 So our speaker is Piotr Boraz, who's the head of the Warsaw Office of the European Council of Foreign Relations. He's a journalist, an author and an expert in German and European politics. He's worked as a journalist, he's worked in Polish think tanks at the Institute for German Studies in Birmingham and at Rockloff and he's just recently published a book, Muslims and Other Germans, The Re-Invention of the Berlin Republic, which was published in Polish in 2011. And his topic is the end of Europeanization, Poland's changing approach to EU integration. Thank you very much for this very nice introduction and very nice invitation to Dublin. It's a great pleasure to be here and a great honour to be given this opportunity to share my views on Poland's dilemmas in the European Union with you. And would like to thank you also for your interest in attending this event. Let me start my presentation with a personal remark. I'm here as a foreign policy analyst but inevitably also as a Polish citizen. And as you certainly know Poland finds itself in a difficult period of political change, which has a very strong polarizing effect on the political and intellectual needs, on the public discourse and indeed on the whole society. The Polish government elected in October 2015 has pursued a very ambitious programme of political, institutional and social transformation, which is welcomed by many and criticised and contested by others. And the stakes in this dispute are very high. Where the supporters of the government talk about the restoration of sovereignty and national dignity, where they praise the removal of corrupt establishment and reinstallment of justice for the Polish people, the critics maintain that the adopted measures boiled down to an unprecedented assault on liberal democratic foundations. The rift between these two opinions is huge and rising and is probably not likely to be bridged very soon. And this polarisation means that it is very difficult, if not impossible, as an observer and commentator of those developments to remain fully indifferent, impartial and cool. And I think it will be only fair to disclose, before I start the proper talk on the European Union and Poland, my own personal position to this debate as it will hopefully help you better understand what is my point of departure. And I belong to those in Poland who believe that the political and institutional changes I'm not talking about economic or social policies introduced by the government of law and justice are worrying, as they constitute, in my view, a departure from the model of liberal democracy. This refers to the newly adopted judicial reform which, in my opinion, violates the constitution and the principles of separation of powers, which refers to the takeover of the constitutional tribunal by the government, to the changes in the public media and some other reforms. And these changes in the constitutional order are the main source of discomfort with the current transformation and other reasons for concern are mostly of political nature. I am, for example, worried about the fact that the public media were renamed into national media and to openly serve the ruling party propaganda. I'm concerned about the nationalist language used by some politicians in power and about the permissive approach to intolerance in the public sphere. And I find it also quite disturbing that some leading politicians would portray the European Union or our partners as enemies. And this is in the natural, where I stand in this domestic political dispute, sort of coming out which I felt obliged to perform for the sake of honesty and fairness. It's namely indisputable that the twists and turns in the Polish-European policy, which is the actual topic of my presentation, are to a large extent determined by the domestic policy choices and developments and the assessment of the former is inevitably coloured by the fact how one perceives the latter. Not less importantly, it has been the domestic policy which led the major crisis marked by the triggering of the Article 7 against Poland by the European Commission in December of the last year. But to make it clear from the outset, Poland is not on the course towards a polexit. The support for EU membership is constantly at a very high level, above 80%, and neither the ruling party nor any other meaningful political force is advocating to follow the British example. Poland has greatly benefited from the EU integration, and the value of EU membership is indisputable in the society and the whole political elite. However, what is not so indisputable any longer, and this makes for the paradigm shift I would like to stress, is the notion of Europeanisation as the ultimate goal of Poland's transformation and modernisation. After 1989, Europe or the West was the only game in town, and the point of reference of any efforts to rebuild the country after communism. Europeanisation, which means the idea that Poland should emulate the Western European model in politics, economic policy and values, and strive as the ultimate priority for a deeper integration in Europe, informed the country's domestic policy, shaped the transformation process and determined the horizon of Poland's foreign policy aspirations over the last quarter century. The redefinition of this fundamental assumption is perhaps the key change brought about by the law and justice. In a nutshell, the ruling party does not frame Europe in terms of the European integration process and the European model of society as an opportunity for Poland only. It sees it as a risk instead. Moreover, there is a growing conviction that the expected further development of the EU beat the integration of the Eurozone, changes in the functioning of the EU internal market, EU defence or migration policy, that this further development is increasingly at odds with the Polish interests. This rising criticism of the EU is an elite driven tendency, inspired to some extent by the ideology of the ruling party law and justice, but it does resonate positively with parts of the society. The EU multiple crisis and the even more fundamental crisis of the West have undermined the foundation of the myth of the West or the myth of the EU as a safe harbor source of identity and promise of a better future. And the persistence of this trend, not necessarily towards Euroscepticism, but rather towards what I would call a permissive indifference with