 Our last panelist is the distinguished founder of the Gulf Research Center, Saudi Abul Aziz Alfman Sagar, who has also been a great interlocutor about the Arab world, the Saudi world. And I'm curious what you'd have to say to us since you're from the region, but I'm also very curious if you could talk a bit about relations with the United States and how they've turned. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. First, let me extend my deepest appreciation to my good friend, Terry, and to the World Policy Conference for all the effort they put and for the host country. I mean, this is great to see a lot of good friends and old faces together here. We understand what does it take to bring all this effort together because we are in the same area. Okay, let me start by saying what are the key concerns, you know, and the keepers, in my opinion, that it is important. First, the US relation to the region, and we see a softness approach, a confusing approach from the US. We don't know what they are up to. We have a different signal, confusing signal. On one hand, they said we are reallocating with our forces. On the other hand, we are reducing our forces in the region. On the other hand, you can hear a statement by saying we remain committed to the security of the region, but what is reality we don't know. So there is a lot of confusing signal, unpredictable coming out of Washington there that really has an impact on the geopolitics of the region. Traditionally, we understood their commitment, and traditionally we understood where does the US and the rest of the West country stand when it comes to the regional security now? It's a bit confusing, honestly. And that confusion forces the region to take different action, different play toward the other. Second, because of the confusion of the US policy, when President Obama said in Syria, it's a red line, we will not allow, all of a sudden we have the Russian re-existent in the region. And the Russian re-existent in the region was due to the American unclarity of policy. They allowed that sort of intervention to happen. Where do we stand on the Ukrainian cases? I will come into that, but I think I will pass this one because I want to focus it in the key element. The third, of course, is the Iranian expansionist. And today we are still suffering from this real serious threat from Iran. We still have the maritime security issue. We still have the energy security issue threatened from Iran, interventionist policy expansionist using sectarianism as a dimension, supporting militia. All of those issues remain as a key issue for us in the region. So where does the Iranian threat goes from here? That's also have a very critical impact in our geopolitical issue. The Ibrahim Accor, some Arab country including United Arab Emirates and Bahrain based in their own national interest, they felt going and signing into the Ibrahim Accor and normalizing relation will bring a better peace to the region. Some countries in the region thought they need peace first before normalization. Some countries they are negotiating quite secretly. So that is a sovereign state decision, but at the same time this is a new element in the geopolitical side of the region. So the other thing we have are conflicting issues and we have a hot spot in the region, including war in Yemen, Syria, Libya, also the Israeli-Iranian vessels attack in each other and so, but at the same time that did not change the geopolitics of the region. When people talked about the Syrian crisis, they thought Jordan will be taking over next day, you know, but Jordan remains still there, Syria is still there, Turkish intervention on the north part of Syria is still there, we have the Iranian intervention in Kurdistan is still there, but that did not really change the whole geopolitical structure there. So, but that's also an important element in the geopolitics to look at all this conflict, all this, you know, issues that is taking place. What is interesting also to see that the region start making their own sovereign decision without really waiting for the instruction coming from the big country, from the superpower, and I think that's a very clear signal, you can see it in UAE in Saudi Arabia, you can see it in Egypt, in Algeria and many countries in the Arab world start saying, look at, we need to protect our interests, we need to fight based on our interests and we need to look at that one. So, this is also an important dimension. Is that going to, since we are witnessing now a new Cold War era, is that independent decision and sovereign decision and so going to be challenged by extreme two power? In other words, our economy, 67% of our export goes to Asia, China is the largest importer from us. So, and China, the president visited recently to the region, he's making a statement saying we are the second largest economy, we would like to legitimize our economic relation by a political visit and by a political umbrella. And the U.S. is concerned, if you read today the Washington Post, there is a concern in the U.S. about the China-Gulf relation. I think it's legitimate concern, but at the same time, still it is an economic relation, it have not yet developed to a political, strong political ties or a strategic ties, China will not replace the U.S. in the region and China cannot provide the security that the region want or looking for at that area. So, but that also, because of the Cold War era syndrome or feeling that we have, that will put a pressure in the region. Where do you go, east or west? Whom should you listen to? You know, each one can exercise different pressure. They are a buyer of 3.6 million barrel a day from the region. So, they are, Saudi Arabia, almost 20 percent of their export goes to China. Also, the crisis on Ukraine, we were forced by the U.S. to take decision. I think there was misinterpretation of our balance. And I like yesterday when Dr. Elmer Gergash used the word, not neutral, but balance. And balance today is really having a balance in a position on the Ukrainian crisis. India, they have a position, a balanced position. We, we in the Arab world have a balanced position. We, first, we are not compromising the unity of Ukraine. And that has been stated by all the foreign minister. We're not accepting any intervention by using a military means. We're not accepting, you know, a territorial intervention or so. But at the same time, we have a similar case in Yemen where we understand the Russian concern. And the Russian concern comes from three things. They want a friendly government to deal with. They want to have a safe border that would not represent a threat to them. And they don't want to have a foreign military presence that can represent a threat. In Yemen, we have a similar case. We want to have a friendly government that we deal with. And we want, we don't want to have a foreign military presence from Iran in our border that threat us and represent the threat to us. And also we want to have a safe border, you know, that, you know, also we share with them a huge one. If I look at, yeah, I mean, just the last comment, if I look at the 2023, I think there will be a similar issue still of, you know, of concern to us. Number one, can we still keep our sovereign independency decision from the superpower? Can we really still state our position based on our interests? Or that will be challenged. That will be a key issue also in the 2023. Can we continue in that? Iran and what will happen to JCPOA? We have a different scenario today. No agreement, status quo, modified agreement with minor changes, modified agreement with the major changes. All new agreement can be reestablished in that one. We don't know. So that remains a big challenge. And how Iran is going to act in terms of representing a threat, are they going to retaliate in the region and how that is going to be? But I could ask you many, many questions, but let me just limit myself right now to do you think the disorder in Iran makes it more dangerous for the region or does it work to keep them concentrated at home? I personally belong to hub school in IR. So I believe in a central government role will be far better than having a fragmented government because we saw that in Lebanon and the outcome. But also if I go back to my 2023, I think oil prices will be very important. What will happen to the oil prices? You see, because again, the region have a lot of important project and a lot of expansion and development in the Tenmia, what we call development. How is that going to be? And that will play also a price. Yemen, we're almost entering the ninth year and what will happen? I think we are happy to have a settlement in Yemen, but based on two things. No intervention is from Iran in that one based on the decision of the Yemeni people and the agreement that can take place. I think all of that really still represent the sort of challenge to us in the region, but again, I'll go back and start from where I start. The US relation is a key issue in this one here. We're not saying we need to replace it. We're not saying we have a ready alternative for that and we are not saying we don't want it. In fact, it's a very important, very crucial. We have enjoyed almost essentially of a good relation here in the region. What we want to have a more sensible approach in Washington when looking at the region here and respecting the issues. Yes, great, because I mean we've had different words for Washington which we need a more educated policy. We need a wiser policy. We need more attention, but clearly the region is sending messages to Washington also. As Saudi Arabia is, the visit of Jean Zemin is a message. I mean, it's a very clear message to a very sensitive point now in Americans view of the world.