 try and be a bit more direct. So my name is Yazid Sayegh. I'm a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon. I'm very pleased to be here and I'm moderating this second panel, which as you'll know, focuses on the question of whether a political solution in Syria is possible. And unfortunately, we've lost one member of the panel today, the head of the Kurdish National Council. But I'm very pleased to have with us Basima Qudmani, formerly the spokesperson of the Syrian opposition and the executive director of the Arab Reform Initiative. Jihad Magdisi, former spokesperson as well of the Syrian Foreign Ministry. And since then, we'll be speaking today as representative of the Cairo platform of the Syrian opposition and Rubam Haishan of the Sawa Non-Governmental Organization working with Syrian Civil Society. And I'm following the same format as in the first panel. I'll lead with a number of questions addressed to each of the panelists and the follow on and then open it up for wider interaction with everyone. My first question is addressed to Basima and it's the broadest and sort of obvious question, I guess, that do you expect the Syrian conflict to end in a formal negotiated settlement, regardless of whether it's favorable or not to one side fair or not, but a formal agreement? Or do we basically face something that will continue endlessly into some what becomes a new status quo in the region? One that's probably going on present trans favors the Assad regime? First, I want to thank you for this day on Syria, which Carnegie has organized and I believe it was a good initiative. It is extraordinarily timely and important to have this discussion now. I think what I will say today may be heard better than it would have been heard a few days ago. And that is that I am a member of the negotiating team in Geneva. So we actually experience every time we go to Geneva, the prospect of having a real interlocutor for negotiations. The answer is no. We have no interlocutor. And this has led us to really deal with the United Nations rather than deal with a regime delegation representing the region because that delegation is simply not interested in engaging in any shape or form, any shape or form. So we pretend we're having negotiations. The real discussion is with the UN. My view is that we may be on a track in which we are building with the United Nations, the alternative institutional, legal, political and security plan for Syria to build the alternative to what Assad has been telling us there is no alternative to my regime and to the international community to slowly realize that that alternative is now present, but it exists on paper. Can we implement it? Can the international community help do so? It's obviously an idealistic approach. But that is what is happening in Geneva. No interlocutor, no partner for negotiations. Now, does that make the those who believe in a political solution irrelevant? That is what we heard from Ambassador Musaveyan. You're nice people, but you're irrelevant. Who has made us irrelevant? I think what we, the hope we have here is that we come to a point where everyone realizes those who have influence, and these are Russia, but also the United States, because in all of our discussions, we realize that Russia is waiting for the signals from Washington. And that was said earlier. So Russia on its own is not playing. It is waiting for the American signals from Washington. Those signals have been accelerated, I think, by what has just happened. Assad makes decisions based only on his military calculus that he needs to prevent the opposition from making progress in one area and by any means. And that means also the use of chemical weapons on civilians. And that's what happened in 2013. And this is what happened yesterday with no measurement, no conscience at all of the political implications or the political message he is sending. He has sent this message once again at a very crucial critical moment when I think Russia is looking for what is what comes next. It still hasn't decided what comes after its victory in a level and is watching what it can do and waiting for the United States to. And here Assad sends that very clear message. He will not be a partner for peace. His delegation in Geneva are not the people we can talk to. Can we talk to people within the constituency of the regime? Certainly. Certainly. And that's what we need to do. So I think what we have here is concretely no political process at the moment. The realization by everyone for the sixth year now that we don't have a partner for a political solution and that something needs to happen for a different kind of a delegation if you like or a partner in negotiations needs to emerge. Am I ignoring the security aspects of all of this? Not at all. I think Astana is a process that needs to take place because Russia is brokering it and is considering itself responsible for its success. We definitely need Russia to feel responsible for bringing a solution to Syria. Is Russia realizing what it needs to do? Not quite yet. But I also think that the illusion of a solution on its own terms the ideal solution that Russia wants which is keep Assad have a unity government in which you have two or three ministries for opposition figures will work. I think Russia is realizing this is not working because Assad is not helping Russia do that. So gradually politics will I think the political solution will prevail will happen because an orderly transition out of this dictatorship is necessary. A violent outcome might bring more violence. We need a controlled orderly negotiated ousting that doesn't mean that we are sparing Assad but the Libyan scenario is not what what the Syrians want because they've seen the failure of that scenario. We definitely need action that makes the political process serious and we need a security track in which and that was my question earlier to Ambassador Musavian. I don't know if he's in the room. I think it all starts with getting foreign fighters out of the country. Who are the foreign fighters? About 80,000 or maybe 100,000 sectarian Iran led militias in Syria and I say sectarian. I don't like to say Shia. Earlier Hezbollah was presented as the enemy to the Syrians. Five years or 10 years ago what is it? 10 years ago the Hezbollah was was the resistance. It was welcomed in Syria. Who knew it was who who even mentioned it was Shia? Nobody. But suddenly Hezbollah has become the arm of the tool of a sectarian agenda for Iran and therefore becomes the enemy and it is definitely fueling Sunni jihadism if you like or jihadis in in general and radicalism in Syria. So the first step we need to see here and this is obviously something where the United States need to weigh in the ousting the withdrawal of these forces through a UN Security Council resolution through a Russian American agreement to weigh in to get these militias out of the country. This is poisoning all of the Syrian scene and and is preventing the opposition from fighting radical jihadis inside the country. Thanks. Now I'm going to depart from my own script and I'm coming to jihad next but I'm going to ask you first to address the same question but very briefly. Do you think we're going to see a formal political settlement or not? Well thank you very much for having me. If I may say something regarding this same subject we need to differentiate between the aspiration of the Syrian people and what is offered for the Syrian opposition on the table. So we can continue forever saying Assad should go. We want democracy. We want like Switzerland's style of governance in our country. That's fine. Continue to do it. This is the continuation of the normal political life inside our country. But today what's offered for us away from emotion on the table is the implementation of 2254 United Nations Security Council resolution that doesn't speak about ousting regimes. It speaks about evolution and not revolution. So there is a big job on the camp of the opposition to adopt more realism and when I'm when I'm advocating realism that doesn't mean letting go of your aspiration at all but prioritizing. This regime cannot you cannot win against this regime and I assume I'm just I assume that I do understand this dynamic inside the regime because I worked for 15 years inside the government and five years after in the opposition. You cannot win by knockout for various reasons the Russian political umbrella they made it very clear no ousting no toppling for the regime militarily. The Iranian on the ground support till the end and they will not back off because this is a matter of strategic interest for Iran. The Chinese economic support for many reasons we can count it even the fear sentiment inside the Syrian society of the rise of jihadism made a segment of the Syrian people not pro regime against change and there is a huge difference. We have our own share of problem among the opposition. We have people who are Assad hater and not opposition. What we need to do is to concentrate more on being Syria saver and not Assad hater so we need to be more pragmatic instead of winning by knockout on this regime what we can do is winning by points and this is what I mean by prioritizing so we should stick to the Geneva communique power sharing in the country concentrate more on the software and not the hardware because everybody's saying is Assad must go okay and what if for instance let's if they sense the regime would tell we assigned this person to be the replacement of Assad who's the same software the same deep state the 18 security apparatus the intelligence community he will be another