 I hope you're all doing fine these days. The uphands, the deadline, I think I can extend it until 24th because the last day of class is December 31st. That is the last day of the year as well. And we may also have our simulation on the 28th instead of 21st. So in that respect, you may have your assignments, duties, obligations to have been postponed for about a week. So therefore, I strongly recommend you to pay attention to your uphands. You're still sending me emails whether this and that subject is appropriate. Well, of course, you should definitely send an email if you have any doubts about whether the subject is appropriate or not. But I would like to see you have already understood what an uphand is, how it should be structured. I mean, what should be the style of writing. It is not a descriptive piece of written material. You do not express or explain or describe to the reader. This guy says that and the other guy says this. You put in there what you think about a specific situation and you just single out many of the arguments and have one argument and push it. And of course, substantiated, supported with some other arguments, facts, figures, knowledge, information that you may have that would support your idea. So it is something that is an assertive type of piece. I mean, you write something well about this issue. Here is what I think. And this is why I think that way. And these are the informations and facts, data, whatever, or other people's arguments that are supporting my argument or that make me believe that way. So it is not just something that you explain the situation, but there is an opinion that you defend, that you assert. So this is something that you, it is therefore something that has to be almost 100% of your work. It must be original. And if it is not original, of course, this will not be accepted. I mean, as I said before, op-eds must only be 100% original. Or at least the idea must be original. Of course, you can benefit from other people's thoughts, other people's information or writings in order to support your opinion, which I also ask for me to do. But of course, the starting point, the emerging point of your argument must be 100% yours. So that's why I don't want you to write term papers. Term papers are usually cut and paste by students or those other people whom students commission their work. And I don't want to make other people rich. I want you to learn something, not only in terms of substance, but also in terms of writing. So op-eds, therefore, in my opinion, help much more in terms of learning and teaching. Today, you remember on Tuesday that I wrote on the board that the talks with Iran should be extended and should take the form of P5 plus 1 plus 1. And if you just watched the video on Tuesday podcast, which I believe will soon be available, you can remember me saying that even I read this joke. So therefore, on Tuesday, right after the class in the afternoon in the evening, the P5 plus 1 and Iran, of course, have taken the decision to stop these negotiations that were taking place in Geneva and continue in late January or early February, the date will be fixed in Istanbul, which actually supports my opinion that Turkey should be somehow linked to these negotiations. And one reason why I said that was there is a huge gap of understanding each other. I mean, neither Iran understands what the West actually wants from Iran to do, and neither the West understand why Iran is doing things that it is doing. So in that respect, Turkey comes into play. Turkey understands both sides much better than these parties are understanding each other. And there is this, therefore, the role of, if not necessarily, mediation, because mediation is something else, but something like a facilitator. And Turkey, by bringing Iran and the P5 plus 1 together and also providing the ground for fruitful discussions and create an environment of trust, may facilitate the process of finding a solution, a resolution to the problem between Iran and the West. Actually, this is not a problem between Iran and the West. When I say West, actually, P5 plus 1, China, Russia, they're all in this basket. And it is not only that concern. It's not only something that concerns Iran. It cannot be something that could only concern Iran. I mean, of course, everybody is free to feel, to be either concerned or not. This is their problem. But when looked at the issue from Turkey's perspective, Turkey must definitely be concerned with Iran's nuclear capabilities. Of course, so long as these capabilities remain the way Iran claims to be, that is peaceful, 100% peaceful, there is no problem. There is nothing to worry. But as we have seen in the past, on many occasions, once secret documents were released officially or very recently, when, again, secret documents were released unofficially, I don't know whether illegally or not, but we have seen that what states are saying or telling the world actually is not exactly what they think and what they do. So therefore, we cannot make 100% sure at this moment in time. I mean, today, the 10th of December, 2010, no one can claim exactly 100% that Iran does not or does have nuclear ambitions. So there are suspicions. And as I explained before, the best way and the surest way of being certain about whether Iran has or does not have any ambitions to develop nuclear weapons, it is to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out