 CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEM SUBJECT, POLITICAL AND PRIVATE. Being spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof, and first of systems, which resemble the similar parts or muscles of a body natural. By systems I understand any numbers of men joined in one interest or one business, of which some are regular and some irregular. Other are those where one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number. All other are irregular. Of regular some are absolute and independent, subject to none but their own representative. Such are only commonwealths, of which I have spoken already in the five last precedent chapters. Others are dependent, that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which everyone, as also their representative, is subject. Of systems subordinate, some are political and some private. Political, otherwise called body's politic and persons in law, are those which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the commonwealth. Private are those which are constituted by subjects among themselves or by authority from a stranger. For no authority derived from foreign power within the dominion of another is public there, but private. And of private systems some are lawful, some unlawful. Lawful are those which are allowed by the commonwealth. All other are unlawful. Irregular systems are those which, having no representative, consist only in concourse of people, which, if not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor made on evil design, such as are conflicts of people to markets or shows or any other harmless end, are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or, if the number be considerable, unknown, they are unlawful. In body's politic the power of the representative is always limited, and that which prescribeth the limits thereof is the power sovereign. For power unlimited is absolute sovereignty, and the sovereign in every commonwealth is the absolute representative of all the subjects, and therefore no other can be representative of any part of them, but so far as he shall give leave. And to give leave to a body politic of subjects to have an absolute representative, to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth, and to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defense, which the sovereign cannot be understood to do, by any grant that does not plainly and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words are not the signs of his will, when other consequences are signs of the contrary, but rather signs of error and misreconning, to which all mankind is too prone. The bounds of that power which is given to the representative of a body politic are to be taken notice of from two things. One is their writ, or letters from the sovereign, the other is the law of the commonwealth. For though in the institution or acquisition of a commonwealth, which is independent, there needs no writing, because the power of the representative has there no other bounds but such as are set out by the unwritten law of nature, yet in subordinate bodies there are such diversities of limitation necessary concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembered without letters nor taken notice of, unless such letters be patent that they may be read to them, and with all sealed or testified with the seals or other permanent signs of the authority sovereign. And because such limitation is not always easy or perhaps possible to be described in writing, the ordinary laws, common to all subjects, must determine what the representative may lawfully do in all cases where the letters themselves are silent. And therefore in a body politic, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the person of the body, which is not warranted in his letters, nor by the laws, is his own act, and not the act of the body, nor of any other member thereof besides himself, because further than his letters or the law's limit he representeth no man's person but his own. But what he does according to these is the act of everyone, for of the act of the sovereign everyone is author, because he is the representative unlimited, and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of the sovereign is the act of the sovereign, and therefore every member of the body is author of it. But if the representative be an assembly, whatsoever that assembly shall decree, not warranted by their letters or the laws is the act of the assembly or body politic, and the act of everyone by whose vote the decree was made, but not the act of any man that being present voted to the contrary, nor of any man absent, unless he voted it by procreation. It is the act of the assembly because voted by the major part, and if it be a crime the assembly may be punished, as far forth as it is capable, as by dissolution or forfeiture of their letters, which is to such artificial and fictitious bodies, capital, or if the assembly have a common stock, wherein none of the innocent members have propriety, by pecuniary mulked. For from corporal penalties nature hath exempted all bodies politic, but they that gave not their vote are therefore innocent, because the assembly cannot represent any man in things unwarranted by their letters, and consequently are not involved in their votes. If the person of the body politic, being in one man, borrow money of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same body, for no letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men's own inclinations to limit lending, the debt is the representatives. For if he should have authority from his letters to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the sovereignty of them, and therefore the grant were either avoid, as proceeding from error commonly incident to human nature, and as an insufficient sign of the will of the grantor, or if it be avowed by him, then it is the representer sovereign, and falleth not under the present question, which is only of bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the representative himself, because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the letters, and to the qualification of the body, understandeth those only for his debtors that are engaged, and seeing the representer can engage himself, and none else, as him only debtor, who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock, if there be any, or if there be none, out of his own estate. If he come into debt by contract or mulked, the case is the same. But when the representative is an assembly, and the debt to a stranger, all they and only they are responsible for the debt that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the mulked was imposed. Because every one of those, in voting, did engage himself for the payment, for he that his author of the borrowing is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when paid by any one he be discharged. But if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly only is obliged to the payment, out of their common stock, if they have any. For having liberty of vote, if he vote the money shall be borrowed, he votes it shall be paid. If he vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending he voted the borrowing, he contradicted his former vote, and is obliged by the latter, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common treasury only, which failing he hath no remedy, nor complaint but against himself, that, being privy to the acts of the assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did, nevertheless, through his own folly lend his money. It is manifest by this that in body's politics subordinate, and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful but expedient for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the representative assembly, and cause their descent to be registered, or