 So now, I'm giving the floor to Douglas Paul who was chairing a session yesterday, who was involved in national security affairs, not of India, not to my knowledge of India but the United States. And so he has also a wonderful combination of experience in government and also in think tanks as now. And Douglas, I hope you will clarify a little bit the Indo-Pacific concept from the viewpoint of the United States. Well, thank you, Tiagra, and I want to follow up precisely on what you said and take advantage of Mr Narayanan's... Do you say young? Take advantage of your sage observation. Okay, I thought you said young. As a point of departure, which is, for me, it's always useful to remind myself as an American and my colleagues in the country that we tend to, as a result of our unique geography and relatively short history, tend to think of foreign policy problems as things you address, you solve, you move on. Whereas if you're living in India next to China, you've been there for a few thousand years, the likelihood is you'll be there for a few more thousand years. So you can't always solve the problem, you have to manage it, you have to deal with it. And this has been a challenge for the U.S. in the framework of the Indo-Pacific, as we were calling it today. To fast forward quickly, historically, in World War II, we had Asia forced upon an internally focused America and the decision was made to emphasize and prioritize victory in Europe before Asia and the conflict was left. And the question of how to deal with Asia was resolved technologically by the discovery of the atomic bomb which shortened the war and allowed the U.S. to move on to post-war conditions. In the aftermath of that, a decade later, we tried to organize East Asia under John Foster Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower as one of the poles in dealing with the great Cold War competition with the Russians in the Soviet Union. And we organized in 1954 in Bangkok an organization called CETO, which was to be the Asian NATO, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. And that had a very ill-fated life because it never really adapted to the realities of a post-colonial Asia, an emerging Asia, a very diverse, culturally, ethnically, economically diverse Asia. Fast forward again, at the end of the Cold War, we saw the unipolar moment coming, sort of, and Australia's Bob Hawk, the Prime Minister at the time, said what we need is to create an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, APEC. Some people have said this is for adjectives in search of a verb, but we tried to find a way of pulling together the Asia trends, but mostly an economic framework on it, trying to address the very strong economic relationship between the United States and Asia, where American market demand was feeding the rapidly developing economies of then-Korea, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, eventually Thailand. And APEC had its moment for the 1990s. And we went into the period of globalization, and we didn't think so much in terms of Southeast Asia or East Asia or Africa. We thought in terms of movement of capital, global supply chains, seeking opportunities, and Asia had very friendly governments, in many cases, the Asian Tigers, who welcomed that kind of investment. So we had a period where a very strong American economic market role saddled alongside the leftover alliances that had been a legacy of World War II and its aftermath. This continued fairly satisfactorily until 2007-2008 with the global financial crisis, and globalization came under challenge, and during which China had become a member of the WTO. And we started to see the shift from the American market being the centerpiece or economic activity in the Asia-Pacific region to something new. And we're still adjusting to that. We haven't been able to disaggregate what we want to do economically with what we want to do strategically. And I think that brings us to today, where we face three kind of large contradictions in American policy towards the Indo-Pacific. The first is, as I say, economics versus security. The Asian and Pacific countries or the Indo-Pacific countries have economic priorities that are not looking for strategic or security conflicts. The second, the Americans have been oscillating between the two before 2010. Since 2010, the rise of Chinese military power and comprehensive capabilities has started the focus of the U.S. to shift from the economic, where the U.S. is no longer the market of greatest relevance to the partners in East Asia-Pacific and to focus more on the security side. We're also seeing a contradiction in the region with the U.S. over coalitions versus fragmentation. The current Biden administration, people will talk about the building of the Quad, the reinforcement of the G7, the continued, well, reduced role of the G20, and new coalitions of countries who are resistant to what they see as Chinese aggression in the Asia-Pacific region and want to form informal arrangements to resist further Chinese encroachments. This coalition contradiction can be seen. We're talking about the Indo-Pacific, so we've got India at one end and the U.S. at the other end of the Pacific. But the three big coalitions economically in the region are the RCEP, the Comprehensive Partnership for Pacific Trade, CPTTT, and the Digital Economic Framework, of which neither India nor the United States is a member. So the coalition is going on with their own dramatic developments, and yet we're outside them. And finally, we have an increasingly legalistic, regulatory, securitized approach of the U.S. to transactions between Indo-Pacific countries and China. And I think the outlook is for far more intervention by the U.S. into trade, investment, and technology relationships as we go forward. So the contradictions and the challenges of the Indo-Pacific, I think, stand foremost in the prospect that I see for the next few years in the region. Thank you. Thank you very much, Douglas. Very interesting, but a bit impressionistic too.