 Thank you for inviting me to present my work on Senegalese. I will present here my work on savings and sharing pleasure in the extended family. So, let's start with quotes that I collected in the field, which says that if you have the money, you have to give it, but if you don't, you don't need to. In Senegal, you don't have the possibility to save because the family is here, there is the pleasure, there is the electricity bill of your brother that you need to pay, there are your parents to help, but the moment you start to do something, then they will let you in peace. That's why I started to build my house in Haiti. So, that was a teacher in the Prudnet board of Dakar and he stressed the mechanism I want to highlight here is that the larger the pleasure you feel from your family, the lower you may be able to save. I will give some elements of context about Senegal and more generally, sub-Saharan Africa. So, it's a context where there is limited access to financial markets, low welfare provision, and structural vulnerability of also two shocks. This may induce two well-documented observations. First, that Kinship and Social Network are really preponderant and there are many news as informal insurance providers. As referred to in the literature as risk-sharing. And this has become to be especially efficient for idiosyncratic shocks. Another point is that low savings rates are achieved, sorry for the typo, and while savings are meant to protect against more obligated shocks. So, there is few evidence on the effect of social network on resource allocation, and I will try here to investigate the role of the extended family in these decisions. So, what do I call extended families? The set of relationships that are acquired by blood, marriage or adoption by someone. And as for blood types, this is typically quite exogenous because it's not a matter of choice. And Kinship entails informal redistribution with its members, at-risk members. And more specifically for Senegal, it's a lineage-based society with polynuclear household, meaning that there are some subunits that are rather autonomous within the same household. And each household or individual is connected with other members of the Kinship network outside of the household. And we found during fieldwork that there is a really important of the household origin, meaning the household in which you grown up, where with your parents, siblings, cousins, etc. 70% of in- and out-transferring value take place within the Kinship network according to our data. So, let me briefly start with a brief literature review. And I will start by saying that there is a recent interest in the economic literature on savings. And one of the main questions that people want to try to answer is how to increase savings in developing countries. And one answer that came out was that people really need commitment device in order to increase demands for savings. And what does, what underlying costs for saving does its need for commitment reveal? Many three arguments have been put forward. First, that people are forgetting about saving. So, it's an argument of limited attention. Or people just value too much their present. So, they prefer to consume now than consume later. And so, more procrastination behaviors. And finally, that people face financial pressure from the Kinship or social network for distribution leaving nothing left to save. So, this third argument is the one I will focus here today. All the three can be complements or substitutes. I'm not tackling this issue right here. So, another part of the literature, economic literature, is looking at the role of social networks. And traditionally, it has been more focused on positive aspects of social networks, meaning more risk sharing, social learning, etc. Recent works, however, are showing more balanced evidence. Well, these, for example, DiFalco and Dante in last year, they published a paper in South Africa, where he shows that households are more exposed to social pressure. They proxy social pressure, probably the number of members that were invited in the household in the past year. Spend more on non-scharable goods that they characterize as investment in the house. Rather than shareable goods in order to escape the family. Jacquela and other in a lab experiment in Kenya show that there is a distortion towards less visible and less lucrative investment due to sharing norms in order to escape sharing norms in Kenya. And Ballon and his co-authors show in a paper entitled Pretending to be poor, pouring to escape forced solidarity in Camus based on the qualitative evidence and on a theoretical signaling model. They show that people in order to be able to refuse a demand for transfer rather prefer to pay interest on a loan so as to signal the fact that they are scarce resources. So what I will do today, I will try to understand the mechanism that are observed on the field concerning the role of the family, what I call family tax on saving decisions. And more specifically, there's the size and the position in the extended family influence both saving and transfer decisions. So to start with, I conducted with a colleague a qualitative survey in Senegal where we traced 35 individuals from different families. So several members of the same extended family in different locations in order to better understand the mechanism that are played between transfers and savings. So we could interview both a saver and a sender of transfer and a receiver for example. So two main points were raised that first redistribution to the network is found as a duty even as a pride but as soon as you are discussing a bit more with most of the people they will acknowledge that it's also a burden. A burden because lower revenue is left for savings so they said that as the court were mentioning that there is really an incapacity to save and that in order to be able to save they have to commit themselves ex-sante into costly strategies of savings in order to be able to say no once they receive a demand for transfer. So this means that there will be an increase in non-sharable or non-observable savings. So Rosca for example can be a tool where it's a public commitment towards the community to participate every week into the Rosca. So Rosca Rotative Saving and Credit Association which is called Tortine, it's illegal. So it's a public commitment to save and so if someone is asking you a transfer and if the only money you have is for this participation you are allowed to say no because it's something that people respect. So people are also investing into Rosca in order to be able to say no or non-sharable can be assets that are non-divisible for example. So in my data what I will consider as non-sharable according to what's said also in our qualitative survey will be money left at the bank even if it's at 300 metres because the moment people are asking you you don't have the money on yourself directly available so they will say that they don't have the money even if it's really at the shopkeeper next door. So bank shopkeeper, Rosca and divisible goods are what I call non-sharable savings. So if you look at... So it enables people to have more control on the demand for transfer on these assets. For the agreement of preference for presence it's also a commitment not to consume right now but in case of need it's true that it's not directly available. There are some entry costs to open a bank account especially in this country. There are some transportation costs if you are not directly next