 Welcome to the second seed lecture of 2016, we have Dr Asiyanbi, it's as bad as my name, I'm Dr Fiya El-Asiyneska and I work at the school of law on climate change law. My background is in forests and international law so I'm extremely interested in the talk today. The talk is looking particularly at the establishments of new markets, frontier markets in my program in terms of nature within this neoliberal construct. I'm particularly excited to have a talk about Nigeria. I've covered this subject for many years and there's very little written about forests and Nigeria generally. And to have one specifically on red class green markets in this is going to certainly add to the development of literature in this field and the critical perspective that I think is going to be given here. So I'd like to welcome you and give you a clap. Thank you Fedia. We'll have to do it again everyone. I'm Niyi Adini Asiyanbi as Fedia Asiyne. So today I'll be talking about red plus, framing red plus within market environmentalism or the idea of neoliberal nature. So look at what kind of neoliberal projects red plus represents. The talk will be mainly divided into two major sections. The first one will be fairly theoretical and I'll try to keep that short. Then before going into the end periods, the case study in Nigeria and some of the things we can learn from that about how neoliberal environmentalism works or neoliberal nature and neoliberal conservation. So I'm speaking for about one hour, one of ten minutes they are about. Fedia, please, we need 30 minutes. You let me know so I can give my pace. So this talk has been drawn from my PhD research which I completed earlier this year and it's also a paper I'm working on. It's actually under review with one of the critical environmental journals but I thought it would be good to get perspectives from you all to share these ideas with you and get what you think about these ideas. So the semi-estates of markets in the making, neoliberal natures, the same view of red plus in Nigeria's mass training forest and the picture there is indicative of what red plus is all about in one time. So developing countries are paying developing countries to keep their forests in order to mitigate climate change in the form of green development but also exemplifies what payment for ecosystem services is. So the idea that environmental users of environmental services pay providers of environmental services to provide these services. So I'll elaborate on some of these terms as we go by. So very quickly the outline for today's talk will first reflect on what neoliberal natures are and some of the recent trends in literature in this area. That's why I like what I think a major challenge is in this literature and then I'll talk about the idea of markets in the making as an extension of neoliberalisation. Neoliberalisation specifically looking at neoliberalisation as a process as opposed to as a destination or as an endpoint. Now I'll bring in the ideas from each of the core and ideas around neoliberalising natures to help understand some of the challenges that are already very soon. Are they going to introduce red plus, give you a bit more introduction for those who are relatively new to the idea of red plus and then go deep into the case study in Nigeria and then try to draw some conclusions from that. So depending on where you are, during the period when I did my PhD research in Nigeria, depending on where you are and who you are, you are likely to find yourself among expert cause authors working to render the forests visible as carbon. So cause authors trying to estimate how much of carbon you have in the country. Or you're likely to find yourself among NGOs and again cause authors in meetings of this kind where deliberations around what constitutes carbon, how much carbon does Nigeria have. These sort of meetings that sort of generate knowledge and authorise certain kinds of knowledge about forests and about carbon. Or you're likely to find yourself in this kind of meetings, meetings with communities where communities are assembled, told about red plus, they are told about carbon forestry, they are giving promises of what experts in undercarbon forestry. They are also giving all sorts of tips, you can see a critter of soft drink that make up cocaful. Or you can find yourself in a place like this. This is a mobile court, a mobile forestry court and you can see an accused person being tried under a very small canopy with the judge sitting right there. Or you can find yourself in this kind of scenario where people are being unpicked, arrested for illegal logging or alleged illegal logging. Or you can find yourself in companies of foreign conservation actors who are championing red plus but also championing forest protection alongside with all kinds of weapons. Or you can find yourself in a company like this, with the government of the state in which red plus is going on Nigeria, in the company of Arnold Schwarzenegger from a government of California, talking about red plus, green development, talking about carbon forestry. Or you can find yourself among critical NGOs who are campaigning seriously against the red plus, campaigning against the whole idea of how to define the forests and the threats that that pertains for communities. Or you can find yourself among NGOs again taking over the roles of the state, of state actors representing the states at all kinds of meetings and events. Or you can find yourself in the company of military men who have been drafted to sort of police the forest for red plus. So depending on where you are and who you are, you can find yourself in any of these circumstances, any of these companies. So the question then arises with this sort of heterogeneous element. You can see all kinds of meetings, all kinds of gatherings from military intervention to meeting in California, to meetings of NGOs, to meetings with communities. You can see the states imposing force on the forest landscape. So with this heterogeneous element, the question then arises whether a project like red plus is actually neoliberal. Whether it's actually seeing the states being ruled as it's expected under a typical neoliberal project. Whether we're actually seeing the market principle being prioritized. I mean you also want to ask a question, is a commodity regime really emerging in a project of that nature? So are we seeing trading in carbon credits for instance or carbon offsets? But are we also seeing incentives in these sort of projects that sort of deploy force to render the forest available as carbon? So that's the sort of questions that I will try to ask and try to also provide answers to this evening. And these sort of questions are important, not just for red. They are important because it's precisely the sort of complexities I showed you earlier that scholars in this area are pointing to when they consider neoliberal projects on the ground. So our neoliberal projects have been pursued on the ground. They also point to all kinds of complexities, difficulties, the very idea that this project did not only deploy market elements, they also deploy elements that are totally against the idea of market environmentalism. So they deploy force and sometimes rather than providing incentives to communities for them to give off action on the forest and then embrace conservation as it were. This project deploy force sometimes, sometimes they deploy subsidies rather than incentives, subsidies comes from the state rather than incentives that come from the market for instance. But they also point to the fact that the implementation of these sort of projects are very minimal, very thin on the ground so that while there's a lot of noise in the policy cycle, actually what's actually happening on the ground is very thin. And in fact in some cases this project has fallen so they are reaching a dead end that scholars are beginning to point out the sense in which some of these projects may not be neoliberal. Some of them are asking, are these projects actually neoliberal? And a very typical, very exemplar example of neoliberal nature project is payment for system services, which is like the umbrella project for the kind of schemes that get environmental services provider in contact with its environmental services user for them to have a voluntary exchange basically. So you have all kinds of projects under this, from forest projects, kind of carbon forestry projects, to biodiversity offset projects, to wetland projects. So basically getting local communities for instance or groups together to provide to sort of secure environmental services, which is then made available to users of the services. So scholars of payment for ecosystem services are essentially pointing to precisely the same sort of complexities. What is expected of a typical PES scheme for ecosystem services scheme is a voluntary association between a well-defined buyer and a provider or producer of environmental services, negotiating over a well-defined environmental service that must be provided, that must be secured on the ground. And in actuality, what people see on the ground when they sort of examine these projects and the ways that they are carried on on the ground are situations where rather than having a voluntary market exchange between two parties, you're having the states taking charge of this project, providing the subsidy rather than allowing incentives between the different parties, the two parties that are provided at the use of the services. So they also point to all kinds of complexities and challenges to those projects on the ground, to find that they are struggling to actually achieve the market ideals that you would expect from projects like this. So in fact some conclude that most PES experiment schemes have little to do with the market. And some also conclude that payment for ecosystem services schemes cannot be described as neoliberal. So that's what some of the hotels in this area have come to conclude, looking at how these projects actually are playing out on the ground. So looking at these complexities again, I mean some of the responses that come from literature is that, okay, given these complexities around whether or not these projects are market projects, let's go back to the very idea of what the market is, what are market projects, what are markets like projects, what are market based projects. So there's a call for more specification or more distinction around those various terms that people have deployed in explaining what's actually going on on the ground. So the idea is if we can get some of these terms very clearly, maybe they give us a very clear sense of what's actually going on on the ground, whether they are actually market instruments or economic instruments or just market life instruments, all kinds of distinctions coming up. So another response is the sense that scholars are also calling for all kinds of typologies and the framing of markets as degrees. So markets as a continuum rather than as one single destination or as one major objective. So agri markets described in terms of continuum. But some scholars in this area are also pointing to the fact that if indeed ecosystem services projects do not