dictator so we should concentrate more on the software which is for instance the Syrian constitution whether we like it or not this regime is governing the the country by law by his own tailored main law the constitution so when he takes Basma or me to jail he has a phrase called harming this the national sentiment of the country of the nation whatever so this is where I see for instance the Russian steps to put on the table a draft constitution because they knew that it's no longer about persona it's about the software itself so if I want to be good for my Kurdish counterpart I don't want to tell them look I accept you guys you have your cultural right political right they don't trust me I might change if I do the same for for people who advocate in human rights minorities that don't worry we love the minorities we have we have this that we have this is nobody after after you move from dictatorship to so-called democratic system nobody trusts individuals people needs to trust texts and this is where the the debate of the constitution is essential because you can talk about the authority of the president the future president you can talk about the identity of the state since people are afraid of the future Syria this is how you can comfort people and convince them to rally behind the opposition but the more you make it personal this man will be the address and he has very truthful allies and I don't think that this is the real bad for Syria let me let me pick up immediately on that with my the original question I wanted to put to you and it fits perfectly here that given what you've said about the regime's deep state the software as you called it is there not a risk that even with a formal political solution that maybe he starts to address some of the constitutional articles some of the software but nonetheless this is a regime that father and son has been very skilled at working behind the formal structures of the state having texts laws constitutions that were not all bad and yet that operated them from behind the scenes through its informal networks and the de facto ways in which it operates how confident are you that this same regime won't know how to adapt to every constitution every formal text you throw at it and still run the show simply because nobody is offering partnership with the same nature and software of this regime if we partner with this same software we will end up like if Bisma said her opinion she can go to jail legally legally that's why what we are advocating is mutual transition this regime is fighting for what just to kill people no he wasn't really killing people forget about the deep state I mean fully fledged war before 2011 he's fighting for recognition this is what he wants that's why he would say to the American visitor yes I would receive a phone call from President Trump he knows that America is very important the Russian are the most important player on the ground but they are not enough you need the blessing of the American so to answer your question nobody trusts the behavior and nobody should but there are ways once we finish with the with the toppling of the regime etc this rhetoric we can sit around the table and we can figure out what's the best election electoral system how can we guarantee it will be done under the UN run and monitored by the UN but we need to move from the military options sincerely because I see colleague from the the Syrian opposition that I really admire but the moment they see like something like few weeks ago the rebels attacked Damascus suddenly I saw people saying let's pray for them let them when well we've been in Geneva one week ago saying the only option is the the diplomatic option I totally understand the frustration people needs to release their anger but there is no way out of this but diplomatically and the only way to defeat the system is the through evolution and not revolution and if I may add something even and if those people manage to enter Damascus for instance the day after what will happen who's going to provide electricity who's going to provide safety what type of justice system will be imposed so if you don't have a plan for the day after stay and stay as a victim don't become I don't want to say gladiator don't become in the as a spearhead of you know being in charge of the state stay victim act specifically as a victim advocating your rights your aspiration benchmarking don't let go of your aspiration but prioritize read read very well the political geopolitical context in the region thanks I mean this raises very interesting questions I want to come back to both basmas and comments of political agency I mean how do you conduct politics under what could be an extremely complex transition whether it's agreed or not I mean in all cases we face huge challenges I want to come to that but I want to come to that same question also with river of I mean I want you to react to some of this but in particular the the view from the grassroots from civil society from citizens of this country who you know who are the other other side of all this I mean we're talking about a top-down approach about constitutions about formal politics and formal agreements but all this has to be sold at the end of the day to be genuinely believed by people so I want to come to that but I want to start first with a question which is um to bring one more sort of high-level political question or issue to the discussion before we zoom in a bit and this is the issue of decentralization because one of the the the ideas that has been proposed with increasing energy over the past year the Russians even tabled something about this last year in March last year and it's been proposed by by many people as as one of the ways of undoing the deadlock in the diplomacy which is to use decentralization the transfer of certain authorities powers budgets etc away from central government and of course the presidency two regions um law 107 is in particular mentioned as the law that was introduced in 2011 but hasn't really been acted on at all um do you see any of this as a meaningful debate or is this just another way of fudging the issue of avoiding tackling the real critical questions of who wields what power in Syria or do you think that decentralization starts to bring in new players including local communities and changes the dynamic push it up as far as i know okay can you hear me now oh salam um but emotional to be here i think uh for a lot of us but particularly for me uh i've been speaking to some colleagues in the morning in the past few days about being here asking them they have any particular messages to bring to the us um and it's been really demotivating for a lot of us to be in Geneva to be in Brussels in the past few days even yesterday at the dinner with comrades and friends of Syria i had some deja vu moments or it was a little bit absurd to be discussing red lines and what responses to the chemical attack so i just want to say that it's it's a little bit emotional now um again we are here uh the chemical weapon attack happened which led us to go back to very basic demands that are like the protection of civilians we have the fifth round of Geneva which as we said didn't need any any solutions and no move towards a substantive political negotiation the fighting is continuing the regime is showing no sign of agreeing to political transition and in all of that the question of what is the political solution available and i'm glad i'm not in any politicians shoes i don't have to have an answer to that question but what i do have an answer is a question which is what shape will it take and what role does decrease like one or seven and others have in this political solution now for those who don't know the law one or seven was um uh voted in part in the Syrian parliament in 2011 it's uh main uh it was one of the proposed packages of legislative reform um it recognizes the rights of local administrative bodies to manage issues meaning to promote decentralization to enable uh local councils to execute development plan it gave more finances to local committees um and its aim was to facilitate services for citizen and to uh you know but due to the escalation of violence it hasn't been nationally implemented everywhere now maybe the three key points that are relevant to know about this law is that um it the availability of such a law would would allow for the decentralization of state power which means uh giving a bigger role to a grassroots level power local administrative bodies it holds then the potential to allow for reconstruction for reconciliation for accountability and it gives a lot of ownership and and and empowerment to the local communities now the second point is that this law um has been implemented to some extent in in some opposition areas and in Kurdish areas through the local coordination committees which have been doing a lot of work and some have been had great success in in doing these uh things that Jihad was mentioning in terms of providing water infrastructure services sanitation bakeries but also sometimes resolving local issues that are arising at the community level um now last but not least the most important point about this law is that it's been viewed favorably both by the regime and by the opposition which is like a very good basis or starting point for future model of of governance now presuming that there is like a genuine desire to decentralize um it should be part however the first step should be a political solution we we're all for the grassroots level solution for the bottom-up approaches but we have to start at the top-down level we