door. It requires all the types of savings to put... to entrust the third party and generally returns are low or no interest even for the bank account since people usually don't use a saving account but just a check account with no interest and I'm speaking about also a country with 95% of the population which is Muslim who is Muslim and who follows the Islamic rule for many of them. I said that Rosca is... since there is many Rosca that end up where people don't receive the money they put into the Rosca and still people continue to use it. Sharable savings for me is the money that it's kept at all so it's directly available in case of need but it will be easily captured by peers and easily consumed by oneself and there are no returns. So what are the expected effects we may have from having a larger extended family according to your situation within your family network? So I differentiate within... if you are... it brings some difficulties you may expect just to have lower savings but to benefit from the network by receiving net altitude. Whereas if you are successful and if it's observable you may expect your savings to decrease as well because of the transfers and to send a lot of transfers to being net received, net sender. Whereas if you have an economic success that you are able to commit yourself into some coping strategy you're saving Michael up and you may have a better control of your transfer by seeing that your net transfer has decreased. So what are the data I'm using for this study? I'm using a poverty and family structure from Senegal which is a nationally representative survey conducted in 2006 and 2007 by Deville, Amber, Stathier and Sylla. It's a sample of 1,750 households for 14,000 individuals spread over all the country. As I said it's a largely messling country with also the size of 8 individuals. Also they are extanty both vertically and horizontally. So to go briefly we observe that women are the ones who save more more women are savings but in value terms there is no strong difference between men and women. Women are more saving into rescues while men are more saving into banks. And we observe that savers are richer are more saving servants and slightly more boys and sisters. Transfer so as I said already before a large majority of transfer is transferred within the family, 72. At least 80% of the sample at least receive or send a transfer to a family member. Let's go to the... My empirical strategy is really straightforward. I'm looking at the effect of having many siblings and having a specific position and the interaction of the two on savings and transfers decision. So I'm considering the siblings because it's an exogenous proxy of the social, the kinship network since it's not a matter of choice by the individual. I reproxy the position in the network by considering social mobility relative to the father meaning whether I'm working in the formal sector while my father was an agricultural farmer and whether I attended at least secondary education while my father did not. So I'm using a bench of control meaning of... like age, education, marital status being the head of the household or as a staff. Revenues, employment sector, occupational status and at the household level the household side, the relative cell side cell is the subunit of the household I'm studying I can have in the data the share of inactive cell background. I'm putting a neighbor to fix the bed to be able to control for any enumerator bias time to correct for any seasonal bias as well since as I said the survey was taken place during two years over one year and cluster standard there was at the household level. So here it's a regression where I look at the direct effect of CPSHIP on savings so the first column is total savings in CFA francs the second is the log the second is the ratio of non-chairable savings over total savings I put one CFA franc to everyone at home and the second is the log of old transfer, the log of old transfer made on a regular basis and finally the log of old transfer to see the effect in net so what we can see here is that when we look at the average effect of the number of savings on savings one more savings is increasing savings and increasing the probability amount that is old transfer that was for male, here for female we see no effect on savings but we see that a balanced effect for transfer however we see that in net women are more net receivers so when we look at the interaction between the number of savings so the size of the network and the position within the network we see that having a high economic status without social mobility meaning that I'm working in a formal job but my father was not a farmer increased the level of savings so by 40,000 francs while working in the formal sector while my father was a farmer meaning having a high economic status with social mobility decreases my savings by 10,000 francs and by 29% meaning 29% decrease in savings for savings while we see on the transfer side that both cases when you have high status you transfer more so for women what we see is that here I'm looking at the high economic status is for the husband meaning when the husband is working in the formal sector while her father was a farmer or not and we see that just having a husband working in the formal sector whatever was the background of the father decreases your level of savings but has no effect on transfer why we observe no effect on transfer one explanation may be that the husband is directly sending the transfer to the in-law family result transferring through the spouse so it's not registered under the spouse that the more the husband is transferring yes the more the husband is in-law family the lower the spouse will save so if I wrap up the result what we found is that on average when we are semi meaning whatever the position you are among your seed chip the more savings you have the more you are saving the more you are transferring but no in that you don't find anything because on average all the transfer that are sent out should also be received by someone but whereas when you look at high economy status without mobility you see that it decreases your savings and your transfer while when it's salience, social mobility you have a decrease in savings associated with transfers for women you see that any high economy status will decrease your savings so I also tried with an alternative measure as I said of position where I looked at attending at least secondary education while your father did or did not attend school and I found the same results so far this is suggestive evidence of course not causal relationship pressure as proxy by the number of savings reduces savings for individuals what a social mobility episode is relative to their father one question you may ask is what alternative competing channel other than redistribution through transfer could explain the effect of savings on savings for this particular position in the family I don't see consistent story that could explain but if you have any I would be really happy to learn about it so to wrap up this is a study that is on the role of informal redistribution and save in decision and we showed that a lower capacity to save and distorted preference for some type of savings and since savings are important because they enable people to face risk and to invest in poverty trap I think it's an important part of the research and more focus should be on the cost and benefits of such informal redistribution within the family network thank you