have the market elements that people expect them to have, then could we then suggest that they are not fostering the kind of capital accumulation ideas that critical scholars are hoping against. So that can we then sort of appropriate the schemes in more progressive ways in trying to sort of actually address environmental problems rather than frame them as projects for capitalist accumulation. So these are responses from PES scholars. So PES scholars are scholars who focus on PES schemes, which is a very narrow aspect of neoliberal nature. But today our scholars of neoliberal nature have also been grappling with these complexities for a while. So about the close of the last decade, for instance, you have many of the scholars coming up to sort of also grapple with the same complexities, but they tend to suggest that what we need to do is just to qualify neoliberalism. So qualify what neoliberal projects are. So you have ideas around hybrid neoliberalism, or variegated neoliberalism, or rollout neoliberalism. So rollout neoliberalism in particular is supposed to be the opposite of rollback neoliberalism. So neoliberalism is suspected to roll back the state, roll back the influence of the state. But what has been observed on the ground is actually the growing interest of the states in this sort of project. So people are trying to suggest that it could be an experience in a form of rollout neoliberalism as opposed to rollback neoliberalism that people have always expected of the schemes of this nature. So but more recently, in fact, earlier in this year, Bosia and Fletcher, who are major scholars in neoliberal nature, also came up with this idea of multidimensional neoliberalism to sort of help us qualify neoliberalism to take account of the complexities of projects that we are observing on the ground. So one of the major conclusions that scholars in these areas have always come back to is this idea that, regardless of how these projects play out on the ground, regardless of the fact that they are incomplete, discontinuous, hybridised, differentiated, complex, whatever the evidence is on the ground, all this evidence do not suggest that these projects are actually not neoliberal. So and the reason they have said this, I'll come to in a second. So the reason is precisely this. Look at Newcastle, another major scholar in this area, has come up with this three dimensions of neoliberal nature, neoliberal projects, which I think is very, very crucial. So it talks of neoliberalism or neoliberal nature, first in terms of an overarching philosophy. So if you think of a philosophy propounded by the earliest propunders of neoliberalism, people like von Misesai, Walter Hewken, Ronald Coles, for those who are familiar with these people, then the Chicago School, which has been at the forefront of neoliberal projects in the world, saved from 1960s onward. And the sort of framing of neoliberalism that people like David Harvey, Neil Smith, and O'Connor and Mitchell Foucault, the framing of neoliberalism that they critique, these people critique this overarching philosophy. So we can then begin to see how on one hand neoliberalism isn't an overarching philosophy, but beneath that philosophy you then have all kinds of general policy programmes. So you can have neoliberalisation of nature, for instance, which is different from neoliberalisation of education or neoliberalisation of health care or neoliberalisation of other dimensions or the aspect of social life, which is a level below the overarching philosophy. And then from these general policies, you then have more specific policies, more specific projects, for instance, the payment for ecosystem services or red plus, which are very specific projects under the neoliberalisation of nature. So the question here is that scholars of payment for ecosystem services, who earlier concluded that PES schemes are non neoliberal, have limited their analysis to this level. So if you limit analysis to this level, we're just looking at how these projects are going on on the ground and then trying to decide whether these projects are neoliberal or not. You're likely to run into the same problem where people suggest, oh, because we're not seeing the states being rolled back then, it's not neoliberalism. If you are not seeing markets being formed explicitly or exchange going on among different actors, then it's not neoliberal nature, it's not neoliberal conservation. But people like Brambosha and Fletcher are arguing that in order to be able to gauge whether these projects are truly neoliberal, we need to go a step higher and consider where they emerge from, the very high depth neoliberalisation of nature, where many of these projects came from. Are they even going from higher and consider the overarching philosophy within which these projects are framed? So the question is then not limiting analysis to this specific level but taking it higher to understand the general policy economy, the overarching framework, the overarching philosophy within which projects like these are framed. So while this sort of explanation helps to address what I consider some of the impulse in whether projects like these are neoliberal or not, I also feel there is an aspect that is less explored and that's the sense in which neoliberal projects are also processes. So they are processes and they can be understood as processes, just processes. Processes that do not necessarily take the outcomes for granted. So you don't take the outcome of these processes for granted. So I'll explain that in a second. But just to mention that the idea that neoliberalisation is a process is not entirely new. Scholars especially don't take the Marxian approach, the full-scale economy approach to neoliberal nature. I've always mentioned that neoliberalisation is a process. But what they have not gone so far to do is to actually elaborate how we can get to understand this process. So how do we talk about it in a way that does not take it for granted that these processes will eventually emerge into markets? So the problem with, for instance, thinking these processes as continuum, like the PES scholars are doing, is that even within the process, scholars want to see commodification going on, they want to see market elements in the process. But I suggest that the process of bringing about markets are more complex, that you're likely not to see even elements of commodification in those processes. And I represent that with a very simple diagram. This is a very, very simple, very simplistic diagram just to capture what I'm trying to explain here. So far, what we've always seen is everyone agreeing, OK, many of us project a neoliberal vision, but between their visions and reality to the point where they become markets, how do we talk about this process in between without taking for granted that they will ultimately end up becoming markets? So if you look at a second diagram, for instance, you have the same, starting from the same vision, but then thinking differently about what this process between vision and result is. So you're not likely to see, you probably won't see market elements, for instance, at the beginning, at the point where neoliberal vision is being implemented on the ground. So how do you talk about, for instance, this red aspect, without mentioning the words commodification of markets, which are actually not happening on the ground at the moment? So this is the problematic that I decided to focus on in my work. How do you talk about this process without taking for granted the fact that they always end up in markets? So how do you talk about this without this blunt categorisation of markets, non-markets, neoliberal, non-neoliberal, market failure, market success? How do you talk about this process? Because the problem with not grappling with this process on its own as a durable and stable analytical category, the problem with that is that once people go on the ground to look at projects like Red Cross and they can't find market, then they say, oh, it's a market failure. And the implication of that is very often people neglect the whole range of implications of this project on the ground. So the effect that this project are having on the ground and the specific ways in which they are being implemented on the ground. So whether they finally become markets or not, let's talk about the process through which market is being built. And my argument is that Red Cross in particular is an archetype of neoliberalisation as a process because Red Cross is meant to sort of prepare developing countries to help them develop carbon commodity regimes that will later be traded on international markets. But most of this project are still in the very early phases where much of what's going on is preparing institutions, changing laws, changing policies, intervening communities, getting communities to understand what all these things are all about. So these are the phases that they call readiness phase and it's a standard phase in Red Cross. So Red Cross is a process that is meant to a route market. So understanding Red Cross as a process is very, very crucial. So on one hand, understanding Red Cross as a process is crucial on one hand, but if you talk to other scholars and tell them Red Cross is neoliberal, they tell you it's not precisely because you don't see exchange of carbon credits already in Red Cross. You don't see a lot of incentives going on on the ground. So my argument is that despite the fact that we're not seeing all of these things happening on the ground, exchange of commodity regimes or large incentives or actual commodification going on on the ground, Red Cross is still neoliberal. For the same reasons I explained earlier because you need to look at the origin of projects of this nature, projects that frame the environment in terms of services that can be traded. So that's where Red Cross itself came from. It came from a very neoliberal province. Many of the elements of Red Cross, at least in its vision, so the vision of Red Cross are totally neoliberal. Part of vision is to incentivise developing countries to keep their forests and incentivise communities to also keep their forests. Of course, the ultimate aim, what I call the term of Red Cross, is the market exchange. In terms of its declared intention, its declared aim, it's clearly neoliberal. I understand the neoliberal project of this nature, so I suggest we understand it as a process. So because of the lack of vocabulary of talking about or elaborating neoliberalisation as a process. It's also lack of vocabulary, especially in the Marxian literature and the Bosch economic literature. I found a very useful element in Fokou's elaboration of neoliberalism to grapple with this idea of neoliberalisation as a process. Fokou, for instance, talks about neoliberalism as different from classical liberalism, which is the precursor of neoliberalism. So for neoliberalism, the period or the progenit of neoliberalism, the proponents of liberalism would suggest that the market is naturally existing. So that if you leave people in society, naturally they will begin to exchange commodities among themselves out of particular need that they consider to be natural. So that's how a