inspections. What Iran claims, yes, I'm a member of the MPT. I have certain obligations. And according to my obligations, I let the IAEA, according to the model protocol, the earlier protocol, insert 153, which was documented, negotiated back in 1970. And since then, Iran is being inspected, according to that document, which, of course, was found many years ago as being weak, as having shortcomings, loopholes. And therefore, the IAEA's verification mechanism was enhanced by developing, by drafting another document which was called additional protocol as a result of a study called Program 93 Plus 2. So therefore, Iran, in order to provide assurances to the international community that whatever they say actually is correct, then there should be no reason why they should not let the IAEA carry out inspections. Of course, from legal standpoint, from international perspective, Iran is not obliged legally. It's not obliged legally to allow the IAEA to go everywhere the IAEA would like to go. Because it is not subject to the additional protocol. They have signed it, but they have not ratified it. And therefore, they cannot be whole responsible, or they cannot be accountable for whatever provisions the additional protocol would require any country. But since they are subject to model protocol, the earlier one, the weakest one, then, of course, the IAEA's inspections and the verification mechanism cannot provide enough assurances for the rest of the world, including Turkey. So in this respect, while Iran has the right to claim that they do not do anything wrong, the rest of the world, in the absence of full scope inspections that would provide assurances, the rest of the world also has the right to be suspicious about Iran's capabilities. So the only way to solve this problem is to let the IAEA go wherever the IAEA would like to go and carry out whatever inspections they I told this to many of my Iranian colleagues, Iranian diplomats here in Ankara when they visited me in my office or whenever I saw them in receptions or whenever I went to Iran. I mean, if you have nothing to hide, just let the inspectors go and carry out inspections and give you a clean bill of health. So, well, they say it's a matter of sovereignty. Fine, of course, it is a matter of sovereignty for you, but it's also a matter of security for us. And if you, in the coming years or decades, somehow provided that, I mean, or given the fact that you have all these infrastructures, if you one day, if not this sort of administration today, about five years from today or 10 years from today, if the next generation of administrative executives in Iran decide to divert from peaceful to means replications, what can we do? So therefore, this is a problem. As I said, they should concern everybody, not only China, not only Germany, not only this and that, but Turkey whether or not anybody is concerned or not. Turkey must be concerned because it is a problem which will be right next to it. I mean, geographically speaking and also politically speaking, Iran and Turkey over the last approximately four or five centuries did not have a serious confrontations. While the history can be interpreted different ways, there are historians who claim that even after Kosovo Shrine Treaty 1639, Turks and Persians have fought each other and there were some disputes and that the borders, the common borders did not remain exactly the same as some people claim. Well, whatever the historical facts might be, but in a sort of macro assessment of the situation, what we see is that except for a short period after Islamic revolution and more specifically after the collapse of the Soviet Union and for reason that I explain here as you should remember, the West did not want Iran to go into the form of republics and sort of transform these republics in such a way that they would take the Iranian regime as a model for them. So there was a competition between Turkey and Iran and Iran's foreign policy was quite assertive against Turkey. That was pretty much late 80s and more specifically early 1990s until I would say 98, 99 when the two countries have finally figured out their interests especially after 9-11 that their interests were actually in sort of having good relations rather than competition. So beyond that Turks and Iranians or Persians did not have much of a problem in terms of security issues. I mean, they were wise enough not to confront each other because when you look at the map, what you see is more or less two powers of equal size. If not geographically equal but Turks and Persians have always been throughout history powerful sort of nations. The geographical location, I mean the high mountains did not allow the two sort of countries to fight effectively that and they both sides knew very well that there would be no winner. I mean, or at least they would harm each other, they would cause damage to each other but they would not be better off by fighting. So I mean, the mere fact that the Turks and Persians have not fought in the history was partly because they were pretty much from the same family. This is, there is this understanding. We have common culture, history, common heritage. Well, that's one fact but sometimes even brothers kill each other. I mean, in history, in families, in empires, et cetera. So, but that was one reason but the second reason was the two were wise enough not to fight because they knew very well that they