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Streamed live on Sep 29, 2016
For years, legal wiretapping was straightforward: the officer doing the intercept connected a tape recorder or the like to a single pair of wires. The changing structure of telecommunications and new technologies such as ISDN and cellular telephony made executing a wiretap more complicated for law enforcement, and such simple technologies would no longer suffice. In response, the US passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which required that wiretapping capabilities be built into digital telephony switches. (Europe has similar requirements.) With new real-time communications technologies using packet-switching technologies, law enforcement has claimed it is "going dark." Several years ago, the FBI proposed changes in wiretap laws to require a CALEA-like interface in Internet software.
By requiring an architected security breach, such a "solution" would, in fact, create a great insecurity in all communications technology. I will present an alternative, namely using current vulnerabilities in order to wiretap. In this talk, I will discuss the technology issues and policy implications.