 I'm Jack Fenner. I'm an archaeologist here at ANU and a college-age specific within an interest in Mongolia. But today I have the pleasure of introducing a different topic related to land reform. And Undarga Sen Dagstern, who is one of the PhD candidates in the Crawford School at ANU, will be speaking on pasture land reform in Mongolia. I'd like to appreciate and express my thank to Dr. Naama for inviting me and including me in the very special gatherings on Mongolia update, along with very experienced and well-known politicians from Mongolia. So thank you so much. And I'm just a student and learning to research on the policy aspects of Mongolia, especially on pasture land reform. So I pretty much prepared a PowerPoint. And I apologize, Jess, that it might not be really clear, so I try to speak clearly. And so looking at the previous speakers, we had a lot of general ideas about Mongolia and all kinds of sectors. But this time it's going to be quite specific because it's a research based on a case study. And looking at the pasture land reform in Mongolia. So just brief outline, introduce my research problems, which is quite important. And then background why this research problem is very important, and research question methodology in case study area, and some of the preliminary findings and some conclusions. So the idea of researching this issue regarding to pasture land is pretty much after the transition Mongolia is considered open access. So environmental issue was pretty much defined as land degradation. And it was mainly considered to be a result of overgrazing. So overgrazing itself is considered as a result of collapse of formal institution, which we heard so many times after the collapse of collective institution and state institutions, there was no support and no regulation of pastoral resource and regulating herders access to pastoral resource. So that's why Mongolia government with the advocacy of international organizations implement the transition structural adjustment package, which included privatization and land reform. So both of these transitional policies highly prioritized pasture land management. So very much land based policy. Yet these policies were far away from solving the problems and reducing the overgrazing. It actually created a lot of complexity. So I argue in my thesis and research, actual pasture land management after the transition is not necessarily prioritizing the land issues itself, but it's actually regulating the components of pasture production management. So when I said pasture production management, historically, including Mongolian and international academics, and including global pastoralism, pasture production management involves three components, major components, land, livestock, labor. So these three aspects are all relevant to each other. It's not only land issue, it's actually a livestock and labor issue. So in order to manage pasture land properly and effectively, regulate the components, these three components together, as well as based on state administrative territory, the idea is there are a lot of initiatives introduced to Mongolia to define the property bodies and institutions, which implies that Mongolia doesn't have any property institution or property institution collapsed, which is to be state. So I argue I had this statement because just OK, you can see much about it, so I'll try to brief it in a efficient way. Historically, Mongolian pasture land management was part of Mongolian pasture production management. And pasture production management was managed based on the state territorial administration historically. So if we divide the history into three major times, feudal time, collective time, and transition time, which is since 1990, feudal time, which we record since Mongol Empire, let's say, even before that, it's usually centralized and decentralized regional state run by nobles and then later, along with Buddhist institution, regulating hereditary access. And then main institutional arrangement was military thousands or atuk later. And then under the Manchu time, it's a Hoshou-based administrative territorial along with pasture production management, which includes land, library, and livestock. So this institutional arrangement changed under the collective system. But collective system does not necessarily dismantle the whole aspects of pasture production management. They're actually maintained it. So the way it's disintegrated was some territorial administration managed the territorial issues. But state design collective institutions managed the production aspect. But collective production management includes land, labor, livestock within some level. So this way, even under the socialism, Mongolia managed to adjust its own policy. I mean, this collective policy, which is introduced by Russians, into their own conditions. So that's why Mongolia's a lot of our speakers are saying, until now Mongolia is the only one country which has managed to retain this landscape in this way is a lot to do with our own institutional arrangement, which is related to how Mongolians historically manage pasture production management, not only pasture land management. So this institutional arrangement changed dramatically under the transition in which some in back territorial administration basically becomes in charge of territory. And also, according to the new laws, it also becomes in charge of land management. So in this case, I'm trying to say here that pasture production management not disintegrated into land being specifically separately managed under the territorial issue. Whereas