regard to sometimes very harsh criticism about Europe as a certain civilisation model is today very visible. So what are the reasons for this new tendency, away from the Europeanisation paradigm towards a more distanced attitude to the European project? To begin with, this backlash against Europeanisation derives from some ideological and political foundations which also shape the ruling party's domestic policy. The party leaders and chief ideologies have disparaged Poland's westward outlook as a policy of imitation, one that involves submission to Western or German ideas. Some even have even claimed that Western liberal ideas are not compatible with Polish traditions and identity. In the view of the leading politicians, intellectuals, the EU is a project that abandoned its Christian conservative and economic roots long ago. And for them, it was commandeered by this 68-ish generation of left-wingers and has turned into an ideologically driven instrument designed to socially and culturally homogenise Europe. P.I.'s rhetoric often folds back upon the theme of left-wing social engineering which it claims has pushed Western societies towards secularisation, ecology and glorification of minorities, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. The EU's decision to monitor the rule of law in Poland solidified the Polish government's opposition to the EU's supranational institutions. And the refugee crisis only served to further harden the party's position. For P.I.'s, the imposition of refugee quotas, for example, served as a proof of EU's attempt to enforce the failed multicultural model of society on Central and Eastern Europe. This rhetoric may come across as anti-Western or anti-European, but it is framed differently. P.I.'s and those who support its manifesto often believe that Poland represents the real West, whereas Western Europe has betrayed Western values. And since the transformation of European societies has been consciously driven, P.I.'s believes it can be consciously rolled back too, and here Poland may play an important role driving the EU back to its genuine cultural roots. But a more nuanced or critical approach towards Europeanisation is not born of ideology alone. Two other sources are first, economic, and second, related to a pessimist analysis of EU's future. That economic considerations can be fuelling Euroscepticism in Poland as truly counter-intuitive. The country's economic transformation over the last 25 years was mainly driven by its integration with the Western European market, received of EU funding and participation with the German value chain, with Polish companies, for example, in the automotive industry, acting as subcontractors for large German companies. This combination of factors led Poland to develop an economic model based on low wages, a large share of foreign capital and high dependence on external factors, such as EU subsidies and developments in foreign markets. Many Poland believe that this economic model is no longer sustainable, and in order to escape the so-called middle income trap, it needs to be reinvented. And the parties or the government's own modernisation plan rests on the idea of moderate renationalisation of economic assets, especially in the financial sector, and great investment by the state in advanced technologies, such as electric vehicles, for example. It may clash with the EU policies or interests of other EU partners more often than it was the case in the past. And while PIS predicates its economic model on Poland's continued ability to tap into EU funds, it is often critical of the EU's effect on the Polish economy, which it believes serves to maintain Poland as a peripheral actor and the backyard of the German economy. Also, the rise of protectionism in Western Europe, often framed as fight against social dumping, is critically viewed in Poland, and this far beyond the current government. A recent report by a Polish think tank, which found a broad echo in Poland, showed that East European companies are often disadvantaged by the European Commission. Their claims against unfair competition by Western companies are much more often ignored or not recognised than the other way around. These arguments support the narrative advanced by the ruling party that the record of the Polish EU membership is more mixed than often claimed by the Euro-enthusiasts and thus a substantial correction is long overdue. This situation is sometimes called the Europeanisation paradox. Poland cannot develop without the EU, but the EU is, at the same time, perceived to be holding Poland back from achieving its economic ambitions. The criticism of the EU's supranationalism, the rejection of deeper integration, the cultural distancing from Western Europe and the more differentiated view of the economic benefits of integration, which are the key premises of the new Polish government's European policy, may have been a sign of a major turn in the Polish approach to the European Union. However, at the time when the party came in power, they were also a reflection of a very pessimist view of the direction which the European integration could take. Interestingly, this Europe pessimism at that time was not a Polish or a PIS specialty. When the party came into power in autumn 2015, the concepts of strengthening the nation-state, re-nationalising the economy, opposing deeper EU integration and criticising liberal democracy were on the rise across Europe, not just in Poland. In a way, PIS's decision to move away from the Europeanisation paradigm seemed to reflect the party's conviction that it was a devangard of Europe's transformation. The populist revolt, not at least as a reaction to the migration crisis against the establishment seemed even to validate PIS's claim that popular sentiment across the EU was on their side. The conviction that the EU in its current institutional setup and political framework is doomed to fail chimed with the new Polish government's belief that its ideas for the EU's renewal would gather momentum. PIS believed that it was not an outlier as it was often portrayed in the foreign press, but rather the vangard of the political transformation in the EU. And it is against this background that the remarkable reorientation of Poland's policy within the EU should be analysed. Poland was to become a part of the new, less integrationist and more sceptical about an ever closer union EU mainstream, the