proponent of classical liberalism considered the market or considered what liberalism is. But neoliberalism, that is the ideas of the markets coming from the 1940s, 1950s, through people like von Aetmase, the sort of people that I listed earlier, their own notion of liberalism doesn't take for granted that markets is naturally existing. So for them, they believe very strongly that the market has to be constructed. The market cannot emerge on its own if it has to be constructed. Fokou emphasised his analysis of neoliberalism and he identified two categories of actions in constructing the markets. So he identified regulatory actions but also organising actions. So regulatory actions are actions that are directed at maintaining already existing markets. Whereas organising actions are actions that are directed at producing markets where markets never existed. So these sort of actions are actions that take account of the fact that markets are never always existing at every level of society. Take for instance, carbon markets were not there 20, 30 years ago, there was nothing like carbon markets. So the process that brought carbon markets into being after being so form of organising actions. So these are actions that are not just economic, they do not just address the economic domain. But these are actions that address all kinds of domains, social domains more generally. So in order to bring about markets, in order to produce or construct markets. So I don't think it's theoretical about going to the empirical elaboration of these ideas very soon. But just to emphasise the sense in which neoliberalising actions capture the sort of actions that is needed to get neoliberalisation through the process of becoming. So the process I emphasised earlier, the sense in which a project I write plus is a process. So those processes are being driven by what Fokou calls organising actions. So these are actions that sort of intervene on scientific details, on legal details, on geographies, intervene on communities on all kinds of domains, as long as those domains are required to bring about markets regime. So if you bring the idea of organising action back into the diagram that I showed earlier, you begin to see that we have a vocabulary, but also a very detailed conceptualisation of markets as process, organising action, helping us to frame markets as processes. So Fokou then take this forward by suggesting that organising actions, as long as they intervene on all kinds of social domains that are necessary to bring about the markets, they are best understood as apparatus. So apparatus are just a collection of all kinds of elements, practices and knowledges that are held together in order to bring about markets. So for those who are familiar with ideas around apparatus, but also assemblage, people like Derrida, Jax Derrida and all of these other post-structuralist thinkers have used ideas around apparatus and assemblage to understand how projects are carried on the ground. So now to Red Cross in particular, I've only dealt with those theoretical details which some of you probably found boring. So a very brief background in Red Cross. Red Cross is reducing emissions from deforestation forest degradation. It was proposed in 2005 at a conference of parties to Kyoto Protocol. And compared to clean development mechanisms which are also projects under the Kyoto Protocol, Red Cross is a nationally-framed project. So these are projects that are pursued through countries, or like CDM that could be pursued at community level or through individuals or organisations or companies. So Red Cross focuses on tropical countries, so you're not likely to find these projects in temperate countries. And the project is led by the UN, UNFCC, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It's led by the UNFCC, but there are all kinds of platforms for implementing a project. So you have the World Bank, which has its own platform for implementing Red Cross. You have the UN itself, which has the UN Red platform for implementing it. But you also have all kinds of bilateral and multilateral agreements between developing and developed countries to implement Red Cross. So we have more than 2,000 of this sort of projects ongoing in different parts of the world, from Asia to Africa to Latin America. So the aim of Red Cross is very clear. The force is to reduce carbon emissions very cheaply by sort of offsetting emissions in developed countries by a true forest sequestration of carbon in developing countries. But this project also promises what they call co-benefits. So those are benefits beyond just carbon mitigation. Benefits that include fostering better livelihoods for local communities, but also conserving biodiversity, improving forest governance, and also the very general idea of protecting conserving forests. So those are co-benefits that Red Cross promises. Funding for Red Cross comes through, at these early stages, much of the funding comes through grants. So grants from developed countries to developing countries. But the aim is that those grants will prepare developing countries to begin to generate carbon credits that can then be sold in international markets so that ultimately the aim is to shift its market regime. So it's also part of what scholars have found as a green economy. So Red Cross in Nigeria, this is a map of Nigeria for those who are not quite familiar with the country. So grant work to implement Red Cross began in 2008, but for my implementation project began in 2014. And Nigeria's projects, Nigeria's Red Cross is being supported by the World Bank, the World Bank's platform for Red Cross, which is the forest and carbon partnership facility. It's also been supported by the UN platform, which is the UN Red, and then the California-based Governors' Climates Forum. So these are the platforms that provide the funding to finance, but also technical expertise for Nigeria. A Nigeria's project just came out from the redness phase, which I explained earlier. The idea that those projects are meant to prepare the ground for market exchange. And then it's been piloted in one of the 36 states in Nigeria, which is Cross River, which is this very small area here. Cross River is anyway relative to southern countries. It can be a country of its own. It's the size of Israel or Slovenia. So this is a map of Cross River where the project is going on. So it's a national project. It's been piloted in Cross River. And then in Cross River, it's been piloted in specific community areas. So community closings around the end, three cluster areas. So these are the pilot areas for Red Cross in Nigeria. Just to mention that this forest is part of a major biodiversity sport, the gili forest by the restial sport. And also it is claimed that this forest has more than 50% of what is left of Nigeria's tropical rainforest. So the area is very, very important. A whole range of conservation projects that have been going on in this area for several decades. So I conducted field work to gather data on this project between 2013 and 2014. And I gathered data through all kinds of means in that interviews. For instance, I went about observing people in their everyday activities, observed bureaucrats and state institutions, observed implementers of that class, but also communities and also looked at high-level documents. So the major frame of analysis is for podium discourse analysis. So now to the results of this case. So again, going back to the idea of organising action as apparatus. So Red Cross as an apparatus has been carried out through what I regard as six major regimes of practices which are linked to the general idea of creating a carbon market. So this is what you have in a typical organising action. Organising action are always a disparate combination of different things. But those different things are categorised under these different categories. These categories emerged first from Fokodian ideas of governmentality on one hand, but also literature on assemblage and apparatus and then combining those two ideas with what I actually saw happening on the ground. What's actually going on the ground as far as Red Cross is concerned. So I'll start and go through each of these very quickly. So plebomatisation. So it's very central to ideas to create a regime of market. It's always the idea that certain aspect of reality will be problematised. So framed as problems in need of solutions or improvements. So in the case of Nigeria's Red Cross, you have these narratives about the forestrysion crisis in Cross River. You know, I earlier indicated how very important Cross River is to Nigeria. So to declare a crisis in a place like that is to call for a very serious intervention. So by framing the crisis in Cross River in terms of a very major catastrophic crisis, proponents of carbon forestry justify why there's a need for a project like Red Cross in Nigeria. So in particular an environment summit was convened in 2008 in which proponents of this summit came up with a communique. In this communique they came up with three major recommendations to the state government. The first one is to stop the generation of state revenue from forestry. Historically the state's Cross River state has generated revenue from forestry, from timber exploitation, by granting licensees and all kinds of permits to people to go log to go convert the forest for timber. So the second recommendation is to declare a moratorium. So that's a ban, it's also a ban on logging for two years. That's what they recommended at first. The third recommendation was to take action to sort of take advantage of carbon credit markets. So at a point it wasn't called Red Plus. Red Plus is a very recent iteration of what began as Red, R-E-D, then R-E-D-D, then R-E-D-D plus. So at a point all they knew was carbon credit markets. And that was how the whole idea of starting Red Plus began in Cross River state around 2008. But another dimension of this privatisation, different from ecological, that is the framing of deforestation as a crisis in Cross River. A different dimension is this fiscal privatisation. So by just suggesting to the states to stop revenue generation from the forests doesn't make sense to any government. I mean to ask the government to stop its own source of revenue. So but you need to understand this fiscal privatisation in order to grasp why the states agreed to actually stop revenue generation from timber. So Cross River state has also been going through a very serious financial crisis since about 2007. And this crisis is due to the fact that it lost some of its crude oil wealth to a neighbouring state through legal litigation. And crude oil is the most important source of revenue for all levels of government in Nigeria. So it lost those oil wealth, which made it cash strapped on one hand, but also the state also accumulated huge debt over a number of years. So that in 2009 the government sat down and began to think of new ways, very new and creative ways of generating funds for the states. And they came up with these ideas of fostering foreign direct investment on one hand, but also attracting international donor grants on the other. So when the governor was told that a project like Red Plus was