have to reach a political agreement a transition that guarantees accountability that people would trust because people lost trust in all of this uh uh system so it needs to be accompanied by a top-down solution that guarantees this space for localization so any political solution in that sense should have explicit reference to the environment of local council and to the role of local society who are doing I would say the most inspiring work not because I'm part of the society but because we have seen them really take action at a level where states whether it's in Syria or in neighboring countries have failed they have resolved local disputes provided basic services they are the ones who for example may know in Hanchei phone or in Lebanon what are the real demands on the ground because they have been there every day with the people so briefly yes we need to move away from a badest strong era of centralization we know that this era is over it will not be accepted any longer it is not even possible but at the same time I would say we have to be very careful to replicate um uh state experiences such as the ones happening in Iraq where the state itself and its institutions were no longer utilized so we do need a unified um central legal framework coupled with uh with local level uh activism so here I would see it uh being implemented maybe there are three possible scenarios for laws like 107 to to be implemented the first one would be a low level decentralization which is something very similar to the current law but a few days ago actually the regime has changed coming back to the fact that they write the laws so they can at any point change and alter it they have actually changed one of the aspects of the law by saying that Damascus can appoint the local governor within within this law so the first option is to have this low level decentralization but ensuring democratically elected local rulers so by rechanging the law to something that looks like us the second aspect would be an institution institutionalized local councils which is what we have now at the LCC model or example but to include more governmental functions in it like policing administration and to have like a more institutionalized format or version of what is already happening de facto like now in opposition health territories and here the local administrative bodies until today have not taken mostly like over security and justice services effectively which is often leaving maybe risks of policing to militias or justice to be run by Islamic courts which of course we don't see as a secular Syria model that we are really calling for so here we need the Syrians really need a transparent rule of law based justice and security system so we need to think of what ways we can incorporate our security apparatus in any proposed political solution and last but not least the third way which we hope as a society will not happen is to have an asymmetrical decentralization meaning that we have a separate separate the country into like decentralized government government run zones that would operate with relative autonomy but that would come together at a certain level at the national level here I think it would be not only not favorable but maybe also difficult to implement because we have a long history of a centralized government and all in all also it's not very favorable because whatever political solution there is as civil society and as Syrians we really want to see one Syria we want to see one Syria one unified Syria we want to see our children learning the same textbooks we saw the example and the model of Lebanon and I'm not sure it's something that we want to be replicating we want one legal administrative social infrastructure of course utilizing the infrastructure of our country our institutions whether right now they fall on the regime territories when a political solution will happen we have to reclaim these spaces and these institutions because they are ours as Syrians but at the same time I would say not lose the gains the very big gains that have been done at local levels after 15 years of of dictatorship these local coordination committees and the important roles so maybe finding a way to bridge this infrastructure which will unify our country into one country for all Syrians why taking into account this contextually the experiences of different areas thanks that's I think very very useful very concrete set of elements there that you've laid out and I hope we'll come back to that you you mentioned the that the only people who really come close to implementing law 107 was in the Kurdish areas and I want to pick up on that a little bit and put the question to all three of you actually anyone who cares to tackle this the Kurdish dimension I mean sadly we've lost the Kurdish participant he should have skyped in maybe well too late for me to set that up right now but given the complexity and here I'm still talking at sort of level of grand strategy as it were that we have reality where say the in this case where I think referring to the Kurdish PYD party of course implementing what it chooses of the laws in this case law 107 or elements of it I'd be interested to hear from you whether you think that implementation has been relatively successful given all the other problems we've heard about Arab Kurdish ethnic relations within those areas and Hussaki and further west but also to both Jihad and Basma the the complexity of the politics here Turkey has a very big interest and it keeps stating it very publicly Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan in particular the Kurdish Kurdistan Democratic Party that governs the KRG and the Barzani have obviously their own disputes with the PYD and their own concern about whether the Kurds get more or less autonomy and what kind in Syria but obviously the Syrian opposition and the Syrian regime also have views that at times don't diverge entirely about how much autonomy the Kurds should and the Kurdish issue in particular seems to be a special case of how much power to give the regions versus the center how do you square that circle and I don't know if you had I was proposing to come to you first if you care to venture you know how do you see that playing out given in particular your understanding of the regime and its own view of the Kurdish question well this is a very important debate let me tell you our sentiment as opposition and as our Cairo platform because the PYD is member of our platform and we felt a bit betrayed when they when they went above the ceiling of the political paper we agreed upon and they signed to it which is decentralization and not federalism so we felt that it's a bit opportunistic and taking advantage of weak Syria to implement what they want regardless of what is the main issue which is the political dilemma and the country transition implementing Geneva implementing the road maps stipulated in 2254 so the Kurdish behavior I do I totally respect and we are totally pro their all their rights cultural political whatever you want we are not even against federalism but you cannot federalize yourself unilaterally that should be a debate inside saying Syria healthy Syria and let's Syrian decide if they want a federalism so be it but you cannot tell me now because while we are busy with barrel bombs with chemical with the political battle in Geneva I care about this region and this is what suits me that's what annoying Arabs let's put it this way or Syrians that we we we didn't betray your demand your aspiration but be patient take it easy take a step back stick to the decentralized system where you will have your freedom if you think you have the majority in your opinion in your region you will get what you want democratically so this is where we feel disappointed was there you know going further than that they have agreed upon but all said I have to say that we have a Kurdish problem in the country and it should be solved and they should get all their rights was totally let me take the same so to basma they or may not come from the same viewpoint we may not differ so much on the on the future my main problem with the with the approach here is the evolutionary versus revolution I think Syrians went for revolution because they lost hope on the evolution and you know that from 2011 you know that since 2000 Syrians have tried and hoped that Assad would open up it allows society to grow with open space and that never happened and then the response in 2011 was brutal killing and and every day Assad is again saying instead of saying or showing any sign that he can be part of some evolution he's saying I'm the problem he is telling the whole world I am the problem I'm I'm killing today with chemical weapons everything you've banned everything we've agreed on I'm using again so the problem with the evolutionary model is is just we we would have loved to have it we would have spared ourselves and all these lives we have lost so we go to Geneva who do we talk to you know who we talk to we not to we talk to mr demistura we don't talk to anyone on the on the regime side they're not interested in talking to us maybe we can get an ear from the Russians who because they see that they're stuck might start listening to some option that moderate opposition could put but you and I are irrelevant in the current context and and that is a reality and that that is my problem with the approach in which we don't disagree on transition and I did say an orderly negotiated agreed transition out of dictatorship but unfortunately it's not going to happen between Syrians at the moment that's not me I so but come