to take witness of it, because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men. But in a sovereign assembly that liberty is taken away, both because he that protest of there denies their sovereignty, and also because whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power is as to the subject, though not always in the sight of God, justified by the command, for of such command every subject is the author. The variety of body's politic is almost infinite, for they are not only distinguished by the several affairs for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversity, but also by the times, places, and numbers subject to many limitations. And as to their affairs, some are ordained for government, as first the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major part, and then this assembly is a body politic, and their power limited by commission. This word province signifies a charge or care of business, which he whose business it is, committed to another man to be administered for and under him, and therefore when in one commonwealth there be diverse countries that have their laws distinct from one another, or are far distant in place, the administration of the government being committed to diverse persons, those countries where the sovereign is not resident, but governs by commission are called provinces. But of the government of a province, by an assembly residing in the province itself, there be few examples. The Romans, who had the sovereignty of many provinces, yet governed them always by presidents and preters, and not by assemblies, as they governed the city of Rome and territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were colonies sent from England to plant Virginia and summer islands, though the government of them here were committed to assemblies in London, yet did those assemblies never commit the government under them to any assembly there, but did to each plantation send one governor. For though every man, where he can be present by nature, desires to participate of government, yet where they cannot be present, they are by nature also inclined to commit the government of their common interest, rather to a monarchical, than a popular form of government. Which is also evident in those men that have a great private estates, who, when they are unwilling to take the pains of administering the business that belongs to them, choose rather to trust one servant than an assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the government of a province or colony committed to an assembly? And when it is, that which in this place I have to say is this, that whatsoever debt is by that assembly contracted, or whatsoever unlawful act is decreed, is the act only of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alleged. Also that, an assembly residing out of the bounds of that colony, whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons or goods of any of the colony, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the colony itself, as having no jurisdiction nor authority elsewhere, but are left to the remedy which the law of the place allows them. And though the assembly have right to impose moat upon any of their members that shall break the laws they make, yet out of the colony itself they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here of the rights of an assembly for the government of a province or a colony, is applicable also to an assembly for the government of a town, a university or a college or a church, or for any government over the persons of men. And generally in all bodies politic, if any particular member conceived himself injured by the body itself, the cognizance of his cause belong to the sovereign, and those the sovereign hath ordained for judges in such causes, or shallow ordained for that particular cause, and not to the body itself. For the whole body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a sovereign assembly is otherwise. For there, if the sovereign be not judge, though in his own cause, there can be no judge at all. In a body politic, for the well ordering of foreign traffic, the most commodious representative is an assembly of all the members, that is to say such a one as every one that adventureth his money may be present at all the deliberations and resolutions of the body, if they will themselves. For proofware of, we are to consider the end for which men that are merchants, and may buy and sell, export and import their merchandise according to their own discretions, do nevertheless to bind themselves up in one corporation. It is true, there be few merchants, that with the merchandise they buy at home, can freight a ship to export it, or with that they buy abroad to bring it home, and have therefore a need to join together in one society, where every man may either participate at the gain according to the proportion of his adventure, or take his own and sell what he transports or imports at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no body politic, there being no common representative to oblige them to any other law than that which is common to all other subjects. The end of their incorporating is to make their gain the greater, which is done two ways, by soul buying and soul selling, both at home and abroad. So that to grant to a company of merchants to be a corporation, or body politic, is to grant them a double monopoly, whereof one is to be soul buyers, another to be soul sellers. For when there is a company incorporated for any particular foreign country, they only export the commodities vindible in that country, which is soul buying at home and soul selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth, both which is gainful to the merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates. And abroad there is but one buyer of foreign merchandise, and but one that sells them at home, both which again are gainful to the adventurers. Of this double monopoly, one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at home, by their sole exportation, they set what price they please on the husbandry and handiworks of the people, and by the sole importation, what price they please on all foreign commodities the people have need of. Both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and soul buying the foreign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the foreigner. For where but one selleth the merchandise is the dearer, and where but one buyeth the cheaper. Such corporations therefore are no other than monopolies, though they would be very profitable for a commonwealth, if, being bound up into one body in foreign markets, they were at liberty at home, every man to buy and sell at what price he could. The end, then, of these bodies of merchants, being not a common benefit to the whole body, which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, viddling, and manning of ships. But the particular gain of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own, that is, that every one beeth the assembly that shall have the power to order the same, and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly where every member of the body may be present at the consultations, if he will. If a body politic of merchants contracted debt to a stranger by the act of their representative assembly, every member is liable by himself for the whole, for a stranger can take no notice of their private laws, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one discharge with all the rest. But if the debt beeth to one of the company, the creditor is debtor for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any. If the common wealth impose attacks upon the body, it is understood to be laid upon every member proportionally to his particular adventure in the company, for there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their