 I'm Dan Kurtz-Faelen. I'm the editor of Foreign Affairs. Very pleased to be joined by Mahmoud Sariel-Gallum and Margot Gual Soler. They give me a very challenging name, so I hope I got those roughly right. You have their bios, so I'm not going to spend time on it, given the vastness of the topic and the shortness of the time. I'm going to ask a few questions. We'll have a discussion up here, and then we'll try to get to questions from all of you, which you can direct to any of the three of us up here. And we'll try to cover, I think, most of the globe and most of geopolitics between us. But with that, we will jump right into the discussion. And I want to start with the same question to each of you, just to set a common framework as we get deeper into this discussion. Mahmoud, let's start with you. How would you describe this moment in geopolitics, and how do you see it developing over the next few years? Thank you, Danielle. I'd like to focus on three points. First, I believe, is an assumption that the United States is the most consequential player in global geopolitics. And one area that we need to pay more attention to is that right now, in Washington, there is bipartisanship and very strong consensus on AI, on trade, on China, and Russia, which basically means that American policy in the next five to 10 years is going to be very consequential and very much stable in terms of what will take place at the global level. Second, the rise of China and Chinese power and also Chinese political influence is irreversible. And this is also taking place in a two system, not taking place in a two system kind of context. During the Cold War, there were two systems. It was the United States and the Soviet Union. They had very clear partitioned ideological division. Right now, the rise of China and American global supremacy all taking place within the same context. And so political and geopolitical decisions are very much influenced by economic calculations. And number three in my assessment is that since we don't have a unipolar international system, we do not have a bipolar international system. We have a multipolar system. We have selective multilateralism. And because of selective multilateralism, there is going to be much more uncertainty on the operations of other players in the international system. And the concept of deterrence is undergoing very deep transformational change in the international system because of the war in Ukraine. The traditional deterrence theories are not conventional anymore. And with cyber security, with changes that are taking place in information warfare in intelligence networks, in critical infrastructure, in military mobility, and command and control disruptions, all of this means that we are moving into an era of very different international geopolitical dynamics, which is asymmetric advantages that great powers are developing. Margo, let me put the same question to you. You're sitting in Europe, so you have a slightly different vantage than we do. Thank you very much. Good morning, everybody. I want to build on multilateralism. So we heard a lot about globalization, the globalization, the globalization. And this is a concept about global markets. But I want to bring it to the world that we have heard less this week is multilateralism, exactly. And I come from the perspective of science and technology. Science used to be a global good. Used to be the one unifier item that we can all agree on, facts and data. Now, science is one of the drivers of the new reconfiguration, the new river risk, the new geopolitics. So how are we going to navigate this transformation? Science as a source of power. A lot of the challenges that we face have no military solutions. So climate change, health, pandemics, oceans, air pollution, food security. We, I think, need to rethink the role of science in geopolitics and the role of research and sharing knowledge to provide the basis for all of us to agree on what the challenges are, how to solve them together. Because they have no, they cross borders. So I think these new sources of power, these new drivers, the ability to access and then to benefit from science and technology is one of the key questions of the next few years. There's a lot on the table there. Mahmoud, let me go back to you and turn the focus to the Middle East, a region where you spend a lot of time now, where you have deep expertise and experience. When we talk about geopolitics, we tend to focus on the US and China, Russia, Europe. But what is, I think, really fascinating about this moment is that you have, you can kind of describe those abstract dynamics or dynamics at a 30,000 foot level. But it's playing out in incredibly complicated and fascinating ways when you focus on various regions, including the Middle East. How do you see these new geopolitical dynamics playing out in the Middle East, given the changes in the region, some very complicated relationships? But I think we've seen surprising developments in the region over the last few years. I think there are three countries we need to pay a lot of attention to. India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. As middle-level geopolitical players, that will have great impact in the way at least regional politics are unfolding. Saudi Arabia had an economic growth rate of 8.7 last year in 2022. And the four GCC countries over the last four years have accumulated $3 trillion of sovereign fund. And just recently, Airbus signed an agreement with a local Saudi company to produce military and civilian helicopters, $6.7 billion. Over the last year, the digital banking in the GCC area has amounted to about $100 billion. So what I mean to say, going back to the third point that I outlined, that there is this relationship between geopolitical and economic calculations. Developing countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and India, they are diversifying their foreign policy portfolio. This international system is giving great