 In the headquarters of the United States and Russian Joint Control Commission in Korea, there was a meeting soon after the victory over Japan of officers of the two occupying forces. Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel had surrendered to Russia, while south of the parallel the Japanese had surrendered to the Americans. The atmosphere was deceptively friendly, considering what was going to happen later in Korea. The United States considered the dividing line along the 38th parallel to be only a temporary military convenience, but the Russians had other ideas. After the Japanese surrender, American and Russian soldiers in the area near the parallel could be seen for a short time behaving like buddies. This sort of thing didn't last long because the Russian command was about to turn the dividing line into a part of the iron curtain. A few years of effort proved that agreement with Russia on Korea was impossible. In 1947, the United States referred the whole problem to the United Nations. The response to the American action was that the General Assembly established a commission to supervise free elections in all of Korea. But the Russians had no intention of allowing such free elections in North Korea. In South Korea, the people turned out in great numbers when the elections were held in 1948. While Russia was setting up a communist regime in North Korea, these South Koreans were forming a constitutional republic and choosing a president. To this government, the United States soon turned over control of our occupied zone. American forces then began their withdrawals. By the middle of 1949, all had moved out except limited numbers for advice and observation. This meant that the Republic of Korea was going to have only a small army and a native constabulary. Forces sufficient to keep order, but not to defend South Korea against military aggression on a large scale. By the middle of 1950, the North Koreans had a fully trained and equipped army. The Russians had seen to that. The day came when it was revealed what had all along been the communist plan, the invasion and seizure of South Korea. The invasion got underway on the morning of Sunday, June 25th, 1950. When they crossed the 38th parallel, the communist forces brought along artillery and tanks that had been supplied months before by the Russians. They began the invasion with eight infantry divisions, three border constabulary brigades and an armored brigade. The South Koreans fought back for a couple of days and then their resistance collapsed. When the Soviet began this aggression by proxy, they didn't look for any active intervention by the United States or other nations. That was the Red's big mistake. From Washington, two days after the invasion began, came President Truman's order that American air and sea forces were to go to the help of South Korea. Aircraft of the United States' Far East Air Forces were sent at once to operational bases. From Guam, the B-29s took off for Okinawa. Their base with a strike soon to be made against the North Korean invaders. Several F-80 squadrons in Japan were moved to southern Japanese airfields in order to put them within range of targets in Korea. A provisional fighter squadron of F-51s was soon ready to go into action from Taegu airfield in South Korea. The conflict had hardly begun before our aircraft turned to the big job of keeping the South Koreans from being overrun and crushed at the very outset of hostilities. The North Korean troops were advancing almost unopposed, so our aircraft went to work on them. First, we put a lot of emphasis on ground support of the badly outnumbered defenders. Within a few days, our F-80s were also going after the enemy's lines of supply. We had to slow up his logistics if we were going to keep the South Koreans from being driven off their peninsula. The F-51s, too, went to work on interdiction targets as well as doing their share in the close support of ground troops. In fact, all of our aircraft gave a fine demonstration of the versatility of air forces. The thing we had to do was trade space for time and slow up the invading forces enough to allow a buildup of defensive strength. So we went on hitting anything that was carrying or storing communist supply. By now, less than a week after the war started, our air strikes went well large at the 38th parallel. The communists had figured on having smoothly operating supply lines. We took out a lot of the smoothness, and we conducted these operations without effective opposition in the air. Because as a first order of priority, our aircraft had destroyed the small but vicious North Korean Air Force. The hard-pressed South Koreans needed help on the ground. President Truman acted quickly. On June 30th, he ordered United States Army units into action. So here in Japan, troops of the 24th Division, part of our occupation forces, made ready to be flown to the Korean battle area in Air Force C-54s and C-47s. These were the first flights in what came to be the greatest combat airlift in history. This was the 4th of July, and the men of the 24th Division were not celebrating the day in quite the way they had planned. When the men of the 24th Division reached Korea, they were implementing the vote of the UN Security Council, which asked all member nations to help. Gradually, 15 other countries sent ground troops to Korea. But from the beginning, by far the largest share of the military burden was borne by the United States. The 24th Division troops were immediately sent to the battle line, not as a unit, but by the plane load. This was an emergency. The enemy had to be slowed up. Even without any support from the air, the North Koreans were a formidable force, well-equipped, and by far outnumbering the defenders. Peace meal, the men of the 24th went up into the crumbling line. The enemy had a lot of firepower. They were a strong force, and the most our ground troops could hope for was a delaying action. Our troops needed close support from the air. And from the beginning, the F-80s and our other aircraft of all types supplied it. It was the only thing that prevented immediate disaster. Still, they came on, those North Koreans with their Russian-built tank. For our people, there was only one thing to do. Pull back, wait for a buildup, and turn a big part of the immediate operation over to our air forces. At best, it was going to be tough to keep a foothold on the peninsula. So our air forces became the only effective offensive weapon we had in this early phase of the war. For weeks, the chief emphasis was on close support of ground forces. Even the B-29s shared in this job, a new one for these big bombers. The rules had to be forgotten if the North Korean army was to be held at all. The versatility of air forces was proved as never before. When the war was about a month old, we could divert the B-29s and other aircraft to more interdiction raids to keep the enemy's supply roots under attack. By this time, we were beginning to take care of the limited number of strategic targets in North Korea. We were doing a good job in slowing up the enemy's progress outward by destroying today the supplies he had counted on using tomorrow. But it remained true for about six weeks that a major part of our air effort was still in close support. Our B-29s included two strategic air command wings that left the United States soon after the conflict began, and were flying combat missions only nine days later, adding their bombing strength to that of our Far East air forces. There had been thorough mobility planning for just such an emergency. In mid-August, 1950, a month and a half after the invasion began, the famous Busan perimeter was established. The big withdrawal was over, this far and no farther. The UN ground troops began digging in. The enemy had come far and fast, but now he was running out of steam and was soon going to find things a lot tougher. During the defense of the perimeter, the F-51s had a large share in carrying on with close support and thereby keeping the communists pinned down. The enemy drive had been halted, but there were still North Koreans out there in the hills, and we gave them no rest. It was one of the jobs of our versatile air forces to wipe out machine gun nests that in a normal war would have been targets for mortars. In addiction was stepped up. We staged about 150 such strikes every day and smashed nearly 90% of the supplies the enemy was trying to bring up. His roots were so extended that we had plenty of targets. This was our chance to soften up the whole communist war effort while our ground forces were building up inside the perimeter. The first phase of the war was over. Thanks largely to our air effort, the United Nations was still in their fighting. It was a peculiar war, but the problems were not proving too much for the United States Air Force.