strategy pursued by the precessors was no longer adequate. Until then, Poland was seen as a part of the Union's core bloc. And Polish policymakers believed that the membership in this core along with Germany and France, even with certain compromises, would be the best long-term investment for the country's security and stability. But since the score in the view of expected successes of, let's say, Marine Le Pen or the German AFD was doomed to crumble, this political climate provided for opportunity for Poland to align itself with partners which would help push the EU towards reform in line with the sovereignty agenda and vision of Europe of nation state. And it should come as no surprise that this consideration has resulted in a redefinition of the country's relationship with Germany. Previously, it's number one partner and the gate to Europe as it was framed in Polish discourse during the 90s. The PIS government has rejected this course, calling it a policy on the knees and claiming that the desire to be part of the EU mainstream has not benefited Poland. The refugee issue has become a key driver of course of criticism of Berlin and also the relations with France, the other partner in the so-called Weimar Triangle reached their historical low. Macron's ideas for the invagoration of the EU, marked by a strong criticism about Poland and Eastern Europe, met a lot of skepticism in Poland. But the crisis of the Weimar Triangle is in the first place a crisis of mutual trust, not a collision of interest. It does not seem as if it was likely any time soon. And already in January 2016 Poland declared the United Kingdom as the new key ally in the European Union. And it was a logical step as London could be indeed a strong partner in pushing the integration process in a different direction than that advanced by the Franco-German axis. The discussion how to accommodate the British demands before the referendum in June 2016 seemed to offer a very realistic channel to achieve this goal. However, in the hindsight these assumptions proved to be wrong. Essentially the PIS government made two fundamental miscalculations. Firstly, the idea that the close alliance with the UK could be a new opening in European policy, allowing Poland to fill the strengthened position of a country independent of Berlin and Paris. And it also leads discussion on reforming the EU onto tracks close to PIS ideological position, disappeared with the negative outcome of the British referendum. The UK, and that's also Poland's new key ally, was simply out of the EU no longer able to shape the integration process. And secondly, they believed that PIS would find itself at the forefront of political transformations, this anti-establishment revolt, which would fundamentally change the EU's political scene, was premature. Europe in which liberal values were on the defensive would be a fertile ground for the Polish government. But it did not turn out this way. No overtly euroskeptic and populist forces won elections in any of the member states, and the French presidential election, which are of fundamental significance for the future of the community were won by Emmanuel Macron. Naturally there are strong populist groupings questioning the European Union in its current form in many EU member states. And significant section of society will certainly still be prone to populism and euroskeptic rhetoric. Nonetheless, while PIS had been counting on a historic moment which would create the conditions needed for the fundamental reconstruction of the EU, which the Polish government preferred, the political reality is at odds with those predictions. Following the elections in France and Germany, we can be certain that the decisions on reforming the EU will take a different direction to the one which the Polish government had been counting on just over a year ago. Instead of a discussion returning competences to the nation states and reversing the process of integration the mainstream of the debate will be on new steps in integration. And it's not to deny that this direction of this evolution is not necessarily viewed in Poland with optimism. The further integration of the eurozone as needed, it might be may have negative implications for the countries staying aside. Once the United Kingdom so far the most powerful non-euro member state is out of the block the political influence of the euro-outs will be diminished. Eurozone will become even more of a core of the EU, possibly able to decide on its own about issues which have an impact on the internal market or EU finances. The concern in Warsaw is that a possible creation of a eurozone budget or other form of fiscal capacity would shift a substantial part of the EU financial resources from the policies aimed at strengthening the cohesion of the block to the efforts focused on the stabilisation of the common currency area. The next EU budget will look differently for other reasons and Poland today the largest beneficiary of the EU funds will certainly lose in purely material financial terms. New institutions of the eurozone like the super ministry for finance could further undermine the unity of the block and created a factor to tie Europe. So while Poland is not ready to join the eurozone anytime soon the prospect of losing political weight puts it in a less and less comfortable position. The other dimension where the potentially negative trend is discernible is the internal market. Most recently the decision to on the axis of so-called post-it workers to the national labour markets in the EU found a very strong ego in Poland as well as in other East European member states. Cheap labour force is an important comparative advantage of the EU eastern members and many in Poland believe that the western European idea of social dumping is just a new form of protectionism against foreign competition. These concerns that euro egoism as a conservative think tank recently put it is gaining ground in western Europe are strong and they fuel the perception that the EU is becoming less comfortable and less favourable place for Poland than it was in the past. Migration policies is another example of this development. The refugee crisis put issues on the EU agenda which were not adequately discussed or were actually avoided for many years. I have already mentioned that the rejection of multiculturalism and preservation of the religious and ethnic homogeneity are the key