opportunities for middle-level countries. Mexico, Brazil, and to some degree, South Africa and Nigeria also are in the same category. So given that overall context, I think Saudi Arabia is a country that will play a very consequential geopolitical, not only at the Middle Eastern level, but also global level. Saudi Arabia is now developing good relations with Russia, with China. About the Chinese trade with Saudi Arabia is more than the trade we've put together EU and the United States. I think the recent reversal of policy by both countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, is an indication, again, of economic relations for Iran and also geopolitical for Saudi Arabia. There was a trade between the two countries, a trade-off, that Iran will change its policy on Yemen and Saudi Arabia will change its policy on helping the Iranian opposition. So in the end, it was the economic sanctions on Iran that played a key role. But what is really interesting about the Middle East is that aside from all these conflicts that are going on, there is amazing economic development taking place at the GCC level. And so we can probably expect a greater role for China and India in the region. 9 million Indians work in GCC, and the GCC-European relations is not as great as it used to be. So I expect cooperation at the same time conflict. And this is one trend that we are experiencing at the global level. Because of selective multilateralism in the globe, I think we can expect a lot of contradictions by countries at the same time cooperation. And we can see this also in the great power relationships between China, United States, and Russia. So, Margo, let's go back to the science and technology piece, which, as you said, is so central to not just these geopolitical dynamics, but so much else that we've been covering over these last couple of days. When you look at the set of environmental challenges, technological developments, the pandemic, drug use, all of these things, not only do what they seem to warrant real multilateral international cooperation, but we really can't make much progress on any of them without it. And yet every single one of them, if you talk about AI, if you talk about drug flows, if you talk about climate change, the pandemic, all of them have gotten swept up into geopolitical tension. And it's hard, at least from where I sit, you're much more directly involved in it to really see whether there are encouraging signs of cooperation or whether it's all getting swallowed up in friction. Do you see encouraging signs? What more needs to be done to generate some of the cooperation that, as you suggested, is so essential? Absolutely. Yes, science is going into your politics now, right? So we have the same countries working together, collaborating on certain fields, which are perhaps the fields that we understand as for the common good, for global challenges, and then competing on other issues that are now part of national security, of course, competitiveness. So when we look at emerging tech, we look at things like quantum computing, AI, gene editing, neuro-technology, decarbonization, we can see both tracks simultaneously play out. So I think we have to look back to our common global agenda, sustainable development goals. For example, we're working in Geneva on an open quantum institute. So what are the quantum computing applications, quantum technology applications for the SDGs, for better water purification, for drug discovery? Those are going to be exponential advances that are going to benefit all. But for that, we need to have equitable access to those technologies, right? So how do we truly develop a multilateral system for governance of emerging technologies, while, of course, understanding that some of these technologies are highly sensitive and still part of national security? So how do we navigate this dual track? And one of the keywords that I would like to introduce is the idea of anti-separatory governance. So these technologies that are reshaping our geopolitical landscape, they always caught us by surprise when it comes to policy, when it comes to regulation. And I don't want to say regulation in a negative sense. It's the idea that if we do not see them coming, we could not plan ahead. We could not decide collectively what is the optimal use and application of these technologies for the maximum benefit of humanity and mitigate the potential negative consequences of those that are going to exacerbate inequalities. So when we look at AI already exacerbating inequalities around the world, when we live in a quantum world, this is going to be exponentially worse, right? So how do we maximize the benefits of science for all through a multilateral system that means giving us enough time to sit at the multilateral table and discuss what future frameworks we can have for these technologies before they are here? All these calls for AI temporary ban or moratorium, this cannot happen once what technology is out into the world. So if we have a window of anticipatory governance, it allows us to come together. And this is how the centers for multilateralism like Geneva, we can really work together on really sensitizing and bringing awareness of what's coming to all the countries around the world to try to work together towards those benefits and health and climate and what we call the global commons and preserve them because at the end of the day, no country alone can solve any of those challenges. All these amazing innovations that we're seeing at the AM&C, all these startups, they cannot scale to solve a global challenge if we cannot get past this geopolitical hurdle. So it sounds a little bit naive, but it really truly speaks to the language of science as a great unifier when there are very few channels that are left for us to agree on. Malcolm, let me go to you for one very quick question or I'll ask you, it's a big question, but you'll have to answer it quickly. And then we'll go to the audience for