back to the Kurdish question I am coming to the Kurdish is it evolutionary or revolutionary that need that necessary that needed an answer I think I'm fine with that I'm just asking whether you'd apply the same evolutionary versus revolutionary logic in the Kurdish case okay we're not going to differ on on on substance we don't differ on the vision for the future we don't differ I actually am very close to what you had us saying I'm saying first of all the high negotiations committee which includes groups you don't like I don't like many of us don't like the the advantage of having such a structure is it can deliver those groups at some point if you want to bring them to adhere to a ceasefire there's no ceasefire today and so attacks on Damascus are retaliation against no respective ceasefire forced displacement which is accelerated and I want to draw attention here the demographics of Syria are changing before our eyes and this process has accelerated tremendously in the last year since summer of 2016 Daraya was the turning point or the one that brought the international attention to see that there is demographic change do we can we in a a serene and peaceful peace of mind with peace of mind discuss the future of the Kurdish issue the answer is at the moment it's almost impossible yet yet we need to provide the assurance to the Kurds who adhere to a unit united Syria that they will be okay that in the constitution their rights will be guaranteed that we will have at the central level before we move to their autonomous self-government federal whatever that at the central state level we have the institutions that enforce and and protect their rights and enforce anti-discrimination and equal rights for them I think it's at the central level of the state which tells us that a failed state as it is today is not in a position to discuss the future of the Kurds but I'm not saying let's put that to the future I'm saying the onus lies on us because Assad has has wrecked the whole has torn apart the Syrian social fabric he has manipulated every minority in the country to raise to to to incite hatred so it's for the society today to find those terms of moving towards a solution where we can move all together including the Kurds inside the among the ranks of the opposition some of us are more aware of that more attentive to this are willing to give priority to that I'm one of those and I but I may be criticized within my own camp I think we should be reassuring the Kurds it's not whether we think they are in in danger or not it's their perception they see that they have there's a risk for them we need to reassure them that is a question of perception of course there's a limit to you know using an international situation to put demands that are sometimes unmanageable for us not unrealistic but unmanageable for an opposition that is weak and not not capable of delivering except on paper what kind of commitments can we make it's at the central government I think and in this country we've had very alarming approaches to Syria well it can be bits and pieces and we'll have a state that will know syrians want a united syria here is an example of thinking about the future the day after the day after is ready believe me it's in everybody's in the moderate opposition's minds I don't think we have a problem I don't think we have a problem are we in a position to implement step one of this obviously not because Assad Assad is finished if he sees that there is an alternative term so his job is to destroy anything that might sound like an alternative decentralization security sectarian reconciliation which I don't like to use because we don't have a problem so it's not reconciliation all of this tells us that that we are you know we are really we've matured ideas and options for the future but but we are not anywhere enabled by anyone to implement any of that constitutional transition yes constitutional transition should we discuss yes we should and we do it in Geneva and we have done so have we talked about elections yes we're willing to talk about elections election law and party and how political parties should be established on on what rules they should function how do we go beyond the discussion with the mistura the united nations and paper I want to pick up on several things you mentioned mentioned polarization reconciliation which he said actually is not a problem in reality you mentioned the counteroffensives around Damascus in response to regime violations and I wanted to tie these things together and take this to rubber that with so much violence and so much polarization the perspective from outside Syria is very much one that genuine reconciliation among Syrians is surely going to be nearly impossible I mean regardless of all the complexity of dismantling regime networks of asserting powerful legal constitutional and other forms of oversight that would genuinely change the balance of power and how power is used in Syria besides all that all this has to ultimately be rooted in society you know reconciling do you do you agree with basma that reconciliation is actually not an issue this is not a real problem because people in syrians aren't really divided and is it is it possible to get what the rest of us would call meaningful reconciliation I think being in DC is again like I'm going to start there because I usually like to go back to the people I I'm honored to be serving who are my community the syrians on the ground both inside syria and neighboring countries and take back whatever things that we have from these discussions as a form of you know transparency and accountability for myself being here I'm not legitimate or representative but I am here speaking on behalf of a chunk of syrians at least and usually what happens is when I come to DC I go to state department meetings or to Capitol Hill or even to panels like this and I go back to the people on the ground and they ask me what have you spoken about or what are the outcomes of these discussions and generally I don't have anything to take back not because these discussions aren't interesting they are but they are very ivory tower discussions that often do not have clear implications on the lives of people in everyday life because people in everyday life they wake up every day and they don't discuss reconciliation or repatriation or decentralization they discuss okay my child is has a cold and he has a fever and you know he has to go to school and my husband is wounded and so I want to go back to the idea of reconciliation like if you take it as a theoretical concept and if you look do we have a problem of reconciliation will we face that problem or that issue I think we will is it going to be impossible to resolve I don't think so because the reason why we have these problems or these differences are actually structural so we will have a problem with reconciliation when people will not have equal rights when people will not have access to the same services for example we see in the refugee camps or internally people start fighting so basically in the camps when we see people from Idlib or Homs or or Hama or even from Damascus not accepting to talk to one another it's because this family received support and the other one didn't so I don't want to oversimplify the issues of reconciliation people differ on a lot of matters but at the end of the day politics with a big P when you bring it back to the micro level it's it's totally like the interactions and implications are very different now I remember like Secretary Albright asked me once like can you speak of one unified Syrian civil society because who are you guys like who is there one body that we can talk to as civil society and of course the answer is no we are not one we differ in our approaches in our legal frameworks but at the same time we exist as a third wave because it really like makes my my hair stand although you can't see it when people come and and tell me is it like ISIS versus Assad and who are the third you know wave and who are the who are the what is the third alternative and here people forget about the millions of Syrians actually who exist and and who are living like every day it's a very reductionist view that doesn't incorporate those who are wounded those who are displaced those who are detained we as a civil society organization have been working delivering food education documenting work crime but mostly working on bringing communities together and how do we bring people together not by having a five star hotel conference where people come and discuss what does it mean reconciliation or what does it mean this and that is but actually going out in the community and saying we are living together in this locality and there is no infrastructure and there is no state so let's work together to create an infrastructure so it's at this very micro level that we start seeing that and and here I want to talk a little bit about the existence of this civil society because one of the things I'm deeply proud about in the past few years is that we as Syrian civil society were able to form we have pushed very much for our space in the international community and in the local community unfortunately we had had to fight to be there not only with those who don't see us as legitimate or as a legitimate player. Basma you just mentioned that you are now in discussion with the UN to see what are the alternatives how will they play at a micro level what role is civil society playing in that is it only inviting them tokenistically to be there inside events in Geneva in Brussels and in all of that but how are you really