going to bring huge funds from international donors, the World Bank and the UN, it made very perfect sense to him. So the fund that was promised to the government, for instance, through carbon funds, was far more than what it could ever realise from timber revenue. So it made sense for him to stop timber revenue and actually impose a ban on logging in order for Red Plus to take root. So this fiscal privatisation added to the ecological ones solidified need for Red Plus in Cross River. And this is a statement that the state governor kept making in his budget speeches, the idea that they expect significant finance from Red Plus on one hand. But just to mention that till the end of the governor's tenure in office in 2015 he kept expecting this fund, but by the end of the tenure the fund had never come to Nigeria. So he expressed disappointment at the fact that the promises of huge carbon funds never materialised. So apart from this privatisation, we also have visions of Red Plus, which are basically aims and objectives and aspirations of those who propose this project. So on one hand you have aims of this project as outlined in project documents, which are very clearly defined aims around mitigating climate change, helping community livelihood, but also improving forest conservation. But you also have discourses, the ways that proponents, so individuals, cause authors, championing this project, they talk about the aim of this project in a very different way. They talk about it in more optimistic, more utilising, more grandiose ways, in ways that also foster inclusion and participation among different actors. So these are some of the ways in which proponents of a project talk about the aim of a project. So take for instance the statement by the regional coordinator for Red, who has been very central to the project in Nigeria. The statement sort of suggests that Red Plus has to be a transformational project that cuts across all of government departments, not just forestry departments, but also departments of agriculture, departments of energy, in fact intervention into the general way of doing development in the States. We also have statements like this one from the State Red Plus coordinator suggesting that Red Plus has something for everyone. So everyone asks something to gain from embracing Red Plus, but surely it has a win-win case for all parties. So apart from those visions, you have all the ways of trying to implement these visions in reality. And one of those other ways is through institutional reforms. This focuses a lot on changing the law on one hand, changing the laws to make Red Plus enabling the way they call it, but also putting in place new bureaucrats in the forestry commission, the forestry departments, bureaucrats that are able to drive this new vision of Red Plus. So these new bureaucrats are framing their own mandate in terms of switching from timber forestry to carbon forestry. And that has all range of implications, including authorising and legitimising new kinds of knowledge about the forest, but also excluding old ways of seeing the forests. So what actually happened through this institutional reform is a situation in which NGO actors, Oakley McSverty's, in this sort of projects, are taking over the roles of state bureaucrats. So they are taking over new positions in the forestry department, and they are beginning to challenge the old bureaucrats who focus a lot on timber forestry. So that at the end of the day, you have a very serious pension between, on one hand, NGO-led carbon forestry coalition, and the state-led timber forestry coalition. So there are sort of quotes from each of these coalitions that exemplify the kind of pension that is ongoing between the two coalitions. So up here you have a member of this NGO board of the Forestry Commission, describing what they met when they were appointed to the Forestry Commission in 2009. So they began to see the Forestry Commission as old, as old fashioned, as archaic, as unruly, so that their aim was to, in fact, get rid of most of the foresters from the Forestry Commission, recruit new set of people who can easily catch up with the idea of carbon forestry or red plus. So on the other hand, you don't have forestry bureaucrats. So those who have practiced timber forestry for a long time in the Forestry Commission who have been in charge of managing the forest for a long time, say these sort of statements, the idea that they have been oppressed by NGOs who claim expertise in forest conservation. And that these NGOs know nothing about forestry, but because they claim to know about red plus and the government, the governor is so much in favour of red plus, they use that to oppress and I doubt their profession as it were. So that's that by institutional reform. You also have elements of elements that are directed at points to the carbon forest. So these are all kinds of interventions that are meant to render the forest visible as carbon. So you have projects and exercises that sort of help to frame the forest in this way, in very simplistic maps like this. There's a map that's been generated by the UNEP. You have WCMC, this is World Conservation Monitoring Centre. I think that's in Cambridge, Oxford. So they were the consultants to Nigeria in determining, estimating how much carbon is in the soil in Nigeria, how much carbon is in the forest in Nigeria. So a map like this claims to show us how much carbon is in the forest, in fact, throughout the landscape in Nigeria. So what this kind of simplification does is it takes for granted to find that papers, this is Nigeria Delta in Nigeria. Nigeria Delta is where much of the crude oil in Nigeria is. That's where exploration goes on. And you can see it is the same region that has the greatest amount of carbon by the shade of, so the darker the shade, the higher the amount of carbon in there. So what this simplification does is that it takes for granted the fact that the amount of carbon in Nigeria Delta is imminently spent carbon. If you get what I mean. So it's crude oil and it's going to be extracted and spent. It's going to be bonds compared to, so it's all carbon that is, that will be kept in there for a long time. So it takes for granted all these different dynamics, all these different kinds of carbon. So carbon in trees is different from carbon in the soil, different from carbon in crude oil, for instance. But this map claims to show all this kind of carbon in just one single map like this. And overlaying this carbon map are areas of co-benefit importance, the way they call it. So these are areas of the red points at Gorilla range areas. Areas where Gorilla species are endemic. The yellow points are area where you can find chimpanzees and then the grey points are important bird areas. Areas where you find important birds. So the claim of the co-zotans who designed this suggests that it's areas where all of these different elements overlap the most. That should be the focus of Red Cross. And of course this is where you find the red, the yellow, the green. And this is the area where Cross River is. So it's sort of reinforcing the choice of Red Cross River as a pilot for Nigeria. But what you don't find on a map like this are areas important to communities. Since the very idea of co-benefit asks community livelihoods at the centre of it. But a map of co-benefit doesn't even have anything to suggest areas that are important to communities. So part of the activities required for constructing a carbon forest again is rescaling. So as this kind of national maps are translated to reality on the ground. Proponents of this project have to come down from the national scale to Cross River scale to state scale. For even further they also have to do all range of rescaling efforts in order to make these areas ready and feasible for Red Cross. So one example is this idea of clustering community forests. So in one of the proposals the proponents have suggested that if you go by each of the individual community forests to sort of propose Red Cross. The community forest would be too small to sort of meet the economics of scale that you need to generate some shared carbon. Or to in fact attract finance for Red Cross in Nigeria. So this suggests that the idea of clustering of communities rescaling and clustering them all. So as you cluster forests cluster communities in this way you also raise tension within these communities. Because what actually happened on the ground is that the more communities are told you're going to be joined together with these other communities as a cluster. The more these communities want to mark out their own portion of the forest. So the more they are told you have to now operate as cluster so that we can do it. The more communities want to sort of be sure that the basis for their own benefits is scaling the market and all this is generating tension in communities. So the next element once this sort of constitution and rescaling is taking place. The next element is this idea of protecting the carbon forests. So I talked earlier about the fact that the states announced a moratorium, a two year moratorium in 2009. This moratorium has been extended indefinitely. And this was extended indefinitely because the moratorium, the ban on logging has become a very important way of demonstrating to international donors, international partners that the states were serious about doing Red Cross. So it has become a way of demonstrating political will for Red Cross. So the state has decided to maintain the ban indefinitely. So the state also constituted a task force for enforcing this ban. So the task force is made up of military men, the police, the navy who also patrol the water areas where timber is being transported. So you have all this kind of constitution, the constitution of the task force going on to protect the forests. But in order to make these things look normal, especially the deployment of military men within the state, you have to also criminalize and sort of securitize the forest landscape. And this includes narratives that sort of paints illegal augers as criminals, as people who are enemies of the state, who threaten the state's projects. So you see pictures like this, you see instances like this, all around Cross River. There are piles of wood that have been seized from people who claim they have been arrested and seen by legally. But you also have police and military men policing the forest in these ways, actually going to the forest to arrest people. And you have a conservationist based with the Jenkins, who has been running conservation projects in Cross River for about 25 years. So for him, he has a personal stake in protecting the forest like this. And he is the chairman of the task force that is enforcing the ban. So I'll show this project of motorbikes for you to see the kind of extraction that has also been apprehended by the task force. You would expect to see vans and trucks of timber. And obviously some of these piles of wood have been transported by trucks. But you also have petty loggers, they call them. So individuals who sort of cut-stream their own farm and convert them to timber and then take them to market. This sort of people will transport few