production of livestock and labor management, which is a production aspect, is pretty much privatized. So herders are only able to talk about production of, only able to talk about livestock and labor issues, but government or state pretty much lose control of regulating these aspects. So if I say when these three aspects are supposed to be together under the state territorial institutional arrangement, now it's all separated. And land is being under the territorial, and the other two aspects are controlled by herders itself, actually individual herding households. So because of these reasons, I'll say specific policy initiatives here just to mention. So 1991, privatization of livestock and livestock which basically means herders are becoming in charge of production aspects individually. In 1994, possession of winter and spring campsites by herding households under the new land law. So which means basically, pasture land is not necessarily have definite property rights, but herding campsites, this is specifically winter campsites, herders have specific property rights to their camping areas. So the idea is basically to introduce in Mongolia a very agrarian based, especially in these cases, very western oriented property rights ideas, exclusive property rights ideas. But this idea sort of conflicts with this communal public raising land. And then 1998, because of absence of this property rights issue to the pasture land, donor organizations again, through the environmental policy, try to create herder groups to define the property rights, to define the property bodies. So which by I mean, by which I mean, herders are all individual single households. So they need to have an institution to claim property rights to certain specific areas. And then in 2003, herder group use and production of natural resources were articulated in under 2003 amendments of the land law and natural law on the environmental protection. In 2007, another policy in its initiatives came. So this time it's quite national Mongolian's old policy, which is not necessarily influenced by international organizations. Stabilization of the state reserve pasture area. It's actually informally very historical practice of pasture use. And in the collective time, it was formalized by the state. All collectives needs to be supported by state institution reserve pasture enterprise. In 2010, another policy initiative came. Again, this time they tried to have separate law on the pasture land. Again, including an applying herder group possession of pasture land. So I'll take up the images. So all the ideas of all these policies is pretty much based on the initial problem definition of Mongolia, which is Mongolia doesn't have any specific property rights. Historically, it's open access. So it sounds like we got a lot of open issues here. That's why I need to define the property rights, define the resource group, define the territorial boundary for that resource group. So I chose to study historical reserve pasture area, which is located two hours drive, well, four hours drive away from Ulaanbaatar. So it's Kitsumayo Mountain, which used to be very famous historical reserve pasture area plus collective time state enterprise, which provided all collectors with reserve pasture and hay making, for automaking and forage making. And it used to be run by state, not collectors. So I focus on three, three bugs to, which belong to two different provincials, in order to compare how different territorial and property institutional arrangement they have. Just to make it brief, these are very brief findings. It can get a lot more complex, so you can ask more questions at the end, but I'll make it very brief here. So first findings I revealed from my research in case that we are using. So basically I'm arguing with whether Mongolia is open access or not, whether there is absence of property rights or not. So why Mongolia need exclusive individual or communal property rights to regulate access to pasture? So I'm arguing basically with these points, and my case study pretty much revealed 50%, some case open access created, some case it's not open access at all. So essentially maintenance of dual control over pasture land management, retained after the transition, dual control of pasture land management I meant by state control and communal control as well. So there was not so much open access created under the transition just because collective institution collapsed. Actually open access created to the collective assets, like wealth and livestock shelters, which collective institutes in the state enterprises all owned, but what herders did was they basically returned to the informal way of using pasture. This is because all Mongolian pasture production management is heavily dependent on weather condition. Seasonal pasture use, rotational pasture use, cross boundary seasonal visits, these are all dependent on weather condition, which has been developed, all these rules are developed for hundreds and hundreds of years in Mongolia, not just because of transition. So once collective and state support disappears, herders basically continue practicing their herd management, which basically led them to rely on traditional way of doing it, but this time it was not as bigger scale as it happened in the collective time, because collective provided with a lot of technological support and management aspect, but this time it's more like we know individual levels. And then also this informal use besides this informal use of pasture use, migration is another factor. So loads of migration happened between different