incorporating this very big actor who is a very big partner in everything that will happen is it really that we are acknowledging the existence of these young men and women who are leading right efforts who are reaching out to Syrians who are everyday speaking in direct contact speaking the language of the people speaking the language both literally and figuratively of these people so again like I'm not here to speak about high level politics I'm here as civil society with non political vested interest we are independent but we are not neutral we are here to fight for the rights of the people at the micro level and bring it onto the micro level we are not just young refreshing voice no we are we have the technical expertise we have operational independence we have the political distance that when you two are discussing I'm just sitting here and smiling because you know I don't have to be part of that debate but I do have my my ideas about it and I have I'm watching actually what both of you are saying and what the regime is saying and what the opposition is saying as civil society so and this can translate not only in in conversations like this but for example in in the conversation around reconstruction civil society organizations for example now it's the big topic everybody is discussing reconstruction but what is really absent in this discussion of reconstruction is the concept of rights and this is where the civil society's role is to say okay are you guys planning for a real estate development plan because if you are then you are on the right track it's great you have the contractors you have the funders you're discussing all of that or are you really like talking about reconstruction of a society and of a community are you taking into account that if if if a political solution exists and if transition is going to happen and if there is accountability and if we have a puristic society with democratic values who are the people in that society who are the ones who will be voting the illiterate or the stateless children that don't have any papers today or the people who don't have any legal documentations who who can't even leave the refugee camp in Lebanon to go to vote or are these only rights that we continue discussing so here the role the role of civil society comes into play for example to say that reconstruction like if we if i want to put it in a nice slogan like the people before the stones we as civil society we're not waiting for anyone to start the reconstruction process because we have already started the reconstruction process in 2011 in our schools in our educational systems in our programs development programs that we are doing on the ground and here I just want to say that we know very clearly what are the rights that we will accept and not accept as civil society we are a third wave we have buy-in from local communities in our local councils we have very high legitimacy but we have to also say that the asset whether it's evolution or revolution we have to say that the asset remaining in power will exasperate you know will make all of our attempts of said governance impossible it will exasperate further extremism which will ultimately be our enemy in our own work so this is why we have to make sure that any again any transition will take into consideration all of this I'm just going to leave you with a few examples where where a couple of examples where we have seen our work being called for example we have four organizations two of them in alapo and two in Damascus who are registered with the regime so they are a legitimate organization in regime health areas trying to do work with our people because our people people in regime health areas are our people as well they are Syrians just like us these organizations have been halted and closed down by the regime who have stopped them from even working with the UN right now when we saw the evacuations from Qudsaya and Hama we have seen many of the civil society activists being sent to Idlib and we know very well when you send a secular activist to Idlib under islamist group it's almost like suicide the same thing is going to happen now in Ghouta so we have to look at it from this perspective and you have to also further our existence not to be not to be having to fight for our presence at international level at local level with the regime with the opposition make our life easy by recognizing that we are partners in all of this and we have a lot to say actually in all of these conversations many thanks and I think you've also addressed part of the closing final question I was going to put very briefly now to Jihad and Basma since you've already started to address this this is the question of at some point we hope sooner rather than later Syria will move into a post conflict situation post conflict transition in two minutes each exactly I want you to give us a comment on what Basma said we're gonna we need to open this up to the floor and I think you're gonna get a lot of opportunity to comment via comment you know responding to questions so I think you'll find the way the challenges of political action in future Syria let's say there's a genuine power sharing agreement and let's say that the software changes enough basher la said as you said whether he's replaced or not the real question is do you change software say say things start to change but the other part of power sharing is the other side who are sharing that power right and there may be multiple actors on the other side it may be the bad party it may be security agencies posing as political parties I don't know but how do you see yourselves and you know not just the opposition but everyone who is in part of the regime structure how do you anticipate conducting politics in this you know not five years down the line once you have a functioning system but in the first year two years the huge challenges of an opposition that is so far been weakened by a number of factors that has been divided affected by external players in very negative ways a lot of the time and yet we'll be going back operating inside Syria under this new setup what do you see as the critical challenges that you need to be thinking about today because that's going to influence your negotiating approach two minutes each okay quickly like look we need to lay out the mission our our mission what we are not first we have to say we are not elected official we were found in this environment where people were you know living inside outside Syria scholars former diplomats politician we end up fighting for change in our country so our mission is not to go there and replace Assad our main main mission is to enable Syrians to choose us others or loyalist camp so this is our mission so we have to accept the end game eventually if Syrian decided to choose this camp more we should respect democracy so what we are aiming at is to provide the the the healthy framework of political life on the question of evolution and not revolution with all the respect I do disagree on this and I can say no the opposition did not try the evolution path and if I may draw a quick charter for the performance of the of the within the one minute remaining to you of the Syrian opposition I would say they are the one who went down in their ceiling not the regime so and we tried seven years so we owe it to the Syrian people because we are not fighting for jihad basma or anybody else there are people inside Syria who are not with the regime and I would never underestimate the wind of change inside the country when they see like one of the priority in my eyes is to see basma inside the country to see the opposition inside the country operating so you can not only win the battle of hearts also the minds because people under certain propaganda they think that we are external agents they need to see us inside they need we need to have a newspaper we need to have instead of these conferences tv station inside Syria talking liberally about our views so and I just wanted to say one last thing we need to know after seven years that the Syria today is not the same Syria of 2012 11 today we have three Syria Syria of Iran and Assad Syria of Rojava and Syria of ISIS so we we cannot operate on the same software again like if it is 2011 it's different reality thanks basma last word forgot the Syria of syrians exactly and you fell into the binary I mean I'm surprised okay okay I I just want to say it's not opposition versus civil society I'm not going to talk about myself but I just jihad just said I would say those who carry the vision for the future of Syria are civil society those who need to sign an agreement internationally has to be a body that represents different groups this is what a body like the high negotiations committee in coordination with other groups who are not part of it today but who see eye to eye on the need for change these people need to be brought to sign off on something that says it's the end we move to the day after okay now I'm not going to go into the day after again that what jihad describes is what I have we've always aspired to do but today if I go to Damascus I'm dead or I'm in jail of course you know that okay so evolution is not is not on offer unfortunately neither was it 10 years ago knows it today I think what we want to realize is the responsibility we carry in building the ties between all Syrians and that is not government and opposition reconstruction as Ruba said very rightly reconstruction is going is is already there the areas controlled by the opposition with local councils are not chaotic there is no chaos in those areas there are remarkably