pieces of timber on their motorbikes. So this sort of people have also been arrested. So people who sort of cut-stream their own farm for livelihood purposes. So that's why you have those motorbikes. And you see the irony of this forest protection is that it's not working at all. In fact, the forest protection has increased over the period that the task force was operating. And the explanations are very straightforward. One is corruption in the task force itself. So you have elements within the task force who began to strike illegal deals with timber dealers. You also have the fact that many of the activities of the task force is directed at apprehending and arresting people who are either already cutting timber or who have cut timber and are transporting it. So that in actual fact, cutting steel goes only that it's been discouraged a little. So actual cutting goes only that the task force goes ahead and goes ahead to seize timber that is already being cut. And also the activities of the task force leaves out large agricultural concessions by foreign investors who are also clearing the forest to establish agricultural plantations. So and they had to leave their house because these sort of agricultural concessions and investment are part of the strategies of the government, the creative funding strategies, foreign direct investment, if you remember, I mentioned that earlier. So the task force couldn't impose its ban on this sort of clearance, which is really, really massive clearing of forest. And of course, the protection of the forest also has no popular support because the price of timber has gone up 400% basically. I mean sort of quadrupled over the last few years. So there is a lot of hostilities against the task force and of course people have protested. There have been petitions and court cases against the task force against the government itself. And communities are also revoking land. They are donated to the Forestry Commission decades ago because of the oppression of the ban on forest exportation. And of course people are also defining this ban, going ahead to fell timber despite the ban. And there have also been attacks on foresters and also on task force themselves. So whenever members of the task force are found around, without being harmed, without military men, young people sometimes attack them in response for what they are also doing, harassing people. So finally, this sort of element, the different elements that I like so far, progmatisation, vision, reforming institutions constituting the carbon forest and also protecting the carbon forest. All those different elements, as you have seen, are sort of permeated by all kinds of contradiction and tension that you would expect that this sort of project should not last a few months because of the complex violence and attacks and law court cases and all that. But interestingly, projects like these go on for years, and that's the case in Nigeria. So for this project, not to fall apart, for them to continue to go on in this way, there is this last strategy that proponents always deploy, which is to stabilise ways of stabilising those projects. So stabilisation is the last dimension of it, and how do they stabilise this sort of project? First is by reinforcing optimistic narratives, so reiterating promises, the fact that huge funds are still coming through carbon finance, if people would only wait a little more and wait a little more, community people but also the states. So another way to which stabilisation has achieved is maintaining minima implementation, so not carrying this project so far, limiting implementation to just reports and workshops and just meetings, so that very, very little is going on the ground, very little is going on the ground. Earlier I demonstrated the sense in which you often have pilots within pilots within pilots, so from a national project you have a pilot in Cross River, then in Cross River you have pilot communities. Within those pilot communities, only two or three communities are actually being engaged on a regular basis on Red Flots. So by limiting implementation in those ways, in very minor ways, proponents of this project sort of go beyond contradictions, they go beyond the possibility of the project falling apart, but the most important way to which they sort of maintain stability or stabilisation is by producing subjects, so ensuring that there are people who are buying into this project, so for instance communities are very key here, so producing model, Red Flots models in communities and they have tried to achieve this through states directed payments of incentives. So prior to this regime, the ban on timber, communities had always received royalties, so timber royalty, but since they imposed the ban on forest exploitation, the state government turned the royalty into what they call carbon royalty. So carbon royalty is then paid to communities not on the basis of how much forest they have, which was based on which royalties were paid, but this were paid on the basis of your cooperation with Red Flots, your cooperation with the states. So they identified communities that are cooperating with the states and then paid them what they call carbon royalty. So these sort of strategies help them to sort of continue to get people, communities and people within the states who are interested in Red and want to see it continue. So that is about it. So you then have communities coming up with these sort of statesfans saying how they support Red and their expectations from Red. But you also have some members of the same community who are a little bit critical, who see things in a very different way. So you always have mixture of this, but in communities where you have most of the people or the leaders supporting Red Flots and you are likely to have a community among the Red Flots models as it were. So that's basically the conclusions. So it's Red Plus neoliberal. It is neoliberal for a range of reasons that I like it. And to understand it's neoliberal nature is to consider it as a form of markets in the making. So if you check Red Plus you won't see people exchanging carbon commodities, but you would see processes in place to sort of bring about markets, bring about this commodity exchange. So understanding markets in the making for grand ideas around organizing action, neoliberal organizing action, actions that are directed at implementing Red are essentially organizing actions. And what's also important is this idea that the market has come is not guaranteed and that's why we need to sort of analyze these processes as processes. We can't wait until we see the markets before we can declare them neoliberal or not neoliberal because the market has come is not even guaranteed. It's not guaranteed that Red Plus will emerge as a commodity regime of this kind. So I haven't mentioned that. What's needed is to pay attention to all kinds of effects, the sort of effects that these sort of projects do have on the ground. Effects on the institutions of communities, but also on the forest itself. And in this case I've shown that the effects of institutions is not helpful. I mean you have pensions within Forestry Commission. On communities you have communities being denied access to the forest being harassed. But also on the forest you have deforestation increases because of this sort of interventions which are in fact counterproductive because of the strategies that they adopt. So that's where I stop. Thank you very much for this. OK. Right. Thank you very much for what is a concise, detailed attempt to convey the complexity of this area of law and policy and governance over nature and forests. That has emerged in the past ten years. Red Plus began initially as an idea, a concept under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change back in 2005, as you said. I found the paper very interesting in terms of detailing the theoretical background behind the process of markets. That this is a process, it is not a process which is going to end up as an idealised goal. But that goal is part of the communication and the logic which is invested in and used by different actors to achieve different objectives in different locations. What's very interesting about Nigeria is the context. You have the desire for not only preserving, say, guerrilla sanctuaries and ensuring that you're getting community-based forestry, successful in operating. You have the conflict as well between the state-level extraction and the economics of that with the extraction for carbon. So it's this transition to a new green economy. In a particular context, I think one of the final quotes somebody mentioned colonialism, a key part of the critique around the processes of translation is the context of colonialism in each country and the effect that they had on each community. So this is an important part of the critique because some people are very clear that this is a reconfiguration of colonialism and new appropriation and new frontier in terms of the green market at multiple levels. And as you say, it doesn't end up with any red plus emission reduction credits as yet after the process of ten years. And the language is, it will be coming. And that's going on at the international level. It's going on in every forest in Asia, in Latin America and in Africa. So, sadly, this is an earth issue that's going away. But what I'd like to invite everybody is to throw out your questions and discussion points to the A and let's have a fruitful discussion. Yes, please. I also wanted to refer back to that last quote. I think the writer tends to read all of it. I'm interested in the subject of how neoliberal nature is a neo-colonial project as well. So I don't know if you have something from your research that speaks to that. Yes, definitely. Like I said, this is one major chapter in my thesis. So I have the whole chapter on colonial forest conservation. And one of the major arguments I've made in my previous thesis is the fact that this is in a very strong sense a conspiracy from colonial forest conservation. So you see the same kinds of logic, the same kinds of ways of treating local people, internalizing, neutralizing ways of treating local people, the same idea that local people are the problem. So in this case, you have the state stopping local people from entering forests, accessing forests. On the other hand, we then have international investors who are being precisely that, about caring more forests than local people. So historically, the colonial forests are criminalizing local people, criminalizing their livelihoods, and then allowing capitalist interests to grow big and all that. So of course, in the ways that the communities also see all of this, they embody the experience themselves. Many of these are stories told in the past definitions generation. And in fact, the very presence of forests, forest reserves around them, remind them of how this reserves are constituted in the forest place. So it's always through the process of excluding the local communities, which is again playing out all the way again in Red Cross. Red Cross, which is supposed to be a way of voluntarily incentivizing conservation, in fact, is in force. It is not just in the case of