could not win the war. So, so far with the existing metric capabilities with the current geographical locations, each being right next to other. So, it would not be wise or at least no party would feel powerful enough to exert its own political will on the other side. So, neither Iran can put much pressure on Turkey to do something nor Turkey can put much pressure on Iran to do something. I mean, if you want to understand better what I mean, just go back to 1998 when Turkey pressurized on Syria to release the head of PKK, Erdalan and then because Turkey was powerful enough to carry out mutual operation if Syria did not comply with what Turkey asked from them. So, what I mean is deterrence. So, neither Iran nor Turkey can have enough capabilities for the time being at present time and for the last several centuries that was the case to make the other side behave in a certain way. But if and when, we don't know where Iran will ever have nuclear weapons. But if and when Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey will be in a difficult situation because for instance, we discuss these things in bits and pieces, for instance, the Gulf nations, of course, the Gulf nations in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and others, you know Arab Emirates. Well, of course they are feeling they are perceiving a threat and this is something that also came out from the WikiLeaks documents that almost all of them either collectively or individually asked from the United States and maybe from Israel, I don't know, to do something to stop Iran. And but because they at present perceive as a powerful threat and if and when Iran acquires these military capabilities the threat will only be augmented, will only be aggravated, increased. When you look at the other countries in the region, actually there will not be a change in the sign of the threat perception. That is, if there is a threat, the threat will be slightly or more depending on the situation, depending on which country we're talking about, will be increased or will remain the same. But in the case of Turkey, Iran, of course the current balance, the parity between Turkey and Iran which exists for the last few centuries will be tipped in favor of Iran. And Iran may have leverages to use against Turkey in order to impose some of its political will. Of course Turkey will likely to remain a member of NATO and that will be a deterrent against Iran but still Iranian administration. I'm not talking about today, I'm talking about future possible contingencies. These contingencies may be realized or may not at all be realized, we don't know. But the task of an analyst, task of a strategist is to thinker on this kind of contingencies and to come up with policy suggestions as to what to do in case such and such thing happens. What I'm saying is if and when Iran acquires weapons and Turkey does not and of course what I always suggest that Turkey should under no conditions develop nuclear weapons, this is something that we can separate, we can discuss separately. But on the other hand if Iran does have nuclear weapons that will be something which will work in favor of Iran and to the disadvantage of Turkey. So therefore Turkey has all the reasons to be concerned as well as to be involved in this process. It is not something that Turkey can let to the P5 plus one. It is not something that Turkey can sit and wait until P5 plus one is pleased enough to do a favor or not to Iran. It is something that Turkey must just take a role. Even if there is nobody to assign a role to Turkey, Turkey should not wait for permission. Turkey should somehow connect itself, attach itself to the issue. This is something that I kept saying for the last two years. It is not something that we can let to others. It is our problem, it is not, even it is not their problem. China, Russia, they cannot be threatened by Iran's nuclear weapons because they have their hundreds of nuclear weapons already. They have their powerful military economic capabilities. They have huge territories. So is the United States. And what about France, UK? They also have nuclear weapons and they are far too away from Iran and they don't have anything in common or in terms of dispute. And they do not, you know, there is not much ground for them to be extremely concerned about Iran's military capabilities even if Iran develops nuclear weapons in the future. Neither is Germany. And I can show you a number of articles written by German scholars, analysts, policy planners and even statesmen who until very recently, until Ahmadinejad made all these statements about Zionism, Israel, Judaism, et cetera, they were remotely concerned with what Iran was doing. They said, well, why should we care? I mean, Iran does not have any capabilities to touch us. I mean, why should we be caring about it? So none of the P5 plus one actually is any tangible reason. Maybe except the United States because there is this hostility between the US and Iran at this rhetorical level. And also, United States is not necessarily concerned for itself, but more specifically because of Israel being in the Middle East, being within the range of Iranian ballistic missiles. So therefore, there was no other solution but to make this P5 plus one to add Turkey as another plus one. So by declaring that the next round of discussions will take place in Istanbul, do we solve all the problems? No. Because there is reason