's one and two, mostly. One and two. So if you could let us know when you sign up to testify, which sections you are interested in. So we have the right ledge counsel here. Because they have a difficulty scheduling. We have many committees to serve. Many masters. Too many house committees. That's the problem. That is the problem. I realized yesterday, I was at a thing in Manchester with Kathleen James and Cynthia Browning. And I had no idea how many caucuses in the house that there are. Oh, there are like 40 of them. Oh, I know, that's, you know, I'm supposed to die. The older people's caucuses Thursday at noon, have people coming up for the older caucuses. Then we have tomorrow the tourism caucus and the climate solutions caucus. The women's caucus is very interested in other subjects. Then there's the... The river caucus. The river caucus. There's three or four other ones. So Claire and I were going to set up the caucus to eliminate caucuses or whatever we called it. And the meeting wasn't going to be set and you weren't required to show up. Because we think there are too many, there's just a proliferation of it. Every time an issue comes up, somebody creates a caucus around it. I agree. She's here about the new quarter right now. Thank you. We're adjourned. Thank you. What?