Nigeria. I mean, there have been many other countries where it has required use of force to sort of secure Red Cross areas, or guarantee that the sort of areas will be protected in the future. So there is a lot of continuities, a lot of resonance between the colonial forest conservation, following up forest conservation with that community, and now for Red Cross, following into its community. And again, it's always the north against south, and here also. It's not against south. If the post-colonial states is used as a go-between, it's still the interest of the global movement that is being pushed through post-colonial states. Yeah, so essentially that. Other similarities, I let it in my work, and we can talk a bit more about it. Why don't we give it a quick answer? Which one? This one. I'm not sure yet, but we can talk about that. So questions, comments? Yeah, thank you very much. I mean, thank you very much for the talk, which I found most illuminating, and I'll have to go away and read more about some of the concepts and that sort of thing. But I've worked a lot in Nigeria, and I've worked in across the state. Now, my concern is always in the country like Nigeria, the government, you know. And that can go right down to the individual, to the head of the local government area, or the state government, or the federal level. And I can't remember whether the forestry is a state level responsibility or a federal one. Eventually, there seems to be an awful lot weighing on this red plus sort of bringing home the bacon and delivering. I mean, I thought these were good quotes, but there's been a problem ever since independence that government and Nigerian authorities have not delivered roasts, safe water at schools and healthcare. And so that must skew the approach, surely, of the communities to the, you know, the commodity that they see that they have, which is hardwoods, which they therefore want to trade. And you're saying that in across the state is about 50% of Nigeria's remaining tropical forest. And I would be surprised where is the rest of it, because I thought it was pretty well drawn. There has been so much illegal logging, and I mean, you know the story of Nigeria better than I do. People will be hand in hand, the so-called big men, making sure that they can earn their naira. But that's always at the price of the communities. So I don't quite see where red plus comes in. Is this something, for example, with the federal government Nigeria subscribed to? And how would we know this? Well, the federal government subscribed. Okay, it's touched your last question. This is a national project. It started off in cross-info, because that was really the environment for it. Whereas that was where the conservationists, where many of them brought in the idea of red plus in the forest. But before they could begin to approach the world and the UN for support and the financial funding, they knew it was a national project. So they had to link up with the national department of forestry. So national power forestry is, so to say, a figure of kind of. And all they do is just working on paper. And that's not only because this started across, but it's also because in Nigeria, the federal government does not have claim to land and forests. So the land and forests are honed or are held in trust for the people by state governments. So that the federal government could not have done anything on the ground anyway. So all they do is just paper work. And that's what they continue to do in red plus. And that's why Nigeria's form of red plus is a nested red plus. Where implementation goes on a national level with policy and paperwork. But at the state level is where you are being given to communities, where you have more interaction on the ground. So that said, I think the point is defined that Nigeria is a peculia case. If I care what you're saying. It's a peculia case where you are likely to have this sort of situation in almost any project that comes in. That's what you're insinuating. But my response to that would be that things are not as simple and straightforward as that. I mean, in fact, in terms of how the state, the Nigerian state, has fostered development, has embraced its own people. Look at it in that way. It won't have a very linear future. I mean, you've had, you know, many three times, you've had civilian times, you've had times of economic boom in the 1970s, where infrastructure was built almost everywhere in the state. We've also had times of structural adjustment programmes where the World Bank had others came and told the states to sort of disengage in all kinds of projects and limit its impact and that pushed a lot of different problems. So it's always, always mixed. And it's difficult to have a linear future. But what's also important to note is the sense in which this Nigerian experience, of course, has been shaped by context, militarisation in particular, and the form that has taken Nigeria, that's taken Nigeria has been shaped by the Nigerian context. But you also have very, very similar narratives coming from other cases of that plus. For Kenya, for instance, you have cases of similar cases of communities being disempowered and being displaced in Uganda. So you have cases here and there of this sort of violence that have been needed to red. Cases that sort of demonstrate the sense of which communities have been marginalised. And they find that red post-benefits is not materialising. It's also universal, like Eilio said. The promise benefits either to communities or the huge finance promise to states are not happening. And states are, on one hand, investing part of their own, so they are in cross-evalry systems before the start of receiving funds from the World Bank and the EU. The state are projecting part of its own finance to sort of prepare for red post. So you have investing from the states in this sort of project that is not yielding anything. That's why the governor came back and said red post is not yielding any return on investment for you. So I think the picture is fairly more complex. Some of the scenarios you see in other cases of red post in the general context of course structures of any project at all would play out. But what we're saying is there have been other projects in the past that haven't been this term. There have been interventions from the USAID, the FID, participatory, community governance, all kinds of projects in the past that haven't been this really bad. So to my mind, it's on one hand a combination of all kinds of factors, some contexture, but also global factors. The promises in red post, the approach of red itself, a totalising approach in which rather than take red post as one of the two tools for forest management, red post has been taking as an overarching strategy for managing the entire forest and crossing. So that's very problematic. As long as the international partners and proponents do not weigh in on the sort of complexities and sort of denounce them and sort of make very strong statements and, in fact, if possible, caution the state to do all kinds of things to show that they are not in support of this because the violence and the militarisation that is going on across the world is constantly being shown to the world and the UN to tell them that we are protecting the forest for red. We are serious about it. We are doing it. So there is complicity from all kinds of factors and not just the Nigerian states, but the Arabian states. So that's a very easy thing. So is that what you will do with this globally? Are there any examples globally where there have been benefitting in that interest of being modernised or has it just been stopped down as opposed to having similar results everywhere? Red post is difficult for me to see where communities are getting the kind of benefits they have imposed or benefits that are commensurate with how much they are giving up in terms of livelihood access. There hasn't been a project that pays communities in commensurates, very commensurates, tangible ways or what they are using for that purpose. So, of course, in many other projects it may not have been a severe issue when communities have been barred from entering the forest at all, being criminalised, being taken to courts. It may not have been this severe in so many other countries, but to my knowledge, I don't refer anywhere communities that have been paid. Red post, not PES. So red post and national photos. PES cases are different because they operate at smaller scales or different kinds of scales. For PES, you might have commensurates to work. But red post, because it's national, it's always stopped down. It involves going through the states. So you cannot have red post outside of the state. And that makes it common. I think you made a very important point about how you can figure red post within our country because you made it one or two communities benefitting. And again, that's a qualified term because what do we mean by benefit? If you link it to development, is it about finances, is it about provision of some service over what period of time? And what do you have to give to get that benefit? What do you have to give up in terms of access to resources or have to take on responsibility by monitoring, reporting to the government using technologies that are not really part of the culture, what we mean by benefit is complex. But you were raising that point about the conflict between communities and suddenly there's a sense of well, we could get something still not really knowing what it is but based on the promises. And there's antipathy between communities and there's animosities which go way back in what nothing to do with red post but it's an opportunity to bring them out. So there are numerous examples in... In Bolivia, in Peru, in Ecuador, in... near everywhere where the forest agencies have taken on red as a strategic way to manage forests. It's had an impact which we're only starting to get more and more information about because this is the pilot projects and nested projects. They've only really started to kick in in the past two, three years. And your point about illegal or the reconstitution regulation ending up criminalising activities which were previously fine, this fits into another parallel narrative and discourse in the international and regional forest law which is on illegal trade in timber and legal harvesting timber. So we've got feeding into criminalisation and transnational environment of crimes and then we've got illegal carbon trading post carbon trading which is another one. It's time out more so. Yeah, yeah. Conflict carbon. So we've... So I wouldn't... You're talking to people that aren't brown. I'm curious about the ways in which local people resist and articulate their resistance and also how critical NGO is based in Nigeria articulate their resistance and I'm more familiar with some of the cases in Latin America. The way that I've heard the martyrdom there is often that those who actually know those who know and who have and who will continue to manage forests are of course indigenous populations, right? And that not only is this about restricting community access and criminalising livelihoods and policing native land it's also kind