 So, Rawls has given us an account of a competent moral judge, and this is someone that knows the difference between right and wrong. Now, do you agree with Rawls or you don't? If you disagree with Rawls, then you think that either one of the conditions is too many or too strict, or he hasn't included enough. Well, here's a question. What's the consequence of rejecting Rawls' account of a competent moral judge? Okay, recall that Rawls' competent moral judge has average intelligence, is informed, is reasonable, and is sympathetic. Well, what happens if we reject the idea that the competent moral judge needs to have at least average intelligence? If we say something like this, then it seems like being a competent moral judge requires very little, if any, thought. You just need to have an emotional reaction in order to be a competent person and a morality. Any competency, morality would come from one's ability to speak out or be outraged, so one would be a competent moral judge because one is outraged. Not that one is outraged because one is a competent moral judge. Well, let's consider the condition that the competent moral judge needs to be informed. Well, if we reject this condition, then the competent moral judge can simply be ignorant of what's happening in the world. The judgments of anyone who is educated or otherwise informed about what's happened in the world would be just as competent as the ones made by somebody who had no such idea. It seems to be a strange result where a judge can be ignorant and still competent. The next condition that Rawls gave us was that the competent moral judge is reasonable. That means that the judge is willing to reach a conclusion based upon evidence as opposed to preference, bias, emotional reaction, or just a determination made before any evidence is given. If we reject this condition, then a competent moral judge can make a decision prior to any evidence or without any new evidence. Indeed, a competent moral judge will be able to ignore any evidence that conflicts with one's own predetermined judgment. A judge would be just as competent not listening to any evidence or reaching a conclusion as one who did listen to evidence. The last condition is that a competent moral judge is sympathetic. This is someone who is able to understand or imagine what it's like to be somebody else in a different set of circumstances. If we reject this condition, then a judge that does not consider somebody else's circumstances or even care about them would be just as competent as one who does. Indeed, the only circumstances worth considering are one's own. Nobody else is important. So if we reject any one of Raul's conditions, then we're saying that a competent moral judge need not use thought, can be ignorant, can make judgments without any evidence, or thinking that anybody else's situation is relevant. You can take this approach if you like, but then moral judgments seem to be just as important as whether one likes chocolate ice cream. Well, so far we've just looked at what the consequence of rejecting any one of Raul's conditions. That's an interesting question whether he'd left something out, whether being a competent moral judge requires something more than average intelligence, being informed, being reasonable, and being sympathetic. If it requires something more, I'd like to hear what you have to say. Feel free to put something in the comments.