to be optimistic just because of the mere fact that the negotiations will be taking place in Istanbul, that Turkey will have a certain capability to influence this process and maybe push toward a real diplomatic solution. But there are also reasons why we cannot be too much optimistic because especially when I heard Jelili, the head of Iranian delegation, which conducted these negotiations, who took over from Sultaniye, another ambassador whom I knew very well in person, a very tough diplomat, and also a scientist and an engineer professor, he gave a very hard time to the other parties who negotiated with Iran. And Jelili said, well, in Istanbul, we will not be talking about suspension of enrichment. This is our sovereign right and we will not back down. Well, if this is really going to be the situation, then that will be the end of diplomacy. Because the only reason why I was saying that Turkey should be somehow and next to the process and that negotiations should take place in Turkey was because of the influence that Turkey had, as we have seen on Iran, and which led Iran to signing the Tehran Protocol, the declaration in Tehran on May 17th, as you will remember this year, Tehran declaration. And this is the declaration signed by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran. And this is the only official document because these are the foreign ministers who have signed it. It's not just NGOs or just not a piece of paper which has no official value. No, this declaration had a very powerful meaning and value, actually, in terms of legitimacy and legality of this declaration. And in this sort of setting, we should remember what at least those who don't know should bear in mind that Tehran has not given its signature to any other document over the at least 10 years. Because especially since the revelations, which came in August 2002 from the Mujaheddin-e-Halq, the popular resistant woman in Iran, actually their representatives in Washington DC revealed to the world the existence of Natanz nuclear uranium enrichment facility in 2002. And since then, Iran is high on the agenda. Iran has been subject to many criticism. There are too many initiatives. Remember the EU3 that I mentioned in the previous classes? So even there was this EU3 initiative between, as I written, 2003, November and more or less March 2005, within this one and a half year period. Yes, Iran suspended temporarily its enrichment activities. Actually, at that time, Iran did not have enough enrichment capability anyway and also acted as if the additional protocol were in force. But they have not signed anything official. So this is the Tehran declaration is the only official document that Iran signed. So Turkey was powerful enough, politically speaking, to influence Iran together with Brazil. Of course, not to forget Brazil's influence on Iran either. So Turkey and Brazil have convinced Iran that it will be in its best interest to sign the protocol, the Tehran declaration. So stemming from this or being encouraged with this, I believe that Turkey, when these P5 plus 1 negotiations between P5 plus 1 and Iran take place in Istanbul, Turkey will definitely be somehow connected or annexed to the process. And Turkey will be able to use its influence. But if Iran behaves the way they declare by Jalili, that in Istanbul, they will not be talking about uranium enrichment, but they will be talking about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world and securities. Well, we just discussed this issue back in the United Kingdom last weekend. So we don't need any more discussions. We know what the problems are. The problem is the attitude of Iran as well as the attitude of the West and the P5 plus 1, which actually altogether blocked the way to finding a resolution. So if they insist on some of the policies that they displayed against P5 plus 1, the Istanbul meeting will not be a success. And that will be the end of diplomatic initiatives because I can't see any other candidate on the horizon, which could replace Turkey. Maybe Brazil, I don't think they will be going to Rio de Janeiro or just São Paulo, wherever, to discuss these issues. Because most likely Brazil will also be coming to Istanbul or will be somehow present in the process. So I mean, when Iran actually asked the P5 plus 1 to start negotiating again, they asked to have this meeting in Istanbul before. I mean, just in late October or early November, I mean, just past month. But the P5 plus 1 said no, for reasons that I can't understand. But then they said, OK, let's again come together in Geneva. Well, Geneva is understandable because it is the headquarters of the United Nations offices in Geneva and the previous headquarters of the League of Nations. So Geneva is the home to many international organizations. And therefore, it is seen as a city where diplomacy reigns, I mean, imposes itself. So it's a diplomacy sort of center. They said, OK, let's get together in Geneva. And if there is no agreement, we can then think about going to Turkey. So as we have seen, nothing came out of the two days discussions. And this decision now is to meet in Istanbul. So it is up to Iran, of course, and the P5 plus 1 and Turkey to push for a resolution of the problem. Because otherwise, again, as I said, unless these negotiations paved a way to at least being hopeful that there can be a light at the end of the tunnel and after walking enough down