of productive in the sense of what I think you were pointing out with the clearing of our cultural land which is obviously one of the major drivers of deforestation is still committed under this framework. So I don't know if there is a linkage between the criminalisation of livelihoods in this kind of violence and also a kind of political ecology narrative about who are the real stewards of the land or who are the destiny of the forest? Yeah, definitely. I think one can always expect that in every situation. I mean the very first basis in which communities would challenge projects that marginalise them first beyond the claims that they want to express is they want to manage the land and in fact that's the basis on which critical NGOs are organising communities on the ground. Those projects threaten your rights to forest your rights to manage your rights to entire access it draw livelihoods from the forest. So in ways that NGOs are organising communities sort of narratives and framings are very central but they stand at the very heart of NGOs organising. But I don't know if what you're also interested in is communities themselves organising resistance? Yeah, I mean that's well like I'm going to curse but I'm actually going to curse a lot of things but if you want to get into the details of resistance and how it's particularly interesting in that but I guess what I find so particularly insidious about Reddit and about these kinds of obviously new colonial very top-down approaches is that they appropriate this idea that we are the protectors right it's like suddenly the global market and international agencies are the ones that you know have successfully appropriated this narrative that we are the protectors we are the ones who show real interest and it's these local people that are violating this interest so I guess what I'm saying is flipping that narrative on its head and saying no actually you have no interest really and it's we're the ones who have always and who will continue to protect our own livelihoods and protect our environment. Is there an element of that of flipping that discourse? Is it the ways that proponents relate to communities? This narrative is that they are better managers of their forests they never make an exit because you can't go to communities and tell them we know how to manage your forest we know how to manage your land so in papers and discussions among proponents they suggest this kind of heritage but when you go to communities they still tell communities you're land to be your forest when the carbon comes you're not carbon to be your land to be your land but pretty great you see beyond those said and begin to organize communities to reinstate their claims of forest if someone is thinking in red for us it's an opportunity to get their claims of forest so common out claims of course not how you do out claims so in the way they say it to the states if you're truly saying you're a forest and you're coming to us for rights to the carbon then give us something in fact formal issues that we have before so we are as state that recognize the fact of claims of communities so communities are taking opportunities to claim digital rights rights enshrines in law so there are benefits of that ongoing the ways that both the communities use the lack of appropriate help from resistance stores to what's around I think that's a you're right that they try to find line and I think this is particularly with conservation organizations historically have been seem to be quite angthly positive people they are the ones that destroy forests so they're trying to refashion themselves as communities are part of the solution but they must have must use these tools that we have to help them show that they're managing it so all the whole thing of community based forests monitoring programs and things like this they are brought in so you're either in with this or you're not and I think it sets up where communities they say no and they're seen to be against trying to contribute to this global solution and this is I think when you were saying the link is why this keeps going because it's desperately needed forest star constitution around 18 to 20% emission greenhouse gas emissions so something needs to happen to stop deforestation as you say agriculture agriculture cash crops in farming it's just so that is a huge PR exercise goes on and I think you point about in your theoretical sections about the way in which they seem to be aggregated and the languages that they use especially flourishing and always inclusive narratives optimistic narratives participatory narratives all these friendly things and even beneficiary is just maybe doesn't it need actually with that question what benefits and what points for expected to be seen in communities you can see those statements as people were telling me those statements of that part of what they told me was in 2009 the first Red Cross mission that came to them told them that by 2013 they said first quarter by the way that's specific they told them the year told them first quarter of 2013 expected to be million years and those were the words that the communities used that they would get so much money that each one of them would be million years and many of the communities believed that so I was told this in the Queer Star community I was told this in the Kuri community and that's precisely why communities feel those promises are not being realized because they were actually told in their line so if we're not told when to expect it it's easy to continue to postpone it communities were giving deadlines like that so much money so they were promised they weren't told alternative life because they were told the carbon would be sold for them so they were told by 2013 you will your forest to be then generating carbon credits which would be sold in international markets that would generate so much money for each one of the intership so those were the things that communities were told so they were told those specifically of course communities began to also think of what to do with this sort of money and that's where they began to say okay we can then send our children to school we can make more money in our communities if we had this much money and that's why these kind of statements are also in addition to that but what they were told was that so why many of the community those who are domestic communities believed this they also had members of community who are more than them who walk in cities who scrutinise these claims more critically and who know that in fact there was a time that one of the community-based organisations in Ikori the second day they did another community in Saisa Ikuaesai they also carried out an evaluation of their own as part of the piloting for red clause carbon estimation so the proponents of that clause selected to three communities where they carried out exercises carbon measurement exercises on the ground so what if it was basically measuring three volumes and then using all kinds of calculations to combat that to carbon equivalent and they involved some of these community members in that one of the actors in the community organisation went ahead and did a calculation extrapolated from that one plot for all their forests and they looked at how much they would actually get in one year for carbon increments in their forests taking account of the fact that their forests as they claim has been around for 2,000 years so the communities claim that their forests have been around for 2,000 years so that whatever carbon measuring in it at the time you are doing the measurement are accumulated for 2,000 years so they divided the amount of carbon by 2,000 years looked at how much they have in one year and see how very tiny the money that will actually come to them by the price of carbon when the international market actually comes so while on one hand medical arts members believe that they will be truly in the millions on the other hand those who are learning in the communities are indeed more risky and showing that in fact going by the cost the price of carbon in the international market and how much it takes to accumulate significant carbon in their trees in their forests the amount that will come to them will be so insignificant, so bigger so some of them are also critically involved in their business You set up organisation actions are part of the government apparatus for creating a market regime while the Red Plus actually provides the vision for that carbon market exchange is what actions are the government actually taking to promote any action in the crossword response You see the organisation actions are all kinds of visions on one hand but also practices and actions on the other so each one of this is one form one category of action it involves all kinds of little little actions from so payments payment, payment, carbon reality actions that limits implementation on one hand but also reiterating promises and narratives these are actions they are not just visions that are written in paper the states and Red Plus implementers and proponents of Red Plus do on a regular basis protecting the forest is also an action, it's an everyday action it's not just a vision written in paper but that answer many of those things are actually actions this is the only one that has vision in there so reforming institutions are actions they have changed the law in 2010 and they are changing constitution of government institutions so it's only this vision that captures the aims documented in paper but also the aims as they speak about it almost every other thing are actions so all of them, all this included vision itself everything comes under organisation actions so all of them, programmatisation, vision, institution categorise all of these as different elements of the organisation actions it's not necessarily doing it's doing on one hand but it's also speaking speaking is also action on reiterating narratives but does that answer your question what? so these are activities that keep this assemblage from falling apart because of the complex and the contradiction and the tension so you can expect that project of this nature to go very far but because implementers are able to stabilise those projects and some of the activities or some of the things they do to stabilise it and repeating the promises and the optimistic narratives distracts people away from the tension so they go to communities and continue to tell them about the good things that will come money that will come from red laws they continue to tell the government to wait until the end of this continue to tell them that just wait a little bit this finance is coming from the World Bank not this coming from the UN it also is waiting patiently you'll see how much money comes from all of that so those are narratives but also limiting implementation because to spread this kind of project all over Nigeria and cause chaos so the limit is as much as possible so from national the limit to cross-eval, people within cross-eval to cross-stack communities and then cross-stack communities they pick just one or two communities within those cross-stacks because they realise that the project is not really feasible on that