particular adventures. If a moat be laid upon the body for some unlawful act, they are only liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed, for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the body, which, if a crime, because the body was ordained by the authority of the common wealth, is not his. If one of the members be indebted to the body, he may be sued by the body, but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the body, but only by authority of the common wealth, for they can do it by their own authority. They can, by their own authority, give judgment that the debt is due, which is as much as to be judged in their own cause. These bodies, made for the government of men, or of traffic, be either perpetual, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business. For example, if a sovereign monarch, or a sovereign assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns and other several parts of their territory, to send to him their deputies, to inform him of the condition and necessities of the subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good laws, or for any other cause, as with one person representing the whole country, such deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a body politic, representing every subject of that dominion. But it is only for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that man, or assembly that by the sovereign authority sent for them, and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, or debated by them, the body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute representative of the people, then were it the sovereign assembly, and so there would be two sovereign assemblies, or two sovereigns over the same people, which cannot consist with their peace. And therefore, where there is once a sovereignty, there can be no absolute representation of the people but by it. And for the limits of how far such a body shall represent the whole people, they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent for. For the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent, then is in the writing directed to them from their sovereign, expressed. Private bodies regular and lawful are those that are constituted without letters, or other written authority, saving the laws common to all other subjects. And because they be united in one person representative, they are held for regular, such as are all families in which the father or master ordereth the whole family, for he obligeth his children and servants as far as the law permiteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions which the law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their fathers and masters, as to their immediate sovereigns. For the father and master, being before the institution of commonwealth, absolute sovereigns and their own families, they lose afterward no more their authority than the law of the commonwealth taketh from them. Private bodies regular but unlawful are those that unite themselves into one person representative without any public authority at all, such as are the corporations of beggars, thieves, and gypsies, the better to order their trade of begging and stealing, and the corporations of men that buy authority from any foreign person themselves in another dominion, for the easier propagation of doctrines, and for making a party against the power of the commonwealth. Irregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or sometimes mere concourse of people without union to any particular design, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become lawful or unlawful according to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of every man's particular design therein, and his design is to be understood by the occasion. The leagues of subjects, because leagues are commonly made for mutual defense, are in a commonwealth, which is no more than a league of all the subjects together, for the most part unnecessary, and saver of unlawful design, and are for that cause unlawful, and commonly go by the name of factions or conspiracies. For a league, being a connection of men by covenants, if there be no power given to any one man or assembly, as in the condition of mere nature to compel them into performance, is so long only valid, as there arises no just cause of distrust, and therefore leagues between commonwealths, over whom there is no human power established to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful but also profitable for the time they last. But leagues of the subjects of one and the same commonwealth, where everyone may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and in case the design of them be evil or unknown to the commonwealth, unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men is, if for evil intent unjust, if for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly concealed. If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority consult a part to contrive the guidance of the rest, this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest. But if he whose private interest is to be debated and judged in the assembly, make as many friends as he can, in him it is no injustice, because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And though he hires such friends with money, unless there be an expressed law against it, yet it is not injustice. For sometimes, as men's manners are, justice cannot be had without money, and every man may think his own cause just till it be heard and judged. In all commonwells, if a private man entertains more servants than the government of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them requires, it is faction and unlawful. For having the protection of the commonwealth, he needed not the defense of private force. And whereas in nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous families have lived in continual hostility and invaded one another with private force, yet it is evident enough that they have done unjustly, or else that they had no commonwealth. And as factions for kindred, so also factions for government of religion, as of papus, Protestants, etc., or of state, as patricians and plebeians of old time in Rome, and of aristocraticals and democraticals of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out of the hand of the sovereign. Concourse of people is in a regular system. The lawfulness or unlawfulness, whereof, depended on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful and manifest, the concourse is lawful, as the usual meeting of men at church, or at a public show, in usual numbers. For if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident, and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them is to be judge conscious of an unlawful and tumultuous design. It may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to be delivered to a judge or magistrate, yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous assembly, because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful, but such a number as the present officers are not able to suppress and bring to justice. When an unusual number of men assemble against a man whom they accuse, the assembly is an unlawful tumult, because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul of Ephesus, where Demetrius and a great number of other men brought two of Paul's companions before the magistrate, saying with one voice, quote, great is Diana of the Ephesians, unquote, which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine as was against their religion and trade. The occasion here, considering the laws of that people, was just. Yet was their assembly judged unlawful, and the magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words, quote, if Demetrius and the other workmen can accuse any man of anything, they'll be pleased and deputies. Let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called, for we are in danger to be accused for this day's sedition, because there is no cause by which any man can render any reason in this concourse of people, unquote, Acts 1940, where he called it an assembly whereof men can give no just account, a sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning systems and assemblies of people which may be compared, as I said, to the similar parts of man's body, such as be lawful to the muscles such as are unlawful to wins, vials, and apostems, engendered by the unnatural conflicts of evil humours. End of Chapter 22. Chapter 23 of Leviathan. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Arrowith. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, Chapter 23 of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power. In the last chapter I have spoken of the similar parts of a Commonwealth. In this I shall speak of the parts organical, which are public ministers. A public minister is he that by the sovereign, whether a monarch or an assembly, is employed in any affairs with authority to represent in that employment the person of the Commonwealth. And whereas every man or assembly that hath sovereignty represented two persons, or, as the more common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural and another politic, as a monarch hath the person not only of the Commonwealth, but also of a man, and the sovereign assembly hath the person not only of the Commonwealth, but also of the assembly, that they be servants to them in their natural capacity, or not public ministers, but those only that serve them in the administration of the public business. And therefore, neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers that wait on the assembly for no other purpose but for the commodity of the men assembled in an aristocracy or democracy, nor stewards, chamberlains, coffers, or any other officers of the household of a monarch are public ministers in a monarchy. Of public ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general administration, either of the whole dominion or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a protector or regent, may be committed by the predecessor of an infant king during his minority, the whole administration of his kingdom, in which case every subject is so far obliged to obedience at the ordinances he shall make, and the command he shall give, be in the king's name, and not inconsistent with his sovereign power. Of a part or province, as when either a monarch or sovereign assembly shall give the general charge thereof to a governor, lieutenant, prefect, or viceroy. And in this case also, every one of that province is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the sovereign, and that not incompatible with the sovereign's right. For such protectors, viceroys, and governors have no other right but what depends on the sovereign's will, and no commission that can be given them can be interpreted for a declaration of the will to transfer the sovereignty without express and perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of public ministers resemble the nerves and tendons that move the several limbs of a body natural. Others have special administration, that is to say, the charges of some special business, either at home or abroad. As at home, first, for the economy of a commonwealth, that they have authority concerning the treasury, as tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever public revenue to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts thereof, are public ministers. Ministers, because they serve the person representative and can do nothing against his command, nor without his authority, public because they serve him in his political capacity. Secondly, they that have authority concerning the militia to have the custody of arms, forts, ports, to levy, pay, or conduct soldiers, or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or sea, are public ministers. But a soldier without command, though he fight for the commonwealth, does not therefore represent the person of it, because there is none to represent it to. For everyone that have command represents it to them only whom he commandeth. They also that have the authority to teach or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the sovereign power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godliness and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the public enemy, or public ministers. Ministers in that they do it not by their own authority, but by others, and public because they do it, or should do it, by no authority but that of the sovereign. The monarch of the sovereign assembly only half immediate authority from God to teach and instruct the people. And no man but the sovereign receiveth his power deagratia simply, that is to say, from the favor of none but God. All other received theirs from the favor and providence of God and their sovereigns, as in a monarchy deagratia et regis, or dea providentia et volentate regis. They also to whom jurisdiction is given are public ministers, for in their seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign, and the sentence is his sentence. For, as hath been before declared, all judicature is essentially annexed to the sovereignty, and therefore all other judges are but ministers of him or them that have the sovereign power. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely a fact and of law, so are judgments, some of fact, some of law, and consequently in the same controversy there may be two judges, one of fact, another of law. And in both these controversies there may arise a controversy between the party judged and the judge, which, because they both be serviced to the sovereign, ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent of both, for no man can be judged in his own case. The sovereign is already agreed on for judged by them both, and is therefore either to hear the cause and determine it himself, or appoint for judge such as they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between them diverse ways, as first, if the defendant be allowed to accept against such of his judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, for as to the complainant he hath already chosen his own judge, those which he accepteth not against are judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeal to any other judge, he can appeal no further, for his appeal is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeal to the sovereign himself, and he by himself, or by delicates which the party shall agree on, give sentence, that sentence is final, for the defendant is judged by his own judges, that is to say, by himself. These properties of just and rational judicature considered, I cannot for bear to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice established both for common and also for public pleas in England. By common pleas, I mean those where both the complainant and defendant are subjects, and by public, which are also called pleas of the crown, those where the complainant is the sovereign. For whereas there were two orders of men, where of one was lords the other commons, the lords had this privilege to have for judges in all capital crimes none but lords, as many as would be present, which being ever acknowledged as a privilege of favor, their judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every subject, as also in civil controversy the lords, had for judges men of the country with a matter in controversy lay, against which he might make his exceptions till at last twelve men without exception being agreed on, they were judged by those twelve. So that having his own judges, there could be nothing alleged by the party why the sentence should