this road of diplomacy, then, of course, there will be other mechanisms which will be introduced by some of the actors. The United States, as we have seen on these slides at the beginning, has long considered diplomacy, especially during the Bush period, as a waste of time. And they were quite nervous about the EU3 initiative because they thought EU3 enabled Iran to use time to gain time for accomplishing whatever it was doing. But as I also said then, the United States was not ready to take any action or to do anything of its own because they could not put anything on the table other than criticizing the EU3 initiative. So the EU3 initiative may have gained time Iran, which actually did, in terms of Iran advancing its capabilities, look where Iran was back in 2003 and where they are today. Because just before the Geneva talks at the beginning of this week, Iran made an official statement that they have completed the nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear fuel cycle is very important because there are certain steps in the nuclear fuel cycle. I mean, this is extraction of uranium from the Earth and then you make it into, of course, after some profication, yellow cake, which is the initial, well, it's not a cake. Don't try, which is the initial sort of cleaned up uranium, which is ready for conversion, fuel conversion. At certain stage, there is this, of course, enrichment and or processing. Well, of course, reactor generation, electricity generation reactor, then waste treatment. So and we're processing. Iran said they have this fuel, complete fuel cycle. Well, of course, we have to rely on the official statements made by the Iranians in that they have, and we also know from various sources some of them are their sources, their statements, their declarations, and some of them are other sources which rely on credible intelligence, some satellite pictures, some reports of credible scientists or group stink tanks, et cetera. So we know that they have all this, but how effectively they can use and in what capacities we don't know. But what is important to bear in mind is that Iran has become pretty much self-sustainable. So that was something which I had pointed out in my article back in 1995. 15 years ago, the article titled Is Iran Going Nuclear? Something that I had written when I saw this, the text of the agreement between Russia and Iran, that Iran was investing in not only technology transfer, but also sending its students, graduate students, and doctoral students to Russian institutions to get their doctoral degrees from advanced Russian institutions. And as I've written in my other article published in 2006, it's available on my website, The Good for the Shah article from 1995 to 2005. Within 10 years, there were some 200 plus Iranians who earned their PhDs from Russian institutions. This is something that an Iranian bureaucrat who was in charge of this program to send students to Russia and organize whatever he was doing. So therefore, and since then, possibly there were maybe another 56 or maybe 100 students who earned their degrees. Because Iran had put a clause, an item in the text of the contract with Russia that every year, 20, 30 students would be sent to Russian institutions. So some of them might have failed. Some of them might have been unsuccessful. But most of them, I believe, were successful and earned their degrees already. So Iran has become a nuclear-capable country. But of course, this is something that we should also bear in mind and to be hopeful that there can be a peaceful resolution to this conflict. Because Iran would definitely not like to see its nuclear facilities being destroyed after a major operation by Israel, by the United States, or both of them. Because Iran wants to become a nuclear supplier state. Not only do they want to advance these capabilities for themselves, but also they want to be in a position to export nuclear technology to Nam countries, Nam being non-aligned movement countries. They still exist. The world has changed, but Nam still is there. Well, whether it has any significance or not, that's a different question. But also to Islamic states. Because Iran propagates in these countries and tell them, look, the West will never give you nuclear technology. I can give you nuclear technology that you need. So protect me. Just support me against the pressures coming from the P5 plus 100 other countries. And if you bear with me, if you trust me, if you support me, in the future, I will share technology with you. And no one else will give you this technology. So in order to mobilize international support, Iran does want to use its nuclear capabilities for this reason. So in order to be in such a position of a supplier, Iran must have its nuclear facilities intact. They should not be damaged. They should not be destroyed by any meter operation. And therefore, of course, there should be no room for a meter operation. There should be no reason for a meter operation from the US perspective. So long as diplomacy succeeds, there is no reason to resort to meter power. So therefore, Iran must be aware of the fact that after all these rounds of unsuccessful talks with the P5 plus 100, there is one president which was successful, was Turkey, Brazil, Iran, swap deal. When it was a very efficient document or not, that's a different question. What is important here is that Iran, for this or that reason, put its