managed by people who deliver services all kinds of services with very small budgets and are organizing people's lives now do we like exactly who's there do we like the courts that rule of course not but something has been permitted is the takeover of areas where moderates have been made irrelevant as well and that is is something that systematically unfortunately systematically Assad has encouraged he likes to have a radical islamist jihadist opposition not other people up here right there just because we really have to bring in more voices now we are coming back of course to the issue of reconstruction in the afternoon and I think we've already laid the ground for some very interesting discussion there I'll start with the lady at the back and then sort of wander around but very brief and we need brief responses for a little while hi everybody thank you so much for this interesting panel please identify yourself my name is Hedy Buzo and I'm the bureau chief of orient news I have a question I have actually two questions that that's okay it's for Mr. Jihad and for Miss Besma afterwards for Mr. Jihad I mean to be just honest for somebody who was born and raised in Syria I just feel like you're talking about an alternative reality that doesn't exist in Syria you know when you talk about the fact that there's people who can actually operate our opposition to the Assad regime you work with the Assad regime you know them on the insight they kill everybody who's opposition so my question is how do you I mean so for somebody who is saying he's an opposition and at the same time just providing a disconnected information disconnected from reality I just want you to correlate what you're saying with the reality like who can operate inside of Syria and what is the solution that you're trying to tell other people about the world criminal regime how could we do this the second question for Miss Besma is about the prioritizing extremists versus the Assad regime in Syria do you think that we can get rid of extremism in Syria and terrorism while Assad and the Hezbollah militias and all the secretarian iranian militias killing innocent civilians in Syria just because they are Sunni for example and that would be my two questions thanks can you look at my question because you elaborated a lot I forgot what no exactly let me first I want to tell you something to educate you about something I worked for the Syrian state I was a civil servant I was never a regime figure just for the sake of history and I'm still working for the maintenance and conservation of the future Syrian state of Syria I'm somebody who worked for the state and I believe that even our allies will not support us if we act in a chaotic manner look at the American for instance they support the Kurdish not because they like them they are with blue eyes because they are disciplined they deliver and they don't get radicalized so we need to learn the lessons if we want to seek the the the help of our friends I never said I want Besma or me to go to Syria I would love to go to Syria actually that's not a secret but it's not doable we don't have a problem with the Syrian state we have problem with people who thinks that they are the state so I never advocated going to Syria with this circumstances on the contrary what I'm saying is implementing 2254 would mean creating a TGB transitional governing body with full executive power so people will have immunity restructuring the security apparatus disabling their ability to arrest we don't want by the way we want Syria with security apparatus before we have terrorism problem our problem is with the behavior of the state not the state itself so here you have FBI you have CIA you have MI6 you have MI5 but if they don't have a case they cannot take you and arrest you this is what we want in our country to have really normal intelligence apparatus so I never said I want people to go and be suicidal I said let's create and implement what's on the table beyond beyond our aspiration we continue this is not the end this is the beginning of the Syrian uprising the moment the opposition managed to enter the country and operate freely and patriotically this is the beginning of the Syrian uprising by the way so if we go as part of this executive branch to enable syrian to choose this is the aspiration I never said go and apologize from the regime and you accept it as it is no we are already talking about another software sorry that's thanks yeah my my my only comment here is what is the sequencing of arrangements for a solution I think if I were to draft a peace plan for Syria I would start with a very strong UN role and responsibility guaranteeing and endorsing and guaranteeing an agreement which says number one foreign fighters get out of Syria without that there is it's a waste of time we cannot work in Syria and rebuild anything with the presence of foreign fighters by foreign fighters I mean Iran led militias coming from everywhere Hezbollah Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan and and Iran that's why but also the jihadis on the other side the Tunisians the Moroccans nobody wants them they the countries don't want them back what do we do with them do they get all killed in Syria what happens to the civilians who get killed with them that I think is is a first requirement is that the international community says these forces get out with enforcement mechanisms and guarantees by the United States Russia the big powers number two is a security plan and for stabilization of Syria with the political horizon of a transitional government which does not include Assad what does that mean can we just take a minute to say what that means without Assad means we have a plan that says elections or constitutional transition will lead to a peaceful departure of Assad on such a date that is when a transition can really be implemented in the country because once more if we if if outrage is eroded every time by time and other concerns and we are about to rehabilitate Assad he does the right thing for himself to be excluded again and I think this has just happened once more just to tell us he doesn't want to be bothered right so that is this security plan is key to ensure the physical security of every community and in the future with constitutional legal all sorts of institutional arrangements to guarantee everybody's safety and future in the country you can see there's a lot of uptake there's a gentleman in glasses in the middle there like he's gonna go and take him one by one although I'd have a thank you for coming today my name is Jesse March and from the Stimson Center my question is for Ruba regarding the post-conflict stabilization the local level there are areas of violence that are receding how do we factor and return and repatriation for IDPs that are likely going to come home and areas where violence is kind of cleaning out how do we factor that into civil society preparation sustainability thank you uh first of all by ensuring that these areas are not being repatriated with non-Syrians because at the moment it is happening a lot of areas there are Iraq Iraqi and Iranian Shia families that have been brought into certain areas to to repatriate it so the first part is that the second part is to make sure that reconstruction efforts that are already started unfortunately there are reconstruction efforts that are already started through UNDP and others going directly to the regime starting reconstruction of areas without the presence of their own population thirdly there's a very big discussion I know in DC about the issue of safe zones or zones or interim zones of stability or whatever you may you may want to call it to make sure that there's not a refugee issue but it's a civilian protection issue to make sure that it is not a forced fulfillment of people it is a voluntary return because I live in Lebanon at the moment and I can see very clearly how the Lebanese government is very very happy about this this sending people back into Syria so to make sure that this is happening but fourthly maybe which maybe is something I would like to ask to Dr. Hijab in the afternoon and others is how to make sure again that we have legal documentation we have almost 300 000 children inside Syria alone that in non-regime areas that don't have birth certification we have people children being born in the region that don't have any papers so how how can you do that and fourthly how can we ensure that the rights of people when we when they go back how can we ensure restorative justice that actually the house that I left I will come back and we will be able to go back to it again so I don't have answers to all of these questions unfortunately but these are all questions that we need to be thinking about front and then there was someone at the back getting the mic Azid I just want to make a comment if I may anyone else very as far as foundation just to come back to what Jihad said I think the point about the Assad you're saying you're all obsessed with the Assad issue the Assad the Assad point there is a difference between saying we want Assad and saying the alternative is the jihadis coming and knocking on the masques and I think it's a very dangerous way of portraying it because the the opposition in the conference embryo they said very clearly they want to maintain the institutions of the state and they want to maintain they want to reform the security apparatus so you are trying to equalize the state with a person and that is exactly what many people in the regime today are saying and what the Russians are saying now if you go back to saying