provincials, and then especially to the leading towards the major urban areas and major reserve, major pasture areas. So it's all about access, how to get access to market and how to get access to good pasture, so you benefit, you increase your benefit. So that's why herders concentration around productive market areas and pastoral resources pretty much led to reduced mobility. So that's the first findings pretty much leading to over grazing. So repeated use of same pasture resource in a very small area creates over grazing. And second findings is, so second findings is related to land law. So 1994 land law articulated campsite possession by individual households. So this law is very, very influential in terms of creating negative impact on how herders use pasture land. So campsite possession becomes the only legal mechanism to secure access to pasture resource. So initially, like I said before, Mongolia had its own very complex property, I mean property resource use rights and which is basically to accommodate flexibility and mobility under a very unstable weather condition. So this right was informal recognized use rights to campsites which also allow access to pasture resources surrounding the campsites. So this access to campsites which used to be informal recognized use rights is now replaced by legal mechanism of campsite possession. So once you have no access to the campsite possession, it's pretty much really have to get access to surrounding pasture. And then also because of the migration, concentration of campsite increased and also it's resulted in expansion of campsite possession to the other seasonal pastures. So historically Mongolian pasture production management is based on state territorial administration. And under different history, territorial boundaries shrink a lot. So that's the fundamental issue about Mongolian pasture land management. So more territorial boundary shrinks, less flexibility is accommodated in pursuing mobility in different seasonal pasture. So concentration of campsite and campsite possession to other seasonal pastures is a very detrimental impact. So basically it reduces herders mobility. So again, repeated use of pasture. If pasture used to be, seasonal pasture used to be rotated a lot. This time it's not necessarily well rotated and actually distance are very much small, increasing number of lifestyles. So third policy initiative. In my case, it's not necessarily have direct impact, but it's quite interesting too. So community based natural resource management becomes big, big model in throughout the world in developing countries. Everybody suggested, okay, community needs to be related to conservation. They need to do the conservation. Okay, another idea is poor people destroy nature. And all these things led to, okay, community should have their own property rights and invest in the land and protect the environment. That idea also come to Mongolia and First Ministry of Environment has implemented this with the funding of international organization. So community based natural resource management raises a question of what's community in Mongolia. So for us, community is, again, in my opinion, and also other academics defined by territorial administration. Back community, some community, as far as Emma community, even in Mongolia, we can call, even in Ulaanbaatar, we can call, nigh noh tok snihang, nigh noh tinh haf ba. So these are the concept of community for us. But in international development advocacy, needs to define it. So it needs to define it more on a territorial base. You need to have a specific group to assign the territory. And define the social boundary, define the resource boundary. So what they did is defining community as a herder group. So herder group is based on nigh noh tok snihang. So again, I said nigh noh tok snihang is not necessarily a territorial term, but it's actually social networking for facilitating mobility. Again, if you say nigh noh tok snihang, nigh noh tinh haf ba, in Ulaanbaatar we have people from Hinti, people from us, it's all social networking, but it does not represent territorial social boundary. So that's why this nigh noh tok snihang idea was a lot more conflicting with creating territorial boundary, which again conflicts with territorial administrative boundaries. So there is an issue with if herder group is established in area involving herders from two different bugs. So how are you gonna manage that? And how are you gonna deal with different summit administration and different bug administrations? And the major issue raised with this herder group is because, for example, sustainable natural research management or UNDP projects or SDC projects, they all had struggled to regulate how incomes of managing. Ex-minister talked about charging people for using natural research, right? All right, users, sorry. So when visiting herders come to herder group area, they need to talk about pasture use fee. So who's gonna be responsible for administering these issues? Is this bug administration some administration or is this herder group itself? If it's true herder group is composed of two different areas, how are they gonna solve this issue? In another issue, herder group territory conflicts with is most of the herder group territory is defined by campsite possession. And most of the herder group territory is winter and spring areas. And winter and spring areas herders possess campsites. So it means basically campsite possession is the legal issue belong to the administrative territory, not group itself. But if you're composed of herders from two different areas, it's