signature on only one document which was this one. And therefore, Turkey's role is significant here. And Iran must also facilitate Turkey's role to be a facilitator. But if Iran insists the way they declare to the world, which I believe is a diplomatic maneuvering, and of course, they would like to set the stage high in order to be able to get more from negotiations, from bargaining. But of course, Iranians are definitely very good diplomats, very skillful diplomats, but so are Turkish diplomats, so are P5 plus 1 diplomats. So there is no reason to think that the other side will be a dumb person who would just come to the bargaining table at the level that is said by you. So Iran must acknowledge that P5 plus 1 and Iran and Turkey sitting around a table should be able to really find a breakthrough. Otherwise, there are all these reasons out there why some countries may differently go and act in such a way that Iran will not be pleased with the end result, one of which might be total destruction of some of their very significant capabilities. So of course, nobody wants that. At least from Turkey's perspective, this is not the ideal situation. Because another confrontation in Turkey's region will add more to the tension in the region, and it is of course not going to be compatible with the foreign policy objectives of Turkey, which is not to have any tension with the neighbors. That is zero conflict policy. Of course, this will not be a conflict which will be between Turkey and Iran directly, but Turkey will be in a very uneasy position, in a very difficult position, because it will be caught between Iran and the West, and Turkey being a member of NATO. And we don't know how this confrontation, if it ever occurs materially, we don't know to what extent it could be escalating. So therefore, it is very, very crucial to have or to use this chance for diplomacy in Istanbul next month. So possibly toward the end of the month, January, maybe early February, there may be some consecutive rounds of talks in Istanbul. Well, as I always said this, whenever I went to diplomats, the one reason why some negotiations take place for a long time is because of the city where these negotiations are taking place. I don't know if you've been to Geneva, but it's a very beautiful city. I spent three months fellowship at the United Nations. I lived there for three months, and I've been there on different occasions for conferences, meetings, whatever. It's a beautiful city. And diplomats are really very happy to be there. And they possibly extend these negotiations and all these talks. Maybe, well, it may not sound very serious, but there is always this element that because Geneva is a very nice city, diplomats do not mind sitting around a table for an extended duration of negotiations. So is Istanbul. And whenever I go to conferences, especially those who come from big industrialized countries which do not have necessarily very nice spots like Istanbul, and also the ones who come from the Middle East, they love being in Istanbul. So I hope Istanbul itself, my hometown, I wish I was there right now, together with you, of course, Istanbul might also help facilitate finding a solution. And if they conduct these negotiations at the Trump Palace Hotel where I used to play soccer when Besiktas was using this for training, and I was a little kid, and I was called to play for Besiktas, by the way, they didn't love. Anyway, well, if they have this setting, looking over the Bosphorus, they will possibly be falling in love with not only Istanbul, but also each other, and they will find a diplomatic solution. That's what we hope. Otherwise, I mean, to be serious, this is going to a much tougher situation because in my discussions with Americans, Chinese, Russians, French, and British, and the Germans, I mean, the P5 plus 1, myself, in my personal individual academic capacity, I have no official capacity, no authorization, nothing, just my knowledge and myself. When I discussed this issue with this and why they turned down the swap deal, why they did not accept or support swap deal, they all made some comments, I'll put forward some claims, some explanations, none of which actually were satisfactory, and they knew it. And when I insisted this swap deal must be given a chance and that next round should be in Turkey, well, they were suspicious. Now that they have agreed upon having the next round in Istanbul, of course, this time they will turn to us and to me when they see me, of course. OK, now we have given this chance to you. Let's see what you can do. So therefore, for Turkey to be successful, Iran must definitely help Turkey to be successful for itself to be successful in its endeavors, in advancing its nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, hopefully. So next Tuesday, we will continue with this subject. Of course, you might think it is all about Iran, but just look around you. It's what you see is almost Iran-related policy in the Middle East. Middle East peace process, nuclear issue, and everything. So we are not stuck with Iran only, but we look at the perspectives of other countries, not only the region countries, but also other countries from other parts of the region. So I'll see you on Tuesday. And tell your friends who are not present today that the deadline for op-eds is pushed to 24th and that the simulation will take place on the 28th of December. I'll see you next Tuesday.