questions from all of you. You could raise the same set of concerns and identify similar dynamics when it comes to the global economy. When you reflect back on what it took to get us through the global financial crisis 15 years ago, a lot of that involved multilateral cooperation, government to government actions that are very hard to imagine happening now if we had a similar or a similar crisis. How do you see the state of global economic governance and economic dynamics given those geopolitical fortunes? Yeah, I'd like to mention four points on that. First is that I think economic cycles are becoming much shorter than they used to be. Perhaps in the past, they were like four to five years now if a company or a government can count on two-year strategy then that would probably be feasible. Second is that because of the nature of the international system today, countries cannot have grand strategies and they have to do constant adjustment to what is taking place. And this is, there is one reason that takes me to my third variable and that is middle-level countries like Mexico, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, India, Turkey, Nigeria, South Africa, these countries will not act in a pugnacious way in their foreign policy behavior. They're going to be working closely with great powers and looking for opportunities. So that's why there's going to be a lot of uncertainty but there's going to be a lot of adjustment without major confrontation between the great powers and a lot of kind of political adjustment at the local level. My last point on this is that we need to look at population at the global level. By the end of the century, a country like Nigeria is going to have a population about 500 million people. Africa will be a continent with more than two billion people in half a century. And 80% of global population by year 280 is going to be concentrated in Africa and Asia which means that despite Western attempts to kind of reshape the international system, countries, middle-level countries and China and India are going to play an important role because with increasing population there's going to be a greater demand for cheap products and therefore there's going to be demand for macro manufacturing in middle-level and also Asian countries. A lot on the table there. Let's go to questions from all of you. There to start. Is there a mic around? And the middle aisle towards the back. And I should say please keep your questions brief and make them questions, not speeches. Thank you. Thank you, Daniel. I'd like to ask a question about Middle East. So, well, with China's increasing influence in the region some are celebrating it and some are being worried for the security risk especially including terrorist attack, what that means to China. And then also if you could also comment quickly what does that mean to US and including its allies in the region especially what would Israel react to this? Thank you. Shirai, go ahead. I think we need to be cautious about Chinese influence in the Middle East. There is vast military, political, financial presence of the United States that goes back many decades. I think China is interested but China will not confront the United States in its encounters in the Middle East. I think it's mostly trade. I don't think at the political level it is anywhere where Europeans and the United States are operating and military is far-fetched. So we have to be very cautious about Chinese presence in the Middle East, yeah. Next question. Yes, there's a mic right behind you. Oh, there you go, there you go. My question relates to Russia. We heard yesterday from Prime Minister Li the importance of peace and at the same time he supported Putin in his war against the Ukraine and actually before the war even happened. So what do you think? How does that fit together? Because he talks about development being such an important topic and peace being the relevant prerequisite for development but at the same time he supports Russia. Do you want to, I mean... You go first. I think there are many signs that Russia is becoming weaker and weaker in its domestic political structure and that is a warning in many ways, both to the US and Europe, which means that Eastern Europe will experience a lingering kind of destabilizing period. So Russia and the Ukrainian war are going to be probably the most significant geopolitical issue in the coming years, which will have economic and energy security consequences for the whole world. So, and I think we need to pay more attention to what happens inside Russia and how the decision-making structure is going to change given the jockeying groups and the factional politics and Putin himself in the position that he is. So we're going to be experiencing quite a bit of instability, I believe, in Russia. If I could just elaborate. I mean, I think the question identified the contradiction in good terms and I think it's why this room is filled. It's very hard to talk about economic progress or progress on any of the issues that Marga identified if you don't solve these very, very hard geopolitical problems, Vladimir Putin could end the war right now. I have no idea what the conversations between him and the Chinese government are, but that would probably be the biggest boon you could imagine to progress on all of these issues and it's hard to see where that goes. Even example, in the long term, for example, since the war began, we don't have access to climate data from Siberia. So for the long term, so we're going to have a gap in our measurements for climate change because of the war. So it's a big dilemma. It's a big question that a lot of scientists are having in a lot of governments as well and the international system, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change that collects and measures the climate data around the world. So can we afford to have gaps in our data? Could science be perhaps a conduit where relationships can continue despite the difficulties