political promises of the ruling party which not only resonate positively with some sentiments in the society but also mobilize those sentiments and strengthen them. An argument which is often used in the public debate is that when Poland joined the European Union in 2004 it could not foresee that the membership in the bloc would entail the necessity to accept large numbers of migrants and the participation in refugee relocation scheme. It is today not certain which direction the EU migration and asylum policy will ultimately take but it is indisputable that this issue will to a large extent determine the EU political agenda in the upcoming years. And for Poland it is a very uncomfortable issue and the EU which is driven by the need to solve this problem in more difficult terrain. And lastly another key area where the EU is expected to move a few steps forward is defence and security policy. Again, Poland is highly skeptical about the rationale and actual shape of this initiative triggered mostly by France and Germany. There is a long list of problems Poland has with this project but the most fundamental one is related to the risk of PESCO, this permanent cooperation and security and defence is diverting the focus of European defence from the collective defence against threats like Russian aggression to crisis management functions like interventions in Africa. Poland is also afraid that the further integration of European defence industries might be detrimental to Polish industrial interests. Poland has ambitions to develop its own independent armament sector but it can become impossible under the new legal regime which would favour the big industries from Western Europe. We decided finally to join this initiative but without much enthusiasm. The motivation is to be in in order to prevent the project from developing in an even more peculiar direction rather than to really benefit from it. And this picture I have just offered might be a bit simplified but I think it does reflect the sources of discomfort with the current direction of the EU integration which are triggering Poland's sort of collision course with the EU even regardless of the ideological assumptions and political miscalculations of the ruling party. In the past the EU was seen as an anchor of Poland's modernisation. Today its evolution in the key policy sectors I described is perceived as at odds with the country's important interests. I mean I suspect that there is no longer much to win for Poland in any of those areas. Again it does not mean that the EU membership is becoming a bad thing altogether but there is much less place for an unconditional embracement of what is offered by the EU and this is of course a fertile ground for some euroskeptic voices. But interestingly the dilemmas related to this ambiguity are not new. They have to do with the peculiarities of Poland's position within the EU. Poland is in many respects a special and sometimes awkward partner due to its size, ambitions and special interests. It is a large country that has lofty political aspirations but relatively few resources with which to pursue them. That means Poland occupies an uneasy space between European superpowers and smaller states between the policy makers and the policy takers in other words. In a nutshell Poland can have a strong impact on the EU but is still too small and too weak to change the course of the EU policy on its own. Because of its distinct interest and its middle-sized position it needs allies which are ready to support it sometimes in exchange for difficult compromises. Poland needs to navigate carefully in Europe, be ready to accept trade-offs and yet be tough when its most vital interests are at stake. It needs to demonstrate diplomacy and tax rather than irk its neighbors. Otherwise Poland will inevitably end up on a collision course with other partners and institutions. Moreover the risk that it can become a vicious circle or paved the way to a self-fulfilling prophecy is real. The lack of a skillful and flexible EU strategy may lead to a situation that Poland's position within the EU gets weaker. The benefits of the EU integration become smaller which in turn could serve as an argument for EU critics and populists. And let me conclude this presentation with two remarks. First I truly believe that Poland is indispensable sometimes pivotal country in the EU. I'm saying that not because of any machinist convictions which are alien to me but because I am sure that without an active engagement influence and constructive approach of my country the European Union is weaker and less stable. Most importantly many positions for example on the EU internal market on the European policy towards Russia or transatlantic relations represented by Poland also by the current Polish government are important, legitimate and even crucial for the EU as a whole. And it is a sad truth that they are today often dismissed or ignored not because of their inadequacy but because the credibility of Poland has suffered under the controversial domestic policy course and European policy miscalculations. However it is hopefully not too much to our partners to make an effort not to dismiss those Polish arguments which hold regardless of who is advancing them. And second the political crisis in Poland is often portrayed as an example of a failed transformation in Eastern Europe or indeed an argument that the new east-west divide is becoming apparent between the liberal west and increasingly populist authoritarian east. Voices claiming that the EU's eastern enlargement should have been avoided or gaining support against the back room of reports about the uterine Polish politics and other central European predicaments. In fact the speed of this politicization of the feeling that western and eastern Europe possess different political cultures and moral systems reminds us that the decade of living together in the enlarged EU has been too short time to overcome long-standing views and mental issues. I am deeply convinced that the European continent including western Europe would be today much less stable, less peaceful and less prosperous if the eastern enlargement had not taken place. And I do believe that a strong undivided Europe keeping together its east and west is still the best framework for all of us to cope with the challenges Europe will be facing in the upcoming years. Thank you very much for your attention.