the script for the transition in Syria is 2254 and the Geneva communique I was in Geneva on the 28th and the 29th of June before the meeting on the 30th in June and the script for Geneva said very clearly that no one should participate at the time in the transitional governing body whose presence will undermine the credibility of the transition process that was the script of Kofi Annan and Nasir it was changed on the 30th and Fred was there and Phil Gordon because the Russians they said we should not dictate we should not participate they came up with a mutual consent and we've had five years of disagreement on the form of mutual consent mutual consent in our definitions in the people of the opposition is mutual veto we want the Syrian dialogue and we want to say we want to eliminate those who have butt on their hands because we want to have a genuine reconciliation process you cannot have a reconciliation when you rehabilitate Assad in a transitional governing body you put him in knowing his history of his family for the last 50 years and you bring them back into this transition and I've always said the analogy in this is like taking a patient who's bleeding and dying putting him in a in a in an ICU with the killer in the he will die in the ICU so we will end up prolonging the crisis and prolonging the conflict I think the point of Assad is extremely extremely central for us because we want a credible transition we don't want masking the process we want a credible transition that moves us into a new chapter we want to flip a page and move on thank you but sorry it was a comment okay you go ahead but this is what you want not the international community what are your tools amen sorry no no I was marina two rows back it's sort of difficult marina okay you need them oh you've got the mic sorry I have the mic with somebody marina ottaway with Wilson Center I'd like to go back to this concept of the local communities that you have all discussed because I hear more and more talk about this certainly in Washington now the you know the state department tells you you are going to provide water and electricity but the political decisions have to be made by the local communities and my and it all sounds good until you start asking who are the local communities at this point because in reality the local communities you know the local community in raca is going to have a very strong ypg and probably American advisors components and I think you can take any part you know the local community in rojava are going to be mostly ypg so that what is there a way the basma you talked about all the the you know the militia should be should go back it's a very nice idea but it's not going to happen the international community is not going to take that position so what happens if a lot of responsibility is given to the local communities under the conditions that are likely to exist who do you like to address this to do basma you mentioned okay just just so one person takes over can I just please do I don't see a easy integration of all the militias existing now I see that we cannot deal with the foreign ones definitely that is a role for outsiders and then we have groups on the ground some need to be fought and they will be fought but they should be fought and I think this is the most important part here capacity is not enough legitimacy is important you cannot have you cannot rely on ypg or pyd and have you know the argument that shea militias have the capacity and hasvallah has the capacity to fight you know jihadi terrorism or sunni jihadism if there is no legitimacy to these groups the groups when we talk about who is the face of an army who are the moderate fighters who are the these are people who have given up because because they don't have the support they need but but these are the people who can defend their communities we have to come back to the model of what happened in 2011 people rose against brutality organized carried arms to protect communities fought and then went back most of them 80 percent today of those fighters are home they have a weapon but they have no participation in any groups because there's no role for them okay if one wants to rely on the communities they are the ones who can get friends of radicalism within their ranks that's number one the number two is the legitimate force is going to grow out of a political horizon i say horizon because we don't need to implement everything before we can get to that stage the stage is when loyalists i'll call them loyalist forces regime forces army in particular not sectarian militias the army plus the free syrian army can turn their guns in the same direction for that we need a ceasefire and the ceasefire has never been implemented the day we have a ceasefire believe me it will be de facto it doesn't even need to be announced it's already the case that those fighters on the opposition side are fighting radicalism terrorism and would like not to have to to to fight as well the army the syrian army or the sectarian militias they would rather fight radicalism and clean up their areas so we have now a mature situation on the ground for that kind of not cooperation but convergence of objectives for these forces and and among free syrian army officers who defected they have a vision that is very different from the opposition they say this is a small army we want to go back to join the side the state and its army are legitimate structures which people identify with recognize and want to see restore so i would say capacity plus legitimacy is what we need to to stabilize those areas i don't know if that answers at least partially your question thanks busman now we've got 11 minutes starting to get tight i'm going to come to two or three people there's gentlemen at the back lady right there in the middle i'm gentlemen over there uh sorry third yes um right right next to me i'm over there i'll i'll get you in due course i think gentlemen back there please uh hello my name is zade i'm a syrian journalist my question to mr jihad you mentioned about the changing the uh what you call it software of the regime so um my question is uh as a Cairo platform how do you uh planning to implement this i mean this project in into consideration taking into consideration you know the interest of russia usa and iran in the in the area and i may ask the same question to mr basma also how do you like implement your plan how do you planning to uh to do your plan in the ground thank you well the only platform that we are working on is the janeva platform this is the only available one so through the un uh in coordination with the three the two other platform the mosco platform and the hnc in order to like to offer them the last round coordination with the hnc and the mosco group in order to have because the special envoy is sending questions and providing non paper asking for your comments so we assign somebody as a coordinator in order to achieve like one answer where we agree to send it to the un special envoy this is the only platform where we can you know push our political vision implementing the roadmap stipulated in the 2254 creating the tgb being part of this mechanism jointly with everybody i want to add to that basma i was partly just implementing the plan require is not going to be done here it requires maps and military experts to speak i sort of understood this more as a political question ie you know given all these external actors is any of this going to happen with without them making it happen if we do not have international sponsorship serious international sponsorship and in the international community taking its responsibilities and we're not throwing on the outside our uh the burden we are saying uh the regime has been supported by a superpower russia plus a major regional power iran plus militias from across the region this is not a syrian conflict anymore it is a major international crisis an international conflict so if there is no us russian and then regional contribution to making this possible unfortunately syrians are not in a position to end it and that that really needs to to to be understood and and any any message which used to come from mr labral and then comes from mr tillerson syrians need to find the solution i think this is the i i don't believe that any of this can can still be defended with any credibility thank you the woman in the middle yes why too hello my name is suheila sabay i'm a student at georgetown's master of science and foreign service my question kind of touches upon the last question that was asked but we've heard many ideas today about what a solution our transition might look like um who should be included in it but was wondering whether in light of the title of the panel is it still possible um what you thought about what facts on the ground need to change and whether in fact we do need outside intervention um to make this a reality because we've been trying political transition for years now and we've seen a continuous failure because of the lack of leverage on one side especially given recent statements from the u.s administration whether they might be willing to intervene to change those facts the response i mean i think we've heard a fair amount of responses to this question really um so i okay let you know what i'm going to take remaining questions all together and so gentlemen right next to you ma'am yes over there and then yeah i'm a gentleman i have a question to mr jihad uh when i said the regime first launched the chemical attack at two thousand two thousand you need to speak up a little bit i'm sorry my name is wadah zawi i'm