scale there's pilots within pilots within pilots so so essentially that is all kinds of strategies and here I have a whole chapter on creating subjectivities communities using this kind of narratives but also using carbon reality payment dimension areas looking at communities that operate and then giving them the money and saying this is reality this will replace your former team by reality communities used to receive based on the amount of forest they have and how much timber is taken from their forest that determines the reality of now it's carbon reality so those are deliberate strategies so that communities conserve and then they give a change so not just for conservation so you might be conceiving but you are critical you are for instance taking the government to court over the violence of the task force you are not cooperating in that sense so their definition of cooperation is subjective to them they don't come in there but it's not just about the outcome but the process of cooperation you are in the process of cooperation and also I'm not sure maybe I just missed the part where you were talking about this how it is that these international markets that were supposedly so promising have a material like what is the state of the international carbon market at the moment and how is it that it's not giving the kind of returns that were forecasted this might be a complex part of it is because part of it is there are all different kinds of elements that constitute that are brought into the international carbon markets so there are carbon cap and trade projects so these are projects for instance in California where people are giving permits to permits to determine how much emissions they could do in the year so if you are able to emit lower than your permits then you sell what is left of your permits to someone else who wanted to emit more than their own permits so that's cap and trade that's copying how much people can emit cap and trade whatever balance or deficits they are so those sort of projects tend to walk fairly smoothly because they are well defined between past-flying industries the actors are known and listed and they are carried out in developed countries in California for instance I don't know which other countries do cap and trade so those ones tend to walk fairly well anyway not actually in terms of reducing not in terms of reducing emissions but they are exchanges going on and people make money from that but sort of markets that are linked to projects like Red Cross it will be difficult for them to take off because of this kind of complexities because on the ground these things are not to work I mean it's difficult to exclude people and they have to use the military to exclude them and then expect them to stay quiet this kind of complexities limits how much this sort of project can translate into global climate exchange but there are maybe most of the carbon market exchange that are ongoing we call them successful on the basis of reducing emissions but successful on the basis of actual transactions are going on they are limited to the global enough except the ones that are linked to payment for ecosystem services which are often very small and that is a kind of discreet projects maybe with one time communities somewhere where one company comes and says okay if you give your forest for five years I will give you this money the company is known the communities has known the kinds of rap and that is often a state project the state phase for the stimulus so that is an argument in many of these cases the state space or in some of these cases bydd y cwsiedl iawn y cyr Merhidol a'r jegwch rwy'n i gael i gael'r cyfeuammu hyn sy'n cyfrifiadau. Maen nhw'n gofynnwyd y cwsiedl iawn mae'r cyfrifiadau sy'n cyfrifiadau mwyhawn i'r cyfrifiadau. Mae hyn yn rhoi deilug i ni ddweud i'r newydd Gwylio. Mae'r hwo rhaen i ni gael i'r newydd i chi â wir i ni ar gyfer y mismoch, am dwi'n ffrifau'r newydd. Rydw i'n dda i ni'n gwneud yn cerddol i'n ddeudio iawn, LED is included in Paris Agreement and has been reshaded for the past 10 years. Now no market has yet been in that system. So Paris Agreement has been in force but we haven't got a global market for forest carbon trade. There is no global market for carbon trade in this. Mae'n gweithiau gwneud i'r unrhyw gynnwys. Mae'r llun i'w gr ".. dych chi'n dda, ond mae yn wedi ei rai gw כjwrd, bydd yn cymryd sefydliadau'r cyd-rhyw. Mae'r rhaglen a'r rhaglen yn amser, lle mae'r rhaglen yn cefnodol, cyfryd sefydliadau Johann refused yn e'r rhaglen i'r cyd-rhyw. Ond efallai ei rai gyngor a chael gyda'r rhaglen, a'i rai cyngorol i'r rhaglen i'r rhaglen, i'r fudr sy'n golygu o'r ysgolwyr gyda'r gweithio. Ieithi'n gweithio â'r iawn, ac mae'r fudr yn caelwyr sydd yn caelwyr. Mae'n caelwyr i'r gweithio a'r fudr yn caelwyr sy'n caelwyr o'r eich gweithio a'r fudr yn caelwyr. Yn i'n caelwyr i'r gweithio. Fy oherwydd, mae'r mawr yn rhaid i'r cyffredinol i'r gweithio arno 30, 70, 80% Ie wnaeth i'w peth o holl, i wnaeth i'w peth o ch mayor, i wnaeth i'w peth o honod y ddadlangu, i wnaeth i'w peth o rôl. Wahy mae'r cyflodyniad ar yw holl iawn o'r arwyf yn tro i gael ymgrifwch mwyrch o brydd fwyllt. The risk element of the investment circle, etc, without all the risk side of dealing with community conflict, etc. They're trying to do it, and they've incorporate. I was going to ask you about safeguards and how safeguards listen to stabilisation. My safeguards were at the end. Safeguards? You're talking about safeguards. Also, payment by results. What about carbon loyalty as a payment by results. Mae yw'r ysgawdd gan unwaith fel y lluddion hynny. Yn dweud wedi'u cynhyrch o'r cyfnodau yn ymu cyllidau ymlaeniad a'r ystod yw'r cyfnodau rhythaffol. Mae'r ysgawdd ymlaeniedd ymlaeniedd a'r cyfnodau yn meddiadol ystod y peth yn gyfaseryddiaeth y 🔥. Ymlaeniedd ymlaeniedd yw ysgawd, mewn cyfnodau flynedd, a'u gw ولdd i'r ymlaeniedd ymlaeniedd yng Nghyrch. We have to move that negative in the monetary part. Those are what safeguards are meant to achieve. One of them is FPEG-3 perline informed consent. So this principle that communities have to know about this project for one they have to agree to do it. So those are standard measures put in place by these international agencies. But of course like bringing them in literary, and it's completely compliant with that. ond nid o'r ddim yn ystyried yng Ngwysig? Yn y dychydig, y wahid felly mae'r ddaeth cyd-gredig yn eistedd a'r ddiddordeb, mae'r ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb? Mae'n ddiddordeb ar yr oedd y ddiddordeb, a mae'r ddiddordeb yn y cyd-gredig yn ei ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb, ..a gwaith o'r ddaf yn ymgyrchio'n cyfrydd a chyfnod, a bwysig iawn. A fyddai'n bwysig iawn. Mae'r ddefnydd i'r llweithio'n ymwneud o'r byddaeth. Mae'n fyddai'n fydd yn fwy o'r ddechrau, yn ychydig yn ei ddechrau. Mae'n dwi'n oedd yn fwy oedd. Y red plus, y bydd y pwysig, haith ymwinell yng Nghymru yn y viawn? Yn y gweithio yw fydd yng nghywethaf, ychydig yn ddefnyddio ddim yn gweithio'n cyd-dweithio. yng Nghymru yn 2005, mae angen nghyrch ddaeth gyda'r ganddoedd fath o ein sgolion i'r ysgolion i dddefnyddio, o bron yw o'r cyfrunio o'r rhaid, o'r coeseddio Costerig, a'r ceisio? Teimlo, mae'n meddwl eisiau cael mynd i'w cair i'r Llyfr. Ym mwy o nod i ddangos yblodau, dwi'n cyfrwyng sy'n ddweud felly y byddwn yn ei wneud o bethiaid iawn i'r lleisio. Mae angen i chi i'w ddbyd. Ac rwy'n ddweud yr ydych chi'n rhai weld ganfodol. Byddai'r llun o ddatblygu lleiwn, byddai'n cyfrwng arnyn byddiant a gynhyrch yn meddwl ar draws rwy'i tatyn. Felly, byddai'n meddwl ar ffordr o ddiwyddiant.negelaf i'r meddwl sydd oedd eich meddwl i wath i'w meddwl, byddai'n meddwl i'r redgyff recycledd o ddiwyddiant, Byddwch i'n meddwl i'r pryd i'w meddwl i ddim yn mynd i'r byddiad, ac ydym eich dynion. Mae'r ffordd yn ymgyrchol i'r dynion, ac yn gyfrifio i'r dynion, y dynion ffordd yn gyfrifio'r dynion, a'r ffordd yn yn ffioedd yn ymddangos, cynnal y Chynwyr, a'r rhaglen yn gwirio'r dynion, mae'r dynion o'r ffordd yn ymgyrchol i'r dynion o'r ffordd. A'i gyd yn ymwynt i'r dynion. Mae gennydd eich gwenybach o'r levyddwr i prydau i'w Llyfridog o'r penodol yng Nghyrchu Rwyfyrdd Cymru. Mae'r bach o'r casin a rwy'r blwysgryffwyr. Mae'n meddyliad mewn gwybodaeth hwn, mae'n mwyaf i'r wand. Mae e'n meddyliad eich gwybodaeth a'r brifwyr mewn rhoi'n bwysig... Mae'r ffordd ir ydweithio arhaen chi i wneud o'r hordi'r genfi ar y Newgyllidig. Mae'n gwin iawn o gyllidio'r dweud. Felly, y system sy'n gwin iawn i'r dymos, yn ffawr i'r dymos, yn ffawr i'r dymos. Mae, yn ei wneud yn ganwch. Rwyf ymlaen i ddechrau arall. Yw'n cyfrif yn yr ystod, chymaau sy'n cefnogaeth, a ladw i'r ddweud o'r dweud ymlaen. Efallai i hoffi redd gerddwyd mewn sgifarrayf, i'r ddwyngog ymlaen, crewnio er mwyn cyllidiau'n cyfrif. yw'r llwyddiadau sydd wedi'i gweithio ymlaen. Mae'r llwyddiadau sydd yn ysgrifennu. Ysgrifennu? Yn ymdweud, ond mae'r bobl yn oed i'n wneud o'r ffordd. Mae'r ffordd yn gwirio. Mae'r ffordd yn gwirio i'r ffordd yn gweithio. Mae'r bwysig yn ymdweud. Mae'r bwysig yn ymdweud? Mae'r bwysig yn ymdweud. Mae'r bwysig yn ymdweud yn ymdweud. Mae'r bwysig yn ei撮wveru amddangosodd mynd caniad ac yn syniad. Ac yn ysgrifennu? Yn ein digun trefiann�nh, mae'r bwysig yn ymdweud yn ymdweud i amddangosodd myndiadau anarhwyme sy IFT yn ddargarf. Mae'r byg fadech genres yn ysgrifennu amddangosodd mewn hyffordd gwirio unrhyw'. So, in Nigeria, like I said earlier, the state has the job rights to land, so there is this land use act of 1990 which invested all land in the state government to audit entrusts for the people. So, whenever the state claims to be doing anything in public interest, that's the rights to the people in the land court, including community lands, though there is a clause within this law that recognizes customary land rights. Even that land rights is subject to the dignity rights of the state government. So, while the communities can challenge other claimants to the land and use that to challenge the claimants, it's difficult for them to use it to challenge the states, because the states would then tell them they're doing this in the general public interest, which supersedes customary recognition. So that, at any point in time, the community land or any kind of land that is potentially near the home of the states for general, optimates for people, so that's recognized. Well, of course, communities are one of these. They want this land. This law came about first in 1978, then 1990. Prior to this time, communities owned the land and they've always used the land, but this law came and then transferred rights to the states. But it's not as if red hasn't changed these things on paper. What it has done is basically reinforced states' control of land through the use of states' force military to chase up communities, even on community forests. Thank you very much for coming. So next week we'll be meeting here again, where we'll be having the next in the series, where Dr Maria, who will be speaking of our post-chicology of water, is in Palestine. Of virtual water, which is very important for water. So please do join us again next week. Thank you very much for coming.