a very, very complicated issue to manage these territories their own. The third conflicting issue is the weather condition. So you have a definite property, resource, right, social boundary and resource boundary of definite herder group areas. But what happens under the unstable, changing herding practices? Herders needs to move, but you can't move as a group. You may arrange it as a group, but under this very scarce resource situation these days, there's no one who wants to accept you with 2,000, 5,000, 10,000 of livestock between different groups. It's actually a bigger matter than herder groups. So a matter is usually sold by box, some, and amic levels of territorial administration. So historically it's all about estate managing and working with herders in a territorial basis, not just some imposed little territorial group. And the fourth problem with the herder group is, again, because territorial administration is shrinking smaller and smaller and after the transition, pastoral resource also shrunk much because of the infrastructure. So less pastoral is accessible because of lack of water and market. In this case, herder group territory becomes much, much smaller. So it's really hard to accommodate flexibility and mobility. And you need to have a flexibility and mobility in herding management in Mongolia because of unstable weather conditions. So you have to be always thinking about ready to move, where to move, when to move, who to talk, what kind of connections we have, how many livestock is available, this kind of situation. So last findings on state reserve pasture policy. So this is a great policy for Mongolian herders. The idea is basically to support what I was saying is supporting the herder's production management. So the policy idea was great and it's based on historical policy practices of Mongolia. Unfortunately, this policy run by Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agriculture faces a lot of challenges. This is again because its policy is heavily based on territorial land-based policy rather than working with the territorial administration and focusing on production management. So the first challenge comes with disputes between different territorial agencies. Local administration and ministry. Ministry created state reserve pasture area taking some areas from other territorial administration. But because herders possess campsites in those areas, the pastoral issue becomes the matter of that's each different territorial administration because reserve pasture area administration cannot deal with campsite possessions. And also each territorial administration loses their territory means it's a big loss for them because of many reasons. Mining, resource mining coming to their area, project coming to their area. And herders are their residents. So herders are their assets. So it's pretty much a lot to do with political economy. Who benefits how using legal state mechanisms? So third issue is ambiguity and authority of different state agencies. It's a really complex issue if you get into the depth but one example is pretty much. In Hirtumayur-Fankins for example. So Hirtumayur-Fankins used to be state reserve area and later become just a territorial administration. But because of its old history it has a less population and it needs to be, it needs to maintain certain population number to maintain its village status. But at the same time which conflicts with local herders, more migration comes and local administration allows it. But it conflicts with herders from surrounding areas and local herders. So that's why it led to a lot of disputable use of resources, pastoral resources and livestock shelters and campsite possessions and created a lot of aggregate grazing issues. So conclusion, basically overall my thesis looking at how policy impact on changing herders' access. So herders are more reactive to policies and they does not necessarily comply with the policy because policy is very inadequate and compared to the local situation. That's why they just, they create their own mechanisms. So they have their own strategies to make sure, to secure they have access to resources. And unfortunately most of these policies are very incompatible and heavily based on agrarian based property rights and land issues. That's why it's very effective in pastoral land management. And also in land law, herders' conditional and ambiguous property rights status lead to a diversification of access strategies and patterns. So basically land law is full of gap and then it has a lot of ambiguity in it. So herders have use, management use and access right to campsites, but they do not necessarily have clearly defined property rights to land. And then herdo group territory is trying to replace that property rights but it does not necessarily meet with the local situation regarding their movements and climate and campsite possessions and all the things. So that's why a lot of these policies being ambiguous and implementation is really ineffective. And so this kind of situation creates very complex institutional condition in Mongolian pastoral land situation. So it actually led to environmental outcome. So one word I'd like to conclude is basically, I think going through all these literatures and research and case study and field works, all these environmental outcomes is not necessarily herders having too many livestock and then they're overgrazing and then they are degrading land. It's not necessarily that. Actually, there are much more complex reasons behind it, which is mainly related to the legal policy issues. That's all. Thank you.