not be final. These public persons with authority from the sovereign power, either to instruct or judge the people, are such members of the commonwealth as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body natural. Public ministers are also those that have authority from the sovereign to procure the execution of judgments given, to publish the sovereign's commands, to suppress the malts, to apprehend and imprison malfactors, and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace. For every act they do by such authority is the act of the commonwealth and their service answerable to that of the hands and the body natural. Public ministers abroad are those that represent the person of their own sovereign to foreign states. Such are ambassadors, messengers, agents, and heralds sent by public authority and on public business. But such are sent by authority only of some private party of a troubled state, though they be received, are neither public nor private ministers of the commonwealth, because none of their actions have the commonwealth or author. Likewise an ambassador sent from a prince to congratulate, condole, or to assist in the solemnity, though the authority be public, yet because the business is private and belonging to him in his natural capacity is a private person. Also, if a man be sent into another country secretly to explore their councils and strength, though both the authority and the business be public, yet because there is none to take notice of any person in him but his own, he is but a private minister, but yet a minister of the commonwealth and may be compared to an eye in the body natural. And those that are appointed to receive the petitions or other information to the people and are, as it were, the public ear, are public ministers and represent their sovereign in that office. Neither a counselor nor a council of state if we consider with no authority, judicature, or command, but only of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a public person, for the advice is addressed to the sovereign only, whose person cannot in his own presence be represented to him by another. But a body of counselors are never without some other authority, either of judicature or of immediate administration. As in a monarchy, they represent the monarch in delivering his commands to the public ministers. In a democracy, the council or senate propounds the result of their deliberations to the people as a council, but when they appoint judges or hear causes or give audience to the ambassadors, it is the quality of a minister of the people. And in an aristocracy, the council of state is a sovereign assembly itself and gives council to none but themselves. End of chapter 23. Chapter 24 of Leviathan. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Semum. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. Chapter 24 of the Nutrition and Procreation of a Commonwealth. The nutrition of a Commonwealth consisted in the plenty and distribution of materials conducing to life, in concoction or preparation and when concocted in the conveyance of it by convenient conduits to the public use. As for the plenty of metal, it is a thing limited by nature to those commodities which, from the two breasts of our common mother, land and sea, God usually either freely give it or for labour sell it to mankind. For the matter of this nutriment consisting in animals, vegetables and minerals, God had freely laid them before us in or near to the face of the earth, so as they're needed no more but the labour and industry of receiving them, in so much as plenty depended, next to God's favour, merely on the labour and industry of man. This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly native and partly foreign, native that which is to be had within the territory of the Commonwealth, foreign that which is imported from without, and because there is no territory under the dominion of one Commonwealth, except it be a very vast extent, that produces all things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body, and few that produce not something more than necessary, the superfluous commodities to be had within become no more superfluous, but supply these once at home by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange or by just war or by labour. For a man's labour also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing, and there have been commonwealths that, having no more territory than had served them for habitation, have nevertheless not only maintained, but also increased their power partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the manufacturers, where of the materials were brought in from other places. The distribution of the materials of this nourishment is the constitution of mine and thine and his, that is to say, in one word propriety, and belonged in all kinds of commonwealth to the sovereign power. For where there is no commonwealth there is, as had been already shown, a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, and therefore everything is his that get at it, and keep at it by force, which is neither propriety nor community, but uncertainty, which is so evident that even Cicero, a passionate defender of liberty, in a public pleading attributed all propriety to the law civil, let the civil law, said he, be once abandoned or but negligently guarded, not to say oppressed, and there is nothing that any man can be sure to receive from his ancestor or leave to his children. And again, take away the civil law and no man knows what is his own and what another man's. Seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the person that represents it, it is the act only of the sovereign, and consistent in the laws which none can make that have not the sovereign power, and this they well knew of old, who called that nomos, that is to say distribution, which we call law, and define justice by distributing to every man his own. In this distribution the first law is for division of the land itself, wherein the sovereign assign it to every man a portion, according as he, and not according as any subject or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to equity and the common good. The children of Israel were a commonwealth in the wilderness, but wanted the commodities of the earth till they were masters of the land of promise, which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the priest, and Joshua their general, who, when there were twelve tribes making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of Joseph, made nevertheless but twelve portions of the land, and ordained for the tribe of Levi no land, but assigned them the tenth part of the whole fruits, which division was there for arbitrary, and though people coming into possession of a land by war do not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants, as did the Jews, but leave too many or most or all of them their estates, yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards as of the victor's distribution, as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conqueror. From whence we may collect that the propriety which a subject hath in his lands consisted in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them, and not to exclude their sovereign, be it an assembly or a monarch, for seeing the sovereign that is to say the commonwealth, whose person he represented, is understood to do nothing but in order to the common peace and security, this desperation of lands is to be understood as done in order to the same, and consequently whatsoever distribution he shall make and prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject that committed his peace and safety to his discretion and conscience, and therefore by the will of every one of them is to be reputed void. It is true that a sovereign monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain that doing of many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust and of the law of nature, but this is not enough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon or so much as to accuse of injustice or any way to speak evil of their sovereign, because they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the sovereign power made them their own. But in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity and the law of nature is to be considered hereafter in another place. In the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself may be conceived to have a portion and possess and improve the same by their representative, and that such portion may be made sufficient to sustain the whole expense to the common peace and defence necessarily are required, which are very true if there could be any representative conceived free from human passions and infirmities. But the nature of man being as it is, the setting forth of public land or of any certain revenue for the commonwealth is in vain intended to the dissolution of government to the condition of mere nature and war as soon as ever the sovereign power followed into the hands of a monarch or of an assembly that are either too negligent of money or too hazardous in engaging the public stock into long or costly war. Commonwealth can endure no diet for seeing their expense is not limited by their own appetite but by external accidents and the appetites of their neighbours. The public riches cannot be limited by other limits than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England there were by the conqueror diverse lands reserved to his own use besides forests and chases either for his recreation or for preservation of woods and diverse services reserved on the land he gave his subjects yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in his public but in his natural capacity for he and his successors did for all that lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects land when they judge it necessary. Or if those public lands and services were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Commonwealth it was contrary to the scope of the institution being as it appeared by those ensuing taxes insufficient and as it appears by the late small revenue of the Crown subject to avianation and diminution. It is therefore in vain to assign a portion to the Commonwealth which may sell or give it away and thus sell and give it away when it is done by their representative. As a distribution of lands at home so also to assign in what places and for what commodities the subject shall traffic abroad belong to the sovereign for if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein some of them would be drawn for gain both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Commonwealth and hurt themselves by importing such things as pleasing men's appetites be nevertheless noxious or at least unprofitable to them and therefore it belong to the Commonwealth that is to the sovereign only to approve or disapprove both of the places and matter of foreign traffic further seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a Commonwealth that every man have a propriety in a portion of land or in some few commodities or a natural property in some useful art and there is no art in the world but it's necessary either for the being or well-being almost of every particular man it is necessary that man distribute that which they can spare and transfer their propriety therein mutually one to another by exchange a mutual contract and therefore it belong to the Commonwealth that is to say to the sovereign to appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting and taking to hire are to be made and by what words and words and sign they shall be understood for valid and for the matter and distribution of the nourishment to the several members of the Commonwealth thus much considering the model of the whole work is sufficient by concoction I understand the reducing of all commodities which are not presently consumed but reserved for nourishment in time to come to something of equal value and with all so portable as not to hinder the motion of man from place to place to the end a man may have in what place so ever such nourishment as the place afforded and this is nothing else but gold and silver and money for gold and silver being as it happens almost in all countries of the world highly valued is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between nations and money of what matter so ever coined by the sovereign of a Commonwealth is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else between the subjects of that Commonwealth by the means of which measures all commodities movable and inmovable are made to accompany a man to all places of his resort within and without the place of his ordinary residence and the same passage from man to man within the Commonwealth and goes round about nourishing as it passes every partner of in so much as this concoction is as it were the sanctification of the Commonwealth for natural blood is in light manner made of the fruits of the earth and circulating nourish it by the way every member of the body of man and because silver and gold have their value from the matter itself they have first this privilege that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one nor of a few Commonwealth as being a common measure of the commodities of all places but base money may easily be enhanced or based secondly they have the privilege to make commonwealths move and stretch out their arms when need is into foreign countries and supply not only private subjects that travel but also whole armies with provision but that coin which not considerable for the matter but for the stamp of the place being unable to endure a change of air had its effect at home only where also it is subject to the change of laws and thereby to have the value diminished to the prejudice many times of those that have it the conduits and ways by which it is conveyed to the public use are of two sorts one that conveyed it to the public coffers the other that issued the same out again for public payments of the first sort are collectors receivers and treasurers of the second are the treasurers again and the offices appointed for payment of several public or private ministers and in this also the artificial man maintains his resemblance with the natural whose veins receiving the blood from the several parts of the body carried to the heart where being made vital the heart by the arteries sends it out again to enliven and enable for motion all the members of the same the procreation or children of a commonwealth are those we call plantations or colonies which are numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth under a conductor or governor to inhabit a foreign country either formally void of inhabitants or made void then by war and when a colony is settled they are either a commonwealth of themselves discharge of their subjection to their sovereign that sent them as had been done by many commonwealths of ancient time in which case the commonwealth from which they went was called their metropolis or mother and requires no more of them than fathers require of the children whom they emancipate and make free from their domestic government which is honor and friendship or else they remain united to their metropolis as were the colonies of the people of Rome and then there are no commonwealths themselves but provinces and parts of the commonwealth that sent them so that the right of colonies saving honor and league with their metropolis depended wholly on their license or lettuce by which their sovereign authorized them to plant end of chapter 24 chapter 25 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter 25 of council how fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words appeared in nothing more than in the confusion of councils and commands arising from the imperative manner of speaking in the both and in many other occasions besides for the words do this are the words not only of him that commanded but also of him that give it counsel and of him that exhorted and yet there are but few that see not that these are very different things or that cannot distinguish between them when they perceive who it is that speak it and to whom the speech is directed and upon what occasion but finding those phrases in men's writings and being not able or not willing to enter into in consideration of the circumstances they mistake sometimes the precepts of counsellors for the precepts of them that command and sometimes the contrary according as it best agreeeth with the conclusions they would infer or the actions they approve to avoid which mistakes and rendered to those terms of commanding counselling and exhorting their proper and distinct significations I define them thus command is where a man said do this or do not this without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it from this it followeth manifestly that he that commanded pretended thereby his own benefit for the reason of his command is his own will only and the proper object of every man's will is some good to himself council is where a man said do or do not this and adduceeth his reasons from the benefit that arrived by it to him to whom he said it and from this it is evident that he that giveth council pretendeth only whatsoever he intended the good of him to whom he giveth it therefore between council and command one great difference is that command is directed to a man's own benefit and counsel to the benefit of another man and from this ariseeth another difference that a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded as when he had covenanted to obey but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counseled because the hurt of not following it is his own or if he should covenant to follow it then is the council turned into the nature of a command a third difference between them is that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's counsel because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himself but to demand right to counsel another argues a will to know his designs or to gain some other good to himself which as I said before is of every man's will the proper object this also is incident to the nature of council that whatsoever it be he that asketh it cannot in equity accuse or punish it for to ask counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall think best and consequently he that giveth counsel to his sovereign whether a monarch or an assembly when he asketh it cannot in equity be punished for it whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most or not so it be to the proposition in debate for if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of before the debate be ended they should neither ask nor take any further counsel for sense of the assembly is the resolution of the debate and end of all deliberation and generally he that demandeth counsel is author of it and therefore cannot punish it and what the sovereign cannot no man else can but if one subject giveth counsel to another to do anything contrary to the laws whether that counsel proceed from evil intention or from ignorance only it is punishable by the commonwealth because ignorance of the law is no good excuse where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject exhortation and dehortation is counsel accompanied with science in him that giveth it of vehement desire to have it followed or to say it more briefly counsel vehemently pressed for he that exhorteth doth not deduce the consequences of what he advised it to be done and tie himself therein to the rigor of true reasoning but encourages him he counseleth to action as he that dehorteth detereth him from it and therefore they have in their speeches a regard to the common passions and opinions of man in deducing their reasons and make use of similitudes, metaphors, examples and other tools of oratory to persuade their hearers of the utility, honor or justice of following their advice from whence may be inferred first that exhortation and dehortation is directed to the good of him that giveth the counsel not of him that asketh it which is contrary to the duty of a counselor who by the definition of counsel ought to regard not as own benefit but his whom he advises and that he directed his counsel to his own benefit is manifest enough by the long and vehement urging or by the artificial giving thereof which being not required of him and consequently proceeding from his own occasions is directed principally to his own benefit and but accidentally to the good of him that is counseled or not at all secondly that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieeth only where a man is to speak to a multitude because when the speech is addressed to one he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude which are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once thirdly that they that exhort and dehort where they are required to give counsel are corrupt counselors and as it were bribe by their own interest for though the counsel they give be never so good yet he that gives it is no more a good counselor than he that giveth but just sentence for a reward is it just judge but where a man may lovely command as a father in his family or a leader in an army his exhortations and dehortations are not only lawful but also necessary and laudable but then there are no more counsels but commands which when they are for execution of sour labor sometimes necessity and always humanity required to be sweetened in the delivery by encouragement and in the tune and phrase of counsel rather than in harsher language of command examples of the difference between command and counsel we may take from the forms of speech that express them in holy scripture have no other gods but me make to thyself no grave an image take not God's name in vain sanctify the Sabbath honor thy parents kill not steal not etc our commands because the reason for which we are to obey them is drawn from the will of God our king whom we are obliged to obey but these words sell all thou hast give it to the poor and follow me our counsel because the reason for which we are to do so is drawn from our own benefit which is this that we shall have treasure in heaven these words go into the village over against you and you shall find an ass tight and her cult lose her and bring her to me our command for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their master but these words repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus our counsel because the reason why we should so do tend not to any benefit of God Almighty who shall still be king in what manner so ever we rebel but of ourselves who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins as the difference of counsel from command have been now deduced from the nature of counsel consisting in a deducing of the benefit or hurt that may arise to him that is to be counseled by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propounded so may also the differences between apt and inept counselors be derived from the same for experience being but memory of the consequences of like actions formally observed and counsel but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another the virtues and defects of counsel are the same with the virtues and defects intellectual and to the person of a commonwealth his counselors serve him in the place of memory and mental discourse but with this resemblance of the commonwealth to a natural man there is one