Syrian-american activist my question is for mr jihad when the syrian regime first launched the chemical attack in 2013 you appeared on the syrian national tv and you say that the syrian regime won't use the chemical weapon against its the syrian civilians now you distance yourself away we understand that and you believe in the uh sorry can i have a question because we're extremely short i'm coming to the question you believe in the evolution of the regime uh trump just announced right now he is considering a military action against the regime don't you think it's a golden chance for you to appear again on the television and expose that regime so that will change your evolution theory we've had a question like this already jihad um muhammad please thank you um my name is muhammad ghan and i'm with syrian-american council i have a question for mr mcdissi as well so if i understood you correctly you advocate gradualism if i and i have a question that if i may i would just like very quickly to deconstruct the approach your approach rests on two assumptions the first assumption is that we don't have the right framework in the country and once you get the right framework then things can proceed but and you mentioned the constitution as a small win uh law laws electoral laws but the we the the constitution that we have in the country in syria now isn't really that bad but the problem is that it has never been anything more than i'm sorry to say toilet paper for the assertion so are you making the question is are you making the assumption that once you have that framework then asset will submit to it then the second the second assumption that i think your evolutionary approach rests on is that the regime is capable of reform aside from the fact that the men in power since 1971 the regime now has embarked on a demographic changing scheme because it cannot rule over restive populations so for the regime to be able to sustain itself in power it has to continue to employ and utilize means of coercion how would you stabilize the country address the security issue while maintaining or while employing instruments of coercion with mr asad in power thank you thanks mohammed gentleman here i'm taking the last one in the middle there maryam urey barman expert at the russian international affairs council my question is for ruby we're talking about the law 107 i was curious whether you could elaborate as to how the law could be sort of the basis for civil reconciliation in syria the reason why i ask is because the law 107 adopted by the government and recognized by the local councils of two different laws right because among other things the law stipulates that the head of provincial council should be appointed by the president directly as well as you know local councils stick to the bylaws adopted by the syrian term a government to dysfunctional body basically and you know officials in russia when i talk to them that they say they are outright legal right when they come into the syrian jurisdiction work according to the syrian laws we could talk about their sort of inclusion process so clearly you know this this thank you and then finally gentlemen yeah thank you very much very quickly larry check out check our communications we've heard the term civil society bandied about all morning and we all know that a good civil society requires functioning independent institutions what are what is the current status of the ongoing institutions in syria at this point well thanks so we will round up like a minute a minute and a half each i know this is sort of like slightly fictional but i'll be quick and thank you very much for your question it's really important what you raised about the chemical attack in ruta in august 2013 to give you an example how how much we don't know each other i resigned nine months earlier to this attack but that was in december 2012 i left the country so i didn't appear on tv and i never advocated atrocity or justified it on the contrary in august i was with christiana amana poor and i did condemn the attack for your record so i wasn't in the country and that was nine months after my departure and if i do if i move to the substantive questions yeah the military action proposed by the administration of trump on the contrary i think if the aim is to build a case and indict the regime we should never advocate punitive strikes because this is what the regime would be happy to receive it will help him escape if he committed this i'm assuming on the contrary if we have a case i would advise the american administration the russian administration to go to the security council and advocate unfettered access for commission of investigation to have a case and go to court then if we have a case if you go for this punitive strike that will people will be more radicalized rallying around the flag it's external aggression and and whoever did it he will get away with it so i i think this is where i'm saying we need to put aside our emotion it's you know that bad testing medicine i know that because people in the street they want you know they want something immediately done and unfortunately this is not the case so i'm pro having investigation unfettered access from the un to get to facts and then when we have the facts we build on it a solid case not a psychological or you know just to vent our anger um and the question for mr ghaniam um exactly you mentioned yeah you talked about transition and Assad in power yeah i remember now i i never said i never talked about the framework of the regime maintain it i talked about Geneva communique the Geneva communique and two two five four is offering a golden opportunity for the opposition to be part of the system to change the software to disable those who can prevent you from saying your your opinion so i never said cosmetic change on the contrary for your for your knowledge in our paper we are advocating the departure of this regime eventually but not as a precondition so we know that we need we should be working on guarantees benchmarking this is what i'm advocating this is what i mean by evolution and not cosmetic change for the regime this regime is expired they cannot throw it Syria anymore the same modest operandi but you cannot distance yourself and ask him to give you what you failed to get militarily to get it by remote on the table from Geneva we need to enter the country and go through this tunnel and cross this bridge i know it's hard the only the discussion will have to continue i want to give a minute now no longer a minute and a half to basma sorry basma okay i will only say that we have all the tools and all the players in place and we've identified who can be part of solution and who is part of the problem in order to move forward we have two two five four that recognizes the Geneva communique as the basis for a political settlement a peaceful negotiated settlement we have a united state that has just realized that there's a linkage between fighting terrorism and and dealing with Assad goods we've made progress here we have a russia that is looking for a solution a way out of Syria because this is a quagmire it might find itself still there in 10 years not having dealt with anyone neither Assad nor terrorism nor the opposition that wants peaceful change and we have regional players who are watching what is coming from russia and from the united states i think the scene is set to make a political process possible but we need the syrian people to gain faith in a political process because as you will probably hear from dr. yad hijab this afternoon people have no faith how can we go back to Geneva every time we've lost our credibility what can we do and i think this is where if we do not have that contribution seems fine stopping the forced displacement and demographic change on the ground and relieving the starvation issue and and the humanitarian issue there is no possibility of having the political discussion and process but everything exists for a political process to happen we need the partner on the other side and that's only the international community at the moment thank you robert last responses um yes i'll quickly answer your question that i did say that we want to depart from the low 107 but i did mention the loopholes that you said so yes it needs to be looked at again but i said it's a good departure point on an example of a law that we can then build upon really quickly to answer the civil society question unfortunately we don't have a civil society as independence of a society we don't have access to the institutions of our own country so that's number one number two we are uh looking on how to establish really strong links with technical directorates or with the with other uh experts in regime health areas to start this because we don't want an NGOization of our country we don't want to replicate the palestinian uh experience and we we do want a strong state a strong institution finally if i may make a strong like a last point i want to take the lead of my syrian friend i never thought i would say of my sorry russian friend which i never thought i would ever say the sentence but in the previous panel sorry not you in the previous panel who said there are russian experts here talk to them i want to invite you i want to invite all syrian cso people in this room to raise your hands please civil society civil society organizations and activists syrians thank you if you can all speak to them in the coffee breaks because they'll give you all the answers that you need we which gives me the cue to say lunch is out there and be back here please at 1 30 p.m for the final panel