in the situation? And this is a question for all of us. It illustrates what the consequence of the long term are going to be. Let me go to this side before I come back here in the back. This is from Mahmood. Do you have, you mentioned Saudi, let's just concentrate on that. What do you believe their vision for the region is and how does that look as opposed to the vision for the region that the Qataris and the Emiratis see? So looking at the autocrats as opposed to, well, not the autocrats, but the monarchies and their development over time, what is their vision for the region and how are they competing to see it succeed? I think when you have to look at numbers in order to determine political behavior, by year 230, Saudi Arabia will have a sovereign fund of $2 trillion and that's power. That's political power, that's political influence throughout the region. Countries like Saudi Arabia, they're helping other countries like Jordan, Egypt just to survive. So I think Saudi Arabia will be, it is an important player, but it will be the dominant player in the region. Other countries, they're trying, but I think proportionally speaking, Saudi Arabia will be the dominant with a diversified foreign policy. Let's go back to this side. Gentlemen, the glasses is right there. Thank you so much, worthy panelists. My name is Mohammad Hassan Dajana. I'm a representative of the global shapers from Pakistan. Just a little context and I'll add into it. So the US and Europe talk a lot about peace. You're the USIP and stuff, but when the war in Ukraine happened, we were priced out of the LNG market. We had long-term deals with Qatar, but Europe bought all of it. There are sanctions against Russia by European Union, but when the oil flows through India to Europe, you can buy that. But if the same oil flows from Iran to Pakistan, we will get sanctions, so we can buy that. Europe and North America. Can I, what's the question? So just the question coming at the end. Yeah, let's get right to the question. Sorry. North America and Europe advocate for peace and I really appreciate that. But what I feel as a young individual from Pakistan is that the actions and the words in Brussels and Washington do not relate with the reality that I see is there is peace, you want peace in Africa and Ethiopia and Asia, but with Ukraine, it's war, weapons and oil, but there's no talk of peace. So why is there a disconnect between what is being said and what we've seen in reality? It's a really important point. Sorry to rush you through it, but the disconnect between the way the war in Ukraine was talked about in our capitals and in the much of the rest of the world. Marga, you've spent a lot of time thinking about policy makers and a broader set of capitals. How do you see that difference? You give us the hard discussions in this session, right? The way I look at it is, again, from the cooperation in terms of data flows and research cooperation. And when we look at data as the new oil in the future, all of these short-term, I think, challenges are going to shape how we then deal with the global, the global flow of information and knowledge in the future. And I think for the EU, there's now this shift in cooperation with what is called the like-minded partners that now there are new rules for scientific cooperation and new rules for how do we work academically and scientifically with other countries that have shifted because before it was about, let's find the best data, the best experts around the world no matter what is going on in other trucks. And now everything is intertwined. So don't have the answer to the specific question, but I think in the macro level, this is going to shape the pattern of how we deal with the flow of any material and technological and intellectual goods for the next decade. So it's very important that we answer this question now, but also we look at how this is actually the pattern that we're setting for the future. Let's get one last quick question in the back there. Sorry to neglect a couple more. Yeah, thanks for the great session. I have a question. You sort of talked about the role of these middle states in the global supply chains. I have a question regarding states that are being not as prominent right now, but the certain states that command a critical role in global value chains, for example, Morocco has the majority of the world's phosphate, Congo has the world's largest deposits of cobalt, Chile has one fourth of the world's lithium reserves, and Guyana had recently found 11 billion barrels of oil. So these are states that sort of command critical quantities of materials. So what role do you see these states sort of playing out in the future? Thanks. This is relevant to both of your expertises, so let's do 45 seconds from each of you. Bachman, if you start. Yeah, low income developing countries, they do not have the option of diversifying. So my assessment would be that these countries, mostly in Africa and Asia, they're going to be pivoting more to China and India in the future to provide the raw materials and be part of the supply chain. Morda? I think it related to the energy transition and from our global shaper and yours, how are we now slowing down our ambitions and progress towards the energy transition and clean energy, right? And I think this then is the macro, macro question. Are we getting irreversibly, I think, caught and slowed out to a point that we will not be able to come back to in the agreements and the ambitions we set in the Paris Agreement. And so again, back to the very macro, to the zooming out, how are we, this present moment in these few years in history are going to shape our ability or hang our ability to work together in the next decades and hundreds of years to solve our common challenges. Keep coming back to that. That is the right kind of note to end on, so we will end there right under the wire. Mark, thank you so much for everything you put on the table. Thanks so much to all of you.