disillimitued joint of great importance which is that a natural man received his experience from the natural objects of sense which work upon him without passion or interest of their own whereas they that give counsel to the representative person of a commonwealth may have and have often their particular ends and passions that render their counsels always suspected and many times unfaithful and therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good counselor that his ends and interest be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of him he counseleth secondly because the office of a counselor when an action comes into the deliberation is to make manifest the consequences of it in such manner as he that is counseled may be truly and evidently informed he ought to propound his advice in such form of speech as may make the truth most evidently appear that is to say with his firm ratiocination as significant and proper language and as briefly as the evidence will permit and therefore rash and unevident inferences such as are fetched only from examples or authority of books and are not arguments of what is good or evil but witnesses of fact or of opinion obscure confused and ambiguous expressions also all metaphorical speeches tending to the stirring up of passion because such reasoning and such expressions are useful only to receive or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own are repugnant to the office of a counselor thirdly because the ability of counseling proceeded from experience and long study and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great commonwealth are necessary to be known no man is presumed to be a good counselor but in such business as he have not only been much versed in but have also much meditated on and considered foreseeing the business of a commonwealth is this to preserve the people in peace at home and defend them against foreign invasion we shall find that requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind of the rights of government and of the nature of equity law justice and honor not to be attained without study and of the strength commodities places both of their own country and their neighbors as also of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may anyway annoy them and this is not attained to without much experience of which things not only the whole some but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a man in years and of more than ordinary study the wit required for counsel as I have said before in chapter eight is judgment and the differences of man in that point come from different education of some to one kind of study or business and of others to another when for the doing of anything there be infallible rules as an engines and edifices the rules of geometry all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel that has learned or found out the rule and when there is no such rule he that had most experience in that particular kind of business has therein the best judgment and is the best counselor fourthly to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth in a business that has reference to another commonwealth it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences and letters that come from dense and with all the records of treaties and other transactions of state between them which none can do but such as the representative shall think fit by which we may see that they who are not called to counsel can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude fifthly supposing the number of counsel is equal a man is better counseled by hearing them apart than in an assembly and that for many causes first in hearing them apart you have the advice of every man but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with I or no or with their hands or feet not moved by their own sense but by the eloquence of another or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken or their whole by contradiction or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension than those that have applauded the country opinion secondly in an assembly of many they cannot choose but be some interests are contrary to that of the public and these their interests make passionate and passion eloquent and eloquence draws others into the same advice for the passions of man which asunder are moderate as the heat of one brand in assembly are like many brands that inflame one another especially when they blow one another with orations to the setting of the commonwealth on fire and they pretend of counseling it thirdly in hearing every man apart one may examine when there is need the truth or probability of his reasons and of the grounds of the advice he gives by frequent interruptions and objections which cannot be done in an assembly where in every difficult question a man is rather astounded and dazzled with a variety of discourse upon it than informed of the course he ought to take besides there cannot be an assembly of many called together for advice wherein there be not some that have the ambition to be thought eloquent and also learn it in the politics and give not their advice with care of the business propounded but of the applause of their motley orations made of the diverse colored threats or shreds of threat or shreds of others which is an impertinence at least that takes away the time of serious consultation and in the secret way of counseling apart is easily avoided fourthly in the liberations that ought to be kept secret where of there be many occasions in public business the councils of many and especially in assemblies are dangerous and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers and of such persons as are most versed and in whose fidelity they have most confidence to conclude who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel from a great assembly of counselors that wish it fall or would accept of their pains when there is a question of marrying his children disposing of its lands governing his household or managing his private estate especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity a man that doth his business by the help of many prudent counselors with everyone consulting apart in his proper element does it best as he that useth able seconds at tennis play plays in their proper stations he does next best that useth his own judgment only as he that has no second at all but he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed council which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions the execution whereof is commonly out of envy or interest retarded by the part dissenting does it worst of all and like one that is carried to the ball though by good players yet in a wheelbarrow or other frame heavy of itself and retarded also by the incongruent judgments and endeavors of them that drive it and so much the more as they be more that set their hands to it and most of all when there's one or more amongst them that desire to have him lose and though it be true that many eyes see more than one yet it is not to be understood of many counselors but then only when the final resolution is in one man otherwise because many eyes see the same thing in diverse lines and are apt to look a squint towards their private benefit they that desire not to miss their mark though they look about with two eyes yet they never aim but with one and that therefore no great popular commonwealth was ever kept up but either by a foreign enemy that united them or by the reputation of some one eminent man amongst them or by the secret council of a few or by the mutual fear of equal factions and not by the open consultations of the assembly and as for very little commonwealths be they popular or monarchical there is no human wisdom can uphold them longer than the jealousy lasted of their potent neighbors end of chapter 25